Basel III

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description: an international regulatory framework for banks, focusing on liquidity and leverage ratios

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The Devil's Derivatives: The Untold Story of the Slick Traders and Hapless Regulators Who Almost Blew Up Wall Street . . . And Are Ready to Do It Again

by Nicholas Dunbar  · 11 Jul 2011  · 350pp  · 103,270 words

EU and IMF bailout (July) Goldman pays $550 million to settle SEC lawsuit over Abacus 2007 AC-1 Dodd-Frank bill signed into law (September) Basel III banking rules finalized (October) “Robo-signing” foreclosure scandal leads to wave of lawsuits against banks (November) Market confidence in Ireland evaporates, leading to an IMF

Tower of Basel: The Shadowy History of the Secret Bank That Runs the World

by Adam Lebor  · 28 May 2013  · 438pp  · 109,306 words

economy. In the event the rules were not as strong or as fine-tuned as they needed to be when the crisis came.”5 The Basel III accords, which have not yet been implemented, aim to further hone the regulations governing banks’ capital requirements. No matter how dedicated the regulators are, they

Messy: The Power of Disorder to Transform Our Lives

by Tim Harford  · 3 Oct 2016  · 349pp  · 95,972 words

the same time for the same reason. Has follow-up legislation solved the problem? Perhaps; the post-crisis Basel III agreement is more conservative than Basel II. But it is also more complex. Basel III is twice as long as Basel II, and domestic legislation such as the Dodd-Frank Act in the United

had gone bankrupt in the crisis, and how safe they had looked earlier according to the various sophisticated criteria laid out in Basel II and Basel III. He compared those numbers with the crudest possible measure of risk: Had the bank borrowed a lot of money? At an annual convocation of central

Broken Markets: A User's Guide to the Post-Finance Economy

by Kevin Mellyn  · 18 Jun 2012  · 183pp  · 17,571 words

’s watch), after the repression was no longer effective. And deregulation has proved remarkably easy to throw into reverse. The Dodd-Frank Act, the new Basel III international bank capital regime, and the policies of the European Central Bank make up the new financial repression regime on the hoof, a regime that

. Obviously, governments around the world strive to protect consumers from sharp practices, but it is highly unusual to shield such a function from political accountability. Basel III As noted, the Basel process has always been about bank capital, the first line of defense in a financial crisis. Before the crisis, the so

manage them. The crisis showed that “scientific” risk ­management left a lot to be desired, so it was back to capital, and more of it. Basel III added three new wrinkles to global bank regulatory standards. First, the amount and quality of bank capital required against various risk assets will be gradually

to appreciate the need for banks dependent on interbank markets to have funding to stay afloat if those markets suddenly dry up. As a result, Basel III requires banks to bolster their liquid asset and cash holding enough to survive such episodes. Finally, the process identified 29 global systemically important financial institutions

intense supervision—yet another fudge on too-big-to-fail. While only large and internationally active US banks will fall under Basel III, many GSIFIs are US domiciled. How to reconcile Basel III and Dodd-Frank is yet to be resolved. The original sin of Basel, zero capital weights on sovereign debt, was left

electronic trading systems simply made it too easy to do business in financial assets with little knowledge of their risks. Have the proposed regulations of Basel III or the Dodd-Frank Act really addressed these distorted incentives? It is hard to see how raising capital requirements encourages a return to basic banking

Euro, real unification, 99 Germany, 99–101 B BankAmericard, 29 Bankcard association/card scheme, 29 Bank-centric system, 110 Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 108 Basel III process, 50–51 Basel process, 27–28 Basel standards, 61 Bipartisan government policy, 72 Boom optimistic entrepreneurs, 77 Bretton Woods system, 26, 111 Bureaucracies, 21

silos, product business, 153 transaction accounts, 152 venture capital industry, 142 “War for Talent”, 143 Financial crises, 23 affordable housing, 24 banking “transmission” mechanism, 43 Basel III process, 50–51 basel process, 27–28 consumer banking(see Consumer banking) Dodd-Frank, 49–50 domestic banking system, 38 European Union, 51–53 FDIC

Unfinished Business

by Tamim Bayoumi  · 405pp  · 109,114 words

”, November 2005. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006): “Results of the Fifth Quantitative Impact Study (QIS 5)”, June 2006. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011): “Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems”, December 2010, revised June 2011. Bastasin (2015): Carlo Bastasin, Saving Europe: Anatomy of a

