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The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order

by Benn Steil  · 14 May 2013  · 710pp  · 164,527 words

White: the facund, servant-reared scion of Cambridge academics, and the brash, dogged technocrat raised in working-class Boston by Lithuanian Jewish immigrants. Keynes at Bretton Woods was the first-ever international celebrity economist. The American media could not get enough of the barbed, eloquent Englishman, who was both revered and reviled

White spat out in one particularly heated session, “to produce something which Your Highness can understand.”7 White’s role as the chief architect of Bretton Woods, where he outmaneuvered his far more brilliant but willfully ingenuous British counterpart, marks him as an unrelenting nationalist, seeking to extract every advantage out of

for conferencing, far from the oppressive summer heat and busy wartime gloominess of Washington. Yet whereas better-known coastal spots might have done as nicely, Bretton Woods offered an attractive political amenity. It was to be found in a state whose Republican senator, Charles Tobey, a redoubtable opponent of international organizations, faced

international unit.”73 Congress would never accept this. Unitas was now dead. But Keynes made one suggestion that ultimately passed muster in Washington and at Bretton Woods. After White rejected the idea of calling the Stabilization Fund the “International Monetary Union,” arguing that Congress would hate the word “Union,” Keynes offered “International

be three stages: the preconference drafting committee meetings in mid-June, to be held in Atlantic City; an enormous multiweek conference starting July 1 at Bretton Woods; and a postconference ratification process in all participating countries’ legislatures. This was hardly the model that Keynes envisioned, which was to be a tightly controlled

, wherever that is, waiting for us,” Morgenthau announced, ending the meeting.140 “The broadcasting companies … made arrangements for a broadcast at the end of the Bretton Woods Conference, with White explaining what we had accomplished,” Bernstein recalled many years later, but “Morgenthau did not let White make that broadcast.” The Secretary told

Acheson, September 1945. (George Skadding/Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images) 7B. U.S. delegation members Frederick Vinson and Edward E. Brown in conversation at the Bretton Woods conference, July 1944. (Alfred Eisenstaedt/Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images) 8A. J. M. Keynes, flanked by Soviet delegation head M. S. Stepanov (left) and

U.S. delegation head Henry Morgenthau, Jr. (right), addressing delegates at the Bretton Woods conference, July 1944. (© Bettmann/CORBIS) 8B. H. D. White (center), flanked by British economists and delegation members Lionel Robbins (left) and Dennis H. Robertson (right

), at the Bretton Woods conference, July 1944. (Courtesy of the International Monetary Fund) 9. J. M. Keynes (center), flanked by Soviet delegation head M. S. Stepanov (left) and Yugoslav

, July 1944. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images) 10. U.S. delegation head and conference chairman Henry Morgenthau, Jr., and J. M. Keynes in conversation at the Bretton Woods conference, July 1944. (Alfred Eisenstaedt/Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images) 11. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Roosevelt meeting at Wolfe’s Cove railroad

its financial independence, Keynes was now buffeted by a ferocious blowback from London. He had conceded to the Americans on highly sensitive areas ranging from Bretton Woods transitional rights to sterling convertibility to trade preferences to creditor priorities. Exhausted and surely conscious of his personal legacy as a diplomat and a coauthor

first conversation we had with our British friends several years ago, when early drafts were being considered.… Throughout the discussions at Atlantic City, throughout the Bretton Woods discussions their views have [been] the same.” The British have always wanted an “International Clearing Union [in which] the greater emphasis should be upon the

tense multilateral discussions, the United States now took up the battle stance that Keynes and the British had adopted, and Harry White resolutely opposed, at Bretton Woods: surplus countries should be forced to reduce their surplus positions. Congressmen even demanded that the formerly hated scarce-currency clause be invoked against countries such

in favor of replacing monopoly central banks with competitive private currency issuers.30 Not surprisingly, Triffin’s, Rueff’s, and Hayek’s radical alternatives to Bretton Woods—international money, a revived gold standard, and private money competition—were not congenial to governments, particularly that of the United States. But Friedman’s monetarist

global trade discrimination to balance its bilateral trade than to stockpile other fiat currencies. The United States had sought to eliminate such discrimination permanently through Bretton Woods. The creditor-debtor relationship between China and the United States today is very different from that between the United States and Britain in the 1940s

unavoidable. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, for one, believes that such a destructive dynamic is avoidable, but nonetheless deeply worrying.47 The Bretton Woods saga unfurled at a unique crossroads in modern history. An ascendant anticolonial superpower, the United States, used its economic leverage over an insolvent allied imperial

Acheson, Dean (1893–1971). American lawyer and statesman. Secretary of state, 1949–53. A highly intelligent patrician Anglophile, he represented the State Department at the Bretton Woods Conference, where he was the chief American delegate on Keynes’s World Bank Commission. Adler, Solomon (“Sol”) (1909–1994). American economist. Department of the Treasury

and national service, 1940–45; foreign secretary, 1945–51. Beyen, Johan Willem (1897–1976). Dutch banker and civil servant. Leader of the Dutch delegation at Bretton Woods. President of the Bank for International Settlements, 1937–39. Bidault, Georges (1899–1983). French politician. President, Provisional Government, 1946; foreign minister, 1947–48; prime minister

–36; ambassador to France, 1936–40. Burgess, Randolph (1889–1978). American banker and diplomat. Represented the interests of the New York banking community during the Bretton Woods negotiations. Opposed the IMF blueprint as unsound. Bykov, Colonel Boris. Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU) agent. Whittaker Chambers claims to have introduced him to White in

White. Chechulin, Nikolai Fyodorovich (1908–1955). Russian banker. Vice-chairman of the board of the State Bank, 1940–55. Member of the Russian delegation at Bretton Woods. Cherwell, Lord (Frederick Alexander Lindemann) (1886–1957). German-born British physicist. As head of the prime minister’s statistical office, he was one of Churchill

the American loan negotiations in 1945. Eccles, Marriner (1890–1977). American banker. Chairman of the Federal Reserve, 1934–48. Member of the American delegation at Bretton Woods. Tussled with White over his deference to Russian demands at the conference. Eden, Anthony (1897–1977). British Conservative politician. Foreign secretary, 1935–38, 1940–45

). German economist and government official. Reich minister of economics, 1937–45; president of the Reichsbank, 1939–45. A staunch nationalist and anticommunist, he blasted the Bretton Woods monetary plans as a sop to the Soviets. Tried as a war criminal at Nuremburg. Glasser, Harold (1905–1992). American economist. Department of the Treasury

, businessman, and government official. Premier of the Republic, 1938–39. A larger-than-life character who claimed descent from Confucius. Headed the Chinese delegation at Bretton Woods. Law, (Andrew) Bonar (1858–1923). British Conservative politician. Chancellor of the exchequer, 1916–19; prime minister, 1922–23. A rare Tory ally of Keynes. Law

uncooperative approach of the Russian delegation. Molotov, Vyacheslav (1890–1986). Russian diplomat. Minister of foreign affairs, 1939–49, 1953–56. Kept the Soviet delegates at Bretton Woods on the tightest possible leash, forbidding them from making the slightest concessions without authorization from Moscow. He painted any measure of Soviet cooperation as a

depended on him for advancement and wider influence. Newcomer, Mabel (1892–1983). American economist. A Vassar professor, she was the only female American delegate at Bretton Woods. Nixon, Richard (1913–1994). American politician. President, 1969–74. As a member of the House Un-American Activities Committee, sparred with White in his August

the Treasury, 1934–39. Opie, Redvers (1900–1984). British economist. Counselor and economic adviser, British Embassy, Washington, 1939–46. Member of the British delegation at Bretton Woods. Pasvolsky, Leo (1893–1953). Russian Ukrainian-born American economist. Special assistant to the secretary of state, 1936–38, 1939–46. Heavily involved in economic planning

dollar as a global surrogate for gold. Ronald, Nigel (1894–1973). British diplomat. Assistant undersecretary of state, 1942–47. Member of the British delegation at Bretton Woods. Roosevelt, Franklin Delano (FDR) (1882–1945). American politician. President, 1933–45. Keynes admired Roosevelt for his bold economic policy interventions. Like Churchill, however, FDR had

, Frederick Cleveland (1884–1956). American doctor and politician. Republican congressman for Ohio, 1939–51. Member of the House Committee on Banking and Currency. Opposed the Bretton Woods agreements. Spence, Brent (1874–1967). American politician. Democratic congressman for Kentucky, 1931–63; chairman of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 1943–47, 1949

Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 1937–47. A prominent New Deal and pro-labor progressive, close to FDR. Member of the American delegation at Bretton Woods. Waley, Sir David (Sigismund David Schloss) (1887–1962). British civil servant. Under-secretary, Treasury, 1939–46. Prescient with regard to the problems American monetary

principle of fixed (but adjustable) exchange rates. Wolcott, Jesse (1893–1969). American politician. Republican congressman for Michigan, 1931–57. Member of the American delegation at Bretton Woods. Wood, Sir (Howard) Kingsley (1881–1943). British Conservative politician. Chancellor of the exchequer, 1940–43. Woolton, Lord (Frederick James Marquis) (1883–1964). British businessman and

Conservative politician. Chairman of the Conservative Party, 1946–55. Opposed Bretton Woods, saying that it meant Britain “surrendering [its just rights] to the power of the dollar, because those responsible for the affairs of this country do

White.” Journal of the History of Economic Thought 26:179–195. Bourneuf, Alice. July 6, 1944. Notes on Bretton Woods Conference. Bretton Woods Conference Collection, International Monetary Fund, Box 15. ———. July 13, 1944. Notes on Bretton Woods Conference. Bretton Woods Conference Collection, International Monetary Fund, Box 15. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Aug. 2010. GDP and Other Major NIPA

.pdf. Chambers, Whittaker. 1952. Witness. New York: Random House. ———. Dec. 2, 1953. “The Herring and the Thing.” Look. Chicago Tribune. June 12, 1944. “Babes in Bretton Woods.” ———. July 2, 1944. “Among Those Absent.” ———. July. 3 1944. “White Admits Bankers Fight Money Scheme.” ———. July 7, 1944. “Front Views & Profiles.” ———. July 9, 1944. “Good

. The Monetary Conservative: Jacques Rueff and Twentieth-Century Free Market Thought. Dekalb: Northern Illinois Press. Christian Science Monitor. July 1, 1944. “Monetary World Looks to Bretton Woods Parley.” ———. July 3, 1944. “Money Experts Start on Draft of World Plan.” ———. July 6, 1944. “Money Parley Pace Is Slowed; Fund Transactions Major Topic.” ———. July

. 2009. “Micro, Macro, and Strategic Choices in International Trade Invoicing.” CEPR Discussion Paper No. 7534. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research. Goldenweiser, Emanuel. Goldenweiser Papers, Bretton Woods Conference, Library of Congress. Goodhart, Charles, and P.J.R. Delargy. 1998. “Financial Crises: Plus ça Change, plus c’est la Même Chose.” International Finance

/cofer/eng/index.htm. ———. 2012. International Financial Statistics Database. Available at http://elibrary-data.imf.org/DataExplorer.aspx. James, Harold. 1996. International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods. New York: Oxford University Press. Karpov, Vladimir. Jan. 21, 2000. “Notes from the Archive.” Independent Military Review. Moscow. Kennan, George F. 1946. Telegram from George

: The Clearing Union. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 1980. The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes: Volume XXVI, Activities 1943–46: Shaping the Post-war World: Bretton Woods and Reparation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ———. 1980. The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes: Volume XXVII, Activities 1940–46: Shaping the Post-war World: Employment

Secretary of the Treasury. New York: Skyhorse Publishing. Lindbergh, Charles Augustus. May 19, 1940. “The Air Defense of America.” Speech. Lippmann, Walter. July 13, 1944. “Bretton Woods and Senator Taft.” Washington Post. London Chamber of Commerce. 1942. Report on General Principles of a Post-war Economy. MacMillan, Margaret. 2003. Paris 1919: Six

. Meltzer, Allan H. 2003. A History of the Federal Reserve, Volume 1: 1913–1951. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Mikesell, Raymond F. 1951. “Negotiating at Bretton Woods, 1944.” In Negotiating with the Russians, ed. Raymond Dennett and Joseph E. Johnson. Boston: World Peace Foundation. Morgenthau, Henry, Jr. The Morgenthau Diaries. ———. Oct. 25

Transmitting a Report on the First Year of Lend-Lease Operations. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. Rosenberg, Andrew, and Kurt Schuler (eds.). 2012. The Bretton Woods Transcripts. New York: Center for Financial Stability. Rubin, Robert E. May 26, 1998. “Remarks for Opening Plenary China–U.S. Joint Economic Committee—Eleventh Session

/Historical%20data%201900-1960.pdf. Utley, Jonathan G. 1985. Going to War with Japan, 1937–1941. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. Van Dormael, Armand. 1978. Bretton Woods: Birth of a Monetary System. New York: Holmes and Meier. Vassar Encyclopedia. “Mabel Newcomer.” Available at http://vcencyclopedia.vassar.edu/faculty/prominent-faculty/mabel-newcomer

Charter and, 14, 119, 121, 127; Austerity, Temptation, and Justice alternatives and, 276–79; beggar-thy-neighbor, 31, 144; Beveridge Plan and, 307; Bretton Woods and, 1 (see also Bretton Woods); Clayton’s European integration plan and, 311–16; deficit spending and, 28–29, 46, 189, 278, 358; deflationary, 24, 46, 48, 76–78

