Air France Flight 447

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description: 2009 Air France flight crash into Atlantic Ocean, no survivors

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Smarter Faster Better: The Secrets of Being Productive in Life and Business

by Charles Duhigg  · 8 Mar 2016  · 401pp  · 119,488 words

Reimagining Boot Camp, Nursing Home Rebellions, and the Locus of Control 2. TEAMS Psychological Safety at Google and Saturday Night Live 3. FOCUS Cognitive Tunneling, Air France Flight 447, and the Power of Mental Models 4. GOAL SETTING Smart Goals, Stretch Goals, and the Yom Kippur War 5. MANAGING OTHERS Solving a Kidnapping with

strategy; (8) has key technical skills. *2 The correct answers for these photos can be found in the notes on this page. FOCUS Cognitive Tunneling, Air France Flight 447, and the Power of Mental Models When they finally found the wreckage, it was clear that few of the victims had realized disaster was near

a defect in machinery, but because of a failure of attention. Twenty-three months earlier, on May 31, 2009, the night sky was clear as Air France Flight 447 pulled away from the gate in Rio de Janeiro with 228 people on board, bound for Paris. In the cabin were honeymooners and a former

heads. And, as a result, when it has to flare to life in the real world, we’re not blinded by its glare. When the Air France Flight 447 investigators began parsing cockpit audio recordings, they found compelling evidence that none of the pilots had strong mental models during their flight. “What’s this

of a situation is one hundred percent our own fault,” said Stephen Casner, a research psychologist at NASA who has studied dozens of accidents like Air France Flight 447. “We started with a creative, flexible, problem-solving human and a mostly dumb computer that’s good at rote, repetitive tasks like monitoring. So we

for connecting the dots and understanding how the world works at a deeper level. That’s who everyone tries to get.” III. One year after Air France Flight 447 disappeared into the ocean, another Airbus—this one part of Qantas Airways—taxied onto a runway in Singapore, requested permission to begin the eight-hour

they can use.” This shift in mindset—What if I imagine this plane as a Cessna?—is what never occurred, tragically, inside the cockpit of Air France Flight 447. The French pilots never reached for a new mental model to explain what was going on. But when the mental model of the Airbus inside

original concept for depressing children stories originated with O’Donoghue, not Garrett. CHAPTER THREE: FOCUS bound for Paris For my understanding of the details of Air France Flight 447, I am indebted to numerous experts, including William Langewiesche, Steve Casner, Christopher Wickens, and Mica Endsley. I also drew heavily on a number of publications

Detail the Final Moments of Flight from Rio,” Los Angeles Times, October 16, 2011; Nick Ross and Neil Tweedie, “Air France Flight 447: ‘Damn It, We’re Going to Crash,’ ” The Daily Telegraph, May 1, 2012; “Air France Flight 447: When All Else Fails, You Still Have to Fly the Airplane,” Aviation Safety, March 1, 2011; “Concerns over

, June 3, 2009; Flight Crew Operating Manual, Airbus 330—Systems—Maintenance System; Tim Vasquez, “Air France Flight 447: A Detailed Meteorological Analysis,” Weather Graphics, June 3, 2009, http://www.weathergraphics.com/tim/af447/; Cooperative Institute for Meteorological Satellite Studies, “Air France Flight #447: Did Weather Play a Role in the Accident?” CIMSS Satellite Blog, June 1, 2009, http

Crash,” The Times, June 7, 2009; “AF 447 May Have Come Apart Before Crash,” Associated Press, June 3, 2009; Wil S. Hylton, “What Happened to Air France Flight 447?” The New York Times Magazine, May 4, 2011; “Accident Description F-GZC,” Flight Safety Foundation, Web; “List of Passengers Aboard Lost Air France Flight,” Associated

; Peter Garrison, “Air France 447: Was It a Deep Stall?” Flying, June 1, 2011; Gerald Traufetter, “Death in the Atlantic: The Last Four Minutes of Air France Flight 447,” Spiegel Online, February 25, 2010; Nic Ross and Jeff Wise, “How Plane Crash Forensics Lead to Safer Aviation,” Popular Mechanics, December 18, 2009; Interim Report

regarding details discussed in this chapter. The airline declined to comment on issues that fell outside of those topics discussed in the official report regarding Air France Flight 447 published by the Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile, or BEA, which is the French authority responsible for

