Francis Fukuyama: the end of history

Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq
by Francis Fukuyama
Published 22 Dec 2005

She holds a B.A. in social studies from Harvard University and an M.Litt. in international relations from Balliol College, Oxford University. Francis Fukuyama is Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of the Johns Hopkins University. As of July 1, 2005, he is also the director of the International Development program at SAIS. Dr. Fukuyama has written widely on issues relating to questions concerning democratization and international political economy. His book, The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press, 1992) has appeared in over twenty foreign editions. He is also the author of Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (Free Press, 1995), The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order (Free Press, 1999), and Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2002).

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Nation-Building Forum on Constructive Capitalism Francis Fukuyama, Series Editor Nation-Building Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq • • Edited by Francis Fukuyama The Johns Hopkins University Press • B A LT I M O R E • © 2006 The Johns Hopkins University Press All rights reserved. Published 2006 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 The Johns Hopkins University Press 2715 North Charles Street Baltimore, Maryland 21218-4363 www.press.jhu.edu Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Nation-building : beyond Afghanistan and Iraq / edited by Francis Fukuyama. p. cm. “Product of a conference held at the Paul H.

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See also the chapters by Michèle A. Flournoy and James Dobbins. 13. Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004). 14. Francis Fukuyama, “Nation-Building 101,” Atlantic Monthly, January/February 2004, 159–62. 15. James Fallows, “Blind into Baghdad,” Atlantic Monthly, January/February 2004, 52–77; Kenneth M. Pollack, “After Saddam: Assessing the Reconstruction of Iraq,” Saban Center Analysis Paper no. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Saban Center, 2004). 16. Woodward, Plan of Attack. • 15 • • Francis Fukuyama 17. Robert M. Perito, The American Experience with Police in Peace Operations (Clementsport, Canada: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2002). 18.

Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution
by Francis Fukuyama
Published 1 Jan 2002

Weightman, June 24, 1826, in The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson (New York: Modern Library, 1944), pp. 729–730. 7 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 8 Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard/Belknap, 1983). 9 On this point, see Leon Kass, “Introduction: The Problem of Technology,” in Technology in the Western Political Tradition, ed. Arthur M. Melzer et al. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 10–14. 10 See Francis Fukuyama, “Second Thoughts: The Last Man in a Bottle,” The National Interest, no. 56 (Summer 1999): 16–33.

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See David Sloan Wilson and Elliott Sober, Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998). 35 For an overview, see Francis Fukuyama, “The Old Age of Mankind,” in The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). CHAPTER 8: HUMAN NATURE 1 Paul Ehrlich, Human Natures: Genes, Cultures, and the Human Prospect (Washington, D.C./Covelo, Calif.: Island Press/Shearwater Books, 2000), p. 330. See Francis Fukuyama, review of Ehrlich in Commentary, February 2001. 2 David L. Hull, “On Human Nature,” in David L. Hull and Michael Ruse, eds., The Philosophy of Biology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 387. 3 Alexander Rosenberg, for example, argues that there are no “essential” characteristics of species because all species exhibit variance, and the median point of a range of variance does not constitute an essence.

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CHAPTER 9: HUMAN DIGNITY 1 Clive Staples Lewis, The Abolition of Man (New York: Touchstone, 1944), p. 85. 2 Counsel of Europe, Draft Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, On the Prohibiting of Cloning Human Beings, Doc. 7884, July 16, 1997. 3 This is the theme of the second part of Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 4 For an interpretation of this passage in Tocqueville, see Francis Fukuyama, “The March of Equality,” Journal of Democracy 11 (2000): 11–17. 5 John Paul II, “Message to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences,” October 22, 1996. 6 Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), pp. 35–39; see also Ernst Mayr, One Long Argument: Charles Darwin and the Genesis of Modern Evolutionary Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 40–42. 7 Michael Ruse and David L.

Zero-Sum Future: American Power in an Age of Anxiety
by Gideon Rachman
Published 1 Feb 2011

Quoted in Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11 (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008), 195. 10. DEMOCRACY: FRANCIS FUKUYAMA AND THE END OF HISTORY 1. Bloom’s book was published in 1987. Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987). 2. Interview with the author, Washington, D.C. May 27, 2009. 3. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” National Interest, June 1989. The article was subsequently turned into a book, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 1992). 4. Ibid. 5. See for example Vince Cable, The Storm: The World Economic Crisis and What It Means (London: Atlantic Books, 2009), 3, and Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams (London: Atlantic Books, 2008). 6.

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In Washington, D.C., Francis Fukuyama came up with a surprising answer. Reflecting on his end-of-history thesis in 2009, twenty years after the publication of the original article, Fukuyama mused that one respect in which he might have gone wrong was that “I kind of assumed that American power would be used wisely.” In the aftermath of the Bush administration, that no longer seemed a safe assumption. And the man who twenty years earlier had been seen as the very epitome of American triumphalism argued that “the End of History was never about Reaganism, you know … the true exemplar of the End of History is the European Union, not the United States, because the European Union is trying to transcend sovereignty and power politics; it’s trying to replace that with the global rule of law, and that’s what ought to happen at the end of history.”25 In Brussels, capital of the EU, there were plenty of people who did indeed see the global economic crisis as a unique opportunity to push a distinctively European view of the world. 20 GLOBAL GOVERNMENT THE WORLD AS EUROPE The idea that the European Union might represent the culmination of world history is depressing.

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Strobe Talbott’s The Great Experiment: The Story of Ancient Empires, Modern States, and the Quest for a Global Nation (Simon & Schuster, 2008) goes all the way back to ancient Greece, but also offers some lively insights into the Clinton era and some interesting reflections on the problem of global governance. Anyone wanting to understand the “end of history” debate has to go back to Francis Fukuyama’s original work, The End of History and the Last Man (Penguin, 1992). Fukuyama’s later disavowal of neoconservatism, America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy (Yale, 2006) is also well worth reading. The best thing to read on Alan Greenspan is Greenspan’s own surprisingly compulsive memoir, The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World (Penguin, 2007).

After Europe
by Ivan Krastev
Published 7 May 2017

Chapter 1 1. José Saramago, Death with Interruptions (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2005). 2. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” in The National Interest, Summer 1989. 3. Ken Jowitt, “After Leninism: The New World Disorder,” Journal of Democracy 2 (Winter 1991): 11–20. Jowitt later elaborated his ideas in The New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); see esp. chapters 7–9. 4. Ibid., 310. 5. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” in The National Interest, Summer 1989. 6. Harry Kreisler interview with Ken Jowitt, “Doing Political Theory,” Conversations with History, Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley (Regents of the University of California, 2000). http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people/Jowitt/jowitt-con5.html. 7.

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Shared memories of the Second World War, for example, have faded from view: half of all fifteen- and sixteen-year-olds in German high schools don’t even know that Hitler was a dictator, while a third believe that he protected human rights. As Timur Vermes’s 2011 satirical novel Look Who’s Back suggests, the question is no longer whether it’s possible for Hitler to come back; it’s whether we’d even be able to recognize him. The novel sold more than a million copies in Germany. “The end of history” that Francis Fukuyama promised us in 1989 may well have arrived, but in the perverse sense that historical experience no longer matters and few are really interested in it.6 The geopolitical rationale for European unity vanished with the Soviet Union’s collapse. And Putin’s Russia, threatening as it may be, cannot fill this existential void.

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The opening represented a dramatic instance of surprise, a moment when structures both literal and figurative crumbled unexpectedly. A series of accidents, some of them mistakes so minor that they might otherwise have been trivialities.”11 The end of communism is thus less effectively explained by Francis Fukuyama’s narrative of “the end of history” than it is by Harold Macmillan’s “events, my dear boy, events.” It is the experience of the Soviet collapse that in myriad aspects defines the way eastern Europeans perceive what is taking place today. Witnessing the political turmoil in Europe, we have a sinking feeling that we have been through this before—the only difference being that then it was their world that collapsed.

America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy
by Francis Fukuyama
Published 20 Mar 2007

See realistic Wilsonian-ism Wohlstetter, Albert, 21, 31-36 Wohlstetter, Roberta, 87 Wolfowitz, Paul, 12, 14, 21, 31 Wolfson, Adam, 2 8 women's empowerment, 120 World Bank, 145, 147 World Intellectual Property Organization, 44 World Trade Organization (WTO), 44 Yushchenko, Viktor, 5 2 Zakaria, Fareed, 140 Zarqawi, Abu Musab al-, 181 226 approach to American foreign policy through 4vhich such mistakes might be turned around — one in which the positive aspects of the neo-conservative legacy are joined with a more rfealistic view of the way American power can Ipe used around the world. Francis Fukuyama is Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of .International Political Economy and director of the International Development Program at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. He has written widely on political and economic development, and his previous books include the End of History and the Last Man, a best seller and the winner of the Los Angeles Times Book Prize. fURE SERIES

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See also Dani Rodrik and Arvind Subramanian, "The Primacy of Institutions (And What This Does and Does Not Mean)," Finance and Development 40, no. 2 (2003): 31-34. William R. Easterly and Ross Levine, Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments Influence Economic Development, NBER Working Paper 9106, 2002. 13. Francis Fukuyama and Sanjay Marwah, "Comparing East Asia and Latin America: Dimensions of Development, " Journal of Democracy 11, no. 4 (2000): 80-94; Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004). 14. Francis Fukuyama, "'Stateness' First," Journal of Democracy 16, no. 1 (2005): 84-88. 15. For a historical overview, see Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). 16.

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This book made available by the Internet Archive. Parts of this book were given as the Castle Lectures in Yale's Program in Ethics, Politics, and Economics, delivered by Francis Fukuyama in 2005. The Castle Lectures were endowed by Mr. John K. Castle. They honor his ancestor the Reverend James Pierpont, one of Yale's original founders. Given by established public figures, Castle Lectures are intended to promote reflection on the moral foundations of society and government and to enhance understanding of ethical issues facing individuals in our complex modern society. *<^\jiii,\,ni,o 7 A Different Kind of American Foreign Policy 181 notes 195 INDEX 217 vm Preface The subject of this book is American foreign policy since the al-Qaida attacks of September 11, 2001.

Falling Behind: Explaining the Development Gap Between Latin America and the United States
by Francis Fukuyama
Published 1 Jan 2006

His most recent publications include Cuba hoy: Analizando su pasado, imaginando su futuro (2006); and, as coeditor with B. K. Kim, Between Compliance and Conflict: East Asia, Latin America, and the “New” Pax Americana (2005). Francis Fukuyama is director of the International Development Program and Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Among his most salient works are The End of History and the Last Man (1992); State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (2004); and America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy (2006).

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The Latin American Equilibrium, 161 James A. Robinson 8. Do Defective Institutions Explain the Development Gap between the United States and Latin America?, 194 Francis Fukuyama 9. Why Institutions Matter: Fiscal Citizenship in Argentina and the United States, 222 Natalio R. Botana 10. Conclusion, 268 Francis Fukuyama Contributors, 297 Index, 301 xiv Contents falling behind This page intentionally left blank 1 Introduction francis fukuyama I n 1492, on the eve of the European settlement and colonization of the New World, Bolivia and Peru hosted richer and more complex civilizations than any that existed in North America.

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Thanks are also due to Valeria Sobrino, who provided key logistical support, and Charles Roberts, who translated into English all of the chapters originally written in Spanish. Finally, special recognition is due to Guadalupe Paz, associate director of the Latin American Studies Program at SAIS, for her help in editing the English version of this volume and her general support of the project as a whole. Francis Fukuyama This page intentionally left blank Contents 1. Introduction, 3 Francis Fukuyama Part I: The Historical Context 2. Two Centuries of South American Reflections on the Development Gap between the United States and Latin America, 11 Tulio Halperin Donghi 3. Looking at Them: A Mexican Perspective on the Gap with the United States, 48 Enrique Krauze 4.

The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution
by Francis Fukuyama
Published 11 Apr 2011

ALSO BY FRANCIS FUKUYAMA America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy State-Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-first Century Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity The End of History and the Last Man NOTES PREFACE 1 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies. With a New Foreword by Francis Fukuyama (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). 2 Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004). 3 On redistributive economic systems in general, see Karl Polanyi, “The Economy as an Instituted Process,” in Polanyi and C.

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In addition to being unable to resolve the fundamental dilemma of the free rider problem we cannot explain the enormous investment that every society makes in legitimacy.” Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981), pp. 46–47. 31 Trivers, “Reciprocal Altruism.” 32 On this general topic, see Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992), chap. 13–17. 33 Robert H. Frank, Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). 34 Ibid., pp. 21–25. Conversely, low-status human beings often suffer from chronic depression and have been successfully treated with Prozac, Zoloft, and other so-called selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, which increase levels of brain serotonin.

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Three Books Against the Simoniacs (Humbert of Moyenmoutier) Three Dynasties Three Gorges Dam Three Kingdoms Tibet Tiger, Lionel Tilly, Charles Time of Troubles Timor-Leste Tocqueville, Alexis de Togo Tokugawa shogunate Tolstoy, Leo Tonga Tönnies, Ferdinand Tower of Babel, biblical story of Transoxania Transparency International Transylvania tribal societies; Arab; Chinese; European; Indian; in Latin America; law and justice in; legitimacy in; military slavery and; mitigation of conflict in; persistence to present day of; property in; religion in; state-level societies compared to; transition from or band-level organization to; Turkish; warfare and conquest by; see also kinship; lineage; specific tribes Trivers, Robert Trobriand Islands Tudors Tunisia Tuoba tribe Turcoman tribes Turenne, Henri de La Tour d’Auvergne, Vicomte de Turgot, Anne-Robert-Jacques Turkana people Turkish Republic Turks; in Abbasid empire; in China; in Hungary; in India; in Transylvania; see also Ottoman Empire Tursun Bey Tylor, Edward Ukraine ulama Umar, Caliph Umayyad dynasty United Nations United States; accountability in; Afghanistan and; antistatist traditions in; bureaucracy in; during cold war; dysfunctional political equilibrium in; economic crises in; homicide in; invasion of Iraq by; Japan and; local governments in; military of; modernization theory in; patronage politics in; per capital spending on government services in; rule of law in; slavery in; South Korea and; taxation in Urban II, Pope urban centers, see cities Uthman, Caliph Uzbekistan Vaishyas Vanuatu Varangians Vedas Velasco, Andres Vena, King venal officeholding: in England; in France; in Russia; in Spain Venezuela Venice, republic of Vietnam Vikings Vinogradoff, Paul violence; in agrarian societies; in chimpanzee society; in China; as driver of state formation; in England; in France; in India; in prehistoric societies; property rights and; religion and; in Russia; in state of nature; see also war Vladimir, Prince Voltaire Vorontsov, Count Vrijjis, gana-sangha chiefdom of Wahhabism Wales Wallis, John Wang, Empress of China Wang family Wang Mang Wanli emperor waqfs (Muslim charity) war; civil, see civil war; counterinsurgency; financing of; institutional innovations brought on by; in Malthusian world; in Muslim states; prisoners of; religion and; state formation driven by; in state of nature; technology of; tribal; see also specific wars War and Peace (Tolstoy) Warring States period; cities during; cultural outpourings during; education and literacy during; infantry/cavalry warfare during; kinship groupings during; map of; road and canal construction during Wealth of Nations, The (Smith) Weber, Max; on bureaucracy; on charismatic authority; on feudalism; modernization theory of; on religion Wei, state of Wei Dynasty Weingast, Barry Wei state well-field system Wen, Emperor of China Wendi, Emperor of China Westphalia, Peace of Whig history White, Leslie William I, King of England William III (William of Orange), King of England Wittfogel, Karl Woolcock, Michael World Bank World Trade Organization World War I Worms, Concordat of Wrangham, Richard Wriston, Walter Wu, Emperor of China Wu Zhao (Empress Wu) Xia Dynasty Xian, Duke Xianbei tribe Xiang Yu Xiao, Duke Xiao-wen, Emperor of China Xin dynasty Xiongnu tribe Xi Xia tribe Xu, Empress of China Xun Zi Yale University Yan, Empress of China Yangdi, Emperor of China Yang family Yang Jian Yangshao period Yanomamö Indians Y chromosome Yellow Turban rebellion Ying Zheng Young Turk movement Yuan Dynasty Yuezhi Yugoslavia Yurok Indians Yushchenko, Viktor Zaire Zakaria, Fareed zemskiy sobor zero-sum games Zhang Shicheng Zhao Kuangyin Zheng He Zhongzong, Emperor of China Zhou Dynasty; bureaucracy during; Confucianism during; Eastern (see also Spring and Autumn period; Warring States period); feudalism of; Later; Mandate of Heaven and; Western Zhu Yuangzhang Zi Chan Zoloft Zoroastrianism A NOTE ABOUT THE AUTHOR Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and Resident at the Center for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. He has taught at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University and at the George Mason University School of Public Policy. He was a researcher at the RAND Corporation and served as the deputy director in the State Department’s policy planning staff. He is the author of The End of History and the Last Man, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, and America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy.

Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy
by Francis Fukuyama
Published 29 Sep 2014

Wilson, Woodrow “winner-take-all” society Wolfenson, James Woolcock, Michael workers working class; conversion into middle class; voting by World Bank; Worldwide Governance Indicators World Bank Institute World Values Survey World War I World War II; Japan’s defeat in Wrong, Michela Wu Zhao Xi Jinping Yamagata Aritomo Yang, Dali Yang, Hongxing Yanukovich, Viktor Yar’Adua, Umaru Musa Yemen Yrigoyen, Hipólito Yugoslavia Zaire Zakaria, Fareed Zambia Zanzibar Zenawi, Meles Zhao, Dingxin Zhou Enlai Zhu Yuangzhang Zimbabwe ALSO BY FRANCIS FUKUYAMA The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy State-Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-first Century Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity The End of History and the Last Man About the Author Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

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Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University and at the George Mason University School of Public Policy. Fukuyama was a researcher at the RAND Corporation and served on the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff. He is the author of The Origins of Political Order, The End of History and the Last Man, Trust, and America at the Crossroads. He lives with his wife in California. Farrar, Straus and Giroux 18 West 18th Street, New York 10011 Copyright © 2014 by Francis Fukuyama All rights reserved First edition, 2014 eBooks may be purchased for business or promotional use. For information on bulk purchases, please contact Macmillan Corporate and Premium Sales Department by writing to MacmillanSpecialMarkets@macmillan.com.

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Gellner makes the comparison of European nationalism and Middle Eastern Islamism in Nations and Nationalism, pp. 75–89. A variant of this argument is also made in Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). See also Francis Fukuyama, “Identity, Immigration, and Liberal Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 17, no. 2 (2006): 5–20. 30: THE MIDDLE CLASS AND DEMOCRACY’S FUTURE 1. This chapter expands on Francis Fukuyama, “The Future of History,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 1 (2012): 53–61. 2. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p. 124. Gellner also makes this argument in Culture, Identity, and Politics. See also Fukuyama, “Identity, Immigration, and Liberal Democracy.” 3.

The Abandonment of the West
by Michael Kimmage
Published 21 Apr 2020

Bloom, Closing of the American Mind, 322, 320, 321, 380, 256. 31. Bloom, Closing of the American Mind, 312, 79, 382. 32. See Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” National Interest, no. 16 (Summer 1989): 3–18; and Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 33. On the CIA and Nelson Mandela, see Borstelmann, Cold War and the Color Line, 156. 34. Fukuyama, End of History, 323, 48. 35. Fukuyama, End of History, xiii, 7, 48. 36. Fukuyama, End of History, 18. 37. Fukuyama, End of History, 45. CHAPTER SIX: THE POST–COLUMBIAN REPUBLIC, 1992–2016 1. McNeill, Pursuit of Truth, 133, 136. 2.

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The romance of the American West signaled the application of European power, technology and law outside of Europe. It was civilization on the frontier, the opposite of civilization as decadence or overrefinement, civilization honored in the breach, mythically vigorous and thrilling. (Francis Fukuyama would conclude the End of History [1992] with a long comparison of the Western triumph after 1989 and the winning of the American West in the nineteenth century.) The historical reality was distressingly at odds with Teddy Roosevelt’s Western romance: the suppression of Native peoples and the theft of their land, the crimes of civilizational entitlement and of empire.

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Perhaps the victorious West could absolve itself of its own guilt, of American misdeeds in Vietnam or of Europe’s misdeeds in Africa, in a new birth of freedom outside of Europe. Simplified story lines in Eastern Europe and Africa alike, these simultaneous liberations were the most captivating news of 1989 and 1990.33 Liberation had great currency for the author of The End of History and the Last Man. From the nineteenth-century German philosopher Hegel, Francis Fukuyama adopted the notion that all people seek recognition in addition to physical well-being. Tracking this notion, Fukuyama regarded much human history until the Renaissance as deformed by a master-slave dynamic. A few masters robbed the many slaves of recognition.

The Age of Illusions: How America Squandered Its Cold War Victory
by Andrew J. Bacevich
Published 7 Jan 2020

“Responses to Fukuyama,” National Interest (Summer 1989). 30. Strobe Talbott, “The Beginning of Nonsense,” Time (September 11, 1989). 31. For contemporaneous synopses of that debate, see Henry Allen, “The End. Or Is It? Francis Fukuyama and the Schism over His Ism,” Washington Post (September 27, 1989); and Richard Bernstein, “The End of History, Explained for the Second Time,” New York Times (December 10, 1989). 32. Francis Fukuyama, “After Neoconservatism,” New York Times Magazine (February 19, 2006). 3. KICKING 41 TO THE CURB 1. For a colorful contemporaneous account of Trump’s troubles, see Marie Brenner, “After the Gold Rush,” Vanity Fair (September 1990). 2.

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Just three months prior to the opening of the Berlin Wall, an article published in the National Interest, a Washington-based quarterly of meager circulation, had created among policy intellectuals a remarkable stir. The author was Francis Fukuyama, hitherto a little-known policy analyst. The title of the piece that vaulted him to instantaneous fame: “The End of History?” The cautious question mark reflected an editorial misjudgment. Given the essay’s expansive claims and eventual impact, an exclamation point would have been far more appropriate. As a milestone in American intellectual history, Fukuyama’s essay belongs in the category of writings that capture something essential about the moment in which they appear, while simultaneously shaping expectations about what lies ahead.

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For an important and underappreciated accounting, incorporating both second thoughts and sober reflection, see Derek Leebaert, The Fifty-Year Wound (New York, 2002). 21. Alfred Thayer Mahan, “The United States Looking Outward,” Atlantic (December 1890). 22. Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History” (1893). 23. Rudyard Kipling, “The White Man’s Burden” (1899). 24. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” National Interest (Summer 1989). 25. “X” [George F. Kennan], “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs (July 1947). 26. Walter Lippmann, The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Harper, 1947). For an excerpt, see https://www.learner.org/workshops/primarysources/coldwar/docs/lippman.html, accessed July 12, 2017. 27.

The Retreat of Western Liberalism
by Edward Luce
Published 20 Apr 2017

In 1989 its schism was healed. By unifying its booming western wing with the shrivelled post-Stalinist eastern one, there was no longer any quarrel between the present and the present. Shortly before the Berlin Wall fell, Francis Fukuyama published his famous essay, ‘The End of History?’. ‘What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War . . . but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government,’ he wrote.1 Though I did not subscribe to Fukuyama’s view of the ideal society I shared his relief.

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It would be lethal malpractice to continue writing off half of society as hidebound. Someone once said that the difference between erotica and pornography is the lighting. There is an equally hazy line between illiberal democracy and autocracy. We will know the difference when we see it. NOTES Preface 1 Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’, National Interest (summer 1989). 2 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes, 1941–1991 (Abacus, London, 1995). 3 Dan Jones, Magna Carta: The Birth of Liberty (Viking, New York, 2015), p. 4. 4 Interview with the author, January 2017. 5 Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World: And the Rise of the Rest (Penguin, New York, 2009). 6 Henry Kissinger, World Order (Penguin, New York, 2014).

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Since the turn of the millennium, and particularly over the last decade, no fewer than twenty-five democracies have failed around the world, three of them in Europe (Russia, Turkey and Hungary). In all but Tunisia, the Arab Spring was swallowed by the summer heat. Is the Western god of liberal democracy failing? ‘It is an open question whether this is a market correction in democracy, or a global depression,’ Francis Fukuyama tells me.4 The backlash of the West’s middle classes, who are the biggest losers in a global economy that has been rapidly converging, but still has decades to go, has been brewing since the early 1990s. In Britain we call them the ‘left-behinds’. In France, they are the ‘couches moyennes’. In America, they are the ‘squeezed middle’.

Why Liberalism Failed
by Patrick J. Deneen
Published 9 Jan 2018

Nicholas Carr, The Shallows: What the Internet Is Doing to our Brains (New York: Norton, 2010). 3. Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other (New York: Basic, 2011). 4. Neil Postman, Technopoly: The Surrender of Culture to Technology (New York: Vintage, 1993). 5. Ibid., 28. 6. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992); Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002). 7. Daniel J. Boorstin, The Republic of Technology: Reflections on Our Future Community (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 5. 8. Stephen Marche, “Is Facebook Making Us Lonely?”

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Liberalism is credited with the cessation of religious war, the opening of an age of tolerance and equality, the expanding spheres of personal opportunity and social interaction that today culminate in globalization, and the ongoing victories over sexism, racism, colonialism, heteronormativity, and a host of other unacceptable prejudices that divide, demean, and segregate. Liberalism’s victory was declared to be unqualified and complete in 1989 in the seminal article “The End of History” by Francis Fukuyama, written following the collapse of the last competing ideological opponent.5 Fukuyama held that liberalism had proved itself the sole legitimate regime on the basis that it had withstood all challengers and defeated all competitors and further, that it worked because it accorded with human nature.

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The culture offers entertaining prophecies born of our anxieties, and we take perverse pleasure distracting ourselves with portrayals of our powerlessness. One example of this genre of technological (as well as political) inevitability, albeit framed in a triumphalist mode, is the narrative advanced by Francis Fukuyama in his famous essay, and later book, The End of History. The book, in particular, provides a long materialist explanation of the inescapable scientific logic, driven by the need for constant advances in military technology, contributing to the ultimate rise of the liberal state. Only the liberal state, in Fukuyama’s view, could provide the environment for the open scientific inquiry that has led to the greatest advances in military devices and tactics.

The Great Surge: The Ascent of the Developing World
by Steven Radelet
Published 10 Nov 2015

John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, “The State of the State: The Global Contest for the Future of Government,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2014, p. 119. 3. Samuel Huntington, “Democracy’s Third Wave,” Journal of Democracy 2, no. 2 (Spring 1991): 15–16, www.ou.edu/uschina/gries/articles/IntPol/Huntington.91.Demo.3rd.pdf/. 4. Francis Fukuyama, “At the ‘End of History’ Still Stands Democracy,” Wall Street Journal, June 6, 2014, www.wsj.com/articles/at-the-end-of-history-still-stands-democracy-1402080661. 5. Alan Neuhauser, “U.S., China Reach Historic Climate Accord,” U.S. News and World Report, November 12, 2014, www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/11/12/us-china-reach-historic-climate-change-accord. 6.

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—George Soros, chairman of Soros Fund Management “Steven Radelet’s brilliant new book demonstrates how the world has actually gotten better in recent years, not by a little but by a lot. This is a careful antidote to today’s fashionable pessimism and should be read by everyone.” —Francis Fukuyama, author of The End of History “With the airwaves filled with news of insurrection, desperation and stubborn diseases, this book jars you out of a cliched response. With his typical care and detail, Steve describes humanity’s greatest hits over the last twenty years—never have we lived in a time when so many are doing so well.

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People around the world could watch in real time as Marcos boarded a plane to flee to Hawaii, Chinese protestors stood up in Tiananmen Square, the Berlin Wall fell, governments in Eastern Europe collapsed, and Mandela walked out of jail. By the early 1990s, dramatic change had begun, as political scientist and author Francis Fukuyama described in his masterpiece The End of History and the Last Man: The most remarkable development of the last quarter of the twentieth century has been the revelation of enormous weaknesses at the core of the world’s seemingly strong dictatorships, whether they be of the military-authoritarian Right, or the communist-totalitarian Left.

American Secession: The Looming Threat of a National Breakup
by F. H. Buckley
Published 14 Jan 2020

When a state liberalized its economy it would create a middle class that would demand political freedom. That seemed to be what had happened in Chile, when the freemarket Pinochet regime was followed by a liberal democracy. Insofar as this pattern was spreading around the globe, it represented what Francis Fukuyama called “the end of history,” the point where the big questions of politics have been settled. The best possible kind of state is one with a free-market economy and guarantees of personal and political liberty.1 That’s as good as it gets. But now China presents us with a rival model, a “Beijing Consensus,” granting its people economic freedoms while denying them political liberty.

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Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin, 1954), pp. 226–27. 16 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954), p. 25. 17 Melanie Mason, “Single-payer healthcare could cost $400 billion to implement in California,” Los Angeles Times, May 22, 2017. CHAPTER 8—BIGNESS AND FREEDOM 1 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon, 1992), p. 204. 2 World Bank, State of the Poor, April 17, 2013. 3 George Orwell, “The Freedom of the Press,” unused preface to Animal Farm published in the Times Literary Supplement, September 15, 1972. 4 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Part 2, Bk. 11.6, in Œuvres complètes (Paris: Gallimard, 1952), p. 397. 5 Others are the Polity IV measure of constitutional democracy, Tatu Vanhalen’s assessment of participatory democracy, and the measure of contested democracy provided by Adam Przeworski and his colleagues.

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—William Bennett, former Secretary of Education This is Buckley at his colorful, muckraking best—an intelligent, powerful, but depressing argument laced with humor. —Gordon S. Wood, Pulitzer Prize winner Praise for The Way Back: Restoring the Promise of America Frank Buckley marshals tremendous data and insight in a compelling study. —Francis Fukuyama Best book of the year. —Michael Anton Praise for The Once and Future King: The Rise of Crown Government in America His prose explodes with energy. —James Ceasar THE LOOMING THREAT OF A NATIONAL BREAKUP American Secession F. H. BUCKLEY © 2020 by F.H. Buckley All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of Encounter Books, 900 Broadway, Suite 601, New York, New York, 10003.

The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities
by John J. Mearsheimer
Published 24 Sep 2018

Jeremy Waldron, “How Judges Should Judge,” review of Justice in Robes, by Ronald Dworkin, New York Review of Books, August 10, 2006. 34. Quotes in this paragraph are from Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, pp. 296, 298, 338. 35. Quotes in this paragraph are from Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, pp. 128, 294, 332, 334. Not surprisingly, Fukuyama is even less confident today about his 1989 predictions than he was when he wrote The End of History and the Last Man in 1992. See, for example, Francis Fukuyama, “At the ‘End of History’ Still Stands Democracy,” Wall Street Journal, June 6, 2014. 36. Stephen Holmes, “The Scowl of Minerva,” New Republic, March 23, 1992, p. 28.

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Until the Cold War ended, however, spreading liberal democracy always took a backseat to hard-nosed policies based on power politics, which sometimes involved overthrowing democratically elected leaders and having cozy relations with brutal autocrats. The United States, in other words, was not in a position to adopt liberal hegemony until 1989. 3. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” National Interest, no. 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3–18. Also see Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 4. “The 1992 Campaign; Excerpts from Speech by Clinton on U.S. Role,” New York Times, October 2, 1992. 5. “President Discusses the Future of Iraq,” Hilton Hotel, Washington, DC, February 26, 2003.

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To be fair, Dworkin understands that applying moral principles to hard cases will be an especially difficult task, which is why he calls his ideal judge “Hercules.” Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 238–40. 31. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992), p. xii. The remaining quotes in this paragraph are from Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” pp. 4, 5, 18. 32. The quotes in this paragraph are from Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (New York: Viking, 2011), pp. 182, 650, 662, 690–91. On page 692, Pinker, sounding like Fukuyama talking about the ineluctable spread of liberal democracy, writes that “many liberalizing reforms that originated in Western Europe or on the American coasts have been emulated, after a time lag, by the more conservative parts of the world.” 33.

Ten Lessons for a Post-Pandemic World
by Fareed Zakaria
Published 5 Oct 2020

,” New York Times, October 8, 2018. 62 “Another ideological god has failed”: Martin Wolf, “Seeds of Its Own Destruction: The Scope of Government Is Again Widening and the Era of Free-Wheeling Finance Is Over,” Financial Times, March 8, 2009. 62 “Capitalism will be different”: Joe Weisenthal, “Geithner Tells Charlie Rose: Capitalism Will Be Different,” Business Insider, March 11, 2009. 62 Could we do so again?: For another observer skeptical that this will mean a break with free market orthodoxy, see: Lane Kenworthy, “The Pandemic Won’t Usher In an American Welfare State,” Foreign Affairs, May 1, 2020. 63 “end of history”: Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 63 “We can only harness”: President William J. Clinton, “Remarks on Signing the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act,” December 8, 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1993, Book II), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-1993-book2/html/PPP-1993-book2-doc-pg2139-3.htm. 63 “golden straitjacket”: Thomas L.

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All societies from the earliest of times began with political systems that Max Weber famously described as “patrimonial,” meaning simply rule by a strongman. The regime was just his family, friends, and allies. Political power and economic power were fused, creating a system that was deeply unrepresentative yet effective. Francis Fukuyama describes the strength of patrimonial systems: “They are constructed using the basic building blocks of human sociability, that is, the biological inclination of people to favor family and friends with whom they have exchanged reciprocal favors.” The patrimonial system has deep roots in human society and has lasted through the millennia.

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He begins with the failure of American government during the pandemic but goes well beyond it, asking why the United States can no longer imagine and execute large projects—building more housing and better infrastructure, reviving manufacturing at home, expanding higher education to millions more people, and so on. He offers some theories: inertia, a lack of imagination, and the influence of established incumbents wary of competition. But the real reason is much deeper than that. America has become what Francis Fukuyama calls a “vetocracy.” The system of checks and balances, replicated at every level of government, ensures that someone, somewhere can always block any positive action. The United States has become a nation of naysayers. Marc Dunkelman, a tenacious researcher, spent years digging into the history of efforts to renovate and rebuild Manhattan’s Pennsylvania Station.

The Light That Failed: A Reckoning
by Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes
Published 31 Oct 2019

Michiko Kakutani, The Death of Truth: Notes on Falsehood in the Age of Trump (Tim Duggan Books, 2018), p. 26. 12. Ben Rhodes, The World as It Is: A Memoir of the Obama White House (Random House, 2018). 13. Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’, National Interest (Summer 1989), pp. 12, 3, 5, 8, 13; The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992), p. 45. 14. Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’, p. 12. 15. If describing American-style liberalism as the final stage of history felt unremarkable to many Americans, it felt the same not only to dissidents but also to ordinary people who grew up behind the Iron Curtain.

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Special thanks go to our agent Toby Mundy and our editor Casiana Ionita for their steady encouragement and thoughtful advice. As usual, Yana Papazova’s tireless assistance proved invaluable. Notes INTRODUCTION: IMITATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 1. Robert Cooper, ‘The Meaning of 1989’, The Prospect (20 December 1999). 2. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992), p. 46. 3. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Timothy Garton Ash, Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West (Random House, 2004). 4.

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Bagger describes the West German consensus on this after 1989 as follows: ‘China would only be able to continue its miraculous economic rise if it introduced individual liberties. Only a free and open society could unleash the creativity that was at the core of economic innovation and success in the information age.’ Thomas Bagger, ‘The World According to Germany: Reassessing 1989’, Washington Quarterly (22 January 2019), p. 55. 8. Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’, National Interest (Summer 1989), p. 12. 9. ‘China is reversing the commonly held vision of technology as a great democratizer, bringing people more freedom and connecting them to the world. In China, it has brought control.’ Paul Mozur, ‘Inside China’s Dystopian Dreams: A.I., Shame and Lots of Cameras’, The New York Times (8 June 2018). 10.

Pax Technica: How the Internet of Things May Set Us Free or Lock Us Up
by Philip N. Howard
Published 27 Apr 2015

And online search habits leading up to an election help predict which candidates will win.43 Around the world, being a modern politician means more than having a decent website. It means being able to work with the information infrastructure that young citizens are using to form their political identities. Ideologies, like governments, have lost much of their ability to exclusively and comprehensively frame events. Indeed, the claim of Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History” argument is that there will be no more great ideologies because capitalism has triumphed over all of its rivals. While it may be true that there have been no great ideologies since the arrival of the civilian internet, it’s also true that when there are ideological battles, they happen online.

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“Hooking up,” Economist, January 31, 2013, accessed September 30, 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/international/21571126-new-data-flows-highlight-relative-decline-west-hooking-up. 7. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 8. World Affairs Council, “Press Conference” (Regent Beverly Wilshire Hotel, April 19, 1994); Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006); G. John Ikenberry, “The Myth of Post–Cold War Chaos,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 3 (May 1996): 79–91. 9. James Ball, “Meet the Seven People Who Hold the Keys to Worldwide Internet Security,” Guardian, February 28, 2014, accessed September 30, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/feb/28/seven-people-keys-worldwide-internet-security-web; “Internet Society,” accessed June 16, 2014, http://www.internetsociety.org/; “ICANN,” accessed June 16, 2014, https://www.icann.org/. 10.

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Cisco, Cisco Visual Networking Index: Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast Update, 2013–2018 (San Jose, CA: Cisco, February 2014), accessed September 30, 2014, http://cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/visual-networking-index-vni/white_paper_c11–520862.html. 25. Larry Diamond, “Why Are There No Arab Democracies?” Journal of Democracy 21, no. 1 (2010): 93–112. 26. Howard and Hussain, Democracy’s Fourth Wave? 27. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, reissue ed. (New York: Free Press, 2006). 28. Clive Southey, “The Staples Thesis, Common Property, and Homesteading,” Canadian Journal of Economics 11, no. 3 (1978): 547–59, doi:10.2307/134323. 29. Lita Person, Mobile Wallet (NFC, Digital Wallet) Market (Applications, Mode of Payment, Stakeholders, and Geography)—Global Share, Size, Industry Analysis, Trends, Opportunities, Growth, and Forecast, 2012–2020 (Portland, OR: Allied Market Research, November 2013), accessed September 30, 2014, http://www.alliedmarketresearch.com/mobile-wallet-market; Marion Williams, “The Regulatory Tension over Mobile Money,” Australian Banking and Finance, February 17, 2014, accessed September 30, 2014, http://www.australianbankingfinance.com/banking/the-regulatory-tension-over-mobile-money/. 30.

Trust: The Social Virtue and the Creation of Prosperity
by Francis Fukuyama
Published 1 Jan 1995

Now that the question of ideology and institutions has been settled, the preservation and accumulation of social capital will occupy center stage. NOTES CHAPTER 1. ON THE HUMAN SITUATION AT THE END OF HISTORY 1See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 2For an excellent discussion of the origins of civil society and its relationship to democracy, see Ernest Gellner, Conditions and Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1994). 3For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Francis Fukuyama, “The Primacy of Culture,” Journal of Democracy 6 (1995): 7-14. 4Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?”

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For a hostile Western account of the literature on Japanese uniqueness, or nihonjinron, see Peter N. Dale, The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986). CHAPTER 30. AFTER THE END OF SOCIAL ENGINEERING 1See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 2In addition, virtually all of the central themes of this book concerning the importance of culture to economic behavior were anticipated in my earlier work. See Fukuyama (1992), chaps. 20, 21; and “The End of History?” National Interest, no. 16 (Summer 1989): 3-18, where I discuss the Weber hypothesis and the impact of culture. 3This point is argued in David Gellner, “Max Weber: Capitalism and the Religion of India,” Sociology 16 (1982): 526-543. 4Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), vol 1. 5This point is made in Ernest Gellner, Plough, Sword, and Book: The Structure of Human History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 39-69.

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THE SPIRITUALIZATION OF ECONOMIC LIFE 1The correlation between democracy and development is explored by Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53 (1959): 69-105. For a review of the literature on the Lipset hypothesis that largely confirms this point, see Larry Diamond, “Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered,” American Behavioral Scientist 15 (March-June 1992): 450-499. 2For a summary of this argument, see Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992), pp. xi-xxiii. 3This is described on pp. 143-180 of Fukuyama (1992). 4Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982), p. 50. 5Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before Its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).

Twilight of Abundance: Why the 21st Century Will Be Nasty, Brutish, and Short
by David Archibald
Published 24 Mar 2014

CHAPTER SIX CHINA WANTS A WAR And there appeared another wonder in heaven; and behold a great red dragon, having seven heads and ten horns, and seven crowns upon his heads. —Revelation 12:3 After the collapse of most Communist states in 1990, the world appeared to have entered a period of permanent peace. Stanford University–based political scientist Francis Fukuyama called it “the end of history,” in which democracy and free-market capitalism would become the final form of human government.1 In response to Fukuyama’s 1992 book, Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington penned an article entitled “The Clash of Civilizations?,” which he expanded into a 1996 book entitled The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.2 Huntington argued that now that the age of ideological conflict between Communism and capitalism had ended, civilizational conflict, the normal state of affairs in the world, would reassert itself.

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Originally published as Der Untergang des Abenlandes, Munich: C. H. Beck’sche Verlagbuchhandlung, 1918. Chapter 1: The Time Is at Hand 1.Alexandra Smith, “Food, Too, Is Wasted on the Young,” Sydney Morning Herald, June 20, 2012, http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/food-too-is-wasted-on-the-young-20120719-22d32.html. 2.Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 3.Eigil Friis-Christensen and Knud Lassen, “Length of the Solar Cycle: An Indicator of Solar Activity Closely Associated with Climate,” Science 254 (1991): 698–700. 4.David Archibald, The Past and Future of Climate (Rhaetian Management, 2010). 5.J.

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Martin’s Griffin, 2013). 6.Chernobyl: Assessment of Radiological and Health Impacts, 2002 update of Chernobyl: Ten Years On (Nuclear Energy Agency, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2002), http://www.oecd-nea.org/rp/chernobyl/. Chapter 6: China Wants a War 1.Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 2.Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). 3.Edward Luttwark, The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2012). 4.Paul Monk, “A Fox’s Thoughts about China and Australia’s Security,” Quadrant, April 2013. 5.Manuel Quinones, “Alternative Fuels: Coal-to-Liquids’ Prospects Dim, but Boosters Won’t Say Die,” Greenwire, May 17, 2013, http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059981383. 6.Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S.

The Fourth Revolution: The Global Race to Reinvent the State
by John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge
Published 14 May 2014

Ibid., p. 113. 11. Ibid., p. 34. 12. Ibid., p. 25. 13. “New Cradles to Graves,” The Economist, September 8, 2012. 14. “Asia’s Next Revolution,” ibid. 15. “Widefare,” The Economist, July 6, 2013. 16. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” National Interest, Summer 1989. 17. Joint news conference in Washington, D.C., October 29, 1997. 18. Fukuyama, “The End of History.” 19. Kurlantzik, Democracy in Retreat, p. 201. 20. Ibid., p. 7. 21. Bertelsmann Foundation, “All Over the World, the Quality of Democratic Governance Is Declining” (press release), November 29, 2009. 22.

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In South Korea, for instance, about 80 percent of what you get out of the system is tied to what you put in.15 In Asia as a whole, public-health spending is still only 2.5 percent of GDP, compared with about 7 percent in the OECD group of rich nations. The second reason is the crisis of the Western model of democracy and free-market capitalism. In the 1990s Lee’s lectures on Asian values seemed somewhat eccentric, even to Asians. The Washington consensus was sweeping all before it. Francis Fukuyama talked about “the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism.”16 Rather than associating Deng Xiaoping’s China with economic greatness, Americans thought of the lone student walking toward the tanks in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Bill Clinton told China’s president, Jiang Zemin, to his face that he was “on the wrong side of ­history.”17 The Asian economic crisis in 1997 only reinforced the conceit of Western democracy, especially when the IMF had to launch a $40 billion program to help South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia, which had all borrowed too much from foreign banks.

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Between January 2009 and November 2013, when the Democrats finally changed the filibuster procedure, seventy-nine of Barack Obama’s nominees were blocked, forcing the president to appoint people while the Senate was in recess (itself something of an abuse of power).6 Obama struggled to get Republican senators to let him appoint Chuck Hagel as his defense secretary, even though Hagel was both a decorated military veteran and a former Republican senator. Even allowing for the 2013 reform, the American political system continues to give extraordinary power to individual politicians to gum up the works. It remains what Francis Fukuyama has dubbed a “vetocracy.” Mill and Tocqueville would have been nervous about fiddling with the checks and balances that were designed to protect liberty. The other two structural problems, gerrymandering and money politics, even though they find some protection in the Constitution, seem far more alien to any idea of liberty.

The End of Power: From Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States, Why Being in Charge Isn’t What It Used to Be
by Moises Naim
Published 5 Mar 2013

In 2004, Hezbollah flew a drone into Israeli air space; the Israeli military downed it, but the psychological effect of the violation, and the message it sent about Hezbollah’s capacities, endures.30 What happens when any disaffected, delusional, or deranged individual has the capacity to wreak havoc from the sky? As Stanford University’s Francis Fukuyama, who has been building his own drone to take better nature photos, has observed: “As the technology becomes cheaper and more commercially available, moreover, drones may become harder to trace; without knowing their provenance, deterrence breaks down. A world in which people can be routinely and anonymously targeted by unseen enemies is not pleasant to contemplate.”31 Drones are hyper-sophisticated compared with the most devastating weapon in military conflicts of the past few years—the improvised explosive device.

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Having a more diverse and inclusive group of actors at the table (the erstwhile “weak”) and reducing the number of decisions arbitrarily imposed on the world by a few powerful players are worth applauding, but the heightened difficulty of getting things done is not. POLITICAL PARALYSIS AS COLLATERAL DAMAGE OF THE DECAY OF POWER That paralysis has become acutely evident in the United States. As politics has become more polarized, the defects of a system overloaded with checks and balances have become more apparent. Francis Fukuyama calls this system a “vetocracy.” He writes: “Americans take great pride in a constitution that limits executive power through a series of checks and balances. But those checks have metastasized. And now America is a vetocracy. When this system is combined with ideologized parties, . . . the result is paralysis. . . .

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Not just in the corridors of presidential palaces, corporate headquarters, and university boardrooms but even more so in encounters around watercoolers in offices, in casual conversations among friends, and at the dinner table at home. These conversations are the indispensable ingredients of a political climate that is less welcoming to the terrible simplifiers. For as Francis Fukuyama correctly argues, to eradicate the vetocracy that is paralyzing the system, “political reform must first and foremost be driven by popular, grassroots mobilization.”5 This, in turn, requires focusing the conversation on how to contain the negative aspects of the decay of power and move us to the positive sloping side of the inverted U-curve.

How Democracy Ends
by David Runciman
Published 9 May 2018

4Something better? CONCLUSION This is how democracy ends EPILOGUE 20 January 2053 FURTHER READING ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS NOTES INDEX PREFACE Thinking the unthinkable NOTHING LASTS FOREVER. At some point democracy was always going to pass into the pages of history. No one, not even Francis Fukuyama – who announced the end of history back in 1989 – has believed that its virtues make it immortal.1 But until very recently, most citizens of Western democracies would have imagined that the end was a long way off. They would not have expected it to happen in their lifetimes. Very few would have thought it might be taking place before their eyes.

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When another democracy starts to fall apart, we want to know if it’s a warning of our own possible fate. Democratic politics is hungry for morality tales, so long as it is someone else who is living them. In the late 1980s many Western commentators viewed Japan as the coming power: the twenty-first century would be the Japanese century. Francis Fukuyama cited Japan (along with the EU) as the likeliest illustration of what we could expect from the end of history: the triumph of democracy would turn out to be stable, prosperous, efficient and just a little bit boring. Then the Japanese bubble burst – along with the Japanese stock market – and the future belonged to someone else. Japan became instead a fable about the dangers of hubris.

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They identify trustworthy institutions as the key to political stability. This is a more accessible version of their classic earlier book, The Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). The initial book has some equations in it; the later one doesn’t. Francis Fukuyama, still best known for The End of History and the Last Man (New York and London: Free Press, 1992), gives his own account of the rise and possible fall of democracy in The Origins of Political Order (New York: Farrer, Straus & Giroux; London: Profile, 2012) and Political Order and Political Decay (New York: Farrer, Straus & Giroux, 2014; London: Profile, 2015).

Broke: How to Survive the Middle Class Crisis
by David Boyle
Published 15 Jan 2014

It isn’t sudden middle-class impoverishment by unemployment that is really the most important story — though it happens in economic downturns of course — it is the slow impoverishment of middle-class professionals, the constriction of their room for manoeuvre, their status and then their salary too. The political thinker Francis Fukuyama caused a storm of intellectual excitement after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 by proclaiming ‘the End of History’. He became, rather reluctantly, part of the intellectual underpinnings of a new kind of deregulated ideal, the one that fell to pieces in the banking crash of 2008. These days, he finds himself in rather different company, and has recently begun a defence of the embattled American middle classes.[23] What he described as ‘happy talk about the wonders of the knowledge economy’, hailing a new economy based exclusively on service and finance, was actually a ‘gauzy veil placed over the hard facts of deindustrialization’.

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There certainly is a middle-class problem in the USA, where 4 million families are believed to be in danger of sliding into poverty and one in four middle-class households are about to drop down onto the lower rung, spending a quarter of their incomes just servicing debt.[22] It is different over there, but there are important parallels between the UK and USA, which is why the Labour leader Ed Miliband borrowed the American phrase ‘squeezed middle’ in 2011. The parallel has also been noticed by one of the most important commentators on world affairs. Francis Fukuyama is busily charting the decline of the middle classes in all developed nations. Into the misty past, the middle classes have benefited from rising above the undifferentiated masses, Fukuyama implies. Now they are being driven back into the undifferentiated mass by a new global elite which is benefiting from the shifts in the financial world over the past generation.

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This period has also coincided with an extraordinary and deeply unpleasant vilification of the working classes, tracked so compellingly by Owen Jones in his polemic Chavs, where mainstream culture and politics alike seem to have become suffused with an unpleasant contempt for anyone who wasn’t middle-class, as if the threat to middle-class values came from below and not from above. Websites like Chavscum were reported in the Daily Telegraph under the headline ‘In defence of snobbery’.[10] As Francis Fukuyama suggested (see previous chapter), the political risks from destroying the middle classes are terrifying. This ‘chavscum’ attitude has fed into the extremes of panic for many middle-class parents desperate to choose the right school for their children, and fearing that a feckless, alien culture would somehow steal their security and poison the minds of their families.

The Corona Crash: How the Pandemic Will Change Capitalism
by Grace Blakeley
Published 14 Oct 2020

, Guardian, 21 April 2020; Jonathan Tepper, ‘Federal Reserve Has Encouraged Moral Hazard on a Grand Scale’, Financial Times, 13 April 2020. 21 Robert Brenner, ‘Escalating Plunder’, New Left Review 123, May-June 2020, pp. 6-9. 22 Geoff Mann, In the Long Run We Are All Dead: Keynesianism, Political Economy, and Revolution London: Verso, 2017. 23 Ellen Meiksins Wood, Democracy Against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism, London: Verso, 2016. 24 Gillian Tett, ‘Why the US Federal Reserve Turned Again to Blackrock for Help’, Financial Times, 26 March 2020; Michael Bird, ‘European Central Bank Hires Blackrock to Help with Loan Purchase Programme’, City A.M., 27 August 2014, cityam.com. 3 The New Imperialism 1 Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’, National Interest, no. 16 (Summer 1989): 3–18, and The End of History and the Last Man, New York: Free Press, 1992; Thomas Friedman, The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century, New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2005. 2 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1, trans. by Ben Fowkes, London: Penguin, 1990, p. 450. 3 There is a long-standing debate in Marxist literature about the class position of the manager: see Nicos Poulantzas, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism, London: Verso, 1975; John Ehrenreich and Barbara Ehrenreich, ‘The Professional-Managerial Class’, in Between Labour and Capital, ed.

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By the end of this crisis, a tiny oligarchy of politicians, central bankers, financiers and corporate executives will have further monopolised wealth and power in the global economy. The challenge for the Left will be to hold them to account. 3 The New Imperialism At the end of the 1980s, as the Iron Curtain fell and free market capitalism spread to most parts of the world, Francis Fukuyama declared the end of history. The evangelists of capital promised an era of opportunity and prosperity, including for poorer nations.1 The 2008 financial crisis shattered this illusion and brought history back with a bang. Resistance to globalisation, once confined to protest movements in the Global South and anarchists in the Global North, began to mount in the very states most integrated into the global economy.

The Ecotechnic Future: Envisioning a Post-Peak World
by John Michael Greer
Published 30 Sep 2009

It’s ironic that one of the best places to begin that discussion is to glance at a recent announcement — ​one of many down through the years — ​that history itself had come to an end. P A R T III P ossi b i l ities The Ecotechnic Promise I 13 n retrospect, 1989 may not have been a good year to announce that history was over. That spring, however, a US State Department official named Francis Fukuyama did just that in an article titled “The End of History?” Later expanded into book form, ­Fukuyama’s claim got the fifteen minutes of fame Andy Warhol claimed everyone would receive in the future and sparked enough controversy in academic circles to justify a small bookshelf of discussions and rebuttals.1 Fukuyama’s announcement is easy to misunderstand and even easier to satirize.

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Political radicals at both ends of the spectrum pounced on Hegel’s ideas before the ink was dry on the first edition of his Philosophy of History. Karl Marx used Hegelian ideas as the foundation for his philosophy of class warfare and Communist revolution, while Giovanni Gentile, the pet philosopher of Mussolini’s Fascist regime in Italy, was also a strict Hegelian. For that matter, Francis Fukuyama, who played Gentile’s role for the neoconservative movement, drew his theory of an end to history straight from Hegel. Still, the spread of Hegel’s ideas isn’t limited to the radical fringes, or even to those who know who Hegel was. When peak oil comes up for discussion outside the activist community, one of the most 229 230 T he E cotechnic F u t u re common responses is,“Oh, they’ll think of something.”

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See Roger Penrose, The Emperor’s New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, and the Laws of Physics, Oxford University Press, 1989, for a thoughtful discussion. 9. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press, 1962. 10. McClenon, Deviant Science. Chapter Thirteen: The Ecotechnic Promise 1. See, for example, Timothy Burns, ed., After History? Francis Fukuyama and his Critics, Rowman and Littlefield, 1994. 2. “We are history’s actors ...when we act, we create our own reality.” This embarrassing display of hubris by a Bush administration staffer is quoted in Ron Suskind, “Faith, certainty, and the presidency of George W. Bush,” New York Times Magazine (17 October 2004). 3.

This America: The Case for the Nation
by Jill Lepore
Published 27 May 2019

By the last quarter of the twentieth century nationalism was, outside of postcolonial states, nearly dead, a stumbling, ghastly wraith. And many intellectuals believed that if they stopped writing national history, nationalism would die sooner, starved, neglected, deserted, a fitting death for a war criminal, destroyer of worlds. Francis Fukuyama’s much-read 1989 essay “The End of History?” appeared three years after Degler delivered his speech, but it remains the best-known illustration of the wisdom of Degler’s warning. At the end of the Cold War, Fukuyama announced that fascism and communism were dead and that nationalism, seemingly all but the last threat to liberalism left standing, was utterly decrepit in Europe (“European nationalism has been defanged”) and that, where it was still kicking in other parts of the world, well, that wasn’t quite nationalism: it was a halting striving for democracy.

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In 1986, when Degler rose from his chair to deliver his presidential address before the American Historical Association, hardly anyone in the academy was writing national history anymore, or making the case for the nation. Degler didn’t have much patience with this. Nor, I suspect, did he have much patience with Francis Fukuyama’s 1989 “The End of History?” Later, after the onset of civil war in Bosnia, the political theorist Michael Walzer grimly announced, “The tribes have returned.” They had never left. They’d only become harder for historians to see, because they weren’t really looking anymore. · XV · THE RETURN OF NATIONALISM To say that events did not bear out foretellings of the death of nationalism is to mute the screams of millions.

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Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2008. DuBois, W. E. B. Black Reconstruction in America. New York: Free Press, 1935. Epps, Garrett. Democracy Reborn: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Fight for Equal Rights in Post–Civil War America. New York: Henry Holt, 2006. Fukuyama, Francis. “The End of History?” The National Interest, Summer 1989. ______ . Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018. Gates, Henry, Jr. Stony the Road: Reconstruction, White Supremacy, and the Rise of Jim Crow. New York: Penguin, 2019. Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism. 2nd ed.

Shadows of Empire: The Anglosphere in British Politics
by Michael Kenny and Nick Pearce
Published 5 Jun 2018

This sustained a ‘distinctive architecture of policy collaboration between these countries’, consisting of transgovernmental elite policy networks addressing common problems and devising shared solutions. Its depth and range suggests a ‘structural multilateral relationship in the Anglosphere, rather than simply bilateral or ad hoc arrangements.’8 From the ‘End of History’ to Iraq In the immediate years after the collapse of Soviet communism, when Francis Fukuyama's contention that liberal-democratic capitalism represented the ‘end of history’, the global dominance of this Anglo-American, liberal economic and political order appeared assured. A long boom, fuelled by global financialisation, was under way. China and India were becoming integrated into the global economy.

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Castles, ‘Australian antecedents of the Third Way’, Political Studies, 50 (2002), pp. 683–702. 7  Commission on Social Justice/Institute for Public Policy Research, Social Justice: Strategies for National Renewal (London: Vintage, 1994). 8  Tim Legrand, ‘Elite, exclusive and elusive: transgovernmental policy networks and iterative policy transfer in the Anglosphere’, Policy Studies, 37/5 (2016), pp. 440–55. 9  Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 1992), p. xxiii. 10  Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The West: unique, not universal’, Foreign Affairs, 75 (1996), pp. 28–46. 11  Rick Fawn, ‘Canada: outside the Anglo-American fold’, in Rick Fawn and Raymond Hinnebusch (eds), The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences (London: Lynne Rienner, 2006). 12  Walter Russell Mead, God and Gold: Britain, America, and the Making of the Modern World (New York: Vintage, 2007). 13  Ibid., p. 314. 14  Ibid., p. 95. 15  Perry Anderson, ‘American foreign policy and its thinkers’, New Left Review, no. 83 (2013) p. 122 [special issue]. 16  The UKIP Manifesto 2015, www.ukip.org/manifesto2015. 17  William Hague, ‘Britain and Australia: making the most of global opportunity’, John Howard Lecture, 17 January 2013, www.menziesrc.org/images/Latest_News/PDF/Britain_and_Australia__making_the_most_of_global_opportunity1.pdf. 18  Boris Johnson, ‘The Aussies are just like us, so let's stop kicking them out’, The Telegraph, 25 August 2013, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10265619/The-Aussies-are-just-like-us-so-lets-stop-kicking-them-out.html. 19  Boris Johnson, Speech at Bloomberg in response to the receipt of Dr Gerard Lyons's publication of ‘The Europe report: a win–win situation’, 6 August 2014, www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/gla_migrate_files_destination/bj-europe-speech.pdf. 20  Tony Abbott, Address to Queen's College, Oxford University, 14 December 2012, www.australiantimes.co.uk/tony-abbott-address-to-queens-college-oxford-university/. 21  See, for example, Owen Paterson, ‘The Anglosphere, trade and international security’, speech to the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, the Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, 25 March 2015, www.uk2020.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/The-Anglosphere-Trade-and-International-Security-UK-2020-25.03.2015-FINAL.pdf. 22  Shashi Parulekar and Joel Kotkin, ‘The state of the Anglosphere’, City Journal (winter 2012), www.city-journal.org/html/state-anglosphere-13447.html. 23  Daniel Hannan, Why America Must Not Follow Europe (New York: Encounter Books, 2011). 7 Brexit: The Anglosphere Triumphant?

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The full story of the emergence of this New Right Anglosphere is yet to be told, primarily because the identity of its main donors and the nature of the relationships between its key figures remain rather opaque.29 Two conferences, organised by the Hudson Institute in 1999 and 2000 in Washington, DC, and Berkshire, brought together what one journalistic observer called ‘the intellectual heart of British-American conservatism’.30 Among the delegates were Thatcher and David Davis MP (later the government minister tasked with negotiating the UK's departure from the EU), leading intellectual conservatives, including Francis Fukuyama, Robert Conquest and Kenneth Minogue, prominent commentators such as James C. Bennett, John O'Sullivan and Owen Harries, the media mogul Conrad Black, and John Hulsman from the Heritage Foundation. Very few American politicians identified with this cause in these years, with the notable exception of the leading Republican Pat Buchanan.

The Future of War
by Lawrence Freedman
Published 9 Oct 2017

Available: http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21693279-how-many-people-has-syrias-civil-war-killed-quantifying-carnage CHAPTER 12 1. Immanuel Kant, Political Writings, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), 100. 2. Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History’, The National Interest (1989). The original essay was developed into a book: Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 3. Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). A key factor according to Huntington was not only the active promotion of democracy by the US and the snowball effect within regions but also the growing opposition of the Catholic Church to authoritarian rule. 4.

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But the spread of democracy was bound to be contentious and would be resisted by autocrats. As European communism imploded Francis Fukuyama of the RAND Corporation announced that this was not just ‘the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history’, but ‘the end of history as such’. By this he meant ‘the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.’2 Talking of the ‘end of history’ invited misinterpretation. He was not suggesting that there would be no more conflict, or other transformational events, only that there was now no serious ideological alternative to the political and economic model that had been embraced by the Western world, to their enormous benefit.

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[ 23 ] Mega-Cities and Climate Change In our world there are still people who run around risking their lives in bloody battles over a name or a flag or a piece of clothing but they tend to belong to gangs with names like the Bloods and the Crips and they make their living dealing drugs. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, The End of History, 19921 As Fukuyama looked with optimism at the West’s liberal triumph in the early 1990s, there was also anxiety about whether a lack of anything serious to fight about would lead it into a soft decadence. The Bloods and the Crips were two famous Los Angeles street gangs. The Bloods were formed at first to resist the influence of the Crips in their neighbourhoods.

The Dying Citizen: How Progressive Elites, Tribalism, and Globalization Are Destroying the Idea of America
by Victor Davis Hanson
Published 15 Nov 2021

“It’s a black thing”: “Mistaken for a Black Thing, Few Strive to Understand It,” Seattle Times, July 4, 2007, www.seattletimes.com/opinion/mistaken-for-a-black-thing-few-strive-to-understand-it; Klan: Sarah Churchwell, “America’s Original Identity Politics,” New York Review of Books, February 7, 2019, www.nybooks.com/daily/2019/02/07/americas-original-identity-politics; Fukuyama: Francis Fukuyama, “Francis Fukuyama—Against Identity Politics,” University of Pennsylvania, www.sas.upenn.edu/andrea-mitchell-center/francis-fukuyama-against-identity-politics. 24. On later embarrassments of Chicano racialist movements: Tim Rutten, “An Identity Issue for Bustamente,” Los Angeles Times, September 6, 2003, www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003-sep-06-et-rutten6-story.html; Matea Gold, “Chicano Student Group Defended,” Los Angeles Times, August 30, 2003, www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003-aug-30-me-mecha30-story.html.

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The civil rights movement finally killed off the dangerous vestiges of the Ku Klux Klan. Yet the latter’s few incoherent remnants are starting to recombobulate in the era of diversity to supposedly preserve their “white” identity by professing a right to emulate the tribal chauvinism of other racial groups. In a series of essays and books, Francis Fukuyama has warned of such unintended consequences of identity politics when all are redefining themselves according to appearance: Perhaps the worst thing about identity politics as currently practiced by the left is that it has stimulated the rise of identity politics on the right. This is due in no small part to the left’s embrace of political correctness, a social norm that prohibits people from publicly expressing their beliefs or opinions without fearing moral opprobrium.

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Vaquera, “The Immigration Enforcement Regime, and the Implications for Racial Inequality in the Lives of Undocumented Young Adults,” Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 1 (2015): 88–104. 23. A discussion of why Latin America did not “catch up” economically with Canada and the United States is found in Francis Fukuyama, ed., Falling Behind: Explaining the Development Gap Between Latin America and the United States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 72–98. For Mexico’s use of its expatriate community to interfere in the domestic politics of the United States, see Mark Krikorian, The New Case Against Immigration: Both Legal and Illegal (New York: Sentinel, 2008), 71–85. 24.

The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations?
by Ian Bremmer
Published 12 May 2010

Chapter six details what those who believe in free-market capitalism can do about it. CHAPTER ONE The Rise of a New System What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. —FRANCIS FUKUYAMA , “The End of History”1 In championing globalization as the defining force in international politics and the global economy, we’ve spent the past several years writing obituaries for communism, for dictatorship, and even for the nation-state.

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Finally, much love to Ann Shuman, who generally puts up with my insufferable nature. And to my favorite brother, Robert Coolbrith. They’re both brilliant, adorable, and would be in more paragraphs if good taste didn’t dictate otherwise. NOTES CHAPTER ONE : The Rise of a New System 1 Francis Fukuyama’s essay “The End of History” appeared in the National Interest, Summer 1989, and was expanded into the book The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 2 According to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2008 Democracy Index, “Democracy can be seen as a set of practices and principles that institutionalize and thus ultimately protect freedom.