The Revolutionary Center: The Lost Genius of Liberalism

by Adrian Wooldridge  · 7 Apr 2026  · 342pp  · 129,097 words

United Nations appeared for the first time in January 1942 in a treaty under which twenty-six nations pledged to overthrow the Axis powers. The Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 looked forward to a world in which nations traded freely and two new institutions, the World Bank and the IMF, provided financial

per cent economic growth from 1955 to 1965, was called the Liberal Democrats. If the emerging new order had a distinctly American feel to it – Bretton Woods was a rickety hotel in New Hampshire and the UN Charter, signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945, began with the phrase ‘We, the

investment and thereby create jobs for workers and demand for the products of those workers. Keynes was the presiding genius at the 1944 meeting in Bretton Woods (indeed the reason for holding the meeting in an obscure hotel in New Hampshire was that Keynes, who had a serious heart condition, couldn’t

the weekend feeding USAID to the woodchipper,’ he chirped on X. Though Trump doesn’t have the power to feed the UN, NATO or the Bretton Woods twins into the woodchipper, he can certainly make their lives miserable, depriving them of money and undermining their ability to operate. The liberal order depends

oligarchy 80–81 Brampton Manor 276 Brandeis, Louis 79, 261–2; The Curse of Bigness 80 Bravin, Tracy 179 Brazil 130, 159 Breitbart, Andrew 196 Bretton Woods Conference (1944) 100, 102, 109, 288 Brexit x, 149, 155, 165–6, 191, 192, 223, 231, 260, 292, 296, 301 Bridges, George 137 Bright, John

Kepel, Gilles 181 Ketteler, Wilhelm von 15 Keynes, John Maynard xiii, xiv, xix, 202 A General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money 108–9, 110 Bretton Woods and 109 capitalism providing wherewithal for civilized society, views 316 demand management and 104, 109 ‘Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren’ 75 liberal intellectual and 108

War and Gold: A Five-Hundred-Year History of Empires, Adventures, and Debt

by Kwasi Kwarteng  · 12 May 2014  · 632pp  · 159,454 words

and specialist field, that of monetary history. Currency arrangements – the gold standard, which tied the value of a currency to a fixed amount of gold, Bretton Woods, the Smithsonian Agreement of 1971 – have been brokered in the aftermath, or have collapsed under the pressure, of war. It is fiscal policy – the

belligerents faced an enormous burden of public debt. Yet, rather to the surprise of many politicians at the time, the monetary arrangements established by the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944 still put gold at the centre of the system. This time it would be the dollar, and not the pound sterling, which

‘continental’ paper money, were followed by periods of relative order, exemplified by the gold standard. In much the same way, the relative order of the Bretton Woods arrangements, which lasted almost three decades, followed the disorder of the 1920s and 1930s. It could be argued that the post-1971 settlement, in which

at any rate, a thinker and writer of real quality, in the form of John Maynard Keynes, had lent an intellectual respectability to them. 10 Bretton Woods Bretton Woods is a phrase which denotes an entire era in the monetary management of the world’s economy. If the inter-war period can be called

Dexter White, was composed of tough, legally trained bureaucrats who would not be bamboozled by the world-famous Englishman. Of course, by 1944, when the Bretton Woods conference took place, Keynes was at the height of his prestige. The advent of the coalition government in 1940 had swept away Conservatives like Neville

an ‘inter-Allied stabilization fund’ which, in Morgenthau’s words, ‘should provide the basis for postwar international monetary arrangements’.6 The actual final outcome of Bretton Woods was, to many radicals who did not want to get back to the 1930s, surprisingly conservative. There were respects in which it differed from the

old pre-war gold standard, but the Bretton Woods Agreement did, to a certain extent, preserve the fetish of gold worship. According to a modern economic historian of the era, there were three distinct

areas in which the Bretton Woods settlement was different from the operation of the gold standard in its classical form. Firstly, instead of each currency being directly convertible to gold, currencies

meant that the exchange rates of each currency were pegged indirectly to gold. The peg to the dollar was adjustable when what the negotiators at Bretton Woods called ‘fundamental disequilibrium’ took place. Secondly, capital controls were allowed to limit movements of international capital. The third new element was a new institution,

but significantly less than the US$26 billion envisaged by Keynes.12 It was not only in the United States, however, that sceptics about the Bretton Woods arrangement arose. The link to gold had irked a number of people in Westminster. One British politician who expressed himself vociferously against the agreement was

attached to gold and more enamoured with his own idea of Bancor. To Boothby, the White and Keynes plans were ‘irreconcilable’. The ‘agreement reached at Bretton Woods was achieved only because the original Keynes plan was totally abandoned’. Boothby described the Agreement as not even ‘a victory on points for White’. Keynes

the other way round. Keynes observed in his speech that times had changed. ‘Public opinion is now converted to a new model . . . of domestic policy.’ Bretton Woods reflected this shift of opinion. It is ‘above all as providing an international framework for the new ideas and the new techniques associated with the

the parliamentarians who had ‘dishonestly’ raised the ‘bugbear of gold’. The debate which took place in the House of Commons in May 1944 on the Bretton Woods proposals was, in Keynes’s view, ‘as disappointing as it could be’. The ‘discussion was certainly not one which did credit to the mother

the liquidation of the British Empire.’22 Regardless of the motivations of the Americans, the relative strength of the two countries’ position was obvious. The Bretton Woods Agreement reflected White’s scheme rather than Keynes’s ‘not because it was technically superior, but because the Americans had the power’.23 Behind the

as had occurred ‘between 1894–6 and 1867–8, before any appreciable revival of activity is felt’.33 Despite the remonstrations of Hawtrey and others, Bretton Woods was not a radical departure from the principles of the old finance. The gold link was maintained, much to the surprise of many. The desire

and capital caused by the war, the economic response of the international community was, as Boothby and others had noticed, one of tepid conservatism. The Bretton Woods system relied, of course, on the United States dollar, but it had not abandoned the link to gold. It marked ‘a set of constitutional rules

at the time of the Agreement believed would characterize flexible exchange rates. An element of stability was desirable to promote trade.34 More remarkably perhaps, Bretton Woods reflected a degree of international co-operation which had been manifestly lacking in the international politics of the first part of the twentieth century. In

the economic field’. ‘Surely’, he continued, ‘it is a considerable thing for the experts of so many nations to have agreed’ to the settlement at Bretton Woods.35 To Camille Gutt, the Belgian politician who would serve as the first Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, international co-operation in the

monetary field,’ he wrote. This was because the ‘idea of money has always been allied to that of national sovereignty’.36 The wider significance of Bretton Woods was in its relative success as an effort of co-ordinated international statesmanship. Although it had the stamp of international co-operation, however, it was

been located in Washington, the capital of the dominant military and economic nation in the world. The dollar was the basis of the monetary system. Bretton Woods may have marked a turning point in international co-operation, but it was, at the same time, an emphatic symbol and proof of the

the House Banking and Currency Committee in May 1946, he declared himself ‘unequivocally in favour of the British loan’. To him, the whole point of Bretton Woods was that it provided a solution to the ‘British postwar balance of payments problem’. Without assistance in the form of the loan, Martin did not

Bank [the World Bank] could take over’.11 The British loan was necessary for Britain to purchase American goods. If it failed, Martin argued, the ‘Bretton Woods program’ would fall ‘of its own weight’, and ‘the prospect of repayment of loans already made’ would be ‘substantially lessened’.12 The details of the

of US government securities which would develop at the end of the twentieth century. The conservatism of the American banking sector was not that surprising. Bretton Woods itself had been, as we have already observed, a lesson in conservative statecraft. As the Canadian economist Jacob Viner noticed when commenting on the objections

of English critics, ‘the program for postwar international economic relations which is contained in the provisions of the Bretton Woods agreements [and in] the Anglo-American loan agreement . . . reverts to nineteenth-century doctrines and practices for its inspiration’. Viner, a classical liberal, felt that

like Humphrey and Martin who bore responsibility for the economic policies of the United States in the 1950s. Contrary to common perception, backed by the Bretton Woods Agreement’s connection of the dollar to gold, the 1950s marked an era of conservative approaches to budgets and currency. It was not a decade

World War; its sudden collpase had an equally global impact. GETTY IMAGES The resort where the global financial system was repaired. The agreement reached at Bretton Woods would last more than a quarter of a century from 1944 to 1971. © BETTMANN/CORBIS Once again, the demands of war forced governments to print

would often mean that companies unlucky enough not to be favoured simply could not borrow money. The loan market was ‘often in disequilibrium’.44 The Bretton Woods settlement and its institutions were crucially important for Japan. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT for short, signed in 1947, was

a stable framework for Japanese economic development. This was achieved through the years of direct rule by SCAP, the reforms of Joseph Dodge and the Bretton Woods system itself. 14 Imperial Retreat American leadership had effectively reconstructed both Germany and Japan. Meanwhile the economic climate in the United States itself began to

47 His instincts on the international stage were strongly nationalistic, which rather undermined the spirit of international co-operation, under American leadership, which had characterized Bretton Woods. His nationalistic poses also chimed well with Nixon’s views of himself as a ‘tough guy’, a man of action and decisiveness. Connally’s assertiveness

” of the US Treasury and insist on trading their dollars for gold’ was something which Nixon was beginning to reconsider.50 The ‘death watch for Bretton Woods’ had begun. On 3 May, the German Finance Minister Karl Schiller set off market concern by hinting at the ‘revaluation of the mark’. In

the United States Constitution. It had been suspended as a consequence of the Civil War, and then resumed. It had now finally been broken. The Bretton Woods Agreement, which had been predicated on a conversion of dollars into gold at the fixed rate of US$35 an ounce, had been unilaterally terminated

World War II economic system and replaced it with what former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt . . . called a “a floating non-system”’.61 The end of Bretton Woods was noted as a significant event at the time. In 1972, Henry Brandon, the Washington correspondent of the British Sunday Times newspaper, observed that devaluation

Nixon claimed that the compact constituted the ‘greatest monetary agreement in the history of the world’. The Smithsonian Agreement had settled on a dollar standard, ‘Bretton Woods without the gold’.3 According to Paul Volcker, who served as Chairman of the Federal Reserve from 1979 to 1987, the two years during which

was always explicitly recognized that the undertaking by the Europeans to create a common currency was an attempt to recreate the lost stability of the Bretton Woods system, which itself harked back to the pre-1914 gold standard. The Werner Report had sketched out a path to economic and monetary union

the benefits of stability as opposed to the free-floating exchange rates which had been a feature of global currency markets since the collapse of Bretton Woods: ‘A stable yuan is of vital significance to the global economic development and the stability of the international monetary system.’43 The consequence of

finalized in three weeks from 1 to 22 July 1944. Such combined and purposeful action seemed to elude international policymakers in the years after 2008. Bretton Woods not only set up the IMF and World Bank. It also inaugurated a new currency regime. As far as currencies were concerned in the period

the eurozone, given that European monetary union itself was an attempt to restore stability to Europe’s currency in the aftermath of the collapse of Bretton Woods in the early 1970s. Richard Nixon’s closing of the ‘gold window’ therefore had profound consequences. Paper money indisputably contributed to an excess of

7. 38Clarke, Keynes, p. 76. 39Ibid., p. 168. 40John Maynard Keynes, A Treatise on Money, 2 vols, London, 1930, vol. 2, p. 149. Chapter 10: Bretton Woods 1Peter Clarke, Keynes: The Twentieth Century’s Most Influential Economist, London, 2009, p. 81. 2Lionel Robbins quoted in Roy Harrod, The Life of John Maynard

1968, p. 316. 4Harrod, John Maynard Keynes, p. 536. 5Stanley W. Black, A Levite among the Priests: Edward M. Bernstein and the Origins of the Bretton Woods System, Boulder, CO, 1991, pp. 39, 44. Bernstein’s comments were derived from a series of interviews he gave in Washington in November 1983. 6David

, Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar, Oxford, 2011, p. 47. 13DNB, ‘Robert Boothby’. 14Robert Boothby, Goods or Gold? The Meaning of the Bretton Woods Agreement, London, 1944, pp. 4–5. 15Ibid., p. 7. 16John Maynard Keynes, letter to the Economist, 29 July 1944, in Collected Writings, vol. 26,

Position and Prospects of Gold’, Economic Journal, vol. 50, no. 198–9 (June–September 1940), pp. 207–23, at pp. 207–8. 21R. G. Hawtrey, Bretton Woods for Better or Worse, London, 1946, p. 25. 22Robert Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes: Fighting for Britain, 1937–1946, London, 2000, p. xx. 23Ibid., p. xxi

2005, p. 23. 35John Maynard Keynes, letter to Lord Addison, 16 May 1944, in Collected Writings, vol. 26, p. 6. 36Camille Gutt, ‘Les Accords de Bretton Woods et les institutions qui en sont issues’, Recueil de Cours, Académie de Droit International, The Hague, 1948, p. 75. Chapter 11: Pax Americana 1Alfred Sloan

blogs.ft.com/economists, 6 April 2008. Guardian, ‘G20 Summit Marks Largest Such Gathering in a Decade’, 14 November 2008. Gutt, Camille, ‘Les Accords de Bretton Woods et les institutions qui en sont issues’, Recueil de Cours, Académie de Droit International, The Hague, 1948. Hamilton, James D., ‘Monetary Factors in the Great