Prakash Loungani, “Regional Labor Market Adjustment in the United States and Europe”, IMF Working Paper WP/14/26, February 2014. Davis Polk (2013): “U.S. Basel III Final Rule: Visual Memorandum”, available at davispolk.com. Davis Polk (2014): “Supplementary Leverage Ratio (SLR): Visual Memorandum”, available at davispolk.com. Davis Polk (2015): “Federal

Fiscal Monitor”, IMF Staff Position Note SPN/09/21, July 2009. Howarth and Quaglia (2015): David Howarth and Lucia Quaglia, “The Comparative Political Economy of Basel III in Europe”, University of Edinburgh School of Law, Research Paper Series 2015/19 and Europa Working Paper 2015/03, 2015. Independent Evaluation Office of the

The Default Line: The Inside Story of People, Banks and Entire Nations on the Edge

by Faisal Islam  · 28 Aug 2013  · 475pp  · 155,554 words

into the rules that seek to ensure the solvency of every major bank in the world? New rules for bank capital requirements, Basel II and Basel III, have emerged over the past decade. At their heart they make use of Vasicek’s work. For the trading book, it is the VaR method

The Crisis of Crowding: Quant Copycats, Ugly Models, and the New Crash Normal

by Ludwig B. Chincarini  · 29 Jul 2012  · 701pp  · 199,010 words

Policy Reaction II: Basel's Back: Three Strikes and You're Out Increased Capital Requirements for Banks New Liquidity Requirements Other Changes Some Thoughts on Basel III Appendix N: The Policy Reaction III: The Federal Reserve The Fed’s Business Unconventional Policies Quantitative Easing The Federal Hedge Fund Appendix O: The Policy

Reserve, a brief analysis of government policies such as Cash for Clunkers, and an overview of the most recent global regulatory standard for bank capital, Basel III. I had originally planned to write a small research paper on the financial crisis, but two people inspired me to write a whole book: Eric

(2007) for a good diagram of this. 12. See the discussion in Lall (2009). 13. See Blundell and Atkinson (2008). 14. FCIC (2010), p. 206. Basel III was issued in September 2010 to correct for the problems in Basel I and II. 15. Some BIS research hinted at macroeconomic imbalances, but it

has $100 million in assets, it should have a minimum amount of capital to cover potential losses. That minimum level was thought to be 8%. Basel III amended the minimum ratio to 13% of total capital in certain conditions. This includes 9.5% of common equity capital. Systemically important financial institutions (SIFI

below ordinary bank deposits. Tier 3 capital debts may include more subordinated issues, undisclosed reserves, and general loss reserves than Tier 2. In normal times, Basel III requires a higher amount of Tier 1 capital (11%) and a higher amount of common equity in Tier 1 capital (9.5%) than Basel II

banks with adequate capital to avoid bankruptcy. On September 12, 2010, the Basel Committee took another swing at bank regulation with what is known as Basel III. Mr. Jean-Claude Trichet, president of the European Central Bank (ECB), had confidence in this new set of rules stating that “the agreements reached today

wiped out their capital base leading to either bankruptcy or the takeover of the bank by another institution, the FDIC, or the U.S. government. Basel III is a modification of Basel II by adding a new liquidity ratio consideration, a new leverage consideration, increased capital requirements to the existing Basel II

, perhaps, one of the shortcomings of their previous proposals was that the required capital by banks was too low. Thus, one of the modifications of Basel III was to increase capital requirements. The new requirements have mainly to do with the numerator of the capital ratio. The minimum common equity requirements have

of 16.5%. Since most of the new capital requirements are common equity, the common equity portion of bank capital has increased significantly due to Basel III.2 New Liquidity Requirements Banks and investment banks are essentially in the business of liquidity management. That is, they usually have short-term liabilities and

would not make a run on a bank just for fear of losing their deposits. Due to problems associated with liquidity during the financial crisis, Basel III has made some proposals related to managing liquidity risk. Although the proposal is quite detailed and long, the fundamental proposal is that banks should calculate

modified to be more applicable to banks. The first measure is called the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) which is computed as: (M.1) According to Basel III, this ratio should be greater than 1. The objective of this measure is to ensure that a bank maintains an adequate level of unencumbered, high