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If the turmoil that these crises generated couldn’t breathe life into the communist corpse, it’s hard to imagine what could. Communism is dead, and there will be no resurrection. Yet no one can credibly say the same for dictatorship. In 1989, as Eastern Europe’s communist states fell like dominoes and millions of Chinese students mounted a bold challenge to their government, writer Francis Fukuyama penned a provocative essay to support a surprising claim: that “history” had come to an end. He argued that though forms of government would continue to vary from place to place and that some countries had considerable catching up to do, mankind was moving toward consensus on the virtues of liberal democracy.

Utopia for Realists: The Case for a Universal Basic Income, Open Borders, and a 15-Hour Workweek
by Rutger Bregman
Published 13 Sep 2014

Orazem, “Challenge Paper: Education,” Copenhagen Consensus Center (April 2014). http://copenhagenconsensus.com/publication/education 17. “Where have all the burglars gone?” The Economist (July 18, 2013). http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21582041-rich-world-seeing-less-and-less-crime-even-face-high-unemployment-and-economic 18. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest (Summer 1989). http://ps321.community.uaf.edu/files/2012/10/Fukuyama-End-of-history-article.pdf 19. Andrew Cohut et al., Economies of Emerging Markets Better Rated During Difficult Times. Global Downturn Takes Heavy Toll; Inequality Seen as Rising, Pew Research (May 23, 2013), p. 23. http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2013/05/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Economic-Report-FINAL-May-23-20131.pdf 20.

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Hayek, “The Intellectuals and Socialism,” The University of Chicago Law Review (Spring 1949). https://mises.org/etexts/hayekintellectuals.pdf 16. Quoted in: Angus Burgin, The Great Persuasion. Reinventing Free Markets since the Depression (2012). p. 13. 17. Quoted in: Burgin, The Great Persuasion, p. 169. 18. Ibid, p. 11. 19. Ibid, p. 221. 20. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (1992). 21. At the end of his life, Friedman said there was only one philosopher he had ever really studied in depth: the Austrian Karl Popper. Popper argued that good science revolves around “falsifiability,” requiring a continual search for things that don’t fit your theory instead of only seeking confirmation.

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“There are still criminals, but there are ever fewer of them and they are getting older.”17 War has been on the decline Source: Peace Research Institute Oslo A Bleak Paradise Welcome, in other words, to the Land of Plenty. To the good life. To Cockaigne, where almost everyone is rich, safe, and healthy. Where there’s only one thing we lack: a reason to get out of bed in the morning. Because after all, you can’t really improve on paradise. Back in 1989, the American philosopher Francis Fukuyama already noted that we had arrived in an era where life has been reduced to “economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands.”18 Notching up our purchasing power another percentage point, or shaving a couple off our carbon emissions; perhaps a new gadget – that’s about the extent of our vision.

Social Capital and Civil Society
by Francis Fukuyama
Published 1 Mar 2000

Social Capital FRANCIS FUKUYAMA THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES Delivered at Brasenose College, Oxford May 12, 14, and 15, 1997 FRANCIS FUKUYAMA is Omer L. and Nancy Hirst Professor of Public Policy at the Institute of Public Policy at George Mason University and director of the Institute’s International Transactions Program. Educated at Cornell, he received his Ph.D. from Harvard University. He has been a member of the Political Science Department of the RAND Corporation, where he is currently a consultant, as well as a member of the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. Department of State.

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He is a member of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies and the Council on Foreign Relations; the editor, with Andrez Korbonski, of T h e Soviet Union and the Third W o r l d : T h e Last Three Decades (1987) ; and book review editor at Foreign A f a i r s . His publications include T h e End of History and the Last M a n ( 1 9 9 2 ), which received the Premio Capri and the Book Critics Award (from the Los Angeles T i m e s ) , and Trust : T h e Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (1995), which was named “business book of the year” by European. LECTURE I. THE GREAT DISRUPTION Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, there has been an extraordinary amount of attention paid to the interrelated issues of social capital, civil society, trust, and social norms as central issues for contemporary democracies.

Fully Automated Luxury Communism
by Aaron Bastani
Published 10 Jun 2019

Ernest Hemingway, The Sun Also Rises In the summer of 1989, as it became clear the United States and its allies had won the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama wrote an essay titled ‘The End of History?’ for the National Interest. Its core proposition was provocative yet simple, with the little-known academic asserting that the collapse of the Soviet Union was of greater importance than simply marking the end of a military rivalry: ‘What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.’

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‘Wisconsin Board Clears Way For $3 Billion Foxconn Deal’. Reuters, 8 November 2017. Part I. Chaos under Heaven 1. The Great Divide Fukuyama, Francis. ‘The End of History’. National Interest, 16 Summer 1989. Capitalist Realism Cox, Christoph, Molly Whalen and Alain Badiou. ‘On Evil: An Interview with Alain Badiou’. Cabinet, Winter 2001-2. Fisher, Mark. Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? Zero Books, 2010. Menand, Louis. ‘Francis Fukuyama Postpones the End of History’. New Yorker, 3 September 2018. Crisis Unleashed ‘Depression Looms as Global Crisis’. BBC News, 2 September 2009. Hertle, Hans-Hermann and Maria Nooke.

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The claim that capitalism will end, is, for capitalist realism, like saying a triangle doesn’t have three sides or that the law of gravity no longer applies while an apple falls from a tree. Rather than understanding the present as one historical period among many, like Victorian England or the Roman Republic, to be alive at the end of history means presuming our social systems to be as unchanging as the physical laws that govern the universe. And yet the truth is capitalist realism is already coming apart. The fact you are reading these words at all is proof. Despite the observations of Francis Fukuyama and his disciples, history returned on 15 September 2008 when the global financial system crashed. Within weeks the world’s leading economic powers, previous zealots for minimal state interference, were left with no alternative but to bail out their domestic banks, with some even being nationalised.

The Great Wave: The Era of Radical Disruption and the Rise of the Outsider
by Michiko Kakutani
Published 20 Feb 2024

GO TO NOTE REFERENCE IN TEXT The watchdog group also pointed out: Sarah Repucci and Amy Slipowitz, “The Global Expansion of Authoritarian Rule,” Freedom in the World 2022, Report, Freedom House, freedomhouse.org/​sites/​default/​files/​2022-03/​FITW_World_2022_digital_abridged_FINAL.pdf. GO TO NOTE REFERENCE IN TEXT It’s a stark and chilling reversal: Jennifer Schuessler, “Francis Fukuyama Predicted the End of History. It’s Back (Again),” The New York Times, May 10, 2022, nytimes.com/​2022/​05/​10/​arts/​francis-fukuyama-history-liberalism.html. GO TO NOTE REFERENCE IN TEXT “permacrisis”: Helen Bushby, “Permacrisis Declared Collins Dictionary Word of the Year,” BBC News, Nov. 1, 2022, bbc.com/​news/​entertainment-arts-63458467.

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The watchdog group also pointed out that authoritarian leaders “are actively collaborating with one another to spread new forms of repression and rebuff democratic pressure,” while longtime democracies are being threatened from within by “illiberal forces, including unscrupulous politicians willing to corrupt and shatter the very institutions that brought them to power.” It’s a stark and chilling reversal of Francis Fukuyama’s naïve declaration in 1989 that the unraveling of the Soviet Union meant “the end of history” and the “universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” By the third decade of the twenty-first century, the new zeitgeist-y phrase was “permacrisis”—chosen as “word of the year” by Collins Dictionary in 2022—meaning “an extended period of instability and insecurity, especially one resulting from a series of catastrophic events.”

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Diamond, Jared, Upheaval: Turning Points for Nations in Crisis (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2019). Foner, Eric, The Second Founding: How the Civil War and Reconstruction Remade the Constitution (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2019). Forrer, Matthi, ed., Hokusai: Prints and Drawings (New York: Prestel, 2019). Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 2006). Fussell, Paul, The Great War and Modern Memory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). Gerstle, Gary, The Rise and Fall of the Neoliberal Order: America and the World in the Free Market Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022). Gitlin, Todd, Occupy Nation: The Roots, the Spirit, and the Promise of Occupy Wall Street (New York: It Books/HarperCollins, 2012).

Framers: Human Advantage in an Age of Technology and Turmoil
by Kenneth Cukier , Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Francis de Véricourt
Published 10 May 2021

Whether it is a high-tech arms race or a hotter climate or a growing underclass around the world, we need to get better at framing to respond. Bookshelves sag with tomes extolling the virtues of human progress. But the affluent, immortal brainiac who is predicted in the book Homo Deus by Yuval Noah Harari will in time be as ridiculed as the rich, safe, and happy “last man” in Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History. A more clear-eyed and responsible look at the world suggests that things aren’t getting easier but harder. The toughest challenges facing humanity are not behind us but ahead of us. In the past most of our challenges were a matter of survival for individuals or communities, but not the entire planet.

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The end of the Cold War and the fall of communism in the early 1990s only deepened the conviction among many in the West that not only Western values but also Western frames, their very mental models of the world, were superior to others. The American political scientist Francis Fukuyama famously gave voice to this belief in 1992, that human civilization had reached the “end of history” because the idea of liberal, market democracy—the dominant frame left standing after the Soviet Union collapsed—seemed to mark an end point in political thinking. The “liberal market democracy” frame, exemplified by the United States, faced no credible or coherent alternative for how to govern.

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Our World in Data: Information about the project and its financial supporters is at “Our Supporters,” Our World in Data, accessed November 2, 2020, https://ourworldindata.org/funding. On Harari: Yuval N. Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (London: Harvill Secker, 2016). On Fukuyama: Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 2. framing Story of Alyssa Milano and the origin of MeToo: The information was compiled from an interview with Alyssa Milano by Kenneth Cukier in August 2020, as well as from the articles that follow: Useful references include: Jessica Bennett, “Alyssa Milano, Celebrity Activist for the Celebrity Presidential Age,” New York Times, October 25, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/25/us/politics/alyssa-milano-activism.html; Anna Codrea-Rado, “#MeToo Floods Social Media with Stories of Harassment and Assault,” New York Times, October 16, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/16/technology/metoo-twitter-facebook.html; Jim Rutenberg et al., “Harvey Weinstein’s Fall Opens the Floodgates in Hollywood,” New York Times, October 16, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/16/business/media/harvey-weinsteins-fall-opens-the-floodgates-in-hollywood.html.

The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It
by Yascha Mounk
Published 15 Feb 2018

Margaret Talev and Sahil Kapur, “Trump Vows Election-Day Suspense without Seeking Voters He Needs to Win,” Bloomberg, 20 October, 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-20/trump-vows-election-day-suspense-without-seeking-voters-he-needs-to-win; Associated Press, “Trump to Clinton: ‘You’d Be in Jail’” New York Times website, video, October 10, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/politics/100000004701741/trump-to-clinton-youd-be-in-jail.html; Yochi Dreazen, “Trump’s Love for Brutal Leaders Like the Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte, Explained,” Vox, May 1, 2017, https://www.vox.com/world/2017/5/1/15502610/trump-philippines-rodrigo-duterte-obama-putin-erdogan-dictators. 2. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” National Interest, no. 16 (Summer 1989): 3–18, quotation on p. 4; Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 3. For a variety of early responses to Fukuyama, see for example essays by Harvey Mansfield, E. O. Wilson, Gertrude Himmelfarb, Robin Fox, Robert J. Samuelson, and Joseph S. Nye, “Responses to Fukuyama,” National Interest, no. 56 (Summer 1989): 34–44. 4.

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Source: US Census Bureau, “Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born Population of the United States: 1850–2000,” https://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0081/twps0081.html; and Pew Research Center tabulations of 2010 and 2015 American Community Survey (IPUMS) in Gustavo López and Kristen Bialik: “Key Findings about U.S. Immigrants,” Pew Research Center, Washington, DC, May, 3, 2017, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/05/03/key-findings-about-u-s-immigrants/. Acknowledgments At the end of “The End of History?,” Francis Fukuyama revealed that he had some doubts about whether history would really end: The end of history will be a very sad time. The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one’s life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands.

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The future, it seemed, belonged to liberal democracy. The idea that democracy was sure to triumph has come to be associated with the work of Francis Fukuyama. In a sensational essay published in the late 1980s, Fukuyama argued that the conclusion of the Cold War would lead to “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” Democracy’s triumph, he proclaimed in a phrase that has come to encapsulate the heady optimism of 1989, would mark “The End of History.”2 Plenty of critics took Fukuyama to task for his supposed naiveté. Some argued that the spread of liberal democracy was far from inevitable, fearing (or hoping) that many countries would prove resistant to this Western import.

State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century
by Francis Fukuyama
Published 7 Apr 2004

state-building state-building governance and world order in the 21st century f r a n c i s f u k u ya m a cornell univer sit y press I t h a c a , N e w Yo r k Copyright © 2004 by Francis Fukuyama All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. First published 2004 by Cornell University Press Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Fukuyama, Francis. State-building : governance and world order in the 21st century / Francis Fukuyama. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index.

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It was only as a result of actions by states that were willing to decisively use traditional forms of military power— the Croatians in the case of Bosnia and the Americans in the case of Kosovo—that Serbian domination was ended and the Balkans pacified. Robert Kagan put the matter in the following manner. The Europeans are the ones who actually believe they are living at the end of history–that is, in a largely peaceful world that to an weak states and international legitimacy 117 increasing degree can be governed by law, norms, and international agreements. In this world, power politics and classical realpolitik have become obsolete. Americans, by contrast, think they are still living in history, and need to use traditional power-political means to deal with threats from Iraq, al-Qaida, North Korea, and other malignant forces.

The Identity Trap: A Story of Ideas and Power in Our Time
by Yascha Mounk
Published 26 Sep 2023

Last but not least, a great number of people have helped to shape this book, from the initial proposal to the final manuscript, whether through formal comments (large and small) or through years of being in conversations about the world. They are responsible for a lot of what’s best in the book, and for many of the happiest moments I had while writing it. They include Shira Telushkin, David Plunkett, Katarina Podlesnaya, Francis Fukuyama, Eleni Arzoglou, Sam Koppelman, Benjamin Shinogle, Ian Bassin, Anne Applebaum, Samantha Holmes, Carl Schoonover, Carly Knight, Jonathan Rauch, Bernardo Zacka, Samantha Rose Hill, George Packer, Rachel Prtizker, Martin Eiermann, Jonathan Haidt, Lidal Dror, Rachel Fraser, David Miliband, Garry Kasparov, David Hamburger, Amelia Atlas, Seth Klarman, Noam Dworman, Mike Berkowitz, Russ Muirhead, Manual Hartung, Marie Thibault de Maisieres, Thomas Chatterton-Williams, Tom Meaney, and Guillermo del Pinal.

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GO TO NOTE REFERENCE IN TEXT study or strive: The negative effects of non-meritocratic systems on economic development and good governance are widely observed. For instance, political scientists have explained Greece’s economic struggles in part by pointing to its lack of a meritocratic bureaucracy. See, for example, Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015), 76–77. GO TO NOTE REFERENCE IN TEXT legitimate aspirations of millions: For the best statement of this position, see Adrian Wooldridge, The Aristocracy of Talent: How Meritocracy Made the Modern World (New York: Skyhorse, 2021).

…

.: Princeton University Press, 2018). For classic texts in the liberal tradition, see, for example, Benjamin Constant, The Liberty of Ancients Compared with That of Moderns (1819); and John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). For recent defenses from a philosophical perspective, see Francis Fukuyama, Liberalism and Its Discontents (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2022); and from an empirical perspective, Deirdre McCloskey, Why Liberalism Works: How True Liberal Values Produce a Freer, More Equal, Prosperous World for All (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2019). GO TO NOTE REFERENCE IN TEXT tends to be right-wing: John Lichfield, “Call Emmanuel Macron Any Name You Like—but Not ‘Liberal,’ ” Politico, Feb. 5, 2019, www.politico.eu/article/call-emmanuel-macron-any-name-you-like-but-not-liberal-lef-right-division-politics/.

The Billionaire Raj: A Journey Through India's New Gilded Age
by James Crabtree
Published 2 Jul 2018

In the three decades since Rajiv Gandhi last won a victory on a similar scale, both the Congress and the BJP had been weakened by regional and caste-based political rivals, and fragile governing coalitions had become the norm in New Delhi. But now Modi had crafted a new and popular nationalism, which drew strength from the decline of the older identity the Congress represented. Modi’s career had barely begun in 1989, the year when Francis Fukuyama wrote “The End of History,” his essay in the National Interest predicting the triumph of Western-style free-market democracy. “It is not necessary that all societies become successful liberal societies, merely that they end their ideological pretensions of representing different and higher forms of human society,” Fukuyama argued.39 Already a democracy, post-socialist India should have provided a neat test case for the brand of this free-market democratic shift.

…

This in turn should form part of a broader set of changes that are described in India as a transition from a “deals-based” to a “rules-based” model of capitalism, meaning one whose rules allow little political and bureaucratic discretion over public resources.13 Yet even this will be far from straightforward. Francis Fukuyama describes this shift away from a “patrimonial” state, meaning one marked by corruption and clientelism, as the defining challenge for all developing nations. “[It is] much more difficult,” he writes, “than making the transition from an authoritarian political system to a democratic one.”14 This balance of growth and corruption then lies at the heart of the struggles of India’s industrial economy.

…

Rajesh Kumar Singh and Devidutta Tripathy, “India Moves Resolution of $150 Billion Bad Debt Problem into RBI’s Court,” Reuters, May 6, 2017. 24. Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, p. 11. 25. T. N. Ninan, “India’s Gilded Age,” Seminar, January 2013. 26. Twain and Warner, The Gilded Age. 27. Francis Fukuyama, “What Is Corruption?” Research Institute for Development, Growth and Economics, 2016. 28. Jayant Sinha and Ashutosh Varshney, “It Is Time for India to Rein In Its Robber Barons,” Financial Times, January 7, 2011. 29. Data compiled by Gapminder.org, which takes India’s 2013 GDP per capita data from a cross-country comparison based on 2005 dollars.

Grave New World: The End of Globalization, the Return of History
by Stephen D. King
Published 22 May 2017

In an earlier, supposedly more peaceful era, Norman Angell’s supporters hoped that common sense would prevail, that war would be futile because it would be mutually destructive. Economic interdependency was so great that only a madman would go to war. Having suffered brain damage at birth, Kaiser Wilhelm II unfortunately went on to prove the point.18 Francis Fukuyama admitted in 1992 that he could not guarantee the end of history. For him, the biggest objection came from Nietzsche, ‘who believed that modern democracy represented not the self-mastery of former slaves, but the unconditional victory of the slave and a kind of slavish morality … The last man had no desire to be recognized as greater than others, and without such desire no excellence or achievement was possible.’19 Yet, as Soviet communism collapsed, Fukuyama’s disciples were convinced that Western liberal democracy – and Western free-market capitalism – had triumphed.

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(i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) Byzantium (i) Cabinet (UK) (i) California (i), (ii) caliphates (i), (ii), (iii) Callaghan, Jim (i), (ii) Cameron, David (i) Canada a reputable country (i) Asian Development Bank and (i) closes gap on US (i) Irish emigrate to (i), (ii) North America Free Trade Agreement (i), (ii) TPP (i) Cape of Good Hope (i) capital, mobility of (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) see also cross-border capital flow Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Thomas Piketty) (i) capitalism communism and (i) free-market capitalism (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) Fukuyama’s disciples on (i) Steffens and Shaw on (i) US economic model and (i) Caribbean (i) Carter, Jimmy (i) Castillon, Battle of (i) Castro, Fidel (i) Catherine of Aragon (i) Catherine the Great (i) Catholics (i), (ii), (iii) Caucasus (i), (ii) Central African Republic (i), (ii) Central America (i) Central Asia (i), (ii), (iii) see also Asia central banks (i), (ii) see also bankers inflation targets (i) Kosmos (i) price distortion (i) printing money (i), (ii) quantitative easing (i), (ii), (iii) zero interest rates and (i) Chad (i) Chechens (i) checks and balances (i), (ii) Chile (i) China (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) 1980 emergence (i) ageing population (i) attracting Western investment (i) balance of payments surplus (i) boom to slowdown (i) Brazil and (i) British in (i) Coca-Cola and (i) demand for German goods (i) Deng Xiaoping (i) Disney and (i) economic resurgence (i), (ii) excess capital in US (i) foreign capital for (i) iPhones (i) Japan and (i) living standards (i) military spending (i) OECD and (i) per capita incomes (i), (ii) ratifies Paris climate deal (i) rise of renminbi (i), (ii) Russia threatens (i) South China Sea and neighbour disputes (i) TPP and (i) treaty ports (i) Trump’s protectionism and (i) US tries to contain (i), (ii), (iii) Chongqing (i), (ii) Christianity (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) Churchill, Winston (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)n1 CIA (i) Ciudadanos (i) Cleveland, Grover (i) climate change (i), (ii) Clinton, Hillary 2016 campaign (i) Bernie Sanders opposes (i) concerns of supporters (i) rejects TPP (i), (ii) Syria (i) wins Democrat nomination (i) clubs (i), (ii) Cobden, Richard (i), (ii), (iii) Coca-Cola (i) ‘coffin ships’ (i) Cold War binary rivalry, a (i) economic differences (i) end of (i), (ii) globalization and (i) NATO and (i) Soviet living standards (i) collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) (i) Collins, Philip (i) Columbus, Christopher (i), (ii), (iii) commodity markets (i), (ii), (iii) common sense (i) Commonwealth (i) communism Berlin Wall and (i) capitalism and (i) Cuba (i) Marx’s stages (i) Shaw extols (i) Soviet Union collapse and (i), (ii) Como, Lake (i) Comptoir National d’Escompte de Paris (i) Concert of Europe (i) Congo (i) Congress (US) 1933 banking crisis (i) American public’s confidence in (i) Bush Jnr on terrorism (i) Immigration Act 1917 (i) Japanese sanctions (i), (ii) Smoot–Hawley tariff (i) Congress of Vienna (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) Connally, John (i) Conolly, Arthur (i) Conservative Party (i), (ii) Constantinople (i), (ii) Constitutional Tribunal (Poland) (i) ‘Convention of Peking’ (i) Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (i) Corbyn, Jeremy (i), (ii) Córdoba (i), (ii) corporate scandals (i) Corroyer, Edouard (i) Court of Cassation (Egypt) (i) Crécy, Battle of (i) Creole languages (i) Crimea (i), (ii) Crimean War (19th century) (i) crop yields (i) cross-border capital flow allocation of resources and (i) emerging markets and (i), (ii) extraordinary growth of (i), (ii), (iii) globalization dominated by (i) inequality and (i) Varoufakis tries to limit (i) Cuba (i) Czech Republic (i) Czechoslovakia (i) Darius the Great (i) Darwin, Charles (i) Davos (i), (ii) de Gaulle, Charles (i), (ii) debt (i) Africa (i) China (i) debt to income ratios (i) government debt (i) Latin America (i) low inflation and (i) deflation (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) Delhi (i) demand management (i), (ii) Democratic Party (US) (i), (ii) Democratic Republic of the Congo (i) Denfert-Rochereau, Eugène (i) Deng Xiaoping (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) Denmark (i), (ii) Department of Housing and Urban Development (US) (i) deposit insurance (i) devaluation 1930s (i), (ii), (iii) dollars, gold and (i) Eisenhower and Britain (i) franc (i) right conditions for (i) Diaoyu (i) Disney (i), (ii) Doha Round (i) dollar (US) see American dollar Dow Jones Industrial Average (i) Draghi, Mario (i) Duisburg (i) Duterte, Rodrigo (i), (ii) DVDs (i) East Africa (i) see also Africa Eastern Europe EU and its effects (i) importing democracy (i) joining the EU (i), (ii) Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact (i) New World emigration (i) Ottoman Empire and (i) Soviet communism and (i), (ii), (iii) ‘Economic Theory of Clubs’ (James Buchanan) (i) Ecuador (i) Eden, Anthony (i), (ii) Edison, Thomas (i) Edison Electric (i) educational attainment (i) Edward VI, King (i) Egypt (i), (ii), (iii) Einstein, Albert (i) Eisenhower, Dwight D. (i) elites (i) Ellis Island (i) Empire Windrush, SS (i) empires (i) End of Alchemy, The (Mervyn King) (i)n12 End of History, The (Francis Fukuyama) (i), (ii), (iii) England (i), (ii), (iii) see also United Kingdom Enron (i) Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip (i) EU (European Union) asylum seekers (i), (ii), (iii) blame thrown at (i) Brexit (i), (ii) eastward expansion (i) economic success and (i) former Soviet countries and (i) Hamas and (i) increasing membership, effect of (i) Juncker Plan (i) key arrangements lacking (i) Marshall Plan and (i) member states and their citizens (i) nation states and (i) Poland and (i) problems from a break-up of (i) Schengen Agreement (i), (ii) Syrian refugees (i) Eurasian Economic Union (i) European Central Bank (i) European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (i), (ii) European Commission (i) European Economic Community (EEC) (i), (ii) see also EU European Exchange Rate Arrangement (i) European House Ambrosetti (i) European Monetary System (i) European Parliament (i) European Recovery (Marshall) Plan (i) Eurozone 2010 crisis (i), (ii), (iii) debtor and creditor nations (i) gap in living standards and (i) impact on rest of world (i) partial aspects of a nation state (i) Spaniards look for work (i) UK deflation and (i) exchange controls (i), (ii) Exchange Rate Mechanism (i) exchange rates (i), (ii) exclusion, sense of (i) experts (i) Facebook (i), (ii), (iii) FaceTime (i) fashion (i) Federal Reserve 2009 emergency measures (i) Bernanke (i) central to global economy (i) Greenspan (i) IMF and (i), (ii)n21 interest rates and (i) printing money (i) S&P 500 index (i) Volcker (i) Finland (i), (ii), (iii) Finns Party (i) First Opium War (i) First World War aftermath in West (i) immigration during (i) US and (i), (ii), (iii) US view of (i) Versailles (i) world turned upside down (i) Five Star Movement (i), (ii) Florence (i) Forbes (i) Forum Villa d’Este (i) ‘Four Freedoms’ (i), (ii) France American troops stationed (i) banks and Eurozone crisis (i) banning the burqa and niqab (i) Coal and Steel (i), (ii) franc plummets (i) G7 (i) Germany and (i) Mitterrand and (i) per capita incomes (i) position in EU (i) Second Gulf War condemned (i) Suez (i) UN Security Council (i) warship tonnage (i) Franco-Prussian War (i), (ii) Franklin, Benjamin (i) free trade Bernie Sanders opposes (i) British Empire and (i) Cobden (i), (ii) EU and (i) evidence regarding (i) protectionism and (i) RCEP and (i) Soviet communism and (i) TPP and (i) Trump against (i) UK leads the way (i), (ii) Freedom and Justice Party (Egypt) (i) Freedom House (i), (ii) French Indochina (i) French Revolution (i) Friedman, Milton (i) Front National (i) Fukushima (i) Fukuyama, Francis (i), (ii), (iii) G5 (i), (ii) G7 (i), (ii) G20 (i) Gaddafi, Colonel (i) Gallup (i), (ii) Gansu corridor (i) Gansu province (China) (i) Gastarbeiter (i), (ii) GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) creation (i), (ii) industrial nations and (i) protectionism kept at bay (i) rounds of (i), (ii), (iii) Gaza (i) General Electric (GE) (i), (ii) General Strike (i) General Theory (John Maynard Keynes) (i) Geneva (i), (ii) Geneva Convention (i) Genghis Khan (i) Georgia (Europe) (i), (ii), (iii) Germany (i) ageing population (i) American troops stationed (i) asylum seekers (i), (ii) Bundesbank (i) Coal and Steel (i), (ii) financial strength (i) France and (i) G7 (i) Gastarbeiter (i) hatred of inflation (i) history of unification (i) Hitler (i) interest rates (i) migration to US (i) per capita incomes (i) position in EU (i) post-First World War (i) post-Second World War (i), (ii) Second Gulf War condemned (i) Southern Europe deficits and (i) Turkish population (i) warship tonnage (i) Weimar Republic (i) Giralda (i), (ii) glacial melt (i) Global Peace Index (i) globalization 19th century (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) 2016 US election (i) Brexiteers and (i) competing currencies and (i) cross-border capital flows dominate (i) see also cross-border capital flow immigrants and (i), (ii) in big trouble (i) information technology and (i) key claims regarding (i) key drivers (i) nation states and (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) opponents of (i) rich benefit from (i) technology and (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) Trump rejects (i), (ii) Glorious Revolution (i) Góes, Carlos (i) GOFF (Global Organization for Financial Flows) (i) gold (i), (ii) 19th century (i), (ii) Churchill re-joins gold standard (i) post-First World War (i) sub-Saharan trade in (i) US dollar and (i) Golden Dawn (i) Google (i), (ii) Gove, Michael (i) Gramm–Rudman–Hollings Act (i) Grand Canal (China) (i) Grand Mosque of Córdoba (i) Great Debasement (i) Great Depression bailing out the banks (i) British Empire survives (i) fears of another (i) GATT and (i) macroeconomics and (i) moving away from the free market (i) Great Game (i) Great Illusion, The (Norman Angell) (i) ‘Great Moderation’ (i), (ii), (iii) ‘Great Society’ (i) ‘Great White Fleet’ (i) Greece asylum seekers and (i) border problems (i) financial weakness (i) joins EU (i) Persia and ancient Greece (i) private sector creditors turn back on (i) Syriza (i), (ii) Greenspan, Alan (i) Grenada (i), (ii)n4 Gresham’s Law (i) Guam (i) Guantanamo Bay (i) Guinness (i) Guizhou province (China) (i), (ii) Gujarat (i) Gulag (i) Gulf States (i) Gulf War, First (i) Gulf War, Second (i), (ii), (iii) Gutt, Camille (i) Haiti (i) Haldeman, H.R.

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Yet thanks to the shooting skills of Gavrilo Princip in Sarajevo five years later, it turned out that no amount of political or economic logic could prevent a catastrophic conflagration. The First World War turned the world upside down economically, financially and politically. The Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires disappeared without trace, while the British Empire began what proved to be its terminal decline. Eighty years on, as the Soviet states began to crumble, Francis Fukuyama, the eminent political scientist, argued that: The most remarkable development of the last quarter of the twentieth century has been the revelation of enormous weaknesses at the core of the world’s seemingly strong dictatorships … liberal democracy remains the only coherent political aspiration … liberal principles in economics – the ‘free market’ – have spread, and have succeeded in producing unprecedented levels of material prosperity, both in industrially developed countries and in countries that had been part of the impoverished Third World.5 More than two decades after the publication of Fukuyama’s The End of History – both as a 1989 short paper6 and a 1992 weighty tome – its claims no longer appear to be quite so secure.

Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization
by Branko Milanovic
Published 10 Apr 2016

It was dominated by the Washington Consensus (a set of policy prescriptions that emphasized deregulation and privatization) and the forecasting of the “end of history” (the title of an influential 1989 article by Francis Fukuyama, leading to the book The End of History and the Last Man [1992]). Japan still appeared to be ascendant, but China made a cameo appearance. Many of the books celebrated neoliberalism and predicted its speedy extension to the rest of the world, including the Middle East. Later, the US invasion of Iraq would be justified by, among other things, an appeal to the “end of history.”5 The war was supposed to bring democracy to Iraq and indirectly to the rest of the Arab world, resulting in an end to the intractable conflict between Israelis and Palestinians in negotiations between the now democratic parties.

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A much more realistic, and in some areas like migration, strikingly prescient, picture was painted by Alfred Sauvy in his excellent Zero Growth? (1976) (the French original was published in 1973). 5. See Francis Fukuyama’s interview with Spiegel International, “A Model Democracy Is Not Emerging in Iraq” (March 22, 2006), available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/interview-with-ex-neocon-francis-fukuyama-a-model-democracy-is-not-emerging-in-iraq-a-407315.html. 6. It could be that Chinese weapons producers, which are all state-owned, are less belligerent than their American counterparts because there is nothing for them to gain in case of a war. 7.

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See also capital; Industrial Revolution and industrialization; labor; skill-biased technological progress economicism, naïve, 73 economic power, 102 economics, discipline of, 234–239 economies, main features of, 246n12 economies of scale, 13 education: twenty-first and twenty-second centuries and, 7, 181; skill-biased technological progress and, 47; twentieth century and, 53, 93–94; preindustrial period and, 70; Brazil and, 82; Chile and, 84; communist countries and, 99; Kuznets cycles and, 99, 117; socialist great leveling and, 100, 102; war and, 102; union density and, 106; race with skills and, 114; United States, 114, 188, 189, 260n24; migrant taxes and, 152; China and, 178; United States and, 181, 263n4; capital/ labor income and, 186–187, 216; globalization and, 207–208, 215–217; equalizing, 218, 219–222; capital income and, 221–222; wages and, 256n21, 263n3; assortative mating and, 260n26; families and, 263n4. See also benign/malign forces; social services effort, work, 140 Ehrlich, Paul, 21 1820–2011, 119–125, 127–132. See also Industrial Revolution; preindustrial period; twentieth century elephant curve, 242n8 Elsby, Michael W. L., 182 emerging market economies, 29 End of History and the Last Man, The (Fukuyama), 157 endowments, 218, 220–222 Engels, Friedrich, 129, 255n14 entrepreneurship, 100–101 entropy index, 254n10 environmental concerns, 232–233, 234, 263n9 epidemics, 50, 57, 62–63, 65, 69, 98. See also benign/malign forces; plague equality of opportunity, 238–239 “equivalent units,” 13 expenditures as share of GDP (United Kingdom and United States), 246n10 exports, 24, 62, 143, 173, 235, 236–237, 241n2 false consciousness, 114, 200, 201–202, 217 families, 112, 141, 215–216, 263n4.

War for Eternity: Inside Bannon's Far-Right Circle of Global Power Brokers
by Benjamin R. Teitelbaum
Published 14 May 2020

“All that is anti-liberal is good”: “Alexander Dugin (Introduction by Mark Sleboda) Identitär Idé 4 / Identitarian Ideas 4,” YouTube, September 14, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7X-o_ndhSVA. Note that I lightly edit Dugin’s English throughout these quotations, as I do in my interview with him. Francis Fukuyama: Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest 16 (Summer 1989). all three were modernist: These ideas are more fully elaborated in Aleksandr Dugin, The Fourth Political Theory (London: Arktos, 2012), 17. Chapter 12: The Summit nobody seemed to notice: Luca Steinmann, “The Illiberal Far-Right of Aleksandr Dugin.

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Because to be a woman or to be a man, that means that we have a collective identity.” This way of thinking about people, defining them as ideally disconnected (liberated) from religion, family, nation, even their own bodies is historically exotic and insidious, he claimed. And as even a proponent of liberalism like Francis Fukuyama understood, it would leave us yearning for community. That problem, Dugin argued, birthed the two main challenges to liberalism in the twentieth century: communism and fascism. Both ideologies aspired to promote an alternative entity—not the individual, but two collectivities, class and race.

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Christianity, however, claimed to be a universal truth superseding local beliefs. It guided people to disdain and abandon their roots through its assertion that the past was sin and the future will bring salvation. Especially in its Protestant incarnations, Christianity would unite all humans in the pursuit of a unified goal at the end of history: communion with God. Marxism and capitalism adopted a lot of these ideas, each claiming to be an absolute truth for all people, regardless of blood or creed, and attempting to funnel all toward a unified goal in the future rather than the past—be it earthly communist utopia, personal wealth, or mere social “progress” instead of a union with the divine.

Unsustainable Inequalities: Social Justice and the Environment
by Lucas Chancel
Published 15 Jan 2020

This is quite remarkable and deserves to be emphasized: rich nations have swallowed at least some of their pride and accepted, or pretended to accept—I shall return to this point in due course—that the international community as a whole should have a say in determining the course of their own development. The “end of history”—the ultimate stage of liberal democracy theorized by the political scientist Francis Fukuyama—has therefore not yet arrived: all countries, including Western democracies meeting in Rio in 2012, realized that they still had a ways to go before reaching true prosperity.4 The American social scientist David Le Blanc has carefully studied the official resolutions establishing the SDGs in the hope of discovering the central aim that this sprawling agenda seeks to achieve.5 From his analysis it becomes apparent that the goal of reducing inequalities of wealth, gender, power, and access to resources stands out among a network of more or less closely interrelated targets.

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World Bank Group, Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2016: Taking on Inequality (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2016), https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/10.1596/978-1-4648-0958-3; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising (Paris: OECD, 2011); Jonathan D. Ostry, Andrew Berg, and Charalambos G. Tsangarides, “Redistribution, Inequality, and Growth,” IMF Discussion Note, February 2014, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2014/sdn1402.pdf. 4. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 5. David Le Blanc, “Towards Integration at Last? The Sustainable Development Goals as a Network of Targets” (working paper no. 141, UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, April 10, 2015), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/sd.1582. 6.

On the Edge: The Art of Risking Everything
by Nate Silver
Published 12 Aug 2024

There was 1945, with the end of World War II, and reorientation of the global order amid the emergence of the Information Age. And there is today. Because although the end of the Cold War had briefly seemed like we were on a glide path toward shared peace and prosperity, it is harder to make that case now. Francis Fukuyama, the Stanford political scientist, is best known for his 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man, which argued in the shadows of the Cold War that liberal democracy was the best way to channel humanity’s conflicted impulses into shared prosperity. Fukuyama has since grown more pessimistic, especially about America. “Decay happens when you have an institutional structure that’s very conservative and can’t be modified,” he said when I spoke with him in 2022.

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Presidential Decision-Making in a Nuclear Attack,” 2022, youtube.com/watch?v=S6r3A2mSNlU. GO TO NOTE REFERENCE IN TEXT in evolutionary psychology: McDermott has an MA in experimental social psychology in addition to her PhD in political science. GO TO NOTE REFERENCE IN TEXT made us human: Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, Kindle ed. (New York: Free Press, 2006), 151. GO TO NOTE REFERENCE IN TEXT exhibit revenge-seeking traits: Rose McDermott, Anthony C. Lopez, and Peter K. Hatemi, “ ‘Blunt Not the Heart, Enrage It’: The Psychology of Revenge and Deterrence,” Texas National Security Review 1, no. 1 (November 24, 2017), tnsr.org/2017/11/blunt-not-heart-enrage-psychology-revenge-deterrence.

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GO TO NOTE REFERENCE IN TEXT Barzun used “decadent”: Jacques Barzun, From Dawn to Decadence: 500 Years of Western Cultural Life 1500 to the Present (New York: HarperCollins, 2000), xvi. GO TO NOTE REFERENCE IN TEXT Some scholars tie this feeling: The Decadent Society: How We Became the Victims of Our Own Success Kindle Edition (New York: Avid Reader Press / Simon & Schuster), 1. GO TO NOTE REFERENCE IN TEXT he calls “thymos”: Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, Kindle ed. (New York: Free Press, 2006), location 118. GO TO NOTE REFERENCE IN TEXT an unofficial slogan: Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,” France Diplomacy, diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/coming-to-france/france-facts/symbols-of-the-republic/article/liberty-equality-fraternity.

The Transhumanist Reader
by Max More and Natasha Vita-More
Published 4 Mar 2013

Meanwhile, maddened children, deluded fanatics, and terrorists like Theodore Kaczynski (the Unabomber) murder with homemade bombs or stolen passenger jets to express their distaste for this relentless and unprecedented future that has exploded, as it were, into reality. It was refreshing, then, in 2002, to find a public intellectual of Dr. Francis Fukuyama’s ­standing take on the intensely real, serious topic of accelerating biotechnology. Instant fame had embraced Fukuyama a decade earlier when his conservative The End of History (Fukuyama 2006) seemed to explain the Soviet Union’s abrupt collapse. Liberal humanism – democratic, realistic, and market-driven rather than authoritarian – had won the cold war against its authoritarian and deludedly utopian foes.

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Shapiro explains “moral category” arguments such as arguments from nature, arguments from identity, from merit, and from external influence, and argues that there are serious problems in distinguishing disorder from augmentation models. This matters because some people have argued in favor of allowing treatments for disorders while prohibiting them for augmentations that are otherwise similar in nature. Philosopher Andy Miah casts a critical eye on Donna Haraway’s concept of the “cyborg” and Francis Fukuyama’s views on “posthumanism.” Miah argues that the technoprogressive pursuit of biological transgressions can enrich individual and collective human life, while also permitting societies to attend to any social injustices that might arise through such behavior. Miah concludes with a full articulation of the concept of “biocultural capital,” which conveys a general, transhumanist justification for human enhancement.

…

One of the main criticisms of this emerging era is the way in which it may commodify life, the focus of the next section. Life as a Commodity If one acknowledges the merit of systematically reinforcing human biology so it is optimized to flourish – while accepting that one cannot expect certainty of bringing about such conditions – then what objections might there be to such a system? Francis Fukuyama’s (2002) primary concern is the commercial character of such a system of healthcare. He argues that such commercialization will lead inevitably to the commodification of life and this will diminish human flourishing, notably through it bringing about an impoverished view of human dignity. In response, I will seek to explain how the freedom to pursue commercial enhancements may be justified on the basis of what I call the accumulation of biocultural capital.

Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West
by Timothy Garton Ash
Published 30 Jun 2004

The fact that this confirmation came from a right-wing American—indeed, one of the fabled, demonized cabal of neoconservatives—doubled the impact. It was as if the devil had just certified the status of the angels. Europeans had already derived their two biggest political ideas of the post–Cold War era from the United States: Francis Fukuyama’s End of History and Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations. Like Kagan’s boutade, both had started as journal articles with a striking, deliberately overstated thesis. The authors’ subsequent caveats and qualifications in the longer book versions passed largely unnoticed. But this was something more.

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Then there will be no cause for terror. Underlying the starkest version of this vision is an equally breathtaking analytical premise: that there is now “a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.”18 This recalls Francis Fukuyama’s argument for a “worldwide liberal revolution” in his hugely influential article of 1989 and subsequent book on The End of History,19 and the so-called Washington Consensus of the IMF and World Bank in the 1990s. The bald simplicity of this claim for a single sustainable model, with its implicit image of America as a model for the future of all humankind, has offended many Europeans, Africans, Asians, and others who have themselves long been committed to such a post-Enlightenment, global meliorist aspiration.

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National security strategy issued on September 17, 2002, section III. All quotations are from the version on http://www.whitehouse.gov. 8. In his State of the Union address to Congress on January 6, 1941. 9. In Newsweek, special Davos edition “Issues 2004,” dated December 2003–February 2004. 10. The list in Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 1992), p. 49, seems to me arbitrarily short. I am most grateful to Jonathan Keates, and his disintegrating Almanach de Gotha, for help in augmenting it. 11. This and the following figures follow Larry Diamond, “A Report Card on Democracy,” Hoover Digest, 2000, no. 3, pp. 91–100, p. 91. 12.

A Short History of Progress
by Ronald Wright
Published 2 Jan 2004

In both its capitalist and communist versions, the great promise of modernity was progress without limit and without end. The collapse of the Soviet Union led many to conclude that there was really only one way of progress after all. In 1992 Francis Fukuyama, a former U.S. State Department official, declared that capitalism and democracy were the “end” of history — not only its destination but its goal.8 Doubters pointed out that capitalism and democracy are not necessarily bedfellows, citing Nazi Germany, modern China, and the worldwide archipelago of sweatshop tyrannies. Yet Fukuyama’s naive triumphalism strengthened a belief, mainly on the political right, that those who have not chosen the true way forward should be made to do so for their own good — by force, if necessary.

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Whether the Russians uttered the same threat, I don’t know. But it was certainly a credible one. Even if a nuclear “exchange” (as the euphemism went) failed to extinguish all higher forms of life, it would have ended civilization worldwide. No crops worth eating would grow in a nuclear winter. 8. See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 9. Alexander Pope, An Essay on Criticism, 1711; Thomas Henry Huxley, On Elementary Instruction in Physiology, 1877. 10. Quoted in Robert J. Wenke, Patterns in Prehistory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 79. 11. William Shakespeare, Hamlet, act 2, scene 2. 12.

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A measure of participation filtered grudgingly down the social pyramid, while the new industrial economy nourished a growing middle class.33 We in the lucky countries of the West now regard our two-century bubble of freedom and affluence as normal and inevitable; it has even been called the “end” of history, in both a temporal and teleological sense.34 Yet this new order is an anomaly: the opposite of what usually happens as civilizations grow. Our age was bankrolled by the seizing of half a planet, extended by taking over most of the remaining half, and has been sustained by spending down new forms of natural capital, especially fossil fuels.

Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order
by Parag Khanna
Published 4 Mar 2008

Geopolitics has since evolved into a family of holistic power formulae applied across the world and over long time horizons, what Fernand Braudel termed the longue durée.19 But it remains Toynbee’s story of challenge and response. GEOPOLITICS VERSUS GLOBALIZATION? In the 1990s, a great debate took place between the contrasting visions of Francis Fukuyama (The End of History) and Samuel Huntington (The Clash of Civilizations), with the former generally caricatured as utopian and the latter as fatalistic. The grand predecessor to this dichotomy was the tension between the worldviews of Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee. Spengler opened The Decline of the West (1918) with the bold claim, “This book will for the first time attempt to predict history.”

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Today there are numerous equivalent statements on the pacifying effect of globalization, each echoing Norman Angell’s Great Illusion claim of the “complete economic futility of conquest.” Francis Fukuyama argues for the end of ideological struggle; John Mueller observes that the prospect of total, annihilating war makes it “subrationally unthinkable” Jonathan Schell and Peter Singer see the emergence of global consciousness as the “moral equivalent of war” or a “weapon of civilization” Robert Wright demonstrates that the accumulation of positive outcomes disincentivizes conflict; and Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman argue for a “Great Capitalist Peace.” See Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon Books, 1992); Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989); Schell, The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003); Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2003); Wright, Non-Zero: The Logic of Human Destiny (New York: Vintage, 2000); and Lieven and Hulsman, Ethical Realism. 69.

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Stateness refers to a government’s capacity to enforce its power, ranging from minimal functions (public goods, property rights, defense) to intermediate functions (addressing externalities, education, regulation, social insurance) to more activist roles (industrial policy, wealth redistribution). See Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-first Century (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004). Four decades ago, Samuel Huntington wrote in Political Order in Changing Societies that “the most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government, but their degree of government.

Break Through: Why We Can't Leave Saving the Planet to Environmentalists
by Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus
Published 10 Mar 2009

Fukuyama acknowledges that he signed the 1998 letter to Clinton but then adds, in order to downplay the significance of the letter, “An American invasion of Iraq was not then in the cards, however, and would not be until the events of September 11, 2001” (x). Fukuyama implies that his position changed after 9/11, but if that were the case then he would not have signed the September 20, 2001, letter urging President George W. Bush to remove Hussein from power—a fact he is careful not to mention in America at the Crossroads. [back] 7. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 338. [back] 8. Fukuyama himself acknowledged his indebtedness to Marx’s vision of historical development and approvingly quotes Ken Jowitt’s reflection that “in [September 11’s] aftermath, the Bush administration has concluded that Fukuyama’s historical timetable is too laissez-faire and not nearly attentive enough to the levers of historical change . . .

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America’s humiliation in Iraq, nuclear proliferation in Iran, and the threat of further terrorism—these are likely to trigger greater insecurity and fear, psychological states that history and a great deal of empirical research show drive conservatism far more strongly than liberalism.2 In this context, to remain reality based is to accept a status quo that is bad for progressives everywhere from Tehran to Akron. 1. In 2006, as Iraq spiraled ever further out of the Bush administration’s control, the neoconservative intellectual consensus behind the U.S. invasion began to come apart. That year, a leading American neoconservative, Francis Fukuyama, published America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy, in which he broke from neoconservativism.3 Once in 1998 and again in 2001, after September 11, Fukuyama signed open letters urging military action be taken to remove Saddam Hussein from power.4 “Failure to undertake such an effort,” the 2001 letter to President Bush warned, “will constitute an early and perhaps decisive surrender in the war on international terrorism.”5 America at the Crossroads served as his mea culpa, albeit one that required that he airbrush his advocacy of U.S. military action in Iraq after 9/11.6 In the book, Fukuyama reasserted an argument he had made fourteen years earlier in The End of History and the Last Man, which was that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the democratization of former right-wing dictatorships in places like Chile signaled the end of history prophesied by the philosopher Hegel in the early nineteenth century.

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Suddenly we have natures, and it is impossible to make natures play any political role whatsoever.” 10. Greatness 1. Ron Suskind, “Without a Doubt,” New York Times Magazine, October 17, 2004. [back] 2. John T. Jost et al., “Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition,” Psychological Bulletin 129, no. 3 (2003): 339–75. [back] 3. Francis Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). [back] 4. The January 26, 1998, letter to President Clinton that Fukuyama signed reads, “The only acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction.

Age of Anger: A History of the Present
by Pankaj Mishra
Published 26 Jan 2017

In particular, the attacks of 9/11, breaking into the general celebratory mood of globalization, sharpened an old divide. How could, it was felt, people be so opposed to modernity, and all the many goods it had to offer to people around the world: equality, liberty, prosperity, toleration, pluralism and representative government. Having proclaimed the end of history, Francis Fukuyama wondered whether there is ‘something about Islam’ that made ‘Muslim societies particularly resistant to modernity’. Such perplexity, widely shared, was answered by a simple idea: that these opponents of modernity were religious fanatics – jihadists – seeking martyrdom; they were unenlightened zealots.

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This religion of universal progress has had many presumptive popes and encyclicals: from the nineteenth-century dream championed by The Economist, in which capital, goods, jobs and people freely circulate, to Henry Luce’s proclamation of an ‘American century’ of free trade, and ‘Modernization Theory’, which proclaimed a ‘great world revolution in human aspirations and economic development’. Writing soon after 9/11, Francis Fukuyama seemed more convinced than ever that ‘modernity is a very powerful freight train that will not be derailed by recent events, however painful and unprecedented. Democracy and free markets will continue to expand over time as the dominant organizing principles for much of the world.’ As late as 2008, Fareed Zakaria could declare in his much-cited book, The Post-American World, that ‘the rise of the rest is a consequence of American ideas and actions’ and that ‘the world is going America’s way’, with countries ‘becoming more open, market-friendly and democratic’, their numerous poor ‘slowly being absorbed into productive and growing economies’.

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Born in 1958, a year after Osama bin Laden, to a devout middle-class family in Aleppo, al-Suri dropped out of university in 1980 to join a radical group that opposed Syria’s secular nationalist Baath Party and advocated an Islamic state based on Shariah law. Working his way through various Islamist organizations in Asia and Africa, al-Suri ended up designing a leaderless and global jihad for uprooted men like himself. A Militant Intelligentsia Al-Suri, labelled by Newsweek the ‘Francis Fukuyama of al-Qaeda’, was more accurately the Mikhail Bakunin of the Muslim world in his preference for anarchist tactics. In his magnum opus, The Global Islamic Resistance Call (2004), al-Suri scorned hierarchical forms of political organization, exhorting a jihadi strategy based on ‘unconnected cells’ and ‘individual operations’ – a call answered by today’s auto-intoxicated killers.

Why Women Have Better Sex Under Socialism: And Other Arguments for Economic Independence
by Kristen R. Ghodsee
Published 20 Nov 2018

If only they could have believed that this particular present never extends infinitely into the future. People born after 1989 came into a world where capitalism was triumphant. It was the only political and economic system left standing after the turbulent twentieth century, with Francis Fukuyama famously declaring that humanity had reached the “end of history,” the zenith of our civilizational development. If they found themselves disenchanted with the chaos wrought by rampaging neoliberalism, there were no alternatives. Their political consciousness was forged in a world where American hegemony appeared ossified and uncontested.

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Elizabeth O’Brien, “People Are Stalling Their Divorce So They Don’t Lose Health Care,” Time, July 24, 2017, time.com/money/4871186/people-are-stalling-their-divorce-so-they-dont-lose-health-care. 26. Albert Einstein, “Why Socialism?,” Monthly Review 1 (1949), monthlyreview.org/2009/05/01/why-socialism. Notes to Chapter 6 1. For information on the Borg, see www.startrek.com/database_article/borg; Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 2. Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever Until It Was No More (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005). 3. This quote is attributed to Margaret Mead, although there is no written source. A full explanation of the quote can be found on the website of the Institute for Intercultural Studies: www.intercul turalstudies.org/faq.html. 4.

Stakeholder Capitalism: A Global Economy That Works for Progress, People and Planet
by Klaus Schwab
Published 7 Jan 2021

Shortly thereafter, political reunification of Germany was at last established. And by 1991, the Soviet Union had officially disintegrated. Many economies that lay in its sphere of influence, including those of East Germany, the Baltics, Poland, Hungary, and Romania, turned toward the West and its capitalist, free-market model. “The end of history,” as Francis Fukuyama would call it later,21 had arrived, it seemed. Europe got another boost, this time leading to even deeper political and economic integration and the establishment of a common market and a monetary union, with the euro currency as its apex. At Davos, we felt the winds of change as well.

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Convinced of the organic benefits of a globalized world, many governments opted to embrace free trade and floating currency exchanges and eliminate barriers to foreign investment at an accelerated pace since the early 1990s. This seemed like a no-brainer following the victory of the American-led capitalist model over the Soviet-led communist one—what Francis Fukuyama famously called “the end of history.” But it ignored the reality that the market does not always knows best—or21 at least it doesn't automatically look after the interests of everyone involved. Economists such as Joseph Stiglitz, Mariana Mazzucato, Dani Rodrik, and many others observed in recent work that growing financialization and financial globalization in fact increases the instability in the economic system and increases both the likelihood and depth of financial crises.

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persistentId=doi:10.21950/BBZVBN/U54JIA&version=1.0. 18 “Trade in the Digital Era,” OECD, March 2019, https://www.oecd.org/going-digital/trade-in-the-digital-era.pdf. 19 As the UK Centre for Ecology and Hydrology explained: “ Tropical rainforests are often called the ‘lungs of the planet’ because they generally draw in carbon dioxide and breathe out oxygen,” https://www.ceh.ac.uk/news-and-media/news/tropical-rainforests-lungs-planet-reveal-true-sensitivity-global-warming. 20 “The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy, Dani Rodrik, W.W. Norton, 2011, https://drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu/publications/globalization-paradox-democracy-and-future-world-economy” 21 “The End of History and the Last Man, Francis Fukuyama, Penguin Books, 1993”. 22 “The Rise and Fall of Hungary,” Zsolt Darvas, The Guardian, October 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/business/blog/2008/oct/29/hungary-imf. 23 “How Rotterdam Is Using Blockchain to Reinvent Global Trade,” Port of Rotterdam, September 2019, https://www.portofrotterdam.com/en/news-and-press-releases/how-rotterdam-is-using-blockchain-to-reinvent-global-trade. 24 Interview with William and Winston Utomo by Peter Vanham, Jakarta, Indonesia, October 16, 2020. 6 Technology A Changing Labor Market The press release touted a most remarkable headline: “Denmark in the world's top 10 for robots.”1 The organization behind the release was not a Danish tech firm, media outlet, or politician.

Stakeholder Capitalism: A Global Economy That Works for Progress, People and Planet
by Klaus Schwab and Peter Vanham
Published 27 Jan 2021

Shortly thereafter, political reunification of Germany was at last established. And by 1991, the Soviet Union had officially disintegrated. Many economies that lay in its sphere of influence, including those of East Germany, the Baltics, Poland, Hungary, and Romania, turned toward the West and its capitalist, free-market model. “The end of history,” as Francis Fukuyama would call it later,21 had arrived, it seemed. Europe got another boost, this time leading to even deeper political and economic integration and the establishment of a common market and a monetary union, with the euro currency as its apex. At Davos, we felt the winds of change as well.

…

Convinced of the organic benefits of a globalized world, many governments opted to embrace free trade and floating currency exchanges and eliminate barriers to foreign investment at an accelerated pace since the early 1990s. This seemed like a no-brainer following the victory of the American-led capitalist model over the Soviet-led communist one—what Francis Fukuyama famously called “the end of history.” But it ignored the reality that the market does not always knows best—or21 at least it doesn't automatically look after the interests of everyone involved. Economists such as Joseph Stiglitz, Mariana Mazzucato, Dani Rodrik, and many others observed in recent work that growing financialization and financial globalization in fact increases the instability in the economic system and increases both the likelihood and depth of financial crises.

…

persistentId=doi:10.21950/BBZVBN/U54JIA&version=1.0. 18 “Trade in the Digital Era,” OECD, March 2019, https://www.oecd.org/going-digital/trade-in-the-digital-era.pdf. 19 As the UK Centre for Ecology and Hydrology explained: “ Tropical rainforests are often called the ‘lungs of the planet’ because they generally draw in carbon dioxide and breathe out oxygen,” https://www.ceh.ac.uk/news-and-media/news/tropical-rainforests-lungs-planet-reveal-true-sensitivity-global-warming. 20 “The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy, Dani Rodrik, W.W. Norton, 2011, https://drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu/publications/globalization-paradox-democracy-and-future-world-economy” 21 “The End of History and the Last Man, Francis Fukuyama, Penguin Books, 1993”. 22 “The Rise and Fall of Hungary,” Zsolt Darvas, The Guardian, October 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/business/blog/2008/oct/29/hungary-imf. 23 “How Rotterdam Is Using Blockchain to Reinvent Global Trade,” Port of Rotterdam, September 2019, https://www.portofrotterdam.com/en/news-and-press-releases/how-rotterdam-is-using-blockchain-to-reinvent-global-trade. 24 Interview with William and Winston Utomo by Peter Vanham, Jakarta, Indonesia, October 16, 2020. 6 Technology A Changing Labor Market The press release touted a most remarkable headline: “Denmark in the world's top 10 for robots.”1 The organization behind the release was not a Danish tech firm, media outlet, or politician.

The end of history and the last man
by Francis Fukuyama
Published 28 Feb 2006

THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN Francis Fukuyama FREE PRESS NEW YORK LONDON TORONTO SYDNEY FREE PRESS A Division of Simon & Schuster, Inc. 1230 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020 Copyright © 1992, 2006 by Francis Fukuyama All rights reserved, including the right of reproduction in whole or in part in any form. First Free Press trade paperback edition 2006 FREE PRESS and colophon are trademarks of Simon & Schuster, Inc. For information about special discounts for bulk purchases, please contact Simon & Schuster Special Sales: 1-800-456-6798 or business@simonandschuster.com Manufactured in the United States of America 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 The Library of Congress has catalogued the hardcover edition as follows: Fukuyama, Francis.

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For information about special discounts for bulk purchases, please contact Simon & Schuster Special Sales: 1-800-456-6798 or business@simonandschuster.com Manufactured in the United States of America 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 The Library of Congress has catalogued the hardcover edition as follows: Fukuyama, Francis. The end of history and the last man / Francis Fukuyama p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. History—Philosophy. 2. World politics—1945-. I. Title. D16.8F85. 1992 91-29677 901—dc20 CIP ISBN-13: 978-0-743-28455-4 eISBN-13: 978-1-4165-3178-4 www.SimonandSchuster.com To Julia and David CONTENTS Acknowledgments By Way of an Introduction Part I AN OLD QUESTION ASKED ANEW 1 Our Pessimism 2 The Weakness of Strong States I 3 The Weakness of Strong States II, or, Eating Pineapples on the Moon 4 The Worldwide Liberal Revolution Part II THE OLD AGE OF MANKIND 5 An Idea for a Universal History 6 The Mechanism of Desire 7 No Barbarians at the Gates 8 Accumulation without End 9 The Victory of the VCR 10 In the Land of Education 11 The Former Question Answered 12 No Democracy without Democrats Part III THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION 13 In the Beginning, a Battle to the Death for Pure Prestige 14 The First Man 15 A Vacation in Bulgaria 16 The Beast with Red Cheeks 17 The Rise and Fall of Thymos 18 Lordship and Bondage 19 The Universal and Homogeneous State Part IV LEAPING OVER RHODES 20 The Coldest of All Cold Monsters 21 The Thymotic Origins of Work 22 Empires of Resentment, Empires of Deference 23 The Unreality of “Realism” 24 The Power of the Powerless 25 National Interests 26 Toward a Pacific Union Part V THE LAST MAN 27 In the Realm of Freedom 28 Men without Chests 29 Free and Unequal 30 Perfect Rights and Defective Duties 31 Immense Wars of the Spirit Afterword to the Second Paperback Edition of The End of History and the Last Man Notes Bibliography Index ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The “End of History” would never have existed, either as an article or as this present book, without the invitation to deliver a lecture by that title during the 1988-89 academic year, extended by Professors Nathan Tarcov and Allan Bloom of the John M.

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Nor can we in the final analysis know, provided a majority of the wagons eventually reach the same town, whether their occupants, having looked around a bit at their new surroundings, will not find them inadequate and set their eyes on a new and more distant journey. Afterword to the Second Paperback Edition of The End of History and the Last Man In the seventeen years that have passed since the original publication of my essay, “The End of History?”, my hypothesis has been criticized from every conceivable point of view. Publication of the second paperback edition of the book The End of History and the Last Man gives me an opportunity to restate the original argument, to answer what I regard as the most serious objections that were raised to it, and to reflect on some of the developments in world politics that have occurred since the summer of 1989.

They Don't Represent Us: Reclaiming Our Democracy
by Lawrence Lessig
Published 5 Nov 2019

On remedies, see Frances Moore Lappé and Adam Eichen, Daring Democracy: Igniting Power, Meaning, and Connection for the America We Want (Boston: Beacon, 2017). 4.See, e.g., Achen and Bartels, Democracy for Realists. 5.Numbers drawn from Max Roser, “Democracy,” in Our World in Data (2016), available at link #7. For a slightly different reckoning, see Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 8. 6.Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” The National Interest 16 (Summer 1989): 6. 7.Steven Kull, “Voter Anger with Government and the 2016 Election: A Survey of American Voters,” Voice of the People, conducted by the Program for Public Consultation, School of Public Policy, University of Maryland (November 2016), available at link #8.

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Swing-state Democrats turn a blind eye to steel tariffs. Democrats generally don’t. Rather than a bias that runs in an obvious direction, the sum of these different inequalities bends consistently in no particular direction. This is not the physics of a plutocracy. It is the dynamic of a vetocracy—a “veto-ocracy,” as Francis Fukuyama puts it.129 As Fukuyama describes, the American Constitution already embeds many veto points for any substantial legislation. A law can be stopped in either house. A law can be slowed by the president. A law can be struck down by the courts. A president can refuse to enforce a law. All of these constitute the ways in which the constitutional system makes change difficult.

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Lacombe, Billionaires and Stealth Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018). 127.See Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson, The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 128.Indeed, the median household income of the twenty smallest states is below the median household income of the top twenty. See Per Capita Wealth, available at link #79. 129.Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2014), chap. 34. 130.Van Reybrouck, Against Elections, xiii. 131.See the analysis by Ciara Torres-Spelliscy in “What Drives Climate Change Denial? Campaign Donations and Lobbying,” Brennan Center for Justice, September 19, 2017, available at link #80. 132.See Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “U.S.

Moneyland: Why Thieves and Crooks Now Rule the World and How to Take It Back
by Oliver Bullough
Published 5 Sep 2018

In the summer of 1991, when hardliners in Moscow tried and failed to re-impose the old Soviet ways on their country, I was on a family holiday in the Scottish Highlands, where I spent days trying to coax the radio into cutting through the mountains to tell me what was going on. By the time our holiday was over, the coup had failed, and a new world was dawning. The previously sober historian Francis Fukuyama declared it to be the End of History. The whole world was going to be free. The Good Guys Had Won. I longed to see what was happening in Eastern Europe, and I read hundreds of books by those who had been there before me. While at university, I spent every long summer wandering through the previously forbidden countries of the old Warsaw Pact, revelling in Europe’s reunification.

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Much Western political thought envisages the liberal democracies of the ‘developed’ countries as the natural end point of a historical process, and refers to other societies as ‘developing’, as if they are trains on a track which will eventually deliver them to the terminal station where we now live. The political theorist Francis Fukuyama – who has given up on the idea that history has come to an end – argues in his 2011 book The Origins of Political Order that this is a damagingly wrong way of looking at the world. The liberal capitalism of Western Europe, the United States and the other Western countries is not only extremely unusual, but also just one of multiple kinds of government.

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It would take too long to list all the books I have read, but here is a brief summary of key texts used in researching different chapters, with suggestions for further reading. 1 – Aladdin’s Cave Mancur Olson’s theories on bandits are set out in Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships (New York: Basic Books, 2000). I also found Francis Fukuyama’s The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2011; London: Profile Books, 2011) very helpful. Sarah Chayes lays out the connection between corruption and terrorism in unanswerable detail in Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security (New York and London: W.

Revolting!: How the Establishment Are Undermining Democracy and What They're Afraid Of
by Mick Hume
Published 23 Feb 2017

Yet even after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was little evidence of any renewed faith in democracy among the rulers of the Western world. In 1989 American author Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ thesis was hailed as a statement of the historic triumph of liberal democratic capitalism. Yet there was little real triumphalism in Fukuyama’s argument. He based his case rather on the fact that all the alternatives had been discredited and collapsed. It was hardly a statement of deep commitment to or faith in the democratic cause. Western democracy was the winner by default. When Fukuyama expanded his thesis into a 1992 book, the full title became The End of History and the Last Man. He was at least half-right; the West had won by being the last man standing.

