Exxon Valdez

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description: an oil tanker that spilled 10.8 million gallons of crude oil into Alaska's Prince William Sound in 1989, causing one of the largest environmental disasters in U.S. history

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Private Empire: ExxonMobil and American Power

by Steve Coll  · 30 Apr 2012  · 944pp  · 243,883 words

Rajagopalan, a 2008 graduate of the University of Maryland who is now studying in China under the Fulbright Scholar Program, worked on global warming, the Exxon Valdez spill, and phthalate regulation; chapters five and twenty-two benefited greatly from her research. Ann O’Hanlon, a former Washington Post reporter who now

Rosemarie Forsythe, Russia adviser, planner for international political strategy Edward G. Galante, senior executive, contender to succeed Raymond, retired 2006 Otto Harrison, lead executive on Exxon Valdez cleanup Ralph Daniel Nelson, lead country manager, Saudi Arabia, 2001–2004, director of the Washington office, 2005–2009 Lee R. Raymond, chairman and chief executive

British Army officer, led coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea Teodoro Obiang Nguema, president of Equatorial Guinea, 1979 to present IN ALASKA Joseph Hazelwood, Jr., captain, Exxon Valdez Mandy Lindeberg, biologist, N.O.A.A. Jeffrey Short, chemist, N.O.A.A. IN INDONESIA Abu Jack, guerrilla commander, Free Aceh Movement Hasan

1999 to present Joseph Pizzurro, Venezuela’s outside lawyer in litigation with ExxonMobil Prologue “I’m Going to the White House on This” As the Exxon Valdez churned through chalky turquoise port waters toward the Gulf of Alaska, Captain Joseph Hazelwood descended to his quarters. It was shortly after 9:30 p

to block the outbound shipping lane. Hazelwood decided on a common maneuver, one taken earlier without incident by the two ships ahead of him. The Exxon Valdez would turn south across the inbound shipping lane toward Busby Island, near Bligh, evade the ice, and then turn back to the outbound corridor

, a representative of the state Department of Environmental Conservation, and two local pilots. The night had turned crisp and clear, and when they reached the Exxon Valdez, “you could see oil bubbling out from underneath,” recalled Mark Delozier, one of the Coast Guard officers aboard. As the oil surfaced it “made

harbor seals, 250 bald eagles, 22 killer whales, 250,000 seabirds, and billions of salmon and herring eggs were destroyed by the initial exposure to Exxon Valdez oil. On Saturday afternoon, March 25, Don Cornett, Exxon’s director of its office in Anchorage, a silver-haired veteran of the corporation, telephoned

way I feel.”13 Lee R. Raymond, the president of Exxon Corporation and then its number-two executive, heard about the grounding of the Exxon Valdez while on company business in Jacksonville, Florida. Raymond had helped to design the ambitious reorganization plan that had eliminated more than 40 percent of the

he was fifty years old and had worked at Exxon for twenty-five years. In time Raymond would draw a number of conclusions about the Exxon Valdez. One of his earliest assessments was that environmentalists and confused politicians in Alaska—particularly Alaska’s governor, Cowper—had prevented Exxon from reducing the

Exxon’s culpability. Browne sensed that the spill’s “repercussions for the industry would be huge. It was the start of a new chapter.” The Exxon Valdez had “damaged not just a fragile environment but also the flimsy trust in oil companies.” Environmental groups would “have a field day,” he expected.

was now measured by its weakest member, the one with the worst reputation. That oil company was now Exxon.”24 A few days before the Exxon Valdez ran onto Bligh Reef, tens of thousands of Hungarians marched through Budapest. The demonstrators turned the commemoration of an 1848 uprising against Austrian rule

Rainbow Warrior, a vessel belonging to Greenpeace, the environmental crusaders, as it led a seaborne protest against nuclear weapons testing in French Polynesia. Since the Exxon Valdez spill, Greenpeace had made Exxon a prominent target of its anti-oil campaigning, but the group propounded nonviolence and civil disobedience, not kidnapping. (“This tragic

forest in southern New Jersey and buried him. Afterward they continued to demand ransom from Exxon until the F.B.I. arrested them. The Exxon Valdez accident had been preventable. It exposed the risks that arise when industrial systems of enormous scale and consequence are entrusted to imperfect human beings without

’s company. Lawrence Rawl retired as chairman in 1993 at age sixty-five, but the practical transfer of power had begun earlier. After the Exxon Valdez grounding, at the corporation’s monthly board meetings, it was Raymond who reported to the board about the results of his investigations into the accident

Exxon while tearing into the corporation’s bloated cost structure and overseeing a campaign of staff reductions that federal investigators found had contributed to the Exxon Valdez fiasco, but which had also protected the corporation from financial distress. Rawl had also belittled colleagues at meetings, engendering an atmosphere in which his

. The state also seemed to appeal to personalities with an ornery or independent streak, and the Auke Bay group was no exception. After the Exxon Valdez spill, the laboratory had become a center for research about the effects of spilled oil on the natural environment. The Auke Bay team increasingly had

money, the studies published with oil corporation funding never seemed to damage ExxonMobil’s legal position that Prince William Sound had fully recovered from the Exxon Valdez spill. The corporation’s studies sometimes produced similar data to those from the government teams, but the ExxonMobil scientists usually reached different conclusions about what

together as asphalt. A third class, called aromatic compounds, has the potential to damage living tissue and biological systems. About a week after the Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef, Jeffrey Short found himself on a boat headed into Prince William Sound to participate in the first round of environmental

long-term effects of spilled oil, which might damage fish or animals without killing them outright. Short knew it sounded coldhearted, but he regarded the Exxon Valdez accident as a historic opportunity to see how a big oil spill might affect marine life outside a lab. Of Prince William’s marine inhabitants

ExxonMobil] can have that position if they like, but most people think it’s flawed.”7 In 1999, to memorialize the tenth anniversary of the Exxon Valdez spill, reporters and camera crews descended on Prince William Sound. ExxonMobil spokespeople emphasized that the sound’s beaches were free of oil—as was true

into relatively harmless tar balls, but which seemed to be preserved beneath the rocks, as fresh—and toxic—as the day it spilled from the Exxon Valdez. Her initial findings meant that fresh oil had survived in many more places inhabited by the sound’s wildlife than had previously been contemplated,

about the mechanisms of corporate influence in science.”11 As ExxonMobil appealed the punitive damages verdict imposed against the corporation by Alaskan jurors in the Exxon Valdez oil spill case, it funded a complex, quiet campaign to bolster its prospects. The effort unfolded in tandem with Ken Cohen’s 2030 forecast