), Oxford Dictionary of Economics, Oxford, 2009 (1st edn 1997). Black, Stanley W., A Levite among the Priests: Edward M. Bernstein and the Origins of the Bretton Woods System, Boulder, CO, 1991. Blake, Robert, Disraeli, London, 1966. Bodin, Jean, Response to the Paradoxes of Malestroit, trans. and ed. Henry Tudor and R.

of the United States, from 1774 to 1789, 3 vols, New York, 1969 (1st edn 1879). Boothby, Robert, Goods or Gold? The Meaning of the Bretton Woods Agreement, London, 1944. Bovard, James, The Bush Betrayal, New York, 2004. Boyle, Andrew, Montagu Norman: A Biography, London, 1967. Braham, Lawrence J., Zhu Rongji

, The Presidency of the European Commission under Jacques Delors: The Politics of Shared Leadership, Basingstoke, 1999. Endres, Anthony M., Great Architects of International Finance: The Bretton Woods Era, Abingdon, 2005. Feavearyear, Sir Albert, The Pound Sterling: A History of English Money, Oxford, 1931. Feis, Herbert, Europe: The World’s Banker, 1870–

Civil War, Princeton, 1970. Harris, S. E., The Assignats, Cambridge, MA, 1930. Harrod, Roy, The Life of John Maynard Keynes, London, 1951. Hawtrey, R. G., Bretton Woods for Better or Worse, London, 1946. Heckscher, Eli, Mercantilism, 2 vols, 1st English edn, London, 1935. Helfferich, Karl, Der Weltkrieg, 2 vols, Berlin, 1919. Hemming

The Economists' Hour: How the False Prophets of Free Markets Fractured Our Society

by Binyamin Appelbaum  · 4 Sep 2019  · 614pp  · 174,226 words

their currencies to make their own exports cheaper and more attractive. White and his foreign counterparts, including John Maynard Keynes, who represented Britain at the Bretton Woods conference, thought that competitive currency devaluations in the early 1930s had driven a collapse in trade, which had plunged the world into the Depression and

a universal currency. Before World War I, major trading nations had fixed exchange rates by promising to redeem their currencies for specified amounts of gold. Bretton Woods was an ersatz gold standard: other nations pledged to redeem their currencies for dollars, and the United States promised that it would redeem dollars for

largely succeeded in stabilizing exchange rates for three decades. The world experienced a recrudescence of prosperity the French fondly dubbed Les Trente Glorieuses. But the Bretton Woods system ultimately undermined the economic dominance of the United States. The root of the problem was that the rest of the world needed dollars. In

of foreign rivals on the home front even as they struggled in export markets. The American economy tilted toward consumption at the expense of production. Bretton Woods barred unilateral currency devaluations, but it did allow nations to negotiate changes in exchange rates when it was necessary to adjust to changes in economic

gold in the federal government’s vaults. By 1963, foreign governments held enough dollars to claim every ounce of gold at Fort Knox, reducing the Bretton Woods Agreement to a convenient fiction that would last only as long as foreign nations refrained from calling those claims.12 The United States tried to

postpone the day of reckoning by slowing the outflow of dollars. But in attempting to preserve the Bretton Woods system, the United States gradually pulled back from its stated purpose of increasing trade among nations. The government limited foreign lending by American banks and

made a promise it could not keep. By 1969, West Germany alone held enough dollars to drain Fort Knox. Milton Friedman worked to end the Bretton Woods system almost from the hour of its creation, telling anyone who would listen that nations should let financial markets determine exchange rates.* He was among

the first to call attention to the fact that Bretton Woods was buttressed and preserved by limits on trade. He also warned, with considerable prescience, that the stability of the system was maintained only by deferring

the deputy governor of the Bank of Canada, to whom Friedman offered the unsolicited advice that Canada should float its currency, effectively withdrawing from the Bretton Woods Agreement, which it had only just signed.17 Friedman offered the same advice to every other nation in a 1953 paper, “The Case for Flexible

Exchange Rates.” Terminating Bretton Woods in favor of floating rates, he wrote, was “absolutely essential for the fulfillment of our basic economic objective: The achievement and maintenance of a free

and prosperous world community engaging in unrestricted multilateral trade.”18 Under the Bretton Woods system, an American business was willing to accept 360 yen instead of $1 because the Japanese government guaranteed that 360 yen could be exchanged for

or each yen, is a claim on that nation’s economic output. Friedman said relying on markets would correct the flaw at the heart of Bretton Woods, because exchange rates would adjust without political impediments. Better yet, he said these adjustments would be gradual and smooth, reflecting the slow pace of change

of major economies. Reliance on the market, he said, would support trade and increase prosperity. In other words, markets would achieve the goals of Bretton Woods better than Bretton Woods. Friedman and the policy-making establishment once again were wrestling over the best way to deal with uncertainty. The interdependence of national economies was

1968, Paul Samuelson estimated 90 percent of academic economists accepted Friedman’s argument in favor of adjustable rates (Samuelson numbered himself among the converts). The Bretton Woods system, in their view, was suppressing trade, as well as failing to allow for adjustments in exchange rates. Samuelson said, however, that he still saw

. Cross-border investment flows had grown even more quickly than international trade in goods and services; the quicksilver changes in those capital flows pushed the Bretton Woods system past its breaking point. Britain surrendered first, announcing on November 18, 1967, that it would start selling pounds for just $2.40. The British

far in declaring, “It will be remembered as the most dishonest statement ever made.”22 The Johnson administration rushed out a press release “unequivocally” backing Bretton Woods. But Gardner Ackley, chairman of Johnson’s Council of Economic Advisers, privately warned that America would need to devalue the dollar, too. It was only

Nationalism During the 1968 election campaign, Richard Nixon asked Arthur F. Burns, his top economic adviser, to sound out European governments on the future of Bretton Woods. Burns reported the situation was “very precarious,” but not beyond repair. He urged Nixon to seek a new set of fixed rates. “Let us

not want to be bothered by international monetary matters.”26 So, for two years, Nixon let Volcker conduct desultory talks with foreign governments. Meanwhile, the Bretton Woods system continued to fall apart. France followed Britain, devaluing its currency in August 1969. The following spring, in May 1970, Canada became the first major

: George Shultz.”51 In September 1971, Shultz arranged for Friedman to meet with Connally at the latter’s Washington home. Friedman lauded Connally for abandoning Bretton Woods and argued against any return to fixed rates. After the meeting, Friedman wrote Connally, “You deserve enormous credit for the courageous and determined stand you

granting the United States veto power and furthermore clarifying that it reserved the right to float the dollar irrespective of any vote. Washington had given Bretton Woods to the world, and Washington took it away. Those like Robert Roosa and Arthur Burns who had predicted floating rates would cause a collapse in

back a few weeks later offering encouragement but pointing out the moment was not ripe because changes in exchange rates were rare events under the Bretton Woods system. After Nixon’s speech, Melamed himself wrote to Friedman, persuading the professor to travel from his vacation home in Vermont for a breakfast

spiked and foreign investors raced to acquire dollars, so they could participate in the lucrative business of lending money to the United States. During the Bretton Woods years, America and other major nations had imposed strict limits on international capital flows to maintain the stability of exchange rates. But the United States

a phrase coined by one of his predecessors in the 1960s — though that dubious privilege was now being conferred by the market rather than the Bretton Woods system.82 Foreign companies that had borrowed in dollars also were punished. The British airline entrepreneur Freddie Laker had launched a daily “Skytrain” service between

pattern of borrowing and consuming, and this time, it found a foreign partner willing to finance its habit on an even larger scale: China. At Bretton Woods in 1944, the Roosevelt administration had made the fateful decision to resist pressure, especially from the United Kingdom, to impose limits on trade surpluses. The

everyone ultimately would benefit from constraints on trade imbalances. China tied its currency to the dollar in the mid-1990s, in effect signing a unilateral Bretton Woods agreement. Initially the Chinese were trying to suppress inflation and avoid the exchange-rate volatility then plaguing other Asian nations. But as the growth of

multinational currency: Western Europe.104 Neither Mundell nor Meade made much of an impression on policy makers at the time. Europe remained committed to the Bretton Woods system. But the debate continued to smolder, and the University of Chicago inevitably was the place that kept the embers alive. Mundell, who had

was most concise and precise — and had lived in West Germany and Belgium.110 Padoa-Schioppa wrote that the European Monetary System (EMS), like the Bretton Woods system, was inherently flawed, and for basically the same reasons. It was not flexible enough to survive changes in economic relations among the major participating

the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, which provided financial assistance to the Chilean government.51 Those institutions, created as part of the Bretton Woods system to encourage the development of the international economy, emerged in the 1980s as zealots in the cause of market freedom, including the free flow

Germany and Switzerland, experienced an economic downturn but did not experience higher inflation. 23. The move toward monetarism was influenced by the end of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, which is described in chapter 8. The system of fixed rates created a target for the money supply; in its

conference that spread monetarist ideas in Germany. See Andreas Beyer et al., “Opting Out of the Great Inflation: German Monetary Policy After the Breakdown of Bretton Woods,” September 2008, The Great Inflation Conference, National Bureau of Economic Research. 24. At the Nobel awards dinner, Friedman joked that it was awkward to accept

while exchange rates remained the same: to increase exports, nations needed to drive down domestic wages and prices. This painful option was still available under Bretton Woods, but it had become politically untenable. The expansion of suffrage and labor unions, among other trends, had shifted the balance of political power across the

memos on floating rates prepared in the aftermath of the broadcast. Two years later, in 1950, Canada floated its exchange rate in violation of the Bretton Woods Agreement. 18. Milton Friedman, “The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates,” in Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 157–203. The paper

:39,” White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library, Yorba Linda, Calif. 58. Solomon, The International Monetary System, 336. 59. Harold James, International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 242. 60. Shultz secured Nixon’s permission at a meeting just before the conference where he told the President

in December 1981 announcing that it had not intervened in currency markets during the previous six months, the first such stretch since the end of Bretton Woods. The Fed customarily defers to the Treasury on foreign exchange policy, carrying out the executive branch’s instructions, but Volcker wasn’t inclined to

, ref6, ref7, ref8 Born, Brooksley, ref1, ref2 Brandeis, Louis, ref1 Brash, Don, ref1, ref2 Brazil, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 Brennan, William, ref1 Bretton Woods Agreement, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 Bretton Woods system: changes in exchange rates, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7; collapse of, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6; and dollar standard

, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5 Buchanan, James M., ref1, ref2, ref3 Buckley, William F., ref1 Burger, Warren, ref1 Burns, Arthur F.: and Martin Anderson, ref1; on Bretton Woods system, ref1, ref2; as Federal Reserve chairman, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4; and Milton Friedman, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6; and inflation, ref1, ref2, ref3

, ref2 Byrd, Robert, ref1 Cairncross, Alexander, ref1 Califano, Joseph A., Jr., ref1, ref2 Callaghan, James, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 Canada: and airline industry, ref1; and Bretton Woods system, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4; exchange rate of, ref1; and inflation target, ref1; and monetary targets, ref1, ref2; and tax brackets, ref1, ref2; and trade

, II, ref1 Ford, John J., ref1 Ford Foundation, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 Foundation for Economic Education, ref1 Fourcade, Marion, ref1 Foxley, Alejandro, ref1 France: and Bretton Woods system, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5; and economic integration, ref1, ref2, ref3; and exchange rates, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4; income growth in, ref1; and inflation

, ref2 Friedman, Milton: and Martin Anderson, ref1, ref2; and antitrust regulation, ref1; and Richard Armey, ref1; awards of, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6; on Bretton Woods system, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4; and Arthur Burns, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6; and Chile, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5; and China, ref1, ref2

Gaskins, Darius, ref1, ref2, ref3 Gates, Howard P., ref1, ref2 Gates, Thomas S., Jr., ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 generational earning power, ref1, ref2 Germany: and Bretton Woods system, ref1, ref2, ref3; and capital controls, ref1, ref2; and corporations, ref1; and economic integration, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4; economy of, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4

, ref1 Jarvis, Howard, ref1 Jefferson, Thomas, ref1, ref2, ref3 Johnson, Lyndon B.: antipoverty programs of, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5; and antitrust regulation, ref1; and Bretton Woods system, ref1; and cost-benefit analysis, ref1, ref2; and defense spending, ref1; economic policy of, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4; and foreign travel limits, ref1, ref2

, ref1; and taxation, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6; and Vietnam War, ref1; and Paul Volcker, ref1 Keyes, Lucile Sheppard, ref1 Keynes, John Maynard: and Bretton Woods conference, ref1, ref2, ref3; economic theories of, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8, ref9, ref10, ref11, ref12, ref13, ref14; on foreign lending, ref1

, ref2 Rodrik, Dani, ref1, ref2, ref3 Rogoff, Kenneth, ref1, ref2, ref3 Roosa, Robert, ref1, ref2, ref3 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano: and antitrust regulation, ref1, ref2; and Bretton Woods system, ref1; and Camp David, ref1; economic advisers of, ref1, ref2, ref3; and international monetary system, ref1; and John Maynard Keynes, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4

