by Jacob Turner · 29 Oct 2018 · 688pp · 147,571 words
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2010), para. 1.1 (hereafter “Russell and Norvig, Artificial Intelligence”). However, John Searle’s “Chinese Room” thought experiment demonstrates the difficulty of distinguishing between acts and thoughts. In short, the Chinese Room experiment suggests that we cannot distinguish between intelligence of Russell and Norvig’s types (i) and (ii), or
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(1980), 417–457. Searle’s experiment has been met with various numbers of replies and criticisms, which are set out in the entry on The Chinese Room Argument, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, First published 19 March 2004; substantive revision 9 April 2014, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries
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/chinese-room/, accessed 1 June 2018. 33Alan M. Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, Mind: A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy, Vol. 59, No. 236 (October 1950),
by Justin E. H. Smith · 22 Mar 2022 · 198pp · 59,351 words
the brain. In such a scenario, the thought experiment sought to know, would China itself become conscious? In 1980, in turn, John Searle imagined the “Chinese room,” which was meant to show the falsehood of “strong AI,” that is, again, of the view that machines can ever be made to literally understand
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that would have brought us at least a small step closer to a one-one correspondence between people and neurons. In the case of the Chinese room, Searle seems to have chosen this language in particular because he could attest that he did not know a single word of it. But nor
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thought experiment would run the risk of eliciting very different intuitions. Since at least the seventeenth century, European observers have imagined Chinese people as being Chinese rooms, processing information and delivering rational and correct responses without any real conscious understanding of what they were doing; and China as a whole has been
by Francis Fukuyama · 1 Jan 2002 · 350pp · 96,803 words
the architect, from the intersection of a dome and the walls that support it. p Searle’s critique of this approach is contained in his “Chinese room” puzzle, which raises the question of whether a computer could be said to understand Chinese any more than a non-Chinese-speaking individual locked in
by Thomas S. Mullaney, Benjamin Peters, Mar Hicks and Kavita Philip · 9 Mar 2021 · 661pp · 156,009 words
a combat model added to the spatial model, without “finding cover and chaining headshots.” Art and indie game studios such as Tale of Tales, The Chinese Room, Fullbright, and Galactic Cafe have explored this in the genre sometimes called the “walking simulator.” But when traveling through a walking simulator, if the goal
by Robert Skidelsky Nan Craig · 15 Mar 2020
the same way as the brain, and thereby to be able to produce consciousness. Searle (1980) produced a powerful challenge to this view with his ‘Chinese room argument’: An English speaker is in a room, holding an English instruction manual on how to manipulate Chinese symbols so as to reply to questions
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gives, thus proving, Searle argues, that computation by itself is not sufficient for understanding. Searle (1993) later extends this conclusion to consciousness, stating that the Chinese room argument shows the computational model to be insufficient for consciousness, and syntax to be insufficient for semantics. In other words, although a machine may be
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formal rules, this (which is all that computers are capable of ) will never amount to consciousness. Kurzweil (2005: 458–469) disagrees. He regards Searle’s Chinese room argument as tautological: Searle concludes that a computer could never ‘understand’ anything only because he has already assumed that it is only biological entities which
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as an emergent property from complex patterns of neuronal activity. Why, he asks, could the same not happen with a sufficiently vast equivalent of the Chinese room? That is, if there were billions of people inside a massive room simulating the different processes of the brain, why should we not say that
by Stuart Armstrong · 1 Feb 2014 · 48pp · 12,437 words
ways to blame others for its failure to solve the problems its boss gave it, learn Chinese, talk sensibly about the implications of Searle’s Chinese Room thought experiment, do original AI research, and so on. When we list the things that we expect the AI to do (rather than what it
by Richard Watson · 5 Nov 2013 · 219pp · 63,495 words
and text recognition and computer vision. However, we may now be less than a decade away from seeing the AI vision become a reality. The Chinese room experiment In 1980, John Searle, an American philosopher, argued in a paper that a computer, or perhaps more accurately a bit of software, could pass
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being truly intelligent—that words, symbols or instructions could be interpreted or reacted to without any true understanding. In what has become known as the Chinese room thought experiment (because of the use of Chinese characters to interact with an unknown person—actually a computer), Searle argued that it’s perfectly possible
by Pistono, Federico · 14 Oct 2012 · 245pp · 64,288 words