.”12 Eventually, ExxonMobil submitted findings from this academic work to the United States Supreme Court to support its challenge to punitive damages arising from the Exxon Valdez spill. The decision ultimately went the corporation’s way and made important new law favorable to American businesses. David Souter, the Supreme Court justice

regular events at the corporation. They involved pipeline spills, trouble at refineries, accidents at construction sites, and losses of inventory of dangerous chemicals. Since the Exxon Valdez accident, under Frank Sprow, the daredevil adventurer and dangerous game hunter, Safety, Health, and Environment had seen worker fatality rates, in particular, fall to

usually no point fighting the basic question of legal responsibility; instead, the goal of its defense strategy was to avoid punitive damages. In the Exxon Valdez case, Lee Raymond had refused to bend by paying punitive damages, and his stubborn determination eventually made new and favorable law for corporations at the

approved in Irving. Under the corporation’s Operations Integrity Management System, or O.I.M.S., the comprehensive instruction book and guidelines adapted after the Exxon Valdez wreck, the same community relations strategies employed in Colorado had to be employed in the conflict zone. To handle complaints, for example, the public affairs

well proved harder to measure, but eventually, the best scientific estimates held that almost 5 million barrels spilled before the well could be plugged. The Exxon Valdez had jolted America’s largest oil corporation to remake its safety, operations, and management systems. Over the ensuing two decades, within ExxonMobil, the wreck

regulation, in particular, was highly credible and should be relied upon by government and the public. Twenty-one years and twenty-seven days after the Exxon Valdez struck Bligh Reef, the Deepwater Horizon blowout exposed what the bipartisan national commission that investigated the disaster would call “such systematic failures in risk management

typically remote, and for consumers gasoline remained a necessity. Marketplace incentives did work constructively in one respect—the high financial and reputational costs of the Exxon Valdez and the Deepwater Horizon served as a powerful deterrent to corporate recklessness at drilling sites—but an occasional catastrophic error could be managed and survived

to those released in response to my F.O.I.A. requests—are indicated below by (W). Court records and trial and deposition transcripts from Exxon Valdez litigation in Alaska; the Jacksonville, Maryland, gasoline spill case Jeff Alban et al. v. Exxon Mobil Corp.; the litigation concerning the corporation’s involvement

reflected that “this was not a job that any sane person would ever seek.” 14. “Chagrined . . . for Exxon”: Trial testimony of Lee Raymond, In Re Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, August 25, 1994. 15. Dennis Kelso oral history, in Bushnell and Jones, op. cit., p. 62. 16. Senior Coast Guard officer: Interview

Exxon employees. 18. Tarbell, The History of the Standard Oil Company, p. 274. 19. Exxon’s relative size: Trial testimony of Lee Raymond, In re Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, August 25, 1994. 20. “Lots of wrong ways”: Interview with Ed Chow. “prickly as partners”: Interview with a competing executive. “Fundamentals”: Interview

” 1. Interview with Mandy Lindeberg. Design of Lindeberg’s study: “Estimate of Oil Persisting on the Beaches of Prince William Sound 12 Years After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill,” Environmental Science and Technology, 2004. 2. Interviews with Auke Bay scientists and ExxonMobil consultant David Page (MR). 3. Agreement and Consent Decree,

and A91-083 CIV. 4. Interview with Jeffrey Short. 5. Ibid. See also, “Petroleum Hydrocarbons in Caged Mussels Deployed in Prince William Sound After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill,” American Fisheries Society Symposium, 1996. 6. Salmon study: “Sensitivity of Fish Embryos to Weathered Crude Oil: Part II. Increased Mortality of Pink Salmon

(Oncorhynchus gorbuscha) Embryos Incubating Downstream from Weathered Exxon Valdez Oil,” Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry, 1999. Damage to fish hearts, future research, single-generation effects: Interviews with Jeffrey Short and Stanley “Jeep” Rice. Financial damages

. All quotations, interview with Jeffrey Short. 8. Ibid. 9. “PCB Exposure in Sea Otters and Harlequin Ducks in Relation to History of Contamination by the Exxon Valdez Spill,” Marine Pollution Bulletin, June 2010. Interview with Jeep Rice. 10. Interviews with Peter Hagen, Jeffrey Short, Jeep Rice, and Mandy Lindeberg. 11. Anchorage

John. Beyond Business: An Inspirational Memoir from a Visionary Leader. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2010. Bushell, Sharon, and Stan Jones. The Spill: Personal Stories from the Exxon Valdez Disaster. Kenmore, WA: Epicenter Press, 2009. Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone. New York: Knopf, 2006. Chernow, Ron

Karl, Terry Lynn. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997. Keeble, John. Out of the Channel: The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill in the Prince William Sound. Spokane: Eastern Washington University Press, 1999. Klitgaard, Robert. Tropical Gangsters: One Man’s Experience with Development and Decadence

. Mooney, Chris. The Republican War on Science. New York: Basic Books, 2005. Ott, Riki. Not One Drop: Betrayal and Courage in the Wake of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill. White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green, 2008. Patton, Patty Sue. Eternal Threads: A Journey Towards Discovery. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2005. Reid, Anthony,

ExxonMobil Transcripts: Transcript of Exxon-Mobil merger press conference, December 1, 1998, and conference call with Emil Jacobs and J. Craig Venter, July 14, 2009. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council: 2009 Status Report and other selected documents. Fair Disclosure: ExxonMobil Analyst Meeting Transcripts, 2000–2011. “Hydrogen and Fuel Cells: Opportunities and

Geopolitical and Financial Risks—The G8, Energy Security, and Global Climate Issues.” Baker Institute, Houston, Report no. 37, July 2008. “Grounding of U.S. Tankship Exxon Valdez on Bligh Reef, Prince William Sound Near Valdez, AK, March 24, 1989.” National Transportation Safety Board, Report no. MAR-90-04. Hansen et al., “

Azerbaijan Corp. v. State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic, 06 Civ. 1125 (RJH), United States District Court, Southern District of New York. In Re Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, United States District Court, District of Alaska, A-89-095 (Civil Consolidated). Jeff Alban et al. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 03-C-06-

, 37–41 as corporate state, 19–21 and demise of Soviet Union, 18–19 employee ranking system of, 39, 41 energy policy and, 21–22 Exxon Valdez cleanup operations and, 14–16, 17 Global Security department of, 30, 42, 43 Exxon Corporation (cont.) Irving campus of, 34–35 Mobil buyout and,

Intelligence Advisory Board, 569 PricewaterhouseCoopers, 263 Prince William Sound, 3, 7 commercial fisheries in, 127–29 scientific surveys of, 122–25, 128–33 see also Exxon Valdez disaster production sharing agreements (P.S.A.), 256, 257, 259 Pryor, Stephen, 493 P. T. Pertamina, 102 Public Interest Research Group, 484, 487 Public

118, 396 Sumatra, 94, 102, 402 Summers, Lawrence, 168–69 Sununu, John, 13, 14–15 Supreme Court, U.S., 35 Citizens United decision of, 624 Exxon Valdez decision of, 314, 385 John Doe lawsuit and, 406–7 Supreme Petroleum Council, 322 Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis (Auty), 166

Vultures' Picnic: In Pursuit of Petroleum Pigs, Power Pirates, and High-Finance Carnivores

by Greg Palast  · 14 Nov 2011  · 493pp  · 132,290 words

is in the opposite direction, eight thousand miles north. I have in my files a highly confidential four-volume investigation on the grounding of the Exxon Valdez in Alaska, written two decades ago. The report concluded,“Despite the name ‘Exxon’ on the ship, the real culprit in destroying the coastline of Alaska