that would qualify for the lower risk weight under Basel II would have a 65% RSF.5 In addition to maintaining the minimum liquidity ratios, Basel III proposes tools that banks should use to monitor their liquidity, including (1) contractual maturity mismatch, (2) concentration of funding, (3) available unencumbered assets, (4) LCR

early movements in market prices to realize whether severe disruptions might be taking place in the market environment that could adversely effect them. Other Changes Basel III did not make any changes to where credit ratings come from. That is, many of the credit charges to various financial instruments of a bank

have inaccurate or not forward-looking assessments of risk unless the problems associated with rating agencies are fixed. Basel III made some modifications to the credit risk analysis methods for banks using their own models. Basel III introduces capital requirements to cover Credit Value Adjustment risk and higher capital requirements for securitization products. Derivatives

Counterparties (CCPs) are no longer risk free and have a 2% risk weight and clearing members shares in CCPs default funds shall be capitalized. Additionally, Basel III introduces a higher correlation factor (applicable to internal ratings-based approaches) to risk weight large and unregulated financial institutions. It also contains changes concerning collateral

eligibilities and haircuts rules. Some Thoughts on Basel III It is without question that Basel III is more prudent than Basel II, but it brings some questions. First, is the tradeoff between the increased costs for banks and

the financial system stability worth it? Second, does Basel III do enough to address key problems? Third, none of the risk weights for mortgages were altered despite the mess it caused. Let’s start with

or less severe crashes. Another study by the Bank of England feels that the capital ratios should be as much as two times higher than Basel III suggests.7 This study attempted to measure the costs of reduced leverage on growth versus the costs of financial crises. It is not clear though

capital that banks must hold during booms to restrain excessive leverage and to act as a buffer in case of a recession. Part of the Basel III guidelines for banks. credit risk The risk that a borrower may not pay back a loan. crowded trade A crowded trade or crowded trading space

, July 12, 2003. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. “Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision.” BIS Publication, September 2008. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. “Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems.” BIS Publication, December 2010. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision

. “Basel III: International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring.” BIS Publication, December 2010. Bebchuk, Lucian A., Alma Cohen, and Holder Spamann. “The Wages of Failure:

-Wignall, Adrian and Paul Atkinson. “The Subprime Crisis: Causal Distortions and Regulatory Reform.” Working Paper, July 2008. Blundell-Wignall, Adrian and Paul Atkinson. “Thinking Beyond Basel III: Necessary Solutions for Capital and Liquidity.” Financial Market Trends, 2010. Bodie, Zvi and Robert Merton. “Financial Infrastructure and Public Policy: A Functional Perspective.” Chapter 8

: Evidence from Qualitative Interviews and a Controlled Experiment with Mortgage Borrowers.” American Economic Review, May 2010. Lall, Ranjit. “Why Basel II Failed and Why Any Basel III Is Doomed.” GEG Working Paper, October 2009. Lehman Brothers. “Annual Report.” Lehman Brothers Annual Report, December 31, 2007. Lewis, Michael. “How the Eggheads Cracked.” New

Red-Blooded Risk: The Secret History of Wall Street

by Aaron Brown and Eric Kim  · 10 Oct 2011  · 483pp  · 141,836 words

the data right, and risk reporting specialists know how to put it together. Within risk reporting there are regulatory experts, especially in Basel II and Basel III capital rules, and people who specialize in specific types of risk: market risk, credit risk, and operational risk (the last named is everything other than

with regulators. The regulatory reports were still produced in the back office, but the middle office designed and explained them. The Basel II and later Basel III capital accords are based on middle-office concepts and data. Investors never showed much interest in middle-office reports, which I find curious since that

The Finance Curse: How Global Finance Is Making Us All Poorer

by Nicholas Shaxson  · 10 Oct 2018  · 482pp  · 149,351 words

Dodd-Frank Act of 2012 that the Basel II framework of using banks’ internal models became part of US bank supervision. A new Basel agreement, Basel III, was announced in 2010; at the time of writing, its implementation was ongoing. 31. Britain made a very similar boast when it came to corporate

The Bankers' New Clothes: What's Wrong With Banking and What to Do About It

by Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig  · 15 Feb 2013  · 726pp  · 172,988 words

international discussion has focused on trying to reduce the incidence of liquidity problems in banking by regulating the liquidity of the banks’ assets. For example, Basel III proposes to introduce a so-called liquidity coverage ratio regulation in order to ensure that at all times banks have enough assets that can be

derivatives that had been treated as riskless.56 In the aftermath of the crisis, regulators set out to strengthen capital regulation. Although the resulting accord, “Basel III,” eliminates some abuses, it fails to address the basic problem that banks can easily game the regulation. Banks’ equity can still be as low

of their total assets. It is not clear that anything would have been substantially different in the 2007–2009 crisis had Basel III already been in place. The weakness of Basel III was the result of an intense lobbying campaign mounted by bankers against any major change in regulation. This campaign has continued

since. By now even the full implementation of Basel III is in doubt.57 Nonsense in the Debate According to bankers, higher equity requirements for banks will restrict bank lending and reduce economic growth.