Robert, ref1, ref2, ref3 Rumsfeld, Donald, ref1, ref2, ref3 Rust Belt, ref1, ref2 Ryan, Tony, ref1, ref2 Safire, William, ref1, ref2, ref3 Samuelson, Paul: on Bretton Woods system, ref1, ref2; economic theory of, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5; on John F. Kennedy, ref1, ref2; on John Maynard Keynes, ref1, ref2, ref3; on

; and Richard Nixon, ref28, ref29, ref30; and post– World War II, ref31; and Ronald Reagan, ref32, ref33; and supply-side economics, ref34 United Kingdom: and Bretton Woods system, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5; and deregulation, ref6, ref7, ref8, ref9, ref10, ref11, ref12; and employment, ref13, ref14, ref15, ref16; and environmental regulation, ref17

Take the Money and Run: Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Demise of American Prosperity

by Eric C. Anderson  · 15 Jan 2009  · 264pp  · 115,489 words

to discuss the current international monetary “system”—or at least what remains of the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement. Back to Bretton Woods In July 1944, 730 delegates from the 44 allied nations gathered at the Mount Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, for the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference. The three-week conference resulted

in the signing of the Bretton Woods Agreement, a system of rules, institutions, and procedures designed to regulate the international monetary system

and thereby avoid a repeat of the conflicting national policies that contributed to the Great Depression of the 1930s.10 The chief features of the Bretton Woods system were an agreement that each nation would adopt a monetary policy that maintained the exchange rate of its currency within a fixed value, and

the International Monetary Fund to temporarily bridge payment imbalances. The devil, as the saying goes, is in the details. While the intention of the original Bretton Woods Agreement was to establish a “pegged-rate” currency regime based on the gold standard, in reality the delegates established a principle “reserve currency”—the U

at the rate of $35 an ounce, and other nations would then “peg” their currencies to the U.S. dollar. As such, the original Bretton Woods Agreement (henceforth “Bretton Woods I”) directly lashed the currencies of a re-emerging Europe and Japan to the U.S. dollar. This meant the values of all other

to facilitate free trade, avoid nationalist arguments over monetary values, and foster recovery from the Second World War. Take the Money and Run 165 Under Bretton Woods I, U.S. dollars became the international currency. This preeminent role was based on the promise that every dollar a foreign government held could, on

demand, be converted into gold. (Thus the phrase, “as good as gold.”) As a whole, Bretton Woods I worked because the U.S. was the world’s largest economy and had accumulated a remarkable stockpile of gold as a result of payments

willing to facilitate development of a trading pattern that enriched the recovering economies in Europe and Japan at the United States’ expense. In any case, Bretton Woods I initially lived up to its promise. While Europe struggled with a balance of payments problem between 1945 and 1950, the Marshall Plan and U

”14 and Kennedy administration policies aimed at encouraging exports. Nonetheless, by the late 1960s it was clear Bretton Woods I was no longer a viable means of governing the international currency system. The “official” end to Bretton Woods I came on 15 August 1971, when then-President Nixon “closed the gold window,” ending the

could fluctuate based on economic, military, and political performance, at home and abroad. This is not to say, however, that the fundamental economic principles underlying Bretton Woods had been buried and forgotten. In 2003, Michael Dooley, David Folkerts-Landau, and Peter Garber released a paper titled, “An Essay on the Revived

Bretton Woods System.”15 According to the authors, the international economic and political system existent during Bretton Woods I is best envisioned as consisting of a “core” and a “periphery.” The United States served as the

long term to the periphery, generally through foreign direct investment.”16 As Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber understood economic history in 2003, the collapse of Bretton Woods I was the result of growing prosperity in Europe and Japan. However, they go on to argue that the subsequent period of free-floating exchange

movements, are driven by the developments of these periphery countries,” with the U.S. again serving as the “core.” The result was the emergence of Bretton Woods II.18 Why Washington at the center? According to Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber: Asia’s proclivity to hold U.S. assets does not reflect

finance . . .19 The bottom line: Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber would have us believe the economic relationships critical for Bretton Woods I have been revived in Take the Money and Run 167 Bretton Woods II, with the periphery using trade imbalances with the U.S. to finance domestic economic development. In turn, the periphery

economic woes in the periphery, or Asian bankers and consumers will lose faith in the weakening dollar and thereby foster international instability. In either case, Bretton Woods II should either unravel like its predecessor, and/or the international monetary system will enter another transition period. But here is where we part company

a select set of Middle East nations. These fundamental changes in the international economic and political environment gave rise to a new school of thought; Bretton Woods II was indeed on its way out, and in a manner suggesting that we are not simply in for another “transition” period. At a February

by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and the University of California-Berkeley, Nouriel Roubini20 and Brad Setser presented a paper titled “Will the Bretton Woods II Regime Unravel Soon? The Risk of a Hard Landing in 2005–2006.” The opening line in Roubini and Setser’s paper sets the tone

risk of a hard landing for the U.S. and global economy will grow.”23 As Roubini and Setser understand the current international monetary system, Bretton Woods II, foreign central bank investments in the United States have “limited the impact of large deficits on the [sale of Treasury securities] and helped to

as 2% in the event foreign governments turn to investment options outside the United States.25 But none of this addresses the issue of the Bretton Woods II demise. Are we really that close to a fundamental change in the way the international monetary system operates? I, for one, would argue yes

. Why? First, as Roubini and Setser so ably argue, maintaining Bretton Woods II requires that the key Asian players (China, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea) do more than just hold onto their existing U.S. shares.26

In order for Bretton Woods II to continue, these Asian central banks, and their counterparts in the Middle East, must continue to substantially add to these U.S. holdings. My

investors are pulling away from the U.S., foreign government investors, particularly sovereign wealth funds, can not be far behind. The second reason I believe Bretton Woods II is on the wane can be directly attributed to greed. As Roubini and Setser so ably argue, “at current interest rates, U.S. dollar

emergence of sovereign wealth funds ably demonstrates, there are now other players more than capable of sharing the burden. A quick note on what a Bretton Woods III international monetary system might look like, before we return to sovereign wealth fund-specific concerns. First, it seems highly unlikely there will ever be

be returned in the form of investment. But here’s the rub: the “core” is no longer simply to be found in North America. Under Bretton Woods III this core could include Brazil, China, India, and Russia.28 In other words, we are moving further away from Triffin’s dilemma. Second, the

at least have the potential to rival their Western counterparts. Finally, there is a potential for a further “regionalization” of the international monetary system under Bretton Woods III. In this scenario, we have the emergence of additional euro counterparts, for instance the long-awaited “Khaleeji”30 in the Middle East, and a

, this regionalization would 170 Take the Money and Run almost inevitably result in monetary conflicts along the “seams,” thereby promoting a revisit of the entire Bretton Woods Agreement. What all this suggests is that the international movement away from the dollar, signaled by the emergence of sovereign wealth funds, could fundamentally change

we appear poised for the emergence of a more “democratic” international monetary system. In place of Bretton Woods I or II, where periphery economies depended on the U.S to maintain favorable trade imbalances, a Bretton Woods III could witness the rise of several “cores” that support smaller peripheries and resultantly do not generate

political system. Back to the Present For the moment (2008) it does not appear as though Washington will have to grapple with the consequences of Bretton Woods III before the November 2008 presidential election. As of early August 2008, oil-exporting countries in the Middle East were still pouring capital from their

zones, areas, or “blocs.”55 For instance, prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union there were two prominent currency areas, the U.S.-dominated Bretton Woods I and the Moscow-led Take the Money and Run 175 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). The fostering and exploitation of monetary dependence within

relatively straightforward, as expulsion from one or the other ultimately suggested almost immediate failure for the economy targeted by this move. Furthermore, forced removal from Bretton Woods I or COMECON would likely have also resulted in a change of government for the nation involved. On the flip side of the coin, staying

France as a classic case of a mid-sized state in such a situation. More specifically, he refers to the role Paris played in unraveling Bretton Woods I. My own suspicion is that a similar role is now open to UAE, Saudi Arabia, or China, states that could use their existing foreign

our fiscal policies have left us poorly equipped for operating in the emerging international economic and political environment. As such, it seems safe to conclude Bretton Woods III will be absent a Washington able to employ monetary power as an element of the United States’ international diplomatic “kit bag.” Sovereign Wealth Funds

.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington DC, 11 June 2008. Chapter 6—Take the Money and Run 1. Nouriel Roubini and Brad Setser, “Will the Bretton Woods 2 Regime Unravel Soon? The Risk of a Hard Landing in 2005–2006,” Paper for the Symposium on the “Revived

Bretton Woods System: A New Paradigm for Asian Development?” Organized by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and University of California-Berkeley, February 2005. 2. Henny

. “Treasury International Capital Data for May,” 16 July 2008. 9. “Dollar Achilles Heel? Next Move on Hold,” Forexfactory.com, 16 August 2008. 10. Benjamin Cohen, “Bretton Woods System,” Prepared for the Routledge Encyclopedia of International Political Economy, New York, 2008. 11. Lawrence H. Officer, “Exchange Rates,” in Susan B. Carter, Scott S

from the London Gold Pool,” Gold-eagle.com, 21 May 2001.) 15. Michael Dooley, David Folkerts-Landau, and Peter Garber, “An Essay on the Revived Bretton Woods System,” National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper 9971, Cambridge, Massachusetts, September 2003. See also: Dooley, et al., “The Revived

Bretton Woods System: The Effects of Periphery Intervention and Reserve Management on Interest Rates and Exchange Rates in Center Countries,” NBER Working Paper 10332, Cambridge, March 2004;

Current Account Deficit and Economic Development: Collateral for a Total Return Swap,” NBER Working Paper 10727, Cambridge, September 2004; and, Dooley, et al., “The Revived Bretton Woods System: Alive and Well,” Deutsche Bank, London, December 2004. 16. Dooley, et al., September 2003. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. For more on

Bayh, Evan, 159 Bear Stearns, 24, 67, 84, 180 Berman, Wayne, 136 Blackstone Group, 54, 55, 183, 184, 193 Boeing, 124, 125 Breakingviews, 115–117 Bretton Woods, 2, 164, 165–170, 175 “Bright Line,” 40, 91, 139, 145, 147, 154, 191 Buffett, Warren, 68, 179, 180, 182, 193 Burma, 128 Byrd Amendment

Paper Promises

by Philip Coggan  · 1 Dec 2011  · 376pp  · 109,092 words

CHOICES THE EURO Chapter 7 - Blowing Bubbles FORTY YEARS OF BUBBLES THE MINSKY EFFECT THE SUB-PRIME BOOM BUBBLES, PAPER MONEY AND THE END OF BRETTON WOODS WHACK-A-MOLE DISGUISED INFLATION Chapter 8 - Riding the Gravy Train EFFICIENT-MARKET THEORY REGULATION THE BIGGER, THE BETTER A CHANGE OF ATTITUDE Chapter 9

allowed me to develop my own interpretation of events. Special mention should be given to Richard Duncan, whose books suggested the idea that the post-Bretton Woods era and asset inflation were intimately related. In researching this book, I have been lucky to work for such an understanding employer as the Economist

on creditors were rejected by the Americans, a decision that the US may be starting to regret, given China’s financial power. The collapse of Bretton Woods in the 1970s seemed to favour the debtor countries, not the creditors. Countries were now free to depreciate their currencies on a regular basis. Many

hundred years have revolved around changes in exchange-rate systems, from the abandonment, re-adoption and then re-abandonment of the gold standard, through the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944 and its failure in the early 1970s, to the creation of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, which was followed by the adoption

globe. But, as we shall see, they were at times forced to adjust interest rates to defend the standard, regardless of domestic economic conditions. Under Bretton Woods, exchange rates were fixed, interest rates were set domestically, but capital did not flow freely. This stopped speculators from exploiting interest rate differentials between countries

follows this approach, managing its exchange rate within tight bands and limiting the scope for foreigners to build up renminbi holdings. Since the failure of Bretton Woods, developed countries have stopped trying to fix their exchange rates, allowing them to let capital flow freely and to set their own interest rates. At

comprising fixed percentages of the dollar, pound, yen and various European currencies. But the SDR was not to be used seriously until well after the Bretton Woods era was past.) Under Keynes’s plan, a country with a persistent deficit would run up against its overdraft limit, and would devalue its currency

circulation, nor could private investors convert their bank notes into bullion. Only other central banks had that privilege with the US Federal Reserve. The original Bretton Woods agreement tried to avoid another problem associated with the gold standard – it recognized the right of nations to devalue their currencies. The idea was to

They did not want the markets to have the ability to point out when monetary policy was incompatible with the exchange-rate target. Establishing the Bretton Woods system evoked many of the arguments that still rage today. Graham favoured floating exchange rates, but that turned out to be a policy whose time

the 1960s and 1970s by the Chicago economists Milton Friedman and Robert Lucas. The creation of the euro owes much to the feeling – prevalent at Bretton Woods – that exchange rates should be stable and speculation curbed. And the need to impose obligations on creditor and surplus nations is now an argument used

enlightened self-interest. By allowing European countries to recover, it created vast markets for US exports and prevented many countries from descending into communism. The Bretton Woods era is still seen by many people as an extraordinary success. This was undoubtedly true of continental Europe, which recovered remarkably quickly from the worst

period was marked by the constant industrial disputes that caused Britain to be dubbed ‘the sick man of Europe’. For their different reasons, when the Bretton Woods system did break down, Britain and America were far more ready to adopt monetarist and free-market ideas than the Europeans, for whom the social

as an ‘exorbitant privilege’ granted America, which could print money and receive goods in exchange. This process also created a long-term problem for the Bretton Woods system. The system required foreign countries to have faith in the dollar but it also required the US to print dollars, behaviour that weakened their

the value of its gold stock.11 The Europeans felt that the US should tailor its economic and financial policies to the requirements of the Bretton Woods system. That would require American politicians to subordinate domestic policies to international needs. But US presidents had to cope not only with public opinion,

an immensely important development in financial history since it created a financial market outside the control of governments. Capital controls had been imposed in the Bretton Woods system, but rules governing the finance of trade flows were relaxed in 1958. European exporters to the US could build up dollar balances. The