’s a lucky guy. So far. TATITLEK VILLAGE, BLIGH ISLAND, ALASKA Chief Gary Kompkoff stood on the beach, watching the Very Large Crude Carrier VLCC Exxon Valdez bearing down on Bligh Reef. Kompkoff was wondering, What the hell? It was near midnight, starlit and clear. As the ship’s shadow loomed, the

. The tanker spill illustration is from the BP-Exxon official OSRP (Oil Spill Response Plan) for Prince William Sound, Alaska, published two years before the Exxon Valdez grounding at Bligh Island, Tatitlek. The oil companies’ top executives swore to this plan under oath before Congress. It was, I admit, a beautiful plan

roll. Simple simple: Surround with rubber and suck. The Tatitlek Natives could have done that lickety-split and you would have never heard of the Exxon Valdez. But could have are the two most heartbreaking words in the English language. The Natives were the firemen with the equipment. It was right in

oil contamination, the chairman of the biology department at the University of Alaska. Steiner literally jumped into the field two decades ago, wading into the Exxon Valdez muck engulfing his own boat. Professor Steiner was not only beyond corruption, he was beyond telephones, somewhere in Africa. My research maven, Matty Pass, somehow

pipeline was dripping and ripping. In five years, it had dumped a quarter-million gallons of crude into the tundra. BP’s pipeline is an Exxon Valdez in slow motion. Based on the cancers I’d seen in Ecuador, I knew what would happen if this oozing continued. But this is America

it all: dogs drowning in oil slicks in China, the Caspian cesspool off Baku, Alaska’s dead beaches (where he lives and literally breathed the Exxon Valdez spill), and the oil smear in Africa known as the Niger Delta, where Steiner had been only two days before on some UN mission. He

good reasons why BP grabbed science by the balls and kept independent experts like Steiner off this beach, barred from the crime scene. After the Exxon Valdez crack-up, the government put professor Steiner and a bunch of other PhDs on a team to investigate the oil’s harm to Alaska’s

’s foolish act of reckless honesty. The university charged Steiner with un-academic “advocacy” for using the words tragedy and disaster to describe the tragic Exxon Valdez disaster. The politicians thought up a way to get rid of Steiner: You can’t fire a tenured professor, but you don’t have to

more valuable than education, so the biologist and some friends bought a commercial fishing boat for $370,000. It was 1988, a year before the Exxon Valdez hit the reef. Since then, for two decades now, no one has caught a herring in Prince William Sound. Steiner’s partnership went belly-up

Gulf would be saved by JFK himself, or at least the man who played him in the movies, Kevin Costner. Costner had ridden on the Exxon Valdez (in the movie Waterworld at least) and could clean the Gulf, no problem. Some sharpies had convinced the aging actor, then sliding from A-list

certainly more ferocious, and here, on Grande Isle, the beast would, at predictable intervals, go mad. The official story didn’t add up. When the Exxon Valdez struck Bligh Reef, everyone blamed Exxon, while the real culprit, BP, skulked away without a scratch. And here we go again. Now was it BP

, nada, no plan at all to prepare his oil state for a big oil blowout. Compare Jindal’s Louisiana to the State of Alaska. Post–Exxon Valdez, Alaska forced the oil industry to spend billions on spill response, but Jindal’s state, moving more than ten times the amount of oil as

TV screen in Vegas, I could not believe these guys had no rubber boom, no sucker ships, no crews, no nothing. It was Son of Exxon Valdez . In my career, I’ve seen corporate pigs snort and wallow, but this was a special return performance. In all fairness, I should note that

tag line that would put the blame on one company only and limit even that to human foibles, just as they had done with the Exxon Valdez, blaming it on poor Captain Hazelwood, the drunk. So the industry settled on the tag line BP’s culture. Bad culture: like failing to wear

among the ruins. Then, they sailed back to bless their new homes. It was Good Friday, 1989. That night, at four minutes past midnight, the Exxon Valdez ran aground and spilled more than eleven million gallons of oil. The black wave soon engulfed the old village, then the new one, and then

first thing our new Chugach clients ordered our gold-plated legal team to do was sue to prevent the Exxon Valdez from returning to their Alaskan waters. Not any other tanker, just the Exxon Valdez. The Natives hoped to ward off the return of the Tanker of Death, the vessel of the Deceiver, the

matter what name Exxon painted on its bow. By winning passage of the “Tanker of Death” law, the Natives had succeeded in keeping the cursed Exxon Valdez/SeaRiver away from Alaska. The problem is that the Natives’ satanic blackbird god is a trickster, never wearing the same mask twice. “Careful,” my late

’s axiom about imperial chiefs: They don’t lie, they elide. Here’s what the oily eliders left out: In 1971, eighteen years before the Exxon Valdez hit Bligh Reef, the Alaska State Legislature passed a very un-insane law requiring the use of double-hulled tankers on the Valdez oil route

Chevron, Exxon and Mobil sued to block the double-hull law. They won. In other words, had the oil companies not killed the law, the Exxon Valdez would have had two hulls and the spill would never have occurred. Mobil built its much-ballyhooed double-hull tanker in 1996 simply because the

company had no choice. Double hulls were written into federal law right after the Exxon Valdez disaster. Back in 1971, British Petroleum was still the baby sister of the oil giants. New on the scene, BP dutifully built three double-hull

next to the body, oily fingerprints all over the place: “DRUNK SKIPPER HITS REEF.” We had the perp (Captain Hazelwood) and the weapon (the VLCC Exxon Valdez). Hazelwood was drunk and the drunk driver drove the ship onto the rocks just like your dumb cousin Louie who killed two six-packs and

steered tankers through the Sound. “That’s right,” he said. “We always left Valdez after some ‘pops.’ ” And something else: Hazelwood wasn’t driving the Exxon Valdez drunk. Because he wasn’t driving. He was nowhere near the helm. He was passed out below-decks, snoozing off the boozing. Now we’re

equipment and highly trained ship personnel should eliminate any probability of groundings in the Prince William Sound.” On the night of March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez did indeed have the most sophisticated radar you could buy, the Raycas Fairways system, the first GPS. Today you could buy it for maybe two

man who could not chance setting foot in Alaska, Captain James Woodle, once Alyeska’s Marine Superintendent for the Port of Valdez. Years before the Exxon Valdez crack-up, in no-BS memos, Captain Woodle warned the Alyeska chiefs that spill containment equipment was missing, busted, inadequate, a frightening joke. He was

deliberate concealment? We talked to those ordered to do the concealing. TANKER PORT, VALDEZ There were lots of oils spills in Alaska waters before the Exxon Valdez cracked. Smaller, true, but it would have signaled the system had gone to hell. BP’s Alyeska’s water samples would have picked up the