Messy: The Power of Disorder to Transform Our Lives

by Tim Harford  · 3 Oct 2016  · 349pp  · 95,972 words

they were facing, and they had not tried it. But David Robert was certainly right on one count: he didn’t understand what was happening. Air France Flight 447 had begun straightforwardly enough—an on-time takeoff from Rio de Janeiro at 7:29 p.m. on May 31, 2009, bound for Paris. Hindsight

/what-really-happened-aboard-air-france-447-6611877/; William Langewiesche, “The Human Factor,” Vanity Fair, October 2014, http://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2014/10/air-france-flight-447-crash; “Air France Flight 447 and the Safety Paradox of Automated Cockpits,” Slate, June 25, 2015; “Children of the Magenta,” 99% Invisible (podcast), June 23, 2015, http://99percentinvisible.org

on your e-reader. Abrahamson, Eric, 236 Academy of Management Journal, 157 Adderley, Cannonball, 96 African Americans, 226 Aiden, Erez Lieberman, 23–26, 28, 97n Air France Flight 447, 177–86, 195, 197, 199 AirAsia Flight 8501, 183n Aldrich, Howard, 53 Algorithms, 10–12, 32, 55, 141, 167n, 254 dating, 243–51 Eno and

does suggest that in many cases, even the best complex algorithms will have only a modest advantage over a well-chosen rule of thumb. * The Air France Flight 447 conditions were atypical, but they were not unique. In December 2014, AirAsia Flight 8501 flew into a thunderstorm near Borneo and the autopilot disengaged as

Hello World: Being Human in the Age of Algorithms

by Hannah Fry  · 17 Sep 2018  · 296pp  · 78,631 words

him by far the least experienced of the three pilots on board.41 None the less, it was Bonin who sat at the controls of Air France flight 447 on 31 May 2009, as took it off from the tarmac of Rio de Janeiro–Galeão International Airport and headed home to Paris.42 This

themselves. So they’ll have very little experience to draw on to meet the challenge of an unanticipated emergency. And that’s what happened with Air France flight 447. Although Bonin had accumulated thousands of hours in an Airbus cockpit, his actual experience of flying an A330 by hand was minimal. His role as

took up to 40 seconds after an alarm sounded for them to regain proper control of the vehicle.59 That’s exactly what happened with Air France flight 447. Captain Dubois, who should have been easily capable of saving the plane, took around one minute too long to realize what was happening and come

-talking-realistically-about-driverless-cars-feature. 40. William Langewiesche, ‘The human factor’, Vanity Fair, 17 Sept. 2014, https://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2014/10/air-france-flight-447-crash. 41. Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la Sécuritié de l’Aviation Civile, Final Report on the Accident on 1st June 2009 to

Our Robots, Ourselves: Robotics and the Myths of Autonomy

by David A. Mindell  · 12 Oct 2015  · 265pp  · 74,807 words

back, the other pushed forward on his control stick. They continued straight and level for about a minute, then lost control. On June 1, 2009, Air France flight 447 spiraled into the ocean, killing more than two hundred passengers and crew. It disappeared below the waves, nearly without a trace. In the global, interconnected

. More recently, these terms morphed into “pilot flying” and “pilot not flying,” because the captain might not always be the person flying (or, as on Air France flight 447, the captain may not even be in the room). Now, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has recommended these terms be changed to “pilot flying” and

modern aircraft, 69–72, 75–77 synthetic vision and, 108–9, 225 technological change and increasing automation, effect of, 72–75 unmanned helicopters, 210–13 Air France Flight 447, 1–2, 1–4, 69–70, 72, 73, 81, 162, 196 Akers, Thomas, 170, 171–72 Alaska Airlines, 92 Alvin (deep-sea submersible), 26–30

–48 Remus 6000 (autonomous underwater vehicle), 2–3 replacement myth, 9 Robert, David, 1–2, 69 robots and vehicles aircraft/aviation and (See aircraft/aviation) Air France Flight 447 recovery and, 1–4 automated and autonomous systems, and human interaction, 4–5, 8, 221–22, 224–26 autonomy and (See autonomy/autonomous systems) extreme

Reinventing Capitalism in the Age of Big Data

by Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Thomas Ramge  · 27 Feb 2018  · 267pp  · 72,552 words