“this reduces growth and has negative effects for all.”58 The Institute of International Finance, a key bank lobbying organization, forecast that the planned Basel III reform would substantially raise interest rates on bank loans in the United States and Europe and lower real growth rates for a number of years

excessive fragility in the past; it has diverted banks away from making loans to small- and medium-sized enterprises and toward investing in tradable assets. Basel III maintains this flawed approach with hardly any change. “Now Is Not the Time” After the financial crisis of 2007–2009, the equity level of

banks has not been much increased. Basel III, the international agreement designed to increase bank equity, has a transition period that will last until 2019. In 2011, the European government debt crisis raised

disappear unless the size of the banking sector is reduced.35 Beyond Basel: Increase Equity Requirements Substantially! In addition to the unnecessarily long transition period, Basel III has two other major flaws. First, its equity requirements are far too low. Second, for the most part the required equity is related not

that none of these abilities can be trusted. The required bank equity should be much higher than the 3 percent of total assets proposed in Basel III. History provides some guidance. As discussed in Chapter 2, for much of the nineteenth century, when banks were partnerships whose owners were fully liable

and makes up fictional “costs” for substantially increasing equity requirements. For example, practically all of the studies that have been provided in support of Basel III assume that there is a cost to society when banks issue new equity, but these studies do not provide a satisfactory explanation of this assumption

banks had greater confidence in each other, this smoothing would be less vulnerable to disruptions and would work more efficiently. Many have argued that the Basel III requirements are too low.53 Even among advocates of higher equity requirements, however, few advocate levels as high as we do.54 Most seem

distortions and allow markets to operate more successfully, benefiting the broader economy. Beyond Basel: Abandon the Illusion of Fine-Tuning As we stated earlier, Basel III specifies equity requirements for banks relative to their risk-weighted assets rather than their total assets. The leverage ratio approach, which specifies equity requirements relative

-tuning of risk measurements on the basis of the banks’ quantitative models has not disappeared. Except for the proposed introduction of the leverage ratio, Basel III provides little substantial change. Regulators and supervisors are also relying on models in the periodic stress tests they use to determine whether banks have “enough

countries—and they make the argument expressed in the heading of this section. For example, Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase, called Basel III “anti-American.”11 According to him, Basel III is biased in favor of European institutions and might lead to Asian banks’ taking some of the U.S. market share. Similarly

, and German public banks thought the new rules were biased against them.12 Public officials often sing the same songs. When criticized for watering down Basel III in response to French and German lobbying, Michel Barnier, the European commissioner for Internal Markets and Services, who is in charge of financial regulation,

complained that the United States was slow to adopt Basel III, had not even fully adopted the previous Basel II agreement, and had gone back on a G20 agreement to limit incentives for bankers’ risk

The official approach to the regulation of bank equity, enshrined in the different Basel agreements on so-called capital regulation, is unsatisfactory. Even the recent Basel III, which is said to be much stricter than its predecessor, permits banks to have very little equity, as little as 3 percent of their total

Says Watchdogs ‘Succumbing’ to Bank Lobby” (Financial Times, July 21, 2010), states that Germany, France, and Japan argued for more relaxed requirements in the Basel III discussions (see note 22 and Chapter 12). Bair (2012) provides more detail. We return to the political issues in Chapters 11–13. 13. Acharya et

major countries that meets regularly in the Swiss city. The agreement that the IIF (2010) and the British Bankers’ Association objected to, also known as Basel III, is contained in BCBS (2010c, 2010e). This agreement strengthens and adds to the earlier Basel II agreement, contained in BCBS (2004). 23. Among numerous

require banks to set aside capital for one year for any instruments, even if they have maturities under a year,” in “Regulate and Be Damned; Basel III Was Designed to Prevent Another Financial Crisis, but the Unintended Consequences Could Lock Up Global Trade,” Wall Street Journal, February 7, 2011; and “The