-Alyeska plan was, I admit, pretty good-looking. On paper. But you can’t pick up much oil with a couple sheets of paper. The Exxon Valdez crashed right there at Bligh. Think about that. First off, if they’d put up the pilot station, there is no way on Earth that

kitchen. The ship would have been warned off. And if the equipment had been there, as I’ve told you, no one would remember the Exxon Valdez today. The rubber and the skimmers and suckers could have been set out in minutes, not days as happened. It would have been like a

gang could not let that happen. So they lied. That is, they elided. They didn’t fill out the Nonreadiness form, and they let the Exxon Valdez sail. Even when the ship was bleeding oil, Alyeska kept up the con. From the ship, Inspector Lawn radioed Alyeska, wanting to know when the

scheduled for, say, ten P.M. January 2.” But he didn’t dare, lest he got BP’s Inspector Lawn treatment. On the night the Exxon Valdez hit their reef, the oil spill response team at Gary Kompkoff’s village, stripped of their jobs, authority, and equipment, just watched hemorrhaging crude flow

good reason. You don’t want each oil company with their own little untested, seat-of-the-pants response system. Seven months later, when the Exxon Valdez ran aground, Exxon dramatically took charge of the emergency. Exxon’s seat-of-their-pants spill response didn’t even have the pants: no equipment

William Sound pooled their money, borrowed some, and with good old American can-do spirit, set up a cannery for the salmon they caught. The Exxon Valdez crack-up was not the best advertising for their canned salmon. Diners of the Lower 48 lost their appetite for “crude in a can.” Plus

to be modified. They were, from the air, by B-52s. Power, Crime, Mystification. Again and again. In 1991, on the second anniversary of the Exxon Valdez tanker spill, I was in Paul Kompkoff’s house, watching TV. The oil was still all over his island beach, and America couldn’t care

Chenega Natives, decked out in yellow hazmat suits, look like firemen from outer space, wielding high-pressure hoses and pulling up the crude from the Exxon Valdez. It’s six years after the spill, and you can see this black crap all over them, like they’d thrown grenades into an outhouse

covers it over. I took a kayak out from Growler Island to Columbia Glacier, the ice floe that shed the icebergs that the radar-blind Exxon Valdez recklessly steered to avoid. The four volumes of evidence will make a nice campfire on the glacier. Unless I violate my contract and put it

. “The Greencoats are coming! The Greencoats are coming!” Where the hell was I going? Didn’t know. American news media got the story of the Exxon Valdez dead wrong. Why not report it myself? Paul Revere was a journalist. Surely, there were newspapers and television outlets in the United States that would

that July. In a nutshell, here’s what happened. In the late 1990s, I was still going through my withdrawal, legal and emotional, from the Exxon Valdez investigation. I was done with being an investigator, a fancy gumshoe. I was hunting for a new job, a new life. OK, I’ll be

A Sea in Flames: The Deepwater Horizon Oil Blowout

by Carl Safina  · 18 Apr 2011

is prepared for oil shooting from a mile-deep pipe. Oddly, just one day after the rig sinks, one major press agency is calling the Exxon Valdez spill “vastly bigger than the current one in the U.S. Gulf.” That may be because right after the rig sank, Rear Admiral Landry said

4.2 million gallons, could spill into the Gulf before crews can drill a relief well to alleviate the pressure.” It’s noted that the Exxon Valdez, the United States’ worst oil spill to date, leaked 11 million gallons into the waters and onto the shores of Alaska’s Prince William Sound

finish them. Five thousand barrels a day. That’s 200 barrels an hour. When will it end? Now I’m hearing, “It could eclipse the Exxon Valdez.” And if the oil reaches shore—. I read, “A BP executive on Thursday agreed with a U.S. government estimate that up to 5,000

on other oil rigs would not be interrupted. But can they protect sea turtles? Can they avoid interrupting dolphins and whales? Two decades after the Exxon Valdez ran aground, its oil can still be found under rocks along Prince William Sound. Scratch and sniff. There’s that terror here—that it will

families disintegrate. But others begin saying maybe not. This isn’t Alaska crude. Gulf crude is “sweet crude”—gotta love these funky terms—while the Exxon Valdez disgorged heavy crude. This isn’t Prince William Sound. It’s hot here. What’s different is different. “You have warm temperatures, strong sunlight,

a tenth of all North Sea oil and gas. When it explodes on July 6, it kills 167 men. March 1989. The 987-foot supertanker Exxon Valdez has just been loaded with 50 million gallons of crude oil piped across the vastness of Alaska from the North Slope to a terminal near

birds continued to be killed in various oil-related mishaps, improved safety and environmental regulations resulted in fewer accidents and reduced wildlife deaths, until the Exxon Valdez set new records. Birds that are lightly oiled, like the ones here today, often raise fewer, slower-growing chicks than normal. Some oiled animals may

now what people are fearing has not materialized,” says a retired professor and oil spill expert from Louisiana State. “People have the idea of an Exxon Valdez, with a gunky, smelly black tide.… I do not anticipate this will happen here.” Others point out that the Ixtoc leak seemed largely to vanish

and around Grand Isle, at the tip of Louisiana. Much of the mobilization falls to the Marine Spill Response Corporation, formed in 1990 after the Exxon Valdez disaster and maintained largely by fees from the biggest oil firms. Its vice president of marine spill response says that most of its equipment, including

makes the poison, and we have no clarity on what it’s doing in the Gulf. Panacea? The Exxon Valdez disaster is what first linked Corexit to respiratory, nerve, liver, kidney, and blood disorders. Exxon Valdez cleanup workers reported blood in their urine. EPA data shows Corexit more toxic and less effective than other

director Marcia McNutt says the oil leaked in the last five weeks totals somewhere between 18 million and 39 million gallons. That’s way past Exxon Valdez’s 11 million gallons. (So it’s said; others insist the total was much more than Exxon ever admitted.) And speaking of Alaska, Shell

the highest is probably a little over 40,000.” Twenty-five thousand, near the low-end estimate, is over 1 million gallons a day. The Exxon Valdez tanker leaked an estimated 11 million gallons. “I think we’re still dealing with the flow estimate. We’re still trying to refine those numbers

of animals struggling in oil moves me to tears more than once. But the numbers here are small compared with the avian toll of the Exxon Valdez. After that spill, workers immediately found more than 35,000 birds; by reasonable estimates, approximately 250,000 died. That was because of the density

birds. Jay Holcomb of the International Bird Rescue Research Center has been saving birds from oil spills for thirty years, on three continents. During the Exxon Valdez event, he oversaw the entire bird search and rescue program in Prince William Sound, the largest ever attempted, involving dozens of boats and thousands of

one bird worker. Several hundred Gulf sea turtles are also getting aid. But a University of California professor who worked to save animals after the Exxon Valdez spill in 1989 says cleaning wildlife gives a false impression that something can be done. To which the director of the International Bird Rescue Research

“… We’ve just been hearing from Riki Ott, author of Not One Drop: Betrayal and Courage in the Wake of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill. She was heavily involved in the Exxon Valdez disaster. If you have any questions for Riki Ott about what’s going on in the Gulf, give us a call

trouble with just getting to the sites.” “The oil companies learned a heck of a lot more than the citizens in the wake of the Exxon Valdez. And what the oil companies learned is this: control the images. No cameras. No evidence. No problem—right?” A royal tern and a brown

isn’t giving us what we need. We’re screaming for more. We want to skim it before it gets here.” A year after the Exxon Valdez ran aground, lawmakers passed the federal Oil Pollution Act to ensure a quick and effective response to oil spills. Every region of the country was

more than three hundred fires at sea, sending thick plumes of smoke, carbon dioxide, and hydrocarbons toward heaven. They’ll burn more oil than the Exxon Valdez spilled. A man employed to ignite floating oil will brag, “No one can deny this is a success.” John Wathen, who spoke of seeing dolphins