MAJESTICALLY INTO THE EVENING air on June 1, 2009, as it lifted off from Rio de Janeiro’s international airport. The 216 passengers on board Air France Flight 447 looked forward to an uneventful journey to Paris. Commercial passenger flights have achieved an amazing safety record, thanks in no small part to powerful computers

to modern adaptive machine learning systems. But Wiener also looked at and worried about catastrophic failures of feedback systems that could, as the story of Air France Flight 447 highlights, be triggered by unexpected situations, or if elements of a feedback system were caught in an erroneous loop. Wiener’s concept of control in

driving only one kind of car: What do we do when we discover that someone has tampered with the brake system? In the context of Air France Flight 447, all flight computers in modern Airbus airplanes exhibited the same behavior, and thus after the terrible accident, all pilots flying Airbus aircraft had to be

/pdf/f-cp090601.en.pdf; see also William Langewiesche, “The Human Factor,” Vanity Fair, September 17, 2014, http://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2014/10/air-france-flight-447-crash; Tim Harford, “Crash: How Computers Are Setting Us Up for Disaster,” Guardian, October 11, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/11/crash

-not-enough-1.20906. INDEX abundance of capital, 142–143, 194 of resources, 220–221 accounting, 90 development of, 91–95 reform of, 172–173 Air France Flight 447, 157–159, 170–171 Airbnb, 70 airline industry, 112 Akerlof, George, 40 Alation, 70 Alexa, 79, 164 Alexandria library, 21 algorithms, 5, 8–9, 71

Mapmatics: How We Navigate the World Through Numbers

by Paulina Rowinska  · 5 Jun 2024  · 361pp  · 100,834 words

suspect that not only have you heard about this method in the news but that you’re using it yourself on an everyday basis. When Air France Flight 447 from Rio de Janeiro to Paris sent its last GPS position just after 2 a.m. UTC on 1 June 2009, it became the last

to Be Costliest in History’, New York Times, 9 April 2014, sec. A. receiving the information about the crash: Lawrence D. Stone, ‘In Search of Air France Flight 447’, OR/MS Today 38, no. 4 (2011), Institute for Operations Research and Management Science, https://www.informs.org/ORMS-Today/Public-Articles/August-Volume-38

-Number-4/In-Search-of-Air-France-Flight-447. which describes motion in water: Stone, ‘In Search of Air France Flight 447’. determining the causes of the crash: Lawrence D. Stone et al., ‘Search for the Wreckage of Air France Flight AF

-works/. Index References in bold are to figures and tables. Aarhus, Denmark ref1 abstraction ref1 actuaries ref1n Adler, Hanna ref1 Afonso V of Portugal ref1 Air France Flight 447 ref1, ref2 airplane flight paths ref1, ref2, ref3 airplane wrecks, finding ref1, ref2 Alaska, USA ref1, ref2, ref3 Alexandria, Egypt ref1, ref2, ref3 algorithm ref1

Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War

by Paul Scharre  · 23 Apr 2018  · 590pp  · 152,595 words

necessarily going to be.” When this happens in high-risk situations, the result can be catastrophic. “WE DON’T UNDERSTAND ANYTHING!” On June 1, 2009, Air France Flight 447 from Rio to Paris ran into trouble midway over the Atlantic Ocean. The incident began with a minor and insignificant instrumentation failure. Air speed probes

plane crashed into the ocean, killing all 228 people on board. Unlike in the F-22 International Date Line incident or the automobile hack, the Air France Flight 447 crash was not due to a hidden vulnerability lurking within the software. In fact, the automation performed perfectly. However, it would be overly simplistic to

–12, 2013. 158 “As systems get increasingly complex”: John Borrie, interview, April 12, 2016. 159 Air France Flight 447: “Final Report: On the accidents of 1st June 2009 to the Airbus A330-203 registered F-GZCP operated by Air France flight 447 Rio de Janeiro—Paris,” Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation

,” Vanity Fair, October 2014, http://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2014/10/air-france-flight-447-crash. Nick Ross and Neil Tweedie, “Air France Flight 447: ‘Damn it, We’re Going to Crash,’” The Telegraph, April 28, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/9231855/Air-France-Flight-447-Damn-it-were-going-to-crash.html. 159 Normal accident theory sheds light