. The development of the Eurobond market was also an early sign of the international flows of capital that were eventually to help bring down the Bretton Woods system. Money was being transferred across borders and between currencies, and that meant it could switch out of currencies about which investors had doubts.

up their gold reserves, a sign that the belief in commodity money had not been eradicated. Filippo Cesarino writes that ‘central banks did not see Bretton Woods as a pure dollar standard but rather as a system hinged on the dollar’s convertibility into gold. The steady expansion of official dollar holdings

policies that promoted expansion, and central banks (with some exceptions such as the Bundesbank) did not counter loose fiscal policy with tighter monetary policy. The Bretton Woods system had worked very well for more than twenty years, delivering economic growth with low unemployment. Arguably, however, fixed exchange rates only played a limited

move with a 10 per cent surcharge on imports – a blatant attempt to force other countries to revalue their currencies. The Bretton Woods system was over. It could be argued that Bretton Woods was doomed by the attempt to combine fixed exchange rates with a full employment policy. Arguably these two aims were not

countries all the time. The switch to floating exchange rates in the 1970s was followed by much higher rates of unemployment than had occurred under Bretton Woods, and the monetarists were accused of being callous about the plight of the unemployed because of their obsession with inflation. Another problem was that the

Promises ‘Only government can take perfectly good paper, cover it with perfectly good ink and make the combination worthless.’ Milton Friedman With the demise of Bretton Woods, money was free of its link to gold, the ‘barbarous relic’ as Keynes had described it. In the ancient battle between creditors and debtors,

system to last a few years at most. Instead, it has lasted forty. The 1970s were a very turbulent decade. Apart from the abandonment of Bretton Woods, it also saw a battle between two very different visions of how economic policy should be run: Keynesianism and monetarism. The hold of Keynesianism was

The ‘bond market vigilantes’ would keep errant governments in line, and head off an inflationary rebound. By itself, this was a crucial difference from the Bretton Woods era. Capital controls meant that, until the late 1960s, the markets played a limited role in disciplining governments. Instead, the key role was played by

plenty of countries had no track record of anti-inflationary success with which to impress sceptical investors. Many developing nations accordingly tried to continue the Bretton Woods system by other means, by pegging their currency to the US dollar. In effect, they were piggybacking on the perceived strength of the world’s

the adjustment has not occurred. Some countries have been almost permanently in deficit; others in surplus. The US was just edging into trade deficit when Bretton Woods collapsed but it still had the advantage of the assets accumulated during the long period of post-war US strength. But by 1985, foreigners had

in driving short-term movements of the dollar. The US could run repeated deficits without triggering the kind of crisis that would have occurred under Bretton Woods. Inflation For investors, it makes sense for inflation to be a determining factor in currency markets. Inflation reduces the purchasing power of a currency;

developments which have occurred since the euro was created. The third motive was to strike a blow against international finance. In the aftermath of the Bretton Woods collapse, European countries made a number of attempts to set up managed exchange-rate systems. The first, known as the snake, was launched alongside

One answer would have been to adjust economic policy so as to eliminate the difference with other countries. But European nations, like the US under Bretton Woods, wanted both to run expansionary policies and to have stable currencies. A classic example was the Mitterrand government that took office in France in 1981

standard of living. Most of these booms end badly.’2 FORTY YEARS OF BUBBLES The last forty years of economic history (since the collapse of Bretton Woods) have been remarkable. Not only have they seen an explosion in debt and in money creation, unprecedented swings in exchange rates and the massive growth

profits were limitless. The mania only collapsed when it was clear that many lines lacked sufficient passengers to make them profitable. However, the end of Bretton Woods released the remaining brake on the system. There was no limit to the amount of money and credit that could be created. Countries no longer

a year, while the debt-to-GDP ratio has soared to more than 300%.20 To sum up, something fundamental changed after 1971, when the Bretton Woods system collapsed. Floating exchange rates allowed larger trade deficits and greater international capital movements. In turn, this allowed the financial sector to grow as a

are the new American oligarchy – a group that gains political power because of its economic power.’ Simon Johnson and James Kwak, 13 Bankers The post-Bretton Woods era has not just produced bubbles. It has also been accompanied by another remarkable development – the phenomenal growth of the financial sector. As we read

outside world for help. In the 1980s and 1990s, sovereign debt crises forced governments to turn to the International Monetary Fund. The demise of the Bretton Woods system had caused the fund to remake itself as an emergency provider of finance to the developing world. These loans often carried strict conditions that

European countries moved over to a welfare-state model, followed at a slower pace by the US, through Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society reforms. The Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates just about worked for twenty-five years, dependent on the control of capital flows and that international investors had confidence

convertibility was abandoned. It changed in the 1930s’ Depression as countries went off the gold standard. And it happened again in the 1970s as the Bretton Woods system collapsed. The system breaks down either because the debtors cannot, or will not, meet their obligations, or because creditors fear they are not being

attempt to reduce the income of creditors by cutting the bond yield.2 Creditors have been dicing with danger ever since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. After 1971, countries were free to depreciate their currencies at will. Many duly did so. Nations also ran budget and trade deficits for

a medium of exchange. But before we dismiss all the ideas for reform, we should remember that the world operates under what some call a Bretton Woods II regime, with the Americans buying Chinese goods and the Chinese supplying the finance. The implication of this process is everlasting US trade deficits and

and outright default is almost unthinkable. But governments did manage to reduce their debt burdens after the Second World War, under the auspices of the Bretton Woods system. In a March 2011 paper, Carmen Reinhart and Belen Sbrancia argue that the success of this debt-reduction programme was down to ‘financial repression

more flexible exchange rate. How would such a managed exchange-rate system work? After all, it eventually proved impossible to keep exchange rates pegged under Bretton Woods. But the system did work for a quarter of a century. If an exchange-rate peg gives speculators a tempting target, the answer will be

system next week or next year. After the gold standard collapsed in the early 1930s, it took another decade, and a world war, before Bretton Woods was agreed. Bretton Woods collapsed in 1971, but order was not really restored to the financial system until the 1980s. However, eventually, if Chinese power grows as fast

the Great Depression 1919 – 1939, Oxford, 1995 and Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System, Princeton, 2008. 6 Filippo Cesarino, Monetary Theory and Bretton Woods: The Construction of an International Monetary Order, Cambridge, 2006. 7 J. K. Galbraith, Money: Whence It Came, Where It Went, 2nd edn, London, 1995.

Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression 1919 – 1939, Oxford, 1995. 9 Keynes, Economic Consequences of Mr Churchill. 10 Filippo Cesarino, Monetary Theory and Bretton Woods: The Construction of an International Monetary Order, Cambridge, 2006. 11 Richard Duncan, The Corruption of Capitalism, Hong Kong, 2009. 12 Barry Eichengreen and Peter Temin

Bank and Europeans the IMF. 12 Carmen Reinhart and Belen Sbrancia, ‘The Liquidation of Government Debt’, NBER Working Paper 16893, March 2011. 13 Russell Napier, ‘Bretton Woods on Speed’, CLSA research note, November 2010. Bibliography Some suggestions for further reading: Acharya, Viral and Richardson, Matthew, eds, Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair

in the Zero Era, London, 1996. Calder, Lendol, Financing the American Dream: A Cultural History of American Debt, Princeton, 1999. Cesarino, Filippo, Monetary Theory and Bretton Woods: The Construction of an International Monetary Order, Cambridge, 2006. Chapman, Meyrick, Don’t Be Fooled Again: Lessons in the Good, Bad and Unpredictable Behaviour of

of the South Sea Bubble, London, 1960. Davies, Glyn, A History of Money: From Ancient Times to the Present Day, Cardiff, 2002. Dormael, Armand van, Bretton Woods: Birth of a Monetary System, New York, 1978. Duncan, Richard, The Dollar Crisis, rev. edn, New York, 2005. —The Corruption of Capitalism, Hong Kong,

von Black Death Black Monday black swan Blackstone Blair, Tony Blum, Léon BMW Bodencreditanstalt Bohemia Bolsheviks Bonnet, Georges Bootle, Roger Brady, Nicholas Brady bonds Brazil Bretton Woods system Brodsky, Paul Brooke, Rupert Brown, Gordon Bruning, Heinrich Brutus Bryan, William Jennings bubbles budget deficits budget surplus building societies Buiter, Willem Bundesbank Burns, Arthur

The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy

by Dani Rodrik  · 23 Dec 2010  · 356pp  · 103,944 words

world economy with little social and political support from those it is supposed to help. The first three decades after 1945 were governed by the Bretton Woods compromise, named after the eponymous New Hampshire resort where American, British, and other policy makers from Allied nations gathered in 1944 to design the

post–World War II economic system. The Bretton Woods regime was a shallow multilateralism that permitted policy makers to focus on domestic social and employment needs while enabling global trade to recover and flourish

state. Developing countries, for their part, were allowed to pursue their particular growth strategies with limited external restraint. International capital flows remained tightly circumscribed. The Bretton Woods compromise was a roaring success: the industrial countries recovered and became prosperous while most developing nations experienced unprecedented levels of economic growth. The world economy

flourished as never before. The Bretton Woods monetary regime eventually proved unsustainable as capital became internationally more mobile and as the oil shocks of the 1970s hit the advanced economies hard. This

in particular. But as we shall see, these were countries that chose to play the globalization game not by the new rules, but by Bretton Woods rules. Instead of opening themselves unconditionally to international trade and finance, they pursued mixed strategies with a heavy dose of state intervention to diversify their

agree that such an economics is possible and think better of economics (even if not of economists) by the end of this book. 4 Bretton Woods, GATT, and the WTO Trade in a Politicized World Trade policy is politically contentious because it has important domestic distributional consequences and because it generates

economy with a new economic philosophy and created two new international organizations: the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The deal struck at Bretton Woods would govern the world economy for the first three decades following World War II. Long after the regime became undone during the 1970s and 1980s

, the term “Bretton Woods” would remain a wistful reminder of the possibilities of collective deliberation at the global level. Neither Keynes nor White was motivated purely by cosmopolitan considerations

off a staff economist to work out overnight the economic formula and justification that would produce these shares.2 Yet the agreement that emerged from Bretton Woods transcended narrow national interests and did much more than buttress American economic hegemony. A delicate compromise animated the new regime: allow enough international discipline

infrastructure for the international economy that would outlast their uncontested hegemony. The institutional embodiment of multilateralism in trade during the fifty years subsequent to the Bretton Woods Conference was the GATT. The GATT was only part of what was originally meant to be a more ambitious organization, the International Trade Organization (

certain important limits (see below). Transport costs continued to decline. And yet, policy makers displayed a decided lack of ambition in pushing for liberalization under Bretton Woods. Large parts of world trade remained either completely outside multilateral agreements or protected by generous exceptions to the existing agreements. The goal was freer trade

some areas, not free trade in all. What pushed globalization along instead was the background of economic growth, equity, security, and stability that the Bretton Woods compromise helped prop up. Broad-based growth facilitated globalization because it helped take the sharp edge off the distributional impacts of trade. The choppiness of

. Thus national policies promoted globalization mostly as a byproduct of widely shared economic growth along with some modest opening up. The success of the Bretton Woods era suggests that healthy national economies make for a bustling world economy, even in the presence of trade controls.6 Consider the long list of

, albeit within a loose framework of international cooperation. When trade threatened domestic distributional bargains, trade would give way. John Ruggie, the preeminent analyst of the Bretton Woods era, has called this mechanism “the compromise of embedded liberalism.” “Unlike the economic nationalism of the thirties,” Ruggie writes, the regime “would be multilateral

different nations doing their own thing. In that respect the institution proved spectacularly successful. Viewed this way, we begin to appreciate a key point about Bretton Woods: what purists increasingly viewed as “derogations” from the principles of free trade were in fact instances of regime maintenance. Anti-dumping duties, the MFA,

different understanding. Along with the onset of financial globalization around 1990, the WTO marks the pursuit of a new kind of globalization that reversed the Bretton Woods priorities: hyperglobalization. Domestic economic management was to become subservient to international trade and finance rather than the other way around. Economic globalization, the international

have protected poor farmers against a sudden surge of agricultural imports.14 These tensions are inherent in the aggressive push for hyperglobalization that replaced the Bretton Woods consensus and shattered Ruggie’s “embedded liberalism compromise.” Trade officials and technocrats become tone-deaf to other economic and social objectives when the pursuit

its own. My Harvard colleague Robert Lawrence makes a useful distinction between “shallow” and “deep” versions of global integration.15 Under shallow integration, as in Bretton Woods, the trade regime requires relatively little of domestic policy. Under deep integration, by contrast, the distinction between domestic policy and trade policy disappears; any discretionary