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Hitler, Hitler’s Table Talk: 1941–44 (London, 1953), p. 497 39. www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/7805.H_L_Mencken 40. Beatrice Webb, My Apprenticeship (Cambridge University, revised edition, 1980), p. 173 41. Cited in Runciman, Confidence Trap, pp. 104, 106 42. Ibid., p. 306 43. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, 1992 (Penguin, 2012) 44. The Writings of the Young Karl Marx, Philosophical and Social, translated by L. Easton and K. Guddat (Garden City, NY, 1967), p. 206 Chapter 4: For Europe – against the EU 1. Miguel Herrero de Minon, ‘Europe’s Non-Existent Body Politic’, in de Minon and G.

The Return of Marco Polo's World: War, Strategy, and American Interests in the Twenty-First Century
by Robert D. Kaplan
Published 6 Mar 2018

Huntington disdains “rational-choice theory,” the reigning fad in political science, which assumes that human behavior is predictable but which fails to take account of fear, envy, hatred, self-sacrifice, and other human passions that are essential to an understanding of politics. In an age of academic operators he is an old-fashioned teacher who speculates historically and philosophically on the human condition. His former students include Francis Fukuyama, the author of the famous Post Cold War anthem The End of History and the Last Man (1992), and Fareed Zakaria, the former managing editor of Foreign Affairs and the current editor of Newsweek International. You aren’t likely to see Huntington on C-SPAN, let alone on The McLaughlin Group. He is a worse than indifferent public speaker: hunched over, reading laboriously from a text.

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In fact, Mearsheimer is best known in the academy for his equally controversial views on China, and particularly for his 2001 magnum opus, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Writing in Foreign Affairs in 2010, the Columbia University professor Richard K. Betts called Tragedy one of the three great works of the Post Cold War era, along with Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man (1992) and Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996). And, Betts suggested, “once China’s power is full grown,” Mearsheimer’s book may pull ahead of the other two in terms of influence. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics truly defines Mearsheimer, as it does realism.

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Whatever the latest groupthink happens to be, Mearsheimer almost always instinctively wants to oppose it—especially if it emanates from Washington. The best grand theories tend to be written no earlier than middle age, when the writer has life experience and mistakes behind him to draw upon. Morgenthau’s 1948 classic, Politics Among Nations, was published when he was forty-four, Fukuyama’s The End of History was published as a book when he was forty, and Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations as a book when he was sixty-nine. Mearsheimer began writing The Tragedy of Great Power Politics when he was in his mid-forties, after working on it for a decade. Published just before 9/11, the book intimates the need for America to avoid strategic distractions and concentrate on confronting China.

Tomorrow's Capitalist: My Search for the Soul of Business
by Alan Murray
Published 15 Dec 2022

One of the US cabinet secretaries asked him if he was considering a “third way” that blended capitalism and socialism. “There is no third way,” he responded without hesitation. “Capitalism has won.” Political scientist Francis Fukuyama went even further, writing a popular book called The End of History and the Last Man, in which he argued, “What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”6 To be sure, capitalism had earned its triumph.

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New York Times, September 13, 1970. 3. Milton Friedman. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. 4. Adam Smith. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1776. 5. Friedman, “A Friedman Doctrine.” 6. Francis Fukuyama. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press, 1992. 7. “For Larry Summers, Milton Friedman Was a Devil Figure in His Youth.” Mostly Economics, August 17, 2010. 8. Ibid. 9. TBR: Statement on Corporate Governance, September 1997. https://cdn.the conversation.com/static_files/files/693/Statement_on_Corporate_Governance_Business -Roundtable-1997%281%29.pdf?

The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom
by Evgeny Morozov
Published 16 Nov 2010

Technology, with its unique ability to fuel consumerist zeal—itself seen as a threat to any authoritarian regime—as well as its prowess to awaken and mobilize the masses against their rulers, was thought to be the ultimate liberator. There is a good reason why one of the chapters in Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and The Last Man, the ur-text of the early 1990s that successfully bridged the worlds of positive psychology and foreign affairs, was titled “The Victory of the VCR.” The ambiguity surrounding the end of the Cold War made such arguments look far more persuasive than any close examination of their theoretical strengths would warrant.

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“The communist bloc failed,” it said in a timely published study, “not primarily or even fundamentally because of its centrally controlled economic policies or its excessive military burdens, but because its closed societies were too long denied the fruits of the information revolution.” This view has proved remarkably sticky. As late as 2002, Francis Fukuyama, himself a RAND Corporation alumnus, would write that “totalitarian rule depended on a regime’s ability to maintain a monopoly over information, and once modern information technology made that impossible, the regime’s power was undermined.” By 1995 true believers in the power of information to crush authoritarianism were treated to a book-length treatise.

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Huxley feared that what we love will ruin us. This book is about the possibility that Huxley, not Orwell, was right,” is how Neil Postman chose to describe the theme of his best-selling Amusing Ourselves to Death. “[In contrast to Brave New World], the political predictions of ... 1984 were entirely wrong,” writes Francis Fukuyama in Our Posthuman Future. Maybe, but what many critics often fail to grasp is that both texts were written as sharp social critiques of contemporary problems rather than prophecies of the future. Orwell’s work was an attack on Stalinism and the stifling practices of the British censors, while Huxley’s was an attack on the then-popular philosophy of utilitarianism.

The Decadent Society: How We Became the Victims of Our Own Success
by Ross Douthat
Published 25 Feb 2020

The vital culture makes a bricolage of classic stories; the decadent culture remakes the bricolage with a slightly different cast and a few plot beats swapped around. The vital culture creates fans de novo; the decadent culture performs “fan service.” The vital culture is a workshop; the decadent culture is a museum. Can the End of History End? One important prophet of this museum culture was Francis Fukuyama, whose end-of-the-Cold-War magnum opus, The End of History and the Last Man, anticipated some of the tedium and repetition I’ve described. The “end” that Fukuyama discerned, contrary to many subsequent smug dismissals of his thesis, was not an ending of events—an end to wars or calamities or economic setbacks.

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Since the 2008 financial crisis and the Great Recession exposed almost a decade’s worth of Western growth as an illusion, a diverse cast of economists and political scientists and other figures on both the left and the right have begun to talk about stagnation and repetition and complacency and sclerosis as defining features of this Western age: Tyler Cowen and Robert Gordon, Thomas Piketty and Francis Fukuyama, David Graeber and Peter Thiel, and many others. This book is, in part, an attempt to synthesize their various perspectives into a compelling account of our situation. But it also weaves the social sciences together with observations on our intellectual climate, our popular culture, our religious moment, our technological pastimes, in the hopes of painting a fuller portrait of our decadence than you can get just looking at political science papers on institutional decay or an economic analysis of the declining rate of growth.

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In the posthistorical period, there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history.” And then: “Perhaps this very prospect of centuries of boredom at the end of history will serve to get history started once again.” So even Fukuyama didn’t imagine that his “end” would be eternal—and as a provisional description of the post-1989 world, the landscape that I’m calling decadent, his “end of history” label is a reasonable fit. Certainly much of the intellectual repetition and frustration described in this chapter feels like frustration at being unable to imagine something new, to discern “clear lines of advance,” in Barzun’s phrase, to escape the political and moral and even theological limits imposed by late-modern liberalism, to reclaim some lost arcadia or reach boldly for heaven or utopia.

The Autonomous Revolution: Reclaiming the Future We’ve Sold to Machines
by William Davidow and Michael Malone
Published 18 Feb 2020

We can start by shutting off our phones at meals and sharing our beds with our partners rather than with texts and tweets. CHAPTER NINE THE BODY POLITIC Government in the Autonomous Revolution IN 1992, FRANCIS FUKUYAMA published his acclaimed book The End of History and the Last Man, which proclaimed that, with the fall of the USSR, government had completed its evolution. As he put it, civilization had arrived at “the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”1 In the decades since, the rise of authoritarian regimes (roughly one nominally democratic country has reverted to tyranny every year for the last two decades) and the surge of right- and left-wing populism have cast a pall over Fukuyama’s optimistic vision.

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Gazzaley and Rosen, The Distracted Mind, 129. 58. Gloria Mark et al., “The Task Left Behind? Examining the Nature of Fragmented Work,” University of California, Irvine, April 2005, http://www.ics.uci.edu/%7Egmark/CHI2005.pdf (accessed June 27, 2019). Chapter Nine THE BODY POLITIC 1. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, reissue ed. (New York: Free Press, 2006). 2. “Homestead Act,” History.com, https://www.history.com/topics/homestead-act (accessed June 27, 2019). 3. Julian M. Alston, Jennifer S. James, Matthew A. Andersen, Philip G. Pardey, “A Brief History of US Agriculture,” in Persistence Pays: U.S.

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See also retail sector cybercrime and security, 132, 153–154 credit card, 74–76 cyber currencies, 78–80, 177–178 evolution of, 172–173 fake news classification as, 169–170 financial, 39–40, 75–76, 78–80, 171–172, 177–178 global effort needed for, 179 government response to, 172–176, 179 public utilities threat with, 173, 174 response rate relation to rate of, 171–172 Russia-based, 174 cyber currencies, 10, 83 blockchain technology of, 79, 80 electricity and miners involved with, 176 governance rules and systems, 176–178 government regulation needed for, 176–177 security with, 78–80, 177–178 as spatial equivalence, 16 cyber weapons, 16, 172–173, 174, 176 Daimler, Gottlieb, 53 Data and Goliath (Schneier), 127 Data Protection Directive, 129 data tracking/collection: advertising revenues’ role in, 89, 90, 120–123 algorithmic prisons with, 13, 114, 123–128 behavior manipulation in, 117, 121, 123 consumer protections against, 127–128 cookies’ role in, 89, 116, 117–118, 128 of credit rating agencies, 118–119 evolution and factors behind abuses of, 116–118 freemium business model role in, 121–123, 129–130 government agencies purchasing, 119, 131 information fiduciaries as protection for, 129–131 laws and regulations on, 128–130 liberty threats to and factors with, 13, 116–117, 123–128 privacy threat evolution with, 116–119 from social networking sites, 116, 118 transparency of, 127 Death and Life of Great American Cities, The (Jacobs), 109 Deep Blue, 46–47 delivery services, 102 democracy: authoritarianism threat to, 158–159 collective identity of citizens key to, 163, 166, 168 income inequality in relation to, 163–164 social media/networking threats to, 7, 18, 168–169 depression, 147–148, 166 Dichter, Ernest, 135 discrimination, 162–163, 165–166 displacement: business, 71, 72–73, 99 job, with job creation historically, 51–54, 106 job, without new job creation, 43, 51, 60–64, 98–99, 105–106 Distracted Minds (Gazzaley), 155 Echo, 119 economic policy and metrics: Depression-era, 67, 160 on monetizable productivity, 58–59 non-monetizable productivity in relation to, 52, 58–59, 66, 67, 68 unemployment rates in relation to, 106–107 “Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren” (Keynes), 187–189 economy: automation impacts on, 12–13 Autonomous, 60–61, 96–98 entrepreneurship, 110 gig, 7, 34, 63, 84, 85, 94 Second Economy contrasted with traditional, 97–98, 103 sharing, 70, 83–87, 100, 101–102 social empathy decline with decline of, 164–165 traditional compared to Autonomous, 96 elder care, 111 election tampering, 89, 167, 180, 186 electricity: cyber currency mining use of, 176 invention of, 29, 182 ELIZA, 46 Elsevier, Reed, 119 email, 60–61, 150 emotion detection technology, 115–116 empires, rise and fall of, 6–7, 24–25 End of History and the Last Man, The (Fukuyama), 158 Enlightenment, xii, 2, 22, 152 entrepreneurship, rates of, 110 Epic of Gilgamesh, The, 24, 183–184, 185 Equifax, 75–76, 118, 126, 130 Estonia, 174 ethnicity. See race and ethnicity European Union, 14, 128–129 expertise, impairment with, 2–3 Facebook, 43, 65, 70 addictive design elements of, 144 BAADD practices of, 88, 90, 91 content governance policies of, 168 cyber currency under, 10 emotion detection technology, 115 employee to user ratio for, 86, 105 evolution unpredictability of, 180 freemium business model profiting, 122–123 narcissistic personality proliferation on, 146–147 revenue, 150 Snapchat competition with, 91 usage decline, 154 facial recognition, 116 fake news, 18, 150, 168, 169–170 farming, 25, 152, 159, 160.

The Virtue of Nationalism
by Yoram Hazony
Published 3 Sep 2018

On both sides of the Atlantic, the unpleasant history of past European and American imperialism prevented most from speaking openly of empire. What was repeated endlessly by elected officials, diplomats, businessmen, and media personalities—as well as in a profusion of utopian political tracts, from Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man (1992), to Thomas Friedman’s The Lexus and the Olive Tree (1999), to Shimon Peres’s The New Middle East (1995)—was that the “international community” was being brought under “global governance.” The world would have a single regime of law and a single economic system, governed by Americans and Europeans in accordance with liberal political doctrines.

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.… Like it or not, America today is Rome” (p. 244). As Tom Friedman put it, “The emerging global order needs an enforcer. That’s America’s new burden.” Thomas Friedman, “A Manifesto for a Fast World,” New York Times Magazine, March 28, 1999. See also Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Picador, 1999), 465–468; Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992); and Shimon Peres, The New Middle East (New York: Henry Holt, 1995), among many other such works. 64. On the conservative (or “traditionalist”) school in English political theory, see Quinton, The Politics of Imperfection; J. G. A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987 ed.), esp. 30–55, 148–181; Harold J.

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As a result, almost all public discussion of these efforts was conducted in a murky newspeak riddled with euphemisms such as “new world order,” “ever-closer union,” “openness,” “globalization,” “global governance,” “pooled sovereignty,” “rules-based order,” “universal jurisdiction,” “international community,” “liberal internationalism,” “transnationalism,” “American leadership,” “American century,” “unipolar world,” “indispensable nation,” “hegemon,” “subsidiarity,” “play by the rules,” “the right side of history,” “the end of history,” and so on.6 All of this endured for a generation—until finally the meaning of these phrases began to become clear to a broad public, with the results that we see before us. Whether the outpouring of nationalist sentiment in Britain and America will, in the end, be for the best, remains to be seen.

Bobos in Paradise: The New Upper Class and How They Got There
by David Brooks
Published 1 Jan 2000

Yale professor Paul Kennedy had a distinguished but unglamorous career under his belt when he wrote The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, predicting American decline. He was wrong, and hundreds of other commentators rose to say so, thus making him famous and turning his book into a bestseller. Francis Fukuyama wrote an essay called “The End of History,” which seemed wrong to people who read only the title. Thousands of essayists wrote pieces pointing out that history had not ended, and Fukuyama became a global sensation. After the article has appeared, the young intellectual will want to let the editor of the piece know what a massive impact the article is having at the White House/the Federal Reserve/the film industry or wherever its intended target is.

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But even in more traditional circles, when one sees people return to religious participation, one often gets the sense that it is the participation they go for as much as the religion. The New York Times Magazine recently ran a special issue on religion that included the astute headline “Religion Makes a Comeback (Belief to Follow).” Francis Fukuyama nicely captured the ethos of Bobo religiosity in his 1999 book, The Great Disruption: Instead of community arising as a byproduct of rigid belief, people will return to religious belief because of their desire for community. In other words, people will return to religious tradition not necessarily because they accept the truth of revelation, but precisely because the absence of community and the transience of social ties in the secular world makes them hungry for ritual and cultural tradition.

A Theory of the Drone
by Gregoire Chamayou
Published 23 Apr 2013

The military drone is a low-cost weapon—at least in comparison to classic fighter planes. That has long been one of the principal selling points for such a weapon. But of course the contradiction lies in the fact that it is in the nature of such a weapon to proliferate. What does Francis Fukuyama do after the end of history? In his leisure hours, he puts together little drones in his garage and then proudly exhibits them on his blog.14 He is part of an rapidly developing subculture: that of the homemade drone. Following in the footsteps of the model enthusiasts of the 1960s, there today exists a whole little community of amateurs who buy or construct drones at the cost of a few hundred dollars.

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To the principle of the nonexposure of lives at the scene of hostilities is added the principle of making the base of operations secure: “the US homeland must remain a secure base from which the Air Force can globally project power”—which means “ensuring the protection of US facilities and infrastructures used for power projection.” Steven M. Rinaldi, Donald H. Leathem, and Timothy Kaufman, “Protecting the Homeland Air Force: Roles in Homeland Security,” Aerospace Power Journal, Spring 2002, 83. 14. Francis Fukuyama, “Surveillance Drones, Take Two,” Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (blog), September 12, 2012, blogs.the-american-interest.com/fukuyama/2012/09/20/surveillance-drones-take-two. 15. See the Team BlackSheep video from November 30, 2010, on YouTube at www.youtube.com/watch?v=M9cSxEqKQ78 and the Team BlackSheep website at www.team-blacksheep.com. 16.

Evil Geniuses: The Unmaking of America: A Recent History
by Kurt Andersen
Published 14 Sep 2020

As the millennium approached, invented-in-America political and economic freedom was triumphing globally and for good, because—in the words of an unknown Reagan State Department dweeb in 1989—we’d arrived at “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” Francis Fukuyama turned his essay into a bestselling and enormously influential book, The End of History, in 1992. It was a moment of supreme self-satisfaction for America’s educated upper middle class in particular. One of their own, a Rhodes Scholar who’d graduated from Yale Law School, was about to be elected president. As the Harvard political philosophy professor (and baby boom Rhodes Scholar) Michael Sandel puts it, “Meritocracies…produce morally unattractive attitudes among those who make it to the top.

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But that saying now has an alternative and nearly opposite meaning: the more that underlying structures change for real (technology, the political economy), the more the surfaces (style, entertainment) remain the same. In the early 1990s, Francis Fukuyama published his argument that all societies were inexorably arriving at the same evolutionary end point—the glorious finale of political economic history. Such folly. Yet in the arts and entertainment and style, what happened then, at the moment when both The End of History and the film Groundhog Day came out, does feel like an end of cultural history. Or at least, and I’m still hoping, an extremely long pause. So to recap: the national nostalgia reflex was triggered in the first place in the 1970s by fatigue from all the warp-drive cultural changes of the ’60s.

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And the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision in 2010, the conservative majority’s view that “there’s no such thing as spending too much money to support a political candidate, because your money is actually speech—that’s all nonsense,” but as a result, apart from passing a constitutional amendment, “there isn’t anything the government can do [about regulating campaign finance] now.” Then there’s the remarkable apostasy of the neoconservative political economist and Reagan administration official Francis Fukuyama. The End of History and its celebration of the permanent global triumph of U.S.-style capitalism in the 1990s got him an endowed public policy professorship at George Mason University, the Koch academic headquarters, and although he moved on to Stanford, he remains conservative in some ways. But when he was asked recently what he thought of the apparent new U.S. vogue for social democracy, even socialism, he said, “It all depends on what you mean by socialism,” and then he went off.

The Rise and Fall of the Neoliberal Order: America and the World in the Free Market Era
by Gary Gerstle
Published 14 Oct 2022

Hacker, The Great Risk Shift: The New Economic Insecurity and the Decline of the American Dream (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Godfrey Hodgson, More Equal than Others; Steve Fraser, The Age of Acquiescence: The Life and Death of American Resistance to Organized Wealth and Power (New York: Little, Brown, 2015), chapter 12. 17.Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). This was an outgrowth of Fukuyama’s essay “The End of History?” published in National Interest 16 (Summer 1989), 3–18. 18.On decline of social democracy in Europe, see Tony Judt, Ill Fares the Land (New York: Penguin Books, 2010) and Judt, Postwar; Sheri Berman, The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe’s Twentieth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); James T.

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Moreover, many jobs had become much less secure than they had once been, with the portion of households suffering an income decline of 25 percent or more a year from job losses rising steadily across the decade.16 The decline of labor was not just evident in shrinking union membership rolls, erosion of political power, and increasing economic inequality. It was also evident in a decline in the very ability to imagine organizing a world on something other than capitalist principles. This was the point powerfully made by the social theorist and philosopher Francis Fukuyama in The End of History and the Last Man, the bestselling book he published in 1992. A fierce critic of communism, Fukuyama nevertheless respected the radicalism of communism’s critique of liberal democracy (the political system most conducive, Fukuyama argued, to capitalism’s flourishing) and the passions that it had long elicited among its supporters.

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Louis and the Violent History of the United States (New York: Basic Books, 2020). 52.Others in this group included the literary critic Allan Bloom; William J. Bennett, Reagan’s secretary of education; editor of Commentary magazine Norman Podhoretz; senator from New York Daniel Patrick Moynihan; and social theorist Francis Fukuyama. Social scientists Daniel Bell and Nathan Glazer hovered around its fringes, as did the historian and social critic Christopher Lasch. They were often grouped under the label “neoconservative.” For a sampling of their writing, see Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 1976); Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations (New York: W.

The Dawn of Eurasia: On the Trail of the New World Order
by Bruno Macaes
Published 25 Jan 2018

Ironically, this would be the most despicable state of human history, when no further movement can be conceived, let alone attempted, when men and women entertain themselves to death in the belief that they have, at long last, discovered happiness. ‘One still works, but work is a pastime.’ Politics has disappeared: ‘Who still wants to rule? Who still wants to obey? Both are too burdensome.’ Mankind lives at the end of history when everything is as perfect as it can be and the whole past looks like a madhouse: ‘Formerly all the world was insane.’ In his extraordinarily popular book The End of History and the Last Man, Francis Fukuyama defended the argument that the desire to live in a modern society is universal and that a modern society assumes everywhere the form of a market economy and a democratic political system.

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Contemporary art had taught them that there is always a different way of seeing. Art must foresee other pictures, other worlds. Western modernity is for them just another form of tradition to be uprooted and overcome. When discussing world politics today, we often revert to one of two models. The first, popularized by Francis Fukuyama, sees the whole world converging to a European or Western political framework, after which no further historical development is possible. Every country or region is measured by the time it will still take to reach this final destination, but all doubts and debates about where we are heading have been fundamentally resolved.

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The view of Asian society was of a society that was backward, that had remained static since antiquity and that, left to itself, would always remain static. As Hegel was to argue, Europe was the end and destination of historical change, Asia the beginning. ‘The history of the world travels from East to West, for Europe is absolutely the end of history, Asia the beginning.’12 With China history begins, for it is the oldest empire and also, as Hegel puts it, the newest; a place where change is excluded ‘and the fixedness of a character which recurs perpetually takes the place of what we should call the truly historical’.13 As the contemporary Chinese political philosopher Wang Hui writes, this division had a number of distinctive traits: Asian political empires as opposed to European nations; agrarian and nomad social types in contrast to European urban societies; political despotism against developed legal systems and the pursuit of individual freedom.

The Wealth of Humans: Work, Power, and Status in the Twenty-First Century
by Ryan Avent
Published 20 Sep 2016

Such a story had not, to my knowledge, been told at the time of writing.   6. ‘The Gifts of the Moguls’, The Economist, 4 July 2015. 11. The Politics of Labour Abundance   1. Yoshihiro Francis Fukuyama (1952–) is an American political scientist, political economist and author, known for his book The End of History and the Last Man (New York, NY: Free Press, 1992), which expanded on his 1989 essay, ‘The End of History’.   2. Schleicher, David, ‘Things Aren’t Going That Well Over There Either: Party Polarization and Election Law in Comparative Perspective’, University of Chicago Legal Forum, 18 November 2014.   3. 

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The period began, in the 1970s and 1980s, with a liberalizing impulse across a broad range of countries, from Britain and America to China and India. While Thatcher and Reagan cut tax rates and squashed unions, Deng Xiaopeng trod cautiously towards limited tolerance of markets and foreign trade. The era of consensus continued with the collapse of communism in Russia and Eastern Europe, which prompted Francis Fukuyama to muse that ‘the end of history’ had arrived with the global ascendance of liberal democracy.1 As global markets integrated, politics in most rich democracies coalesced around support for market-oriented economies, global openness and progressive social goals. It was a pleasant sort of era for the cosmopolitan, technocratic elite: the believers in the notion that markets, lightly tended, offered the best route to global prosperity and peace.

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Feenstra, Robert C., and Taylor, Alan M., eds., Globalization in an Age of Crisis: Multilateral Economic Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2014) Floud, Roderick, Humphries, Jane, and Johnson, Paul, eds., The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) Ford, Martin, The Lights in the Tunnel: Automation, Accelerating Technology and the Economy of the Future (Createspace, 2009) _____, Rise of the Robots: Technology and the Threat of a Jobless Future (London: Oneworld Publications, 2015) Friedman, Milton, and Schwartz, Anna, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963) Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History and the Last Man (The Free Press, 1992) Glaeser, Edward, Triumph of the City: How Our Greatest Invention Makes Us Richer, Smarter, Greener, Healthier, and Happier (London: Macmillan, 2011) Goldin, Claudia and Katz, Lawrence, The Race Between Education and Technology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008) Gordon, Robert, The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The U.S.

The Revolt of the Public and the Crisis of Authority in the New Millennium
by Martin Gurri
Published 13 Nov 2018

With the fall of communism and implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991, no alternative system was left to oppose the democracies. They had triumphed with a completeness rarely seen in history. As early as 1989, Francis Fukuyama, in his famous essay “The End of History?”, could speculate about a world wholly dominated by the democratic ideology: What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, of the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the endpoint of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. This is not to say that there will no longer be events to fill the pages of Foreign Affairs’ yearly summaries of international relations, for the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness and is as yet incomplete in the real or material world.

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[265] Robert Mackey, “For Egypt’s Rulers, Familiar Scapegoats,” New York Times, November 29, 2014, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/29/for-egypts-new-rulers-familiar-scapegoats/. [266] Patrick Kingsley, “I’m no traitor, says Wael Ghonim as Egypt regime targets secular activists,” The Guardian, January 9, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/09/wael-ghonim-egypt-regime-targets-secular-activists. [267] Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest, Summer 1989, http://www.kropfpolisci.com/exceptionalism.fukuyama.pdf. [268] Angelique Chrisafis, “François Hollande becomes most unpopular French president ever,” The Guardian, October 29, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/29/francois-hollande-most-unpopular-president

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But there are powerful reasons for believing that it is the ideal that will govern the material world in the long run.[267] Following the horrors of 9/11, Fukuyama and his ideas were derided as triumphalist nonsense. But he was only half wrong. Fukuyama, a Hegelian, argued that Western democracy had run out of “contradictions”: that is, of ideological alternatives. That was true in 1989 and remains true today. Fukuyama’s mistake was to infer that the absence of contradictions meant the end of history. There was another possibility he failed to consider. History could well be driven by negation rather than contradiction. It could ride on the nihilistic rejection of the established order, regardless of alternatives or consequences. That would not be without precedent. The Roman Empire wasn’t overthrown by something called “feudalism” – it collapsed of its own dead weight, to the astonishment of friend and foe alike.

The Despot's Accomplice: How the West Is Aiding and Abetting the Decline of Democracy
by Brian Klaas
Published 15 Mar 2017

Even with heroic efforts to the contrary, digital information flows are difficult to stop— and knowledge and social coordination can be extremely powerful when it comes to standing up to despots. â•… But the corresponding backlash by authoritarian rulers, who also have learned a thing or two about digital communication, is undermining naïve predictions made across the Western world in the wake of the Arab Spring. Everyone seemed to think that it was only a matter of time before Twitter revolutions began toppling despots left and right. It was a return to the notion, initially articulated by Francis Fukuyama, that we had reached the democratic endpoint, the “End of History”4—but this time the end would be announced in 140 characters or fewer. There was even a movement to nominate Twitter for the Nobel Peace Prize.5 Yet as the grip of authoritarianism has tightened rather than loosened in the last decade, it has become clear that reports of despotism’s death at the hands of Twitter and Facebook have been greatly exaggerated. â•… Social media, information technology, and digital communication are incredibly powerful tools that scare despots—and rightly so.

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When it does not, it should fall by the wayside, as other overriding interests are deemed more important. This is the current approach. It has led us to a prolonged period of democratic stagnation and decline, giving despots the upper hand. Twenty-five years ago, Francis Fukuyama mistakenly argued that the world was nearing “The End of History,” wherein democracy would ultimately supplant despotism everywhere as the ideological dominance of democracy became uncontested. Instead, because of the West’s halfhearted approach to democracy promotion, despots have a growing number of defenders, and the West is far too often on the wrong side of “history.” â•… There is a third way forward: promote democracy consistently and more intelligently.

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‘Director Peter Jackson Wades into Turkish Debate over “Evil” Gollum’, The Telegraph, 3 December 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/ 12030987/Lord-of-the-Rigns-director-Peter-Jackson-wades-into-RecepTayyip-Erdogan-Gollum-debate.html, last accessed 3 April 2016. 4.╇Fukuyama, Francis (1992). The End of History and the Last Man, New York: Free Press. 5.╇Khan, Urmee (2009). ‘Twitter Should Win Nobel Peace Prize, Says Former US Security Adviser,’ The Telegraph, 7 July 2009, http://www. telegraph.co.uk/technology/twitter/5768159/Twitter-should-winNobel-Peace-Prize-says-former-US-security-adviser.html, last accessed 3 April 2016. 6.╇Dobson, William J. (2012).

Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society
by Eric Posner and E. Weyl
Published 14 May 2018

Glen Weyl, Surge Pricing Solves the Wild Goose Chase (2017), https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/ECabstract.pdf. 3. Janny Scott, After Three Days in the Spotlight, Nobel Prize Winner Is Dead, New York Times, October 12, 1996. Introduction. The Crisis of the Liberal Order 1. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press, 1992). 2. Marion Fourcade-Gourinchas & Sarah L. Babb, The Rebirth of the Liberal Creed: Paths to Neoliberalism in Four Countries, 108 American Journal of Sociology 533 (2002); Fourcade et al., The Superiority of Economists, 29 Journal of Economic Perspectives 89 (2015). 3.

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Saumitra Jha, Financial Asset Holdings and Political Attitudes: Evidence from Revolutionary England, 130 Quarterly Journal of Economics 1485 (2015); Markku Kaustia, Samuli Knüpfer, & Sami Torstila, Stock Ownership and Political Behavior: Evidence from Demutualizations, 62 Management Science 945 (2015). 71. Francis Fukuyama, Trust (Free Press, 1995); Paola Sapienza, Anna Toldra-Simats, & Luigi Zingales, Understanding Trust, 123 Economic Journal 1313 (2013). Chapter 2. Radical Democracy 1. Mogens Herman Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, Principles, and Ideology 6 (J. A. Crook, trans., Basil Blackwell, 1999). 2.

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—JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY, 1936 The Berlin Wall fell when one of us was just starting preschool and the other was beginning his career, that moment was crucial in shaping our political identities. The “American way”—free markets, popular sovereignty, and global integration—had vanquished the Soviet “evil empire.” Since then those values—which we will call the liberal order—have dominated intellectual discussions. Leading thinkers declared “the end of history.” The great social problems that had so long been the center of political drama had been solved.1 Both of us came of age intellectually in an unprecedented era of global intellectual consensus, confidence, and complacency. Nowhere was this atmosphere clearer than in the policy world in which we each ended up—one of us in law, the other in economics.

Can Democracy Work?: A Short History of a Radical Idea, From Ancient Athens to Our World
by James Miller
Published 17 Sep 2018

Yet with twists and turns, and despite some spectacular setbacks, the “great democratic revolution” that Tocqueville described indeed continued, sometimes flaring up with disturbing results, throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first. Tocqueville was one of the first in a long line of modern writers who have believed that democracy in some sense represented a logical culmination of human affairs: for Francis Fukuyama, writing in 1989, the year that jubilant Germans tore down the Berlin Wall, liberal democracy marked “the end of history,” with an American exclamation point. But history hasn’t evolved in quite the way that these theorists anticipated. Tocqueville expected democracy to produce greater equality—yet democratic states conjoined with market societies have recurrently produced growing inequality.

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Although Huntington briefly worked for Brzezinski when his old friend became national security adviser for the Democratic president Jimmy Carter in the late 1970s, he mainly focused his energies on teaching undergraduates at Harvard—and on episodically commenting in books and articles on the main currents of history as he perceived them. When the Soviet Union unexpectedly collapsed in 1989, and a renewed democratic spirit afterward led to mainly peaceful transitions to liberal democratic regimes in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, Huntington saw no cause to celebrate. Where his student Francis Fukuyama perceived the apparent triumph of liberal democracy as the logical climax of world history, Huntington discerned the ascendance of new centers of political power in China and the Islamic world, both representing mature civilizations of great antiquity—and both offering religious and authoritarian alternatives to Western liberal ideals of human rights and representative democracy.

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Lawrence Krader (Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1974). “to answer Sir Henry Maine’s ‘Popular Government’”: Woodrow Wilson to Horace Elisha Scudder, May [12], 1886, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 5:218. “Democracy in Europe,” he explains: Ibid., 5:69–70. In effect, Wilson puts America at the end of history, as Hegel put Prussia in his Philosophy of Right, and Marx put communism in his Manifesto. “It had not to overthrow other polities”: Wilson, “The Modern Democratic State,” Ibid., 5:67. Democracy “in its most modern sense”: Wilson, “The Modern Democratic State,” in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 5:70.

The Coming of Neo-Feudalism: A Warning to the Global Middle Class
by Joel Kotkin
Published 11 May 2020

Essays on a Failing System (New York: Verso, 2016), 219. 30 Phil Longman, The Empty Cradle: How Falling Birthrates Threaten World Prosperity (New York: New America Books, 2004); Joel Kotkin, “Death Spiral Demographics: The Countries Shrinking the Fastest,” Forbes, February 1, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/joelkotkin/2017/02/01/death-spiral-demographics-the-countries-shrinking-the-fastest/#4ae48b38b83c. 31 Alex Gray, “The troubling charts that show young people losing faith in democracy,” World Economic Forum, December 1, 2016, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/12/charts-that-show-young-people-losing-faith-in-democracy/. 32 Amanda Taub, “How Stable Are Democracies? ‘Warning Signs Are Flashing Red,’” New York Times, November 29, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/29/world/americas/western-liberal-democracy.html?_r=0. 33 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992), 12. 34 Emily Atkin, “Al Gore’s Carbon Footprint Doesn’t Matter,” New Republic, August 7, 2017, https://newrepublic.com/article/144199/al-gores-carbon-footprint-doesnt-matter; “How Electricity Became a Luxury Good,” Spiegel, September 4, 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/high-costs-and-errors-of-german-transition-to-renewable-energy-a-920288-2.html; Dagmara Stoerring, “Energy Poverty,” European Parliament, November 9, 2016, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/607350/IPOL_STU(2017)607350_EN.pdf. 35 Salena Zito and Brad Todd, The Great Revolt: Inside the Populist Coalition Reshaping American Politics (New York: Crown Forum, 2018), 3, 246. 36 Guilluy, Twilight of the Elites, 15; Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry, “The Failure of the French Elite,” Wall Street Journal, February 22, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-failure-of-the-french-elite-11550851097?

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A strong supporter of the Beijing regime’s current climate policies, Brown even recommends the “brainwashing” of the uncomprehending masses, a concept very much congruent with the logic behind Chinese thought control.48 CHAPTER 21 Can We Challenge Neo-feudalism? The hope that we might see a global convergence toward democracy, as was once predicted by Francis Fukuyama and Thomas Friedman among others, seems increasingly remote. As China has grown both richer and more powerful, it has not become more like us, but instead has developed an authoritarian form of state capitalism.1 Globally, democratic governance appears to have peaked in 2006, and many countries—including Turkey, Russia, and China—have become far more authoritarian.

How to Stop Brexit (And Make Britain Great Again)
by Nick Clegg
Published 11 Oct 2017

The reasons behind the recent run of election results require extensive analysis, but it is clear that the shock of Brexit, followed by Trump’s victory, inspired liberal-minded, internationalist, pro-European politicians to come out of their shells and make their arguments with renewed passion. They can no longer close their eyes and pretend there is no populist threat. They can no longer assume that we have reached, as the political scientist Francis Fukuyama famously stated, the end of history. Instead they have had to take their message to voters – many of whom are unhappy with the status quo – with fresh arguments and a promise to listen and reform. Europe has been shocked into action and is determined to … well, make Europe great again. The Times is often credited with a headline that, sadly, never actually appeared.

The Glass Half-Empty: Debunking the Myth of Progress in the Twenty-First Century
by Rodrigo Aguilera
Published 10 Mar 2020

But it made a comeback after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the swift implosion of the Soviet Union and the communist bloc over the next two years. Nothing exemplified the supreme victory of Western ideals in almost all spheres of life better than US political scientist Francis Fukuyama’s seminal 1989 essay “The End of History”, best known for its bold forecast about the future of humanity: What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such … That is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.5 It is certainly true that doomsday predictions like Malthusian overpopulation and Y2K have a terrible track record.

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There is little scope for naivety or pessimism — the movement largely discounts the tremendously complex issues that could arise from such selective augmentation of our natural capabilities, whereas critics understandably find the possibilities terrifying. Notably, transhumanism was listed as one of the world’s eight “most dangerous ideas” in a 2004 special report by Foreign Policy magazine. Perhaps surprisingly, the author of the scathing piece was Francis Fukuyama who took particular issue with its disregard for what the existence of a superior class of human being would mean in terms of citizenship and equality in democratic societies: If we start transforming ourselves into something superior, what rights will these enhanced creatures claim, and what rights will they possess when compared to those left behind?

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Printed and bound in the United Kingdom by TJ International Ltd CONTENTS Introduction: A New Secular Religion Part I: Optimism and Its Discontents Chapter One: Mad World Chapter Two: Getting Better Chapter Three: Twenty-First Century Breakdown Part II: Progress and the Crisis of Liberalism Chapter Four: Masters of Puppets Chapter Five: The Big Money Chapter Six: And Justice for All Part III: The End of the End of History Chapter Seven: The Evil That Men Do Chapter Eight: Renegades of Thought Chapter Nine: Built for the Future Epilogue: Winds of Change A Note on Data Sources Notes Acknowledgements To my mother and aunt “We don’t throw virgins into volcanoes anymore.” — Steven Pinker INTRO: A NEW SECULAR RELIGION A Necessary Inquiry If one could think of the worst possible year to write a book that was critical of human progress, that year would be 1991. This was year zero of the “end of history”, when the collapse of the Soviet Union removed the last challenge to the dominance of Western liberal democracy and capitalism.

Culture works: the political economy of culture
by Richard Maxwell
Published 15 Jan 2001

“The ratings were so high that NBC will take the same tack into Sydney and beyond.”143 Coda In corporate/Americanized sport, the game has become somewhat less important than its capacity to be a vehicle presenting particular messages to a particular select and often massive audience.144 This discussion may have unearthed some disheartening revelations pertaining to the political economy of contemporary sport culture. Elsewhere I have argued that sport has, in Francis Fukuyama’s terms, reached the end of history precipitated by the “total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives”145 to the sport-media-entertainment complex discussed here.146 On reflection, this sentiment intimates a resigned bitterness that adds little to the critical analysis of contemporary sport. Without question, the global sport economy is dominated by brazenly commercial enterprises that make no pretense as to the cardinal importance of delivering entertaining products designed to maximize profit margins.

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Mica Nava, Andrew Blake, Iain MacRury, and Barry Richards (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 87–102. 161 David L. A n d r e w s 142. Gunther, “Get Ready for the Oprah Olympics,” 42. 143. Knisley, “Rock Solid,” S6. 144. P. Donnelly, “The Local and the Global: Globalization in the Sociology of Sport,” Journal of Sport and Social Issues 20:3 (1996): 246. 145. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” National Interest 16 (1989): 3. 146. Andrews, “Dead and Alive?” 147. L. Grossberg, We Gotta Get out of This Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture (London: Routledge, 1992), 21. 162 Chapter Seven Shopping Susan G. Davis The opportunity and imperative to shop are everywhere.

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Butsch, ed., For Fun and Profit: The Transformation of Leisure into Consumption (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990). Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century, 25th ed. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1998), 279. T. Miller and A. McHoul, Popular Culture and Everyday Life (London: Sage, 1998), 61. S. Hardy, “Where Did You Go, Jackie Robinson? Or the End of History and the Age of Sport Infrastructure,” Sporting Traditions: Journal of the Australian Society for Sports History 16:1 (1999): 85–100. Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1991), 48. This apt metaphor is borrowed from Jürgen Habermas, “Conservatism and Capitalist Crisis,” New Left Review 115 (1979): 73–84.

Capitalism, Alone: The Future of the System That Rules the World
by Branko Milanovic
Published 23 Sep 2019

It would seem absurd to Marxists, as well as to pretty much everyone else, that such a development could happen. But the “fall” of communism back to capitalism is equally absurd, and cannot be explained within the traditional Marxist framework. It can be explained better, albeit not fully, within the liberal framework. In the liberal view, which Francis Fukuyama captured quite well in the 1990s with The End of History and the Last Man, liberal democracy and laissez-faire capitalism represent the terminus of socioeconomic formations invented by humankind. What Marxists see as an incomprehensible reversal to a much lower (inferior) system, liberals see as a perfectly understandable movement from an inferior, dead-end system (communism) back onto the straight path leading to the end point of human evolution: liberal capitalism.

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Debin Ma reprises a similar theme in his paper on the fiscal capacity of the Chinese state: “In China, the precocious rise of absolutism [centralized state based on hierarchically organized bureaucracy] with the absence of any representative institution ensured that the economic rents from the control of violence were firmly in the hands of political interest divorced from those of commercial and property interest” (2011, 26–27). It was surely not a government at the behest of the bourgeoisie. Francis Fukuyama, in The Origins of Political Order (2011), explains the absence of a countervailing merchant class in China by the omnipotence of the state, which goes back to the formation of the Chinese state. Fukuyama argues that China was ahead of every other major power in building the state; it did so also before any other organized nonstate actors (independent bourgeoisie, free cities, clergy) were created.

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Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics. Freund, Caroline, and Sarah Oliver. 2016. “The Origins of the Superrich: The Billionaire Characteristics Database.” PIIE Working Paper 16-1, Peterson Institute for International Economics, February. https://piie.com/system/files/documents/wp16-1.pdf. Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press. Fukuyama, Francis. 2011. The Origins of Political Order. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Gabriel, Satyananda J. 2006. Chinese Capitalism and the Modernist Vision. London: Routledge. Gernet, Jacques. 1962. Daily Life in China on the Eve of Mongol Invasion, 1250–1276.

The Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet Union
by Serhii Plokhy
Published 12 May 2014

Boris Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (New York, 1994), 116; Gorbachev, Memoirs, 658; interview with Valentin Varennikov in Rozpad Radians’koho Soiuzu. Usna istoriia nezalezhnoï Ukraïny 1988–91, tape 2, http://oralhistory.org.ua/interview-ua/401/. 13. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” National Interest, Summer 1989; Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York, 1992). 14. George Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (New York, 2008), 914; C. J. Chivers, “Russia Will Pursue Democracy, but in Its Own Way, Putin Says,” New York Times, April 26, 2005. 15.

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While losing the battle to save the Soviet Union as a junior partner in the international arena, the Bush administration helped orchestrate its peaceful dissolution. This was no small accomplishment, especially if one thinks of the bloody ends of other empires. On a certain level, history had indeed come to an end—not in the sense of a final victory of liberalism, as declared by the leading American political scientist Francis Fukuyama in his best-selling book The End of History and the Last Man (1990), but in the disappearance of the old European empires. The United States, born of rebellion against an empire and an archenemy of colonialism throughout the world, unexpectedly found itself presiding over the dissolution of a country often labeled the last world empire.

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See Donets Basin Donbas, 259, 269, 282, 293, 304, 401 Donets Basin (Donas), 177 Donetsk region, 176, 293 Drach, Ivan, 60–61, 63, 67 Dudaev, Dzhokhar, 243–245, 247, 287, 288 Dyczok, Marta, 284 Dzerzhinsky, Felix “Iron Felix,” 139–140, 172 Eastern Europe, 204 Economic aid Germany, 331 U.S., 202–203, 237, 329, 331–332 Economic management, reform of, 30 Economic reform center-republic relations and, 206, 207, 215–230, 238–239 difficulties with, 13–14, 216, 219–220, 223, 238–239, 341 Yeltsin and, 218–220, 225–226, 227–230, 238–239, 241, 284 Economy food shortage and dire, 205, 208, 214, 220–221, 237, 242, 340, 351 with state funds emptied, 259, 270–271 U.S., 331 Egypt, 231 Electoral democracy demonstrations for, 139–143, 202 imperial rule incompatible with, xviii, 13–14, 33, 394 in Russia, xviii, 112 Electoral system, reform of, 29, 33, 35, 56 Elena (Yeltsin’s elder daughter), 100 Elliott, Iain, 118 Empires Soviet Union as last, xvii–xviii, xx–xxii, 34, 40, 178, 182, 185–186, 393 world, xviii, xix, 6, 33, 393, 402 The End of History and the Last Man (Fukuyama), 405 Estonia, 45, 191 annexation of, 192 population, 244 sovereignty and, 174, 175, 195, 197 Ethnic clashes between Azeris and Armenians, 33–34, 213, 357, 361 in Kazakhstan, 349–352 See also specific ethnic groups Ethnicity minorities in Ukraine, 283–286 nationality and mixed, 288–289 EU.

Owning the Earth: The Transforming History of Land Ownership
by Andro Linklater
Published 12 Nov 2013

The collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union in 1989, and the growing strength of China’s market economy, made it appear that one economic system now circled the world. Soaring on the wings of hubris, Thomas Friedman named his popular book on the globalized economy The World is Flat, while Francis Fukuyama updated Walt Rostow’s development strategy and, in a scholarly article that assumed universal capitalism must lead to universal democracy, predicted “The End of History.” Absent from the writings of either author and from the published deliberations of the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, of governments on either side of the Atlantic, of most of Wall Street and the City of London, and an array of international financial experts, was any suggestion that they understood that the phenomenon of globalization grew out of the disparity between two ways of owning the earth.

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almost six hundred trillion dollars: The figure from the Bank for International Settlements for the last quarter of 2007, $596 trillion. the number of politically free countries: Figures for 2007 from Freedom House, “Freedom in the World,” 2008. the 1992 paper he cited: Professor Fukuyama’s assertion of a “strong correlation” between industrial development and democracy is made in “Reflections on the End of History, Five Years Later” by Francis Fukuyama, History and Theory 34, no. 2, Theme Issue 34: World Historians and Their Critics (May, 1995), 27–43. The paper he refers to is by Larry Diamond, “Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered,” American Behavioral Scientist 15 (March–June 1992), 450–499. “free and equal in dignity and rights”: Compared to the painstaking arguments that backed the assertion to natural rights in property and to the pursuit of happiness, the United Nations’ assertion of its human rights is strangely bare.

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During the thirty-year experiment, a transformation had taken place in other societies as they became linked to the globalized economy. In that period, the number of politically free countries, according to the index of democracy compiled by Freedom House, rose from forty-three to eighty-seven, home to three billion inhabitants or 43 percent of the global population. For “development” commentators, such as Professor Francis Fukuyama, this was cause and effect, the result of “an extraordinarily strong correlation between high levels of industrial development and stable democracy.” But, as Fukuyama ought to have been aware, the 1992 paper he cited as evidence gave no more than the shakiest support for his belief that industrial development led to democracy.

The Raging 2020s: Companies, Countries, People - and the Fight for Our Future
by Alec Ross
Published 13 Sep 2021

Today, Democrats and Republicans disagree not just on taxes, but also on climate change, health care, immigration, foreign policy, economic regulation, and nearly every issue in between. Over the last decade, we have seen each party obstruct the other, preventing meaningful legislation on these issues from passing. To describe this reality, where obstruction becomes the dominant mode of governance, political scientist Francis Fukuyama coined the term vetocracy. “The delegation of powers to different political actors enables them to block action by the whole body. The U.S. political system has far more of these checks and balances, or what political scientists call ‘veto points,’ than other contemporary democracies, raising the costs of collective action and in some cases make it impossible altogether,” Fukuyama wrote.

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Not one of the 237 Democrats: “Republicans Pass Historic Tax Cuts without a Single Democratic Vote,” Axios, December 20, 2017, https://www.axios.com/republicans-pass-historic-tax-cuts-without-a-single-democratic-vote-1515110718-8cdf005c-c1c9-481a-975b-72336765ebe4.html. obstruct the other: Ezra Klein, “Why We Can’t Build,” Vox, April 22, 2020, https://www.vox.com/2020/4/22/21228469/marc-andreessen-build-government-coronavirus. “The delegation of powers to different political actors”: Francis Fukuyama, “America in Decay,” Foreign Affairs, Sept./Oct. 2014, http://cf.linnbenton.edu/artcom/social_science/clarkd/upload/Fukuyama,%20America%20in%20Decay.pdf. “For any particular problem we have”: Steven M. Teles, Kludgeocracy: The American Way of Policy (Washington, DC: New America Foundation, 2012), https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/4209-kludgeocracy-the-american-way-of-policy/Teles_Steven_Kludgeocracy_NAF_Dec2012.d8a805aa40e34bca9e2fecb018a3dcb0.pdf.

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American consumers drove Chevys, drank Budweiser, and smoked Marlboros. Their Soviet counterparts drove Ladas, drank Zhigulevskoye, and smoked Belomorkanals. When the Cold War ended, however, the rules that had held for centuries started to change rapidly. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, capitalism became the triumphant economic model. In the “end of history” euphoria, the United States, United Kingdom, and other Western democracies rolled back many of the financial and legal guardrails that tethered businesses to the government. They simultaneously set out to build the infrastructure for a global economy based on free-market capitalism. The European Union was created in 1993, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect in 1994, and the World Trade Organization kicked off its operations in 1995.

The Death of Truth: Notes on Falsehood in the Age of Trump
by Michiko Kakutani
Published 17 Jul 2018

The culture wars compelled Americans, even conservatives, to acknowledge transformations to American life. And although acknowledgment often came in the form of rejection, it was also the first step to resignation, if not outright acceptance.” As it turns out, this optimistic assessment was radically premature, much the way that Francis Fukuyama’s 1989 essay “The End of History?” (arguing that with the implosion of Soviet Communism liberal democracy had triumphed and would become “the final form of human government”) was premature. A Freedom House report concluded that “with populist and nationalist forces making significant gains in democratic states, 2016 marked the eleventh consecutive year of decline in global freedom.”

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“the final form of human government”: Ishaan Tharoor, “Fukuyama’s ‘Future of History’: Is Liberal Democracy Doomed?,” Time, Feb. 8, 2012. “with populist and nationalist forces”: Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2017, freedomhouse.org. “a slow erosion”: Ishaan Tharoor, “The Man Who Declared the ‘End of History’ Fears for Democracy’s Future,” Washington Post, Feb. 9, 2017. And Trump, as both candidate: Jasmine C. Lee and Kevin Quealy, “The 425 People, Places, and Things Donald Trump Has Insulted on Twitter: A Complete List,” New York Times, Jan. 3, 2018. Russian trolls used an impostor Facebook account: Donie O’Sullivan, “Russian Trolls Created Facebook Events Seen by More Than 300,000 Users,” CNN, Jan. 26, 2018.

21 Lessons for the 21st Century
by Yuval Noah Harari
Published 29 Aug 2018

For a general discussion see for example: Nicholas John Cull, Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2003). 6 For this interpretation see: Ishaan Tharoor, ‘Brexit: A modern-day Peasants’ Revolt?’, Washington Post, 25 June 2016; John Curtice, ‘US election 2016: The Trump–Brexit voter revolt’, BBC, 11 November 2016. 7 The most famous of these remains, of course, Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 1992). 8 Karen Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014); Timothy Snyder, The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2018); Anne Garrels, Putin Country: A Journey Into the Real Russia (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2016); Steven Lee Myers, The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin (New York: Knopf Doubleday, 2016). 9 Credit Suisse, Global Wealth Report 2015, 53; Filip Novokmet, Thomas Piketty and Gabriel Zucman, ‘From Soviets to Oligarchs: Inequality and Property in Russia 1905–2016’, July 2017, World Wealth and Income Database; Shaun Walker, ‘Unequal Russia’, Guardian, 25 April 2017. 10 Ayelet Shani, ‘The Israelis Who Take Rebuilding the Third Temple Very Seriously’, Haaretz, 10 August 2017; ‘Israeli Minister: We Should Rebuild Jerusalem Temple’, Israel Today, 7 July 2013; Yuri Yanover, ‘Dep.

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Thornton, A Cultural History of the Atlantic World, 1250–1820 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 110. 13 Susannah Cullinane, Hamdi Alkhshali and Mohammed Tawfeeq, ‘Tracking a Trail of Historical Obliteration: ISIS Trumpets Destruction of Nimrud’, CNN, 14 April 2015. 14 Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), 36–8. 15 ‘ISIS Leader Calls for Muslims to Help Build Islamic State in Iraq’, CBCNEWS, 1 July 2014; Mark Townsend, ‘What Happened to the British Medics Who Went to Work for ISIS?’, Guardian, 12 July 2015. 7. Nationalism 1 Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2014). 2 Ashley Killough, ‘Lyndon Johnson’s “Daisy” Ad, Which Changed the World of Politics, Turns 50’, CNN, 8 September 2014. 3 ‘Cause-Specific Mortality: Estimates for 2000–2015’, World Health Organization, http://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/estimates/en/index1.html, accessed 19 October 2017. 4 David E.

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Contents Cover About the Book About the Author Also by Yuval Noah Harari Dedication Title Page Introduction Part I: The Technological Challenge 1. DISILLUSIONMENT The end of history has been postponed 2. WORK When you grow up, you might not have a job 3. LIBERTY Big Data is watching you 4. EQUALITY Those who own the data own the future Part II: The Political Challenge 5. COMMUNITY Humans have bodies 6. CIVILISATION There is just one civilisation in the world 7. NATIONALISM Global problems need global answers 8. RELIGION God now serves the nation 9. IMMIGRATION Some cultures might be better than others Part III: Despair and Hope 10.

Can It Happen Here?: Authoritarianism in America
by Cass R. Sunstein
Published 6 Mar 2018

David Goodhart, The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics (London: Hurst, 2017). 36. Ivan Krastev, After Europe (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017). 37. This thesis is developed more fully in Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes, The End of Victory: The Untold Story of the Unraveling of the Post-1989 Order (forthcoming). 38. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest (Summer 1989). 39. Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011). 40. Thomas Geoghegan, Only One Thing Can Save Us: Why America Needs a New Kind of Labor Movement (New York: New Press, 2014). 41.

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The key to explaining the appeal of authoritarian xenophobia in Hungary, Poland, and elsewhere in the region lies in the aftermath of 1989. The end of the Cold War was experienced there as the beginning of the Age of Imitation.37 This is why we can trace the roots of the current crisis of liberal democracy to the communist collapse. Francis Fukuyama’s central thesis was that, after the Soviet Union dissolved, Western-style liberal democracy had no serious competitors. This thesis, put into practice, turned out to have exceptionally perverse consequences.38 Because Western liberal democracy was unrivaled and uncontested, it allegedly offered the one and only political and economic model worthy of emulation.

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Rather, it is something that sits just beneath the surface of any human society—including in the advanced liberal democracies at the heart of the Western world—and can be activated by core elements of liberal democracy itself. Liberal democracy can become its own undoing because its core elements activate forces that undermine it and its best features constrain it from vigorously protecting itself. So it seems we are not at the “end of history” (Fukuyama 1992). The “last man” is not a perfected liberal democrat. Liberal democracy may not be the “final form of human government.” And intolerance is not a thing of the past; it is very much a thing of the present, and of the future. References Adorno, Theodor, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, and D.

The Idea of Israel: A History of Power and Knowledge
by Ilan Pappe
Published 30 Apr 2012

More than 600 people filled the university hall and gave up the game in which Bulgaria kicked Germany out of the World Cup.’ Zvi Gilat, Yedioth Ahronoth, 13 July 1994. 5 I have described this in Ilan Pappe, Out of the Frame: The Struggle for Academic Freedom, London: Pluto, 2010. 6 See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York: Free Press, 1992. 7 Gorny, ‘Thoughts on Zionism as a Utopian Ideology’. 8 This is part of a campaign led by the Israeli Ministry of Information called ‘The Faces of Israel’ launched in 2000. 9 See Omar Barghouti, Boycott, Divestment, Sanction: The Global Struggle for Palestinian Rights, New York: Haymarket Books, 2011. 10 Edward Said, Orientalism, New York: Vintage, 1979, pp. 5–28.

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The images and narratives formulated by Zionist leaders and activists in the past, and Israeli Jewish intellectuals and academics in the present, present Israel as the inevitable, successful implementation of the European history of ideas. Ideas are the transformative agents that in any narrative of Western enlightenment lifted Western societies, and in turn the rest of the world, out of medieval darkness and into the Renaissance, and helped restore civilisation following the Second World War. According to Francis Fukuyama, this history of ideas would almost have reached its culmination had not political Islam, national movements in the former Soviet bloc, and Marxist leaders in South America ‘sabotaged’ the train of progress and modernisation.6 Israel was one such transformative idea. To challenge it as such is to challenge the entire narrative of the West as the driving global force of human progress and enlightenment.

The Tragedy of Great Power Politics
by John J. Mearsheimer
Published 1 Jan 2001

Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 93–130. Also see John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989); Michael Mandelbaum, “Is Major War Obsolete?” Survival 40, No. 4 (Winter 1998–99), pp. 20–38; and Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest, No. 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3–18, which was the basis of Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 2. Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” International Security 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994–95), pp. 50–90. 3. The balance of power is a concept that has a variety of meanings.

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Goncharov, Lewis, and Litai, Uncertain Partners, chap. 5; Mastny, The Cold War, pp. 85–97; Weathersby, “Soviet Aims in Korea” and Kathryn Weathersby, “To Attack or Not to Attack: Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude to War,” CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1–9. 85. See inter alia Galia Golan, The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in the Third World (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988); Andrzej Korbonski and Francis Fukuyama, eds., The Soviet Union and the Third World: The Last Three Decades (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Bruce D. Porter, The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars, 1945–1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); and Carol R. Saivetz, ed., The Soviet Union in the Third World (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989). 86.

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The end of the Cold War, so the argument goes, marked a sea change in how great powers interact with one another. We have entered a world in which there is little chance that the major powers will engage each other in security competition, much less war, which has become an obsolescent enterprise. In the words of one famous author, the end of the Cold War has brought us to the “the end of history.”1 This perspective suggests that great powers no longer view each other as potential military rivals, but instead as members of a family of nations, members of what is sometimes called the “international community.” The prospects for cooperation are abundant in this promising new world, a world which is likely to bring increased prosperity and peace to all the great powers.

Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration and the Future of White Majorities
by Eric Kaufmann
Published 24 Oct 2018

The Bushes’ string of victories produced an optimistic mindset in which the Republican elite felt they could win Latino votes with a package emphasizing conservative social values and the work ethic. Ideologically, the fall of the Berlin Wall gave rise to an optimistic ‘End of History’ spirit among American neoconservatives and interventionist liberals, symbolized by Francis Fukuyama’s iconic book of 1992.40 With communism defeated, liberalism, capitalism and democracy, under American tutelage, could finally become universal. A global framework based on the Pax Americana and the shared values of the ‘Washington Consensus’ would revolutionize humanity.

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Both are seminal influences on today’s internet-based white nationalist movement which forms the core of today’s alternative right, or ‘alt right’.55 Neoconservatives preferred to endorse American exceptionalism, the idea that the US was a new type of post-ethnic nation. Most came to approve of Official English, opposed affirmative action and bilingual education and endorsed the need for immigrants to embrace a positive view of American history. They focused squarely on the creedal elements in the national repertoire. Francis Fukuyama, whom I interviewed soon after Brimelow’s book came out, saw value in the country’s ethno-traditions, thus deviating from the missionary nationalism of the neoconservatives. He argued that English was key for assimilation and traced the country’s founding to its Anglo-Protestant forebears. Where Fukuyama was critical of paleoconservatism was over Brimelow’s emphasis on a ‘white’ ethnic core rather than an Anglo-Protestant cultural inheritance which could be readily adopted by citizens of any background.

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When genetic tests revealed this to be true, the findings reinforced their myth of descent.29 In contrast, a study of North African Jews which showed them to be more similar to Arabs than European Jews caused ructions because it challenged existing beliefs.30 The active manipulation of genes would be much more consequential, raising a wide range of questions which Francis Fukuyama tackles in Our Posthuman Future (2002). The least intrusive form is to use gene therapy to modify our genetic makeup, altering physical traits. A more problematic step is to select which embryo we would like from a range of naturally occurring possibilities so that no one could guess that we engineered our baby’s characteristics.

Conscience of a Conservative: A Rejection of Destructive Politics and a Return to Principle
by Jeff Flake
Published 31 Jul 2017

At the time, as the wall fell and the Soviet bloc that had been encased in Stalinism thawed, it was a vogue among some historians, scholars, and others to declare “the end of history”—that the big questions had been settled, that liberal democracy was triumphal and inexorable, and that the decline of the blackhearted impulse to enslave whole countries was also inexorable. Freedom had won, it was said, and for ever. The historian Francis Fukuyama, who had coined “the end of history” in an essay the year before, was much in demand, and it is likely that Havel would have been inspired by the fervor, which would explain this passage from his speech: “I often hear the question: How can the United States of America help us today?

The Case for Space: How the Revolution in Spaceflight Opens Up a Future of Limitless Possibility
by Robert Zubrin
Published 30 Apr 2019

Thus, in his seminal work on world history, The Evolution of Civilizations, historian Carroll Quigley identified seven major stages in the development of societies: (1) mixture, (2) gestation, (3) expansion, (4) conflict, (5) universal empire, (6) decay, and (7) collapse.4 With its victory in the Cold War circa 1990, Western (essentially modern global) civilization reached stage five. Should we choose to continue in the footsteps of such historical analogs, stage six would soon follow—and in fact, some would argue that it has already begun. In 1992, philosophy professor Francis Fukuyama wrote a widely read book entitled The End of History, in which he posited that with the unification of the world resulting from the West's victory in the Cold War, human history had essentially “ended.”5 In 1996, Scientific American writer James Horgan published a much more interesting best seller entitled The End of Science, in which he held that all the really big discoveries to be made in science had already been made, and thus the enterprise of scientific discovery must soon grind to a halt.6 (The day after I finished reading Horgan's book in February 1998, a group of astronomers using the Hubble Space Telescope announced they had found a fifth fundamental force in nature.)

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Christopher Stringer and Robin McKie, African Exodus: The Origins of Modern Humanity (New York: Henry Holt, 1997). 2. James Shreve, The Neanderthal Enigma: Solving the Mystery of Modern Human Origins (New York: Avon Books, 1995). 3. William McNeill, The Rise of the West (New York: Mentor Books, 1965). 4. Carroll Quigley, The Evolution of Civilizations (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1961). 5. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History (New York: Free Press, 1992). 6. James Horgan, The End of Science (New York: Broadway Books, 1997). 7. Thomas D. Snyder, 120 Years of American Education: A Statistical Portrait (Washington, DC: US Department of Education, 1993), pp. 85–87, https://nces.ed.gov/pubs93/93442.pdf (accessed November 24, 2018).

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I believe this marks the end, not of human history but merely of the first phase of human history: our development into a mature Type I civilization. It is not the end of history, because if we choose to embrace it, we have in space a new frontier offering endless challenge—an infinite frontier, filled with worlds waiting to be discovered and history waiting to be made by myriad new branches of human civilization waiting to be born. Are we living at the end of history or at the beginning of history? Are we old, or are we young? The choice is ours. FOCUS SECTION: SPACE PROGRAM SPIN-OFFS One of the main selling points that NASA has frequently advanced to support its funding are the technological advances developed to meet space program needs that have greatly benefited society at large.

The Establishment: And How They Get Away With It
by Owen Jones
Published 3 Sep 2014

Politicians largely conform to a similar script; once-mighty trade unions are now treated as if they have no legitimate place in political or even public life; and economists and academics who reject Establishment ideology have been largely driven out of the intellectual mainstream. The end of the Cold War was spun by politicians, intellectuals and the media to signal the death of any alternative to the status quo: ‘the end of history’, as US political scientist Francis Fukuyama put it. All this has left the Establishment pushing at an open door. Whereas the position of the powerful was once undermined by the advent of democracy, an opposite process is now underway. The Establishment is amassing wealth and aggressively annexing power in a way that has no precedent in modern times.

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As well as the dramatic political shifts in Britain, the proponents of unrestrained free-market economics were helped by other developments too. When the Soviet bloc collapsed in the late 1980s onwards, it was spun as a dramatic victory for free-market capitalism. It was the ‘end of history’, declared US political scientist Francis Fukuyama. ‘It’s time to say we’ve won, goodbye’ was the assessment of US neo-conservative Midge Decter. Even mild Keynesianism, however non-existent its links with Soviet-style Communism, was somehow seen as beyond the pale. Even mild forms of state involvement in the economy were consigned to a discredited past.

The Left Case Against the EU
by Costas Lapavitsas
Published 17 Dec 2018

It was very much a product of its time marked by the discrediting of state-controlled socialism, the retreat of organized labour in the previous decade in the face of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, and the ascendancy of neoliberal economics in both theory and policy. That was the moment of Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man, a book that gained tremendous visibility by claiming that liberal democracy and free-market capitalism went hand-in-hand, and together had actually won the grand historical contest among political and social systems.2 The Maastricht Treaty encapsulated the spirit of the time for Europe, and was a moment of historic importance in the evolution of the European project.3 The EU engaged in further sustained expansion in the 1990s and the 2000s, above all by incorporating a host of new countries in Eastern Europe and developing its international presence.