These companies are multinational. Imagine what they do elsewhere. What they do: In Nigeria, an amount of oil roughly equivalent to that lost by the Exxon Valdez spills into the Niger Delta every year. It has destroyed farms and forests, contaminated drinking water, driven people from their homes, and ruined the nets

, momentary blip on Exxon’s profit spreadsheets—and a second catastrophe for the real lives of real people of actual communities. Nineteen years after the Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef, some plaintiffs received their final payment. Others had already died. And today the Court remains stacked with Bush appointees as

thoughtless, more heartless, and more pro-business than it was then. The aftermath of the Exxon Valdez spill—its devastating effect on the region’s wildlife, its long-lasting depression of fish prices, the social and economic strains that followed, Exxon’s

the toilet—set the bar so low, it’s as if someone dug a trench and threw the bar in. One nation under oil. The Exxon Valdez spill was more than a tragedy, more than a crime. It remains a national stain and a national trauma. The fear that this Gulf blowout

will be “as bad as the Exxon Valdez” will remain in hearts, on minds, and on lips throughout. Back on May 6, President Obama had declared a three-week moratorium on exploratory oil

six months. Today, June 22, a federal judge strikes down the moratorium, saying, “Are all airplanes a danger because one was? All oil tankers like Exxon Valdez? All trains? All mines? That sort of thinking seems heavy-handed, and rather overbearing.” Of course, that’s not the point. When a plane crashes

almost half of pollock eggs. The Torrey Canyon killed 90 percent of the eggs of a fish species called pilchard. Similar death rates followed the Exxon Valdez. Other species seem far less affected. Of oiled fish eggs that hatched, larvae often had deformed jaws, spinal problems, heart problems, nerve problems, and

fish eggs by an oil spill might have a difficult-to-notice effect on adult populations. In Prince William Sound during the months following the Exxon Valdez spill, herring eggs and larvae in oiled areas died at twice the rate they did in unoiled areas. Larval growth rates were half those measured

periods of time. Oil that works its way into sediments and under boulders remains toxic and available to living things. In Prince William Sound after Exxon Valdez, oil hiding beneath mussel beds continued to find its way into the region’s animals and their food web. For years, ducks and otters suffered

annually for over a decade. A study published in the April 2010 issue of Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry finds that harlequin ducks are still ingesting Exxon Valdez oil. Biopsy samples show their livers containing the enzymes they produce when their body is wrestling with oil. Everywhere I’ve been, there’s

the Gulf.” The manufacturer will say that the alternative, Corexit 9500, does not include the 2-butoxyethanol linked to the long-term health problems of Exxon Valdez cleanup workers. BP seems to get away with shrugging its shoulders. When it only partially complies, there are no fines and no one goes to

located in the mirror. It’s been the world’s largest accidental release of oil into ocean waters. Twenty times the volume spewed by the Exxon Valdez. They’d told us 1,000 barrels a day; then 5,000; then 12,000 to 19,000; then upward from there. Now the

But they do believe that help is going away. During a public forum, Louisiana fishermen hear an Alaskan seafood spokesman describe how after the 1989 Exxon Valdez accident, the perception was that oil affected all seafood from the state. “It took ten-plus years to get out of that hole,” he says

smoke, wood smoke, and meat cooked at high temperatures. NOAA found that Alaskan villagers’ smoked salmon contained far more PAHs than shellfish tainted by the Exxon Valdez spill. Live fish metabolize PAHs rather than store them. For instance, the highest level of the PAH naphthalene found in fish from recently reopened Florida

as far as the eye could see. “This is my second major spill response—I was one of the volunteer idiots power-washing rocks after Exxon Valdez back in ’89—and as bad as Valdez was, the scale of this one simply takes my breath away. “In this horrible mess was the

see long-term impacts to communities, families, and individuals,” says University of South Alabama sociologist Steven Picou. He has studied the impacts of both the Exxon Valdez spill and Katrina. In a natural disaster, he says, “People quit blaming God, usually after two weeks; then they come together with purpose and meaning

empty, those who see it as half full, and those who see it as half-assed. We can begin with brief comparisons. Oil from the Exxon Valdez remains obvious in the sands of Prince William Sound. Oil spilled four decades ago in a well-studied Cape Cod marsh lingers a few inches

right not to let the corporation simply buy our goodwill; in important ways, it doesn’t deserve it. But when, in the wake of the Exxon Valdez spill, the Congress of the United States of Corporate America passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, it sent squeals of delight through the petroleum

peeve: such heavy reliance on dispersant chemicals. “This is really important,” Allen explains. “Because the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was Congress’s response to Exxon Valdez, legislators were producing regulations aimed at tanker spills. But drilling technology was going to deep water. We lost it on the technology.” I comment that

were bulldozed; those are the areas that haven’t recovered. Marsh recovery seems to depend a lot on not disturbing the plants’ roots. With the Exxon Valdez, the mistake was to pressure-wash tidal zones with hot water. Hard clams are still diminished in washed areas because the structure of sediments was

should have been in place, but it wasn’t, because we were focused on tanker spills. Oil spill response in this country is based on Exxon Valdez.” “That’s painfully obvious,” Lubchenco concurs. “The assumption was, ‘We’ll never have a failed blowout preventer.’ ” But we know blowouts happen, I insist.

on. But what will the next time be? Just as the federal response plan failed this blowout because it was designed to fight the next Exxon Valdez, we’re gonna need something that doesn’t just plan to fight the last war. Some added thought is called for. Some vision. What

Allen, “Prodigal Sun,” Mother Jones, March–April 2000; http://motherjones.com/politics/2000/03/prodigal-sun. 4 Exxon Valdez otter, bird, and seal deaths C. H. Peterson et al., “Long-Term Ecosystem Response to the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill,” Science 302, December 19, 2003: 2082–86. 5 Great Britain’s Health and Safety Executive

,’ ” Bloomberg, May 28, 2010; http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-05-28/bp-uses-junk-shot-to-plug-well-that-s-spilled-more-oil-than-exxon-valdez.html. 42 Hayward’s “tiny” in a “very big ocean” T. Webb, “BP Boss Admits Job on the Line over Gulf Oil Spill,” Guardian,

E. Cohen, “Fisherman’s Wife Breaks the Silence,” CNN, June 3, 2010; http://articles.cnn.com/2010-06-03/health/gulf.fishermans.wife_1_shrimping-exxon-valdez-oil-spill-cell-phone?_s=PM:HEALTH. 50 “It’s hard to understand if nausea” F. Tasker and Laura Figueroa, “How Dangerous Is Oil to