Broad-based economic growth could help diminish the tensions, but that objective would require locally tailored strategies and the requisite domestic maneuvering room, as under Bretton Woods. As Blinder indicates, we cannot take it for granted that the potential economic benefits of this new wave of globalization will accrue to the many

had begun to dismantle the controls they maintained over cross-border lending and borrowing, as the advanced countries themselves did following the dissolution of the Bretton Woods regime. Traditionally, domestic residents in these countries had legally not been permitted to take their money out of the country to invest in foreign

winning his argument. Despite resistance from many developing countries, an IMF interim committee declared that it “is time to add a new chapter to the Bretton Woods agreement.” Private capital flows had become much more important to the global economy, and the committee expressed its view that “an increasingly open and

trade agreements to renounce capital controls. This signaled a momentous transformation in policy beliefs. We need to return to the original Bretton Woods agreement to appreciate its full significance. The Bretton Woods Consensus on Capital Controls It would be difficult to overstate the strength of the consensus in favor of capital controls in

money’ varieties, will be desirable for most countries not only in the years immediately ahead but also in the long run as well.”11 The Bretton Woods arrangements fully reflected this consensus. As Keynes himself would make clear, the agreement gave every government the “explicit right to control all capital movements”

of the policies pursued elsewhere. This global leveling of policy was unacceptable in view of Keynes’s desire (widely shared by other architects of the Bretton Woods regime) to put domestic economic and social goals ahead of the global economy. There was an alternative to capital controls. Countries might opt for

trade required higher transaction costs in international finance—in other words, capital controls. Free capital mobility was out and capital controls were in. The Bretton Woods regime championed the principle that national economies needed management to ensure full employment and adequate growth. This in turn required that they have sufficient “policy

ounce. Even though all other countries could in principle devalue their currencies, the system relied on the United States never doing so itself. The Bretton Woods regime depended on what came to be called the “dollar-exchange standard.” What if the United States faced a conflict between its domestic requirements and

. This fateful decision, taken on August 15, 1971, sealed the fate of the global regime of fixed exchange rates, the monetary cornerstone of the Bretton Woods regime. Once again, the domestic economy had triumphed over the needs of the global economy. In subsequent years there were various attempts to establish new

currency parities, but none proved durable. The move to floating currencies was officially sanctioned in 1973. The Dissolution of the Bretton Woods Consensus The success of the Bretton Woods regime contained the seeds of its undermining. As world trade and finance expanded, the “policy space” that the existing controls afforded shrank

of liberalization and the benefits of capital mobility. Just as in trade, an agenda of deep integration centered on free capital mobility would replace the Bretton Woods compromise. The 1960s were the heyday of Keynesian ideas on economic management. The oil shocks and the stagflation of the 1970s—which confronted advanced

became orthodoxy had become heresy once again. When Financial Markets Misbehave With fixed exchange rates and capital controls gone, two key planks of the original Bretton Woods consensus had been shelved. In the years that followed, international financial markets would exert significant influence on the conduct of economic policy. At the

to remain stable. Britain had two major devaluations between 1945 and 1973 (in 1949 and 1967), but these were aimed at removing what in the Bretton Woods regime were called “fundamental disequilibria,” and were followed by periods of stability in foreign currency markets. The post-1973 floating experience looks like something

champions of the last three decades, just as those of the immediate postwar decades, were countries such as China that played the globalization game by Bretton-Woods rules rather than deep integration rules. They maintained capital controls, kept foreign finance at bay, and used their policy space for domestic economic management

a perfect world, and caution dictates that we not let financial markets run wild. Let us return to James Tobin, one of the earliest post–Bretton Woods advocates of capital controls within the economics establishment. Before he floated his proposal to tax international currency transactions, Tobin carefully considered the hedgehogs’ ideal

by national policy makers—in addition to improved international regulatory standards designed, among other things, to penalize excessive leverage. We cannot return to the Bretton Woods regime, but we can still learn a lot from that experience. The compromise that energized the world economy in the aftermath of World War II

difficult to diversify out of agriculture and other traditional products otherwise. China (like South Korea and Taiwan before it) played the globalization game by Bretton Woods rules rather than the post-1990 rules of deep integration. The Diversification Imperative You become what you produce. That is the inevitable fate of nations

up the slack. But more on this in the next chapter. The only remaining option sacrifices hyperglobalization. The Bretton Woods regime did this, which is why I have called it the Bretton Woods compromise. The Bretton Woods–GATT regime allowed countries to dance to their own tune as long as they removed a number of border

unprecedented economic growth rates until the late 1970s under import-substitution policies that insulated their economies from the world economy. As we saw, the Bretton Woods compromise was largely abandoned in the 1980s as the liberalization of capital flows gathered speed and trade agreements began to reach behind national borders. The

at the national level. More restrained forms of globalization need not embrace the assumptions inherent in deep integration. By placing limits on globalization, the Bretton Woods regime allowed the world economy and national democracies to flourish side by side. Once we accept restraints on globalization, we can in fact go one

narrowly technical areas and encompass broader social purposes? Yes, says John Ruggie, the Harvard scholar who coined the term “embedded liberalism” to describe the Bretton Woods regime. Ruggie agrees that transnational networks have undermined the traditional model of governance based on nation states. To right this imbalance, he argues, we need

. The postwar model required keeping the international economy at bay because it was built for and operated at the level of nation states. Thus the Bretton Woods– GATT regime established a “shallow” form of international economic integration, with controls on international capital flows, partial trade liberalization, and plenty of exceptions for

globalization while explicitly recognizing the virtues of national diversity and the centrality of national governance. What we need, in effect, is an updating of the Bretton Woods compromise for the twenty-first century. This updating must recognize the realities of the day: trade is substantially free, the genie of financial globalization

national institutions. Relying on nation states to provide the essential governance functions of the world economy does not mean we should abandon international rules. The Bretton Woods regime, after all, did have clear rules, even though they were limited in scope and depth. A completely decentralized free-for-all would not

international. But let goods be homespun whenever it is reasonably and conveniently possible, and, above all, let finance be primarily national.” 2 Raymond Mikesell, The Bretton Woods Debates: A Memoir (Princeton: Princeton Dept. of Economics, International Finance Section, Essays in International Finance, no. 192, 1994). 3 John Ruggie has called this

Fifty-eighth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May 1946), p. 687. 12 John Maynard Keynes, “Activities 1941–1946: Shaping the Post-war World, Bretton Woods and Reparations,” in D. Moggridge, ed., The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, Vol. 26 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 17. 13 Abdelal,

The Making of Global Capitalism

by Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin  · 8 Oct 2012  · 823pp  · 206,070 words

Grand Truce with Capital PART II: THE PROJECT FOR A GLOBAL CAPITALISM 3. Planning the New American Empire Internationalizing the New Deal The Path to Bretton Woods Laying the Domestic Foundations 4. Launching Global Capitalism Evolving the Marshall Plan The American Rescue of European Capitalism “The Rest of the World” PART III

: THE TRANSITION TO GLOBAL CAPITALISM 5. The Contradictions of Success Internationalizing Production Internationalizing Finance Detaching from Bretton Woods 6. Structural Power Through Crisis Class, Profits, and Crisis Transition through Crisis Facing the Crisis Together PART IV: THE REALIZATION OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM 7. Renewing

conditions for the free movement of capital throughout the world. Precisely because these conditions were so successfully fostered in the advanced capitalist countries during the Bretton Woods era, those years should be understood as “the cradle of the global financial order that eventually emerged.”24 One key feature of this transformation was

“money changers.”18 It was also significant that the most important planning for the postwar world took place in the Treasury, and led straight to Bretton Woods. In contrast with the State Department—whose “moralistic, pacifist and laissez-faire” orientation to free trade during the 1930s reflected a bureaucracy that, as

be liberalized on the basis of an international monetary arrangement that would also allow for economic growth and domestic accumulation in other countries. Those planning Bretton Woods could draw on their experience in fashioning the 1936 Tripartite Monetary Agreement between the US, France, and Britain (subsequently joined by Belgium, the Netherlands,

the broader tasks that the American imperial state was now assuming. The plan Harry Dexter White developed for the Treasury, which laid the foundation for Bretton Woods, was fundamentally predicated on there being “no advantage in achieving a pseudo stability by clinging to restrictive measures that seriously hamper international economic life.”33

ensuring that, even in the absence of the old gold standard, financial discipline could be imposed on other states. The historic significance of the Bretton Woods Agreement is that it institutionalized the American state’s predominant role in international monetary management as part and parcel of the general acceptance of the

evolved for the United Nations, especially the composition of the Security Council, still bore significant traces of the old Great Power “spheres of influence,” the Bretton Woods framework was designed to avoid this, and to establish a general system of rules for mediating the international and national economic responsibilities of all states

could only draw on under much tighter conditions than Keynes’s plan envisaged. The Joint Statement hammered out between the two Treasuries in advance of Bretton Woods was thus largely framed in American terms, securing “discipline” on Britain’s part and “limited liability” on America’s.43 Yet however arduous the

The Treasury argued that Wall Street’s portrayal of the Fund as a vehicle for capital controls was substantially incorrect. Its official “backgrounder” to the Bretton Woods Agreement emphasized that it “would be incorrect to assume that most capital exports are prohibited under the Fund’s provisions” and that a “careful

importance of these new capacities for bringing other states into the orbit of the new American empire had already been much in evidence at the Bretton Woods conference itself, where the commission responsible for creating the Fund was chaired and tightly controlled by White. Even though Keynes oversaw the commission and

Evolving the Marshall Plan As we saw in the previous chapter, the key condition Wall Street had set for calling off Congressional opposition to the Bretton Woods Agreement Act was the creation of the interdepartmental National Advisory Council (NAC) to oversee the making of US international economic policy. And in the

, as Keynes quickly recognized, “than is usually the case with such Washington Committees.”11 What political economists later called the “embedded liberal” norms of Bretton Woods were little in evidence as US policymakers played the central role in shaping the World Bank and IMF. By insisting on reviewing World Bank loans

American programs and government agencies “occupy the center of the stage.”13 The fundamental American policy orientation throughout what is often called—somewhat misleadingly—the “Bretton Woods era” was that currency and capital controls should be transitional, not permanent.14 All the essential questions of policy informing the intergovernmental negotiations that defined

negotiators attached to the 1945 British loan requiring sterling to be made convertible within one year (rather than the five years allowed for in the Bretton Woods negotiations). This was indicative of just how short both Washington and New York initially expected the transitional period for the removal of controls might

. The Marshall Plan was conceived in this context for quite pragmatic reasons, not because of a new enthusiasm for the normative framework outlined at Bretton Woods.16 A shift in responsibility for the central aspects of international economic policy from the Treasury to the State Department was important here. Whereas the

dynamic elements inside most European countries. By the time full currency convertibility in Europe was achieved in 1958, it might have been expected that the Bretton Woods framework would finally come into its own in mediating international economic relations in a way that reconciled currency stability with capital mobility, as had always

the opportunity this gave to internationalize US banking. The vast cross-border flows of private capital this now involved were bound eventually to undermine the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. And a further, much more profound contradiction had arisen—one that overlapped with and to a considerable extent really

the time the US in 1971 hesitatingly ended the dollar’s link to gold, it was already clear that neither clinging to nor jettisoning the Bretton Woods system offered a long-term solution to this accumulating set of contradictions. Internationalizing Production The American state’s capacity to assume such a central

, not only the Chicago School but also many Keynesian economists vociferously opposed this on the grounds that it undermined the liberal international economic order that Bretton Woods had been designed to foster. Writing in the Wall Street Journal, John Kenneth Galbraith declared: “[T]he fruits of great strenuous private efforts and

as the US Treasury had been central to the establishment of new forums and mechanisms for the international management of the “dollar crisis” within the Bretton Woods framework, so was it now central to that framework’s dismantling. This did not involve withdrawing from the multilateral management of the contradictions and

your problem.” This glib remark by Nixon’s Treasury secretary, John Connally, to European finance ministers in 1971 shortly after the US effectively ended the Bretton Woods system was immediately belied by the increased attention the US gave to international economic coordination throughout the 1970s. While detaching the dollar from gold decreased

because it is inevitably linked to a fixed exchange rate system. Gold never really served fully the purpose for which it was intended under the Bretton Woods System—regulator of liquidity, enforcer of discipline. It couldn’t because of its own rigidities, and its international monetary role has been dying from

favor of the temporary use of capital controls were in fact the most conservative and monetarist and the least oriented to the guiding principles of Bretton Woods; German Keynesians (above all the social democratic finance minister, Karl Schiller) were at one with US economists like Galbraith and Kindleberger in viewing capital

key dimension of capitalist strategies for innovation and the construction of competitive advantage. This could especially be seen when, immediately after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange—the world’s central futures market in livestock long after the slaughterhouses were gone from Chicago

critical to this. Notably, the very settings where senior officials of the advanced capitalist states had met together during the decade-long effort to save Bretton Woods now provided the venues for establishing the legal and institutional framework for floating currencies. The most intimate of these settings were the private dinners attended

administration’s famous hostility to the IMF and World Bank had contributed to marginalizing their role in the key decisions that determined the fate of Bretton Woods. Yet a more sober appreciation of the utility of the international financial institutions to the making of global capitalism had soon prevailed in Washington.