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‘The Systemic Crisis of the Euro: True Causes and Effective Therapies’, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Studien, available at: http://www.rosalux.de/fileadmin/rls_uploads/pdfs/Studien/Studien_The_systemic_crisis_web.pdf Flassbeck, H. and C. Lapavitsas 2015. Against the Troika: Crisis and Austerity in the Eurozone, London and New York: Verso. Fukuyama, F. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man, New York: Free Press. Fukuyama, F. 2007. ‘The History at the End of History’, The Guardian, 3 April, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/apr/03/thehistoryattheendofhist Giurlando, P. 2016. Eurozone Politics: Perception and Reality in Italy, the UK, and Germany, London and New York: Routledge. Gourinchas P.O., T.

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This is fully appreciated in the academic literature, which recognizes the end of the ‘permissive consensus’ after Maastricht, that is, the end of a period in which European integration proceeded mostly from above as a project operated by the elites of European countries. After Maastricht, ‘Europe’ became an issue of national and popular politics and the functioning of the EU acquired new characteristics. See Hooghe and Marks (2009) and Bickerton, Hodson, and Puetter (2015). 4. More than a decade after publishing The End of History and the Last Man, Fukuyama (2007) helpfully explained in the British Guardian that his model for the triumph of ‘post-historical’ liberal democracy was not the USA but the EU precisely because it was transnational (Fukuyama 2007). 5. Academics have long discussed the ‘crisis of representation’ in Europe: see, for instance, the special issues of West European Politics (Hayward 1995) and the European Journal of Political Research (summed up in Norris 1997).

People, Power, and Profits: Progressive Capitalism for an Age of Discontent
by Joseph E. Stiglitz
Published 22 Apr 2019

—MARK 3:25; ABRAHAM LINCOLN CHAPTER 1 Introduction That things are not going well in the US and in many other advanced countries is a mild understatement. There is widespread discontent in the land. It wasn’t supposed to be this way, according to the dominant thinking in American economics and political science in the last quarter century. After the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, Francis Fukuyama declared The End of History, as democracy and capitalism at last had triumphed. A new era of global prosperity, with faster-than-ever growth, was thought to be at hand, and America was supposed to be in the lead.1 By 2018, those soaring ideas seem finally to have crashed to Earth. The 2008 financial crisis showed that capitalism wasn’t all that it was supposed to be—it seemed neither efficient nor stable.

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US labor force participation rate (the fraction of working-age citizens who either have or are looking for a job) is also much lower than that of many other countries with much higher tax rates. 46.Nancy MacLean, a distinguished historian at Duke University, has put these arguments into historical context in her book Democracy in Chains: The Deep History of the Radical Right’s Stealth Plan for America (New York: Penguin, 2017). 47.Including our rules-based competitive market economy and our democracy with its system of checks and balances to which we referred earlier, and upon which we will elaborate below. 48.Inaugural address, Jan. 20, 1961. 49.As we noted earlier, Francis Fukuyama referred to this as the “end of history.” All the world would now converge to this economic and political system. 50.Alain Cohn, Ernst Fehr, and Michel André Maréchal, “Business Culture and Dishonesty in the Banking Industry,” Nature 516, no. 7592 (2014): 86–89. 51.Yoram Bauman and Elaina Rose, “Selection or Indoctrination: Why Do Economics Students Donate Less than the Rest?

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Norton), I analyzed the unfolding Great Recession, giving recommendations for how serious, extended economic underperformance could be avoided, and how the financial sector could be reformed to prevent such bubbles and their bursting in the future. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1.The full title of Fukuyama’s 1992 book is The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press). After the election of Trump, his views changed: “Twenty five years ago, I didn’t have a sense or a theory about how democracies can go backward. And I think they clearly can.” Ishaan Tharoor, “The Man Who Declared the ‘End of History’ Fears for Democracy’s Future,” Washington Post, Feb. 9, 2017. 2.This is the thesis of a recent book by Adam Tooze of Columbia University, Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World (New York: Viking, 2018). 3.New York: Harper, 2016. 4.New York: The New Press, 2016. 5.See also Jennifer Sherman, Those Who Work, Those Who Don’t: Poverty, Morality, and Family in Rural America (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009); Joan C.

Destined for War: America, China, and Thucydides's Trap
by Graham Allison
Published 29 May 2017

Acknowledging that the “lines between [civilizations] are seldom sharp,” Huntington argued that they are nonetheless “real.”12 Huntington by no means ruled out future violent conflicts between groups within a common civilization. His point, rather, was that in a post–Cold War world, civilizational fault lines would not dissolve in a global convergence toward liberal world order—as one of Huntington’s former students, the political scholar Francis Fukuyama, had predicted in his 1989 article “The End of History?”13—but become more pronounced. “Differences do not necessarily mean conflict, and conflict does not necessarily mean violence,” Huntington allowed. “Over the centuries, however, differences among civilizations have generated the most prolonged and the most violent conflicts.”14 Huntington was keen to disabuse readers of the Western myth of universal values, which he said was not just naive but inimical to other civilizations, particularly the Confucian one with China at its center.

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Qianlong’s First Edict to King George III (September 1793), in The Search for Modern China: A Documentary Collection, ed. Pei-kai Cheng, Michael Lestz, and Jonathan Spence (New York: Norton, 1999), 104–6. [back] 11. Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993), 22. [back] 12. Ibid., 24. [back] 13. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” The National Interest, no. 16 (Summer 1989), 3–18. [back] 14. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” 25. [back] 15. Ibid., 41. [back] 16. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2003), 225. [back] 17.

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As Geoff Dyer has explained, “The Communist Party has faced a slow-burning threat to its legitimacy ever since it dumped Marx for the market.” Thus the Party has evoked past humiliations at the hands of Japan and the West “to create a sense of unity that had been fracturing, and to define a Chinese identity fundamentally at odds with American modernity.”47 During the 1990s when many Western thought leaders were celebrating the “end of history” with the apparent triumph of market-based democracies, a number of observers believed that China, too, was on a path to democratic government. Today, few in China would say that political freedoms are more important than reclaiming China’s international standing and national pride. As Lee put it pointedly, “If you believe that there is going to be a revolution of some sort in China for democracy, you are wrong.

Keynes Hayek: The Clash That Defined Modern Economics
by Nicholas Wapshott
Published 10 Oct 2011

Hassett, “The Second Coming of Keynes,” National Review, February 9, 2009. 11 UCLA Oral History Program, p. 195. 12 Robert E. Lucas Jr., “Macroeconomic Priorities,” presidential address to the American Economic Association, January 10, 2003, http://home.uchicago.edu/%7Esogrodow/homepage/paddress03.pdf. 13 Yoshihiro Francis Fukuyama (1952– ), American political economist. 14 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1992). 15 Ben Bernanke (1953– ), chairman of the Federal Reserve (2006– ), chairman of George W. Bush’s Council of Economic Advisers (2005–6). 16 Ben Bernanke, remarks at “A Conference to Honor Milton Friedman,” University of Chicago, Chicago, November 8, 2002. 17 Michael Kinsley (1951– ), American political journalist. 18 Michael Kinsley, “Greenspan Shrugged,” The New York Times, October 14, 2007. 19 Greenspan, Age of Turbulence, p. 68. 20 George H.

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“Its central prob-lem of depression-prevention has been solved, for all practical pur-poses.”12 When the Cold War ended, the American political economist Francis Fukuyama13 declared that the evolutionary stages of societal development, from feudalism through agricultural and industrial revolutions to a modern capitalist democracy, had come to an end; the world had reached “the end of history.”14 It was with a similar confidence that economists announced “the end of economic history”: the world economy was cured of the prospect of a return to depression. Friedman, not Keynes, was credited with solving the mystery of why the Great Depression of the 1930s occurred and how it could be prevented from happening again.

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“The Quantity Theory of Money—A Restatement, an Essay in Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money,” (in Friedman, ed., Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money [University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1956]). Friedman, Milton, and Rose D. Friedman. Two Lucky People: Memoirs (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1998). Friedman, Milton, and Anna D. Schwartz. A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1963). Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press, New York, 1992). Galbraith, James K. Ambassador’s Journal (Houghton Mifflin, New York, 1969). —. A Life in Our Times (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1981). —. The Essential Galbraith, ed. Andrea D. Williams (Mariner Books, Orlando, Fla., 2001). —. The Predator State: How Conservatives Abandoned the Free Market and Why Liberals Should Too (Free Press, New York, 2008).

Open: The Story of Human Progress
by Johan Norberg
Published 14 Sep 2020

The shock of this transition is one of the factors that have made possible the rise of those reactionary movements which have tried, and still try, to overthrow civilization and to return to tribalism.’ Karl Popper, 1945 Around the time of the fall of communism, two essays that would later be extended to book format captured the interest of the chattering classes. The first one was Francis Fukuyama’s ‘The End of History?’ from 1989, arguing that liberal capitalist democracies were the final form of government and that history had in effect ended. The other essay, in many ways a response, was ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’ by Fukuyama’s old teacher Samuel Huntington. Huntington thought a new phase of history was starting after the Cold War, one that would be defined by traditional civilizations, which would set the pattern for collaborations and conflicts.

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1 ‘Freedom in the world: Electoral democracies 1989–2016’, Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Electoral%20Democracy%20Numbers%2C%20FIW%201989-2016.pdf (accessed 9 March 2020). 2 G. Ward, The Politics of Discipleship. Grand Rapids, Baker Academic, 2009, p. 49. 3 F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man. London, Penguin Books, 2012, pp. 288 and 312. 4 Fukuyama, 2012, p. 328. See also P. Sagar, ‘The last hollow laugh’, Aeon Essays, 21 March 2017, https://aeon.co/essays/was-francis-fukuyama-the-first-man-to-see-trump-coming (accessed 9 March 2020). 5 Pinker, 2011. 6 S. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York, Simon & Schuster, 2007, ch. 12. 7 I.

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But he feared even more an assault from a reactionary Right, yearning for heroism and hierarchies that are lost in an egalitarian, consumerist world populated by the last men ‘without chests’. Therefore, there is a constant temptation to ‘return to being first men engaged in bloody and pointless prestige battles, only this time with modern weapons’. When he discussed whether the status-seeking and power-hungry would in the long run be satisfied with the comfortable life at the end of history, he just happened to mention ‘a developer like Donald Trump’.4 I don’t agree with all of Fukuyama’s analysis, and I do think he overdosed on Hegel and Nietzsche. But he was perceptive in his historical positioning of liberal capitalism and of the cultural and psychological factors that make us uncomfortable with it, and which therefore threaten to undermine it.

Jihad vs. McWorld: Terrorism's Challenge to Democracy
by Benjamin Barber
Published 20 Apr 2010

Finally, neither Jihad nor McWorld has any intrinsic interest in the fairness question and here, as in other domains, the poorest nations with neither energy reserves nor a productive economy do the worst. They are “good energy citizens” by default, because in the cruel competition of McWorld they are not citizens at all. APPENDIX B TWENTY-TWO COUNTRIES’ TOP TEN GROSSING FILMS, 1991 Notes Introduction 1. Francis Fukuyama, in The End of History and the Last Man, (New York: Free Press, 1992), although he is far less pleased by his prognosis in his book than he seemed in the original National Interest essay that occasioned all the controversy; and Walter B. Wriston, Twilight of Sovereignty (New York: Scribner’s, 1992). 2.

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For in the economics of McWorld, the traditional dominance of raw materials and goods yields to a novel and distinctive new realm of activity—what I call the infotainment telesector—that redefines the economic realities of McWorld and reorders the relations of nation-states in ways that neither Francis Fukuyama nor Paul Kennedy could anticipate. 2 The Resource Imperative: The Passing of Autarky and the Fall of the West TRADE IN NATURAL resources and the fruits of the land, whether animal, vegetable, or mineral, is among the oldest and most prosperous and profitable sectors of the economy, dating back to the beginning of economic time.

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In the short run the forces of Jihad, noisier and more obviously nihilistic than those of McWorld, are likely to dominate the near future, etching small stories of local tragedy and regional genocide on the face of our times and creating a climate of instability marked by multimicrowars inimical to global integration. But in the long run, the forces of McWorld are the forces underlying the slow certain thrust of Western civilization and as such may be unstoppable. Jihad’s microwars will hold the headlines well into the next century, making predictions of the end of history look terminally dumb. But McWorld’s homogenization is likely to establish a macropeace that favors the triumph of commerce and its markets and to give to those who control information, communication, and entertainment ultimate (if inadvertent) control over human destiny. Unless we can offer an alternative to the struggle between Jihad and McWorld, the epoch on whose threshold we stand—postcommunist, postindustrial, postnational, yet sectarian, fearful, and bigoted—is likely also to be terminally postdemocratic.

England: Seven Myths That Changed a Country – and How to Set Them Straight
by Tom Baldwin and Marc Stears
Published 24 Apr 2024

The fading light of the old millennium had shown the Berlin Wall being pulled down and apartheid in South Africa collapsing into its own contradictions. To many, the glow of globalisation coming over the horizon promised a new era of peace through prosperity and connectivity across the world. In the United States, this myth expressed itself through the writing of thinkers like Francis Fukuyama who pronounced ‘the end of history’ with liberalism, both economic and political, the winner.3 But there were few places on earth where hope flared brighter than England. It was difficult to be youngish and leftish in this country at the turn of the new millennium without feeling at least a little bit of joy.

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Gareth Southgate, ‘Dear England’, Football Tribune, 8 June 2021. 118 ITV News, ‘Pensioner admits sending racist and threatening emails to MPs,’ ITV News, 4 June 2018, https://www.itv.com/news/2018-06-04/pensioner-admits-sending-racist-and-threatening-emails-to-mps 119 David Lammy, Tribes, A Search for Belonging in a Divided Society, (Constable, 2020) p. 158. 120 Marion Brennan, ‘Wolves fans buy part of club’s history from landmark city church’, Express & Star, 17 November 2017, https://www.expressandstar.com/news/2017/11/17/take-a-pew---and-a-slice-of-wolves-history/ 121 Krishan Kumar, The Making of English National Identity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 272. 5 GREENWICH 1 Imogen West-Knights, ‘Was the Millennium Dome really so bad?’, Guardian, 12 March 2020. 2 Adam Nicolson, Regeneration, London, HarperCollins 1999, p. 1. 3 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York, Free Press, 1992. 4 ‘Oasis star Noel Gallagher’s shocking revelation’, Daily Mail, 24 September 2008. 5 ‘Britain’s 20 favourite meals’, Daily Mirror, 11 December 2018. 6 Arsène Wenger, directed by Gabriel Clarke and Christian Jeanpierre, Amazon Prime, 2021, 1 hr 35 mins. 7 Mark Leonard, BritainTM, London, Demos, 1999, pp. 4−5. 8 Simon Partridge, The British Union State, London, Catalyst Press, 1999. 9 Norman Davies, The Isles: A History, New York, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. xxv; Linda Colley at https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20040809182858/ http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page3049.asp 10 See http://enochpowell.info/wp-content/uploads/Speeches/Nov%201973-Feb%201974.pdf 11 Ibid., 241. 12 Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries, 1974–76, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1980, p. 28. 13 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?

The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War
by Robert D. Kaplan
Published 1 Jan 1994

The breaking apart and remakina of crack • 8 H ^ T ^ f t G m i R f n f t U S e r e and OF T H E P O S T C O L D W A R of the Arab-Israel milita^ Qngp^tj^n^areQnerely prologues^tothe realU Ina changes that lie ahead. . . . A u t h o r of B A L K A N GHOSTS U.S.A. $21.95 Canada $33.00 When "The Coming Anarchy" was published in The Atlantic Monthly in 1994, it was hailed as among the most important and influential articulations of the future of our planet, along with Francis Fukuyama's "The End of History" and Samuel P. Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations." Since then, Robert Kaplan's anti-utopian vision of the fault lines of the twentyfirst century has taken on the status of a paradigm. "The Coming Anarchy" has been hailed as the defining thesis for understanding the post-Cold War world.

Blockchain Chicken Farm: And Other Stories of Tech in China's Countryside
by Xiaowei Wang
Published 12 Oct 2020

The darkened screen beckons to me, reflecting back like an ancient scrying mirror, a device used for divination, a mirror on which to project all our desires. The future, in perpetuity. One of the gifts of the free market has been precisely that: the delusion that we are free of the past, expanding ever outward into a startling, wild future abetted by the free market, liberalism, and technology. The end of history, as Francis Fukuyama would call it. I have traded a family story, subject to the forces of political will, for a life that changes and moves under economic forces, through the will of financial capital, of Alibaba and Amazon. And it remains to be seen just how the inhabitants of the new socialist countryside will embrace this same free market futurity.

To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism
by Evgeny Morozov
Published 15 Nov 2013

Norton & Company, 2011), 16. 19 “the Net . . . provides a high-speed system”: ibid., 117. 20 McLuhan went as far as to calculate sense ratios: see Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 28. 20 they can do so many other things in so many different ways: see Ian Bogost, How to Do Things with Videogames (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011). 20 “My interest is description, not prescription”: Felix Gillette, “Feats of Clay,” New York Observer, June 9, 2010, http://observer.com/2010/06/feats-of-clay. 21 “the network . . . is not going away”: Larry Lessig, “Against Transparency,” The New Republic, October 2009, http://www.tnr.com/article/books-and-arts/against-transparency. 22 To paraphrase Frederic Jameson on capitalism: for Jameson’s original quote, “Someone once said that . . . ,” see Frederic Jameson, “Future City,” New Left Review 21 (2003): 65–80. 22 this experience of the “offline” is also profoundly affected: Nathan Jurgenson, “The IRL Fetish,” The New Inquiry, June 28, 2012, http://thenewinquiry.com/essays/the-irl-fetish. 23 the French finally pull the plug on Minitel: Scott Sayare, “After 3 Decades in France, Minitel’s Days Are Numbered,” New York Times, June 27, 2012. 23 Silicon Valley’s own version of the end of history: see Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, reprint ed. (New York: Free Press, 2006). 23 “policymakers should work with the grain of the Internet”: Eric Schmidt, “Let Luvvie Embrace Boffin in the Digital Future,” The Guardian, August 26, 2011. 23 “without a major upgrade”: Rebecca MacKinnon, “Why Doesn’t Washington Understand the Internet?

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But perhaps we can’t imagine life after “the Internet” because we don’t think that “the Internet” is going anywhere. If the public debate is any indication, the finality of “the Internet”—the belief that it’s the ultimate technology and the ultimate network—has been widely accepted. It’s Silicon Valley’s own version of the end of history: just as capitalism-driven liberal democracy in Francis Fukuyama’s controversial account remains the only game in town, so does the capitalism-driven “Internet.” It, the logic goes, is a precious gift from the gods that humanity should never abandon or tinker with. Thus, while “the Internet” might disrupt everything, it itself should never be disrupted.

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But, alas, the preservation of “the Internet” seems to have become an end in itself, to the great detriment of our ability even to imagine what might come to supplant it and how our Internet fetish might be blocking that something from emerging. To choose “the Internet” over the starkly uncertain future of the post-Internet world is to tacitly acknowledge that either “the Internet” has satisfied all our secret plans, longings, and desires—that is, it is indeed Silicon Valley’s own “end of history”—or that we simply can’t imagine what else innovation could unleash. The irony is that Zittrain’s theory of generativity, while very critical of gatekeepers like Apple, is itself a gatekeeper. While generativity green-lights good, reliable, and predictable innovation, the kind that promises to stay within the confines of “the Internet” and leave things as they are, it frowns upon—and possibly even blocks—the unruly and disruptive kind that might start within “the Internet” but eventually transcend, supplant, and perhaps even eliminate it.

Culture and Imperialism
by Edward W. Said
Published 29 May 1994

The great imperial experience of the past two hundred years is global and universal; it has implicated every corner of the globe, the colonizer and the colonized together. Because the West acquired world dominance, and because it seems to have completed its trajectory by bringing about “the end of history” as Francis Fukuyama has called it, Westerners have assumed the integrity and the inviolability of their cultural masterpieces, their scholarship, their worlds of discourse; the rest of the world stands petitioning for attention at our windowsill. Yet I believe it is a radical falsification of culture to strip it of its affiliations with its setting, or to pry it away from the terrain it contested or—more to the point of an oppositional strand within Western culture—to deny its real influence.

…

Underlying these epigonal replications of Matthew Arnold’s exhortations to the significance of culture is the social authority of patriotism, the fortifications of identity brought to us by “our” culture, whereby we can confront the world defiantly and self-confidently; in Francis Fukuyama’s triumphalist proclamation, “we” Americans can see ourselves as realizing the end of history. This is an extremely drastic delimitation of what we have learned about culture—its productivity, its diversity of components, its critical and often contradictory energies, its radically antithetical characteristics, and above all its rich worldliness and complicity with imperial conquest and liberation.

…

Long a champion of Black nationalism, he always tempered his advocacy with disclaimers and reminders that assertions of ethnic particularity were not enough, just as solidarity without criticism was not enough. There is a great deal of hope to be derived from this if only because, far from being at the end of history, we are in a position to do something about our own present and future history, whether we live inside or outside the metropolitan world. In sum, decolonization is a very complex battle over the course of different political destinies, different histories and geographies, and it is replete with works of the imagination, scholarship and counter-scholarship.

The Moral Animal: Evolutionary Psychology and Everyday Life
by Robert Wright
Published 1 Jan 1994

In the 1960s, one philosopher of history observed that historians “tend to use the term ‘metahistorian’ to mark deviations from normal professional activity in either the law-seeking or the pattern-seeking direction.” Not much has changed since then. The one pattern-seeking work of history to make a big splash over the past two decades—The End of History—was written not by a historian but by a political scientist, Francis Fukuyama. Oddly, pondering laws of history is less deviant behavior for a political scientist than for a historian. Opponents of “metahistory” have often been candid about their motivations. The dedication to Popper’s book reads, “In memory of the countless men and women of all creeds or nations or races who fell victims to the fascist and communist belief in Inexorable Laws of Historical Destiny.”

…

—Simon Conway Morris, The New York Times Book Review “An extraordinarily insightful and thought-provoking book. . . . Wright does an astonishingly effective job of finding directionality in history, not just over the past few thousand years but over the almost four billion years since the beginning of life on earth.” —Francis Fukuyama, The Wilson Quarterly “A dazzling tour of world history. . . . Although he takes into account the tooth-and-claw battles of nations, the vanished empires, social violence and chaos, the shocks and changes of technology, Mr. Wright finds pattern and meaning in history. We are moving toward connectedness, toward one world. . . .

…

Fried, Morton (1983) “Tribe to State or State to Tribe in Ancient China,” in Keightley, ed. (1983). Friedman, Thomas (1999) The Lexus and the Olive Tree. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Friedrich, Otto (1986) The End of the World: A History. Fromm International. Fromkin, David (1981) The Independence of Nations. Praeger. Fukuyama, Francis (1993) The End of History and the Last Man. Avon. Gaddis, John L. (1999) “Living in Candlestick Park.” The Atlantic, April, pp. 65–74. Garraty, John A., and Peter Gay, eds. (1981) The Columbia History of the World. Harper and Row. Garsoian, Nina (1981) “Early Byzantium,” in Garraty and Gay, eds. (1981). Gernet, Jacques (1962) Daily Life in China on the Eve of the Mongol Invasion, 1250–1276.

Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny
by Robert Wright
Published 28 Dec 2010

In the 1960s, one philosopher of history observed that historians “tend to use the term ‘metahistorian’ to mark deviations from normal professional activity in either the law-seeking or the pattern-seeking direction.” Not much has changed since then. The one pattern-seeking work of history to make a big splash over the past two decades—The End of History—was written not by a historian but by a political scientist, Francis Fukuyama. Oddly, pondering laws of history is less deviant behavior for a political scientist than for a historian. Opponents of “metahistory” have often been candid about their motivations. The dedication to Popper’s book reads, “In memory of the countless men and women of all creeds or nations or races who fell victims to the fascist and communist belief in Inexorable Laws of Historical Destiny.”

…

—Simon Conway Morris, The New York Times Book Review “An extraordinarily insightful and thought-provoking book. . . . Wright does an astonishingly effective job of finding directionality in history, not just over the past few thousand years but over the almost four billion years since the beginning of life on earth.” —Francis Fukuyama, The Wilson Quarterly “A dazzling tour of world history. . . . Although he takes into account the tooth-and-claw battles of nations, the vanished empires, social violence and chaos, the shocks and changes of technology, Mr. Wright finds pattern and meaning in history. We are moving toward connectedness, toward one world. . . .

…

Fried, Morton (1983) “Tribe to State or State to Tribe in Ancient China,” in Keightley, ed. (1983). Friedman, Thomas (1999) The Lexus and the Olive Tree. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Friedrich, Otto (1986) The End of the World: A History. Fromm International. Fromkin, David (1981) The Independence of Nations. Praeger. Fukuyama, Francis (1993) The End of History and the Last Man. Avon. Gaddis, John L. (1999) “Living in Candlestick Park.” The Atlantic, April, pp. 65–74. Garraty, John A., and Peter Gay, eds. (1981) The Columbia History of the World. Harper and Row. Garsoian, Nina (1981) “Early Byzantium,” in Garraty and Gay, eds. (1981). Gernet, Jacques (1962) Daily Life in China on the Eve of the Mongol Invasion, 1250–1276.

Empire
by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri
Published 9 Mar 2000

For Los Angeles, see Mike Davis, City of Quartz (London: Verso, 1990), pp. 221–263. For Sa˜o Paulo, see Teresa Caldeira, ‘‘Fortified Enclaves: The New Urban Segregation,’’ Public Culture, no. 8 (1996); 303–328. 9. See Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zone Books, 1994). 10. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 11. ‘‘We have watched the war machine . . . set its sights on a new type of enemy, no longer another State, or even another regime, but ‘l’ennemi quelconque’ [the whatever enemy].’’ Gilles Deleuze and Feĺix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans.

…

The liberal notion of the public, the I M P E R I A L S O V E R E I G N T Y 189 place outside where we act in the presence ofothers, has been both universalized (because we are always now under the gaze ofothers, monitored by safety cameras) and sublimated or de-actualized in the virtual spaces ofthe spectacle. The end ofthe outside is the end ofliberal politics. Finally, there is no longer an outside also in a military sense. When Francis Fukuyama claims that the contemporary historical passage is defined by the end ofhistory, he means that the era of major conflicts has come to an end: sovereign power will no longer confront its Other and no longer face its outside, but rather will progressively expand its boundaries to envelop the entire globe as its proper domain.10 The history ofimperialist, interimperialist, and anti-imperialist wars is over.

…

On the one hand, in this situation all the forces of society tend to be activated as productive forces; but on the other hand, these same forces are submitted to a global domination that is continually more abstract and thus blind to the sense of the apparatuses of the reproduction of life. In postmodernity, the ‘‘end of history’’ is effectively imposed, but in such a way that at the same time paradoxically all the powers of humanity are called on to contribute to the global reproduction of labor, society, and life. In this framework, politics (when this is understood as administration and management) loses all its transparency.

The World's Banker: A Story of Failed States, Financial Crises, and the Wealth and Poverty of Nations
by Sebastian Mallaby
Published 24 Apr 2006

The family’s political heroes were Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt. Paul won a full scholarship to Cornell, and he lived as an undergraduate in the Telluride House, a hothouse for gifted students. Again, it was an experience that several future neoconservatives shared. Francis Fukuyama, who famously celebrated the end of history in his 1989 essay, was another Telluride product, as was the maverick presidential candidate Alan Keyes; Wolfowitz later recruited Fukuyama and Keyes to work for him at the State Department. The reigning spirit at Telluride was a charismatic young professor named Allan Bloom, later author of The Closing of the American Mind and the inspiration for the title character in Saul Bellow’s novel Ravelstein.

…

As usual, shifting intellectual fashions within the Bank are echoed outside its walls. In the aftermath of the Iraq war, the limits to outsiders’ ability to remake political attitudes have been emphasized by commentators of all stripes—including some whose pedigree make pessimism surprising. In a book published in 2004, Francis Fukuyama, the former Wolfowitz protégé who had proclaimed history’s end, let loose an antitriumphalist broadside. The idea that outsiders can build institutions in chaotic countries misunderstands what institutions are, Fukuyama wrote. They are the bundles of attitudes, of shared learning and assumptions.

Belt and Road: A Chinese World Order
by Bruno Maçães
Published 1 Feb 2019

What their arguments show is that, far from suffering from a dearth of alternatives, we have too many universal values to choose from and they are evidently not compatible or even fully commensurable between them. When discussing world politics today, we often revert to one of two models. The first, popularized by Francis Fukuyama, sees the whole world converging to a European or Western political framework, after which no further historical development is possible. Every country or region is measured by the time it will still take to reach this final destination, but all doubts and debates about where we are heading have been fundamentally resolved.

…

After the completion of the project, a Chinese company operating a port might modestly slow transit to send a coercive signal about China’s control over a target country’s trade flows.24 The idea of a “harmonious world” or a “community of shared destiny” may appeal to the pursuit of peace, cooperation and respect for cultural difference, but when—in a curious imitation of the Western concept of the end of history—it is presented as the inevitable endpoint of historical development, it becomes uncompromising and oppressive. Once a “community of shared destiny” has been advanced as the only correct option, the temptation is to start identifying disharmonious elements, those who, as the Chinese authorities like to put it, still harbor a Cold War mentality or a zero-sum approach to world politics.

…

Mei Xinyu, “The Gwadar Port Disillusion,” Caijing, December 19, 2016. 12. Nadège Rolland, China’s Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative (National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017), p. 113. 13. Bruno Maçães, “Russia’s New Energy Gamble,” Cairo Review, 2018. 14. Nadine Godehardt, “No End of History: A Chinese Alternative Concept of International Order”, SWP Research Paper, Berlin, January 2016. 15. Wang Yiwei, The Belt and Road Initiative: What China Will Offer the World in Its Rise (New World Press, 2016), p. 1. 16. See Zhao Tingyang, “Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept ‘All-under-Heaven’ (Tian-xia, 天下),” Social Identities, January 2006, pp. 29–41. 17.

The Secret War Between Downloading and Uploading: Tales of the Computer as Culture Machine
by Peter Lunenfeld
Published 31 Mar 2011

I adopt this notion of long and short decades from the ways in which historians have proposed that the nineteenth was a long century, from the French Revolution in 1789 to the outbreak of World War I in 1914, and that the twentieth was a short one, running from 1914 to 1989. Likewise we can say that in the United States, the 1960s were a long decade, lasting from 1957 to 1973 (roughly the publication of Jack Kerouac’s On the Road to the triple shocks of the OPEC oil embargo, Watergate, and the loss in Vietnam). 2. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 3. For a sterling analysis of New Economy hubris, see Thomas Frank, One Market under God: Extreme Capitalism, Market Populism, and the End of Economic Democracy (New York: Doubleday, 2000). 4. This figure comes from Lawrence Haverty Jr., senior vice president of State Street Research, quoted in Rachel Konrad, “Assessing the Carnage: Sizing Up the Market’s Swift Demise,” CNET News, March 8, 2001, available at <http://news. com.com/2009-1017-253125-2.html?

…

The post-1989 period contained a multitude of features, but one unifying construct was the belief that after the fall of the Berlin Wall and then the Soviet Union itself, not just Communism, but all the countervailing forces against market capitalism were vanquished, and not just for the moment but literally for all time. The Market with a capital M was the grail at the end of Francis Fukayama’s treatise The End of History.2 The Market was the solution for all questions, the Market would bring peace and prosperity, and would free itself from the tyranny of the business cycle, evolving into an entirely invisible, frictionless, perpetual motion machine that would take the name of the New Economy (again with capital letters).3 This immediate post-1989 period coincided with the most utopian phase of the culture machine: the euphoria of the World Wide Web’s first Wild, Wild West phase.

…

Congress and, 90 violations of, 92–93, 95 Web n.0 and, 88–95 Corian, 64 Creative Commons, 173, 189n12 bespoke futures and, 123 Mickey Mouse Protection Act and, 90 Computers (continued) Aquarians and, xv, 24, 144, 152, 157, 159–169 challenge to television of, 2 as culture machine, xiv, xvi, xv–xvi, 5 (see also Culture machine) distribution and, xiii dominance of, xii–xiii, xiv as dream machines, xiii emergence of, xii–xiii first, 146 hackers and, 22–23, 54, 67, 69, 162, 170–173 historical perspective on, 143–178 Hosts and, xv, 144, 167, 175 Hustlers and, xv, 144, 156, 162–167 intelligence test for, 19 as “Man of the Year,” xii Moore’s law and, 156, 195n13 mouse for, 158–159 participation and, xvi, 15–17, 27–35, 54, 66–67, 74–80, 98–99, 120– 121, 129, 143–147, 151, 156–165, 170, 175–178 Patriarchs and, xv, 143–144, 147–153, 156–157, 162–163, 166–168 personal, 152, 161–167 Plutocrats and, xv, 144, 152–159, 163–166, 170 production and, xiii relationship with data and, 32 Searchers and, xv–xvi, 144, 167, 174–178 simulation and, xvi, 2 (see also Simulation) Sterling on, 101–102 symbiosis and, 151–152 systems theory and, 151 ubiquity and, xiii, 22–23, 39, 57–59, 62, 74, 81–82, 87, 92–93, 125, 128, 144, 166, 177–178 Universal Turing Machine and, 18–19 201 INDEX Creative Commons (continued) open source and, 90–93, 123, 173 purpose of, 91 Web n.0 and, 90–93 Creatives, 30 Credit cards, 76 Crenshaw district, 105 Critical inquiry, 14 Cuban Missile Crisis, xi Cubism, 44, 79, 117 Cultural issues commercialism and, 4–5, 8 (see also Commercial culture) diabetic technologies and, 3–5 dominance of television and, xii, 2–5, 7–10 fan culture and, 28–32, 48, 49, 87 free culture and, 75, 92, 98–99 Freud and, 43–44 hierarchies and, 1, 24, 29, 93, 114 junk culture and, 5–10 mass/pop culture and, 13, 31, 39–40, 47–48, 53, 56–58, 61–63, 107, 109, 184n16 mechanization and, 44–45 open source and, 36, 61, 69, 74–75, 91–92, 116, 121–126, 144, 170– 173, 177, 189n12 psychology and, 16, 21–22, 42–44, 56, 151, 161 secular culture and, 133–139 Slow Food and, 5–7 stickiness and, 28–32 (see also Stickiness) Culture machine, 5 Aquarians and, xv, 24, 144, 152, 157, 159–169 bespoke futures and, 97–101, 116, 123–133, 137–138 design and, 139, 150, 160, 165, 167, 171–172, 176 development of, 143–178 downloading and, 143, 168 gaming and, 70–74 Hosts and, xv, 144, 167, 175 Hustlers and, xv, 144, 156, 162–167 information and, 46, 143–149, 152– 153, 163, 167–168, 172, 176–178 networks and, 143–144, 152, 167– 168, 172–175, 178 participation and, 15–17, 143–147, 151, 156–165, 170, 175–178 Patriarchs and, xv, 143–144, 147–153, 156–157, 162–163, 166–168 Plutocrats and, xv, 144, 152–159, 163–166, 170 postmodernism and, 39–40 Searchers and, xv–xvi, 144, 167, 174–178 simulation and, 15–17, 143–144, 147– 152, 156–160, 166–168, 175–178 stickiness and, 15–19, 27, 32, 35 technology and, 143–163, 173–174 unimodernism and, 39, 42, 46–60, 67–76 uploading and, 143, 168, 173, 175 Warriors and, 146–147 Web n.0 and, 79–85, 90–93 Cut-up fiction, 52 Cyberpunk, 68, 87, 110 Czechoslovakia, 104 Dada, 79, 186n8 Danger Mouse, 54–55 Dare, Dan, 108 Darth Vader, 90 Darwin, Charles, 133 Davis, Miles, 25–26 Dawkins, Richard, 143 Death and Life of Great American Cities, The (Jacobs), 84–85 Deconstruction, 29–31 DeLanda, Manuel, 189n8 De.lic.ious, 75 202 INDEX Design bespoke futures and, 102, 105–106, 110–111, 115–116, 119–120, 124–125, 137 control over form and, 111 culture machine and, 139, 150, 160, 165, 167, 171–172, 176 future as client and, 110–113 futurists on, 101–102 graphic, 31, 45, 64, 102, 181n7 Gropius and, 36–37 isotypes and, 44, 125, 193n34 mechanization and, 44–45 Moore’s law and, 156 open source, 36, 61, 69, 74–75, 91–92, 116, 121–126, 144, 170– 173, 177, 189n12 play and, 32–34 postmodernism and, 29–30, 39–41, 74, 79, 130, 135 power and, 32–34 tweaking and, 32–35 unimodernism and, 39, 43–46, 49, 55–56, 60, 64–8, 71–74 Design of Everyday Things, The (Norman), 16 Design Within Reach, 46 Desk jobs, 3 Dewey, John, 129 Dewey, Melvil, 80 Diabetes, 3–5, 8 “Diamond Dogs” (Bowie), 62 Dick, Philip K., 9 Difference engine, 149 Digg, 34 Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC), 71, 149, 153, 163, 170 Digital video discs (DVDs), 2, 7–8, 15, 58 Digital video recorders (DVRs), 2, 7, 15, 23, 181n3 Disco, 63 Disney Concert Hall, 39 DIY (do-it-yourself) movements, 67–70 203 Dot-com bubble, 79, 145, 174 Doubleclick, 177 Downloading, xiii–xiv, 180nn1,2 animal kingdom and, 1 bespoke futures and, 97, 123, 132, 138 best use and, 13–14 commercial networks and, 4–5 communication devices and, 15–16 cultural hierarchy of, 1–2 culture machine and, 143, 168 dangers of overabundance and, 7–10 defined, 1 diabetic responses to, 3–5 disrupting flow and, 23–24 figure/ground and, xvi, 42–43, 46, 102 Freedom software and, 22–23 habits of mind and, 9–10 humans and, 1–2 information overload and, 22, 149 info-triage and, xvi, 20–23, 121, 132, 143 as intake, 5 mindfulness and, xvi, 14, 17, 20–24, 27–29, 42, 77, 79, 123, 129, 183n6 patio potato and, 9–10, 13 peer-to-peer networks and, 15, 54, 92, 116, 126 stickiness and, 13–17, 20–23, 27–29, 184n15 surfing and, 20, 80, 180n2 television and, 2 unimodernism and, 41–42, 49, 54–57, 66–67, 76–77 viral distribution and, 30, 56, 169 wants vs. needs and, 13, 37, 57 Web n.0 and, 79, 82–83, 86–87 Duchamp, Marcel, 44, 48, 94 Dymaxion map, 73 Dynabook, 161–162, 196n17 Dynamic equilibrium, 117–120 EBay, 68 Eckert, J. Presper, 148 INDEX Efficiency, 21–24, 98, 103 8 Man (Hirai and Kuwata), 108 8–track tapes, 2 89/11, xvi, 97, 100–102, 105, 130 Einstein, Albert, 49–50, 186n4 Eisenstein, Sergei, 31 52, 88 El Lissitzky, 45 Eminent Victorians (Strachey), 19 End of History, The (Fukayama), 97 Engelbart, Douglas, 144, 157–167 ENIAC computer, 148 Enlightenment Electrified, xvi, 47 bespoke futures and, 129–139 determinism and, 131–132 Nietzschean self-satisfaction and, 132 religion and, 130–135, 138 secular culture and, 133–134 technology and, 131–133, 136–139 Entrepreneurs, 99, 109, 156–157, 174 Environmental impact reports (EIRs), 79–80 Ethernet, 161 Etsy.com, 68 Evans, Walker, 41–42 Everyone Is a Designer!

Independent Diplomat: Dispatches From an Unaccountable Elite
by Carne Ross
Published 25 Apr 2007

As liberalism evolved in the twentieth century (and some called it neo-liberalism), it argued that cooperation and collective security in a multipolar system of democratic states and strong international institutions would best serve the interests of stability (echoing Kant’s “perpetual peace”). Many contemporary liberals viewed the end of the Cold War (the realist paradigm of a bipolar system) as the ultimate confirmation of liberalism as the only viable mode of political life. Champion among such thinkers was Francis Fukuyama who, in his seminal book The End of History and the Last Man, argued that political history had come to a close with the death of the Cold War and, by default, the triumph of liberalism. Not only will liberal democracy and capitalism spread through an ever-globalising world, but also such a system would be ideal.

…

Simplification, though tempting, must inevitably be inaccurate and wrong and is therefore dangerous. Academics are as guilty of this thought-crime as the politicians, providing glib generalisations with which we can organise our thoughts and dinner-party arguments. The absurdity of theses such as “the clash of civilizations” or the “end of history” (though the latter book admits to a more nuanced analysis) is only revealed at the point that any situation, anywhere, is examined using such templates. 8. At a more prosaic level, contemporary diplomacy is deeply unbalanced and unfair. Its practice and machinery are dominated by rich and powerful states, whose political and economic power is reinforced and supplemented by their less-recognised diplomatic power.

What About Me?: The Struggle for Identity in a Market-Based Society
by Paul Verhaeghe
Published 26 Mar 2014

But whenever a number of religions or ideologies laid claim to being the one true belief, wars broke out in the name of faith or reason. Since that time, secular religions have followed hot on each other’s heels, each with their promise of a new and better world: socialism, communism, fascism, and, most recently, liberal democracy. Francis Fukuyama’s proclamation of the latter as marking ‘the end of history’ again conjures up the idea of a ladder with a substandard beginning and a glorious end. Once again, it’s not hard to see the legacy of Christianity in these different ideologies: the better society, Heaven on Earth, is always located in the future, and requires a great deal of effort and sacrifice.

This Is Not Normal: The Collapse of Liberal Britain
by William Davies
Published 28 Sep 2020

Firstly, the political plausibility of Brexit increased as a direct response to Tony Blair’s dogmatic assumption that European integration was a historical destiny, which encompassed the UK. No doubt a figure such as Blair would have discovered a messianic agenda under any historical circumstances. But given that he gained power specifically in the mid-’90s, he was one palpable victim of the fin de siècle ideology (stereotyped by Francis Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis, but also present in Anthony Giddens’s ‘Third Way’) that the world was programmed to converge around a single political system. Neoconservative faith in violent ‘democratisation’ was Blair’s worst indulgence on this front, but a view of European unification (and expansion) as inevitable was partially responsible for inciting the Tory reaction within Westminster.

Financial Market Meltdown: Everything You Need to Know to Understand and Survive the Global Credit Crisis
by Kevin Mellyn
Published 30 Sep 2009

The state had clearly failed to deliver prosperity and had destroyed the liberty of billions and the lives of millions in the process. Outside of its strongholds in the universities and cultural elites of the rich capitalist world, state socialism was universally seen to be an abject failure. THE END OF HISTORY In 1992, a renowned scholar published a book that stayed on the bestseller list for months. Francis Fukuyama based The End of History and the Last Man on a lecture he gave in 1989 when state socialism began to crumble in Eastern Europe. He argued persuasively that ‘‘liberal democracy remains [after the fall of communism] the only coherent political aspiration that spans different regions and cultures around the globe.

…

The triumph of Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Ronald Reagan in the United States during the 1980s had started the pendulum of history swinging back to the classical liberalism of Bagehot’s Britain. The triumph of the AngloAmerican model of business and finance appeared complete and final. Conclusion REAL HISTORY DOES NOT END Of course, real history as we have seen is always a series of accidents. It never really comes to an end. Instead of the end of history, Fukuyama was really observing a turnover in the long, never complete grudge match between free markets and those people and institutions that seek to suppress and manipulate markets through political power. The game continued, and in 2008, the other team—the left wing of the Democratic Party, not its basically mainstream membership as a whole—was able to turn a very scary market panic that had nothing to do with the fundamentals of capitalism into a big score for a return to state control of the economy.

…

See Stocks CRA (Community Reinvestment Act), and financial institutions, 132–33 credit, xvi–xx, 2–9, 13–14, 19, 25, 27–28, 31–33, 38, 40, 55, 57, 61, 66, 71, 73–74, 78, 82–84, 86, 88, 90, 93, 99, 104, 107, 109, 122, 130, 135, 139, 152, 156, 161–162, 164, 185; credit enhancement, 64; credit exposure, 73; credit money, xviii, 2–3, 5–6, 86; credit scores, 63–64; credit underwriting by banks, 17; lost art of, 62 current account, 36–39, 61, 78, 89, 90 dealer, 19–22, 27–28, 44, 95, 142, 154, 159 deflation, 112–113 democracy, and finance/markets, 99, 122, 182 deregulation, 117 deposit money, 8–17, 19, 23, 28, 35–37, 39, 85–87, 91, 104, 144, 148, 172–173 deposit taking (as a monopoly of banks), 8, 12 ‘‘derivatives,’’ 25, 55, 72–73, 185 Dicey, A.V., 181 discount houses, 21, 34, 37, 77, 85–87 discount window, 107 ‘‘disintermediation,’’ 41, 152 Dow Jones Industrial Average, 50, 157 ‘‘efficient market’’ theory, 49 El-Erian, Mohamed, and the ‘‘New Normal,’’ 188 Enlightenment, and US constitution, 179–80, 182 Enron, 3, 136 ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act), 156 ETF (Exchange Traded Fund), 51 Eurobank, 148 Eurodollar market, 147–151 Euromarkets, 150–52, 157 exchange (concept), xi–xiii, xvi, 14, 20–21, 30–32, 36, 85 193 194 Index Exchanges (stock, commodities, etc.), 20, 28, 42, 54–55, 72, 82, 88–89, 93–97, 120, 167, 169 Fannie Mae, 57, 133, 142 FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), 16, 128–129, 131–132, 159, 163 federal funds rate, 146 Federal Home Loan Banks, 56, 142 Federal Reserve, 6, 11, 13–14, 44, 84, 86, 102–110, 123–124, 128, 132, 140, 152, 156, 159, 162–163, 186 Federal Reserve Act of 1913, 103–104, 124 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 105 Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 104, 107 Ferguson, Niall, concept of ‘‘Chimerica,’’ 185; on John Law, 92; on Medicis, 79; on the Rothschilds, 88; Fiat money, 155, 173, 184 FICO scores, 63, 65, 68 financial economy, ix, 1–5, 8, 150, 174 financial innovation, 58, 60, 74 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 132 financial instruments, 19–20, 64; customization, 65, 150; standardization of, 66; risks, 47, 49, 52; types of, 29–31; 32–40, 42–45, 54–55; uses of, 31–32 financial markets, x, xx, 19–20, 22, 24–25, 29, 40, 45, 75, 79–80, 88, 90, 99, 101, 119, 127, 139–141, 160, 165, 167, 176, 180, 186, 189 First National Bank of Boston, 143 First National City Bank of New York, 145 fixed income, 43, 48, 52, 67, 93, 153 floating currencies and FX market, 155 foreign exchange, x, 55, 72, 93–95, 125, 149, 156 401(k) plans, 122, 157 fractional reserves, 151 Freddie Mac, 57 Friedman, Tom, World Is Flat, The, 184 Fukuyama, Francis, End of History and the Last Man, The, 182–183 ‘‘futures,’’ 54–55 Galbraith, John Kenneth, Affluent Society, The, 153 Garn-St. Germain Act, 130–131 GDP (Gross Domestic Product), 6, 14, 27, 133, 169, 171, 188 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 115 Genoa and origins of banking and finance, 77–79 Glass-Steagall, 141, 149, 159 gold, xiv–xvi, xix, 8, 12, 19, 34, 83–84, 106, 147, 149, 154–155, 184 Goldman Sachs, 159 Goldsmiths, 83 gold standard, 94–98, 108, 115, 125–126, 137–139, 155, 162 Graham-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 159 Great Inflation, 130, 152, 154, 156 Great Moderation, 140–141, 152 Greenberg, Maurice ‘‘Hank,’’ and AIG, 138, Index Greenspan, Alan, 101, 111, 140, 157 ‘‘Greenspan put,’’ 101, 111 Gresham, Sir Thomas, 80, 82 GSE (Government Sponsored Enterprises), 57, 133, 142, 176, 186 Health Care, 51, 162, 187–189 Hedge Funds, 25–27, 65 High Street (UK equivalent for Main Street), 91 High Street Bank, 89.

The Long Good Buy: Analysing Cycles in Markets
by Peter Oppenheimer
Published 3 May 2020

Although these reforms were aimed at reversing the bureaucratic structure that had become a major constraint to economic progress, now they are often seen as important catalysts in the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 and, as such, the end of the Cold War and the start of the modern era of globalisation. In the summer of 1989, just a few months before the collapse of the Berlin Wall, as the pressures on the Eastern European communist states intensified, Francis Fukuyama, a US State Department official, wrote a paper titled ‘The End of History’ where he argued, ‘What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.’4 The paper seemed to capture the zeitgeist.

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This had already been achieved in 1967 with Our World, which had used satellites to beam to a global audience of 400,000 to 700,000 people, the biggest ever at the time, and included appearances and performances from Pablo Picasso, Maria Callas, and the famous UK entry, The Beatles, who performed ‘All You Need Is Love’ for the first time. 4 See Fukuyama, F. (1989). The end of history? The National Interest, 16, 3–18. 5 http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/16/newsid_2519000/2519013.stm 6 The Maastricht Treaty, officially known as the Treaty on European Union, marked the beginning of ‘a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’.

…

ECB [online]. Available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/explainers/tell-me-more/html/25_years_maastricht.en.html Frehen, R. G. P., Goetzmann, W. N., and Rouwenhorst, K. G. (2013). New evidence on the first financial bubble. Journal of Financial Economics, 108(3), 585–607. Fukuyama, F. (1989). The end of history? The National Interest, 16, 3–18. Gagnon, J., Raskin, M., Remache, J., and Sack, B. (2011). The financial market effects of the Federal Reserve's large-scale asset purchases. International Journal of Central Banking, 7(1), 3–43. Galbraith, J. K. (1955). The great crash, 1929. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

Worth Dying For: The Power and Politics of Flags
by Tim Marshall
Published 21 Sep 2016

The relatively new concept of European identity finds itself battling with national identities and symbols that have been forged over centuries. Flags, and the importance nation states and peoples attach to them, give the lie to the famous theory of the American thinker Francis Fukuyama in his The End of History and the Last Man, published in 1992. Dr Fukuyama argued that the fall of the Berlin Wall was not ‘just the end of the Cold War but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government’. This damaging idea continues to influence generations of foreign-policy thinkers who appear oblivious to the patterns of history and the political direction of Russia, the Middle East, China, swathes of Central Asia and elsewhere.

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This damaging idea continues to influence generations of foreign-policy thinkers who appear oblivious to the patterns of history and the political direction of Russia, the Middle East, China, swathes of Central Asia and elsewhere. It is damaging because it causes some people to assume that such a thing as the end of history is possible, and that mankind’s ‘ideological evolution’ must end in liberal democracy. This is as wrong as the Marxist theory of the inevitability of the ‘law of history’ leading to a Communist utopia. The problem with Dr Fukuyama’s and Dr Marx’s theories are that they come into contact with real people. In Dr Fukuyama’s case they have helped foster the complacent idea that what the liberal democracies have is inevitable and everlasting.

But What if We're Wrong? Thinking About the Present as if It Were the Past
by Chuck Klosterman
Published 6 Jun 2016

[2]When I spoke with Horgan, he’d recently completed his (considerably less controversial) fifth book, The End of War, a treatise arguing against the assumption that war is an inescapable component of human nature. The embryo for this idea came from a conversation he’d had two decades prior, conducted while working on The End of Science. It was an interview with Francis Fukuyama, the political scientist best known for his 1989 essay “The End of History?” The title of the essay is deceptive, since Fukuyama was mostly asserting that liberal capitalist democracies were going to take over the world. It was an economic argument that (thus far) has not happened. But what specifically appalled Horgan was Fukuyama’s assertion about how a problem-free society would operate.

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Hyde (Stevenson), 143–44 dreaming content of dreams, 142–43 dimethyltryptamine (DMT), 141–42 “Dream Argument,” 137n lucid, 137, 141 meaningless nature of, 138–39 and near-death experiences, 141–42 Dress, The (viral phenomenon), 146–47 dying and sleep, relationship between, 141–42 Dylan, Bob, 74–77, 86–87, 230 Earth, location in Milky Way, 120 earthquakes, 258–60 echolocation sonar, 254 Ed Sullivan Show, The, 60, 66 Egan, Jennifer, 52 Eggers, Dave, 52 Ehrlich, Paul, 14 Einstein, Albert, 4, 112, 114 elections, US Ohio’s importance in, 196–97 political polarization since 9/11, 198–99 presidential race of 2000, 197–98, 216 See also voting electronic dance music (EDM), 79 EmDrive rocket thruster, 119–20 Empire (TV show), 170 “End of History?, The” (Fukuyama), 226–27 End of Science, The (Horgan), 223–24, 226 End of War, The (Horgan), 226–27 Entourage (TV show), 170 equality, 212–14 Esquire, 246 E.T. (film), 182 “Ethicist, The” (New York Times Magazine column), 255 Everest, Mount, 183 extraterrestrials, music for, 83–84 fact-checking, 154n false memories, 150–51 Fight Club (Palahniuk), 53 film industry, 28–30, 90, 227, 243–45 financial crisis of 2008, 41 First Amendment rights, 211–12 flawed assumptions, 93–94, 185–86 fleeting popularity, 23–24 Foer, Jonathan Safran, 47 Fomenko, Anatoly, 135 football college level, 191–93 comparative risks in other sports, 183 dangerous nature of, 179–80, 185 future of, 178–82 hypothetical scenario of its decline, 180 National Football League (NFL), 180–81, 182–83 safety modifications envisioned, 181 silo analogy, 184–85 forces fundamental vs. emergent, 4 gravity, 3–7 Fourteenth Amendment rights, 220 fox vs. hedgehog, 199–201 Franzen, Jonathan, 27, 36, 261 free speech, limitations to, 211–12 Freed, Alan, 59 freedom, 214 Freud, Sigmund, 138 Frost, Robert, 93 Fukuyama, Francis, 226–27 future, thinking about, 252–53 Galileo, 5, 100, 117–18 Gaussian curve, 22n Gazzaniga, Michael, 203n Gehry, Frank, 90 genius, recognizing, 23–24, 73 Gibbon, Edward, 207 Gillett, Charlie, 14 Gioia, Ted, 77–79 Gladwell, Malcolm, 177–79, 181 Glass, Stephen, 154n global politics, 15, 17 God and the simulation hypothesis, 124–27 Gone Girl (Flynn), 53 “good job” response to art, 188–89 Goodman, John, 174 Gore, Al, 197–98 gorillas, 255–56 GQ, 242–43 Grand Theft Auto (video game), 128 Grant, Ulysses S., 206 gravity Aristotle’s ideas about, 5, 101 author’s knowledge of, 3 evolution of ideas about, 3–7 temperature analogy, 4n greatness, 51n Greene, Brian, 3–4, 101–8, 112–14, 124–25 Gross, David, 104n Gumbel, Bryant, 185 Halley’s Comet, 136 Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps, 156–57 Harbaugh, Jim, 185 Hard Rain (album), 75 Hardcore History (podcast), 201–3 Harrison, George, 84n heliocentrism, 117 Hellman, Martin, 260 Hemingway, Ernest, 93 Hendrix, Jimi, 60 “Here Comes the Sun” (song), 84 Hero with a Thousand Faces, The (Campbell), 74n hero’s journey, 74 Hersh, Seymour, 151–53 Herzen, Alexander, 201 Hidden Reality, The (Greene), 103 Higgs boson (“God particle”), 130–31 historical figure game, 155–56 history confirming, 151, 153–57, 203–5 revisionist, 233–35 History: Fiction or Science?

On Paradise Drive: How We Live Now (And Always Have) in the Future Tense
by David Brooks
Published 2 Jun 2004

Floating in a warm bath of relativism, fearing conflict, picking up one value one day and an opposite value the next, they are comfortably untroubled by their lack of firm beliefs and guiding principles. “I fear that spiritual entropy or an evaporation of the soul’s boiling blood is taking place.” By the time we get to the 1990s, the pile is over my head. I’m peering up at books such as Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man, which warns of the arrival of the Last Man, the lukewarm child of comfort, afraid of conflict, obsessed by health and safety, untroubled by any disturbing passions, content in his world of money, mildness, and easy pleasures. I see Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone, which documents the decline of community and healthy human bonds throughout American society.

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Dulles, Allen Earth in the Balance (Gore) Eastward Ho! (Chapman, Jonson, Marston) Easyriders education as American ideal high school years, preparing for college preparing résumés of activities school requirements See also college education Edwards, Jonathan Einstein, Albert Elliot, Charles William Emerson, Ralph Waldo End of History and the Last Man, The (Fukuyama) energy and mobility: and abundance, inspired by and the Achievatron and being incapable of relaxing causing risk taking downside of possible failure of and economic/cultural domination of world as evidence of superficiality and “Find Your Fry!” products/services and idealism, driven by and millionaires moving compared with other countries moving from Northeast/Midwest to South/Southwest the mystery of as national trait as pioneering spirit popular culture as expression of of senior citizens as spiritual trait women in work ethic See also imagination evangelical Christians Execution: The Discipline of Getting Things Done (Charam, Burck, Bossidy) exurbia cars in centers, lack of in children’s names in clothing in development of homes in influential communities and inner-ring suburbs, compared with lawns in non-segregation of people, types of settling in political beliefs in and religion restaurants in roads in shopping in sports in and sprawl streetscape “feel” in Sunday activities in themists, use of in Fables of Abundance (Lears) Falwell, Jerry farmer’s markets Fast Company Ferrets USA FHM Field, Sally Field and Stream Fields of Battle (Keegan) “Find Your Fry!”

Imperial Legacies
by Jeremy Black;
Published 14 Jul 2019

Westermann, Hitler’s Ostkrieg and the Indian Wars: Comparing Genocide and Conquest (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016). 4 On “our disregard of the Boer War,” Matthew Parris, “Forgotten Wars,” Times, April 4, 2018. 5 David Edgerton, The Rise and Fall of the British Nation: A Twentieth-Century History (London: Allen Lane, 2018). 6 Bruce D. Graham, Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics: The Origins and Development of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 7 For this concept, see Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest (spring 1989): 2–18. 8 Henry Chauncy, Historical Antiquities of Hertfordshire (London, 1700), p. 1. 9 Judith M. Brown, “Epilogue,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire: IV: The Twentieth Century, ed. Brown and Wm R. Louis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 710. 10 Karim Bejjit, English Colonial Texts on Tangier, 1661–1684: Imperialism and the Politics of Resistance (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015). 11 P.

The Rebel and the Kingdom: The True Story of the Secret Mission to Overthrow the North Korean Regime
by Bradley Hope
Published 1 Nov 2022

Surely once people heard the details and saw the pictures, as he had, policy makers in Washington and others with influence would begin to act, he declared to Nakanishi. Something was different about the cohort of these college roommates in 2002 compared with the irony-steeped Gen X generation that had come before them. Ten years earlier, Francis Fukuyama had published his infamous book The End of History, arguing that with the breakup of the Soviet Union liberal democracy had triumphed. But just the prior year, two weeks into their first semester at Yale, Adrian and Nakanishi had witnessed the world change before their eyes when Islamic jihadists crashed planes into the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon.

When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Rise of the Middle Kingdom
by Martin Jacques
Published 12 Nov 2009

For a discussion on the fundamental importance of cultural difference in the era of globalization, see Stuart Hall, ‘A Different Light’, Lecture to Prince Claus Fund Conference, Rotterdam, 12 December 2001. 32 . Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), Chapters 4-5. 33 . Chris Patten, East and West: China, Power, and the Future of East Asia (London: Times Books, 1998), p. 166. 34 . Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’, National Interest, summer 1989. See also for example, Edward Luttwak, Turbo-Capitalism: Winners and Losers in the Global Economy (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1998), p. 25. 35 . John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000), for example Chapters 2, 6, 12, Epilogue. 36 .

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The significance of this debate to a world in which the developing nations are increasingly influential is far-reaching: if their end-point is similar to the West, or, to put it another way, Western-style modernity, then the new world is unlikely to be so different from the one we inhabit now, because China, India, Indonesia and Brazil, to take four examples, will differ little in their fundamental characteristics from the West. This was the future envisaged by Francis Fukuyama, who predicted that the post-Cold War world would be based on a new universalism embodying the Western principles of the free market and democracy.34 If, on the other hand, their ways of being modern diverge significantly, even sharply, from the Western model, then a world in which they predominate is likely to look very different from the present Western-made one in which we still largely live.

…

International Herald Tribune, 1 June 2006 ——‘Side by Side in China, While Still Worlds Apart’, International Herald Tribune, 20 March 2008 ——and Lydia Polgreen, ‘China Brings Its Deep Pockets to Africa’, International Herald Tribune, 13 August 2007 Friedman, Thomas L., ‘China’s Sunshine Boys’, International Herald Tribune, 7 December 2006 ——‘Democrats and China’, International Herald Tribune, 11- 12 November 2006 ——The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999) ——The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Globalized World in the Twenty-first Century (London: Allen Lane, 2005) Fukuyama, Francis, ‘The End of History?’, National Interest, 16, Summer 1989 ——The End of History and the Last Man (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992) ——Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1995) Gall, Susan, and Irene Natividad, eds, The Asian American Almanac: A Reference Work on Asians in the United States (Detroit: Gale Research, 1995) Gardner, Howard, To Open Minds (New York: Basic Books, 1989) Garrett, Valery M., Chinese Clothing: An Illustrated Guide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) ——Traditional Chinese Clothing in Hong Kong and South China, 1840- 1980 (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1987) Garrison, Jim, America as Empire: Global Leader or Rogue Power?

What Went Wrong: How the 1% Hijacked the American Middle Class . . . And What Other Countries Got Right
by George R. Tyler
Published 15 Jul 2013

Henry Olson of the American Enterprise Institute, writing in the Wall Street Journal during 2008, miscast Europe this way: “Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands are poorer than the United States, with substantially higher unemployment rates and slower economic growth.”61 France is regularly demonized, including a 2007 editorial in the Washington Post arguing it needs “weaning … from a mind-set that disdains and devalues work.”62 And here is reporter Simon Heffer of London’s Daily Telegraph, cheerleader for the conservative Tory party and critic of continental Europe: “While much of the rest of the World moves on through the application of free-market disciplines, France is demoralized, impoverished, overtaxed, and in despair.”63 A similar verdict was issued in 2001 by law professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, who described stakeholder capitalism and codetermination as “a failed social model.”64 Disciples of Milton Friedman and Ayn Rand, their article was entitled “The End of History for Corporate Law.” Their writing was reminiscent of political scientist Francis Fukuyama’s inaccurate commentary on the end of the Cold War or Oswald Spengler’s much earlier prediction amid the carnage of World War I, in his chilling The Decline of the West, that Western civilization had begun an inevitable downturn. Even the Economist magazine promotes the canard of a sickly Europe, as it did in June 2006 with unfortunate timing, not long before the US housing bubble burst.

…

Pew found that fewer American youths believe in the superiority of the US culture (37 percent) than youths in Germany, Spain, or Britain who view their own cultures as superior, even amid the European sovereign debt turmoil.23 Reaganomics has caused America’s children to conclude that their nation is no longer the exceptional land of opportunity it was for their grandparents. It has also sparked a much more dramatic reappraisal. Extrapolating these trends, political scientist and author Francis Fukuyama has grown alarmed that the decline of the American middle class poses an existential threat to democracy itself. By widening income disparities and shrinking the middle class that anchors societies, he frets that global integration threatens the very foundation of Western democratic institutions and practices.