_1965_Article.pdf 26 The Law of Accelerating Returns March 7, Ray Kurzweil, 2001. http://www.kurzweilai.net/the-law-of-accelerating-returns 27 The Chinese room is a thought experiment presented by John Searle. It supposes that there is a program that gives a computer the ability to carry on an
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understand the conversation. Similarly, Searle concludes, a computer executing the program would not understand the conversation either. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room 28 A ‘facepalm’ is the physical gesture of placing one’s hand flat across one’s face or lowering one’s face into
by Michael Wooldridge · 2 Nov 2018 · 346pp · 97,890 words
, who was in fact the person who coined the terms strong and weak AI. He invented a scenario called the Chinese room in an attempt to show that strong AI is impossible. The Chinese room scenario goes like this: Imagine a man working alone in a room. Through a slot in the door he
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be nothing there. Many counter arguments have been proposed to Searle’s critique. An obvious common-sense response is to point out that Searle’s Chinese room is simply not possible. Apart from anything else, having a human play the role of a computer processor would mean it would take millennia to
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would require tens of thousands of printed volumes.) A computer can retrieve instructions from memory in microseconds, whereas the Chinese room computer would be billions of times slower. Given these practical considerations, the Chinese room and its contents could not convince an interrogator that it was a person: it could not in fact pass
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the Turing test. Another standard response to the Chinese room is that while the person in the room does not exhibit understanding, and the room itself doesn’t, the system containing the person, the room
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, within these, understanding of the kind Searle asks for. I believe that there is an even simpler response to Searle’s ingenious thought experiment. The Chinese room puzzle, expressed as a kind of Turing test, is a cheat because it does not treat the room as a black box. We only claim
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that there is no understanding in the Chinese room when we start to look inside it. The Turing test itself insisted that we should only look at the inputs and outputs, and ask whether
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system, we do so on the assumption that ‘All other things are held equal’ (i.e. as close as possible to how they are now). Chinese room A scenario proposed by the philosopher John Searle in an attempt to show that strong AI is impossible. choice under uncertainty A situation in which
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27–8, 155, 223–35 certainty factors 97 ceteris paribus preferences 262 chain reactions 242–3 chatbots 36 checkers 75–7 chess 163–4, 199 Chinese room 311–14 choice under uncertainty 152–3 combinatorial explosion 74, 80–1 common values and norms 260 common-sense reasoning 121–3 see also reasoning
by Ray Kurzweil · 14 Jul 2005 · 761pp · 231,902 words
325 The Criticism from Failure Rates 327 The Criticism from "Lock-In" 327 The Criticism from Ontology: Can a Computer Be Conscious? 328 Kurzweil's Chinese Room. The Criticism from the Rich-Poor Divide 335 The Criticism from the Likelihood of Government Regulation 336 The Unbearable Slowness of Social Institutions. The Criticism
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the energy and transportation sectors will witness revolutionary changes from new nanotechnology-based innovations. ·The "criticism from ontology": John Searle describes several versions of his Chinese Room analogy. In one formulation a man follows a written program to answer questions in Chinese. The man appears to be answering questions competently in Chinese
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, "he is just a computer," according to Searle. So clearly, computers cannot understand what they are doing, since they are just following rules. Searle's Chinese Room arguments are fundamentally tautological, as they just assume his conclusion that computers cannot possibly have any real understanding. Part of the philosophical sleight of hand
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how such a system could possibly have any real understanding. But the characterization itself is misleading. To be consistent with Searle's own assumptions the Chinese Room system that Searle describes would have to be as complex as a human brain and would, therefore, have as much understanding as a human brain
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of human consciousness against trivialization by strong-AI "reductionists" like Ray Kurzweil. And even though I have always found Searle's logic in his celebrated Chinese Room argument to be tautological, I had expected an elevating treatise on the paradoxes of consciousness. Thus it is with some surprise that I find Searle
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. But we can build machines with the same abilities. That, indeed, has been my own area of technical interest. Searle is best known for his Chinese Room analogy and has presented various formulations of it over twenty years. One of the more complete descriptions of it appears in his 1992 book, The
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Rediscovery of the Mind: I believe the best-known argument against strong AI was my Chinese room argument ... that showed that a system could instantiate a program so as to give a perfect simulation of some human cognitive capacity, such as the