Spill,” Miami Herald, June 15, 2010; http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/06/15/1680757/bp-promises-swifter-attack-against.html. 5 A year after the Exxon Valdez, and, “I still don’t know who’s in charge” C. Robertson, “Efforts to Repel Gulf Spill Are Described as Chaotic,” New York Times,

s estimates, and John Roberts quote “The Oil Well and the Damage Done,” The Economist, June 19, 2010; http://www.economist.com/node/16381032. 36 Exxon Valdez’s devastating effects A. Symington, “Spill Waters Run Deep,” New Statesman, October 4, 2010; http://www.newstatesman.com/environment/2010/10/oil-spill-liability-gulf

of oil on fish eggs and larvae Joanna Burger, Oil Spills. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1997. 53 Herring egg and larval mortality following Exxon Valdez M. D. McGurk and Evelyn D. Brown, “Egg–Larval Mortality of Pacific Herring in Prince William Sound, Alaska, After the

–54. See also B. L. Norcross et al., “Distribution, Abundance, Morphological Condition, and Cytogenetic Abnormalities of Larval Herring in Prince William Sound, Alaska, Following the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill,” Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Science 53, no. 10 (1996): 2376–87. See also J. E. Hose et al., “Sublethal Effects of

the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill on Herring Embryos and Larvae: Morphological, Cytogenetic, and Histopathological Assessments, 1989–1991,” Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Science 53, no. 10 (1996

things get hurt at different rates C. H. Peterson et al., “Long-Term Ecosystem Response to the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill,” Science 302, no. 5653, December 19, 2003: 2082–86. 55 Harlequin Ducks still ingesting Exxon Valdez oil S. Dhillon, “Exxon Oil Showing Up in Alaskan Wildlife 20 years After Spill, Research Shows,” Canadian

Drowning in Oil: BP & the Reckless Pursuit of Profit

by Loren C. Steffy  · 5 Nov 2010  · 305pp  · 79,356 words

Eastern cartel that suddenly demonstrated it could bring the world’s greatest industrialized nation to its knees with the turn of spigot. In 1989, the Exxon Valdez ran aground in Alaska’s Prince William Sound, spilling 11 million gallons of oil and cementing the oil industry’s demonic public image. BP was

was running BP’s U.S. exploration division and was on the verge of a promotion to lead its global operation from London when the Exxon Valdez tanker ran aground in Prince William Sound. Browne was on Alaska’s North Slope at the time, at a base camp, when he was awakened

, and the leak was tiny, but Malone knew that the fallout would be as loud and as bitter as if he had personally piloted the Exxon Valdez onto the rocks. After all, it was an oil spill. It was Alaska. And it wasn’t the first time this had happened. In fact

executive, the newer, greener face of energy. How would it look to have BP’s oil staining the tundra in the same state where the Exxon Valdez ran aground? 0071760814_Steffy_07_r5_3p.indd 107 10/29/10 2:48 PM 1 08 D R O W N I N G

cracks in the riser. Within days, it would become the worst oil spill ever in American waters, releasing the same amount of oil as the Exxon Valdez spill each week. CHAPTER 14 DROPS IN THE BIG OCEAN T he Deepwater Horizon burned for two days after the initial explosions had sent her

relatively modest amount that would mean that the well could leak for the better part of a year before matching the environmental damage from the Exxon Valdez spill. One of the conclusions of the commission that investigated the Valdez spill was that a spiller should not be in charge of the response

only the clubbing of baby seals is more detested by the public. America’s revulsion with the damage from oil on the water predates the Exxon Valdez spill by almost two decades. In 1969, a Union Oil platform off the coast of Santa Barbara, California, blew out, and an attempt to cap

. “I am always tremendously impressed at the publicity that death of birds receives versus the loss of people,” Hartley said.3 Twenty years later, the Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef in Alaska’s Prince William Sound. Unaware of the Alyeska consortium’s role in the slow response to the Valdez

estimates put the flow rate of oil as high as 70,000 barrels a day, meaning that the Macondo had released more oil than the Exxon Valdez in fewer than four days. Whatever had gone wrong with the Macondo, there was no denying BP’s expertise at finding oil. The Macondo well

Power in the 21st Century (New York: Grand Central Publishing, 2009). 9. Browne, Beyond Business. 10. Alaska Oil Spill Commission, “Spill: The Wreck of the Exxon Valdez,” final report, February 1990. 11. Browne,Beyond Business. 12. Ibid. 13. Tyler Priest,The Offshore Imperative: Shell Oil’s Search for Petroleum in Postwar America

-K annual report, filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Feb. 24, 2010. 2. Alaska Oil Spill Commission, “Spill: The Wreck of the Exxon Valdez, Implications for Safe Transportation of Oil,” Final Report, Feb. 1990. S O U R C E S 3. Robert Olney Easton, Black Tide: The Santa

Alyeska and, 183 Mobil merger, 46 safety culture of, 60–61 Seven Sisters and, 36 Thunder Horse project and, 99 Valdez spill and, 41–42 Exxon Valdez, 23–24 Alyeska response to, 183 Browne regarding, 41–42, 88–89 Ezell, Miles “Randy,” 8, 11, 14, 16–18, 175–176 Feinberg, Kenneth, 223

Oil: Money, Politics, and Power in the 21st Century

by Tom Bower  · 1 Jan 2009  · 554pp  · 168,114 words

birthright. Filling their gas tank did not make anyone feel good. Ever since nearly 11 million gallons of oil had spilled from the tanker the Exxon Valdez into Alaska’s pristine waters in March 1989, the public’s antagonism toward Big Oil had become entrenched. Big Oil had overtaken Big Tobacco as

Oil. At the end of 1990 it became apparent that Exxon had reduced its liability for taxation by setting off some costs caused by the Exxon Valdez disaster in Alaska against taxes. That calamity, and the reaction of Lawrence Rawl, the chairman, further damaged the industry’s credibility. Rawl had been telephoned

at 8:30 a.m. on Good Friday, March 24, 1989, and told that the Exxon Valdez, a 900-foot tanker, had hit the Bligh Reef while maneuvering through Prince William Sound. By daybreak over 10 million gallons of Alaskan crude oil

the background to the incident fueled public loathing of Exxon and Big Oil. The news soon emerged that Captain Joseph Hazelwood, in charge of the Exxon Valdez, had spent the previous afternoon drinking straight vodkas in a bar. Hazelwood had twice been convicted of drunk driving in New York, and Exxon knew

a spokesman’s denial that the corporation was “sloppy.” The judicial process aggravated the anger felt toward Exxon. In Alaska, exactly one year after the Exxon Valdez spill, Captain Hazelwood was acquitted of navigating under the influence of alcohol and only convicted of a misdemeanor, namely the negligent discharge of oil. Two