…

Kris Warner, “Protecting Fundamental Labor Rights: Lessons from Canada for the United States,” Center for Economic and Policy Research, August 2012, http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/canada-2012-08.pdf. 51 Kate Bronfenbrenner, “The NLRB Got It Right on Boeing,” Washington Post, June 23, 2011. 52 Thomas Geoghegan, “Infinite Debt,” Harper’s Magazine, April 2009. 53 David Leonhardt, “In Wreckage of Lost Jobs, Lost Power,” New York Times, Jan. 19, 2011. 54 Ken Silverstein, “Labor’s Last Stand,” Harper’s Magazine, July 2009. 55 “The Imperfect Union Bill,” Editorial, Washington Post, May 11, 2009. 56 Harold Meyerson, “Card Check and Gut Check,” Washington Post, May 14, 2009. 57 Silverstein, “Labor’s Last Stand.” 58 Geoghegan, “Infinite Debt.” 59 Ibid. 60 Norbert Häring, “The Economist Who Wanted to Make a Difference,” Handelsblatt, July 27, 2010. 61 Henry Olson, “The GOP’s Time for Choosing,” Wall Street Journal, Jan. 5, 2008. 62 “The ‘Omnipresident’s’ Crucible,” Editorial, Washington Post, Nov. 23, 2007. 63 Quoted by Martin Newland, The Observer, May 6, 2007. 64 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, “The End of History for Corporate Law,” 89 Georgetown Law Journal, 439–468, 2001. Also see Irene Lynch Fannon, “The European Social Model of Corporate Governance: Prospects for Success in an Enlarged Europe,” European Union Studies Association Conference, March 30, 2005. 65 “The Financial Crisis: What Next?,” Economist, Sept.18, 2008. 66 Andrew Moravcsik, as quoted in “Suddenly, Europe Looks Pretty Smart,” Dealbook, New York Times, Oct. 20, 2008. 67 Mark Leonard, Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 70. 68 Mark Leonard, Ibid., 74. 69 “Bankruptcies Eliminate Millions of Jobs,” Berliner Zeitung, Dec. 28, 2009. 70 Mary Bartnik, “They Could Renounce Their RTT to Save Their Jobs,” Le Figaro, July 19, 2010. 71 Floyd Norris, “A Shift in the Export Powerhouses,” New York Times, Feb. 20, 2010. 72 Barry Eichengreen, The European Economy Since 1945 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 380. 73 “France Is Open for Business with Foreign Investors,” Paris: Invest in France Agency, November 2007. 74 Steven Hill, “5 Myths about Sick Old Europe,” Washington Post, Oct. 7, 2007. 75 Julia Werdiger, “To Woo Europeans, McDonald’s Goes Upscale,” New York Times, Aug. 25, 2007. 76 Daniel S.

Losing Control: The Emerging Threats to Western Prosperity
by Stephen D. King
Published 14 Jun 2010

Globalization is a natural feature of the economic landscape, leading to a happier, more contented, global community driven on by the ideas of the Enlightenment and the spread of liberal democracy. In this view of the world, it is relatively easy to incorporate the hopes, aspirations and economic muscle of the emerging nations into an already established world economic order. This is the kind of message that found favour in books such as Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and which still finds sympathy today in international gatherings such as the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland (where the great and the good of the global community can solve mass poverty for the benefit of the international media before heading off to the nearest champagne reception or ski slope).

…

Knopf, New York, 2005 Friedman, M., A Theory of the Consumption Function, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1957 Friedman, T., The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, New York, 1999 ———, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the 21st Century, Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, New York, 2005 Fukuyama, F., The End of History and the Last Man, Free Press, New York, 1992 Gibson, C. and Lennon, E., Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-born Population of the United States: 1850–1990, Population Division Working Paper No. 29, US Bureau of the Census, Washington DC, 1999 Gohkale, J. and Smetters, K., Fiscal and Generational Imbalances: New Budget Measures for New Budget Priorities, Policy Discussion Paper No. 5, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, OH, 2003 Greenspan, A., The Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic Society, Federal Reserve, Washington DC, 1996 ———, The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World, Allen Lane, London, 2007 Headrick, D.R., Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1981 Heilbroner, R., The Worldly Philosophers: The Lives, Times and Ideas of the Great Economic Thinkers, 7th edn, Simon & Shuster, New York, 1999 Hertz, N., The Silent Takeover, The Free Press, New York, 2002 Hobbes, T., ed Gaskin, J., Leviathan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008 House of Commons Treasury Committee, Globalisation: Prospects and Policy Responses, Fourteenth Report of Session, London, 2006/7 Hume, D.

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(i) Canada (i), (ii), (iii) Canning, David (i) capital Asian economic growth (i) empires (i), (ii) inequalities (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) price stability (i) protectionism (i) resource scarcity (i) Spain and silver (i) state capitalism (i) trade (i), (ii), (iii) capital controls (i), (ii), (iii) capital flows see cross-border capital flows capital goods (i), (ii), (iii) capitalism (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) capital markets anarchy in capital markets (i) emerging nation war-chest (i) at the end of the rainbow (i) foreign-exchange reserves (i) gold rush revisited (i) the hole in the story (i) hunt for yield (i) Japan’s currency appreciation (i) liquidity and greed (i) mispricing of Western capital markets (i) no promised land (i) role of capital markets (i) economic integration, political proliferation (i), (ii), (iii) globalization (i) indulging the US no more (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) political economy and inequalities (i), (ii), (iii) resource scarcity (i), (ii) state capitalism (i) trade (i), (ii) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii) capital mobility (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) car industry (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) carry trades (i), (ii) Catholic Church (i) Ceauşescu, Nicolae (i) Celler, Emanuel (i) central banks capital controls (i) capital flows and nation states (i) price stability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) printing money (i) Central Europe (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) Chang, Ha-Joon (i) Chelsea FC (i) Cheney, Dick (i) Chevron (i) China anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) currency (i) globalization (i), (ii) indulging the US no more (i), (ii), (iii) political economy and inequalities (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) population demographics (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) price stability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) savings (i) scarcity (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) secrets of Western success (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) state capitalism (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) trade (i), (ii), (iii) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii) China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) (i), (ii) Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) (i) choice (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) Christianity (i), (ii), (iii) Chrysler (i) Clark, Gregory (i) classical economists (i) climate change (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) coal (i) COFER (currency composition of official foreign exchange reserves) (i), (ii) Collier, Paul (i) colonialism (i), (ii), (iii) Columbus, Christopher (i), (ii) Comet jet airliner (i), (ii) Commission of the European Union (i) Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) (i) commodity prices globalization (i) income inequality (i) a post-dollar financial order (i) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) savings (i) Spain and silver (i) state capitalism (i), (ii) Common Agricultural Policy (i) communications (i), (ii), (iii) communism capital markets (i) economic integration, political proliferation (i) fall of (i) political economy and inequalities (i) population demographics (i), (ii) scarcity (i), (ii) state capitalism (i) trade (i), (ii), (iii) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii) The Communist Manifesto (Marx and Engels) (i) Communist Party (i), (ii) comparative advantage political economy and inequalities (i), (ii), (iii) trade (i), (ii), (iii) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii) computers (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) Congress of Vienna (i) Conservative Party (i) consumer prices (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) contraception (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) ‘core’ inflation (i), (ii) corruption (i), (ii) Cortés, Hernando (i), (ii) Costa Rica (i) cotton industry (i), (ii) Cour de Cassation (i) credit (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii) credit crunch anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) indulging the US no more (i), (ii) politics and economics (i), (ii), (iii) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) state capitalism (i), (ii) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii) crime (i), (ii), (iii) Crimean War (i) ‘crony capitalism’ (i) cross-border capital flows anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii) capital flows and nation states (i), (ii), (iii) comparative advantage (i) economic integration, political proliferation (i) economic models (i), (ii) globalization (i), (ii) Japan (i) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii) Cuba (i), (ii) Cultural Revolution (i), (ii), (iii) currency capital markets (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) economic integration, political proliferation (i) indulging the US no more (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) monetary union (i), (ii), (iii) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) protectionism (i) single capital market and many nations (i), (ii) state capitalism (i) current account (balance of payments) (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) current-account deficit (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) current-account surplus capital markets (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) indulging the US no more (i), (ii) resource scarcity (i) state capitalism (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) Cyprus (i) Czechoslovakia (i) Czech Republic (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) debt capital markets (i), (ii), (iii) globalization (i) indulging the US no more (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) political economy and inequalities (i) population ageing (i) price stability and economic instability (i) state capitalism (i), (ii) deflation (i), (ii), (iii) demand-management policies (i), (ii), (iii) democracy (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii) demographic deficit (i), (ii), (iii) demographic dividend (i), (ii), (iii) demographic profile (i), (ii), (iii) Deng Xiaoping (i), (ii), (iii) dependency ratios (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) Depression see Great Depression Desai, Meghnad (i) Deutsche Mark (i), (ii), (iii) developed world capital markets (i), (ii), (iii) globalization (i) political economy and inequalities (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) population demographics (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii) state capitalism (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) trade (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) diet (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) see also food diversification (i), (ii) division of labour (i) dollar see US dollar Dominican Republic (i) dot.com bubble (i), (ii) drugs (i), (ii), (iii) Dubai Ports World (DP World) (i), (ii) Dutch East India Company (i), (ii) East Asia (i), (ii) Eastern Europe capital markets (i), (ii) migration (i), (ii), (iii) scarcity (i) state capitalism (i) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii) East Germany (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) East India Company (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) Economic Consequences of the Peace (Keynes) (i), (ii), (iii) economic crisis see also Asian economic crisis anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii) economic instability (i) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii) state capitalism (i) trade (i), (ii) economic growth capital markets (i), (ii), (iii) demographic dividends and deficits (i) globalization (i), (ii), (iii) political economy and inequalities (i), (ii), (iii) a post-dollar financial order (i) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) scarcity (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) trade (i), (ii) US domestic reform (i) economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) economic models (i), (ii), (iii) economic rent (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) economics (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) economies of scale (i), (ii), (iii) The Economist (i) Ecuador (i) EdF (Électricité de France) (i), (ii) education capital markets (i) migration (i), (ii), (iii) political economy and inequalities (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) resource scarcity (i) state capitalism (i) Eichengreen, Barry (i), (ii) elderly population (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) electricity (i) Elizabeth II, Queen (i) Ellis Island (i), (ii) emerging economies anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) globalization (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) indulging the US no more (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) political economy and inequalities (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) population demographics (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) scarcity (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) secrets of Western success (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) state capitalism (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) trade (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) Western progress (i), (ii), (iii) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) ‘enabling’ resources (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) The End of History (Fukuyama) (i) energy supplies political economy and inequalities (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) politics and economics (i) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) resource scarcity (i), (ii) Russian power politics (i) Spain and silver (i) state capitalism (i), (ii), (iii) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii) Engels, Friedrich (i) England (i), (ii), (iii) English language (i) English Premier League (i), (ii), (iii) Enlightenment (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) Enron (i) Entente Cordiale (i) equities anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) population ageing (i), (ii), (iii) a post-dollar financial order (i) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) savings (i) An Essay on the Principle of Population (Malthus) (i), (ii), (iii) EU see European Union euro (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii) Europe political economy and inequalities (i), (ii) population demographics (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii) secrets of Western success (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) Spain and silver (i) state capitalism (i), (ii) trade (i), (ii) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) European Central Bank (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) European Union (EU) economic integration, political proliferation (i), (ii) migration (i), (ii), (iii) state capitalism (i) trade (i) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) exchange rates anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) income inequality (i) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) sovereign wealth funds (i) the West’s diminished status (i) exports China (i), (ii) political economy and inequalities (i) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii) state capitalism (i), (ii) trade (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) Eyser, George (i) Fannie Mae (i) Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC) (i), (ii) Federal Reserve anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii), (iii) economic integration, political proliferation (i) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii) Ferrari (i) fertility rates (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) Fidelity International (i) financial services industry (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) Finland (i) First World War (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) FOMC see Federal Open Markets Committee food political economy and inequalities (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) rent-seeking behaviour (i) resource scarcity (i), (ii) savings (i) state capitalism (i), (ii), (iii) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii), (iii) Forbes.com (i) foreign direct investment anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii) income inequality (i) population demographics (i), (ii) trade (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) foreign-exchange reserves anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) indulging the US no more (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) price stability and economic instability (i) single capital market and many nations (i) state capitalism (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) fossil fuels (i) France economic integration, political proliferation (i), (ii) indulging the US no more (i), (ii) Louisiana Purchase (i), (ii) political economy and inequalities (i), (ii) population demographics (i) state capitalism (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) trade (i) the West’s diminished status (i), (ii) Frank, Barney (i) Freddie Mac (i) freedom of speech (i), (ii) free market (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) free trade (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) Friedman, Milton (i), (ii), (iii) Friedman, Thomas (i) Fu Chengyu (i) fuel (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) Fukuyama, Francis (i) fund managers (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) G7 (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) G8 (i), (ii), (iii) G20 (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) Gagon, Joseph E.

The Internet Is Not the Answer
by Andrew Keen
Published 5 Jan 2015

Back then, with the dramatic destruction of the Wall in November, it was thought that 1989 would be remembered as a watershed year that marked the end of the Cold War and the victory of free-market liberalism. The Stanford University political scientist Francis Fukuyama, assuming that the great debate between capitalists and socialists over the best way to organize industrial society had finally been settled, described the moment that the Wall came down as the “End of History.” But the converse is actually true. Nineteen eighty-nine actually represents the birth of a new period of history, the Networked Computer Age. The Internet has created new values, new wealth, new debates, new elites, new scarcities, new markets, and above all, a new kind of economy.

…

The answer is history. It’s not just Michael Birch who has seceded from time and space. Fukuyama may have thought that history ended in 1989, but it’s that other world-historic 1989 event, Tim Berners-Lee’s invention of the World Wide Web, that has unintentionally created another, more troubling version of the end of history. “I recently took my 16-year-old daughter Adele to see a section of the Berlin Wall that has been preserved as part of a museum devoted to the division of the city, Germany and Europe. It was a bright Berlin morning,” writes the New York Times columnist Roger Cohen about revisiting the divided Berlin of Erich Mielke and the Stasi.

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“The point is that a fundamental aspect of human life—memory—is being altered by the digital revolution,” Freedland warns.20 The savage irony is that the more accurately the Internet remembers everything, the more our memories atrophy. The result is an amnesia about everything except the immediate, the instant, the now, and the me. It’s the end of history as a shared communal memory, the end of our collective engagement with the past and the future. “Once we had a nostalgia for the future,” warns Mark Lilla. “Today we have an amnesia for the present.”21 “The libertarian age,” Lilla argues, “is an illegible age.”22 But this isn’t quite right, either.

Toast
by Stross, Charles
Published 1 Jan 2002

Historian Eric Hobsbawm dated it as running from June 28th, 1914 (when the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria was assassinated by Gavrilo Princip, raising the curtain on the First World War) until December 25th, 1991 (when Mikhail Gorbachev formally dissolved the Soviet Union). But that diagnosis was carried out in the 1990s, back when it was possible for conservative political analyst Francis Fukuyama to publish a book titled The End of History without being laughed out of town and pelted with rotten fruit. It is seductively tempting in 2005 to say that the 20th century really ended on September 11th, 2001, with an iconic act of violence that may well lead to long-term consequences as horrific as the start of the First World War.

…

“Once we quantized time, we tied our work to the clock; and now that the work is automated, so is the ticking. We are a short-sighted species. That there was a quarter of a trillion lines of bad software out there seven years ago is no surprise. That such a quantity has been halved to date is good news, but not quite adequate. We have, in a very real way, invented our own end of history: a software apocalypse that in the day ahead will engulf banks, businesses, government agencies, and anyone who runs a large, monolithic, database that is more than perhaps ten years old. Let us hope for the future that the consequences are not too serious—and that the lesson will be learned for good by those who for so long have ignored us.”

The Socialist Manifesto: The Case for Radical Politics in an Era of Extreme Inequality
by Bhaskar Sunkara
Published 1 Feb 2019

And while we defend newly won gains, we must fight to avoid the crippling bureaucratization that pushed the great social-democratic movements of the early twentieth century into a self-defeating accommodation with the system. It won’t be easy, but we still have a world to win. TEN STAY FLY IN RECENT DECADES, socialism has been challenged from all directions. The influential German sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf was right when he wrote that Francis Fukuyama’s proclamation of “liberal democracy as the final form of human government” was “a caricature of a serious argument,” but he agreed with its core premise: “socialism is dead, and none of its variants can be revived for a world awakening from the double nightmare of Stalinism and Brezhnevism.” From the Left, Andre Gorz echoed that sentiment: “As a system, socialism is dead.

…

They spent their energy writing detailed blueprints for the future but had no strategy to realize them besides the goodwill of elites. What’s more, they suffered from a profoundly antidemocratic sensibility. Marx believed that socialism came from the struggles of workers, not the plans of a few intellectuals. In The German Ideology, Marx did describe an “end of history”: communism. He wrote of a world without states and with class divisions overcome, in which “society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic.”

…

At the very least, socialism of other stripes seemed to offer the only way out of underdevelopment for the formerly colonized world and welfare-state prosperity for the former colonizers. Socialist confidence was destroyed over the course of the 1980s. By the early ’90s, the Marxist theory of history was stood on its head: proponents of capitalism were confident that their own “end of history” had been reached. If you could even find Marx outside of university classrooms (where he was increasingly presented as a humanist philosopher instead of a revolutionary firebrand), it was on Wall Street, where cheeky traders put down Sun Tzu and heralded the long-dead German as a prophet of globalization.

The Complacent Class: The Self-Defeating Quest for the American Dream
by Tyler Cowen
Published 27 Feb 2017

As overall social and economic dynamism declines and various forms of lock-in increase, it becomes harder to finance and maintain the superstructure that keeps stability and all of its comforts in place. The most talented of the middle rise to the top, while a lot of other forms of mobility slow down and congeal, thereby heralding the loss of dynamism and, eventually, control. And so the complacent class is but a phase in American life, rather than Francis Fukuyama’s much-heralded “End of History.” Still, for whatever cracks may be showing in the edifice, the complacent class defines our current day, even though we are starting to see parts of it crumble before our eyes. One of the great ironies of the situation is that those most likely to complain about the complacent class are themselves the prime and often most influential members of that class themselves, namely what I call the privileged class.

1989 The Berlin Wall: My Part in Its Downfall
by Peter Millar
Published 1 Oct 2009

But it didn’t half feel good. * See also Peter Millar’s All Gone to Look for America: Riding the Iron Horse Across a Continent and Back. London: Arcadia Books, 2008 12 Brave New World And with that, history came to an end. I wish. American political philosopher Francis Fukuyama’s celebrated 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man, arguing that the collapse of communism spelled the global triumph of Western liberal democracy could not have been more wrong. In early 1990, I described the tumultuous events of the previous year as a wave of revolutions that had finally ended a seventy-five-year European civil war.

How Much Is Enough?: Money and the Good Life
by Robert Skidelsky and Edward Skidelsky
Published 18 Jun 2012

In all ages, we find groups of “peers” or “equals” respecting each other while looking down on everyone else. The citizenry of ancient Athens was one such group, as was the medieval nobility. Modern democracy extends the circle of peers to all adults in a given territory. Whether or not its triumph is guaranteed by History, as Francis Fukuyama has claimed, it now has the support of almost all the world, at least on paper. No modern vision of the good life can be such as to thwart it. This rules out, as we noted in Chapter 3, values such as mastery and “greatness of soul,” which cannot in principle be universalized. Respect has many sources, varying from culture to culture.

…

The Book of Revelation, source of so much poetry and madness, prophesies a “new heaven and a new earth,” in which “there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain: for the former things are passed away.” The millenarian seed lies deep in the Christian consciousness, ready to sprout forth lusciously in times of hardship or turmoil. But mainstream Christianity has kept a wary distance from it. St. Augustine, a former Platonist, positioned his “city of God” not at the end of history but outside time altogether, abandoning the “city of man” to its old cyclical fate. Sacred history was thus sharply distinguished from mundane, secular history. However, the potential for intermingling was always there. Joachim of Flora, a twelfth-century mystic, developed an ingenious theory of human history based on the three persons of the Trinity.

The Dark Net
by Jamie Bartlett
Published 20 Aug 2014

But his ultimate vision is for us to return to what we once were, thousands of years ago: roaming groups of hunter-gatherers. ‘I accept, of course,’ says Zerzan, ‘this is going to be rather difficult to achieve.’ Zerzan’s solutions are pretty extreme. But it’s not just anarcho-primitivists who are worried by a transhumanist future of boundless possibilities. Francis Fukuyama, the prominent economist who coined the expression ‘the end of history’ to pronounce the victory of the capitalist system, has declared transhumanism the ‘most dangerous idea of the twenty-first century’. That’s probably a little unfair. One of the stated aims of Humanity+ is to think through the ethical, legal and social implications of dramatic technological change.

Less Is More: How Degrowth Will Save the World
by Jason Hickel
Published 12 Aug 2020

Reagan beat Carter in a landslide. During the decade that followed, with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the euphoria around the globalisation of American-style consumerism, Limits to Growth was more or less forgotten. Its warnings were cast aside in favour of the consensus celebrated by Francis Fukuyama in his 1992 book The End of History: free-market capitalism was the only game in town, and it seemed for all the world that it was going to last for ever. * But then something changed. With the global financial crisis of 2008 the party came crashing to an end. People’s faith in the limitless magic of the free market and the universal promise of the American Dream was shaken to its core.

Restarting the Future: How to Fix the Intangible Economy
by Jonathan Haskel and Stian Westlake
Published 4 Apr 2022

Debt also keeps cognitive load low (in periods of no crisis), and so the returns to new financial innovation that will enable intangibles to be securitised will help. Finally, we saw that one institution is fit for purpose throughout the ages and over all the dimensions of exchange: trust and reciprocity. The long-run determinants of this institution are a source of ongoing debate; see, for example, the work of Francis Fukuyama and Robert Putnam.18 In the meantime, the software industry has developed tools, practices, and working norms that make it perhaps the most remote-work-friendly high-skilled job. Perhaps people who grew up playing online video games or socialising and dating over smartphones have developed ways of communicating at a distance that replicate much of the emotional and psychological quality of face-to-face interactions.

…

In 1968, computer scientist Douglas Engelbart demonstrated videoconferencing and simultaneous collaborative document editing.16 Three decades later, the journalist Frances Cairncross coined the term “the death of distance” to describe a world in which these technologies would free the economy from the vulgar constraints of place.17 At the beginning of 2020, place remained at least as important as ever: to the extent that people invoked the death of distance, they did so as an example of the naive optimism of yesteryear, alongside flying cars, the paperless office, and the end of history. COVID-19 offered a new hope for remote working. With nearly half of all workers forced to stay at home in many countries, firms were faced with a compulsory experiment. Many workers and some employers found that remote working was not as bad as they thought. Few people missed their commute, people learned to use videoconferencing and collaboration software, and many businesses that would have never considered a wholesale move to remote working found that it was possible to do business without everyone in the office.

Net Zero: How We Stop Causing Climate Change
by Dieter Helm
Published 2 Sep 2020

For climate change and a carbon cartel, it is the medium and long term that count, and despite all the claims to the contrary, the UN’s carbon cartel has fallen flat. That is why emissions keep going up. The appeal to universal interests The initial cheerleader for what became the Kyoto Protocol was the US, and Bill Clinton in particular. In the heady days after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the zeitgeist was captured by Francis Fukuyama’s bestseller, The End of History and the Last Man.[3] The theme of the book is the recognition that, after trying almost everything else, including socialism, the rational enlightenment had produced its final end-product: liberal democracy. All nations would eventually converge on this model. Politics is a rational business, and to the extent that people are organised into nations, they would all come to share the democratic model, with markets to allocate most resources.

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As people got richer, because liberal markets worked, they would lend their support to the liberal model. They would not, it was easily assumed, act parochially and nationalistically, as the old nationalisms of the past withered away. There would be no Donald Trumps, Vladimir Putins and Xi Jinpings, and no Marine Le Pens or Viktor Orbáns. Behind this end-of-history thesis lay a deeper intellectual idea, one that was instrumental in the very creation of the UN. It was that rationalism would prevail, with a universal appreciation of the rights of all people, wherever and whenever they lived. It would find its expression in Nicholas Stern’s The Economics of Climate Change.[4] Stern is a utilitarian who cannot see why we should discriminate between current and future people.

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See Barrett, S., Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-making. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005; and Victor, D. G., Global Warming Gridlock: Creating More Effective Strategies for Protecting the Planet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Back to text 3. Fukuyama, F., The End of History and the Last Man. Hamondsworth, Penguin, 1989. Back to text 4. Stern, N., The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review, HM Treasury. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, January 2007. Back to text 5. For an analysis, see Baltensperger, M. and Dadush, U., ‘The European Union–Mercosur Free Trade Agreement: Prospects and risks’, Policy Contribution, 11 September 2019, https://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/PC-11_2019.pdf.

We Need New Stories: Challenging the Toxic Myths Behind Our Age of Discontent
by Nesrine Malik
Published 4 Sep 2019

And it is something which the right, the centre and the left agree on because identity is so subjective – you cannot hold on to it, you cannot achieve traction with it, it is too atomised for an ideology, whether that ideology is nationalism or socialism. You can see this frustration in the works of thinkers who have come to the identity debate. Francis Fukuyama, in 2018, pines for a time when the nation state was the unit of identity, in his book Identity: Contemporary Identity Politics and the Struggle for Recognition. Philosopher Kwame Appiah, in the 2018 book The Lies That Bind, thinks identity is ‘imagined’. Unable to conceive of coalitions of inequality as the way forward, people reach for universal values that are not relevant when people are disenfranchised.

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(Prospect, 20 February 2004), https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/too-diverse-david-goodhart-multiculturalism-britain-immigration-globalisation [accessed on 25 July 2019] 235 ‘uncritical channelling of black anger’: David Goodhart (Twitter, 1:29 p.m., 12 May 2018), https://twitter.com/david_goodhart/status/995279834753495040 [accessed on 25 July 2019] 235 ‘racial grievance outburst’: David Goodhart (Twitter, 4:42 p.m., 12 May 2018), https://twitter.com/David_Goodhart/status/995328243065675776?s=20 [accessed on 25 July 2019] 235 ‘the nihilistic grievance culture’: David Goodhart, ‘The riots at the end of history’ (Prospect, 9 August 2011), http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2011/08/the-riots-at-the-end-of-history/ [accessed on 25 July 2019] 235 ‘How does it help black inner city youth’: David Goodhart (Twitter, 2:52 p.m., 13 May 2018), https://twitter.com/David_Goodhart/status/995663062433783808?s=20 [accessed on 25 July 2019] 235 ‘Windrush would have been less likely’: David Goodhart (Twitter, 3:19 p.m., 13 May 2018), https://twitter.com/David_Goodhart/status/995669746619207680?

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(Prospect, 20 February 2004), https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/too-diverse-david-goodhart-multiculturalism-britain-immigration-globalisation [accessed on 25 July 2019] 237 ‘will not get a job if you don’t give a shit’: David Goodhart, ‘The riots at the end of history’ (Prospect, 9 August 2011), http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2011/08/the-riots-at-the-end-of-history/ [accessed on 25 July 2019] 237 ‘… a “metropolitan” fixation’: David Goodhart (Twitter, 4:12 p.m., 5 November 2017), https://twitter.com/David_Goodhart/status/927207074278313984 [accessed on 25 July 2019] 239 ‘… the British media is 95 per cent white’: Neil Thurnan, ‘Does British Journalism Have a Diversity Problem?’

The Vanishing Neighbor: The Transformation of American Community
by Marc J. Dunkelman
Published 3 Aug 2014

The disparity is particularly harrowing for anyone who has recently returned from China, where many of the airports gleam.19 The United States devotes only 2 percent of its annual GDP to infrastructure investment—less than half of what Europe spends, and a mere sixth of China’s equivalent investment.20 Nevertheless, it’s not entirely clear how we would finance an explosion of new building: though some dispute whether the nation’s budget is really in such dire need of rebalance, a country whose deficit is out of control seems a lousy candidate for the next New Deal.21 No one can doubt that many of the institutions that were once uniquely American—or, at least, creatures of the West—have recently been adopted elsewhere around the world. It’s been more than two decades since Francis Fukuyama published The End of History, arguing that free-market democracy had finally vanquished its competitors as the prescription for societal success.22 Whether or not you bought into Fukuyama’s thesis—even if you believe, as some do, that history has “returned”—what’s undeniable is that many of the rhythms that propelled American preeminence have been adopted elsewhere.

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Norton, 2009), 211–12. 16Niall Ferguson, Civilization: The West and the Rest (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), 12. 17Binyamin Appelbaum and Robert Gebeloff, “Even Critics of Safety Net Increasingly Depend on It,” New York Times, February 12, 2012. 18Martin Wolf, ”How Austerity Has Failed,” New York Review of Books, July 11, 2013. 19Friedman and Mandelbaum, That Used to Be Us. 20Paul Weinstein Jr., “Cut to Invest: Establish a ‘Cut-to-Invest Commission’ to Reduce Low-Priority Spending, Consolidate Duplicative Programs, and Increase High-Priority Investments,” Brookings Institute, November 2012. 21http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/11/opinion/krugman-dwindling-deficit-disorder.html. 22Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 2006). 23Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism (New York: W. W. Norton, 1996). 24Lipset, American Exceptionalism, 54, 81–83. 25The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, November 15, 2012. 26Emma Lazarus, “The New Colossus,” http://www.libertystatepark.com/emma.htm. 27Edmund Burke, Reflections on the French Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: The Harvard Classics, 1909–14). 28Thomas Bender, Community and Social Change in America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978). 29Gordon S.

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(Eisenhower administration), 14, 51, 58, 65, 100, 190 elderly people, 196–211 independence of, 197, 203, 207, 208–9 elections, U.S., 15, 50, 56, 187, 190 Chinatown Bus effect and, 47 gerrymandering and, xvi, 182–87, 189 of 2012, 7, 37–38, 184–85 Elks Lodges, 44, 116 e-mail, xi, 8, 109–10, 125, 145 End of History, The (Fukuyama), 230–31 England, xii, 81, 82, 157, 158, 166–67, 179, 194 entrepreneurialism, 82, 164 ethnicity, 32, 79, 147, 148, 231, 237 ethnic tensions, 4, 39 Europe, 81, 226, 230, 232 evangelism, 42, 71 evolution, 90–91 expectations, 30, 60, 70–71, 82 Facebook, 37–38, 45, 48, 108, 114, 124–25, 140, 145, 148–49, 152, 190, 194, 219 faith, loss of, xv, xvii, xviii, 14, 181–82, 193, 195 family, 70, 119, 125, 129, 139, 194 affirmation and, 104–7 extended (traditional), 12, 15, 16, 26–27, 68, 97, 106 health care and, 201, 210 income inequality and, 21–22 nuclear, 16, 26, 32, 84, 145 in Saturn model, 95, 96 single-parent, 26, 30–31, 43, 105, 216 Farmer, Paul, 64 fathers, 12, 106, 131 of author, 132–33, 134, 240 fax machines, 16, 35, 74 fear, 71, 84, 119, 128, 157, 233, 235 of hitchhiking, 133, 134, 135 homosexuality and, 42 quality of life and, 50–52, 55–57, 60 Federal Express, 147–48 Ferguson, Niall, 229 Fiddler on the Roof (musical), 69–70 filibuster, xvi, 182, 185, 188, 191, 248n Filter Bubble, The (Pariser), 37 Fiorina, Morris, 139 First Wave society, 16, 20, 31–32, 233 Fischer, Claude, 87, 88, 105, 106, 128–29, 237–38 Fishkin, James, 192–93 Florida, Richard, 83, 175 food, 51, 58, 62, 79, 136–37, 202 brain and, 90–91 see also agriculture Ford, Gerald, 47 Fortune, 4–5, 14 Fowler, James, 96 Fox News, 184, 187–88 France, 80 Franklin, Rosalind, 161 Freakonomics (Levitt and Dubner), 7, 133–34 freedom, 25, 26, 43, 49, 52, 60, 67, 82, 102, 161, 207 French and Indian War, 157 Friedman, Thomas, xiv, 17–21, 24, 141–42, 151–52, 240 friends, 8, 12, 24, 25, 91, 95, 99–100, 101, 119, 120, 122, 124, 152, 194 affirmation from, 102–3, 104, 107, 110, 111 agreement of, 148–49 health care and, 201, 210 Fukuyama, Francis, 230–31 Galbraith, John Kenneth, 52 Gans, Herbert, 144–45 Gates, Bill, 10 gay marriage, 42, 50, 69 GDP (gross domestic product), 17, 53, 99, 180, 198, 227, 230 gemeinschaft, 86 General Social Survey, 105, 119–20, 260n–61n generational succession, 135 genetics, 160–62 genius, 159, 160, 162 Genovese, Kitty, 84–85 Georgetown University, 118 gerrymandering, xvi, 182–87, 189 ghettos, 128 Gingrich, Newt, 14, 15 Gini coefficient, 22, 23 Girls (TV show), 30 Gladwell, Malcolm, 6, 91–92 globalization, 17–18, 20, 50, 138, 141, 152, 221 global village, 16, 142–43 Google, 37, 194 government, U.S., xii–xviii, 52, 67, 200, 234 dysfunction of, 181–90 French government compared with, 80 health care and, 201–5 public frustration with, xiv–xvii, 181–83, 195 urban decay and, 127 Graduate, The (movie), 4, 28, 30, 248n Granovetter, Mark, 168–69, 266n Great Depression, 60, 68, 85, 202–6, 210, 226 Greatest Generation, 51, 70 Great Migration, 40–41, 43, 137 Great Recession, xv, 54, 55, 62, 106 Great Society, 210, 255n Gresens, Mr., 220–22, 225 grit, 5, 6, 216–25 Grove, Andy, 10 Guest, Avery, 118 Gutenberg, Johann, 162 “habits of the heart,” 81, 89, 115, 138, 258n Habits of the Heart (Bellah), 65–66, 141, 258n Hampton, Keith, 118–19 Harlem Children’s Zone (HCZ), 222, 224 health, health care, 101, 197–211 costs of, 198–200, 204–5, 206, 209–10 public, 197, 199, 204 quality of life and, 31, 51, 52, 57–60, 204 Hearst, William Randolph, 188 heart attack, 58, 200, 207 Heckman, James, 223 helicopter parent, 106 Henry, Peter Blair, 179–81 history, 51, 59, 67, 68, 230–34 affirmation and, 109, 110 of American community, 79–89 Dunbar’s number and, 94 Tofflers’ view of, 15–16 hitchhiking, 132–35 Hoffman, Dustin, 28 homogeneity, 46–47, 135, 147–48, 189, 191 homophobia, 42, 43, 51 homosexuality, 42–43, 87, 88 hospitals, 197, 199–204, 206–7 House of Representatives, U.S., xvi, 182, 184–85, 186 Hout, Mike, 237–38 Hughes, Charles Evans, 187 Hunter, James Davison, 69 hunter-gatherers, 16, 92, 142, 144–45 Hussein, Saddam, 67 Hutterites, 94 identity, 20, 42, 74, 130, 146 immigrants, 79, 82–83, 88, 232 income, xv, 21, 147, 180, 216, 227 discretionary, 55 inequality and, 21–24, 31 national, 21–22, 54 online communities and, 250n working women and, 27, 28 independence, 28–29, 30, 52, 57, 60, 106, 138, 151 of elderly, 197, 203, 207, 208–9 individualism, 65–66, 73, 74, 102 networked, 111 industrial paradigm, 14–15, 26, 82, 84–87, 170–71, 233 Industrial Revolution, xiii, 4, 16, 85, 86, 127, 138, 166, 201 inequality, economic, 21–24, 26, 31 information, 6–8, 18, 21, 26, 138, 260n brought together in a new way, 159–66, 209 Chinatown bus effect and, 35–38 information technology, 13, 16, 125, 141–43, 187, 209 affirmation and, 103–4, 108, 109–10 online communities and, 114–15 infrastructure, xiv, xv, xvi, 11, 25, 45, 194, 236 decay of, 229, 230 health, 200–201, 203–4, 206, 210 Inglehart, Ronald, 67–69, 73 inner directedness, 5–7 inner-ring relationships, see intimate relationships innovation, xiii, xvii, xviii, 158–75, 209 intellectual cross-fertilization, 158–68 interdependence, 17, 85–86 intermarriage: educational, 43–44 racial, 68 Internet, 10, 18, 36, 37, 121, 125, 146, 250n interracial marriage, 68 intimate relationships (inner-ring relationships), 92, 93, 96, 119–20, 137, 138–39, 145, 238 affirmation and, 103–7, 110, 112, 115 Chinatown Bus effect and, 42–46 health care and, 201, 204, 210 see also marriage iPhones, 160, 231 Iraq, 67 isolation: intellectual, 176 social, 73, 87, 113, 115, 118–19, 122, 127, 149, 207 Issacson, Walter, 164 Italy, 17, 163 It Gets Better Project, 43 Jackson, Kenneth, 40 Jacobs, Jane, 85–88, 127, 166–68, 170, 176 Jamaica, 179–81, 191 James, LeBron, 8–9 Japan, 226, 233 Jews, Orthodox, 98–99 jobs, 18–20, 23, 24, 27, 29, 30, 131, 139, 170–71, 235–36, 260n–61n affirmation and, 104–5, 107 assembly line, 53, 85 exporting of, 197–98 service, 18–19, 53, 132, 138, 236 Jobs, Steve, 10, 64, 160, 164–65 Johansson, Frans, 163, 168, 172 Johnson, Lyndon B., 127, 187, 210 Johnson, Steven, 159 Kahneman, Daniel, 13 Kelling, George, 150 Kelly, Mervin, 164 Kennedy, Robert, 206 Kenner, Edward, 158, 159 Kentucky, 147–48 Kerry, John, 47 Keynes, John Maynard, 53 Khrushchev, Nikita, 56 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 24, 46, 108–9, 128, 238 King, Stephen, 123 Kiwanis Club, 44, 45, 116 “Knowledge Is Power Program” (KIPP), 222, 223, 224 Koestler, Arthur, 158–60, 162, 166 Krebs cycle, 220–22 Ku Klux Klan, 111, 146 labor, labor unions, 14, 19, 20, 23, 53, 180, 181 leadership, xv, xvii, 23, 101, 108–9, 182, 186, 191 Leave It to Beaver (TV show), 34–35, 51 legislative districts, manipulation of (gerrymandering), xvi, 182–86, 189 Lehigh Valley, 170, 171 leisure, 53, 104–5, 139 Levin, David, 223 Levitt, Steven, 133–34 Lexus and the Olive Tree, The (Friedman), 141, 151–52 LGBT rights, 24, 42–43 libraries, 18, 36, 37 lifespan, longevity, 17, 31, 57–60, 62, 199, 204–5 Lincoln, Abraham, 228 Ling, Richard, 122–23 Lipset, Seymour Martin, 231 LISTSERVs, 114, 151 Little House on the Prairie (TV show), xii, 247n lobbyists, 183, 187, 229 Locke, Richard, 165, 172 Lonely Crowd, The (Riesman), 5–6, 7, 65, 141 Loose Connections (Wuthnow), 239 Lorain, Ohio, 79–80, 135 “lord of the manor” community, xii–xiii, 81 Lowery, Rev.

The Age of Stagnation: Why Perpetual Growth Is Unattainable and the Global Economy Is in Peril
by Satyajit Das
Published 9 Feb 2016

A utopian future of endless expansion beckoned, where the economy doubled every dozen years, bringing prosperity to billions. Growth would help resolve poverty and political tensions, without damaging the environment.5 The power and mobility of capital, free trade, and a globally integrated economy were now articles of faith. Political scientist Francis Fukuyama, in his 1992 book The End of History and the Last Man, made the case for the triumph of Western liberal democracy and market systems as the end point of ideological evolution. In reality, though, the period was punctuated by a series of rolling bubbles and crises: the 1987 stock market crash, the 1990 collapse of the junk bond market, the 1994 great bond market massacre, the 1994 Tequila economic crisis in Mexico, the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the 1998 collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management, the 1998 default of Russia, and the 2000 dot-com crash.

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In his book about the period, Greenspan proudly quoted an economist's assessment of his policy: “The housing boom saved the economy…. Americans went on a real estate orgy. [They] traded up, tore down, and added on.”6 It was to end, of course, in disaster. In 2008, in a deliberate rejoinder to The End of History, Robert Kagan titled his new book The Return of History and the End of Dreams, an appropriate description of the events that unfolded. The financial crisis in the US subprime mortgage market commenced in 2007. It spawned jokes about loans made to NINJAs (no income, no job or asset), NINAs (no income, no asset), and to unemployed men in string vests buying houses with no money.

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In stage seven, people disassociate themselves from the idea, becoming embarrassed to refer to it directly. In stage eight, it becomes fashionable to admit that you never read the book in the first place. In stage nine, the book is moved from its prominent place in the library or living room to the guest toilet, joining other such notable works as A Brief History of Time, The End of History, The Black Swan, and The Tipping Point. There may be an additional stage when the author and the book are subsequently rediscovered, usually posthumously, and undergo a revival. But inequality remains a serious issue, constraining economic recovery and improvements in living standards globally.

Milton Friedman: A Biography
by Lanny Ebenstein
Published 23 Jan 2007

Everyone, everywhere, now understands that the road to success for underdeveloped countries is freer markets and globalization. Interviewer: In the end, your ideas have triumphed over Marx and Keynes. Is this, then, the end of the road for economic thought? Is there anything more to say than free markets are the most efficient way to organize a society? Is it the “end of history,” as Francis Fukuyama put it? Friedman: Oh no. “Free markets” is a very general term. There are all sorts of problems that will emerge. Free markets work best when the transaction between two individuals affects only those individuals. But that isn’t the fact. The fact is that, most often, a transaction between you and me affects a third party.

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The fact is that, most often, a transaction between you and me affects a third party. That is the source of all problems for government. That is the source of all pollution problems, of the inequality problem. There are some good economists like Gary Becker and Bob Lucas who are working on these issues. This reality ensures the end of history will never come. Many books and articles have been written on Friedman over the decades. J. Daniel Hammond, Theory and Measurement: Causality Issues in Milton Friedman’s Monetary Economics (Cambridge University Press, 1996), is a detailed study of Friedman’s monetary views from the perspective of causality.

Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work
by Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams
Published 1 Oct 2015

For a contemporary updating, see the Laboria Cuboniks manifesto in Helen Hester and Armen Avanessian, eds, Dea Ex Machina (Berlin: Merve Verlag, 2015). 69.Benedict Singleton, ‘Maximum Jailbreak’, in Mackay and Avanessian, #Accelerate. 70.Alfred Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx (London: Verso, 2014), pp. 144–5. 71.Sadie Plant, ‘Binary Sexes, Binary Codes’, 3 June 1996, at future-nonstop.org. 72.Reza Negarestani, ‘The Labor of the Inhuman’, in Mackay and Avanessian, #Accelerate, 452. 73.Ibid., p. 438. 74.For examples of these parochial defences, see Jürgen Habermas, The Future of Human Nature (Cambridge: Polity, 2003); Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (London: Profile, 2003). 75.For two fascinating accounts of bodily experimentation, see Shannon Bell, Fast Feminism (New York: Autonomedia, 2010); and Beatriz Preciado, Testo Junkie: Sex, Drugs and Biopolitics in the Pharmacopornographic Era (New York: Feminist Press CUNY, 2013). 76.The remainder of this book will be concerned mostly with the first two aspects of synthetic freedom: the basic conditions of existence, and the collective capacities to act.

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Triumph in the political battles to achieve it will require organising a broadly populist left, building the organisational ecosystem necessary for a full-spectrum politics on multiple fronts, and leveraging key points of power wherever possible. Yet the end of work would not be the end of history. Building a platform for a post-work society would be an immense accomplishment, but it would still only be a beginning.1 This is why conceiving of left politics as a politics of modernity is so crucial: because it requires that we not confuse a post-work society – or indeed any society – with the end of history. Universalism always undoes itself, possessing its own resources for an immanent critique that insists and expands upon its ideals. No particular social formation is sufficient to satisfy its conceptual and political demands.

Hiding in Plain Sight: The Invention of Donald Trump and the Erosion of America
by Sarah Kendzior
Published 6 Apr 2020

This was the era after the Iran-Contra criminals were sentenced but before future Trump attorney general William Barr helped pardon them; when the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union soon followed; when dissidents like Nelson Mandela, Lech Walesa, and Václav Havel went from prisons to presidencies; when America had a war and a recession and both of them came to a seemingly definitive end. This was an actual era of hope and change, and it did not last long. At the time, I was too young to appreciate the novelty of this reversal of fortune—or to appreciate that political and economic fortunes could be reversed at all. I took global shifts in stride like a preteen Francis Fukuyama, lumping “the USSR” in with “gangster rap” in the category of “things only adults are dumb enough to fear.” My parents had been ridiculous to hide under their desks in the 1950s and 1960s, I thought, waiting for bombs that never dropped and invaders that never came. My main resource on the end of the Cold War may have been the Scorpions’ “Wind of Change” video, but my casual conviction that America was indomitable put me in the mainstream.

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Throughout the early 1990s, public intellectuals proclaimed that American-style democracy and capitalism had begun their ceaseless triumph across the globe. Peace and prosperity were not mere aspirations, but the permanent condition of the new world order. The contention that we were on a brand-new geopolitical path, free from age-old travails, was discussed in bestsellers like Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man. This idea reflected the doctrine of American exceptionalism that post–Cold War US presidents pushed citizens to embrace. The rest of the world had to fall in line with America because America no longer had a rival of equal might—a position US officials marketed as civic-minded benevolence rather than de facto domination.

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For your reference, the terms that appear in the print index are listed below. Abramovich, Roman academia Access Hollywood tape Acosta, Alexander Afghanistan Agalarov family Ailes, Roger Akin, Todd Allen, Woody al-Qaeda “alternative facts” American exceptionalism danger of definition of and The End of History and the Last Man (Fukuyama) illusion of and normalcy bias Andrew, Prince, Duke of York Apprentice, The Arab Spring Arendt, Hannah Arif, Tevfik Arpaio, Joe Assange, Julian authoritarianism adult children of authoritarian leaders American authoritarianism asylum seekers from and conspiracy narratives and digital media and fear in former Soviet republics in Hungary and the judiciary and kinship rivalries networked authoritarianism and pageantry of branding and protest scholars of and Trump, Donald and voice of individual conscience See also autocracy; dictatorship autocracy abdication of vigilance as bedrock of and The Apprentice autocratic consolidation and black Americans and climate change definition of expecting versus accepting and hope in Hungary international axis of autocrats and Karimov, Islam and kleptocracy in Kyrgyzstan and loss of sense of time and nepotism predictability of and propaganda and the Republican Party in Russia state recovery from and technological change traits and warning signs transition to and transnational criminal networks and Trump, Donald and writers See also authoritarianism; dictatorship Bannon, Steve Baquet, Dean Barak, Ehud Barr, Donald Barr, William Barrett, Wayne “battleground states” Bayrock Group Ben-Menashe, Ari Bezos, Jeff Biegun, Stephen “Big Lie” (Third Reich technique) Billy Bush Principle bin Laden, Osama Black, Charles Black Lives Matter Blavatnik, Len Bloom, Lisa Bloomberg, Michael Blunt, Matt Blunt, Roy Bogatin, David Bogatin, Jacob “both-sidesing” Bouazizi, Mohamed Boyle, Matthew Breitbart (website) Breitbart, Andrew Browder, Bill Brown, Julie K.

Ground Control: Fear and Happiness in the Twenty First Century City
by Anna Minton
Published 24 Jun 2009

Once the largest port in the world, Docklands was reduced to a largely derelict wasteland, bereft of its economic base and identity. Tens of thousands of jobs were lost, factories were abandoned and the riverfront was crumbling. In 1989, as the Cold War came to an end and the political economist Francis Fukuyama declared ‘the end of history’, Canary Wharf, the emblem of Thatcher’s free-market revolution, was going up. The foundations of the landmark tower, One Canada Square, the tallest building in Britain, were laid at the height of the 1980s’ boom. It followed the deregulation of the financial markets, which was the catalyst for the exponential growth of the global financial services industry in Britain.

The Year That Changed the World: The Untold Story Behind the Fall of the Berlin Wall
by Michael Meyer
Published 7 Sep 2009

For them, the revolutions of 1989 became the foundation of a new post–Cold War weltanschauung: the idea that all totalitarian regimes are similarly hollow at the core and will crumble with a shove from the outside. If its symbol is the Berlin Wall, coming down as Ronald Reagan famously bid it to do in a speech in Berlin in 1987, the operational model was Nicolae Ceausescu’s Romania. “Once the wicked witch was dead,” as Francis Fukuyama, the eminent political economist, has put it, “the munchkins would rise up and start singing joyously about their liberation.” It is true that instead of seeking to contain the former Soviet Union, as previous administrations had done, the United States under Ronald Reagan chose to confront it.

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In it, he warned of the dangers of “mismemory” or, worse, the deliberate rewriting of memory (not unlike the onetime overlords of the Soviet empire) to shape the future. “In the wake of 1989,” he said, “with boundless confidence and insufficient reflection, we put the twentieth century behind us and strode boldly into its successor swaddled in self-serving half-truths: the triumph of the West, the end of History, the unipolar American moment.” If there is a real enemy, he concluded, it is less the rogues’ gallery of Washington’s “bad guys” than America’s ignorance of itself and the past—a prescription, according to Judt, for self-defeat. America will sort out its troubles. The country does that well, better than most others.

The Future Is Analog: How to Create a More Human World
by David Sax
Published 15 Jan 2022

His supporters loved him because of this. He “wasn’t afraid to fight” and took to social media as they often did, to share every thought without shame or hesitation. “Democracy is really about a conversation in which people deliberate, express views, and come to a consensus,” said Francis Fukuyama, the famed political scientist and author of books such as The End of History and the Last Man. “Digital technology undermined our ability to have that public conversation because it undermined the authorities of institutions that shaped that conversation”—news media, publishers, political parties, universities—“and replaced it with a cacophony of voices that aren’t democratic, they’re nihilistic.

The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty
by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson
Published 23 Sep 2019

Gaining rights was a consequence of their organization and empowerment. The story of women’s liberation isn’t unique or exceptional. Liberty almost always depends on society’s mobilization and ability to hold its own against the state and its elites. Chapter 1 HOW DOES HISTORY END? A Coming Anarchy? In 1989, Francis Fukuyama predicted the “end of history,” with all countries converging to the political and economic institutions of the United States, what he called “an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism.” Just five years later Robert Kaplan painted a radically different picture of the future in his article “The Coming Anarchy.”

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The 2018 UAE Gender Equality Awards, https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2019/jan/28/uae-mocked-for-gender-equality-awards-won-entirely-by-men. See Holton (2003) for the women’s suffrage movement in Britain and the empowerment of women and the facts we use. CHAPTER 1. HOW DOES HISTORY END? The contrasting arguments made by Francis Fukuyama, Robert Kaplan, and Yuval Noah Harari are presented in Fukuyama (1989), Kaplan (1994), and Harari (2018). We quote from Fukuyama (1989, 3), and Kaplan (1994, 46). The text of the 2005 Constitution of the DRC can be found at http://www.parliament.am/library/sahmanadrutyunner/kongo.pdf. A useful overview of the rebel groups of the Eastern DRC is provided by the BBC: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-20586792.

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It is, and repression and dominance are as much in its DNA as they are in the DNA of the Despotic Leviathan. But the shackles prevent it from rearing its fearsome face. How those shackles emerge, and why only some societies have managed to develop them, is the major theme of our book. Diversity, Not the End of History Liberty has been rare in human history. Many societies have not developed any centralized authority capable of enforcing laws, resolving conflicts peacefully, and protecting the weak against the strong. Instead they have often imposed a cage of norms on people, with similarly dire consequences for liberty.

Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State
by Paul Tucker
Published 21 Apr 2018

And having become, by doctrine, inclination, and expertise, overly detached from the system’s stability, there was nothing short of a reawakening among central banks to the significance of most monetary liabilities being issued by private businesses (banks). Inflation targeting had no more heralded the End of Monetary History than, twenty years earlier, the collapse of the Berlin Wall had marked the End of History (as Francis Fukuyama had wondered in his paean to Hegel). As the financial and economic crisis broke and deepened, there was unscripted innovation on a grand scale. In addition to finding themselves acting in their institutions’ traditional role as lenders of last resort to the banking system, central banks provided liquidity to “shadow” banks, such as money market funds and finance companies.

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It does not remotely have the range, let alone ambition, of the work of the Continental European public intellectuals who have taken on that vast subject, perhaps most famously Michel Foucault and Juergen Habermas. Nor is it a broad examination of shortcomings in the modern democratic state of the kind recently pursued by Francis Fukuyama.19 Rather, it looks at just one corner of the state apparatus and its position in democratic society—independent agencies—albeit one of great importance for understanding the role and legitimacy of the state more generally. As will become apparent, for my taste too many discussions of the regulatory state, perhaps especially in Europe, are about “independence versus accountability” or about combining “accountability and control,” often stretching the concept of accountability until those supposed antonyms can coexist.20 To find our way through this, we have to think about what democratic legitimacy entails, but not about whether insulated agencies can help to prop up or restore the ailing authority of a state.

Pale Blue Dot: A Vision of the Human Future in Space
by Carl Sagan
Published 8 Sep 1997

Crawford, "Interstellar Travel: A Review for Astronomers," Quarterly Journal of the Royal Astronomical Society, vol. 31 (1990), p. 377. I. A. Crawford, "Space, World Government, and `The End of History,' "Journal of the British Interplanetary Society, vol. 46 (1993), pp. 415-420. Freeman J. Dyson, The World, the Flesh, and the Devil (London: Birkbeck College, 1972). Ben R. Finney and Eric M. Jones, editors, Interstellar Migration and the Human Experience (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992). Charles Lindholm, Charisma (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990). The comment on the need for a telos is in this book.

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The prospects of such a time contrast provocatively with forecasts that the progress of science and technology is now near some asymptotic limit; that art, literature, and music are never to approach, much less exceed, the heights our species has, on occasion, already touched; and that political life on Earth is about to settle into some rock-stable liberal democratic world government, identified, after Hegel, as "the end of history." Such an expansion into space also contrasts with a different but likewise discernible trend in recent times—toward authoritarianism, censorship, ethnic hatred, and a deep suspicion of curiosity and learning. Instead, I think that, after some debugging, the settlement of the Solar System presages an open-ended era of dazzling advances in science and technology; cultural flowering; and wide-ranging experiments, up there in the sky, in government and social organization.

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Instead, I think that, after some debugging, the settlement of the Solar System presages an open-ended era of dazzling advances in science and technology; cultural flowering; and wide-ranging experiments, up there in the sky, in government and social organization. In more than one respect, exploring the Solar System and homesteading other worlds constitutes the beginning, much more than the end, of history. IT'S IMPOSSIBLE, for us humans at least, to look into our future, certainly not centuries ahead. No one has ever done so with any consistency and detail. I certainly do not imagine that I can. I have, with some trepidation, gone as far as I have to this point in the book, because we are just recognizing the truly unprecedented challenges brought on by our technology.

The City
by Tony Norfield

That is why there is no such thing as a ‘NYIBOR’ for New York, for US dollars or for anything else.31 Panitch and Gindin’s political analysis also exaggerates the stability of US domination. Ironically, they trace the different historical phases of US power, but then suggest that the latest phase of US hegemony is one that will last indefinitely. This is a reincarnation of Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ thesis, where (free market) global capitalism is the final stage of world economic development. Not surprisingly, Fukuyama’s thesis was celebrated by Washington policy-makers.32 But Panitch and Gindin do something similar, making many references to former US Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin’s management of and influence on the resolution of global financial crises and posing the US as the world’s ‘chief financial architect’.33 In this, they badly misjudge the security of the US position.

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But the British state’s promotion of finance in the late twentieth century, and still today, can be explained by the fact that the UK financial system is a structural part of the international operations of British capitalism, underpinning the role of Britain as an imperial power. Far from Britain having a ‘lagging’ commitment to finance since the 1970s, British policy-makers had a very forward-looking view on how the existing status of the City as a global financial centre could be leveraged to its best advantage.25 The ‘End of History’ revisited The role of the US in the world economy and global finance comes up in a different way in the work of Leo Panitch, Sam Gindin and their fellow authors, many from York University, Canada. Panitch and Gindin’s book, The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire, is worth noting for its many insights but also because it displays some typical analytical weaknesses.

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But he admits that he has only very circumstantial evidence, at best, of the US government encouraging US hedge funds to disrupt various markets in US interests. 21Sebastian Mallaby, More Money Than God: Hedge Funds and the Making of a New Elite, London: Bloomsbury, 2010, Chapter 9. 22Eric Helleiner, States and the Re-Emergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996, pp. 119–20. 23Ibid., p. 144. 24Ibid., p. 167. 25This point is explained in Chapter 3 especially. 26Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire, London and New York: Verso, 2012, p. 288. 27Ibid., pp. 12, 117–18. 28This will be discussed further in Chapter 8. 29Panitch and Gindin, The Making of Global Capitalism, p. 312. 30Martijn Konings, ‘American Finance and Empire in Historical Perspective’, in Leo Panitch and Martijn Konings (eds), American Empire and the Political Economy of Global Finance, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, 2nd Edition, p. 51. 31Chapter 2 explains the peculiar form of the US interbank money market. 32Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York: Free Press, 1992. 33Panitch and Gindin, The Making of Global Capitalism, p. 277. 34Ibid., p. 330. 35Ibid., p. 336. 36James Kynge, Richard McGregor, Daniel Dombey, Martin Arnold, Helen Warrell and Cynthia O’Murchu, ‘The China Syndrome’, Financial Times, 3 March 2011. 37US Congress, Annual Report to Congress, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 1 November 2010. 38US Congress, Annual Report to Congress, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 20 November 2013. 39David Harvey, The New Imperialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 181. 40Ibid., pp. 210–11. 41Harvey does not discuss this in his 2003 ‘dispossession’ book, or in his major work, The Limits to Capital (London: Verso, 2006). 42François Chesnais, ‘The Economic Foundations of Contemporary Imperialism’, Historical Materialism, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2007, pp. 121–42 (pp. 122–4). 43Ibid., pp. 131–2. 44Maria Ivanova has also clearly set out the links between the expansion of the financial system and the worldwide problems of capital accumulation, something ignored by many others who instead see the growth of finance as driven by a financial elite that controls government policy.

Utopias: A Brief History From Ancient Writings to Virtual Communities
by Howard P. Segal
Published 20 May 2012

For that matter, in the spirit of Victor Frankenstein, the ultimate dream of many of Noble’s visionaries is the creation through genetic engineering of a womanless world—the culmination of centuries of mistreatment of women in general and of female engineers and scientists in particular.5 Such schemes go beyond the eugenics crusades of many “reformers” in both Europe and America in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that culminated in Nazism’s quest for a pure Aryan race—but not, of course, one of men alone. The Absence of Historical Context History can therefore be ignored, so profoundly different will the future be from the past. History no longer matters.6 One might, of course, suggest that our ahistorical contemporary visionaries have embraced a watered-down version of Francis Fukuyama’s still controversial The End of History and the Last Man (1992), but there is no evidence of that kind of sophisticated argument in any of their writings. Consequently, few if any of the high-tech zealots of our own day have ever considered the possibility that, far from being original, their crusades fit squarely within a rich Western tradition of 188 The Resurgence of Utopianism scientific and technological utopianism.

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But it was sometimes taken up by others who, for whatever reasons, dismissed serious and systematic thinking about the future as a waste of time, an indulgence not The Future of Utopias and Utopianism 241 fit for respectable leaders daily confronting endless challenges. Fukuyama’s provocative The End of History and the Last Man (1992) might have been Bush’s gospel had he ever read, much less understood, it; but he did neither. Ironically, Bush lost re-election in part because of his inability to present specifics to support the New World Order that he mentioned from time to time in light of the collapse of the Soviet Union.

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Adams) 82–83 Educational Network of Maine 208 Edutopia 203–213 higher education and Edutopia 206–213 Edwards, Robert 127 Ehrenreich, Barbara 168 Einstein’s general theory of relativity 202 Eisenhower, President Dwight D 108–109, 115, 143 el dorado, Latin America 21 Electricite de France 152 “electronic battlefield” 105, 112 “electronic campus” 208, 210 Elements of Technology (Bigelow) 52 Elizabeth II, Queen, on economic crisis 166–167 Ellicott, Thomas 77 Embree, Ainslie 171 Emerson, Ralph Waldo 84 empowerment of the individual 122–123 End of History and the Last Man, The (Fukuyama) 188, 242 End of Ideology, The (Bell) 101 end of science 116 Endangered Species Act, United States 111 Energy Policy Act, US 153, 157 Index 273 Engels, Friedrich 32, 53, 60, 66–67, 250, 251 engineers and scientists compared 52 engineering as a culture 121 Engineers and the Price System, The (Veblen) 97, 106 “Enlightenment Project” 104, 116 Enlightenment 50, 55–56, 104, philosophies of 160 environmental disasters 115 environmental rights 253 Epode 47 Equality movement Washington state 25 equality 56 equality of genders 26, 92–93, 196 equality of opportunity 31, 54, 210 Erasmus 190 Espy, James 188 ethnopsychiatry 170 Etzler, John Adolphus 78, 79–80, 81 eugenics 159, 188 Evans, Oliver 77 Ewbank, Thomas 78, 80 experts 109, 112 and activism 107 attitudes toward 114, 115, 155–156, 157–160, 192 and changing of society 97 and education 205, 211 experts and scientists 100, 119, 121 need for 57 and nuclear power 155–156 as social engineers 108 systems experts 160 and Systems Analysis 110 and TQM 217 274 Index Expo 2010 Shanghai, China 38 Fabianism 20 Facebook 193, 194, 238 Fair America: World’s Fairs in the United States (Rydell, Findling, Pelle) 36 fascism 98, 104 Federal Communications Commission 210 Female Man, The (Russ) 92 Findling, John 36 Flanagan, Judy 145 Fleming, James 187–188, 207 Flubber 202 Fogarty, Robert 25 Ford Motor Company 139, 246 Ford, Henry 104, 157, 165 Ford, President Gerald 108 Fourier, Charles 25, 53, 60, 64–66, 67, 255 utopian views 64–65 Fourierists 29 Fourth Eclogue 47 Fragments (Pindar) 47, 237 France: and energy 157 French Revolution 57, 60, 64 French student revolt 1968 252 nuclear industry in 152 utopian housing projects in 2 utopianism in 24 Frankenstein (M.

Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism
by Ha-Joon Chang
Published 26 Dec 2007

In the current renaissance of such views, some cultural theorists do not actually talk about culture per se. Recognising that culture is too broad and amorphous a concept, they try to isolate only those components that they think are most closely related to economic development. For example, in his 1995 book, Trust, Francis Fukuyama, the neo-con American political commentator, argues that the existence or otherwise of trust extending beyond family members critically affects economic development. He argues that the absence of such trust in the cultures of countries like China, France, Italy and (to some extent) Korea makes it difficult for them to run large firms effectively, which are key to modern economic development.

…

Of course, this “right” was the proverbial rope on which to hang one’s own economy!’ 17 According to an interview in the magazine Veja, 15 November 1996, as translated and cited by G. Palma (2003), ‘The Latin American Economies During the Second Half of the Twentieth Century – from the Age of ISI to the Age of The End of History’ in H-J. Chang (ed.), Rethinking Development Economics (Anthem Press, London), p. 149, endnotes 15 and 16. 18 Chang (2002), p. 132, Table 4.2. 19 A. Singh (1990), ‘The State of Industry in the Third World in the 1980s: Analytical and Policy Issues’, Working Paper, no. 137, April 1990, Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Notre Dame University. 20 The 1980 and 2000 figures are calculated respectively from the 1997 issue (Table 12) and the 2002 issue (Table 1) of World Bank’s World Development Report (Oxford University Press, New York). 21 M.

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Nye (1991), ‘The Myth of Free-Trade Britain and Fortress France: Tariffs and Trade in the Nineteenth Century’, Journal of Economic History, vol. 51. no. 1. 18 Brisco (1907) neatly sums up this aspect of Walpole’s policy: ‘By commercial and industrial regulations attempts were made to restrict the colonies to the production of raw materials which England was to work up, to discourage any manufactures that would any way compete with the mother country, and to confine their markets to the English trader and manufacturer’ (p. 165). 19 Willy de Clercq, the European commissioner for external economic relations during the late 1980s, intones that ‘[o]nly as a result of the theoretical legitimacy of free trade when measured against widespread mercantilism provided by David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill and David Hume, Adam Smith and others from the Scottish Enlightenment, and as a consequence of the relative stability provided by the UK as the only and relatively benevolent superpower or hegemon during the second half of the nineteenth century, was free trade able to flourish for the first time’. W. de Clercq (1996), ‘The End of History for Free Trade?’ in J.Bhagwati & M.Hirsch (eds.), The Uruguay Round and Beyond – Essays in Honour of Arthur Dunkel (The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor), p. 196. 20 J. Bhagwati (1985), Protectionism (The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts), p. 18. Bhagwati, together with other free-trade economists of today, attaches so much importance to this episode that he uses as the cover of the book a 1845 cartoon from the political satire magazine, Punch, depicting the prime minister, Robert Peel, as a befuddled boy being firmly led to the righteous path of free trade by the stern, upright figure of Richard Cobden, the leading anti-Corn-Law campaigner. 21 C.

Bad Samaritans: The Guilty Secrets of Rich Nations and the Threat to Global Prosperity
by Ha-Joon Chang
Published 4 Jul 2007

In the current renaissance of such views, some cultural theorists do not actually talk about culture per se. Recognising that culture is too broad and amorphous a concept, they try to isolate only those components that they think are most closely related to economic development. For example, in his 1995 book, Trust, Francis Fukuyama, the neo-con American political commentator, argues that the existence or otherwise of trust extending beyond family members critically affects economic development. He argues that the absence of such trust in the cultures of countries like China, France, Italy and (to some extent) Korea makes it difficult for them to run large firms effectively, which are key to modern economic development.