was mired in internal stagnation, needs to be understood in the context of the continuing integration of European and American capitalism. The abandonment of the Bretton Woods framework, wherein all European currencies had been fixed in a hub-and-spokes relationship to the dollar, was initially compensated for by the European

arranged. Its discretionary Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF), established in 1934, had not only been extensively used for this purpose after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970s; it was also used to pay for the expansion of the Treasury’s responsibilities in the broader management of global capitalism

Global Society 13: 3 (1999); and “Embedded Liberalism, Disembedded Markets: Re-Conceptualizing the Pax Americana,” New Political Economy 4: 3 (1999). 23 Our argument that Bretton Woods laid the foundation for financial globalization runs counter to the influential interpretation offered in Eric Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of International Finance, Ithaca: Cornell

Richard Gold, “The Legal Foundations of the US Dollar: 1933–1934 and 1971–1978,” in David M. Andrews, ed., Orderly Change: International Monetary Relations since Bretton Woods, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008, pp. 186–7. 42 As the New York Federal Reserve emphasized in its 1975 Report, whatever the “great difficulties in

and Robert D. Putnam, Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993; and John S. Odell, “From London to Bretton Woods: Sources of Change in Bargaining Strategies and Outcomes,” Journal of Public Policy 8: 3/4 (July–December 1988). 15 Arthur I. Bloomfield, Capital Imports and

Bernstein, a key Treasury official at the time. See Stanley W. Black, A Levite Among the Priests: Edward M. Bernstein and the Origins of the Bretton Woods System, Boulder: Westview Press, 1991, p. 38. Sufficient compromises—however vaguely worded—were agreed that softened the conditions for adjusting exchange rates, accessing the

Eckes, Search for Solvency, pp. 174–6. 50 As the Congressional vote approached, the Treasury “orchestrated the presentation of written and oral testimony supporting the Bretton Woods agreement from all sectors of American society,” and supplemented this with radio and film spots, pamphlets, and newspaper, magazine and scholarly articles, as well as

: European Banking in the 1950s,” in Stefano Battilossi and Youssef Cassis, eds., European Banks and the American Challenge: Competition and Cooperation in International Banking under Bretton Woods, New York: OUP, 2002, p. 42. 22 Marcello de Cecco, “The Lender of Last Resort,” CIDEI Working Paper no. 49 (October 1998), p. 4.

David M. Andrews, “Kennedy’s Gold Pledge and the Return of Central Bank Collaboration,” in David M. Andrews, ed., Orderly Change: International Monetary Relations since Bretton Woods, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008, p. 101. 36 Andrews continues: “On the one hand, as the central banking foxes took increasing charge of the financial

(May 1973); and Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism, London: Verso, 1975, esp. Chapter 10. 6 Eric Helleiner in particular has presented the outcome of the Bretton Woods crisis in terms of the American state—well-armed with neoliberal Friedmanite ideas under Nixon and his successors—imposing its free-market will against European

Personal interview with Paul Volcker, New York, March 2003. 52 See William Glenn Gray, “Floating the System: Germany, the United States, and the Breakdown of Bretton Woods, 1969–73,” Diplomatic History 31: 2, April 2007; and Hubert Zimmerman, “West German Monetary Policy and the Transition to Flexible Exchange Rates, 1969–1973,”

in David M. Andrews, ed., Orderly Change: International Monetary Relations since Bretton Woods, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008. 53 See John Williamson and Molly Mahar, A Survey of Financial Liberalization, Essays in International Finance, No. 211, Department of

to Development, New York: Monthly Review, 1993, p. 158. 85 Michael P. Dooley, David Folkerts-Landau and Peter Garber, “An Essay on the Revived Bretton Woods System,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 9971, September 2003, p. 2. 86 See Sylvia Maxfield and Ben Ross Schneider, eds., Business and the

and M. Mastanduno, eds., US hegemony and International Organizations: The United States and Multilateral Institutions, Oxford and New York: OUP, 2003; and Ruth Felder, “From Bretton Woods to Neoliberal Reforms: The International Financial Institutions and American Power,” in Panitch and Konings, American Empire and the Political Economy of Global Finance. 51 Quoted

Financial Stability Forum, now called the Board, had its membership expanded to include the G20 countries. See Eric Helleiner and Stefano Pagliari, “Towards a New Bretton Woods? The First G20 Leaders’ Summit and the Regulation of Global Finance,” New Political Economy 14: 2 (June 2009). 66 G20 Declaration, “Summit on Financial

Mexico, 253–4 protests against, 241, 271 surveillance, 155 and Turkey, 217, 434n7 US dominates, 155, 235, 271,428n37 voting power in, 76 See also Bretton Woods; structural adjustment International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), 117, 379n16, 414n42 Interstate Commerce Commission, 32–4 International Trade Organization (ITO), 73, 93

, 86, 122, 239, 369n76 and ‘An American Proposal,’ 362n3 and approaching 2007 crisis, 312–14, 439n.46 and Asian Crisis, 18, 247–61, 422n66 and Bretton Woods, 70–80, 366n42, 367n50 and deregulation, 178, 399n75 and the dollar crisis, 123–7, 130–1, 381n37, 382n46, 395n19 Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF), 250,

Unfinished Business

by Tamim Bayoumi  · 405pp  · 109,114 words

economic instability—and also to World War II. By contrast, the more radical revamp of the global economic order after World War II at the Bretton Woods conference ushered in a long period of growth and prosperity. The crucial question is whether the response to this crisis is a new Versailles or

a new Bretton Woods. The first section of this book, “Anatomy of the North Atlantic Financial Crisis”, explains how the North Atlantic financial system became so brittle. There was

an effort to deepen as well as widen the European Community to create a counterweight to the US dollar. Unlike the earlier gold standard, the Bretton Woods system set up at the end of World War II involved a two-tiered global system, with the dollar pegged to gold and other currencies

, they agreed that the European currencies would fluctuate in modestly narrower limits against each other than those implied by bands around the dollar in the Bretton Woods system, an extremely modest move to European monetary integration.11 These new bands were supposed to be put in place in June 1971, but this

of a European Monetary Cooperation Fund to support this move.12 This distinctly half-hearted agreement, however, did not survive the final collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system in 1973. Ultimately, the unwillingness of the French, in particular, to surrender sovereignty over fiscal policy to the European Council torpedoed

the period from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s plans for monetary union were overshadowed by monetary instability coming from the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. Globally, the main challenges were managing the switch from fixed to floating exchange rates and taming inflation, which rose in

within 2¼ percent of each other’s central parities, half the amount allowed under the Smithsonian Agreement that attempted to resuscitate the doomed dollar-based Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system. The snake was also widened to include prospective new members of the Community, with the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, and Sweden

the 2¼ percent fluctuation margins between European currencies while ending any efforts to stabilize their currencies against the dollar. This marked the moment when the Bretton Woods exchange rate system was replaced by a global float of the major currencies overlaid by attempts to stabilize intra-European exchange rates via the snake

exchange rate regime). Parities could be altered, in theory after discussion with other partners, although in practice this was often ignored (as in the earlier Bretton Woods exchange rate system). Initially dismissed by some as “a mere crawling peg”, the early years saw relatively frequent changes in parities given major difference in

the 1930s Great Depression in mind, economic cooperation and the avoidance of negative spillovers from exchange rate devaluations was central to the design of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system. In this system, described in more detail in the next chapter, countries kept their exchange rates fixed against the US dollar, which

two objectives (full employment and a desirable trade balance). Support for this integrated policy framework started to fray soon after the break-up of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s as belief in the active use of fiscal policy waned. This came in large part from a backlash against the

by an erosion in the belief that policymakers needed to worry about the trade balance. Coming immediately after the financial turmoil of the 1930s, the Bretton Woods system had been sympathetic to government-imposed constraints on the transfer of money across borders. As time went on, however, these constraints started to be

. Another consequence was that fiscal policy came to be seen as largely ineffective, shifting the focus of policy to central banks. The consensus in the Bretton Woods era that both monetary policy and fiscal policy had a role to play in stabilizing the economy was increasingly replaced by a view that monetary

financial crises are largely limited to emerging markets and the weakness of their policies. The first of these crises was the break-up of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system in the early 1970s as debt flowed from the United States to Germany and Japan, countries whose economic policies were considered

the lens of footloose international debt flows that have ebbed and flowed across regions. The Center Cannot Hold: Collapse of the Bretton Woods Fixed Exchange Rate System The collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system in the early 1970s was a watershed event.10 It marked the end of international efforts to

that replaced it between World Wars had foundered because the parities across currencies were too rigid, creating constraining “golden fetters”.11 In response, the 1944 Bretton Woods conference created a new and more flexible fixed exchange rate system in which countries could adjust their parities in the face of persistent trade deficits

to limit flows of assets between countries so as to reduce potentially disruptive speculative flows that had bedeviled the interwar gold exchange standard.12 The Bretton Woods system comprised a two-tier exchange rate system in which the dollar was fixed to gold and other currencies were fixed against the dollar. More

to funds.13 The system became gradually less flexible as the size of international capital flows increased. The neat distinction envisioned by the founders of Bretton Woods between trade-related “current account” transactions and “capital account” transactions in which financial assets were bought and sold became increasingly leaky over time. For example

old parity continued to be respected for transactions between central banks. The separation of the private and official gold parities sealed the fate of the Bretton Woods system since it took away its underlying logic. The unwillingness of the United States to run the policies necessary to maintain the gold parity undermined

foreign imports and stopped exchanging gold with foreign central banks. Following four months of negotiations, the major countries agreed to a major overhaul of the Bretton Woods system at the Smithsonian Conference in Washington. The dollar was devalued by 8 percent against gold, the currencies of the other major countries were revalued

to the Deutsche mark and the yen, Germany and her European partners floated their currencies against the dollar and the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system finally expired. The felling of the Bretton Woods system came from the unwillingness of the United States to subordinate its domestic priorities to the need to maintain a

American debt crisis came from the need to recycle oil producers’ rising holdings of dollars to new borrowers.15 Soon after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1973 came the 1974 quadrupling of the price of oil, followed by a further doubling in 1979. Since oil was priced in dollars

international debt pendulum was swinging back to the advanced countries. The Outskirts Cannot Hold: The European Exchange Rate Mechanism Crisis After the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system, the European Economic Community (EEC, later the European Union) tried to maintain fixed exchange rates across its membership even as the

. The initial arrangement to foster exchange rate stability was the European snake, set up in 1971 as part of the failed attempt to salvage the Bretton Woods system at the doomed Smithsonian Conference.20 The conference agreed to widen the band of fluctuations around dollar parities from 1 to 2¼ percent. This

, Belgium, and Luxembourg) with Germany was often referred to by the even less appealing tag of “the worm”. These animals survived the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. However, faced with the financial turbulence of the 1970s and the fact that most of the onus to maintain the parity was on the

was not made public as Schmidt explained that its disclosure would have ended any chances of an agreement at the European level.22 As with Bretton Woods, the ERM gradually hardened and realignments became less common. With the system becoming less flexible and more politicized, investors became less worried about unexpected changes

of US or Germany policies that helped precipitate the Latin American and ERM meltdowns, respectively, or the multiple speculative attacks at the end of the Bretton Woods system. As in earlier crises, financial markets gave few warnings signs of growing imbalances. Instead of the gradual building of investor concerns about the region

: The North Atlantic Crisis In many respects the 2008 North Atlantic crisis was an amalgam of these earlier experiences. As in the case of the Bretton Woods break-up, unsustainable imbalances in the United States (in this case driven by private financial flows) led to global disruptions. In the

Bretton Woods episode, these disruptions were limited because of the controls on private capital flows so that most of the losses were on holdings of dollar reserves.

cases where banks deliberately financed a crisis on the assumption that they would be bailed out. Banks were not important drivers of the collapse of Bretton Woods or the ERM crises. Bank flows played a more important role in the Asia crisis, but excessive optimism about future growth seems to be a

Figure 45 at the end of this chapter reports the results for every major country involved in each crisis.29 In the case of the Bretton Woods break-up (the earliest of the advanced country crises) the misery index for the United States is just one, implying a reduction in spending of

the Latin American crisis, rising to over 30 for the subsequent Asian crisis. This is over thirty times the shock to spending created by the Bretton Woods break-up on the United States, with half of the fall in spending being borne by the crisis countries. It is easy to understand why

to emerging markets are offset by their smaller weight within the world economy. The impact on global spending rises steadily from around ¼ percent for the Bretton Woods crisis of the late 1960s/early 1970s to 1 percent by the time of the Asia crisis of the late 1990s. It then jumps massively

composition of debt seems less important, as the relative role of bank and bond finance varies widely. In the case of the break-up of Bretton Woods and the Latin American debt crisis, most of the flows came from banks. By contrast, for the ERM crisis, bond and bank outflows were of

, where rapid inflows followed by even faster outflows have driven a regular cycle of ever larger international crises, starting with the break-up of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system in the early 1970s and culminating in the North Atlantic crisis almost forty years later. Finally, while some of the flaws

.Bergsten and Green (2016). 9.IMF (2012b) paragraph 18 and references therein. 10.Garber (1993) contains a more detailed description of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. 11.Eichengreen (1992). 12.Eichengreen (2008) contains a description of the evolution of capital market regulation over time. 13.Skidelsky (2001). 14.The