California and paralyzed Chevron’s production in Point Arguello, off Santa Barbara, for three years. Negotiations to restart operations had finally been destroyed by the Exxon Valdez disaster and a contemporaneous oil spill off California. “These days,” admitted George Babikian, the president of Arco’s refining and marketing, “you mention oil company

him as vengeful and insane, had encouraged Alyeska’s employees to secretly supply him with more damaging information. Worse, Hamel’s campaign coincided with the Exxon Valdez spill. “That goddamned, insane son of a bitch,” Rawl was reported to have cursed. Fearful of Hamel’s enhanced credibility, Exxon, BP and Arco hired

reservoir as big as any in the Middle East. Until then the passage of a bill through Congress to allow drilling had seemed assured. The Exxon Valdez spill challenged the entire project, and on November 1, 1991, the bill was rejected. “We have drawn a line in the tundra,” declared Senator Joseph

after a dangerously unfit chief executive had been removed; facing down threats from Venezuela to pay more for crude; and directing the cleanup after the Exxon Valdez oil spill. In the spotlight for the first time in Alaska, he had been asked by a lawyer during the preliminaries of a civil trial

to assess the Exxon Valdez damages to describe his background. “I hope this doesn’t get too boring,” Raymond replied. “It kind of bores me.” Asked later about his low

presented scientific studies financed by Exxon showing that Prince William Sound had suffered more damage over the past years from diesel spills than from the Exxon Valdez. Despite his aggressive defense of his company, Raymond’s arguments were rejected. The scientific evidence lacked credibility, and he was criticized for refusing to meet

. In his testimony, he had described how in 1991 he had authorized the immediate payment of $70 million to destitute fish processors, ruined by the Exxon Valdez spill: “I said from New York, ‘Forget the release, just pay the money. Get a receipt that you paid the money and some day we

drilling a succession of dry wells, aggravating its financial distress. Alaskan politicians feared that the state’s economy, dependent on oil, was jeopardized. Before the Exxon Valdez spill, Congress had been on the verge of approving a lease to explore for oil in the protected Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), but thereafter

Oil during the Arco bid, Browne pondered how to rebrand BP, consolidating the new acquisitions, and to rid the industry of the legacy of the Exxon Valdez and Brent Spar. At the same time he had become preoccupied by his latest passion: to save the planet from global warming. The energy companies

by employees was the company’s conclusion within weeks. Browne recalled the consequences for Exxon’s public image of the company’s stubborn manner after Exxon Valdez. To avoid similar damage to BP, he decided on unusual candor. After moving among the bereaved and the survivors, engaging in four-minute conversations with

. In London, Peter Sutherland and his fellow directors were convinced that BP had become the victim of grotesque political opportunism. The company was suffering its Exxon Valdez moment. Nevertheless, Sutherland again concluded, John Browne, once an asset, had become a liability. “Beyond Petroleum” was haunting the company. The unmistakable green-and-yellow

Valley So Low: One Lawyer's Fight for Justice in the Wake of America's Great Coal Catastrophe

by Jared Sullivan  · 15 Oct 2024  · 545pp  · 147,673 words

ash, a foot deep in spots, six or more in others. The spill would prove to be nearly a hundred times larger than the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, and it would rank as the single largest industrial disaster in U.S. history in terms of volume. The sludge could have filled

three-piece suits, which he tended to complete with colorful geometric ties and cowboy boots that boosted his height by several critical inches. After the Exxon Valdez supertanker ran aground on March 24, 1989, and spewed eleven million gallons of oil into Alaska’s Prince William Sound, Exxon had called Jimmy Sanders

’t expect to win every case. “I know…the verdict could be awful,” he once told an interviewer. But sometimes his job, like in the Exxon Valdez case, was to lose less, to limit the damage for whichever company had hired him. And to do that he wrote detailed examination outlines and

trial, Jacobs would do so knowing there was almost no risk of a jury handing out a multibillion-dollar judgment against it, as in the Exxon Valdez case. Without such a risk, Jacobs would have little motivation to settle quickly. For such reasons, the company would soon inform shareholders, in a filing

E. Jenkins and Jill Watry, “Running Aground in a Sea of Complex Litigation: A Case Comment on the Exxon Valdez Litigation,” UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 18, no. 151 (1999): 166; James Vicini, “Exxon Valdez $2.5 Billion Oil Spill Ruling Overturned,” Reuters, June 25, 2008. GO TO NOTE REFERENCE IN TEXT

$287 million: “Exxon Valdez Jury Awards $287 Million,” AP via Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, August 12, 1994. GO TO NOTE REFERENCE IN

Shipping Company et al., Opinion of the Court, June 25, 2008. GO TO NOTE REFERENCE IN TEXT The Valdez plaintiffs: Mark Thiessen, “Judge OKs First Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Payments,” AP via Santa Fe New Mexican, November 24, 2008. GO TO NOTE REFERENCE IN TEXT “completely arbitrary”: Joni Hersch and W. Kip

, 277–8, 282–3 Superfund status of Kingston declared by, 61–2 Tennessee Valley Authority and, 21, 36, 168–9, 200 Evangelis, Theane, 278–9 Exxon Valdez oil spill (1989), 9, 175–6 Exxon v. Baker, 176 F Farragut Hotel, 230 federal court system (U.S.), 110 Fish and Wildlife Service (U

Dangerous Waters: Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas

by John S. Burnett  · 1 Jan 2002  · 399pp  · 120,226 words

0800 to 2000 but the ratings, during a passage, keep banker’s hours. The Alaska Oil Spill Commission, in its final report on the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster, was critical of Exxon for claiming that modern automated vessel technology permitted reduced manning without compromise of safety or function. “Manning policies also may

,” the report stated. “Whereas tankers in the 1950s carried a crew of 40 to 42 to manage about 6.3 million gallons of oil . . . the Exxon Valdez carried a crew of 19 to transport 53 million gallons of oil.”13 The Montrose carries a crew of 17 to transport 84 million gallons

the potential to become an environmental crisis. Few people involved with oil tankers have not learned a lesson or two from the grounding of the Exxon Valdez, the nation’s greatest environmental disaster since Three Mile Island. Betts knew what a similar spill of crude oil would mean to the coral beaches

all critical figures needed to manage such a disaster. The Montrose carries two million barrels of crude, nearly ten times the amount spilled by the Exxon Valdez and about fifty times the amount of oil washed onto the Alaska coastline.29 The devastation from a VLCC breaking up in the Straits would

of coastline, the equivalent of nearly three times the circumference of the globe, could be affected. Using the formula for the damage caused by the Exxon Valdez, were the Montrose to spill all of her oil—84 million gallons of it—five-hundred thousand square miles, twice the size of the state

Montrose has a double hull and a double bottom, and conforms to U.S. Oil Pollution Act of 1990. The legislation, hastily written following the Exxon Valdez disaster, required that all tankers calling in at American ports, in time, have double hulls and double bottoms. The two-hull system is quite simple

Sanko Honour at the northern entrance of the Malacca Straits. It spilled nearly eight million gallons of oil, about the same amount released by the Exxon Valdez—the two ships were well out to sea and pollution to the land was avoided. There was no explanation for the accident. Vincent takes me

have little involvement in the selection of those who crew their ships. The change in manning policies stems in part from the legacy of the Exxon Valdez disaster. Since the tanker ran up on Bligh Reef in 1989, oil companies have been shedding their shipping companies. Exxon-Mobil, the world’s largest

the world’s crude oil supply originates in so-called “sensitive” Middle East countries such as Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Sudan, and Libya. 7 The Exxon Valdez disaster, in which the master’s judgment was considered by some to have been impaired by the few drinks he had consumed ashore before departing

“AT ANY ONE TIME (emphasis theirs) . . . This is in line with the maximum limit imposed by the United States Coast Guard.” The master of the Exxon Valdez was determined to have alcohol in his blood several hours after the accident but he was found not guilty of operating a vessel under the