…

Of course, this “right” was the proverbial rope on which to hang one’s own economy!’ 17 According to an interview in the magazine Veja, 15 November 1996, as translated and cited by G. Palma (2003), ‘The Latin American Economies During the Second Half of the Twentieth Century – from the Age of ISI to the Age of The End of History’ in H-J. Chang (ed.), Rethinking Development Economics (Anthem Press, London), p. 149, endnotes 15 and 16. 18 Chang (2002), p. 132, Table 4.2. 19 A. Singh (1990), ‘The State of Industry in the Third World in the 1980s: Analytical and Policy Issues’, Working Paper, no. 137, April 1990, Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Notre Dame University. 20 The 1980 and 2000 figures are calculated respectively from the 1997 issue (Table 12) and the 2002 issue (Table 1) of World Bank’s World Development Report (Oxford University Press, New York). 21 M.

…

Nye (1991), ‘The Myth of Free-Trade Britain and Fortress France: Tariffs and Trade in the Nineteenth Century’, Journal of Economic History, vol. 51. no. 1. 18 Brisco (1907) neatly sums up this aspect of Walpole’s policy: ‘By commercial and industrial regulations attempts were made to restrict the colonies to the production of raw materials which England was to work up, to discourage any manufactures that would any way compete with the mother country, and to confine their markets to the English trader and manufacturer’ (p. 165). 19 Willy de Clercq, the European commissioner for external economic relations during the late 1980s, intones that ‘[o]nly as a result of the theoretical legitimacy of free trade when measured against widespread mercantilism provided by David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill and David Hume, Adam Smith and others from the Scottish Enlightenment, and as a consequence of the relative stability provided by the UK as the only and relatively benevolent superpower or hegemon during the second half of the nineteenth century, was free trade able to flourish for the first time’. W. de Clercq (1996), ‘The End of History for Free Trade?’ in J. Bhagwati & M. Hirsch (eds.), The Uruguay Round and Beyond – Essays in Honour of Arthur Dunkel (The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor), p. 196. 20 J. Bhagwati (1985), Protectionism (The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts), p. 18. Bhagwati, together with other free-trade economists of today, attaches so much importance to this episode that he uses as the cover of the book a 1845 cartoon from the political satire magazine, Punch, depicting the prime minister, Robert Peel, as a befuddled boy being firmly led to the righteous path of free trade by the stern, upright figure of Richard Cobden, the leading anti-Corn-Law campaigner. 21 C.

How Long Will Israel Survive Threat Wthn
by Gregg Carlstrom
Published 14 Oct 2017

This is an odd concept in a state populated mostly by Jews, a people whose history offers little cause for wistfulness. Yet the turmoil of the past few years suggests that a current of nostalgia runs through not only Israel, but societies around the developed world. In the final pages of his 1992 book The End of History, the theorist Francis Fukuyama offered a prediction about the future: The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one’s life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands.

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.: President of CCAR, 137 Egypt: 85, 89, 197, 230; Alexandria, 22; Aswan High Dam, xviii, 157, 168; Cairo, 22, 26, 156–7; Constitution of, 89–90; Coptic population of, 24; government of, 22; Suez Canal, 22; Suez Crisis (1956), 43, 200 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty (1979): 202, 212, 218 Eichmann, Adolf; execution of (1962), 36, 235; trial of (1961), 235 Eilam, Uzi: 165 Eisen, Colonel Gilad: xiv Eizenkot, General Gadi: xvi Elad (City of David Foundation): purchase of homes by, 71 Eldar, Akiva: Lords of the Land, 16 Elitzur, Uri: 37 Eliyahu, Shmuel: 207 Elovitch, Shaul: 181 Elrov, Itzik: 82 Eran, Oded: 219 Erdan, Gilad: 134, 146, 151, 180, 185 Erdogan, Recep Tayyip: 210; head of AKP, 217 Erlich, Arye: 191 Eritrea: asylum seekers from, 171 Eshkol, Levi: administration of, 16 Esther: xi Ethiopia: Jewish migrants from, 76 Ethiopian Jews: 120, 126; migration of, 76; standards of living for, 75–7 Ettinger, Meir: background of, 149; family of, 149; writings of, 149–50 Etzion, Yehuda: 200; imprisonment of (1984), 201 European Union (EU): 67–8, 163, 209, 211; Israeli exports to, 134; opposition to BDS, 135 Facebook: xv, 37, 53, 81–2, 88, 90, 103, 113, 119, 157, 170, 188, 203 Falashmura: xv–xvi Farage, Nigel: 171, 209 Fatah: 153 Federman, Noam: writings of, 148–9 Feiglin, Moshe: 105 First Intifada (1987–93): 70, 132, 151; casualties of, 152 First Temple: 13 First World War (1914–18): 217 Forward, The: 47; editorial staff of, 132 Fox, Steven: Chief Executive of CCAR, 129, 144 Fraenkel, Naftali: abduction of (2014), 33–4, 117 France: 43, 57, 200; Charlie Hebdo Massacre (2014), xiv; Hyper Cacher Market Attack (2015), 78–9; Jewish diaspora in, 78–9; Nice, 174; Nice Truck Attack (2016), 174, 210; Paris, 78, 80, 85, 182, 200 Francis, Pope: 22–3; visit to Israel (2013), 23 Free Druze Youth Organization: 22 Friedman, David: 142; background of, 141; US Ambassador to Israel, 141 Friedman, Moshe: founder of KamaTech, 96 Fuchs, Amir: 176 Fukuyama, Francis: End of History, The (1992), 213 Gaffney, Frank: founder of Center for Security Policy, 143 Gal-On, Zehava: 54 Gamliel, Gila: 180 Gantz, General Benny: 168 Garbuz, Yair: 173 Gaza: xiv, xviii, 29, 42, 45, 49–51, 57, 59–60, 68, 107, 116–17, 123, 153; borders of, 54, 111–12, 151, 205; coastline of, 210; disengagement of Israel from (2005), 118, 148, 218, 233 Gaza Strip: 56; Gaza City, 58, 168; Israeli Occupation of, 6; Khan Younis, 46; Rafah, 49 Germany: 57, 82, 91, 182; Berlin, 185 Ghattas, Basel: 24 Gingrich, Newt: ‘Contract with America’, 130 Ginsburgh, Yitzhak: 20 Glick, Yehuda: attempted assassination of (2014), 64 Golan, General Yair: Israeli Deputy Chief of Staff, xvii Golan Heights: 3; Israeli military forces on, 113 Goldberg, J.J.: 47; Jewish Power (1997), 132 Goldstein, Baruch: shooting rampage conducted by (1994), xi Goldstein, Lillian: 9 Goldstein, Matti: 64 Goor, Hanna: 174–5 Gopstein, Bentzi: leader of Lehava, 147 Gorbachev, Mikhail: 26 Goren, Shlomo: Chief Rabbi of IDF, 67 Gove, Michael: 211 Great Recession (2008–10): 80 Greece: 189 Green Line: 218 Grossman, David: 176 Grossman, Gilad: 229 Grunis, Asher: 226 Guardian, The: 5, 221 Gur, Haviv Rettig: 212 Ha’aretz: 29, 34, 49–50, 101, 110, 116, 165, 170, 175, 181, 185, 203 Haber, Eitan: 159 Hadash: electoral performance of (1981), 124; ideology of, 83; introduction of no-confidence motion in Knesset (1982), 43–4; members of, 53, 115 Haganah: personnel of, 199 Haifa University: 88 HaKol HaYehudi: 149 Halevy, Efraim: 144, 165; background of, 162–3 Halper, Jeff: founder of International Committee Against Home Demolitions, 70 Haman: xi Hamas: xiv, 37, 43, 47–8, 50, 55–6, 58–61, 107, 111, 138, 151, 153, 204, 210, 221; arsenal of, 55; capture of Gilad Shalit (2006), 46, 56, 188; militants, 46 Hamdan, Khair al-Din: killing of (2014), 73 Haniyeh, Ismail: 59; popularity of, 59 Har Nof: 63–4, 87, 150 Harel, Amos: 34 Hasson, Tommy: 88 Hassoura, Abed: 41 HaTnuah: 178; members of, 19 Hazan, Oren: 232 Hebrew (language): 1, 8, 21, 27–9, 35, 46, 53, 65–6, 86, 93, 99, 120, 133, 140, 146, 158, 172, 174, 177, 179, 186, 210, 214; calendar, 199 Hebrew University: 154, 162; faculty of, 175 Henkin, Eitam: death of (2015), 150 Henkin, Na’ama: death of (2015), 150 Hermann, Dr Tamar: 53, 109; ‘Peace Index’, 109–10 Herut: 185 Herzl, Theodor: 65, 91; Der Judenstaat (1896), 92, 214 Herzliya Conference (2014): 31; key figures present at, 32, 125, 166, 169 Herzog, Isaac: 1, 8, 57, 67, 106, 110, 112–13, 117, 119–20, 122, 156, 164–5, 173, 178–9; electoral performance of (2015), 120–1; family of, 151; leader of Zionist Camp, 104 Herzog, Michael: family of, 151 Hezbollah: 43, 107, 212 Hilltop Youth: 147–8; members of, 149; price tag attacks conducted by, 148 Hinduism: 216 Hirsch, Samson Raphael: 91 Histadrut: 185 Hitler, Adolf: Mein Kampf, 173 Hotevely, Tzipi: 234; invitation to Lehava to attend Knesset (2011), 147; Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister, 147 Human Rights Watch: criticism of Israeli home demolitions, 70 Hussein, Saddam: 108, 232 Hussein of Jordan, King: 163 i24: 179 Ibrahimi Mosque Massacre (1994): 159 Im Tirtzu: 7–8; campaigns against liberal NGOs, 176 Indyk, Martin: 9, 139, 159 Institute for National Security Studies: 168; Annual Conference (2016), 139 International Committee Against Home Demolitions: members of, 70 International Crisis Group: personnel of, 197 Iran: 6, 108, 164; Arak, 165; nuclear program of, 25, 162, 165–6, 213; Tehran, 4, 161, 163 Iraq: 24, 68 Iron Dome system: 47, 51; success of, 54–5 Islam: xiv, 22, 194–5, 216; Qur’an, 28; Ramadan, 30, 35, 40, 42; shari’a, 89–90; Sunni, 217 Islamic Jihad: 61, 221; suicide attacks conducted by, 152 Islamic Movement: 71 Islamic State: 107, 138, 210; territory occupied by, 68 Islamism: 151, 210, 213; Sunni, 18 Israel: xiii, xv, 3, 12–13, 23, 27, 34, 39, 55–7, 60–1, 67, 70–1, 74–5, 79, 92, 99, 102, 110, 119, 123–4, 130, 145–6, 168, 186, 199, 204, 211, 222–3, 232–3, 235–6; Abu Ghosh, 192; Acre, 1; Arab population of, 24, 73–5, 84; as a Jewish state, 85–6, 92, 171, 196–7, 218; Ashdod, 101, 112, 119–20, 174–5, 194; Ashkelon, 50, 52, 190; Be’er Sheva, 1, 208; Beit Jann, 88; Bethlehem, 15, 23; Caesarea, 108; Christian population of, 22–3; conscription legislation of, 21; Dimona, 200; East Jerusalem, 3, 6, 17, 35, 40, 64, 67–70, 72, 104–5, 135, 150, 153–5, 187; education system of, 74, 76–7, 173; Eli, 13; Elon Moreh, 13. 228; Galilee, 20–1, 72, 87, 114–15, 158, 172–3, 205; GDP per capita, 135; Hadera, 189; Haifa, 45, 73, 88, 114, 172, 186, 189, 191, 205–6, 208, 221; Hebron, xii, 1, 16, 19, 33–4, 72, 159, 170, 234; Jaffa, 30, 47–8, 66, 146, 155, 195; Jenin, 33, 152; Jerusalem, xiii–xiv, 2, 13, 23, 32, 40, 45, 61, 65–8, 78, 80, 88, 95, 117, 129, 131, 135, 146–7, 150–1, 153, 155, 172, 183, 187, 193, 198, 205, 231, 234; Jish, 20, 25–6; Jisr az-Zarqa, 74; Kedumim, 13; Kiryat Gat, 150–1; labor law (1951), 193; Lydda/Lod, 167; Mount Carmel Wildfires (2010), 206; Nablus, 13–14, 33, 145, 152, 225; Nazareth, xv, 24, 75; Negev, 1, 112, 134, 158, 172, 200; Old City, 35, 41–2, 65–7, 69, 150–2, 154, 159, 193; Petah Tikva, xiii; Ra’anana, xiii; Sderot, 54–5, 111–12, 120; Shiloh, 13; Soreq, 200; Tel Aviv, xiii, 8, 25, 44–5, 47–8, 50–4, 59, 61, 64, 66, 73–6, 78, 80–4, 97, 99–101, 109, 116, 118–19, 121–2, 134, 139, 155–6, 160, 162, 164, 170, 172, 175–6, 183, 186, 189, 191, 193, 198, 201–2, 205, 212, 220, 222; unemployment rates in, 74, 95, 107; West Jerusalem, 63, 154; Yanuh-Jat, 87 Israel Broadcasting Authority (IBA): 180, 188; first radio transmissions (1948), 186; funding of, 180 Israel Broadcasting Corporation (Kan): development of (2016), 188; proposals for, 180 Israel Defence Forces (IDF): xi, xvi–xvii, 126, 158, 160, 169, 171, 173, 186, 229; Central Command, 67; Circassian personnel of, 22, 167–8; Druze personnel of, 22; Home Front Command, 54–5; Nahal Brigade, 170 Israel Democracy Institute (IDI): 8, 53, 109, 174, 184, 233; personnel of, 53, 86, 125, 176; Seventh Eye, The, 177 Israel HaYom: 36, 141, 176–7, 186; weekday print run of, 176 Israel HaYom bill: 176, 178 Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty (1994): 163, 212, 218 Israel Project, The: Tower, The, 187 Israel Railways: 189 Israeli Association for Ethiopian Jews: personnel of, 76 Israeli-Palestinian Chamber of Commerce: 135 Israeli High Court: 71 Italy: Milan, 164 J Street: lobbying efforts of, 10, 142 Jabotinsky, Ze’ev: 9, 91, 166 Jarrah, Sheikh: 41–2 Al Jazeera: 48, 206 Jerusalem Post: 38, 104, 177–8, 202 Jesus Christ: 23, 26, 72 Jewish Agency: 78; personnel of, 92 Jewish Federations of North America: 164 Jewish Home: 8, 178; development of, 118; ideology of, 119; members of, 32, 36–7, 100, 104, 117–18, 157; supporters of, 17, 125 Jewish National Fund: xv Jewish Power: 114 Jewish Telegraphic Agency: 44 Jewish Underground: members of, 201 Jewish Voice for Peace: 132 Johnson, Boris: removal of pro-BDS adverts from London Underground stations (2016), 221 Joint List: electoral performance of (2015), 195; formation of (2014), 115; members of, 111, 117 Jordan, Hashemite Kingdom of: 7, 70; Amman, 163; military of, 201 Jordan, River: 7, 201 Joseph’s Tomb: 14 Judaism: xiv, xvi, 3–4, 10–11, 19, 22, 25, 32, 35, 41, 43, 71, 85, 96, 104, 109, 118, 140, 149–50, 180–1, 195–6, 200, 211, 214, 217, 235–6; Ashkenazi, 9, 11, 30, 42, 67, 77–8, 82, 99–101, 126, 172–3; conversion to, 57, 64, 76, 129, 136–7, 143; diaspora, 6, 10–12, 79–80, 87, 122, 212; Hanukkah, xiv, 232; Hasidic, 96–7; intra-Jewish discrimination, 77; kosher, 190; mikvah, 76; Mizrahi, 11, 74, 77–8, 99, 101, 126, 172–3; Orthodox, 6, 8, 27, 64, 66, 100, 136–8; Passover, 16; persecution of, 7, 9–10, 23, 78–9; Purim, xi, 116; Reform, 27, 129–30, 136–8, 144; Revisionist, 91; Rosh Hashanah, 56, 150; secular, 94, 197; Sephardic, 11, 26, 172; Shabbat, 10, 86, 92–4, 100–1, 116, 118, 170, 189–94, 229; Talmud, xvi, 94; Torah, 91–2, 94, 136, 138, 191 Jumblatt, Walid: 22 Justice and Development Party (AKP) (Turkey): 217 Kach: 148; banning of (1994), xvii, 41, 148–9 Kafr Kanna: 72–3 Kafr Qassem Massacre (1956): 30 Kahane, Meir: xvii, 41; family of, 149 Kahanist Movement: 148 Kahlon, Moshe: 220; Israeli Finance Minister, 134, 188, 227; leader of Kulanu, 112 Kakon, Rachel: 81 KamaTech: 96 Kamir, Orit: 175 Kara, Ayoub: 87 Karelitz, Avraham Yeshaya: meeting with David Ben-Gurion (1952), 93–4 al-Kasrawi, Ramzi: shooting conducted by (2015), xii Katsav, Moshe: President of Israel, 26 Katz, Yisrael: 189 Kehilat Bnei Torah Attack (2014): 63–4, 150; casualties of, 87 Kenya: 216 Kerry, John: 232–3; meetings with Benjamin Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas (2014–15), 31; US Secretary of State, 31, 138 Keshet: 179 Kfar Etzion: 38; establishment of, 15–16 Khalloul, Shadi: 21–3, 26 Khatib, Hashim: 75 kibbutz: 21, 55–6, 59, 88, 120, 126, 132, 185, 203; presence of men in IDF, 158, 168 King, Aryeh: 72 King Jr, Martin Luther: 116 Kirby, John: 139, 227 Kissinger, Henry: 164, 227 Knesset: xv, 8–9, 17, 19, 21, 24, 27–8, 43–5, 87, 90–1, 106, 108, 112–13, 129–30, 138, 157, 159–60, 177, 186, 193–4, 198, 222, 227–8; Ethics Committee, 184; Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, 167; mandates in, 103; members of, 51, 74, 77, 84, 98, 106, 171, 196, 200, 220; proposed self-limitations on power of, 175–6 Kulanu Party: 222; members of, 110, 112 Kurds (ethnic group): territory inhabited by, 218 Kurtzer, Daniel: 139 Kushner, Jared: family of, 142 Labor Party: xv, 2, 7, 16–17, 28, 43, 100–1, 122, 185, 199, 202–3, 219, 221; electoral defeat of (1996), 121; electoral performance of (1981), 124; members of, 57, 110, 157, 178–9, 200, 205; pre-election rally of (2015), 173; supporters of, 125; ‘What is Zionism?’

Why Aren't They Shouting?: A Banker’s Tale of Change, Computers and Perpetual Crisis
by Kevin Rodgers
Published 13 Jul 2016

Chapter 8 1 ‘Forms and paradoxes of principles-based regulation’, Julia Black, Professor of Law and Research Associate, Centre for the Analysis of Risk and Regulation, London School of Economics and Political Science, Capital Markets Law Journal, 3/4, 10 September 2008, http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/staff%20publications%20full%20text/black/forms%20and%20paradoxes%20of%20pbr%202008.pdf 2 The Age of Turbulence, Alan Greenspan, Penguin Books, 2008, p52. 3 ‘Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan, The regulation of OTC derivatives, Before the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives’, 24 July 1998, http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/1998/19980724.htm 4 For more on this fascinating topic, see The Myth of the Rational Market, Justin Fox, Harper Business, 2011. 5 The End of History and the Last Man, Francis Fukuyama, Penguin Books, 1992. 6 ‘The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators’, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, 23 October 2008, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg55764/html/CHRG-110hhrg55764.htm 7 Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, Professor Hyman Minsky, McGraw-Hill Professional, 1986. 8 ‘Working Paper No. 74, The Financial Instability Hypothesis’, Hyman Minsky, The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, May 1992, http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp74.pdf 9 Unsettled Account: The Evolution of Banking in the Industrialised World since 1800, Richard S.

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His leap of logic seems absurd but was, emotionally speaking, in tune with the widespread triumphalism of the time: Western free-market economies had just won the Cold War; the argument between state control and ‘freedom’ was thus seen to have been conclusively settled; and a popular and influential book even explained that we might be ‘at the end of history’.5 This, then, was the background to the regulatory environment that emerged. A widespread faith in the efficacy and inexorable ‘rightness’ of markets led, first from changes in the US, and then via inter-country rivalry, to a regulatory framework embodying the belief that professionals had, in Alan Greenspan’s words, ‘[the] ability to protect themselves’.

The Googlization of Everything:
by Siva Vaidhyanathan
Published 1 Jan 2010

Abigail Cutler, “Penetrating the Great Firewall: Interview with James Fallows,” Atlantic, February 19, 2008; James Fallows, “ ‘The Connection Has Been Reset,’ ” Atlantic, March 2008; Ronald Deibert et al., Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008). 51. Thomas Frank, One Market under God: Extreme Capitalism, Market Populism, and the End of Economic Democracy (New York: Doubleday, 2000). 52. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Pres, 1992). 53. Ideology, as the Cambridge University sociologist John Thompson argues, is “meaning in the service of power,” or a sense of how symbolic expressions support or challenge structures and habits of social domination. See John Thompson, Ideology and Modern Culture: Critical Social Theory in the Era of Mass Communication (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990). 54.

Globish: How the English Language Became the World's Language
by Robert McCrum
Published 24 May 2010

Now the Anglo-American hegemony-often hotly disputed by anti-American liberals – was wholly underpinned by rampant capitalism, represented by Margaret Thatcher’s premiership in Britain and Ronald Reagan’s two-term presidency in the United States. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 this new global culture would morph into the worldwide cultural revolution that would become Globish. The eerie decade that preceded the crisis of 2001 was the first in a century in which the world was no longer in the shadow of war. Francis Fukuyama declared ‘the End of History’. It was during this unreal and optimistic hiatus that the little term coined by Jean-Paul Nerrière in 1995, ‘Globish’ – simple, inelegant and almost universal-first gained currency. Now Globish began to emerge, in the words of The Times, as ‘the language of the present and the future’, the worldwide dialect of the third millennium.

Why It's Still Kicking Off Everywhere: The New Global Revolutions
by Paul Mason
Published 30 Sep 2013

He calls the resulting phenomenon ‘capitalist realism’, defined as the widespread sense that not only is capitalism the only viable political and economic system, but also that it is now impossible even to imagine a coherent alternative to it … a pervasive atmosphere conditioning not only the production of culture but also the regulation of work and education, and acting as a kind of invisible barrier constraining action.11 Up to 2008, the left’s inability to imagine any alternative to capitalism was like a mirror image of the right’s triumphalism. The establishment’s tramline thinking on Islam and its theories of ‘durable authoritarianism’ conformed, like the rest of its ideology, to Francis Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis and the paeans of various commentators—Thomas Friedman foremost among them—to the triumph of globalization. Together, left and right created a shared fatalism about the future. The right believed that with indomitable power it could create whatever truth it wanted to. In a famous phrase, Karl Rove, senior advisor to then US President George W.

Hate Inc.: Why Today’s Media Makes Us Despise One Another
by Matt Taibbi
Published 7 Oct 2019

Friedman has no ideas that can’t be expressed in a catchphrase,” author David Plotz wrote, in a piece that was genuinely intended to be complimentary. Brooks meanwhile wrote an entire book called Bobos in Paradise about how rich New Yorkers had achieved the apex of consumer taste. This was like Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History, except the Brooks version was The End of the History of Buying Tasteful Furniture. Lineups full of themes like this are designed to make sure that readers—particularly upper-class readers—are never surprised or offended when they click on an op-ed page. Humor is discouraged because humor is inherently iconoclastic and trains audiences to think even powerful people are ridiculous (or at least as ridiculous as everyone else, which of course is a taboo thought).

Practical Doomsday: A User's Guide to the End of the World
by Michal Zalewski
Published 11 Jan 2022

Each time, it has culminated in the indiscriminate murder, imprisonment, or expropriation of the members of the out-group. Perhaps all this cruelty is in the rearview mirror. The world today is, in many respects, a more prosperous and peaceful place. But I’m reminded that in the early 1990s, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Francis Fukuyama—a noted political scientist—proclaimed “the end of history.” He explained that we had reached “the end-point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” Fukuyama’s prediction was a fashionable thought back then; a bit over 20 years later, very few still agree with his view.

MegaThreats: Ten Dangerous Trends That Imperil Our Future, and How to Survive Them
by Nouriel Roubini
Published 17 Oct 2022

The Soviet Union and the United States even initiated détente in the 1970s and 1980s, with arms agreements, despite proxy wars still fought in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. Thus, the risk of a nuclear exchange among great powers was vastly reduced. After the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War came to an end, our collective risks changed character. Francis Fukuyama proclaimed that humankind had reached its evolutionary apex—it was the end of history. Instead of World War III, we now had to worry about much less existential threats, such as obesity. Throughout the Cold War decades, economic crises and recessions were relatively mild, short, and without concurrent major financial disruption. Global climate change was visible only to experts.

The Secret Lives of Buildings: From the Ruins of the Parthenon to the Vegas Strip in Thirteen Stories
by Edward Hollis
Published 10 Nov 2009

The events of that night represent the end of history, a term invented by the political economist Francis Fukuyama. Democratic capitalism defeated autocratic communism, bringing the last great ideological conflict to a close once and for all. But unlike the Hulme Crescents, the Berlin Wall, whose spectacular destruction marked Fukuyama’s “end of history,” was not obliterated. Indeed, as hated as it had been, the Wall soon took on something of the preciousness of the marble of the Parthenon, which dissolves and crumbles even as it is gathered. The strange afterlife of the Berlin Wall is the history of the end of history. ONCE UPON A TIME, an obscure woman stood on an obscure street in an obscure corner of Berlin.

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Translated through centuries and transported across continents, this Venice is nothing like the robber republic that Marco Polo described. It’s a place for a relaxing weekend, nothing else. After the end of history, we take a break, sip a coffee, and take our snaps of monuments that used to change with history—and used to change it, too. They don’t seem to, anymore. IT IS TWELVE YEARS after the end of history. A Western merchant stands before an Eastern potentate in the Hall of Purple Lights in the Zhongnanhai Palace in Beijing. The brightly lacquered columns and glazed tiles of the old pleasure pavilion still evoke hours of imperial leisure.

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Art, in fact, can be nothing but violence, cruelty, and injustice. The Futurists. It sounds like a band from Manchester, doesn’t it? The Berlin Wall In Which History Comes to an End HISTORY FOR SALE A young boy sells pieces of the Berlin Wall, Potsdam Square, Berlin, 10 March 1990. THE END OF HISTORY The Parthenon is dissolving into the atmosphere, but preparations have been made for the conclusion of its story. Bernard Tschumi’s new museum at the foot of the Acropolis contains an empty space the same size as the temple, ready to receive its remains should it ever become necessary to transfer them indoors.

The Problem With Work: Feminism, Marxism, Antiwork Politics, and Postwork Imaginaries
by Kathi Weeks
Published 8 Sep 2011

To trace the lineages of contemporary anti-utopian discourse in the United States, I want to focus on two key texts produced at very different moments in the evolution of official US anti-utopianism, each of which was celebrated for both its persuasiveness and its prescience. The first of these, Karl Popper’s The Open Society and Its Enemies, first published in 1945, anticipated the Cold War threat to liberalism’s ideological ascendance and confidence; the second, Francis Fukuyama’s 1989 “The End of History?,” declared the end of that threat. Each text announces the dawn of a new political era and marks a specific moment of anti-utopian revival, when liberalism’s general distrust of utopianism reasserts itself in reaction to new events. Fascism was one of these threats, but the two authors agree that at least by 1950 the more pressing challenge was posed by communism (Fukuyama 1989, 9; Popper 1950, vii).1 As bookends to the Cold War, one mode of anti-utopianism expresses the anxieties of liberalism under siege while the other emerges from the confidence in liberalism’s triumph.

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Fukuyama declares liberalism the winner, but not with the kind of confidence that accompanied declarations in the 1990s of liberalism’s unrivaled and world-historic ascendancy. In the transition from the Cold War era of superpower competition to the emergence of triumphant neoliberalism in the age of empire, Fukuyama’s then rather speculative claims (the title of the essay was a question: “The End of History?”) ossify into official common sense. The end of the Cold War and the threat to liberal politics that Popper so feared cleared the way for the rise of neoliberalism in its fundamentalist mode, a discourse that in many ways dominated the 1990s. Centered on the strident insistence that, in Margaret Thatcher’s famous formulation, there is no alternative, the neoliberal anti-utopianism of the 1990s seemed to be absolved of Popper’s regrets and relieved of Fukuyama’s nostalgia.

…

Beyond Gender: The New Politics of Work and Family. Edited by Brigid O’Farrell. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center. Froines, Ann. 1992. “Renewing Socialist Feminism.” Socialist Review 22 (2): 125–31. Fromm, Erich. 1961. Marx’s Concept of Man. New York: Frederick Ungar. Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. “The End of History?” National Interest 16 (summer): 3–18. Genovese, Eugene D. 1974. Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made. New York: Pantheon. Geoghegan, Vincent. 1987. Utopianism and Marxism. New York: Methuen. Gheaus, Anca. 2008. “Basic Income, Gender Justice and the Costs of Gender-Symmetrical Lifestyles.”

A Pelican Introduction Economics: A User's Guide
by Ha-Joon Chang
Published 26 May 2014

The Central European countries – Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia – fared better, especially after they joined the European Union in 2004, thanks to being more gradualist in their reform and to their better skill bases. But even in the case of these countries, it is difficult to hail the transition experience as a great success. The fall of the socialist bloc ushered in a period of ‘free-market triumphalism’. Some, such as the American (then) neo-con thinker Francis Fukuyama, pronounced the ‘end of history’ (no, not the end of the world) on the grounds that we had finally conclusively identified the best economic system in the form of capitalism. The fact that capitalism comes in many varieties, each with particular strengths and weaknesses, was blissfully ignored in the euphoric mood of the day.

…

Sutri, ‘Capital requirements for over-the-counter derivatives central counterparties’, IMF Working Paper, WP/13/3, 2013, p. 7, figure 1, downloadable from: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1303.pdf. 10. G. Palma, ‘The revenge of the market on the rentiers: why neo-liberal reports of the end of history turned out to be premature’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 33, no. 4 (2009). 11. Lapavitsas, Profiting without Producing, p. 206, figure 2. 12. J. Crotty, ‘If financial market competition is so intense, why are financial firm profits so high?: Reflections on the current “golden age” of finance’, Working Paper no. 134 (Amherst, MA: PERI (Political Economy Research Institute), University of Massachusetts, April 2007). 13.

How Not to Network a Nation: The Uneasy History of the Soviet Internet (Information Policy)
by Benjamin Peters
Published 2 Jun 2016

For example, sociologist Manuel Castells has developed an extensive argument detailing how the Soviet Union failed to enter the information age, which this book is in some ways a sideways response to, and legal scholar Lawrence Lessig used his experience observing the rapid deregulation and privatization in post-Soviet economic transition in the early 1990s as a formative analog for what he felt was an equally disastrous attitude about the supposed unregulability of cyberspace common in the late 1990s.10 Since then, scholars have recognized that the summary experiences of perhaps the last two great information frontiers of the twentieth-century—the rise of post-Soviet economic transition and the Internet—present not, as Francis Fukuyama infamously claimed, the end of history so much as a new chapter in it. Leading cyber legal scholar Yochai Benkler has argued for a middle way by observing how online modes of “commons-based peer production” sustain capitalist profit margins through collectivist forms of reputational altruistic communities that do not depend on individual self-interest.11 From the final chapters of Soviet history, we may begin to observe and puzzle through the perennial fact that, for many Western technologists and scholars, the promise of socialist collaboration shines brightest online today—a promise that the Soviet OGAS designers were among the first to foresee.

Rewriting the Rules of the European Economy: An Agenda for Growth and Shared Prosperity
by Joseph E. Stiglitz
Published 28 Jan 2020

However, the aggressive free-market approach of Margaret Thatcher and the fall of the Berlin Wall resulted in a major change in this balance, based on an excessive confidence in markets. In the clash between two competing systems, Communism and capitalism, the latter seemed to have triumphed absolutely. Some, like Francis Fukuyama, went so far as to proclaim “the end of history,” prophesying that the entire world would eventually appreciate the wisdom of liberalism, capitalism, and democracy. This triumphalism paved the way for a shrinking role for the state. This confidence in the market has taken more than a few body blows since 1989. Above all, the 2008 financial crisis laid bare deep structural shortcomings.

The Nanny State Made Me: A Story of Britain and How to Save It
by Stuart Maconie
Published 5 Mar 2020

On the contrary, I think most nurses, teachers, doctors, care workers, emergency-service personnel and the rest can be trusted with our children and our lives. In fact, that’s exactly what we do every day. Recent history tells us again and again that, more often than not, it’s those in the boardroom, the smooth ennobled fellow or his wideboy chum, who can’t be trusted. Even Francis Fukuyama, the US intellectual who, dizzy with excitement at the collapse of communism, wrote the once much lauded but latterly mocked The End of History (a confident assertion of the triumph of Western capitalist democracies and neoliberalism), now says that public ownership is no bad thing. If you mean redistributive programmes that try to redress this big imbalance in both incomes and wealth that has emerged then, yes, I think not only can it come back, it ought to come back.

Boom and Bust: A Global History of Financial Bubbles
by William Quinn and John D. Turner
Published 5 Aug 2020

Since people used the Internet increasingly often, its revolutionary potential was widely apparent, and the Internet itself was 163 BOOM AND BUST a powerful means of spreading the new era narrative.50 In some cases, these theories encompassed broader sociological and political changes as well as technological ones. In a nod to Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History, perhaps the most influential new era narrative of the time, a 1997 article in Foreign Affairs argued that ‘changes in technology, ideology, employment, and finance’ had precipitated ‘the end of the business cycle’.51 While new era ideas look foolish with hindsight, as of 2000, pessimistic forecasters had been crying wolf for so long that their warnings were easy to ignore.

Becoming Kim Jong Un: A Former CIA Officer's Insights Into North Korea's Enigmatic Young Dictator
by Jung H. Pak
Published 14 Apr 2020

After five decades of the Cold War, in which the United States and the Soviet Union had locked horns in an ideological confrontation, the West rejoiced in the collapse of the Soviet Union, seeing the event as a victory for liberal democracy and capitalism. The American political scientist Francis Fukuyama famously declared “the end of history.” The United States and Vietnam, where a hot war had punctuated the era of cold peace, normalized ties in 1995, a reconciliation that seemed to demonstrate to most observers that the world would now be marked by peaceful coexistence, with Washington as the global leader. Indeed, armed conflict decreased dramatically in the period between 1992 and 2003, and champions of globalization believed that mankind was on a linear path of progress with Western-style governance and economic models leading the way in knitting together the international community.

Democracy for Sale: Dark Money and Dirty Politics
by Peter Geoghegan
Published 2 Jan 2020

In 1999 and 2000, the Hudson Institute, a think tank whose funders also included Richard Mellon Scaife and the Koch brothers, organised two conferences in Washington and Berkshire to bring together leading figures in British and American conservatism.42 As authors Michael Kenny and Nick Pearce note in their history of the Anglosphere, the Hudson conferences proved crucial to the idea’s revival. Among the delegates were Thatcher, future Brexit minister David Davis, the influential Daily Telegraph owner Conrad Black, and prominent commentators such as James C. Bennett, John O’Sullivan and Francis Fukuyama, the neo-conservative historian who had prematurely prophesied the “the end of history” after the fall of communism. Many of the main contributors subsequently wrote books and articles proselytising for the Anglosphere, which often appeared in outlets owned by Black and Rupert Murdoch.43 In Washington, John Hulsman, a policy analyst at Heritage, called on “Britain to join an alternate future path, one that recognises that its natural economic and political partner remains the US, and not the European Union”.44 Somewhat ironically, it was the global financial meltdown from 2008 that propelled the Anglosphere into the centre of the conservative imagination.

The Economics of Enough: How to Run the Economy as if the Future Matters
by Diane Coyle
Published 21 Feb 2011

I watched the events, holding my breath in case it all went wrong at the last minute, on an ancient small black-and-white television in the depths of the English countryside. It couldn’t have been more exhilarating. Seeing the images again, twenty years on, was still an emotional experience. After the drama of the end of communism came the debate. Even those who found Francis Fukuyama’s famous and triumphal declaration of “The End of History” abrasive had to acknowledge that the philosophical basis of communism and economic planning was in tatters.1 In the economic sphere, the first chance people on each side of the divide had had for an honest look at each other’s way of life made it clear that the capitalist economies had massively outperformed the centrally planned ones.2 In the political sphere, there was no question about the huge costs imposed by repression, conformism, and the absence of civil liberties on countless individuals.

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Happiness and Economics: How the Economy and Institutions Affect Human Well-Being. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. 2007. “Should National Happiness Be Maximized?” Working Paper No. 306. Zurich: University of Zurich, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics. Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press. Galbraith, John Kenneth. 1952. American Capitalism—The Concept of Countervailing Power. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. ———. 1958. The Affluent Society. New York: Penguin. Garber, Peter. 1989. “Tulipmania.” Journal of Political Economy 97:3, pp. 535–60. ———. 1990.

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See also psychology Bell, Daniel, 230, 235–36 Bentham, Jeremy, 31 Berlin Wall, 182, 226, 239 Bhutan, Kingdom of, 40 Biswas–Diener, Robert, 48 Blackberry phones, 205 black markets, 225 Blake, William, 27 Blinder, Alan, 133, 224 Blueprint for a Safer Planet (Stern), 29 Bono, 194–96, 308n13 bonuses: bankers and, 87–88, 115, 139, 143–44, 193, 221, 223, 277–78, 295; as essential, 88; halting of, 278; lobbyists and, 87–88; penal tax on, 278; policy recommendations for, 277–79, 295–96; reform and, 295 boom–bust cycles, 4, 277, 280, 283; fairness and, 136–37; happiness and, 22, 28; posterity and, 93, 102, 106–9; trust and, 145, 147; values and, 213, 222–23, 233 Booth, Charles, 131 Boskin Commission, 37 Bové, José, 27 Bowling Alone (Putnam), 140–41 Boyle, James, 196 Brazil, 63, 65, 123 BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), 123, 160, 164, 176–77 British National Health Service, 247 British Social Attitudes, 140–41 Bronk, Richard, 28 Brown, Gordon, 93 Brundtlandt Report, 77 bubbles, 3, 26, 223, 228, 301n1 Buchanan, James, 220, 242 Bundesbank, 99 Burry, Michael, 86 Bush, George W., 127–28 Calculus of Consent, The: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Buchanan and Tullock), 242 call centers, 131, 133, 161 Cameron, David, 288 capitalism: China and, 234; communism and, 96, 182–83, 209–13, 218, 226, 230, 239–40; community and, 27, 51, 65, 117–18, 137, 141, 152–54; cultural effects of, 25–29, 230–38; current crisis of, 6–9; democracy and, 230–38; Engels on, 14; fairness and, 134, 137, 149; growth and, 268, 275, 290, 293, 297; happiness and, 25–29, 33, 45, 53–54; historical perspective on, 3, 6, 14; institutions and, 240; market failure and, 226–30; Marx on, 14; measurement and, 182; mercantile economy and, 27–28; nutrition and, 10; profit–oriented, 18; Protestant work ethic and, 13–14; protests against, 211–13; rethinking meaning of, 9; social effects of, 25–26; values and, 209–13, 218, 226, 230–32, 235–36; well-being and, 137–39 carbon prices, 70–71 celebrities, 33 charitable giving, 33, 141 Checkpoint Charlie, 147 China, 161, 262, 280; capitalism and, 234; carbon emissions and, 63; changed demographic structure of, 90; convergence and, 122; declining population in, 98; energy use in, 63, 65; global manufacturing and, 149; inequality and, 125–26; Mao and, 10; middle class of, 125–26; as next major power, 94; one–child policy and, 95–96; population growth and, 95–96; purchasing power parity (PPP) and, 306n19; rise in wealth of, 81, 122–23, 125, 212; savings and, 87, 94, 100, 108; wage penalties and, 133; World Bank influence and, 163 cities, 308n29; face-to-face contact and, 165–68; size and, 165–66; structural changes in, 165–70; urban clustering and, 166 City of London, 147, 221 Clemens, Michael, 81 climate change, 5–7, 17, 24, 90, 238; carbon prices and, 70–71; Copenhagen summit and, 62, 64–65, 68, 162, 292; domestic dissent and, 66–71; future and, 75–83; geological history and, 69; global warming and, 57, 64, 66, 68; greenhouse gases and, 23, 29, 35, 59, 61–63, 68, 70–71, 83; Himalayan glaciers and, 66–67; incandescent light bulbs and, 59–60; InterAcademy Council and, 66–67; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and, 59, 66–69, 82, 297; Kyoto Protocol and, 62–64; lack of consensus on, 66–71; Montreal Protocol and, 59; policy dilemma of, 58–62; policy recommendations for, 267, 280, 297; politics and, 62–65; social welfare and, 71–75; technology and, 59–60, 198 Coachella Value Music Festival, 197 Cobb, John, 36 Coca Cola, 150 coherence, 49 Cold War, 93, 112, 147, 209, 213, 239, 252 Collier, Paul, 77–78, 80, 82 Commerzbank, 87 Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, 37–38 communism: Berlin Wall and, 182, 226, 239; capitalism and, 96, 182–83, 209–13, 218, 226, 230, 239–40; Cold War and, 93, 112, 147, 209, 213, 239, 252; fall of, 209–13, 226, 239–40, 252; Iron Curtain and, 183, 239, 252; Leipzig marches and, 239; one-child policy and, 95–96; Velvet Revolution and, 239 community: civic engagement and, 140–41; globalization and, 148–49; intangible assets and, 149–52, 157, 161 (see also trust); public service and, 295; Putnam on, 140–41, 152–54 commuting, 45–47 Company of Strangers, The (Seabright), 148–49, 213–14 comprehensive wealth, 81–82, 202–3, 208, 271–73 consumerism, 22, 34, 45, 138 consumption: conspicuous, 11, 22, 45, 236; consumerism and, 22, 34, 45, 138; cutting, 61; downgrading status of, 11; downshifting and, 11, 55; Easterlin Paradox and, 39–44; global per capita, 72; of goods and services, 7, 10, 24, 35–36, 40, 82, 99, 161, 188, 191, 198, 214, 218, 228–29, 282; green lifestyle and, 55, 61, 76, 289, 293; growth and, 280, 295; happiness and, 22, 29, 40, 45; hedonic treadmill and, 40; increasing affluence and, 12; institutions and, 254, 263; Kyoto Protocol and, 63–64; measurement and, 181–82, 198; missing markets and, 229; natural resources and, 8–12, 58, 60, 79–82, 102, 112, 181–82; nature and, 58–61, 71–76, 79, 82; posterity and, 86, 104–5, 112–13; reduction of, 105; Slow Movement and, 27; trends in, 138; trilemma of, 13–14, 230–36, 275; values and, 229, 236 convergence, 5, 122 Copenhagen summit, 62, 64–65, 68, 162, 292 Crackberry, 205 Crafts, Nicholas, 156–57 credit cards, 2, 21, 136, 138, 283 Csikszentmilhalyi, Mihaly, 45–49 Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, The (Bell), 230, 235–36 Czechoslovakia, 239 Daly, Herman, 36 Damon, William, 48 Dasgupta, Partha, 61, 73, 77–78, 80, 82 David, Paul, 156 Dawkins, Richard, 118 debit cards, 2 decentralization, 7, 159, 218, 246, 255, 275, 291 defense budgets, 93 democracy, 2, 8, 16, 312n19; capitalism and, 230–38; culture and, 230–38; fairness and, 141; growth and, 268–69, 285–89, 296–97; institutions and, 242–43, 251–52, 262; nature and, 61, 66, 68; posterity and, 106; trust and, 175; values and, 230–35 Denmark, 125 Dickens, Charles, 131 Diener, Ed, 48, 49 Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality among Men (Rousseau), 114 distribution, 29, 306n22; Asian influence and, 123; bifurcation of social norms and, 231–32; consumerism and, 22, 34, 45, 138; Easterlin Paradox and, 39–44; fairness and, 115–16, 123–27, 134, 136; food and, 10, 34; of goods and services, 7, 10, 24, 35–36, 40, 82, 99, 161, 188, 191, 198, 214, 218, 228–29, 282; income, 34, 116, 123–27, 134, 278; inequality and, 123 (see also inequality); institutions and, 253; measurement and, 181, 191–99, 202; paradox of prosperity and, 174; policy recommendations for, 276, 278; posterity and, 87, 94; trust and, 151, 171; unequal countries and, 124–30; values and, 226 Dorling, Danny, 224, 307n58, 308n34 Douglas, Michael, 221 downshifting, 11, 55 downsizing, 175, 246, 255 drugs, 44, 46, 137–38, 168–69, 191, 302n47 Easterlin, Richard, 39 Easterlin Paradox, 39–44 eBay, 198 Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity project, The (TEEB), 78–79 economies of scale, 253–58 Economy of Enough, 233; building blocks for, 12–17; first ten steps for, 294–98; growth and, 182; happiness and, 24; institutions and, 250–51, 258, 261–63; living standards and, 13, 65, 78–79, 106, 113, 136, 139, 151, 162, 190, 194, 267; Manifesto of, 18, 267–98; measurement and, 182, 186–88, 201–7; nature and, 59, 84; Ostrom on, 250–51; posterity and, 17, 85–113; values and, 217, 233–34, 238; Western consumers and, 22 (see also consumption) Edinburgh University, 221 efficiency, 2, 7; evidence–based policy and, 233–34; fairness and, 126; Fama hypothesis and, 221–22; happiness and, 9, 29–30, 61; institutions and, 245–46, 254–55, 261; limits to, 13; nature and, 61–62, 69, 82; network effects and, 253, 258; productivity and, 13 (see also productivity); trilemma of, 13–14, 230–36, 275; trust and, 158–59; values and, 210, 215–16, 221–35 Ehrlich, Paul, 70 e-mail, 252, 291 “End of History, The” (Fukuyama), 239 Engels, Friedrich, 14 Enlightenment, 7 Enron, 145 environmentalists. See nature European Union, 42, 59, 62, 162–63, 177, 219 Evolution of Cooperation, The (Axelrod), 118–19 “Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, The” (Trivers), 118 externalities, 15, 70, 80, 211, 228–29, 249, 254 Facebook, 289 face-to-face contact, 7, 147, 165–68 fairness: altruism and, 118–22; antiglobalization and, 115; bankers and, 115, 133, 139, 143–44; behavioral econoics and, 116–17, 121; bonuses and, 87–88, 115, 139, 143–44, 193, 221, 223, 277–78, 295; capitalism and, 134, 137, 149; consequences for growth, 135–36; criticism of poor and, 142; democracy and, 141; emotion and, 118–19, 137; game theory and, 116–18, 121–22; government and, 121, 123, 131, 136; gratitude and, 118; growth and, 114–16, 121, 125, 127, 133–37; happiness and, 53; health issues and, 137–43; high salaries and, 130, 143–44, 193, 223, 277–78, 286, 296; inequality and, 115–16, 122–43; innate sense of, 114–19; innovation and, 121, 134; morals and, 116–20, 127, 131, 142, 144, 221; philosophy and, 114–15, 123; politics and, 114–16, 125–31, 135–36, 140–44; productivity and, 131, 135; Putnam on, 140–41; self-interest and, 114–22; social corrosiveness of, 139–44; social justice and, 31, 43, 53, 65, 123, 164, 224, 237, 286; statistics and, 115, 138; superstar effect and, 134; sustainability and, 115; technology and, 116, 131–34, 137; tit-for-tat response and, 118–19; trilemma of, 13–14, 230–36, 275; trust and, 139–44, 150, 157, 162, 172, 175–76; ultimatum game and, 116–17; unequal countries and, 124–30; wage penalties and, 133; well-being and, 137–43; World Values Survey and, 139 Fama, Eugene, 221–22 faxes, 252 Federal Reserve, 145 Ferguson, Niall, 100–101 financial crises: actions by governments and, 104–12; bubbles and, 3 (see also bubbles); capitalism and, 6–9 (see also capitalism); contracts and, 149–50; crashes and, 3, 28, 161, 244, 283; current, 54, 85, 90–91, 145; debt legacy of, 90–92; demographic implosion and, 95–100; goodwill and, 150; government debt and, 100–104; Great Depression and, 3, 28, 35, 61, 82, 150, 208, 281; growth debt and, 85–86; historical perspective on, 3–4; institutional blindness to, 87–88; intangible assets and, 149–50; intrusive regulatory practices and, 244; pension burden of, 92–95; as political crisis, 8–9; statistics of, 145; stimulus packages and, 91, 100–103, 111; structural change and, 25; total cost of current, 90–91; trust and, 88–89 (see also trust); weightless activities and, 150; welfare burden of, 92–95 Financial Times, 257 Fitzgerald, F.

Human Frontiers: The Future of Big Ideas in an Age of Small Thinking
by Michael Bhaskar
Published 2 Nov 2021

For example, no one really has a concrete suggestion for what, after the collapse of communism, might advantageously replace capitalism or liberal democracy as the dominant principles of world organisation, or even whether this is possible. Concepts like democracy and capitalism are commonly assumed to be in crisis. Yet without clear directions for the future or any replacements, they lurch on. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Francis Fukuyama noticed the phenomenon, famously (and more optimistically) calling it the ‘End of History’. His hypothesis has been mocked as the epitome of liberal overreach, but it's also widely misunderstood. He neither believed nor argued that events, including those of the highest significance, would stop, just that the principles and institutions of government and politics were unlikely to develop much further.

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(2019), ‘Large teams develop and small teams disrupt science and technology’, Nature 566, pp. 378–82 Wuchty, Stefan, Jones, Benjamin F., and Uzzi, Brian (2007), ‘The Increasing Dominance of Teams in Production of Knowledge’, Science, Vol. 316 No. 5827, pp. 1036–9 Xinhua (2019), ‘China to build scientific research station on Moon's south pole’, Xinhua, accessed 18 January 2021, available at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/24/c_138004666.htm Yueh, Linda (2018), The Great Economists: How Their Ideas Can Help Us Today, London: Penguin Viking Index ‘0,10’ exhibition 103 ‘0-I’ ideas 31 Aadhaar 265 abstraction 103 AC motor 287, 288 academia 209 Académie des sciences 47 Adam (robot) 235–6 Adams, John 211 Adler, Alfred 188 Adobe 265 Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) 180, 247, 253, 296, 317 AEG 34 aeroplanes 62–6, 68–70, 71, 219 Aeschylus 3 Africa 267, 279–80, 295 age/ageing 122, 158–60, 193 AGI see artificial general intelligence Agrarian Revolution 252 agricultural production 92–3 AI see artificial intelligence Akcigit, Ufuk 193 Alexander the Great 159 Alexander, Albert 52 Alexandrian Library 4, 295, 304 algorithms 175, 185, 196, 224, 235, 245 aliens 240–1, 306, 308–9, 337 Allison, Jim 58 Alphabet 193, 225, 265, 294, 295 AlphaFold software 225–6, 227, 228–9, 233 AlphaGo software 226–7, 228, 233 AlQuraishi, Mohammed 225, 226, 229 Amazon 84–5, 214, 272 Amazon Prime Air 71 American Revolution 139 amino acids 223, 226 Ampère, André-Marie 74–5 Anaximander 35 ancestors 10–12 ancient Greeks 1–6, 7–8, 291, 303–4 Anderson, Kurt 106 Angkor Wat 43 anthrax 47–8, 51 Anthropocene 14–15 anti-reason 211–12 anti-science 211–12 antibacterials 234 antibiotics 38, 52–3, 124, 125, 217, 315 resistance to 235 Apollo missions 70, 315, 316, 317, 318 Apple 33, 85, 159, 185, 186, 193, 272, 296, 312 Aquinas, Thomas 36 AR see augmented reality archaeology 153–4 Archimedes 1–6, 7–8, 19, 27, 32, 37, 39, 291, 304 architecture 103, 115, 188 ARIA 297 Aristarchus 5 Aristotle 24, 108, 282, 304 Arkwright, Richard 25, 26, 34, 253 Armstrong, Louis 103 ARPA see Advanced Research Projects Agency art 99–104, 107–8, 176–7, 236, 321, 339 Artemis (Moon mission) 71, 218 artificial general intelligence (AGI) 226, 237–8, 249, 250, 310, 313, 330, 341 artificial intelligence (AI) 225–9, 233–41, 246–7, 248, 249–52, 262, 266, 300, 310, 312–13, 323, 329, 330, 331, 338 arts 152, 293 see also specific arts Artsimovich, Lev 147 arXiv 116 Asia 264, 267–8, 273, 275 Asimov, Isaac, Foundation 45 Astor, John Jacob 288 astronomy 30, 231, 232 AT&T 85, 181, 183, 185, 197 Ates, Sina T. 193 Athens 24, 295 Atlantis 154 augmented reality (AR) 241–2, 338 authoritarianism 112–13, 284 autonomous vehicles 71, 72, 219 ‘Axial Age’ 108 Azoulay, Pierre 317–18 Bach, J.S. 236 bacillus 46 Bacon, Francis 25, 259 bacteria 38, 46, 53 Bahcall, Safi 31 Ballets Russes 99–100 Baltimore and Ohio railway 67 Banks, Iain M. 310 Bardeen, John 182 BASF 289 Batchelor, Charles 286 Bates, Paul 226 Bayes, Thomas 289 Beagle (ship) 36 Beethoven, Ludwig van 26 Beijing Genomics Institute 257, 294–5 Bell Labs 180–4, 186–8, 190, 206, 214, 217, 289, 296, 322 Benz, Karl 68, 219, 330 Bergson, Henri 109 Bessemer process 80 Bezos, Jeff 71, 326 Bhattacharya, Jay 201, 202, 321 Biden, Joe 59 Big Bang 117, 174, 181 Big Big Ideas 79–80 big ideas 5, 8, 11, 13–19 adoption 28 and an uncertain future 302–36 and art 99–103 artificial 223–38 and the Big Ideas Famine 13 and bisociation 36 blockers to 17–18 and breakthrough problems 46–73, 77, 86, 98, 222, 250, 301 and the ‘burden of knowledge’ effect 154–65, 175, 178, 235, 338 and business formation 95 ceiling 18 conception 37 definition 27–8, 40–1 Enlightenment 132–40, 136–40 era of 109–10 erroneous 176 evidence for 222, 223–54 execution 37 ‘fishing out’ mechanism 152 future of 45, 98, 302–36, 337–43 harmful nature 41–2 how they work 23–45 and the Idea Paradox 178–9, 187, 191, 217, 226, 250, 254, 283–4, 301, 312, 342 and the Kardashev Scale 337–43 long and winding course of 4, 5, 35–8, 136 and the low-hanging fruit paradox 149–54, 167, 178 and luck 38–9 moral 136, 138 nature of 169–72 necessity of 41–3 need for 42–3 normalisation of 171–5, 178 originality of 28 paradox of 143–79 and patents 97 process of 37–8 purchase 37–8 and resources 128 and rights 132–40 and ‘ripeness’ 39 and short-termism 192 slow death of 106–7 slowdown of 98 society's reaction to 216 and specialisation 156, 157–8 today 21–140 tomorrow 141–343 big pharma 31, 60, 185, 217–18, 226 Big Science 118–19 Bill of Rights 137 Bingham, Hiram 153 biology 243–8, 300 synthetic 245–6, 251, 310, 329 BioNTech 218, 298 biotech 195–6, 240, 246, 255–8, 262, 266, 307 bisociation 36 Björk 104 Black, Joseph 26 ‘black swan’ events 307, 310 Bletchley Park 180, 296 Bloom, Nick 91, 92, 93 Boeing 69, 72, 162, 165, 192, 238 Bohr, Niels 104, 118, 159 Boltsmann, Ludwig 188 Boston Consulting Group 204 Botha, P.W. 114 Bowie, David 107 Boyer, Herbert 243 Boyle, Robert 232 Brahe, Tycho 36, 229, 292 brain 166, 246–8, 299–300 collective 299, 300–1 whole brain emulations (‘ems’) 248–9, 341 brain drains 197 brain-to-machine interfaces 247–8 Branson, Richard 71 Brattain, Walter 182 Brazil 266–7, 268, 279 breakthrough organisations 294–9 breakthrough problems 46–73, 77, 86, 98, 222, 234, 250, 301 breakthroughs 2–5, 27–8, 32–7, 41, 129, 152, 156 and expedition novelty 333 hostility to 187 medical 58–60 missing 175 near-misses 160 nuclear power 145 price of 87–98 and short-termism 192 slowdown of 87, 94 society's reaction to 216 and universities 204 see also ‘Eureka’ moments breast cancer 94 Brexit referendum 2016: 208 Brin, Sergey 319, 326 Britain 24, 146, 259, 283, 297 see also United Kingdom British Telecom 196 Brunel, Isambard Kingdom 67 Brunelleschi 232 Bruno, Giordano 216 Buddhism 108, 175, 264–5, 340 Buhler, Charlotte 188–9 Buhler, Karl 188–9 ‘burden of knowledge’ effect 154–65, 175, 178, 235, 338 bureaucracy 198–87, 280–1 Bush, George W. 211 Bush, Vannevar 168, 314–15, 317 business start-ups 95–6 Cage, John 104 Callard, Agnes 111 Caltech 184 Cambridge University 75, 76, 124, 235–6, 257, 294–6 canals 67 cancer 57–61, 76, 93–4, 131, 234, 245, 318 research 59–61 capital and economic growth 88 gray 192, 196 human 275, 277 capitalism 36, 111–13, 186, 189, 191–8 CAR-Ts see chimeric antigen receptor T-cells carbon dioxide emissions 220–1 Cardwell's Law 283 Carey, Nessa 244 Carnap, Rudolf 189 Carnarvon, Lord 153 cars 289 electric 71 flying 71 Carter, Howard 153 Carter, Jimmy 58 Carthage 3, 43 Cartright, Mary 163 CASP see Critical Assessment of Protein Structure Prediction Cassin, René 135 Catholic Church 206, 230 Cavendish Laboratory 76, 294 Cell (journal) 234 censorship 210–11 Census Bureau (US) 78 Centers for Disease Control 212 Cerf, Vint 253 CERN 118, 233, 239, 252, 296 Chain, Ernst 52, 60, 124 Champollion, Jean-François 155 Chang, Peng Chun 135 change 10–13, 18–19, 24 rapid 30, 32 resistance to 222 slowdown 85 chaos theory 163 Chaplin, Charlie 104 Chardin, Pierre Teilhard de 300 Charpentier, Emmanuelle 244, 256 chemistry 49, 56, 104, 117, 118, 124, 149–50, 159, 241, 244 chemotherapy 57 Chicago 10 chicken cholera 46 chimeric antigen receptor T-cells (CAR-Ts) 58, 61 China 15, 25, 71–2, 111, 112, 138, 208, 213, 216, 255–64, 265, 266, 267, 268, 275, 277, 279, 280, 283, 284–5, 312, 313, 314, 319, 328 Han 259, 260 Ming 284, 308, 309 Qing 260 Song 24, 259–60, 306 Tang 259–60 Zhou 259 Christianity 108, 303–4, 340 Church, George 245 cities 270–2, 308–9, 340 civilisation collapse 42–4 decay 187 cleantech 195 climate change 219–21, 284, 313–14, 338 clinical trials 218 cliodynamics 339 coal 23, 24, 26, 80, 220 Cocteau, Jean 101 cognitive complexity, high 332–3 cognitive diversity 281–3 Cognitive Revolution 252 Cohen, Stanley N. 243, 244 collective intelligence 339 collectivism 282 Collison, Patrick 117, 272 colour 75 Coltrane, John 104 Columbian Exchange 177 Columbus 38 comfort zones, stepping outside of 334 communism 111, 133, 134, 173, 217, 284 companies creation 95–6 numbers 96–7 competition 87, 283 complacency 221–2 complexity 161–7, 178, 204, 208, 298, 302, 329 high cognitive 332–3 compliance 205–6 computational power 128–9, 168, 234, 250 computer games 107 computers 166–7, 240, 253 computing 254 see also quantum computing Confucianism 133, 259 Confucius 24, 108, 109, 282 Congressional Budget Office 82 connectivity 272 Conon of Samos 4 consciousness 248, 340 consequences 328–9 consolidation, age of 86 Constantine 303 convergence 174, 311–12 Copernicus 29, 30, 41, 152, 171, 229, 232, 292 copyright 195 corporations 204–5 cosmic background microwave radiation 117, 181 cotton weaving, flying shuttle 24–5 Coulomb, Charles-Augustin de 74–5 counterculture 106 Covid-19 (coronavirus) pandemic 13, 14, 15, 55, 86, 113–14, 193, 202, 208, 212, 218, 251–2, 263, 283–4, 297–8, 309, 318, 327 vaccine 125, 245 Cowen, Tyler 13, 82, 94–5, 221 cowpox 47 creativity 188, 283 and artificial intelligence 236 crisis in 108 decrease 106–8 and universities 203 Crete 43 Crick, Francis 119, 296 CRISPR 243, 244, 251, 255–8, 299 Critical Assessment of Protein Structure Prediction (CASP) 224–6, 228 Cronin, Lee 242 crop yields 92–3 cultural diversity 281–3 cultural homogenisation 177 cultural rebellion 106–7 Cultural Revolution 114, 305 culture, stuck 106 Cunard 67 Curie, Marie 104, 144, 203, 289–90, 332 Daniels, John T. 62–3 Daoism 259 dark matter/energy/force 338 DARPA see Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Darwin, Charles 34, 35–6, 37–8, 41, 77, 109, 118, 171, 289 Darwin, Erasmus 35 data 233 datasets, large 28 Davy, Sir Humphrey 149, 150 Debussy, Claude 100–1 decision-making, bad 43–4 Declaration of Independence 1776: 137 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen 1789: 137 DeepMind 225–9, 296 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 315 democracy 111–12 Deng Xiaoping 261 deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 119, 223–4, 243, 251, 255, 339 DNA sequencing 56 Derrida, Jacques 109 Deutsch, David 126, 203 Diaghilev, Sergei 99–101 Diamond, Jared 42 Digital Age 180 digital technology 241–2, 243 diminishing returns 87, 91, 94, 97, 118, 123, 126, 130–1, 150, 161, 169, 173, 222, 250, 276, 285, 301 Dirac, Paul 159–60 disruption 34, 96, 109, 119, 157 diversity, cultural 281–3 DNA see deoxyribonucleic acid Dorling, Danny 171 Doudna, Jennifer 244, 251, 256 Douglas, Mary 290 Douthat, Ross 14, 106 drag 65 Drake equation 306 Drezner, Daniel 214 drones, delivery 71, 72 Drucker, Peter 189 drugs 55–7, 124, 235 Eroom's Law 55, 57, 61, 92–3, 119, 161, 234, 245, 338 and machine learning 234 research and development 55–7, 61, 92–4, 119, 161, 172–3, 217–18, 234, 245, 315, 338 see also pharmaceutical industry Duchamp, Marcel 103, 171 DuPont 184 Dutch East India Company 34 Dyson, Freeman 120 dystopias 305–8 East India Company 34 Easter Island 42–3 Eastern Europe 138 ecocides 42–3 economic growth 240, 272, 273, 316 endogenous 94 and ideas 88, 89–92, 95 process of 87–8 slowdown 82, 83, 84, 85, 178 economics 87–9, 98, 339, 340 contradictions of 87 Economist, The (magazine) 188 Edelman annual trust barometer 209 Edison, Thomas 183–4, 286–9, 290, 293 education 127, 277, 324–8 Einstein, Albert 11, 29, 74, 77, 104, 109, 117, 119, 124, 159–60, 203, 332 Eisenstein, Elizabeth 231 Eldredge, Niles 30 electric cars 71 electricity 11, 74–7, 81, 286–7, 289 electromagnetic fields 76 electromagnetic waves 75, 76 elements (chemical) 149–50 Elizabeth II 144–5 employment 204–5 Encyclopædia Britannica 97, 128, 155 ‘End of History’ 112 energy 337–8, 341–2 availability 85 use per capita 85 see also nuclear power engineering 243 England 25, 144–5, 309 Englert, François 118 Enlightenment 130, 136–40, 252 see also Industrial Enlightenment; neo-Enlightenment Eno, Brian 295 entrepreneurship, decline 96 epigenetics 164 epigraphy 236–7 epistemic polarisation 210 Epstein, David 334 Eratosthenes 5 Eroom's Law 55, 57, 61, 92–3, 119, 161, 234, 245, 338 ethical issues 256–7 Euclid 3, 304 ‘Eureka’ moments 2–5, 35, 36–7, 129, 163 Europe 95, 247, 258–60, 268, 268, 271, 283, 304, 308 European Space Agency 71 European Union (EU) 206, 216, 262, 266 Evans, Arthur 153 evolutionary theory 30, 35–6 expedition novelty 333 experimental spaces 296–8 Expressionism 104 Facebook 34, 159, 170, 197 Fahrenheit 232 failure, fear of 335 Faraday, Michael 75 FCC see Future Circular Collider FDA see Food and Drug Administration Federal Reserve (US) 82 Feigenbaum, Mitchell 163 fermentation 49 Fermi, Enrico 143, 159, 306 Fermi Paradox 306 Fernández-Armesto, Felipe 109 fertility rates 269 Feynman, Richard 77, 166, 332 film 104, 106–7, 108, 115 financialism 191–8, 206–7, 214, 217, 219 Firebird, The (ballet) 99–100 ‘first knowledge economy’ 25–6 First World War 54, 99, 104, 187, 188–9 Fisk, James 182 Fleming, Alexander 38, 52, 60, 332 flight 36, 62–6, 68–70, 71, 335 Flint & Company 64 flooding 220, 284 Florey, Howard 52, 60, 124, 332 Flyer, the 62–4, 66, 72 Foldit software 225 Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 55, 60, 93, 212 food supply 81 Ford 34, 253 Ford, Henry 68, 104, 219 Fordism 81 Foucault, Michel 110 Fraenkel, Eduard 124 France 49–51, 54, 64, 67, 95, 279, 309, 332 franchises 31 Franklin, Benjamin 119, 211 Frederick the Great 292 French Revolution 137, 275 Freud, Sigmund 34, 36, 77, 104, 171, 188, 190, 216 frontier 278–9, 283–4, 302, 310–11 Fukuyama, Francis 111–12 fundamentalism 213 Future Circular Collider (FCC) 239 futurology 44 Gagarin, Yuri 70 Galen 303 Galileo 206, 231, 232, 291, 322 Galois, Évariste 159 GDPR see General Data Protection Regulation Gell-Mann, Murray 77 gene editing 243–4, 251, 255–8 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 206 General Electric (GE) 33, 184, 265, 288, 333 General Motors 289 Generation Z 86 genes 223–4 genetic engineering 243–4, 251, 253, 255–8 genetic science 163–4, 202 genius 26 genome, human 119, 202, 244, 255–7, 296, 313 genome sequencing 243–4 germ theory of disease 50–1, 53 Germany 54, 95, 96, 279, 283, 292, 332 Gesamtkunstwerk 99 Gibson, William 241 Glendon, Mary Ann 135 global warming 147 globalisation 177 Go 226–7 Gödel, Kurt 41, 168 Goldman Sachs 197 Goodhart's Law 199 Google 34, 85, 185, 197, 240, 272, 318 20 per cent time 319–20 Google Glass 241 Google Maps 86 Google Scholar 116 Google X 294 Gordon, Robert 13, 83, 94–5 Gouges, Olympe de 137 Gould, Stephen Jay 30 Gove, Michael 208 government 205, 207, 214, 216, 252, 267–8, 297 funding 185–6, 249, 252, 314–19, 321 GPT language prediction 234, 236 Graeber, David 13–14, 111 grants 120, 185–6, 195, 202, 316, 317, 319, 321–3 gravitational waves 117–18, 119 Great Acceleration 309–10 Great Convergence 255–301, 339 Great Disruption 96 Great Enrichment (Great Divergence) 23, 26, 258 Great Exhibition 1851: 293, 309 Great Stagnation Debate 13–14, 16, 17, 45, 72, 82–3, 87, 94–6, 129, 150, 240, 279, 338 Greenland 42 Gropius, Walter 103 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 82, 90, 128, 278, 318 GDP per capita 23, 78, 82 growth cultures 25 growth theory, endogenous 88–9, 94 Gutenberg, Johannes 36 Guzey, Alexey 200, 322 Haber, Fritz 332 Haber-Bosch process 289 Hadid, Zaha 152 Hahn, Otto 144 Hamilton, Margaret 316 Harari, Yuval Noah 114–15, 236 Harris, Robert 307 Harvard Fellows 200 Harvard, John 156 Harvey, William 34, 291–2 Hassabis, Demis 229, 233 Hayek, Friedrich 189 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 36 Heisenberg, Werner 41, 159, 168, 332 heliocentric theory 5, 29, 118, 232, 304 helium 145 Hendrix, Jimi 105 Henry Adams curve 85 Hero of Alexandria 39 Herper, Matthew 55 Hertz, Heinrich 76 Herzl, Theodor 188 Hesse, Herman 307 Hieron II, king of Syracuse 1–2 Higgs, Peter 118 Higgs boson 117–18, 119, 239 Hinduism 133 Hiroshima 144 Hitler, Adolf 138, 188 Hodgkin, Dorothy 124, 332 Hollingsworth, J.