, 61 future of robotic aircraft, 23–25 Global Hawk drone, 17 nuclear weapons security lapse, 174 remotely piloted aircraft, 16 X-47 drone, 60–61 Air France Flight 447 crash, 158–59 Alexander, Keith, 216, 217 algorithms life-and-death decisions by, 287–90 for stock trading, see automated stock trading Ali Al Salem

The Disappearing Act

by Florence de Changy  · 24 Dec 2020

be forthcoming from the American plane maker Boeing or the British jet engine manufacturer Rolls-Royce, these two cornerstones of the global aircraft industry. When Air France Flight 447 went down between Rio de Janeiro and Paris in 2009, the last ACARS bulletin made it possible to locate the crash site, as the indications

four of the best-known cases of crashes at sea: SilkAir Flight 185 (19 December 1997),15 Adam Air Flight 574 (1 January 2007),16 Air France Flight 447 (1 June 2009)17 and Air Asia Flight 8501 (28 December 2014).18 However, the demonstration was not entirely convincing, as all the examples showed

true. By the time the details of the accident became known, the world’s attention had already turned to something else that had just happened. Air France Flight 447: a combination of parameters The BEA’s final report on the crash of Air France Flight 44712 highlighted a combination of technical and human failures

Air Crashes and Miracle Landings: 60 Narratives

by Christopher Bartlett  · 11 Apr 2010  · 543pp  · 143,135 words

AIR (On Approach to Buffalo Niagara International 2009) 50% of Flights in US by Regional Carriers Readers might well ask why the A330 crash of Air France Flight 447 into the South Atlantic is in the next (‘Fly-by-Wire’) chapter and the Colgan crash is in this one, when in both cases the

happening. The captain had gone for his rest ostensibly leaving the less experienced of the two copilots in charge. [Air France Flight 447] At around 10:30 p.m. local time on August 31, 2009, Air France Flight 447 took off from Rio de Janeiro at almost its maximum takeoff weight. On board the twin-engine Airbus A330

Canada Flight 143 35 Air Canada Flight 797 134 Air Crash Investigation xii Air France 67, 92, 161, 187, 309 Air France Flight 358 67 Air France Flight 447 201 Air France Flight 4590 161 Air France Flight 8969 309 air freshener 171 Air Inter Flight 148 265 Air Liberté 92 Air Liberté and

The Crash Detectives: Investigating the World's Most Mysterious Air Disasters

by Christine Negroni  · 26 Sep 2016  · 269pp  · 74,955 words

, 249–50, 255–56 Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS), 20, 41, 45–46, 55, 57 air data inertial reference unit (ADIRU), 235–36 Air France Flight 447, 53, 55–58 Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), 110, 171, 176, 216 Air New Zealand Flight 901, x, 117–31 Antarctic Experience flights, 118, 125

Foolproof: Why Safety Can Be Dangerous and How Danger Makes Us Safe

by Greg Ip  · 12 Oct 2015  · 309pp  · 95,495 words

AIQ: How People and Machines Are Smarter Together

by Nick Polson and James Scott  · 14 May 2018  · 301pp  · 85,126 words

Prediction Machines: The Simple Economics of Artificial Intelligence

by Ajay Agrawal, Joshua Gans and Avi Goldfarb  · 16 Apr 2018  · 345pp  · 75,660 words

The Knowledge Illusion

by Steven Sloman  · 10 Feb 2017  · 313pp  · 91,098 words

Utopia Is Creepy: And Other Provocations

by Nicholas Carr  · 5 Sep 2016  · 391pp  · 105,382 words

Antifragile: Things That Gain From Disorder

by Nassim Nicholas Taleb  · 27 Nov 2012  · 651pp  · 180,162 words

Fly by Wire: The Geese, the Glide, the Miracle on the Hudson

by William Langewiesche  · 10 Nov 2009  · 175pp  · 54,028 words

Driverless: Intelligent Cars and the Road Ahead

by Hod Lipson and Melba Kurman  · 22 Sep 2016

438 Days: An Extraordinary True Story of Survival at Sea

by Jonathan Franklin  · 17 Nov 2015  · 231pp  · 75,147 words

Site Reliability Engineering: How Google Runs Production Systems

by Betsy Beyer, Chris Jones, Jennifer Petoff and Niall Richard Murphy  · 15 Apr 2016  · 719pp  · 181,090 words