(1990). We discuss liquidity in Chapter 10 and the politics of reserve requirements in Chapter 12. 42. In addition to the liquidity coverage ratio, Basel III also proposes to introduce a so-called net stable funding ratio (NSFR), putting limits on the extent to which banks use short-term funding for

de/drs/nachrichten/wirtschaft/ubs-vom-musterschueler-zum-problemfall/72270.218256.chronologie-die-ubs-in-turbulenzen.html, accessed October 14, 2012. 57. See, for example, “Basel III Implementation Delay Looms,” Wall Street Journal, August 22, 2012, describing delays in Europe, China, and elsewhere. “Europe’s Big Bang for Bank Rules Set

2011, the Federal Reserve announced that it will require U.S. banks with total assets of $50 billion or more to satisfy the requirements of Basel III (see http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20111220a.htm, accessed October 14, 2012). 37. Deutsche Bank itself lists “Tier 1 capital without hybrid

their “research” has indicated significant declines in growth, jobs, and so on as a result of increased capital requirements. One of the studies justifying the Basel III numbers (BCBS 2010d, 1) states: “The regulatory minimum is the amount of capital needed [by the bank] to be regarded as a viable going

twenty academics, including John H. Cochrane, Eugene F. Fama, Charles Goodhart, Stewart C. Myers, William F. Sharpe, Stephen A. Ross, and Chester Spatt, criticizes Basel III as flawed and insufficient, calls for at least 15 percent equity relative to total assets, raises concerns with the use of risk weights, and proposes

Capital Still Broken after Four Years,” Bloomberg editorial, May 6, 2012. Bair (2012) discusses capital requirements extensively and argues for higher requirements than those in Basel III. Jenkins (2011), Haldane (2012c), and Hoenig (2012) also urge higher requirements, and both view risk weights, discussed later, as highly problematic. Senators Sherrod Brown

See Tarullo (2008) and Goodhart (2011). 61. See “FDIC: Crisis Validates US Basel II Delay and Leverage Ratio,” Risk Magazine, August 20, 2009. 62. Under Basel III as well as Basel II, there are three “pillars” of banking supervision. Pillar 1 concerns capital regulation, pillar 2 the professional quality of banking, and

2012). In a similar vein, Hoenig (2012), from the FDIC, criticized Basel for its failed risk weight approach and low levels of equity requirements (see “Basel III Should Be Scrapped, Hoenig Says,” American Banker, September 14, 2012). Roubini and Mihm (2010, 203–209 and 214) also criticize the use of risk weights

imposed on U.S. bank holding companies and systemically important nonbank financial companies.) 79. The success of this lobbying can be seen in Europe. Whereas Basel III insists that, for banks whose shares are traded on stock exchanges, only common equity will be accepted as “core capital,” the capital requirements regulation

http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/regcapital/new_proposals_en.htm, accessed October 21, 2012; for a critique, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III Regulatory Consistency Assessment (Level 2) Preliminary Report: European Union, Basel, October 2012, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/imple-mentation/l2_eu.pdf, accessed October

of 4.5–7 percent of Tier 1 capital (primarily equity but often including other securities, such as preferred equity) relative to risk-weighted assets. Basel III also postulates the use of countercyclical buffers meant to contain the credit booms that often lead to credit busts (see BCBS 2010e). Goodhart (2010)

, July 28, 2010; Tom Braithwaite, “FDIC Chief Says Watchdogs ‘Succumbing’ to Bank Lobby,” Financial Times, July 20, 2010; “Heavy Lobbying Leads to Easing of Basel III Banking Norms,” Reuters, July 27, 2010; and “Feud Deepens over EU Bank Rules; Germany, France Lead Effort to Relax Regulations; U.K. Urges Tougher Approach

the competitive positions of “their” banks had been responsible for some of the worst lapses of supervision before the crisis. In the context of Basel III, France and Germany not only re-sisted increases in capital requirements as such; they also wanted to preserve some past rules that allowed securities other

economic and political performance are affected by them. 11. Dimon, interview in the Financial Times, September 12, 2011. 12. “German Banks Try to Fend Off Basel III,” Financial Times, September 6, 2010. See “Behind French Bank Drama, a Relaxed Regulator?” Wall Street Journal, September 15, 2011. 13. See “EU Warns US