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nets, Markov models, genetic algorithms, and more complex paradigms based on brain reverse engineering). A machine that could really do what Searle describes in the Chinese Room argument would not merely be manipulating language symbols, because that approach doesn't work. This is at the heart of the philosophical sleight of hand
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underlying the Chinese Room. The nature of computing is not limited to manipulating logical symbols. Something is going on in the human brain, and there is nothing that prevents
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these biological processes from being reverse engineered and replicated in nonbiological entities. Adherents appear to believe that Searle's Chinese Room argument demonstrates that machines (that is, nonbiological entities) can never truly understand anything of significance, such as Chinese. First, it is important to recognize that
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(because that's a trivial task) but answering any unanticipated question or sequence of questions from a knowledgeable human interrogator. Now, the human in the Chinese Room has little or no significance. He is just feeding things into the computer and mechanically transmitting its output (or, alternatively, just following the rules in
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workings, doesn't give us that impression. But that will not be true for a computer that can really do what is needed in the Chinese Room. Such a machine will at least seem conscious, even if we cannot say definitively whether it is or not. But just declaring that it is
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its expertise to the level of syntax alone and prevents it from mastering semantics. Indeed, if the machine inherent in Searle's conception of the Chinese Room had not mastered semantics, it would not be able to convincingly answer questions in Chinese and thus would contradict Searle's own premise. In chapter
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powers salient and relevant to thinking. Will such a copy be conscious? I don't think the Chinese Room tells us anything about this question. It is also important to point out that Searle's Chinese Room argument can be applied to the human brain itself. Although it is clearly not his intent, his
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in the wrong places....[He] seemingly cannot accept that real meaning can exist in mere patterns.37 Let's address a second version of the Chinese Room. In this conception the room does not include a computer or a man simulating a computer but has a room full of people manipulating slips
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be conscious. What are we to consider conscious, he asks: the slips of paper? The room? One of the problems with this version of the Chinese Room argument is that it does not come remotely close to really solving the specific problem of answering questions in Chinese. Instead it is really a
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. At least I'm claiming that I'm conscious (and so far, these claims have not been challenged). So if we scale up Searle's Chinese Room to be the rather massive "room" it needs to be, who's to say that the entire system of billions of people simulating a brain
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number of slips of paper. But as I said, such a system doesn't remotely work. Another key to the philosophical confusion implicit in the Chinese Room argument is specifically related to the complexity and scale of the system. Searle says that whereas he cannot prove that his typewriter or tape recorder
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human and knows Chinese in a human way, is it conscious? Now the answer is no longer so obvious. What Searle is saying in the Chinese Room argument is that we take a simple "machine" and then consider how absurd it is to consider such a simple machine to be conscious. The
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the system. Complexity alone does not necessarily give us consciousness, but the Chinese Room tells us nothing about whether or not such a system is conscious. Kurzweil's Chinese Room. I have my own conception of the Chinese Room—call it Ray Kurzweil's Chinese Room. In my thought experiment there is a human in a room. The
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room can answer questions in Chinese, who or what can we say truly knows Chinese? The decorations? Now, you might have some objections to my Chinese Room. You might point out that the decorations don't seem to have any significance. Yes, that's true. Neither does the pedestal. The same can
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the thousands of Chinese-character symbols on the keys of a typewriter). Yes, that's a valid objection, as well. The only difference between my Chinese Room conception and the several proposed by Searle is that it is patently obvious in my conception that it couldn't possibly work and is by
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its very nature absurd. That may not be quite as apparent to many readers or listeners with regard to the Searle Chinese Rooms. However, it is equally the case. And yet we can make my conception work, just as we can make Searle's conceptions work. All you
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