. “You can carry LPG in for free,” he says. Some crude oil, like Saudi Khafji Crude, has some naphtha naturally blended within. 29 When the Exxon Valdez piled onto Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, there was no explosion, no fire to burn off the spill, and 10.8 million gallons of

Peter Emergency Response and Industry Standards Empty Quarter Energy independence Environmental protection Erika Erria Inge European Union European Vision Exclusive Economic Zone Exxon-Mobil Corporation Exxon Valdez disaster Falklands War Firearms Fire hoses Fleet Clearance Diving Team Flynn, Stephen E. FoCs (flags of convenience) Foresight of London Forester.S. Fourth International Meeting

This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. The Climate

by Naomi Klein  · 15 Sep 2014  · 829pp  · 229,566 words

willy-nilly, turning precious freshwater sources salty, and pipelines were left exposed and unmaintained, contributing to thousands of spills. In an often cited statistic, an Exxon Valdez–worth of oil has spilled in the Delta every year for about fifty years, poisoning fish, animals, and humans.25 But none of this compares

the oil tankers that the pipeline would load up with diluted tar sands oil—up to 75 percent more oil in some supertankers than the Exxon Valdez was carrying in 1989 when it spilled in Alaska’s Prince William Sound, devastating marine life and fisheries across the region.3 A spill in

Kalamazoo River, noting that Enbridge, the company responsible, was the same one pushing the Northern Gateway pipeline. The teens were also keenly interested in the Exxon Valdez disaster since it took place in a northern landscape similar to their own. As a community built around fishing and other ocean harvesting, they were

mass die-off, there would just be . . . nothing. An absence. A hole in the life cycle. That’s what happened to the herring after the Exxon Valdez disaster. For three years after the spill, herring stocks were robust. But in the fourth, populations suddenly plummeted by roughly three quarters. The next year

waters has a maximum capacity of 2.2 million barrels of oil, about 74 percent more than the 1,264,155 barrels carried by the Exxon Valdez: “Section 3.9: Ship Specifications,” TERMPOL Surveys and Studies, Northern Gateway Partnership Inc., Enbridge Northern Gateway Project, January 20, 2010, pp. 2–7; “Oil Spill

Facts: Questions and Answers,” Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, http://www.evostc.state.ak.us. 4. Jess Housty, “Transformations,” Coast, April 1, 2013. 5. “Protesters Blamed for Cancelled Pipeline Hearing

, 179–82 progressive, 181–82 sustainability and, 447 Exxon, 145, 147 ExxonMobil, 44–45, 111, 113, 150, 192, 196, 234, 236, 238, 282, 283, 314 Exxon Valdez oil spill, 337–39, 426 Eyre, Nick, 90 factories: green credits for, 219 retrofitting of, 122–23 fact resistance, 37 fairness: austerity and, 117–19

, 328 marine life: climate change and, 433–35 food chain in, 259 impact of Deepwater Horizon spill on, 425–26, 431–34, 451 impact of Exxon Valdez oil spill on, 337–39 oceanic acidification and, 259, 434 Marine Stewardship Council, 209 markets: carbon, 211 cyclical nature of, 225 expansion of, 171 limits

report of, 261 price controls, 125 PricewaterhouseCoopers, 15 Princeton Environmental Institute, 113 Princeton University, Carbon Mitigation Initiative of, 113–14 Prince William Sound, impact of Exxon Valdez oil spill in, 337–39, 426 privatization, 8, 9, 39, 72 diminished services under, 128 of disaster response, 51–52 of former Soviet economies, 19

The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power

by Daniel Yergin  · 23 Dec 2008  · 1,445pp  · 469,426 words

without the same risk to human health or life. It occurred at four minutes after midnight, on Good Friday, March 24, 1989, when the supertanker Exxon Valdez rammed into the rocky Bligh Reef in Alaska's Prince William Sound, spilling 240,000 barrels of petroleum into those pristine waters. The expenditure of

with Robert O. Anderson. [6] Cambridge Energy Research Associates, Energy and the Environment: The New Landscape of Public Opinion (1990). [7] National Response Team, The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: A Report to the President from Samuel K. Skinner and William K. Reilly, May 1989. On oil production, Robert Esser, "The Capacity Race

Industry. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1923. ---------. Prices, Profits, and Competition in the Petroleum Industry. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1928. U.S. National Response Team. The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: A Report to the President from Samuel K. Skinner and William K. Reilly. May 1989. U.S. National Security Council. Documents of the

was deliriously greeted in Tehran when he returned from exile in February 1979, (2) Just after midnight, on Good Friday, March 24, 1989, the supertanker Exxon Valdez went aground in Alaska's Prince William Sound, spilling 240,000 barrels of oil— and giving a great boost to the environmental movement, (3) The

Why Things Bite Back: Technology and the Revenge of Unintended Consequences

by Edward Tenner  · 1 Sep 1997

with appalling regularity. Not one is left in modern Rome, even as a ruin. Not every technological catastrophe is, strictly speaking, a revenge effect. The Exxon Valdez oil spill, the release of radioactive material at Three Mile Island, and the Challenger explosion, to name only three of the most celebrated recent disasters

how ironic the results can be of attacking a symbol like the dirty plume of a low smokestack. 36 Oil Spills: Dispersing Pollution When the Exxon Valdez hit Bligh Reef off the Alaska Coast in 1988, the murky discharge of 35,000 tons of crude oil was an ethical Rorschach test. To

fish eggs to lob sters .4° Tidying up an oil spill mechanically can have even more serious revenge effects. The $2 billion cleanup of the Exxon Valdez disaster relied heavily on hot water applied to the shoreline through high-velocity pumps—Exxon's response to outrage. A later independent report for the

point out that efforts to save the most seriously injured otters may only have made them suffer longer.42 The Torrey Canyon and especially the Exxon Valdez disasters show the perils of purification. Contamination anywhere in the world can become so unbearably visible that it seems to cry out for equally televisable

natural pollution of Prince William Sound sped its recovery; local spruce trees produce hydrocarbons related to those in the Prudhoe Bay crude spilled by the Exxon Valdez. (Refined products are less likely to find preadapted bacteria.) Recovery rates have varied from one site to another, but a study by the Congressional Research

birds died after landing in open ponds and containers of waste oil in five Southwestern states alone in one year as were lost in the Exxon Valdez spill. Tank farms and pipelines on a Brooklyn site have been slowly leaking over one and a half times the spill of the

Exxon Valdez. Another tank farm in Indiana is being forced to remedy leaks that could have been three times as large. Rusting pipes, bad welding, leaking valves,

in downtown New Orleans and flood evacuation routes. Around the world, weather can still break up supertankers with far more petroleum on board than the Exxon Valdez or even the Torrey Canyon." Federal disaster aid and private insurance, plus a cyclical lull in major storms, have helped reduce perceived risk and have

wildlife and endangered more species by spreading pests than by fouling seas and shores. John Balzar, writing in the Los Angeles Times, acknowledges that the Exxon Valdez spill killed hundreds of thousands of birds, but notes that by spreading rats to over 8o percent of the world's islands, shipping is condemning

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