MA. Angelini, Paolo, Laurent Clerc, Vasco Cúrdia, Leonardo Gambacorta, Andrea Gerali, Alberto Locarno, Roberto Motto, Werner Roeger, Skander Van den Heuvel, and Jan Vlček. 2011. “Basel III: Long-Term Impact on Economic Performance and Fluctuation.” Staff Report 485. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York. Aron, Janine, and John Muellbauer. 2010

Settlements, Basel. ———. 2010d. “Calibrating Regulatory Minimum Capital Requirements and Capital Buffers: A Top-Down Approach.” Discussion Paper 180. Bank for International Settlements, Basel. ———. 2010e. “Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems.” Discussion Paper 189. Bank for International Settlements, Basel. ———. 2011a. “Resolution Policies and Frameworks—Progress

96 Basel Accords (rules for banking regulation and supervision): history of, 96; implementation of, 302n2; pillars of, 312n62, 313n64. See also Basel I; Basel II; Basel III Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS): on funding costs, 275n3; on hybrid securities, 315n78; mission of, 233n22, 302n2; on resolution of failed institutions, 263n63; on

, 187; implementation of, 177, 273n53, 274n54, 307n38; risk-weighted assets in, 177, 183, 184–85, 312n64, 313n66; in United States, 177, 194, 274n54, 307n38 Basel III (2011): bankers’ claims about, 265n5; capital conservation buffers in, 189, 307n36, 317n87; cash payouts to shareholders and, 175; flaws of, 96, 169–70, 176, 178

; questions about solvency of, 304n19 Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (U.S.), 325n51 Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), 265n4, 325n51, 327n62 common equity: in Basel III, 315n79; in TARP, 305n26 Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) (U.S.), 323n38 compensation, of bankers: clawbacks and, 127; impact of guarantees and subsidies on, 130;

See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act dilution, 28, 175, 306n29. See also debt overhang Dimon, Jamie: on allowing bank failures, 77–78; on Basel III, 194; on blame for financial crisis of 2007-2009, 1, 229nn2–3; as board member of New York Fed, 205, 326n58; on cost of resolution

bailout, 69, 88; authority over nonmember banks, 251n28; banknotes issued by, 150, 293n9; bank vulnerability to runs as a reason for creation of, 150; on Basel III, implementation of, 307n36; in Bear Stearns bailout, 72, 74, 219; boards of directors of regional banks of, 205; and cash payouts to bank shareholders,

292n39, 318n7; effectiveness of lobbying in, 3, 231n12; implicit guarantees in, 137; opposition to banking reform in, 3, 192–93, 203, 231n12, 319n8; reception of Basel III in, 194 Franklin, Benjamin, 81, 218 Franklin National, 258n23 fraud: in bankruptcy delays, 246n19; in mortgage loans, 58; prosecution of, 208, 215, 228, 332n33 Freddie

140; opposition to banking reform in, 193, 203, 231n12, 319n8; prepayment penalties in, 255n48; public banks as source of government funding in, 202; reception of Basel III in, 194; resistance to leverage ratio regulation in, 312n58, 325n47; resolution of failed institutions in, 77, 239n53; rise of corporations in, 242n21; sovereign default risk

–19; regulation of (See leverage ratio); and required return on equity, 108; risk-weighting approach and, 184–85 leveraged buyouts (LBOs), 234n26 leverage ratio: in Basel III, 177–78, 183, 235n28, 308n42; definition of, 308n42; resistance to, 183, 312n58, 325n47 Levin, Carl, 231n13, 259n52 Levitin, Adam J., 309n50, 335n46 Levitt, Arthur,

, 155–56, 158–59, 250n17, 296n31 living wills, for financial institutions, 77, 263n65 loans. See bank lending; bank loans; borrowing lobbying, bank, 192–207; on Basel III, 96, 97, 187, 194, 315n79; campaign contributions in, 203, 205, 324n46; on capital regulation, 96, 97, 99, 310n51; on Dodd-Frank Act, 3, 231n13,

33, 41–43; guarantees’ impact on, 145, 291nn37–38; in innovation, 216 risk-weighted assets: in Basel II, 177, 183, 184–85, 312n64, 313n66; in Basel III, 176–77, 183, 307n36, 312n64, 314n68, 323n35; definition of, 235n28; European regulation of, 303n6; illusion of fine-tuning measurements in, 183–87; models used for

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