Bretton Woods system came to maturity in 1960 after the termination of the European Payments Union (EPU), an arrangement that curtailed even current account transactions because of

of the crisis that argues that banks lent on the expectations of a bail-out. 27.A partial exception may be the break-up of Bretton Woods, since its likely demise was in the words of one commentator “one of the most accurately and generally predicted of major economic events”, Garber (1993

terms. However, the misery index still provides an intuitive measure of the size of a crisis. 29.The United States for the break-up of Bretton Woods, Mexico and Brazil for the Latin American crisis, the United Kingdom, Italy, and France for the ERM, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and South Korea in the

Multipolarity, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington DC, 2012. Garber (1993): Peter Garber, “The Collapse of the Bretton Woods Fixed Exchange Rate System”, in Michael D. Bordo and Barry Eichengreen (eds), A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International Monetary Reform, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1993. Geithner (2014): Timothy F. Geithner, Stress

Asset Value calculation, (i) BNP Paribas ABS EONIA, (i) BNP Paribas ABS EURIBOR, (i) Brandt, Willy, (i) Brazil debts, (i) exchange rate collapse (1999), (i) Bretton Woods break-up of system, (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii) conference, (i), (ii), (iii) fixed exchange rate system, (i), (ii), (iii) and monetary

), (ii) on supervision of investment banking groups, (i) see also European Economic Community Evian, Switzerland, (i) Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) Balladur proposes reforms, (i) and Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system, (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) crisis (1992-3), (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) and Delors Committee, (i), (ii) and German reunification, (i

, (i) currency as international standard, (i) currency union in, (i), (ii), (iii) debt outflows, (i) deregulation, (i), (ii) devaluation, (i) effect of break-up of Bretton Woods on, (i) effect of post-crisis changes, (i), (ii) Euro area lends to, (i), (ii) European universal banks in, (i), (ii) favors larger bank capital

Money: 5,000 Years of Debt and Power

by Michel Aglietta  · 23 Oct 2018  · 665pp  · 146,542 words

the principles, the norms and the conditions of acceptability of two international systems: namely, the gold standard, which lasted for four decades, and the Bretton Woods system, which lasted for two. We will examine the endogenous conditions for these systems’ deterioration and ultimate destruction. The lesson that can be drawn from

s financial institutions to continue to dominate international relations. Here, we will analyse the evolution of international monetary relations after the 1971 disappearance of the Bretton Woods system and the 1976 Jamaica Accords. We will analyse these developments as a form of degenerated system, known as the dollar semi-standard. This

. This historical detour should also enable us to find some bearings for the era of financial globalisation that has followed the disappearance of the Bretton Woods system. If we do not have accepted rules, is there a system or not? Does the dominant role set for the dollar in the

Bretton Woods system endure today? If so, how? In this era, international relations have been affected by something of an Unidentified Flying Object in the monetary landscape

around a rule of convertibility. This accompanied the first process of financial globalisation, before ultimately coming up against World War One. The other was the Bretton Woods system, which was a heavily institutionalised international system. Contemporaneous with the rise of the labour society, it specified the dollar as the key currency

fluctuation in the basic balance meant that Britain did not accumulate long-term structural debt. This was totally at odds with the US situation under Bretton Woods, and indeed in the period of the imbalances of the 1980s and 2000s. Remaining constantly in long-term surplus, Britain had short-term creditors

, each of which was attached to its own currency zone. This was, therefore, a three-currency system with a common means of settlement. THE BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM: COORDINATION VIA THE INSTITUTIONALISED HEGEMONY OF THE DOLLAR The end of World War Two saw new arrangements for international monetary relations inspired by the

procedures under the aegis of a consultation forum set up for this very purpose: the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF was created at the Bretton Woods conference as a common subsidiary of the member countries’ governments. It had three responsibilities: to be the guardian of mutually accepted rules; to provide

financial aid for the accepted adjustments; and to drive debates on monetary questions. The Bretton Woods accords of July 1944 came at the end of long and complex negotiations. Indeed, these talks saw a clash between two visions for the future

two shared convictions made possible the approach that resulted in the creation of the IMF. This was an institutional heritage that lasted even beyond the Bretton Woods system itself. The Difficult Compromise Underlying the IMF’s Creation11 At the beginning of this chapter, we saw the general obstacle that international money

committee for this purpose. In the end, reaching a compromise required an increase in the amount that was being shared out. The global conference at Bretton Woods was nonetheless one of a kind, in the sense that it did indeed produce results. None of the previous conferences, from Paris in 1865

an expression of the situation of US dominance at the end of the war. There lay the seeds for problems that would later haunt the Bretton Woods system, when the European economies’ restored competitiveness made it possible to re-establish current account convertibility from 1958 onwards. In the absence of a

, made monetary expansion in the rest of the world subject to monetary expansion in the United States. The Period of Preconvertibility (1947–58) The Bretton Woods system went through two periods, 1947–58 and 1958–71, separated by the re-establishment of convertibility in Europe. The first sub-period was dominated

of large-scale military spending in the United States gave fresh impulse to industrial production in Europe. At the end of the 1950s, the Bretton Woods system was finally in working order. It had to confront the two problems that any international monetary system must resolve if it is to be

and it has to assure that balances of payments are adjusted so as to balance out the offer and demand across the different currencies. The Bretton Woods system functioned in conformity with its statutes for a relatively short period, from 1958 to 1971, because it failed to deal with these two problems

thus proved unable to adapt to the transformations of the world economy. Global Monetary Expansion and the Triffin Dilemma The problem that would undermine the Bretton Woods system was the permanent deficit in the US capital balance. Up until the end of the 1960s, the United States maintained an average annual

). Figure 7.2 Global inflationary growth driven by US money creation (1958–71) Table 7.9. portrays the monetary asymmetry mechanism produced by the Bretton Woods system under US monetary hegemony. Table 7.9 Asymmetrical effect of foreign central bank intervention on foreign exchange markets Operation USA Rest of World Fed

+ T$ Total – – – – + T$ + RW – – It is necessary now to study the consequences of an intervention by a foreign central bank, following the rules of the Bretton Woods system. Such an intervention was expressed in an acquisition of surplus dollars on the foreign exchange market, at the prevalent exchange rate. The intervention portrayed

no responsibility over the private price of gold. However, speculation on gold was symptomatic of the concern over the dollar’s pivotal role in the Bretton Woods rules. Thus, the US government reacted in two ways. Firstly, in 1960, it formed a network for swaps between central banks, by means of

this consultation represented a failure that would ultimately sweep away the whole system. Within just four years after the devaluation of the pound sterling, the Bretton Woods system would itself disappear. Gold speculation ran riot, and the Gold Pool was left powerless to resist. It was closed in March 1968, leaving

the ideas in Keynes’s plan, the reform sought to construct a system of symmetrical adjustments in order to remedy the rigid aspects of the Bretton Woods system. It was necessary to develop rules that could deal with imbalances before they began to accumulate. The Americans proposed making reserves an indicator

did allow the IMF to take on a new role as a mentor for indebted developing countries. The true winners of the destruction of the Bretton Woods system were the international investment banks, who were able to arbitrate between currencies and throw themselves into credit distribution policies at the international level,

of the IMF’s adaptation to the new roles that resulted from the Jamaica Accords. Table 7.10 portrays the evolution of these roles after Bretton Woods, and the role that the IMF could have played if anything had come of the reform project studied by the C20.19 Table 7.

10 Development of the IMF’s roles Mutual assistance fund for currents running temporary deficits (Bretton Woods) Agency issuing an international monetary asset (C20) Financial intermediary for development (Washington Consensus) International lender of last resort (new structure) Structure of the monetary

Settlements (BIS). The financial cycle resulting from the new global credit dynamic has profoundly transformed the macroeconomy in relation to what it was under the Bretton Woods system. The financial cycle has a much longer duration than the decision-making horizon of market participants and policymakers. This cycle extends beyond their

dual problem of the international liquidity supply and the adjustment of balances of payments – an incapacity which manifested itself in the global inflation under the Bretton Woods system – took the form of a cycle in the dollar. This was a highly disruptive phenomenon that propagated the financial crisis at the global

level. The International Monetary System as a Dollar Semi-Standard After the fall of Bretton Woods, countries could freely choose their own exchange regimes. That meant that a country could allow its currency to float according to supply and demand,

self-referential logic at work within private actions. This logic emerges from the mimetic character of competing exporters’ behaviour. Even since the disappearance of the Bretton Woods system, the dollar has remained very stable as a proportion of exchange reserves over time. This illustrates the crucial importance that ultimate liquidity has for

IV. What is international money? A look across history has not provided the answer. From the Delian League to the international gold standard and the Bretton Woods system, there have been numerous attempts to provide greater legitimacy to arrangements between multiple currencies each legitimised by its own foundational sovereignty. Yet these attempts

of international exchange, as we saw with specific reference to the dollar in Chapter 7. International monetary regimes are created by voluntary associations among states. Bretton Woods was a peculiar regime that aimed to create elements of international law and international institutions (the IMF, the World Bank) distinct from the associated countries

countries to exporter countries. Yet this rule of international monetary circulation is violated by the international use of national currencies. As we saw with the Bretton Woods system, the total international means of payment may not line up with the needs of the international circulation of goods and services. Indeed, the

monetary policies (C). We can say that the IMS is coherent if countries with convertible currencies choose to situate themselves within the same diamond. The Bretton Woods system is close to the line AB (fixed exchanges), with a staggered pattern of capital controls: these are low for the United States, high

segment BC by accepting greater capital mobility and thus floating exchanges. The major Western countries did this in the 1970s after the disappearance of the Bretton Woods system; Japan did so in the 1980s; and China did so after 2005. The European countries also followed this trend, albeit only as a

if the conditions are no longer the same as those that motivated the creation of the institutions concerned. Thus, the institutions created at Bretton Woods survived beyond the Bretton Woods system itself; they adapted by developing their functions. What we still have to do is to get a sense of prospects for the

play a major role in making the IMF the authority that organises international monetary coordination, which it had to abandon after the disappearance of the Bretton Woods system. Since the multi-currency system is structured by monetary regions, the representation of individual eurozone countries must give way to the representation of

in which there is an increasingly diversified set of interdependencies, as regions previously on the edges of the international game now converge with it. Bretton Woods lasted for a quarter of a century because negotiations could make use of an institutional framework that had been legitimised by treaty. But the system

regime. Such a regime articulates principles, rules and procedures for maintaining permanent coordination.17 Its principles are those of multilateral exchange that emerged from the Bretton Woods framework. In the twenty-first century, these principles include the recognition of the need to produce global public goods. These principles legitimise both cooperation as

and supervise the channels through which financial fragility is transmitted. The IMF must rediscover its central role in international monetary governance, in the spirit of Bretton Woods. For an IMS with More Symmetrical Adjustments Transforming international monetary relations in the direction of an institutionalised cooperation framework is one of the necessary responses

the euro and the yuan, could expand their field of attraction if the structural problems of China and the eurozone could be properly overcome. At Bretton Woods, the United States’ political and monetary domination prevented the formation of a system able to deal with the problems of adjusting balances of payments

of reference current balances. This method would consist of adopting and adapting the work the C20 carried out in its abortive attempt to reform the Bretton Woods system.19 This method consists of estimating the investment requirements necessary to sustaining the capital growth compatible with the long-term trajectory of countries’

majority necessary to take decisions that alter the Fund’s statutes. This qualified majority level currently stands at 87.5 percent. This was calculated at Bretton Woods in order to allow the United States to arrogate a blocking-minority vote to itself, allowing it alone to veto decisions. This arrangement is

Economics, vol. 96, no. 2, 1981, pp. 207–222. 2 For a wide retrospective of views on the Bretton Woods system and its extensions, see the collective work edited by Thierry Walfaren, Bretton Woods. Mélanges pour un cinquantenaire, Paris: Association d’Économie Financière, 1994. 3 Michel Aglietta, La Fin des devises-clés, Paris

Studies in International Finance, no. 45, 1979. 11 On Keynes and White’s rival expectations and conceptions, and the difficult reconciliation that led to the Bretton Woods accords, see Michel Aglietta and Sandra Moatti, Le FMI. De l’ordre monétaire aux désordres financiers, Paris: Economica, 2000. 12 John Maynard Keynes, ‘Proposals

: Alternative Views and Historical Experience’, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Review, January–February. Bordo, Michael and Barry Eichengreen (eds) (1993), A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Borio, Claudio (2014), ‘The financial cycle and macroeconomics: What have we learnt?’, Journal of Banking and Finance, vol.

et le cirque. Sociologie historique d’un pluralisme politique, Paris: Seuil. Vilar, Pierre (1974), Or et monnaie dans l’histoire, Paris: Flammarion. Walfaren, Thierry (1994), Bretton Woods. Mélanges pour un cinquantenaire, Paris: Association d’Économie Financière. Walras, Leon (2010) Elements of Pure Economics, or The Theory of Social Wealth, London: Routledge. Warnier

Bodin, Jean, 115 bond crisis (1994), 237 Braudel, Fernand, 83, 84, 120–1, 135, 145 Brazil crisis (1999), 243 Brender, Anton, 162n6 Breton, Stéphanie, 68 Bretton Woods system, 286, 296, 302, 311–29, 348, 350, 352–3, 386, 387, 389, 390, 391 bronze money, 98, 192 Bryan, William Jennings, 217n13 Bundesbank,

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