The American Way of Poverty: How the Other Half Still Lives
by Sasha Abramsky
Published 15 Mar 2013

Skip forward forty years, however, and in many political circles that concern with addressing the needs of the worst-off, and with wrestling with markets’ imperfections, had largely vanished. In the post–Cold War world—a triumphalist environment that the political scientist Francis Fukuyama notoriously labeled “the end of history”—there were, quite simply, few to no breaks placed on the machinations of markets. The result was both a philosophical and practical breakdown in many of the networks of laws, regulatory agencies, and cultural practices designed to tame markets. The crisis that ensued is as much an existential one—of identity—as a practical economic mess.

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We have a large population who are poor; economic opportunities are few and far between. On a year-to-year basis they’re going to have a lot of uncertainty trying to make long-term plans. Employment in Eastern Kentucky for men 25 to 60: about 65 percent are employed; nationally it’s about 85.” MARKETS RUN AMOK, SHIVERING IN THE RAINFOREST, AND THE END OF HISTORY Regional development alone, however, won’t be enough. After all, some problems, such as the massive growth in unemployment seen in the post-2008 years, have national implications. To tackle them, we need to marshal energies at a federal level. There will have to be an expansion in the resources available to meet the needs of the long-term unemployed and jobless, as well as resources to keep the short-term unemployed out of poverty and to preserve the assets of the working and middle classes during particularly acute economic downturns.

The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality
by Katharina Pistor
Published 27 May 2019

The data measure the sum of all national income at the global level, where national income includes public and private income as well as income from existing resources, labor, and the expected value of future gains. 2. Note that in terms of global income, they still fall squarely in the center of the income curve, accounting for the range from 50th to 90th percentiles. 3. Fukuyama’s provocative thesis about the “end of history” has become emblematic for this period. See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 4. See, for example, Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View (London, New York: Verso, 1999). 5. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York, London: Norton, 2002); Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox (New York: Norton, 2011). 6.

Bad Money: Reckless Finance, Failed Politics, and the Global Crisis of American Capitalism
by Kevin Phillips
Published 31 Mar 2008

Technology guru George Gilder theologized that “it is the entrepreneurs who know the rules of the world and the laws of God.” Thomas Friedman, the New York Times columnist, enthused, “International finance has turned the world into a parliamentary system” that allows initiates “to vote every hour, every day through their mutual funds, their pension funds, their brokers.” Even historian Francis Fukuyama, normally sober, burbled that “liberal democracy combined with open market economics has become the only model a state could follow.”1 The Holy Grail had rarely been pursued with more passion than market-bewitched academicians brought to seeking financial capitalism’s roots in furthest antiquity.

…

In China, with its $1.4 trillion holdings, comments on how Beijing might or might not view the anemic U.S. currency sometimes came from officials of leading Communist Party bodies.2 Something went wrong in the 1990s after “the fall of Communism”; somebody forgot to explain the New World Order to the Russians and the Chinese. Instead, Anglo-Saxon speculative capitalism—in a grand misreading that may yet turn out to match the cupidity of the French Bourbons in 1789—decided to celebrate “the end of history” and the perceived vacuum of serious economic rivalry by staging the largest-ever orgy of debt and credit. If history had ended, thereby assuring the triumphal invulnerability of asset-backed securities and structured investment vehicles, well, then, let ’em roll. Of course, we now know that history had not ended; the muse had merely started learning Mandarin, Hindi, and Arabic, rereading Karl Polanyi and Hyman Minsky, and pondering what might befall a leading world economic power that so worshipped its markets as to entrust them to hedge funds, bad quantitative mathematics, and banks like Citigroup.

Geek Heresy: Rescuing Social Change From the Cult of Technology
by Kentaro Toyama
Published 25 May 2015

Congressman Henry Waxman said of it, “History may look back and say this was the turning point on climate” (Parsons et al. 2014). Let’s hope it sticks. 14.Figures are as posted by the US Energy Information Administration (2010) and include only CO2 emissions from the burning of fossil fuels in 2010. 15.Francis Fukuyama (1992) contended that liberal democracy represents the “end of history” – the summit and end point of human civilization, which other nations would eventually tend toward. The thesis has been heavily criticized, not least by Fukuyama himself. 16.Asimov (1942 [1991]), p. 126. Asimov’s thinking about the laws of robotics was philosophically much deeper than presented here, though none of it changes what I’m trying to say in these paragraphs.

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Additional intrinsic growth would mean less material consumption and more involvement with self-transcendent ends. Other countries would likely follow. Seeking our own growth also takes the edge off paternalism. Humility is required in social causes, as privileged-world dogmas often cause damage. We should dispense with arrogant notions that we’ve reached some End of History.15 Today’s rich societies are, at best, adolescents with still a long way to go before they reach maturity. When everyone’s intrinsic growth is a common goal, relationships become closer to true partnerships. When Do We Intend to Start? Isaac Asimov was tired of dark robot stories. Tales involving what he called the “Frankenstein syndrome” always had humanity destroyed by its own creations.

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Fried, Barbara. (2013). Beyond blame. Boston Review, June 28, 2013, www.bostonreview.net/forum/barbara-fried-beyond-blame-moral-responsibility-philosophy-law. Friedman, Thomas L. (2005). The World Is Flat: The Globalized World in the Twenty-First Century. Penguin. Fukuyama, Francis. (1992). The End of History and the Last Man. Free Press. Fuller, Robert W. (2004). Somebodies and Nobodies: Overcoming the Abuse of Rank. New Society Publishers. Fundación Paraguaya. (n.d.). Self-sufficient school, www.fundacionparaguaya.org.py/?page_id=741. Gallup and Purdue University. (2014). Great jobs great lives: The 2014 Gallup-Purdue index report, http://products.gallup.com/168857/gallup-purdue-index-inaugural-national-report.aspx.

The Innovation Illusion: How So Little Is Created by So Many Working So Hard
by Fredrik Erixon and Bjorn Weigel
Published 3 Oct 2016

“The Goliath of totalitarianism will be brought down by the David of the microchip,” mused conservative icon Ronald Reagan,22 who drew heavily from technology enthusiasts like George Gilder, an economist who later identified the billion-transistor chip as the cure to root out all economic evil.23 A British libertarian politician has predicted that the new digital age will be the end of politics.24 Neoconservatives similarly were quick to embrace the revolutionary promise of technology. In his thought-provoking but often misunderstood book The End of History and the Last Man, Francis Fukuyama charted the idea of a progressive relationship between technology in modern consumer culture and capitalism. It was the “ultimate victory of the VCR,” he argued, to have homogenized the world upon liberal economic principles.25 Twenty-five years later, after a crushing ideological defeat for the revolutionary view of new technology, Twitter was proposed as a contender for the Nobel Peace Prize.

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At the sixty-fourth square, the pile of rise equaled the size of Mount Everest. 10.Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 41. 11.Levy, Love and Sex with Robots. 12.Holley, “Apple Co-founder on Artificial Intelligence.” 13.Romm, “Americans Are More Afraid of Robots Than Death.” 14.Smith and Anderson, “AI, Robotics, and the Future of Jobs.” 15.This section on Stafford Beer and Project Cybersyn builds on Medina, Cybernetic Revolutionaries. 16.Medina, Cybernetic Revolutionaries, 25. 17.Morozov, “The Planning Machine.” 18.Huebner, “A Possible Declining Trend for Worldwide Innovation,” 985. 19.Taleb, Antifragile. 20.Kelly, “The New Socialism.” 21.Mason, Postcapitalism. 22.The Economist, “Caught in the Net.” 23.Gilder, Microcosm. 24.Carswell, The End of Politics and the Birth of iDemocracy. 25.Fukuyama, The End of History, 98–108. 26.Kaminsky, “Iran’s Twitter Revolution.” 27.Nixon, “Lack of Innovation Leaves EU Trailing.” 28.OECD, “Territorial Review: Stockholm, Sweden 2006.” 29.Legrain, European Spring, 367. 30.Gordon, “Secular Stagnation.” 31.Gage, “The Venture Capital Secret.” 32.Marmer et al., “Startup Genome Report Extra,” 10. 33.Schumpeter’s vision of capitalism is explained in Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development and, in a different way, in Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. 34.For a discerning analysis of the similarities between Marx and Schumpeter, see Elliott, “Marx and Schumpeter on Capitalism’s Creative Destruction.” 35.Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1992), 61. 36.To avoid repetition in the book we will use terms like contestable innovation, big innovation, radical innovation, or game-changing innovation to describe the same phenomenon: innovation that contests markets. 37.Mokyr, “Long-Term Economic Growth and the History of Technology,” 4. 38.Broadberry et al., British Economic Growth. 39.Clark, A Farewell to Alms, 1. 40.Phelps, Mass Flourishing. 41.Our version of modern capitalism and its birth draws on several scholars such as Gregory Clark, David Landes, Joel Mokyr, and Edmund Phelps.

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Frey, Carl Benedikt, and Michael A. Osborne. “The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation.” Paper, Sept. 17, 2013. At http://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/The_Future_of_Employment.pdf. Frum, David, “Paris Taxi Shortage: It’s about Jobs.” CNN, July 10, 2012. Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History and the Last Man. Simon & Schuster, 2006. Gabler, Alain, and Markus Poschke, “Experimentation by Firms, Distortions, and Aggregate Productivity.” Review of Economic Dynamics, 16.1 (2013): 26–38. Gage, Deborah, “The Venture Capital Secret: 3 out of 4 Start-ups Fail.” Wall Street Journal, Sept. 20, 2012.

This Land: The Struggle for the Left
by Owen Jones
Published 23 Sep 2020

After another failed challenge for the leadership, in the following years and decades Benn himself changed: no longer a figurehead for a movement seriously aspiring to power, he became more of a moral conscience, a comfort to the defeated fragments of the left. This was the iteration of Tony Benn I was familiar with. Growing up in the age of ‘The End of History’ – the title of political scientist Francis Fukuyama’s 1989 landmark essay, which argued that free-market liberal democracy was the endpoint of human development – I found him a reassuringly defiant, but isolated, voice challenging the neoliberal dogma of ‘There is no alternative’. In his final years, we spoke together at meetings and rallies, and I got to know him; his warmth, optimism, tea-drinking and pipe-smoking were undimmed.

…

Murray remembers the Daily Mail in the late 1980s crowing that the spectre of socialism had been lifted from Britain. ‘We didn’t have a convincing rebuttal,’ he says, ‘other than a sense that history would turn at some point.’ In these dark moments, it was only this faint hope that sustained the left: where neoliberals, convinced of the permanence of their triumph, talked of the end of history, the left clung to the idea that history had a habit of coming back. But, in the early 1990s, it didn’t look likely any time soon. A new consensus had been forged, one defined by the late cultural theorist Mark Fisher as ‘capitalist realism’, or ‘the widespread sense that not only is capitalism the only viable political and economic system, but also that it is now impossible even to imagine a coherent alternative to it’.6 Len McCluskey, a thick-set Scouser whose rectangular spectacles give him the air of an intellectual bouncer, is the most influential trade union leader of modern times.

…

The eternal sunshine of neoliberalism was exposed for what it was: a sham. As people realized this, they turned again to politics and history, and started to protest. By this point, the veneer had long since come off the shiny surfaces of the Blair government and similar centrist administrations around the world, with their implied mantra of ‘The End of History’. At the close of the twentieth century, the term ‘anti-capitalism’ had started to creep into mainstream news bulletins, along with coverage of mass worldwide protests from Prague to Seattle, Genoa to Gothenburg. The political establishment saw these demonstrations as a futile howl against ‘globalization’, the system that was now here to stay.

World Cities and Nation States
by Greg Clark and Tim Moonen
Published 19 Dec 2016

Analysts and commentators searched for new conceptual tools to grasp this change. The emergence of a new way of thinking about cities coincided with a wave of optimism and prophecy about the future of global society, as the Berlin Wall came down, the Soviet Union collapsed and regional economic integration accelerated. Francis Fukuyama’s (1989) ‘The End of History’ thesis famously declared the triumph of Western liberal democracy and the inevitable supremacy of global capitalism; this had an echo in the ‘end of the nation state’ foreseen by management and economics analyst Kenichi Ohmae (1995). Ohmae viewed nation states as inefficient and bureaucratic obstacles to globalised economic growth.

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Regionalism and Global Economic Integration: Europe, Asia and the Americas. London and New York: Routledge. Frankopan, P. (2015). The Silk Roads: A new history of the world. London: Bloomsbury. Friedmann, J. (1986). The world city hypothesis. Development and Change, 17(1): 69–83. Fukuyama, F. (1989). The End of History? In The National Interest (1992). The End of History and the Last Man. New York: The Free Press. Germain, R.D. (1997). The International Organization of Credit: States and Global Finance in the World‐Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Giersig, N. (2008). Multilevel urban governance and the European City: discussing metropolitan reforms in Stockholm and Helsinki.

Why geography matters: three challenges facing America : climate change, the rise of China, and global terrorism
by Harm J. De Blij
Published 15 Nov 2007

And this is only one dimension of the ceaseless transformation of Earth that began 4.6 billion years ago. OCEANS PAST AND FUTURE The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 led to much introspection—not only political, but also philosophical and scientific—and gave rise to a spate of books signaling the onset of a new era. Their titles were often misleading, such as The End of History by Francis Fukuyama, but none more so than one by John Horgan (1996) called The End of Science, which argued that all the great questions of science had been answered and that what remained, essentially, was a filling of the gaps. When it comes to global environments, however, some great questions remain open.

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See also specific regions and countries and geography, 10, 15 and Islam, 164 and NAFTA, 3 and population, 95-96 and terrorism, 175 Economist, 52, 95, 257 Ecuador, 120, 180 education graduate education of geographers, 6, 46 on Islam, 164 and population, 96 status of geography, X, 12, 13, 14-19 Eemian interglacial, 69, 72-73, 82, 83, 90 Egypt ancient civilization of, 128, 134,258-59 Islam in, 162, 185 terrorism, 156, 159, 161, 176 Ehriich, Paul, 93 empires, 77, 135, 138-44 The End of History (Fukuyama), 57 The End of Science (Horgan), 57 energy crises, 21,51, 132, 277-78. See also natural gas; oil England, 202. See also United Kingdom English Channel, 74 Enlai, Zhou, 125 Environmental Conservation, 15 environmental determinism, 11, 87-90 environmental issues, 6, 15, 100-101, 102, 115.

Dreaming in Code: Two Dozen Programmers, Three Years, 4,732 Bugs, and One Quest for Transcendent Software
by Scott Rosenberg
Published 2 Jan 2006

This is the scenario presented by a business thinker named Nicholas Carr in a notorious May 2003 article in the Harvard Business Review titled “IT Doesn’t Matter.” Carr infuriated legions of Silicon Valley visionaries and technology executives by suggesting that their products—the entire corpus of information technology, or IT—had become irrelevant. Like Francis Fukuyama, the Hegelian philosopher who famously declared “the end of history” when the Berlin wall fell and the Soviet Union imploded, Carr argued, essentially, that software history is over, done. We know what software is, what it does, and how to deploy it in the business world, so there is nothing left but to dot the i’s and bring on the heavyweight methodologies to perfect it.

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To believe that we already know all the possible uses for software is to assume that the programs we already possess satisfy all our needs and that people are going to stop seeking something better. Irate critics of software flaws like The Software Conspiracy’s Mark Minasi and skeptical analysts of the software business like Nicholas Carr share these end-of-history blinders. If you believe that we already know everything we want from software, then it’s natural to believe that with enough hard work and planning, we can perfect it—and that’s where we should place our energies. Don’t even think about new features and novel ideas; focus everyone’s energies on whittling down every product’s bug list until we can say, for the first time in history, that most software is in great shape.

Who Owns the Future?
by Jaron Lanier
Published 6 May 2013

Lana Wachowski, cowriter and director of the Matrix movies, described a later project, Cloud Atlas, as residing between “the future idea that everything is fragmented and the past idea that there is a beginning, middle, and end.”1 As the turn of the millennium approached, such declarations were commonplace (as in the monologue of the “world’s oldest Bolshevik” in Tony Kushner’s play Perestroika, or aspects of Francis Fukuyama’s book The End of History—both from 1992), but it’s odd that we can still hear them today even from the most tech-oriented writers and thinkers. You won’t find any such point of view within tech circles, however. There, one is immersed in a clear-enough dominant narrative. Everything is becoming more and more software-mediated, physicality is becoming more mutable by technology, and reality is being optimized.

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W., 149 Bush, Vannevar, 221n business data, 112–13, 150, 189 business plans, 107–8, 117–20, 154, 169–74, 175, 236, 258, 301–2, 344–45 cached data mirrors, 223 Cage, John, 212 California, University of, at Berkeley, 104, 107–8, 111, 172 call centers, 177n Caltech, 94, 184 Cambridge, Mass., 157–58 cameras, 2, 10, 89, 265, 309–11, 319 capital flows, 37, 43–45, 47, 49, 201, 329, 355–56 capitalism, 11, 16–17, 20, 43–46, 47, 49, 66–67, 79, 208, 243, 246–48, 258, 260–63, 272, 273n, 277, 329 capital resources, 86 “captured” populations, 170–71 carbon credits, 87, 88, 298–99, 300, 301–3, 314 cartels, 158 Catholic Church, 190 cell phones, 34n, 39, 85, 87, 162, 172, 182n, 192, 229, 269n, 273, 314, 315, 331 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 199–200 chance, 23n change acceleration, 10, 21, 130–33, 136, 193–95, 217 chaos, 165–66, 273n, 331 cheating, 120, 335 Chicago, Ill., 47 China, 54, 70, 85, 87, 199, 200, 201, 208 Christianity, 190, 193–94, 293 Christian Science, 293 civility, 293–94 civilization, 123, 255, 300, 311, 336 civil liberties, 317–24 classified ads, 177n click-through counts, 183, 286, 347 clothing, 89, 260, 367 Cloud Atlas, 165 cloud processors and storage, 11–12, 19, 20, 42, 62, 88, 92, 100, 110, 113, 121, 124n, 144, 146n, 147, 149, 151, 153–54, 168, 203, 209, 245–46, 255, 258, 261–62, 274, 284, 292, 306, 311–13, 326, 338, 347–48, 350, 359 code, 112, 272 cognition, 111–12, 195–96, 260, 312–13, 314, 315, 328 Cold War, 189 Coleman, Ornette, 353 collectives, 358–60 collusion, 65–66, 72, 169–74, 255, 350–51 Columbia Records, 161n commercial rights, 317–24, 347 commissions, 184 communications industry, 258 communism, 136, 153, 291, 344 compensatory servers, 64 competition, 42, 60, 81, 143–44, 147, 153, 180, 181, 187–88, 246–48, 326 complexity, 53–54 Computer Lib/Dream Machines (Nelson), 229 computer programmers, 113–14, 123, 286n computers: artificiality of, 130, 134 calculations by, 146n, 147–48, 149, 151 cloud processors and, see cloud processors and storage development of, 53, 129–30 as machines, 22–25, 123, 129–30, 155, 158, 165–66, 178, 191, 193, 195, 248, 257–58, 261, 328 memory of, 146n networks of, see digital networks parallel, 147–48, 149, 151 personal (PCs), 158, 182n, 214, 223, 229 programming of, 113–14, 120, 123, 157, 180, 193, 248, 272, 286n, 342, 362–63 remote, 11–12 reversible, 143n security of, 175, 345–46 servers for, 12n, 15, 31, 53–57, 71–72, 95–96, 143–44, 171, 180, 183, 206, 245, 358 software for, 7, 9, 11, 14, 17, 68, 86, 99, 100–101, 128, 129, 147, 154, 155, 165, 172–73, 177–78, 182, 192, 234, 236, 241–42, 258, 262, 273–74, 283, 331, 347, 357 user interface for, 362–63, 364 computer science, 113–14, 120, 123, 157, 180, 193, 248, 272, 286n, 342, 362–63 conflicts of interest, 62n Confucianism, 214, 215–16 connectivity, 171–72, 184–85, 273, 296n, 309, 316, 331 consciousness, 195–96 conservatism, 148, 149–51, 153, 204, 208, 249, 251, 253, 256, 293 construction industry, 151 consultants, 69–72 consumer electronics, 85–86, 162 consumer-facing sites, 179–80, 182, 216 consumers, see economies, consumer “content farms,” 120 contracts, 79–82, 172, 182, 183–84, 246–48, 314, 347, 352–53 copyright, 44, 47, 49, 60, 61, 96, 183, 206, 207, 224–26, 239–40, 263–64 corporations, 265–67, 307, 314, 348–51 correlations, 75–76, 114–15, 192, 274–75 correlative algorithms, 75–76 corruption, 31, 48, 77, 235, 257, 341n cost comparisons, 64 cost-effectiveness, 136–37 cost externalization, 59n countercultures, 24 Craigslist, 177n credit, 52, 116, 177, 193, 287–90, 305, 320, 337–38 credit cards, 185, 186, 269n credit ratings, 52, 116, 177, 193, 320 creepiness, 305–24 crime, 48, 307, 311, 319–21 crowdsourcing, 21, 86, 119–20, 356 cryptography, 14 currencies, 286–87 customer service, 177 cyberactivism, 14, 199, 200–201, 210, 308–9, 335–36, 339 cyberattacks, 201 cybernetics, 230 cyberpunk literature, 309, 356n Daedalus, 22 data, 12, 20, 50–54, 55, 71–76, 92, 167n, 174, 176–77, 178, 196, 223, 234–35, 246–48, 256–58, 271–75, 286–87, 292, 300, 307, 316, 317–24, 347 see also big data databases, 20, 71–72, 75–76, 178, 192, 203 data copying, 50–51 data mining, 120 dating services, 108–9, 113, 167–68, 274–75, 286 Deadpool, 189 death denial, 193, 218, 253, 263–64, 325–31, 367 death tolls, 134 debt, 29, 30n, 54, 92, 95, 96 Debt: The First 5,000 Years (Graeber), 30n decision-making, 63–64, 184, 266, 269–75, 284n decision reduction, 266, 269–71, 284n deconstructionism, 131 democracy, 9, 32–33, 44, 90–92, 120, 200, 202–4, 207, 208, 209, 209, 210, 246–48, 277–78, 321, 324, 336, 342 Democratic Party, 202 demonetization, 172, 176n, 186, 207, 260–61 denial of service, 171–72, 312–13, 315 depopulation, 97, 133 depressions, economic, 69–70, 75, 135, 151–52, 288, 299 deprinters, 88 derivatives funds, 56, 60, 149, 153, 155, 301 determinism, 125, 143, 156, 166–68, 202, 328, 361 devaluation, 15–16, 19–21 developed world, 53–54 Diamond, Jared, 134 dice throws, 23n Dick, Philip K., 18, 137 differential pricing, 63–64 digital cameras, 2 digital networks, 2–3, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19–21, 31, 35, 49, 50–51, 53, 54–55, 56, 57, 59, 60–61, 66–67, 69–71, 74, 75, 77–80, 92, 96, 99, 107–8, 118–19, 120, 122, 129–30, 133n, 136–37, 143–48, 192, 199, 209, 221–30, 234, 235, 245–51, 259, 277, 278, 286–87, 308–9, 316, 337, 345, 349, 350, 355, 366–67 design of, 40–45 educational, 92–97 effects, 99, 153, 169–74, 179, 181–82, 183, 186, 207, 305, 362–63, 366 elite, 15, 31, 54–55, 60, 122, 201 graph-shaped, 214, 242–43 medical, 98–99 nodes of, 156, 227, 230, 241–43, 350 power of, 147–49, 167 punishing vs. rewarding, 169–74, 182, 183 tree-shaped, 241–42, 243, 246 see also Internet digital rights movement, 225–26 digital technology, 2–3, 7–8, 15–16, 18, 31, 40, 43, 50–51, 132, 208 dignity, 51–52, 73–74, 92, 209, 239, 253–64, 280, 319, 365–66 direct current (DC), 327 disease, 110 disenfranchisement, 15–16 dossiers, personal, 109, 318 dot-com bubble, 186, 301 double-blind tests, 112 Drexler, Eric, 162 DSM, 124n dualism, 194–95 Duncan, Isadora, 214 Dyson, George, 192 dystopias, 130, 137–38 earthquakes, 266 Eastern Religion, 211–17 eBay, 173, 176, 177n, 180, 241, 343 eBooks, 113, 246–47, 352–60 eBureau, 109 economic avatars, 283–85, 302, 337–38 economics, 1–3, 15, 22, 37, 38, 40–41, 42, 67, 122, 143, 148–52, 153, 155–56, 204, 208, 209, 236, 259, 274, 288, 298–99, 311, 362n, 363 economies: austerity in, 96, 115, 125, 151, 152, 204, 208 barter system for, 20, 57 collusion in, 65–66, 72, 169–74, 255, 350–51 competition in, 42, 60, 81, 143–44, 147, 153, 180, 181, 187–88, 246–48, 326 consumer, 16–17, 43, 54, 56n, 62, 63–65, 72–74, 85–86, 98, 114, 117, 154, 162, 173–74, 177, 179–80, 182, 192, 193, 215, 216, 223, 227, 241, 246, 247, 248–64, 271–72, 273, 286–88, 293, 323, 347–48, 349, 355–56, 357, 358–60 depressions in, 69–70, 75, 135, 151–52, 288, 299 dignity in, 51–52, 73–74, 92, 209, 239, 253–64, 280, 319, 365–66 distributions in, 37–45 of education, 92–97 efficiency in, 39, 42–43, 53, 61, 66–67, 71–74, 88, 90, 97, 118, 123, 155, 176n, 187–88, 191, 236, 246, 310, 349 entrepreneurial, 14, 57, 79, 82, 100–106, 116, 117–20, 122, 128, 148–49, 166, 167, 183, 200, 234, 241–43, 248, 274, 326, 359 equilibrium in, 148–51 financial sector in, 7n, 29–31, 35, 38, 45, 49, 50, 52, 54, 56–67, 69–70, 74–80, 82, 115, 116–20, 148n, 153–54, 155, 179–85, 200, 208, 218, 254, 257, 258, 277–78, 298, 299–300, 301, 336–37, 344–45, 348, 350 freedom and, 32–33, 90–92, 277–78, 336 global, 33n, 153–56, 173, 201, 214–15, 280 government oversight of, 44, 45–46, 49, 79–80, 96, 151–52, 158, 199, 205–6, 234–35, 240, 246, 248–51, 299–300, 307, 317, 341, 345–46, 350–51 growth in, 32, 43–45, 53–54, 119, 149–51, 236, 256–57, 270–71, 274–75, 291–94, 350 of health care, 98–99, 100, 153–54 historical analysis of, 29–31, 37–38, 69–70 humanistic, 194, 209, 233–351 361–367 of human labor, 85, 86, 87, 88, 99–100, 257–58, 292 identity in, 82, 283–90, 305, 306, 307, 315–16 inclusiveness of, 291–94 information, 1–3, 8–9, 15–17, 18, 19–20, 21, 35, 60–61, 92–97, 118, 185, 188, 201, 207, 209, 241–43, 245–46, 246–48, 256–58, 263, 283–87, 291–303, 331, 361–67 leadership in, 341–51 legal issues for, 49, 74–78 levees in, 43–45, 46, 47, 48, 49–50, 52, 92, 94, 96, 98, 108, 171, 176n, 224–25, 239–43, 253–54, 263, 345 local advantages in, 64, 94–95, 143–44, 153–56, 173, 203, 280 market, 16–17, 20, 23–24, 33–34, 38, 39, 43–46, 47, 50–52, 66–67, 75, 108, 118–19, 126, 136, 143, 144–48, 151–52, 155, 156, 167, 202, 207, 221–22, 240, 246–48, 254–57, 261, 262–63, 266, 277–78, 288, 292–93, 297–300, 318, 324, 326, 329, 344, 354, 355–56; see also capitalism mathematical analysis of, 40–41 models of, 40–41, 148–52, 153, 155–56 monopolies in, 60, 65–66, 169–74, 181–82, 187–88, 190, 202, 326, 350 morality and, 29–34, 35, 42, 50–52, 54, 71–74, 252–64 Nelsonian, 335, 349–50 neutrality in, 286–87 optimization of, 144–47, 148, 153, 154–55, 167, 202, 203 outcomes in, 40–41, 144–45 political impact of, 21, 47–48, 96, 149–51, 155, 167, 295–96 pricing strategies in, 1–2, 43, 60–66, 72–74, 145, 147–48, 158, 169–74, 226, 261, 272–75, 289, 317–24, 331, 337–38 productivity of, 7, 56–57, 134–35 profit margins in, 59n, 71–72, 76–78, 94–95, 116, 177n, 178, 179, 207, 258, 274–75, 321–22 public perception of, 66n, 79–80, 149–50 recessions in, 31, 54, 60, 76–77, 79, 151–52, 167, 204, 311, 336–37 regulation of, 37–38, 44, 45–46, 49–50, 54, 56, 69–70, 77–78, 266n, 274, 299–300, 311, 321–22, 350–51 risk in, 54, 55, 57, 59–63, 71–72, 85, 117, 118–19, 120, 156, 170–71, 179, 183–84, 188, 242, 277–81, 284, 337, 350 scams in, 119–21, 186, 275n, 287–88, 299–300 self-destructive, 60–61 social aspect of, 37–38, 40, 148–52, 153, 154–56 stimulus methods for, 151–52 sustainable, 235–37, 285–87 transformation of, 280–94, 341–51 trust as factor in, 32–34, 35, 42, 51–52 value in, 21, 33–35, 52, 61, 64–67, 73n, 108, 283–90, 299–300, 321–22, 364 variables in, 149–50 vendors in, 71–74 Edison, Thomas, 263, 327 editors, 92 education, 92–97, 98, 120, 150, 201 efficiency, 39, 42–43, 53, 61, 66–67, 71–74, 88, 90, 97, 118, 123, 155, 176n, 187–88, 191, 236, 246, 310, 349 Egypt, 95 eHarmony, 167–68 Einstein, Albert, 208n, 364 elderly, 97–100, 133, 269, 296n, 346 elections, 202–4, 249, 251 electricity, 131, 327 Electronic Frontier Foundation, 184 “elevator pitch,” 233, 342, 361 Eloi, 137 employment, 2, 7–8, 11, 22, 56–57, 60, 71–74, 79, 85–106, 117, 123, 135, 149, 151–52, 178, 201, 234, 257–58, 321–22, 331, 343 encryption, 14–15, 175, 239–40, 305–8, 345 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 338 End of History, The (Fukuyama), 165 endoscopes, 11 end-use license agreements (EULAs), 79–82, 314 energy landscapes, 145–48, 152, 209, 336, 350 energy sector, 43, 55–56, 90, 144, 258, 301–3 Engelbart, Doug, 215 engineering, 113–14, 120, 123–24, 157, 180, 192, 193, 194, 217, 218, 248, 272, 286n, 326, 342, 362–63 Enlightenment, 35, 255 enneagrams, 124n, 215 Enron Corp., 49, 74–75 entertainment industry, 7, 66, 109, 120, 135, 136, 185–86, 258, 260 see also mass media entrepreneurship, 14, 57, 79, 82, 100–106, 116, 117–20, 122, 128, 148–49, 166, 167, 183, 200, 234, 241–43, 248, 274, 326, 359 entropy, 55–56, 143, 183–84 environmental issues, 32 equilibrium, 148–51 Erlich, Paul, 132 est, 214 Ethernet, 229 Etsy, 343 Europe, 45, 54, 77, 199 evolution, 131, 137–38, 144, 146–47 exclusion principle, 181, 202 Expedia, 65 experiments, scientific, 112 experts, 88, 94–95, 124, 133–34, 178, 325–31, 341, 342 externalization, 59n Facebook, 2, 8, 14, 20, 56–57, 93, 109, 154, 169, 171, 174, 180, 181, 188, 190–91, 200n, 204, 206, 207, 209, 210, 214, 215, 217, 227, 242–43, 246, 248, 249, 251, 270, 280, 286, 306, 309, 310, 313, 314, 317, 318, 322, 326, 329, 341, 343, 344, 346, 347–48, 366 facial recognition, 305n, 309–10 factories, 43, 85–86, 88, 135 famine, 17, 132 Fannie Mae, 69 fascism, 159–60 fashion, 89, 260 feedback, 112, 162, 169, 203, 298, 301–3, 363–64, 365 fees, service, 81, 82 feudalism, 79 Feynman, Richard, 94 file sharing, 50–52, 61, 74, 78, 88, 100, 223–30, 239–40, 253–64, 277, 317–24, 335, 349 “filter bubbles,” 225, 357 filters, 119–20, 200, 225, 356–57 financial crisis (2008), 76–77, 115, 148n financial services, 7n, 29–31, 35, 38, 45, 49, 50, 52, 54, 56–67, 69–70, 74–80, 82, 115, 116–20, 148n, 153–54, 155, 179–85, 200, 208, 218, 254, 257, 258, 277–78, 298, 299–300, 301, 336–37, 344–45, 348, 350 firewalls, 305 first-class economic citizens, 246, 247, 248–51, 273, 286–87, 323, 349, 355–56 Flightfox, 64 fluctuations, 76–78 flu outbreaks, 110, 120 fMRI, 111–12 food supplies, 17, 123, 131 “Fool on the Hill, The,” 213 Ford, Henry, 43 Ford, Martin, 56n Forster, E.

Moscow, December 25th, 1991
by Conor O'Clery
Published 31 Jul 2011

It signals the final defeat of the twentieth century’s two totalitarian systems, Nazi fascism and Soviet communism, which embroiled the world in the greatest war in history. It is the day that allows American conservatives to celebrate—prematurely—the prophecy of the philosopher Francis Fukuyama that the collapse of the USSR will mark the “end of history,” with the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. Mikhail Gorbachev created the conditions for the end of totalitarianism, and Boris Yeltsin delivered the death blow. But neither is honored in Russia in modern times as a national hero, nor is the date of the transfer of power formally commemorated in Moscow.

The Wires of War: Technology and the Global Struggle for Power
by Jacob Helberg
Published 11 Oct 2021

From the maternity ward, I added my voice to the festive chorus. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, former Warsaw Pact countries in Eastern Europe began holding free elections. From Europe to Latin America, across Asia and Africa, free markets and liberal democracy were on the march. A young political scientist, Francis Fukuyama, famously concluded that we had reached “the End of History.” Not everyone was savoring the moment, however. On the day the Berlin Wall came down, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin was a young KGB officer stationed in Dresden, East Germany. In his own telling, he brandished a pistol to fend off an angry crowd intent on sacking the agency’s Dresden headquarters.

Culture and Prosperity: The Truth About Markets - Why Some Nations Are Rich but Most Remain Poor
by John Kay
Published 24 May 2004

A central lesson of the last chapter of the Soviet Union was that economic institutions cannot be viewed in isolation from the social and political environment in which they function. This lesson was not taken to heart, either by the American victors or by the reformers who subsequently came to power in Russia. Francis Fukuyama famously captured the triumphalism of America's victory by proclaiming "the end of history." 1 A lightly regulated market economy in a liberal democracy was appropriate, not just for the United States at the end of the twentieth century, but for all countries at all times. The market economy was victorious not only in the war between the United States and the Soviet Union.

…

Antiglobalization protesters gained confidence from their Seattle success, and every subsequent international economic meeting was besieged by demonstrators. Symbols of international capitalism-branches ofMcDonald's-were stoned and Culture and Prosperity { 11} even burned. Environmentalists joined these protesters in denouncing the values of modern business. So, as the new millennium dawned, the end of history seemed more, not less, distant. International relations took on a new complexity, in which a simple contrast of good and evil became a complex mixture of economics, ideology, religion, and politics. Russian living standards have fallen below the dismal levels achieved under communism, while Russian criminal oligarchs have become billionaires.

…

China is still Culture and Prosperity {17} extremely poor, but the extraordinary achievements of Chinese people outside China, and increasingly within China, may change this balance of the world economy in the twenty-first century. One of the key issues of economic history has always been why rapid economic growth in the eighteenth century began in northwest Europe rather than southeast China. No End of History ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• This diversity of experience demonstrates that there is no single model of a successful modern economy. In an extraordinary reversal, the claims of historical inevitability and economic determinism once made by Marxists are today adopted by devotees of the American business model.

The Marginal Revolutionaries: How Austrian Economists Fought the War of Ideas
by Janek Wasserman
Published 23 Sep 2019

More recently, the fascination of a small faction of Alt-Right extremists, pledging fealty to Mises, Rothbard, and Austrian ideas, has forced the “producers” of contemporary Austrian ideas to confront the unfortunate fact that the “consumers” of Austrianism are not always the well-reasoned, liberal individuals they imagined. Their ideas have had unintended consequences, which demand a greater reckoning from within the tradition. Austrian Economics at the “End of History” The “end of history” announced by the political scientist Francis Fukuyama in 1989 seemed to be an Austrian moment. Fukuyama celebrated “the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government” and “the total exhaustion of viable systemic alternatives to Western liberalism.” For a century, the Austrians had railed against socialists and conservatives in the name of liberalism.

…

Scholars of free-market conservatism, neoliberalism, and libertarianism have placed the Austrians at the center of their accounts. They see Vienna as the seedbed of capitalist internationalism and globalism. Hayek’s MPS has become the locus classicus of neoliberalism. Popular commentators have positively linked the Austrians to the fall of Communism, the triumph of the West, and “the end of history,” on the one hand, and negatively to Pinochet’s Chile, the Koch empire, the Tea Party, and the Alt-Right, on the other. How these diverse impacts developed—and what precise role the Austrians played in them—requires further elaboration.11 These problems illustrate why there is still such confusion surrounding the Austrian School tradition.

…

The scions of the Viennese Bildungsbürgertum would have applauded this judgment. They had been marginalized and expelled, yet they continued to fight for the values of the West and the Enlightenment. Hayek and Mises had been right all along, and the West owed them a debt of gratitude. In a final irony, though, the post-1989 narrative of “the end of history,” which Judt rightly criticized, has further muddied our understanding of the Austrian School. The school has occupied a curious place in the current popular imagination and in the economic and political discourse of the twenty-first century. Its current iterations would probably shock the liberal cosmopolitans of the original school.

The End of Alchemy: Money, Banking and the Future of the Global Economy
by Mervyn King
Published 3 Mar 2016

The latter states that ‘The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 was fundamentally a credit crisis on a massive, international scale.’ 15 Notable exceptions are Dumas (2010) and Wolf (2014). 16 In 1989 Francis Fukuyama published a famous essay ‘The End of History?’ in the international affairs journal The National Interest. He later wrote, ‘What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.’

…

To understand why the crisis was so big, and came as such a surprise, we should start at the key turning point – the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. At the time it was thought to represent the end of communism, indeed the end of the appeal of socialism and central planning. For some it was the end of history.16 For most, it represented a victory for free market economics. Contrary to the prediction of Marx, capitalism had displaced communism. Yet who would have believed that the fall of the Wall was not just the end of communism but the beginning of the biggest crisis in capitalism since the Great Depression?

…

Friedman (ed.), Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 3–21. —— (1960), A Program for Monetary Stability, Fordham University Press, New York. Friedman, Milton and Anna Schwartz (1963), A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. Fukuyama, Francis (1992), The End of History and the Last Man, Free Press, New York. Geithner, Timothy (2014), Stress Tests: Reflections on Financial Crises, Crown Publishers, New York. Gennaioli, Nicola, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny (2015), ‘Neglected Risks: The Psychology of Financial Crises’, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 20875, mimeo, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

God Is Back: How the Global Revival of Faith Is Changing the World
by John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge
Published 31 Mar 2009

on its cover, and in the same year Thomas Altizer, a theologian, published to much acclaim The Gospel of Christian Atheism.19 In 1968 Gallup found that sixty-seven percent of Americans believed that religion was losing its impact on society. A year later, an American reached the moon, metaphorically conquering the heavens. By the end of the twentieth century the intelligentsia had little doubt that modern man had outgrown God. Most trend-setting books in the 1990s saw the world through secular lenses.20 Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man predicted the triumph of secularization as well as liberalism. The word “religion” does not appear in the index of Diplomacy, Henry Kissinger’s nine-hundred-page masterpiece on statesmanship, published in 1994. In 1980-99 only half a dozen of the articles in America’s four main international-relations journals dealt with religion .21 The Economist was so confident of the Almighty’s demise that we published His obituary in our millennium issue.

…

The evidence of this can be seen everywhere in the developing world: in churches the size of football stadiums across Latin America, in twelve-thousand-acre “redemption camps” in Nigeria, in storefront churches in the slums of Rio and Guatemala City, in brick and mud tabernacles with metal roofs and dirt floors in rural South Africa. Across the world fiery preachers are delivering the same message: live your life according to God’s law, read the Bible as the literal word of Truth, be on the lookout for miracles and wonders, and, above all, prepare yourself for the end of history and the beginning of the millennium. The success of Pentecostalism is a strange mixture of unflinching belief and pragmatism, raw emotion and self-improvement, improvisation and organization: it is as if somebody had distilled American-style religion down to its basic elements and then set about marketing it globally.

Predator: The Secret Origins of the Drone Revolution
by Richard Whittle
Published 15 Sep 2014

Bosnia-Herzegovina was a multiethnic republic of the former Yugoslavia, whose post–Cold War breakup in 1992 unleashed decades of repressed hostility among Croats, Muslims, Serbs, and smaller ethnic groups. The result was a civil war that marked the worst conflict in Europe since 1945 and led to demands for intervention to stop it. Western triumphalism was in the air—political scientist Francis Fukuyama had just published his book The End of History, predicting the rise of global liberal democracy—and most of America’s leaders felt inclined or even obliged to use U.S. military power for world peace, especially now that the Soviet Union’s history really had ended and Moscow wasn’t going to interfere. Seven months before Clinton’s election, his predecessor, President George H.

…

See also Hellfire Predator; Predator; WILD Predator; and other specific models Blue expands into early, and problems early pilotless planes and early reconnaissance flight endurance of Karem designs new nano-drones revolution in Smithsonian exhibit target Dr. Strangelove (film) drug war Dusseault, Christopher East Germany Edwards Air Force Base Eglin Air Force Base Egypt Ehrhard, Thomas P. Eielson Air Force Base 11th Reconnaissance Squadron (Black Owls) El Mirage airfield Empire State Building End of History, The (Fukuyama) “Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Program” (Deutch-Rutherford memo) Enduring Freedom, Operation European Command European Union Executive Orders Exposition Internationale, L’ F-4D Phantom F-5 Tiger F6F Hellcat F-14 Tomcat F-15 Eagle F-15E Strike Eagle F-16 F-16C Fighting Falcons F-18 F-22 Raptor F-100F Super Sabre F-117 stealth fighter F/A-18 fighter-bombers Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 15th Reconnaissance Squadron 53rd Test and Evaluation Group 56th Rescue Squadron Firebees Fireflys 1st Armored Division 555th Tactical Fighter Squadron Flynn, Cathal Fogleman, Ronald Ford, Gerald Fort Belvoir Fort Huachuca Fort Irwin Forty-Four ball (AN/AAS-44 V) forward air controller (FAC) Foscue, Greg Fossum, Robert Franks, Tommy free-flight World Championships Front Burner (Lippold) Frontier Systems Fry, Scott Fukuyama, Francis Fulcher, Tim Garmabak Ghar camp Gates Learjet GBU-12s General Atomics (formerly GA Technologies) 11th RS and Blues buy Forty-Four ball and Gnat 750 and Karem quits Leading Systems buyout and Predator forerunner and Predator name reused by General Dynamics Germany Gersten, Peter Ghengis (pilot) Gibaldi, Rich Gibbons, James A.

The Ones We've Been Waiting For: How a New Generation of Leaders Will Transform America
by Charlotte Alter
Published 18 Feb 2020

Even the millions of boomers who opposed the excesses of McCarthyism and the Vietnam War grew up to think, with considerable justification, that capitalist economies created more wealth for their countries than socialist ones. When many socialist countries in the developing world shifted to more market-based systems in the 1990s, many boomers saw it as vindication: boomer historian Francis Fukuyama called this shift “the end of history” and characterized it as a decisive victory for free-market capitalism and liberal democracy. Even those over fifty who didn’t conflate socialism with communism were leery of what a more socialist America might do to their income. But Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez didn’t have memories of the Berlin Wall falling the year she was born, and she was a child when Eastern European, African, and Asian countries converted from socialism to capitalism to improve their standards of living.

Post Wall: Rebuilding the World After 1989
by Kristina Spohr
Published 23 Sep 2019

Hahn Russia’s Revolution from Above, 1985–2000: Reform, Transition and Revolution in the Fall of the Soviet Communist Regime Taylor & Francis 2002; Jacques Lévesque The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe Univ. of California Press 1997 Back to text 3. Francis Fukuyama ‘The End of History?’ The National Interest no. 16 (Summer 1989) pp. 3–18; idem, The End of History and the Last Man Hamilton 1992. On ‘post 1989-optimism’, see Thomas Bagger ‘The World According to Germany: Reassessing 1989’ Washington Quarterly 41, 4 (Winter 2019) pp. 53–63 Back to text 4. Cf. for example George Lawson et al. (eds) The Global 1989: Continuity and Change in World Politics Cambridge UP 2010; Richard K.

…

Meanwhile, the GATT – forged after the Great Depression and the Second World War – was transmuted under US pressure into a more open World Trade Organisation – a body that would eventually include a communist-capitalist PRC and a post-Soviet Russia. To some, it seemed that ‘the West’ and its way of doing things had triumphed. In a famous and widely misunderstood book, the political scientist Francis Fukuyama spoke of ‘the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government’ – in short ‘the end of history’.[5] Yet, it was people on the streets who drove the revolutionary wave of 1989. From Tallinn to Tirana, from Berlin to Bucharest, they marched, demonstrated and rebelled. East Germans travelled hundreds of miles in their Trabants, rushed border checkpoints and ran across fields hoping that no one would open fire, to pierce the Iron Curtain in a myriad of places.

…

On leaders making choices in 1989–92, see Zelikow & Rice To Build a Better World Back to text 5. Russia joined the WTO (previously GATT) in 2012 after nineteen years of ‘tortuous negotiations’, China in 2001 after fifteen years of talks. Catherine Belton ‘Russia joins WTO after nineteen years of talks’ FT 22.8.2012; ‘China Joins WTO Ranks’ NYT 12.12.2001. Fukuyama ‘The End of History?’ p. 4 and idem, The End of History p. 330 Back to text 6. GHWBPL Scowcroft SSCNF-CF China 1989 (sensitive) (OA/ID 91136–001) Memcon of Deng–Scowcroft talks 2.7.1989 10:00 a.m. Great Hall of the People Beijing p. 5 Back to text 7. Bush & Scowcroft A World Transformed p. 9 Back to text 8. Jan Orbie ‘Civilian Power Europe – Review of the Original and Current Debates’ Cooperation and Conflict 41, 1 (2006) pp. 123–8; Smith ‘Beyond the Civilian Power EU Debate’ pp. 63–82 Back to text 9.

America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism
by Anatol Lieven
Published 3 May 2010

Partly in consequence, this set of assumptions is also basically optimistic. It suggests both that the United States has achieved the highest possible form of political system and that this great system can be extended to the rest of humanity. 48 THESIS: SPLENDOR AND TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN CREED Centuries before Francis Fukuyama recoined the phrase, a certain belief that America represented the "end of history" was already common in American thought and still more in the American subconscious. "I alone inaugurating largeness, culminating time," as Walt Whitman put it, speaking for his country.6 In Richard Hofstadter's words, "It has been our fate as a nation not to have ideologies but to be one."7 This American Thesis is also, both in belief and in reality, the core foundation of America's "soft power" in the world and of its role as a civilizational empire: the American version ofRomanita.

…

The collapse of Soviet communism greatly helped in the restoration of the American ideological and mythical self-image after Vietnam. It also reduced still further any perceived need to take the opinions of the rest of the world into account. The collapse of communism combined with the messianic elements in the American tradition to produce an attitude summed up in Fukuyama's "End of History" thesis. This proposition was so extreme that it was widely challenged, and indeed eventually Fukuyama himself moved to much more moderate and sophisticated positions. However, as I wrote in 1996, the spirit which it reflected became so omnipresent in the U.S. media and political discourse that it was rarely noticed, let alone analyzed or criticized.

…

The West's immense wealth and security compared to most societies on this planet makes lecturing them rather than giving them serious economic aid singularly indecent; and if we look back only a few decades, we will find our own societies guilty of monstrous crimes of racism, aggression and oppression. If we look back not much more than a century, we will often find them guilty of what would now be called genocide. If we have any sense at all of history, we should know that our system does not represent the "end of history," is not divinely ordained, and will not last forever. It is already clear, for example, that if the environmental challenges facing us reach really severe dimensions, then Western free market democracy in general, and the American version in particular, will fail to meet these challenges just as completely as the Chinese Confucian order failed to meet the challenge of Western modernization in the nineteenth century and many Muslim societies are failing in this regard today.

Bibi: The Turbulent Life and Times of Benjamin Netanyahu
by Anshel Pfeffer
Published 30 Apr 2018

I have already noted that for the foreseeable future the only kind of peace that will endure in the region between Arab and Arab and between Arab and Jew is the peace of deterrence.4 Netanyahu’s view of history is bleak. Writing immediately after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, he attacked the “end of history” theory, made fashionable then by American political scientist Francis Fukuyama. The fall of communism in Eastern Europe was indeed proof that democracy could prevail, even among the Arabs, but there were no guarantees. International relations must still be based on military deterrence. There must be no question of Israel relinquishing control of the West Bank and the Golan Heights, vital buffer zones for a tiny state surrounded by enemies.

…

See Netanyahu, Sara Ben Tovim, Noach, 25, 33 Ben Yona, Chaim, 83 Ben-Gurion, David, 19–20, 26, 32 anti-IZL operation, 36–37 death of, 107–108 Israeli control in Jerusalem, 51–52 Israeli statehood, 43–44 nuclear opacity doctrine, 324 postwar struggle for Israel’s founding, 39–40 Revisionist-Mapai divide, 34–35 Sinai Campaign, 58–59 statehood conflicts, 49–50 US-Jewish relations during World War II, 32–33 Bennett, Naftali, 101, 229, 300–302, 343–344, 374, 381 Bentwich, Norman, 21 Ben-Yair, Michael, 211 Bergson, Peter, 32–33 Betzer, Muki, 121, 125 Biden, Joe, 317–318 Black September, 87, 93–94 Blair, Tony, 273, 301 Boehner, John, 318, 354 border fences, US and Israel, 1–4, 292–294, 373 Boston Consulting Group (BCG), 126–128, 137, 299 Breitbart, Andrew, 372–373 Brit Shalom movement, 20–22 Britain/United Kingdom Balfour Declaration, 16–17, 26–27 Israeli statehood, 42 IZL insurgency, 40–41 Jabotinsky’s Revisionist group, 18 mandate, 12, 26, 36, 41–42 Netanyahu’s official visit, 379 policy toward Zionism, 26–27 Revisionists’ hostility, 24–25 sanctions against Iran, 335–336 Sinai Campaign, 58–59 the Netanyahus’ luxury trip, 301–302 World War II, 29–30 Zionist leaders’ resistance to global involvement, 19–20 Zionist Uganda Plan, 11 Bush, George H.W., 135, 141, 171, 174–176, 178, 180–181, 217 Bush, George W., 301, 315, 329 Cairo Agreement, 203 Camp David Accords, 133–135 Camp David summit, Barak’s, 281, 284 campaign finance, 302–303 Carter, Jimmy, 133–134, 217 Cates, Fleur, 130–131, 136–137, 148, 156, 167, 173–174 Center Party (Mifleget Ha’Merkaz), 270 Charlie Hebdo, 351 chemical weapons, 346–348 China, 325 Chomsky, Noam, 106 Christianity and the Christian population, 20, 54, 142–143, 373–374 Christopher, Warren, 255–256 citizenship, Netanyahu’s, 142 Clinton, Bill, 199, 206, 217, 219–220, 228, 232–233, 236, 240–242, 254–255, 260–261, 262(fig.), 263–266, 268, 273, 281, 284, 315 Clinton, Hillary, 312–313, 317, 371 Cohen, Yossi, 363–364 Cold War: “end of history” theory, 195 colonialism, Israeli occupation as, 105–106 corruption criminal investigation of Netanyahu for financial wrongdoing, 281–283 Ehud Olmert, 303–304 investigations of Netanyahu and associates, 379–383 last four prime ministers, 284 Leah Rabin, 128 Neeman’s attack by the legal establishment, 247 Netanyahu’s cabinet, 247–249 Netanyahu’s private upkeep on public funds, 355–356 Shas’s leader, 275 cultural Zionism, 28 Dagan, Meir, 329–331, 333, 356–357, 363 Dayan, Ilana, 365 Dayan, Moshe, 73–74, 97, 139 debates, campaign, 231–232, 277 Deri, Arye, 230, 248, 258, 275 Dermer, Ron, 299, 346, 354, 360, 373, 375 direct election of the prime minister, 183–185, 220, 286 disengagement agreements, 111–112, 293–296 Diskin, Yuval, 329–331 Draper, Morris, 143–145 Eagleburger, Lawrence, 144–145 East Jerusalem, 74, 174, 176, 244–245, 262, 284, 297, 316–317, 368 Eban, Abba, 70, 85, 112 economic policies Ayn Rand influencing Netanyahu’s, 67 Ben-Gurion’s Israel, 57–58 Gush Herut-Liberalim, 108 Netanyahu as finance minister, 290–292 Netanyahu’s failure to change Israel’s economy, 249–250 Netanyahu’s first administration, 238–240 Netanyahu’s private upkeep on public funds, 355–356 Netanyahu’s targeted 2009 campaign, 305–306 resistance to reform, 1–2 tent protests and social protest movement, 320–321 economic status, Israel’s, 1–2, 26, 99–100, 137, 234 The Economist magazine, 251 Egypt border fence with Israel, 1–4 Camp David Accords, 133–135 disengagement agreement, 111–112 Gaza violence, 350–360 Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy, 110 Nasser’s death, 95 Netanyahu’s alliance with Sisi, 379 Nixon’s presidential visit, 110–111 Obama’s presidential visit, 318–320 Operation Frenzy, 82–83 Sadat’s peace proposal, 95–96 Sinai Campaign, 58–59 Six-Day War, 69–73 Soviet support, 58 Summit of Peacemakers, 228 War of Attrition, 82–83, 85–86 Yom Kippur War, 95–99 Eitan, Rafael, 226, 270 Elazar, David “Dado,” 97–98 elections (Israel) attempts to oust Netanyahu through early elections, 269–271 Barak and Netanyahu in 1999, 160–161, 278–279 Barak’s challenge to Netanyahu, 89 direct election of the prime minister, 183–185, 220, 286 Fleur’s avoidance of the campaign trail, 174 Israeli strike on Iran as election issue, 338–339 Likud’s collapse, 297–298 Likud’s debut in 1973, 108–109 Likud’s increasing presence, 361–362 Netanyahu and Livni’s electoral stalemate, 307–308 Netanyahu’s bid for leadership in 1992, 185–187 Netanyahu’s first administration, 238–240 Netanyahu’s first campaign, 166–170 1995, 221–222 1999 campaign strategy and image, 271–276 Netanyahu’s 1995 campaign, 222–236 November 1993 local elections, 201 political aftermath of Rabin’s assassination, 220–221 re-election in 2013, 342 Revisionist parties in Israel’s first elections, 51 Sharon’s 2001 victories over Netanyahu and Labor, 289–290 stalemate in 1984, 153–156 “trust” campaign in 2015, 353–357 “winner’s campaign” of 2009, 305–308 Zionist lobbying in 1944, 35–36 elections (US), 148, 224, 371–376 electoral reform, 183–185 Encyclopedia Hebraica, 55–56, 58, 61 “end of history” theory, 195 Entebbe raid, 116–123 Erdogan, Recep Tayyip, 345–346 Eshel, Nathan, 303 Eshkol, Levi, 69–71, 76, 80, 84, 108 ethnic cleansing of Arabs, 123 Fatah, 68–69, 78–80, 86, 318, 322 financial crisis (2008–2011), 2 financial scandals, Netanyahu’s, 379–380 Finkelstein, Arthur, 223–224, 234, 271–272, 277, 285 Ford, Gerald, 111 foreign policy (Israel), 1–3, 161–162, 316 foreign policy (US) Carter’s stance on a Palestinian state, 133–134 Netanyahu’s criticism of Bush policy, 173 Obama’s Middle East policy, 314–315 pressure on Israel from the Bush administration, 174–175 Trump’s lack of interest in, 377–378 US as strategic ally for Israel, 105–106 Forsyth, Frederick, 178 The Fountainhead (Rand), 67 France, 58–59, 80, 351, 365–366 Frenkel, Yaakov, 239, 249 Fukuyama, Francis, 195 Gahal (Gush Herut-Liberalim), 108 Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 18 Gates, Robert, 173 Gaza Ayyash assassination and subsequent violence, 221–222 Begin’s peace plan, 144–145 disengagement, 293–296 Egypt under Sisi, 379 First Intifada, 164–165 Gilad Shalit’s imprisonment, 321–323 Hamas coup, 349–351 Hamas electoral victory, 297 Hamas violence in, 349–350 Hebron Agreement, 244–246 Netanyahu’s “peace plan,” 200–201 Operation Pillar of Defense, 241, 342 Oslo process, 198–204, 208–210 PFLP violence, 78 Second Intifada, 285–286 Gemayel, Bashir, 144–145 Gesher party, 207–208, 226–227, 260, 270 Golan Heights Law, 140–141 Gold, Dore, 197, 240, 242–243, 363 Goldstein, Baruch, 202–203 Gore, Al, 258 Greenblatt, Jason, 374, 376 Groisser, Leon, 91–92 Gulf War (1991), 176–178, 180, 335 Ha ‘Tehiya party, 183 Haaretz newspaper, 364 Habib, Philip, 143–144 Haganah, 19, 25–27, 29, 36–41, 44, 54, 56 Haig, Alexander, 141–142 Hamas, 192–193, 203–204, 221–223, 250–251, 318, 321–323, 341–342, 349–361 Hanegbi, Tzachi, 187, 203–204, 247 Haram al-Shari, Sharon’s tour of, 285 Haran, Miriam (Miki Weizmann), 91 Haredi leadership, 258–259, 274–276 Hariri, Rafik, 256 Harow, Ari, 299, 306–307, 380–381 hasbara (Zionist diplomacy strategy), 33, 165–166, 196, 259 Hassan of Jordan, 205 Ha’Tnuah (The Movement) party, 343 Hatzohar (World Union of Zionist Revisionists), 17–19 Ha’Yarden (The Jordan) newspaper, 22, 24–25 Hazony, Yoram, 197 Hebrew language, 11–12, 20–22 Hebrew University, 20, 27–28, 52–54, 58, 81 Hebron Agreement (1997), 244, 246–248, 268, 284 Herut (Freedom) party, 50–51, 106–107, 270 Herzl, Theodor, 10–11, 28 Herzog, Chaim, 175 Herzog, Isaac “Buzhi,” 356, 358–359, 363 Hezbollah, 146, 193, 206, 228–229, 254, 285, 332, 347, 377–378 Hoenlein, Malcolm, 157 Holocaust, 318–319, 325, 352 “hot tape” scandal, 187–190, 220, 232, 272 Hovevei Zion (Lovers of Zion), 10–12 Hussein, Saddam, 176, 261 Hussein of Jordan, 205, 251, 264, 276 IDF (Israel Defense Forces) Ben-Gurion’s Israel, 57–58 covert intelligence missions, 75–78 Entebbe raid, 116–123 exemption of the ultra-Orthodox from service, 274–275 Hamas violence in Gaza and the West Bank, 349–350 Israeli control in Jerusalem, 51–52 Israeli strike on Iran, 327–329, 331–339, 341 Israel’s air strikes on Syria’s nuclear reactor, 324–325 Netanyahu distancing himself from, 253–255 Operation Protective Edge, 349–361 Operation Wrath of God, 94 Oslo process terms, 203 Second Intifada, 244–245, 285 Second Lebanon War, 300–301 Sinai Campaign, 58–59 Six-Day War, 70–74 Syrian plans to recover the Golan Heights, 255–256 war in Lebanon, 142–148 Yom Kippur War, 95–99 See also military service, Netanyahu’s immigrants and refugees border fence as obstacle to, 3–4 British cap on, 27 German Jews’ migration to Palestine, 22–23 Jabotinsky’s European evacuation plan, 26 Netanyahu family’s move to Israel, 48–49 Netanyahu wooing Soviet Jewish voters, 230–231 postwar Zionism, 38–40 practical Zionism, 11 Russian voters’ stance on Likud and Labor, 275 Soviet Jewish refugees, 180–182 Soviet Jews, 180–182 US Rogers Plan for Palestinians, 85–86 independence day celebration, 258–259 inequality, social and economic, 1–2, 320–321 Intifada, First, 164–165, 192–193 Intifada, Second, 285, 287, 292 Iran, 359–360 as the source of conflict in the Middle East, 176 Dagan’s security concerns, 330–331 Israeli strike on, 327–329, 331–339, 341 Israel’s Begin Doctrine on nuclear weapons, 324–327 Netanyahu’s American political allies, 313–314 Netanyahu’s congressional address protesting the nuclear deal, 354–355 P5+1 talks, 259–260 sanctions, 335–336 Syria’s conflict, 377–378 US agreement, 346, 348–349 Iraq as the source of conflict in the Middle East, 176 Gulf War, 176–178 Israeli bombing of nuclear reactor, 139–140 nuclear ambitions, 324 Soviet support, 58 US war in, 288, 326 Irgun Zvai Leumi (IZL), 25–27, 29–31, 33, 36–37, 40–41, 49–50, 152 Iron Fence, 3–4 Islamic fundamentalism, 194–195 Israel Defense Forces.

…

See Netanyahu, Sara Ben Tovim, Noach, 25, 33 Ben Yona, Chaim, 83 Ben-Gurion, David, 19–20, 26, 32 anti-IZL operation, 36–37 death of, 107–108 Israeli control in Jerusalem, 51–52 Israeli statehood, 43–44 nuclear opacity doctrine, 324 postwar struggle for Israel’s founding, 39–40 Revisionist-Mapai divide, 34–35 Sinai Campaign, 58–59 statehood conflicts, 49–50 US-Jewish relations during World War II, 32–33 Bennett, Naftali, 101, 229, 300–302, 343–344, 374, 381 Bentwich, Norman, 21 Ben-Yair, Michael, 211 Bergson, Peter, 32–33 Betzer, Muki, 121, 125 Biden, Joe, 317–318 Black September, 87, 93–94 Blair, Tony, 273, 301 Boehner, John, 318, 354 border fences, US and Israel, 1–4, 292–294, 373 Boston Consulting Group (BCG), 126–128, 137, 299 Breitbart, Andrew, 372–373 Brit Shalom movement, 20–22 Britain/United Kingdom Balfour Declaration, 16–17, 26–27 Israeli statehood, 42 IZL insurgency, 40–41 Jabotinsky’s Revisionist group, 18 mandate, 12, 26, 36, 41–42 Netanyahu’s official visit, 379 policy toward Zionism, 26–27 Revisionists’ hostility, 24–25 sanctions against Iran, 335–336 Sinai Campaign, 58–59 the Netanyahus’ luxury trip, 301–302 World War II, 29–30 Zionist leaders’ resistance to global involvement, 19–20 Zionist Uganda Plan, 11 Bush, George H.W., 135, 141, 171, 174–176, 178, 180–181, 217 Bush, George W., 301, 315, 329 Cairo Agreement, 203 Camp David Accords, 133–135 Camp David summit, Barak’s, 281, 284 campaign finance, 302–303 Carter, Jimmy, 133–134, 217 Cates, Fleur, 130–131, 136–137, 148, 156, 167, 173–174 Center Party (Mifleget Ha’Merkaz), 270 Charlie Hebdo, 351 chemical weapons, 346–348 China, 325 Chomsky, Noam, 106 Christianity and the Christian population, 20, 54, 142–143, 373–374 Christopher, Warren, 255–256 citizenship, Netanyahu’s, 142 Clinton, Bill, 199, 206, 217, 219–220, 228, 232–233, 236, 240–242, 254–255, 260–261, 262(fig.), 263–266, 268, 273, 281, 284, 315 Clinton, Hillary, 312–313, 317, 371 Cohen, Yossi, 363–364 Cold War: “end of history” theory, 195 colonialism, Israeli occupation as, 105–106 corruption criminal investigation of Netanyahu for financial wrongdoing, 281–283 Ehud Olmert, 303–304 investigations of Netanyahu and associates, 379–383 last four prime ministers, 284 Leah Rabin, 128 Neeman’s attack by the legal establishment, 247 Netanyahu’s cabinet, 247–249 Netanyahu’s private upkeep on public funds, 355–356 Shas’s leader, 275 cultural Zionism, 28 Dagan, Meir, 329–331, 333, 356–357, 363 Dayan, Ilana, 365 Dayan, Moshe, 73–74, 97, 139 debates, campaign, 231–232, 277 Deri, Arye, 230, 248, 258, 275 Dermer, Ron, 299, 346, 354, 360, 373, 375 direct election of the prime minister, 183–185, 220, 286 disengagement agreements, 111–112, 293–296 Diskin, Yuval, 329–331 Draper, Morris, 143–145 Eagleburger, Lawrence, 144–145 East Jerusalem, 74, 174, 176, 244–245, 262, 284, 297, 316–317, 368 Eban, Abba, 70, 85, 112 economic policies Ayn Rand influencing Netanyahu’s, 67 Ben-Gurion’s Israel, 57–58 Gush Herut-Liberalim, 108 Netanyahu as finance minister, 290–292 Netanyahu’s failure to change Israel’s economy, 249–250 Netanyahu’s first administration, 238–240 Netanyahu’s private upkeep on public funds, 355–356 Netanyahu’s targeted 2009 campaign, 305–306 resistance to reform, 1–2 tent protests and social protest movement, 320–321 economic status, Israel’s, 1–2, 26, 99–100, 137, 234 The Economist magazine, 251 Egypt border fence with Israel, 1–4 Camp David Accords, 133–135 disengagement agreement, 111–112 Gaza violence, 350–360 Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy, 110 Nasser’s death, 95 Netanyahu’s alliance with Sisi, 379 Nixon’s presidential visit, 110–111 Obama’s presidential visit, 318–320 Operation Frenzy, 82–83 Sadat’s peace proposal, 95–96 Sinai Campaign, 58–59 Six-Day War, 69–73 Soviet support, 58 Summit of Peacemakers, 228 War of Attrition, 82–83, 85–86 Yom Kippur War, 95–99 Eitan, Rafael, 226, 270 Elazar, David “Dado,” 97–98 elections (Israel) attempts to oust Netanyahu through early elections, 269–271 Barak and Netanyahu in 1999, 160–161, 278–279 Barak’s challenge to Netanyahu, 89 direct election of the prime minister, 183–185, 220, 286 Fleur’s avoidance of the campaign trail, 174 Israeli strike on Iran as election issue, 338–339 Likud’s collapse, 297–298 Likud’s debut in 1973, 108–109 Likud’s increasing presence, 361–362 Netanyahu and Livni’s electoral stalemate, 307–308 Netanyahu’s bid for leadership in 1992, 185–187 Netanyahu’s first administration, 238–240 Netanyahu’s first campaign, 166–170 1995, 221–222 1999 campaign strategy and image, 271–276 Netanyahu’s 1995 campaign, 222–236 November 1993 local elections, 201 political aftermath of Rabin’s assassination, 220–221 re-election in 2013, 342 Revisionist parties in Israel’s first elections, 51 Sharon’s 2001 victories over Netanyahu and Labor, 289–290 stalemate in 1984, 153–156 “trust” campaign in 2015, 353–357 “winner’s campaign” of 2009, 305–308 Zionist lobbying in 1944, 35–36 elections (US), 148, 224, 371–376 electoral reform, 183–185 Encyclopedia Hebraica, 55–56, 58, 61 “end of history” theory, 195 Entebbe raid, 116–123 Erdogan, Recep Tayyip, 345–346 Eshel, Nathan, 303 Eshkol, Levi, 69–71, 76, 80, 84, 108 ethnic cleansing of Arabs, 123 Fatah, 68–69, 78–80, 86, 318, 322 financial crisis (2008–2011), 2 financial scandals, Netanyahu’s, 379–380 Finkelstein, Arthur, 223–224, 234, 271–272, 277, 285 Ford, Gerald, 111 foreign policy (Israel), 1–3, 161–162, 316 foreign policy (US) Carter’s stance on a Palestinian state, 133–134 Netanyahu’s criticism of Bush policy, 173 Obama’s Middle East policy, 314–315 pressure on Israel from the Bush administration, 174–175 Trump’s lack of interest in, 377–378 US as strategic ally for Israel, 105–106 Forsyth, Frederick, 178 The Fountainhead (Rand), 67 France, 58–59, 80, 351, 365–366 Frenkel, Yaakov, 239, 249 Fukuyama, Francis, 195 Gahal (Gush Herut-Liberalim), 108 Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 18 Gates, Robert, 173 Gaza Ayyash assassination and subsequent violence, 221–222 Begin’s peace plan, 144–145 disengagement, 293–296 Egypt under Sisi, 379 First Intifada, 164–165 Gilad Shalit’s imprisonment, 321–323 Hamas coup, 349–351 Hamas electoral victory, 297 Hamas violence in, 349–350 Hebron Agreement, 244–246 Netanyahu’s “peace plan,” 200–201 Operation Pillar of Defense, 241, 342 Oslo process, 198–204, 208–210 PFLP violence, 78 Second Intifada, 285–286 Gemayel, Bashir, 144–145 Gesher party, 207–208, 226–227, 260, 270 Golan Heights Law, 140–141 Gold, Dore, 197, 240, 242–243, 363 Goldstein, Baruch, 202–203 Gore, Al, 258 Greenblatt, Jason, 374, 376 Groisser, Leon, 91–92 Gulf War (1991), 176–178, 180, 335 Ha ‘Tehiya party, 183 Haaretz newspaper, 364 Habib, Philip, 143–144 Haganah, 19, 25–27, 29, 36–41, 44, 54, 56 Haig, Alexander, 141–142 Hamas, 192–193, 203–204, 221–223, 250–251, 318, 321–323, 341–342, 349–361 Hanegbi, Tzachi, 187, 203–204, 247 Haram al-Shari, Sharon’s tour of, 285 Haran, Miriam (Miki Weizmann), 91 Haredi leadership, 258–259, 274–276 Hariri, Rafik, 256 Harow, Ari, 299, 306–307, 380–381 hasbara (Zionist diplomacy strategy), 33, 165–166, 196, 259 Hassan of Jordan, 205 Ha’Tnuah (The Movement) party, 343 Hatzohar (World Union of Zionist Revisionists), 17–19 Ha’Yarden (The Jordan) newspaper, 22, 24–25 Hazony, Yoram, 197 Hebrew language, 11–12, 20–22 Hebrew University, 20, 27–28, 52–54, 58, 81 Hebron Agreement (1997), 244, 246–248, 268, 284 Herut (Freedom) party, 50–51, 106–107, 270 Herzl, Theodor, 10–11, 28 Herzog, Chaim, 175 Herzog, Isaac “Buzhi,” 356, 358–359, 363 Hezbollah, 146, 193, 206, 228–229, 254, 285, 332, 347, 377–378 Hoenlein, Malcolm, 157 Holocaust, 318–319, 325, 352 “hot tape” scandal, 187–190, 220, 232, 272 Hovevei Zion (Lovers of Zion), 10–12 Hussein, Saddam, 176, 261 Hussein of Jordan, 205, 251, 264, 276 IDF (Israel Defense Forces) Ben-Gurion’s Israel, 57–58 covert intelligence missions, 75–78 Entebbe raid, 116–123 exemption of the ultra-Orthodox from service, 274–275 Hamas violence in Gaza and the West Bank, 349–350 Israeli control in Jerusalem, 51–52 Israeli strike on Iran, 327–329, 331–339, 341 Israel’s air strikes on Syria’s nuclear reactor, 324–325 Netanyahu distancing himself from, 253–255 Operation Protective Edge, 349–361 Operation Wrath of God, 94 Oslo process terms, 203 Second Intifada, 244–245, 285 Second Lebanon War, 300–301 Sinai Campaign, 58–59 Six-Day War, 70–74 Syrian plans to recover the Golan Heights, 255–256 war in Lebanon, 142–148 Yom Kippur War, 95–99 See also military service, Netanyahu’s immigrants and refugees border fence as obstacle to, 3–4 British cap on, 27 German Jews’ migration to Palestine, 22–23 Jabotinsky’s European evacuation plan, 26 Netanyahu family’s move to Israel, 48–49 Netanyahu wooing Soviet Jewish voters, 230–231 postwar Zionism, 38–40 practical Zionism, 11 Russian voters’ stance on Likud and Labor, 275 Soviet Jewish refugees, 180–182 Soviet Jews, 180–182 US Rogers Plan for Palestinians, 85–86 independence day celebration, 258–259 inequality, social and economic, 1–2, 320–321 Intifada, First, 164–165, 192–193 Intifada, Second, 285, 287, 292 Iran, 359–360 as the source of conflict in the Middle East, 176 Dagan’s security concerns, 330–331 Israeli strike on, 327–329, 331–339, 341 Israel’s Begin Doctrine on nuclear weapons, 324–327 Netanyahu’s American political allies, 313–314 Netanyahu’s congressional address protesting the nuclear deal, 354–355 P5+1 talks, 259–260 sanctions, 335–336 Syria’s conflict, 377–378 US agreement, 346, 348–349 Iraq as the source of conflict in the Middle East, 176 Gulf War, 176–178 Israeli bombing of nuclear reactor, 139–140 nuclear ambitions, 324 Soviet support, 58 US war in, 288, 326 Irgun Zvai Leumi (IZL), 25–27, 29–31, 33, 36–37, 40–41, 49–50, 152 Iron Fence, 3–4 Islamic fundamentalism, 194–195 Israel Defense Forces.

No Such Thing as Society
by Andy McSmith
Published 19 Nov 2010

Handwritten draft by Margaret Thatcher for a speech to be delivered. This was also among the batch of documents released on 30 January 2010. 11. John Hills et al., An Anatomy of Economic Inequality in the UK – Report of the National Equality Panel, Government Equalities Office, London, 2010, p. 41, p. 27. 12. The Times, 14 October 1981. 13. Francis Fukuyama’s essay ‘The End of History?’ first appeared in the magazine The National Interest in 1989. 14. She used this expression in a valedictory interview with ITN, broadcast 28 June 1991. CHAPTER 1 1. Kenneth Williams, The Kenneth Williams Diaries, edited by Russell Davies, HarperCollins, London, 1993, p. 581. 2.

…

No established communist system had ever been dismantled or overthrown from within. People expected this contest between rival systems to continue indefinitely. Instead, they saw it coming to a quick, decisive and non-violent end. As communism rolled out of Eastern Europe in 1989, an American philosopher forecast that the end of history was approaching13 and that every other political system in the world would evolve into the western model of liberal capitalism. These developments were mirrored in domestic politics. Since 1945, the UK had edged towards becoming more ‘socialist’, with free medicine, free schools, state pensions and more than 40 per cent of the country’s industrial capacity owned by the state.

Money: 5,000 Years of Debt and Power
by Michel Aglietta
Published 23 Oct 2018

The underestimation, or even outright ignorance, of the oppositions between Anglo-Saxon liberalism, the French nation-state, and the German and Russian empires ought to have sounded the alarm for the latent conflicts in the international sphere. But the Anglo-Saxon philosophers of the Belle Époque, just like Francis Fukuyama after the fall of the Berlin Wall, were quick to extol the end of history. They believed themselves to be carrying forth universal values, and that it was their mission to introduce them around the world. And what better vehicle for, indeed, this than finance? The pound sterling’s longstanding gold convertibility sanctioned its preponderance as a key currency.

…

Recognising this allows us to steer clear of the reflexively Western orientation formalised by the English liberal school from the seventeenth century onwards, the notion of a natural order that gave rise to the theory of equilibrium. Its historical success in the age of the gold standard was not, in fact, the end of history. We have already outlined three postulates that will guide our historical investigation: (1) money resembles a language, the language of accounting; (2) money is a system, the payment system, which links it to technology; and (3) money is overseen by a principle of sovereignty that confers on it a common legitimacy within the space of sovereignty under consideration.

How to Be a Liberal: The Story of Liberalism and the Fight for Its Life
by Ian Dunt
Published 15 Oct 2020

He died a year later, at the age of 92. The end of the USSR was considered the complete historical triumph of the laissez-faire model. Two opposing economic extremes had faced each other: communism and unfettered capitalism. And now one of them was victorious. The American political economist Francis Fukuyama suggested it could effectively be ‘the end of history.’ For years, politicians and academics all over the western world acted as if that was the end of the story, as if all matters of economic consideration in human affairs were now closed. By the time centre-left parties had fought their way back into power in the 1990s – under Democratic President Bill Clinton in the US and New Labour prime minister Tony Blair in the UK – they had largely accepted the deregulation agenda.

…

See also USA (United States of America) American Civil War 1 American Revolution 1, 2, 3, 4 British colonialism 1 Declaration of Independence 1, 2, 3 exclusion 1 independence and France 1 slavery 1 Amish community 1 ancient constitution 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Andrews, Kehinde 1 Angelina, Pasha 1 anti-racism 1, 2 Anti-Semitic League, France 1 anti-semitism 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 apartheid 1 Arab Spring 1, 2 Aristotle 1, 2, 3 Article 50 1, 2 Articles of Confederation 1, 2 Asch, Solomon 1 al-Assad, Bashar 1, 2 asset-backed commercial paper 1 assignats 1, 2, 3 asylum seekers 1, 2, 3 atheism 1, 2 Atlantic Charter 1 Augustine, St 1 Auschwitz 1 austerity 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Austria 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 authentic self 1, 2 automatic stabilisers 1, 2, 3 autonomy 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Azam, Sher 1 Babcock, Barbara 1 Bagehot, Walter 1 Bailey, Michael 1 balanced budgets 1, 2, 3 Bank of America 1, 2 banks anti-semitism 1 deregulation 1, 2 emergency rescue measures 1 Greece financial crisis 1 interest rates 1 post-war policy 1 securitisation 1, 2 securitisation risks 1 securitisation system collapse 1 Wall Street Crash 1 Bannon, Steve 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 Baraka, Amiri 1 Barroso, José Manuel 1 Barry, Brian 1 Bartlett, Jamie 1 Bartolo, Pietro 1 Bastille 1, 2, 3 Bastwick, John 1 Bear Stearns 1, 2, 3 Beigui, Dariush 1 belonging Berlin on 1, 2, 3, 4 identity 1, 2, 3 Orwell on 1, 2 Belzec camp 1 Ben Ali, Zine El Abidine 1 Benedict, Ruth 1 Bentham, Jeremy 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 Beradt, Charlotte 1 Bercow, John 1 Beria, Lavrentiy 1 Berlin, Isaiah development of liberal values 1 early life 1 group identity 1, 2, 3, 4 identity and belonging 1, 2 Jewish identity 1, 2 liberal theory 1 on Mill 1 pluralism 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Second World War work 1 Berlusconi, Silvio 1, 2 Bernanke, Ben 1, 2 Berners-Lee, Tim 1 Bespalov, Vitaly 1, 2 Bible 1, 2 bicameral legislature 1, 2, 3 Bill of Rights 1, 2 Black, Hannah 1 black identity 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 black women 1, 2 Blair, Tony 1, 2 bloggers 1 BNP Paribas 1, 2 Boer War 1 Bolsheviks 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Bonaparte, Joseph 1 Bonaparte, Napoleon 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 books 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Borchard, Ruth 1 Boston (Tea Party) 1 Bouazizi, Mohamed 1, 2 Bradford Council for Mosques 1 Breitbart 1, 2, 3 Breivik, Anders 1 Brexit EU referendum 1 government response and May 1 Johnson as prime minister 1 Trump and nationalism 1 Bridges, George 1 Brixton riots 1 Brown, Gordon 1, 2 brownshirts 1, 2, 3, 4 Brown, Winthrop 1 Bruno, Giordano 1 Buchenwald camp 1 Burghart, Devin 1 Burke, Edmund 1 Burton, Henry 1 call-out culture 1 Cambridge Analytica 1 Cameron, David 1, 2, 3 cancel culture 1 capital goods theory 1, 2 capitalism 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Carlyle, Thomas 1, 2, 3 Carrier, Jean-Baptiste 1 Carter, Jimmy 1 The Case of the Army Truly Stated 1, 2, 3 Castile, Philando 1 Catholicism 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 CDOs (collateralised debt obligations) 1, 2, 3, 4 Cecil the lion 1 censorship 1, 2, 3, 4 Central America 1 Charles I 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 Charles II 1, 2 Charrière, Isabelle de 1 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 1 Chelmno camp 1 child separation 1 China 1 Churchill, Winston 1, 2, 3, 4 Church of England 1, 2, 3 cities 1, 2 City of London 1, 2, 3 Civil Rights Act 1 class 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 classical economics 1, 2, 3 climate change 1 Clinton, Bill 1, 2 collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) 1, 2, 3, 4 collateral rehypothecation 1 Collini, Stefan 1 colonialism 1, 2, 3 Combahee River Collective 1, 2 commercial paper 1, 2, 3 communism emergence of 1 Germany 1, 2 identity and belonging 1 Marx 1 post-war economics 1, 2 Russia 1, 2, 3, 4 Soviet Union collapse 1 Communist Party 1, 2, 3 community of the free 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 concentration camps 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 conformity 1, 2, 3 consent 1, 2, 3 Conservative party 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Constant, Benjamin Adolphe 1, 2 affairs 1, 2 ‘le benjamin’ constitution 1, 2 character and thinking 1 development of liberal values 1, 2, 3 early years 1 and Hardenberg 1 and Madame de Staël 1, 2, 3, 4 and Mill 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and Napoleon 1, 2, 3, 4 Principles of Politics Applicable to All Governments 1 property rights 1, 2, 3 on Rousseau 1 The Spirit of Conquest and Usurpation and Their Relation to European Civilisation 1 Constant, Juste 1, 2, 3 Conway, Kellyanne 1 Copernicus, Nicolaus 1, 2, 3 On the Revolutions of the Celestial Spheres 1 Cornwallis, Charles 1 Council of Europe 1, 2 Cox, Jo 1 credit rating agencies 1, 2, 3 Creighton, Mandell 1 Crenshaw, Kimberlé 1 Cromwell, Oliver 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 Cult of the Supreme Being 1 cultural appropriation 1, 2 cultural identity 1, 2 cultural relativism 1, 2 culture war 1, 2, 3 Cummings, Dominic 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Curtin, John 1 customs border 1 customs union 1, 2, 3 DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals) 1 Dachau camp 1, 2 Danton, George 1, 2, 3, 4 Darwin, Charles On the Origin of Species 1 Davis, Michele 1 debt restructuring 1, 2, 3 Declaration of Independence 1, 2, 3 Declaration of the Rights of Man 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 deep state 1, 2, 3, 4 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) 1 demand 1, 2, 3 democracy 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 Denmark 1, 2 Department of Homeland Security 1, 2 deregulation 1, 2 Descartes, René birth of liberalism 1, 2, 3 birth of science 1 character 1 Cogito 1, 2, 3, 4 Discourse on the Method 1 doubt 1, 2, 3 dreams 1 evil demon theory 1, 2 Meditations on First Philosophy 1, 2, 3, 4 religion 1, 2 senses 1 The World 1 difference 1, 2, 3 disability 1 discrimination 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 disinformation 1, 2 dissent 1, 2 divine right 1, 2, 3 Dorsey, Jack 1 doubt Constant 1 Descartes 1, 2, 3 Mill 1, 2, 3 Milton 1 Puritans 1 Rousseau 1 social media outrage 1 Douglas, Lord Alfred 1 Downs, Jim 1 Dreamers 1 Dreyfus, Alfred 1, 2, 3 Dreyfus Affair 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 drug use 1 Drumont, Édouard 1, 2 Duclos, Benoit 1 ECB (European Central Bank) 1, 2, 3, 4 echo chamber 1 ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights) 1, 2 economic growth 1, 2, 3 economics Hayek and Keynes 1, 2 Mill and Taylor 1 post-war rebuilding 1 Smith 1 Eden, Anthony 1 education 1, 2, 3, 4 egalitarian liberalism 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 Egypt 1 Eicke, Theodor 1 Eisenhower, Dwight 1 Electoral College 1 Eleven Years’ Tyranny 1 Eliot, TS 1 elite 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 empathy 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 end of history 1 enemies of the people EU referendum 1, 2 French Revolution aftermath 1 nationalism 1 Russia 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 enemies of the state 1 English Civil War Constant on 1 effects 1, 2 events of 1, 2 origins of liberalism 1 printing 1 English Defence League 1 Enragés (Enraged Ones) 1 Environmental Protection Agency 1 epistemology 1 equality 1, 2, 3, 4 equal pay 1 Erdogan, Recep Tayyip 1, 2 Estates General 1, 2, 3 Esterhazy, Charles 1, 2 ethnic minorities 1, 2, 3 ethnocentrism 1 ethno-nationalism 1 ethnopluralism 1 EU.

Superclass: The Global Power Elite and the World They Are Making
by David Rothkopf
Published 18 Mar 2008

Yet, even acknowledging that the elites of today are different from those studied by Mills, several of the central questions that he raised and that bedeviled his times remain. Despite assertions to the contrary that emerged in the wake of the end of the cold war, we have not resolved the central debates about how to order our societies. We have not reached, as Francis Fukuyama put it, “the End of History”—an ideological consensus that the liberal Western view of government and economic life is the best way to order society. Nowhere is this clearer than with the issue that provoked the split between mainstream capitalism and Marxism—that of the just distribution of wealth. Contentious sessions at Davos in 2007 turned on issues like executive pay and whether it is fair that the average American CEO makes 350 to 400 times what his or her average employee makes.

The Sovereign Individual: How to Survive and Thrive During the Collapse of the Welfare State
by James Dale Davidson and William Rees-Mogg
Published 3 Feb 1997

The Great Unanswered Question This brings us to one of the great unanswered puzzles of modern history: why the Cold War that came at the conclusion of the Great Power system pitted as its final contenders Communist dictatorships against welfare-state democracies. This issue has been so little examined that it actually seemed plausible to many when a State Department analyst, Francis Fukuyama, proclaimed "the end of history" after the Berlin Wall fell. The enthusiastic audience his work elicited took too much for granted. Apparently neither the author nor many others had bothered to ask a fundamental question: What common characteristics of state socialism and welfare-state democracies led them to be the final contenders for world domination?

Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire
by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri
Published 1 Jan 2004

Patrick Camiller (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000). 3 See Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); and Robert Harvey, Global Disorder: America and the Threat of World Conflict (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2003). 4 Two influential examples that link capitalist democracy and U.S. hegemony are Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Anchor Books, 2000); and Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 5 See the National Security Strategy document released by the White House in September 2002. One of the most widely discussed arguments for unilateral U.S. power is Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Knopf, 2003). 6 Michael Hirsh, At War with Ourselves: Why America Is Squandering Its Chance to Build a Better World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 254.

Them And Us: Politics, Greed And Inequality - Why We Need A Fair Society
by Will Hutton
Published 30 Sep 2010

In November Bill Clinton strode to victory in the American presidential election by promising to combine Republican toughness on welfare reform and rigour on tackling the budget deficit with Democratic promises on expanding healthcare entitlements and improving training. Intervention in the economy was determinedly out. The world had decided that markets, free enterprise and globalisation ruled. Francis Fukuyama captured the zeitgeist with his book The End of History and the Last Man, declaring that the ideological pitched battles that had punctuated world history were over because liberal democracy and capitalism had emphatically won and their efficiency could not now be contested. There was only one future. For Labour politicians confronting the prospect of another five years in opposition, bitter truths had to be learned.

The Finance Curse: How Global Finance Is Making Us All Poorer
by Nicholas Shaxson
Published 10 Oct 2018

There was Australia’s blokeish Bob Hawke, who could have given Juncker a run for his money: Hawke once held the world speed record for drinking a yard of ale. There was Italy’s Romano Prodi, Sweden’s Göran Persson, Dutch prime minister Wim Kok and Germany’s Gerhard Schröder with his project for Die Neue Mitte—the New Middle. The political philosopher Francis Fukuyama had famously summed up the changes in 1989, as the movement was gathering steam, with the declaration that the victory of market capitalism was ‘the end of history as such: the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government’. For the left, the Third Way was the only way. This was the spirit of the age in 1997 when Britain, parched by eighteen hard years of Conservative rule, was offered the chance to elect a rock-star politician at the head of a renewed Labour Party.

Beyond the Wall: East Germany, 1949-1990
by Katja Hoyer
Published 5 Apr 2023

For many Germans, East and West, the division of their country, which had seemed a fact of life during the Cold War, now looked like an unnatural state of affairs, a product of the Second World War and perhaps a punishment for it. By 1990, had Germany not done enough to overcome this dark chapter of its past? Did it not deserve a fresh start without constant reminders of it? Francis Fukuyama’s framing of the end of the Cold War as ‘the end of history’ seemed particularly apt for Germany. The nation wanted, indeed needed to see reunification as a happy ending to its tumultuous twentieth century. Acknowledging the continuing impact of Germany’s decades of division as anything other than distant history destroys this comforting illusion.

…

They might be able to chip away at Germany’s obsession with Vergangenheitsbewältigung, the process of ‘overcoming’ its own history. This concept has too often prevented the country from accepting continuities where it only wants to see clean breaks. It has made it tempting to see 1990 as a watershed moment that erased the GDR from the national narrative for good. Yet reunification is no more the end of history than the unification was in 1871. German unity cannot be ‘achieved’ in a single event. Rather the East German approach of the Wende as the beginning of a dynamic process seems more constructive. It allows a fluid, open and changeable interpretation of a country that no longer exists, that is no longer an enemy to be overcome.

…

W., 412 Calgary Winter Olympics (1988), 378–9 Carl Zeiss Jena (company), 194 Carlsohn, Hans, 216–17 Catholic Church, 76, 100, 112, 135, 278, 287, 289, 347, 348 Ceaus‚escu Nicolae, 352 Central Committee of SED, 120, 124, 127, 201, 237, 277, 290, 316, 335, 339, 409; attempts to rein-in Stasi (early-1960s), 219–20; entire membership resigns (3 December 1989), 410; and fall of Ulbricht, 246–51; headquarters of in East Berlin, 102, 246; Honecker’s ‘Beat Ban,’ 212–13; Mielke’s rise in, 107; and opening of the Wall (9 November 1989), 402; place within SED structure, 84, 88; political enemies of Honecker, 353; power struggle after June uprising (1953), 139–41; Secretariat of, 84, 88, 140, 211, 212; and Ulbricht’s Westpolitik, 243 Centrum (shopping centre chain), 256–7 Chávez, Hugo, 137 Chemnitz, 270, 386 Chernenko, Konstantin, 351–2, 353, 355–6, 357 Chernobyl nuclear disaster (April 1986), 384 Cherokee Nation, 373–4 Chile, 265 Christian Democratic Union (CDU), 59, 63, 81, 85, 390, 391, 413; and foundation of GDR, 74; in GrandCoalition (1989-90), 414; and ideological purges of early 1950s, 87–91; youth organization in FRG, 260 Churchill, Winston, 35 City (rock band), 268 civil/human rights: growing protests in late-1980s, 389, 390; Helsinki Accords (August 1975), 291–2, 386; human rights groups, 386, 389; illusion of in GDR, 85, 109; and ‘New Course’ (9 June 1953), 132; and public hopes for peace/security/food in 1950s, 109–10; and Schalck–Strauß ‘channel,’ 343–4 Clausewitz, Carl von, 350 ‘Clausewitz – Life of a Prussian General’ (film), 350 Claussen, Peter, 372–4 coffee: ‘coffee agreement’ with Mengistu, 299–300; coffee crisis (1977), 293–6; ‘Erichs Krönung’ (Erich’s brew), 295, 300; GDR’s production project in Vietnam, 296–8, 305; production in African nations, 298–300; supply of as huge and costly issue, 294, 295–6, 299–300 Cold War: Berlin as focal point of, 75, 125, 171–86, 207–8; Berlin Blockade (1948-9), 72, 73, 74–5; Fukuyama’s end of history claim, 3–4; heated tensions of the early 1980s, 342–3; Hungarian Uprising ends ‘thaw,’ 151; June uprising stoked by West, 129, 133, 141–2; Khrushchev’s Berlin demilitarization demands, 152–3, 171–2; Korean War (1950-3), 119; McCarthyism, 119; simplistic images of the Other, 7; ‘thaw’ after Khrushchev’s takeover, 149–50; unfolds on the world stage (1947-8), 72, 73; West sees victory as proving alternative models wrong, 5; Western intelligence agencies, 139, 141–2, 273–4 Communist International (Comintern), 12, 18, 22–3, 28, 29, 37, 48, 106, 137 consumer goods: car ownership, 197–8, 280, 325, 365; Intershops, 322–3, 327, 338; production of, 229, 280, 324–5, 334, 336–7, 365–6; refrigerators, 229, 280, 324–5, 365; subsidized branded American jeans, 256–9, 279, 327; telephones, 229; television ownership, 226, 280, 324–5, 337, 365; washing machines, 69, 229, 280, 324–5, 365 Crimean Peninsula, 328 cruise liners, 186–9, 224, 231 Cuba, 188, 300–3, 304, 319 Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), 175, 188 Czechoslovakia, 89, 215, 221, 233, 242 Dachau concentration camp, 64 Damerius, Helmut, 25 Danzig (now Gdańsk), 367 Davis, Angela, 260–1 DEFA (state-owned film production company), 128, 213, 257, 270 defence, national: ‘Defence Education Camps,’ 312–13, 314; dense network of sirens, 318; militarization of society after June 1953 events, 142–7; militarization of society (from late 1970s), 306–16, 317–19 Democracy Now, 411 Democratic Awakening, 413 ‘democratic centralism,’ doctrine of, 91–2 Democratic Farmers’ Party (DBD), 81, 390 Demuth, Renate, 43–4, 45, 323 denazification, 35, 58, 107–8; as foundational dogma of GDR, 36, 117–18 Dessau, 304 Deubel, Klaus, 334–5 Diener, Alfred, 135 Dietrich, Wolfgang, 339–40 Dimitrov, Georgi, 29, 37, 48, 49, 106, 137 Doherr, Annemarie, 171, 172 Döllnsee, Brandenburg, 209–10 Drasdo, Herbert, 217 Drasdo, Ursula, 217 Dresden, 50–1, 154–5, 236–7, 240, 334, 335, 345, 399, 409, 412 Druzhba (Russian gas pipeline), 360–5 Druzhba (Russian oil pipeline), 281, 330 Dubček, Alexander, 215 Duroplast, 198 Dzerzhinsky, Felix, 157–8, 216 East Berlin: 10th World Festival of Youth and Students (1973), 259–63, 271; and 17 June uprising (1953), 133–4, 150; Bebelplatz, 78; Central Committee headquarters, 246; events of October/November 1989, 393–4, 399, 401–4; FDJ’s march on West Berlin (August 1951), 93–6; Fernsehturm, Berlin Television Tower, 5–6, 225–6, 393–4; Friedrichsfelde Central Cemetery, 159, 263; Göring’s former Air Ministry, 77–8, 132; as much smaller than West Berlin, 76; Neue Wache (New Guard), 350; open sector borders, 125, 130, 171–2, 207–8, 217; Pankow district, 163; Stalinallee renamed Karl-Marx-Allee, 150, 225; Stasi’s Ruschestraße headquarters, 216, 217; State Council Building, 234–5, 237, 262, 263; strike at Stalinallee (June 1953), 129, 130, 132–3, 150; Unter den Linden boulevard, 78; Werner-Seelenbinderhalle, 86; Zionskirche, 388–9 Eastern Bloc countries: and Willy Brandt, 233–4, 242–3; Brezhnev Doctrine, 215; and Brezhnev’s conservatism, 214; deep financial problems (1981), 338; dependence on Soviet oil, 330; directive to after death of Stalin, 136; holiday opportunities in, 190; Honecker returns GDR economy to, 254–5, 274; Hungarian Uprising (1956), 16, 151, 163, 217, 313; impact of Gorbachev’s reforms, 398; Prague Spring (1968), 215, 233; show trials in, 89; suppression of Prague Spring (1968), 215, 233; Ulbricht as dismissive of, 242 Eberlein, Werner, 244, 329 Eberswalde, Brandenburg, 300, 301–3 Edition Leipzig (publisher), 350 education: compass on GDR flag, 228; extended secondary school (EOS), 204, 227, 228, 256, 315, 316; higher education, 193, 203–5, 227, 228, 312, 314, 315–16, 317, 318, 320, 325; kindergartens, 138, 155, 236, 239; and militarization of society, 145, 312–16, 318; military service before university, 312–13, 315–16, 317; in Moscow, 23–5, 97, 106; obligatory military education, 312–16; physical education, 235–6, 237; politicized structures within, 240; polytechnic secondary schools (POS), 227, 314; reforms (1965), 226–7; ‘Social Science’ unit at university, 126; and socialist ideology, 157, 160; spending on, 124, 138; technical colleges, 228; vocational training/apprenticeships, 111–12, 123, 155–6, 162, 183–4, 204–7, 227–8, 302, 325, 340, 369; in Weimar era, 105 Egerland, Helmut, 175 Egypt, 231–3 Ehmke, Horst, 273–4 Ehrenburg, Ilya, 42 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 141–2, 153 Eisenhüttenstadt (Ironworks City), 115, 150 Eisleben, 347, 348 Eisler, Gerhart, 74 electoral politics: doctrine of ‘democratic centralism,’ 91–2; fixed, allocated seat shares in GDR parliament, 81, 91, 91–2, 390–1; local elections (May 1989), 390–3; March 1990 election, 411, 412–13, 421; shift to multi-party democracy, 420–1; voting process, 92–3, 390–3; Western democracies today, 92 energy supplies: brown coal (lignite), 114–15, 282, 330; and dependency on USSR, 6, 115, 243, 281–2, 306, 329–31, 332–3, 336, 338; Druzhba gas pipeline, 360–5; GDR’s desperate need of, 115, 169, 279, 306; self-sufficiency drive, 114–15 see also oil production/supplies Engelberg, Ernst, 350–1 environmental issues, 114–15, 282, 330, 384, 387–9, 391–2 Erhard, Ludwig, 168, 232 Erler, Peter, 10 Ernst Thälmann Pioneer Organization, 318 Ernsting, Stefan, 265 Erpenbeck, Fritz, 31–2, 47 Ethiopia, 299–300 European Defence Community, 119 Ewald, Manfred, 237–8 Falge, Andreas, 402–4 Falin, Valentin, 58–9 Faustmann, Regina, 111–12, 117, 135, 155–6, 200 Fechter, Peter, 178–81 Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), 145; Adenauer’s election victories, 110; Angela Markel’s family move from, 338; Basic Treaty (1972), 261, 275; Brandt as first Social Democrat Chancellor, 90; constitution labelled as ‘provisional,’ 79, 276; cracking down on opponents, 85; declared the continuity state, 4, 417–22; demonstration in Essen (11 May 1952), 101–2; differences to GDR, 76–7, 114; economic aid from Western Allies, 76; exploits June uprising, 142; Federal Intelligence Service, 273–4; FIFA World Cup hosted by (1974), 266–8; food rationing ended (1950), 124; foreign contract workers, 303; as geopolitical pawn, 168; Germany Treaty (26 May 1952), 121; ‘Grand Coalition,’ 233; grants Israel arms purchase credit, 232; growth of trade volume with GDR (from 1984), 345–6; Hallstein Doctrine (1955), 156, 232–3, 275; idea of 1945 as ‘zero hour,’ 4, 38; and immigration from GDR, 130–1, 162; and inner-German thaw (1970s), 275–6, 322–5, 327, 331–2; limited social mobility in, 240, 316–17; as much larger than GDR, 76, 114; national debt in 1980s, 280; NATO membership, 108, 119, 145–6; new capital in Bonn, 76; ‘ohne mich’ (count me out) generation, 168; open welcome to former Nazis, 117; outright ban of the KPD (1956), 85; proclamation of constitution (23 May 1949), 73–4; rearmament/remilitarization (from 1952), 119, 122, 145–6; religious populations of, 76; reunification as a constitutional aim, 276; Schalck–Strauß ‘channel,’ 341–6, 357; selling of prisoners to, 277–9, 282, 387; Stalin Note (10 March 1952), 119–22, 141; Stasi spies in, 272–3, 274; streamed education system, 227; Welcome Money for East German arrivals, 405–6, 407; women’s employment rates in, 156 see also Adenauer, Konrad; Kohl, Helmut; West Berlin Feist, Margot, 77–8 Fensch, Eberhart, 266 Field, Noel, 89, 90, 103, 106–7 First World War, 14, 15, 104 Fleischer, Anneliese, 118–19, 122 Forck, Bishop Gottfried, 389 foreign labour programme, 300–6 Forum Handelsgesellschaft, 322, 323 France, 119, 121 Frank, Mario, 86 Frederick the Great, 350, 351 Frederick William I, King of Prussia, 351 Free German Trade Union Federation (FDGB), 59, 187, 189, 321 Free German Youth (FDJ), 77–9, 93–6, 112; and 10th World Festival of Youth and Students (1973), 260; banned in West Germany (June 1951), 101–2; and ‘Blue Jeans,’ 255–6, 257; and building of Berlin Wall, 176–7; ‘Convention of the German Youth’ (June 1950), 100–1; denounces Western culture, 160, 212; and Druzhba gas pipeline, 361, 362; Forum (student newspaper), 201; as ‘Hitler’s children,’ 100, 167–8; Honecker as founder, 99–100, 256; Jugendtourist (Youth Tourist), 367; Kuhfeld’s delegation to Berlin (1969), 224, 225–6; Angela Merkel’s role in, 288, 369; militarization of, 144, 145; stuffy image of, 160, 202; waning enthusiasm for, 200–1; Western members of, 101 Freie Welt (Free World) magazine, 264, 265 Freikorps, 14–15 Freudenberg, Ute, 269 Friedrich, Walter, 383 Fritschen, Brigitte, 44, 125, 162 Fritz Heckert (state-owned cruise ship), 186–8, 189, 224 fruits, exotic, 190, 218, 279 Fukuyama, Francis, 3–4 Fulbright Scholarship scheme, 373 Fulbrook, Mary, 93, 108, 205 Fürnberg, Louis, 82–3 Gaddafi, Muammar, 300 Gagarin, Yuri, 200 Geige, Hans die, 364 gender equality: childcare system, 155, 345, 413, 419–20; divorce rates, 207; female officers/recruits in NVA, 380–2; impact of reunification, 415, 419; as inherent feature of socialist ideology, 15, 155, 205; and kindergarten system, 138, 155, 236, 239; limited success of programme, 206–7; obstacles to, 205–7; pragmatic reasons for, 205; women in higher education, 203–5, 207; women in workplace, 111–12, 155–6, 319–20, 380, 419; women’s organizations, 92, 139–40; women’s rights activists, 16; women’s social lives, 156 Genex (mail order catalogue), 323–4, 361, 365, 366 Gerbilskaya, Luba, 21–2 German Communist Party (KPD): and creation of SED (May 1946), 62–4; exiles in Soviet Union, 9–10, 12–14, 15–20, 21–7, 28, 29–33, 36–8, 102; founding of (1918/19), 28, 29; Honecker joins Central Committee, 99; illegal information hubs in Nazi era, 78; members executed in Soviet Union, 19, 22, 102, 106; and Molotov– Ribbentrop Pact (August 1939), 26–7; Nazi suppression of, 11–12, 19, 21–2, 166; Neumann–Remmele group in Soviet Union, 102, 103; outright ban of in FDR (1956), 85; persecution during Stalin’s Terror, 9–10, 13–14, 17–21, 22–6, 31–3, 102; and post-war East Germany (pre-GDR), 35–8, 46–9; prisoners in Soviet gulags, 9–10, 13–14, 17, 25, 33; refounded under Pieck (June 1945), 58; Reichstag deputies (1933), 11–12; resentment towards the nobility, 65–6; Soviet deportations back to Germany, 20–1, 32; survivors of Stalin’s purges, 28, 29, 31–3, 36–8, 46–7, 87; in Weimar era, 14–15, 64, 105–6; in West Germany, 102 German Democratic Republic (GDR): 1950s as decade of missed chances, 167–9; acceptance of conscientious objection, 176, 315; alcohol consumption in, 366; alienates creative artists over Biermann, 291, 292; anti-Soviet sentiment of German men, 146; appeal of a genuinely anti-fascist, socialist state in 1950s, 110–11, 167–8; border crossings of November 1989 period, 403–7; ceases to exist (midnight 3 October 1990), 415–16; closer relations with West (late-1980s), 372–7; consolidation/stabilization (late 1950s/early 1960s), 5, 152–6, 158; dams of change broken (October 1989), 397–406; differences to FRG, 76–7, 114; feeling of helplessness as country dismantled, 415, 418–19; feeling of stability in 1987 period, 365–7; few natural resources in, 114–15, 169, 192–3, 198–9, 258, 281–2, 333; foundation of (7 October 1949), 74, 76; as geopolitical pawn to Moscow, 141, 168, 331–2; German refugees from the east in, 76; historiography of Prussia, 349–51; ideological purges of early 1950s, 87–91, 108; Khrushchev’s continued demand for reparations, 161; lack of political reform in last years of, 382–4, 390–3, 397–9; leadership’s deep mindset of fear, 108, 147, 163–7, 168, 219, 293, 318–19, 388–9; life as dull/stuffy in 1980s, 325, 360–1, 362, 367, 369–71; life as fairly comfortable in 1980s, 261–2, 320–1, 325, 362, 367, 371, 394–5; loses right to write its own history, 4; and ‘Luther Year’ (1983), 346–9; Angela Merkel’s life in, 1, 2–3, 259, 288–9, 367–9, 422; as much smaller than FRG, 76, 114; national flag of, 121, 228; normalization of German history in, 346–51; as not a footnote in German history, 5, 7, 418–23; ‘ohne mich’ (count me out) generation, 168; optimism/hope of early 1970s, 259–64; Ore Mountains (Thuringia and Saxony), 115–16; political events after opening of borders, 408–14; political repression in late-1960s, 228–9, 240; progress during 1960s, 186–98, 199–208, 219–20, 224–8, 229–31, 240, 242, 244–5; public hopes for peace/security/food in 1950s, 109, 110; regime as frightened of its own people, 109, 163–7; religious populations of, 76, 85, 112, 135, 138, 278, 284–9, 292, 349; rich cultural scene in 1950s, 112; room for private withdrawal in, 288–9; serious opposition to Ulbricht’s reforms, 93; show trials in, 89; silence over Red Army rapes, 45–6; Soviet backing of in late 1950s, 153; sudden disintegration of, 2, 397–416; suffocating weight of original economic burden, 114–18, 123–4, 138, 168–9; Ulbricht’s Soviet-style reforms, 86–7, 91, 93; vast Soviet reparations extracted from, 115–17, 168; widening gulf between regime and people, 166–7; widespread discontent at economic situation (early 1950s), 127–30 see also Honecker, Erich; Ulbricht, Walter German Democratic Republic (GDR), economy: 1970s as high point in living standards, 324–5; Apel’s death (December 1965), 214; Bavarian loan (1983/4), 343–5, 357; begins to catch up with the West (1960s), 194–5, 208; collaboration with Japan, 336, 337–8; consequences of land reforms, 66, 124; currency issues, 72–3, 169, 277, 322–4; desperate need for credit in early-1980s, 340–5; East Germans as highly attuned to 1980s crisis, 339–40; economic crisis of 1980s, 334–7, 338–42; economic planning commission, 194; economic/financial crisis (early-1950s), 123–5, 127–30; few natural resources, 114–15, 169, 192–3, 198–9, 258, 281–2, 333; first five-year plan (1951), 123–5; five-year plan (1981), 335; food rationing finally ends (1959), 124, 156; foreign trade/export markets, 6, 156, 192–4, 232, 234, 243, 258–9, 277–81, 319, 342, 345, 350; and FRG’s Hallstein Doctrine (1955), 156, 232–3, 275; fruit and vegetable production, 117, 124; game of ‘catch-up,’ 111–18, 123–4, 168; government lies about 1980s crisis, 338–9; growth of trade volume with FRG (from 1984), 345–6; haphazard/absurd efficiency measures (1981), 335; highest living standards in communist world (1970s), 6, 324–5; ‘Honecker Account,’ 279, 281; Honecker returns economy to Soviet bloc, 254–5, 274; Honecker’s five-year plan (1971), 253–9; illusion of progress as post-1975 state policy, 281–2; impact of armed forces build-up, 124–5; impact of denazification, 118; impact of emigration on, 125, 130–1, 138, 153, 161–2, 169–70, 171; impact of Russian oil price rise (1975), 281–2, 306; inherent dependence on Soviet Union, 6, 280–1, 306, 329–31, 332–3, 336; loss of expertise/resources to USSR, 118; nationalization policies, 36, 70, 71, 153, 161, 169, 254; need for high-tech future in 1980s, 335–6; ‘New Course’ (9 June 1953), 132, 138; ‘New Economic System’ (NES, 1963)., 193–5, 198–9, 210, 214, 335; possession of foreign currencies legalized (1974), 322–4; rising living standards from late-1950s, 153, 158, 229–31; rising living standards in 1970s, 279–80, 320, 324–5; rising living standards in post-1953 period, 138–9; rising productivity in 1970s, 279–80; sale of Nazi era paraphernalia, 282; Schalck–Strauß ‘channel,’ 341–6, 357; seven-year plan (1959), 161; Soviet loan and food subsidies (1953), 139; Treuhand’s privatization of, 414–15, 418; Ulbricht’s sharp U-turn, 160–1; Ulbricht’s Westpolitik policy, 243–4, 274; Western creditors in 1970s, 279, 281; withdrawal of Western investments (1982), 338 see also consumer goods German Democratic Republic (GDR), emigration/escape from: Baltic Sea route (‘State Border North’), 385; brain drain as inevitable with open border, 169–70; brief lull in emigration figures (1958), 153, 162, 169; from cruise ships, 187; economic and social impact of, 125, 130–1, 138, 153, 161–2, 169–70, 171, 385–6; facilitated by Western intelligence agencies, 139, 153; impact of ‘New Course,’ 138; legal methods in 1980s, 369–70, 384–5; and Karl-Heinz Nitschke, 385–7; from open sector borders in Berlin, 125, 130–1, 171; record number of leave applications (1988/89), 389–90, 398; refuge in West German embassies (1989), 398; through Eastern bloc after Gorbachev’s reforms, 398; by writers/artists/actors, 160 see also Berlin Wall; border, inner-German German Democratic Republic (GDR), foreign policy/diplomacy: Basic Treaty (1972), 261, 275; and Brandt’s Ostpolitik, 233–4, 242–3, 274; closer relations with West (late-1980s), 382–3; ‘coffee agreement’ with Mengistu, 299–300; de facto break with Moscow (1978), 378, 383; foreign aid to socialist nations, 303–4, 305–6; foreign contract workers, 300–6; friendship with Arab nations, 231–3; and Honecker-Kohl relationship, 353–6, 357, 359–60; inner-German thaw (1970s), 275–6, 322–5, 327, 331–2; joins United Nations, 261; membership of United Nations (1972), 6, 261; recognition by foreign countries, 6, 231–3, 261–2; signs Helsinki Accords (August 1975), 291–2, 386; Transit Agreement (1971), 275 German Democratic Republic (GDR), governmental structure: constitution (1968), 228–9; designed for easy merging with West Germany, 79, 110; first constitution, 79–85, 80, 109; fixed, allocated seat shares in parliament, 81, 91, 91–2, 390–1; forced democratization of (from October 1989), 399–406; illusion of civil rights and basic freedoms, 85, 109; as initially bicameral, 81; initially designed as federal system, 79–81; interim governing arrangements after collapse of SED, 410, 411; Ministerrat (Council of Ministers), 82; People’s Chamber (Volkskammer), 77–8, 81, 82, 84–5, 91–3, 132, 408–10, 415; and pretense of democracy, 49, 54–5, 61–2, 81, 390–3; role of President abolished (1960), 81; Round Table, 411; Staatsrat (Council of State), 81–2 see also Central Committee of SED; politburo of the Central Committee German Democratic Republic (GDR), political protests/opposition: 17 June uprising (1953), 5, 128–9, 130, 133–6, 139–40, 141–2, 168, 200; coverage in the Western media, 133, 385, 386–7, 388–9, 392; against denied applications for permanent leave, 370, 385, 386–7, 388–9; deportations to FRG, 389; environmental groups, 384, 387–9; events of October/November 1989, 393–4, 399–406; growth of in late-1980s, 389; human rights groups, 386, 389; idea of collective action as powerful, 387–9; Krenz promises Wende (turning point), 401, 407–8; as largely absent in 1960s, 245; and local elections (May 1989), 390–3; New Forum proclamation, 398–9; Karl-Heinz Nitschke, 385–7; organized groups from mid-1970s, 370, 384–93; pacifist/peace organizations, 384, 387, 388–9; question of GDR’s future (November 1989 period), 411–12; Red Flags targeted, 133, 146; as regular in 1953 period, 131, 132–5; ‘Riesa Petition for the Full Accomplishment of Human Rights’ (1976), 386; Soviet crushing of 17 June uprising, 134–5, 141; strike at Stalinallee (June 1953), 129, 130, 132–3, 150; Ulbricht’s responses to 1953 uprising, 136, 138, 141; white circles, 387 German reunification (1990): day of (3 October 1990), 415–16; debates in GDR (from November 1989), 411–13; desire to see as happy ending, 3–4, 417; Deutsche Mark exchange rate issue, 413, 414; East Germans’ refusal to forget GDR, 421–2; East-West economic imbalance, 418–19; final treaty signed (31 August 1990), 415; FRG-GDR negotiations, 414, 415; impact on childcare system, 419–20; Kohl’s ten-point plan for (28 November 1989), 412; limited social mobility after, 240; many successes of, 1–2; and March 1990 election, 412–13; monetary union, 414; nostalgia for GDR as not desire to bring it back, 421–2; old fault lines as not disintegrating, 418–22; People’s Chamber formally votes for, 415; popular support for in GDR (1989-90), 411–13; and role of women, 415, 419; and shift to multi-party democracy, 420–1; ‘solidarity surcharge’ (1991), 418; Treuhand’s privatization of GDR economy, 414–15, 418; triggers wave of change for East Germans, 417–22; Two Plus Four negotiations, 415; Wende as beginning of a dynamic process, 423; ‘West German’ equated with ‘normal,’ 417, 420–2; writing of GDR out of national narrative, 3 German Social Union, 413 German Unity Day (3 October), 1–3, 415 Germany: arrival of Red Army at end of war, 39–46, 47, 63, 146; Deutsche Mark (DM) introduced (1948), 72–3, 74, 169; four zones of occupation, 35–6, 58, 67, 68–9, 70–1, 72, 74, 76, 114, 172–3; German prisoners of war on Eastern Front, 30, 51; ‘Gruppe Ulbricht’ arrives in (April/May 1945), 46–9; ‘magnet’ theory on reunification, 243; merging of US and British zones (1947), 72; move towards division (1948-9), 71–4; Parteiselbstschutz (paramilitary wing), 105–6; post-war influx of refugees from the east, 51–2, 59, 76; process of ‘overcoming’ its own history, 422–3; question over inevitability of division, 74–5; rapes committed by Red Army soldiers, 40, 42–3, 45–6, 48, 146; reunification issue in 1960s/70s, 233–4; Revolution (1918-19), 10, 78; Ruhr industrial heartlands, 69, 115; Second World War reparations, 35, 68–9, 76, 115–17, 129, 139; shortages in post-war period, 41, 48, 50, 51; Soviet desire for reunification, 86–7, 100–1, 108, 110, 119–21, 122, 131–2; Soviet Zone of Occupation, 32–4, 35–8, 46–9, 51, 53–7, 58–66, 68–73, 74–5, 76, 114, 143; unification (1871), 417; wartime ruin/devastation, 47, 50–1, 53, 55–6, 77, 112, 153–4, 156–7; Weimar era, 14–15, 63, 64, 68, 105–6, 144, 166, 197; Western sectors, 63, 70–1, 72–3, 76 see also Federal Republic of Germany (FRG); German reunification (1990); Nazi Germany and entries for German Democratic Republic (GDR) Gieseke, Jens, 274 Goebbels, Joseph, 28–9, 62 Good Bye Lenin!

Dawn of the Code War: America's Battle Against Russia, China, and the Rising Global Cyber Threat
by John P. Carlin and Garrett M. Graff
Published 15 Oct 2018

Over two decades, I went from working on the evolution side of that fight from Freedom House in the mid-1990s, during an era of hope at the end of the Cold War, to watching from a front-row seat in government as the revolution side of the fight played out in Russia, as it retrenched from a fledgling democracy to a criminal autocratic state led by Vladimir Putin. And I devoted my energies, later, at the National Security Division to combatting Russia and three other countries with a very different set of values: Iran, North Korea, and China. We took that moment of hope in the 1990s for granted, as Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man made it appear that ideological struggles were over and democracy would reign supreme.* At the time, the rising digital world seemed to take freedom even one natural step further, allowing for a place that can be without rules and completely unfettered. The same year, 1996, that I worked at Freedom House, John Perry Barlow—a former lyricist for the Grateful Dead who been an early participant in the web—authored and posted online a “Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,” writing, “Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind.

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See Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting & Conformance Dokuchaev, Dmitry Aleksandrovich, 302 domain awareness, 151–152 Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting & Conformance (DMARC), 396 Donilon, Tom, 242, 249 Draper, John, “Captain Crunch,” 79 DrDDoS, 280 Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 157, 213, 215 Drummond, David, 184 DUBrute.exe malware, 27 DuPont, 256–258 Durkan, Jenny, 199, 200 Dyn, 391 Dyn Research, 340 Dyson, James, 131 economic espionage, 53, 129–130, 134, 146–147, 197–198, 209, 256–257, 263 Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 257 al-Ekhlas (Sincerity) (website), 6 election systems, 382, 386 Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 201 Electronic Frontier Foundation, 72 Emirnet, 102 eMoney, 118 The End of History and the Last Man (Fukuyama), 72 Enron Task Force, 187 EP-3 spy planes, 109–111, 166 Equifax hack, 32 espionage, 4; China approach to, 146; by civilian hackers, 165; corporate, 162–163; cyber, 178, 231–233. See also counterespionage; economic espionage Esquire magazine, 79 Estonia, 135, 282 Etchells, Paul, 162 Euronext, 223 Facebook, 41, 45, 56, 375 Factory Direct Machine Tools, 316 Al-Falih, Khalid, 221 Fanning, Shawn, 65 Fatal System Error (Menn), 119, 280 Fathi, Ahmad, 230 FBARs.

Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty
by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson
Published 20 Mar 2012

—Niall Ferguson, author of The Ascent of Money “Acemoglu and Robinson—two of the world’s leading experts on development—reveal why it is not geography, disease, or culture that explain why some nations are rich and some poor, but rather a matter of institutions and politics. This highly accessible book provides welcome insight to specialists and general readers alike.” —Francis Fukuyama, author of The End of History and the Last Man and The Origins of Political Order “A brilliant and uplifting book—yet also a deeply disturbing wake-up call. Acemoglu and Robinson lay out a convincing theory of almost everything to do with economic development. Countries rise when they put in place the right pro-growth political institutions and they fail—often spectacularly—when those institutions ossify or fail to adapt.

The Rise and Fall of Nations: Forces of Change in the Post-Crisis World
by Ruchir Sharma
Published 5 Jun 2016

A Washington Post team identified the “middle-class rage” of societies that “are now demanding more.” A New York Times writer began his piece in an upscale restaurant in the Istanbul suburbs, where he saw a revolt of “the rising classes” and of the “educated haves” who had benefited most from the regimes they had come to reject. The Stanford political scientist Francis Fukuyama spotted a “middle-class revolution” of tech-savvy youths. These were rich stories, well told, but the growing middle class was not a harbinger of the coming protests. Yes, the middle class was growing in the protest-stricken nations, but it was growing in many other countries as well. Over the previous fifteen years, in twenty-one of the largest emerging nations, the middle-class population had expanded by an average of 18 percentage points as a share of the total population, to a bit more than half.3 The protests, however, had erupted in nations where the middle class had grown very fast, such as Russia (up 63 percentage points) and quite slowly, such as South Africa (up 5 percentage points).

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New York Times, November 30, 2013. Fry, Richard, and Rakesh Kochhar. “America’s Wealth Gap between Middle-Income and Upper-Income Families Is Widest on Record,” Pew Research Center, December 17, 2014. Fukuyama, Francis. “The Middle Class Revolution.” Wall Street Journal, June 22, 2013. ——. “At the ‘End of History’ Still Stands Democracy.” Wall Street Journal, June 6, 2014. Garman, Christopher. “New Voices vs. Old Leaders: How the Middle Class Is Reshaping EM Politics.” Eurasia Group, July 2013. ——. “Emerging Markets Strategy.” Eurasia Group, November 2014. Global Emerging Markets Equity Team. “Tales from the Emerging World: The Myths of Middle-Class Revolution.”

A Generation of Sociopaths: How the Baby Boomers Betrayed America
by Bruce Cannon Gibney
Published 7 Mar 2017

The bipartisan, congressionally chartered National Defense Panel “want[ed] to make two points crystal clear.”51 First, recent budget cuts “precipitated an immediate readiness crisis.”52 Second, (and much more gloomily than the DoD), the Obama administration’s proposals for partial funding restoration “are nowhere near enough to remedy the damage which the Department has suffered and enable it to carry out its missions at an acceptable level of risk.”53 The “capabilities and capacities” called for in the nation’s master defense document, the Quadrennial Defense Review, “clearly exceed budget resources made available to the Department”; in nonbureaucratese, the military simply doesn’t have the money to do its job.54 Therefore, it can come as no surprise that the Secretary of Defense worried that the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps would not achieve readiness goals until 2020 and the Air Force not until 2023, or that the head of the Marine Corps informed Congress that half of its home-stationed units experienced unacceptable shortfalls that could “result in a delayed response and/or the unnecessary loss of… lives.”55 Various think tanks question the military’s capacities, with the (admittedly hawkish) Heritage Foundation rating the military overall as “marginal,” and the Army scoring no better than “weak,” not an inspiring adjective in any context, especially the martial; other institutions offer chirpier gloss, but generally fret over the military’s present size and posture.56 The Air Force operates the oldest and smallest fleet in recent history, the Navy has shrunk, and overall manpower has been in decline since the Boomers took control of Congress. It’s revealing that the posture of the armed forces has actually weakened since the period 1990–1995, a period of unusual peace. While optimists invoked (part of) Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” to contend that all nations would transition to liberal, Western, and presumably nonhostile democracies, 1991’s hopes of global harmony proved no more realistic than Thomas More’s Utopia of 1516 or any of the many fantasies that followed.* The world remains dangerous and America militant.

Berlin: Life and Death in the City at the Center of the World
by Sinclair McKay
Published 22 Aug 2022

That night of 9 November 1989 saw illimitable tears as East and West Berliners conjoined fully and freely for the first time since 1961; for those in the East, the first true freedom that they had known since 1933, and the advent of the Nazis. This final Berlin Revolution of the twentieth century was the truly definitive one; the oppressive wall was danced upon before being hacked at by countless euphoric souvenir hunters. This was not, to use the overworn phrase of historian Francis Fukuyama, the End of History (and nor did he ever mean it quite like that); but for Berlin, it was a resolution. 1. The deathly winter of 1918–19 – defeat and disease – brought near civil war in Berlin. As communists and government-backed Freikorps fought, other civilians sought to restore normal lives. 2.

The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined
by Steven Pinker
Published 24 Sep 2012

The story can be told in titles and dates: Werner Levi’s The Coming End of War (1981), John Gaddis’s “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System” (1986), Kalevi Holsti’s “The Horsemen of the Apocalypse: At the Gate, Detoured, or Retreating?” (1986), Evan Luard’s The Blunted Sword: The Erosion of Military Power in Modern World Politics (1988), John Mueller’s Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (1989), Francis Fukuyama’s “The End of History?” (1989), James Lee Ray’s “The Abolition of Slavery and the End of International War” (1989), and Carl Kaysen’s “Is War Obsolete?” (1990).154 In 1988 the political scientist Robert Jervis captured the phenomenon they were all noticing: The most striking characteristic of the postwar period is just that—it can be called “postwar” because the major powers have not fought each other since 1945.

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Two highly publicized rallies in the nation’s capital, one organized by black men, one by white, affirmed the obligation of men to support their children: Louis Farrakhan’s Million Man March, and a march by the Promise Keepers, a conservative Christian movement. Though both movements had unsavory streaks of ethnocentrism, sexism, and religious fundamentalism, their historical significance lay in the larger recivilizing process they exemplified. In The Great Disruption, the political scientist Francis Fukuyama notes that as rates of violence went down in the 1990s, so did most other indicators of social pathology, such as divorce, welfare dependency, teenage pregnancy, dropping out of school, sexually transmitted disease, and teenage auto and gun accidents.181 The recivilizing process of the past two decades is not just a resumption of the currents that have swept the West since the Middle Ages.

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During its heyday, violence by Marxist regimes was justified with the saying “You can’t make an omelet without breaking eggs.”172 The historian Richard Pipes summarized history’s verdict: “Aside from the fact that human beings are not eggs, the trouble is that no omelet has emerged from the slaughter.”173 Valentino concludes that “it may be premature to celebrate ‘the end of history,’ but if no similarly radical ideas gain the widespread applicability and acceptance of communism, humanity may be able to look forward to considerably less mass killing in the coming century than it experienced in the last.”174 On top of that singularly destructive ideology were the catastrophic decisions of a few men who took the stage at particular moments in the 20th century.

The WikiLeaks Files: The World According to US Empire
by Wikileaks
Published 24 Aug 2015

Meanwhile, post-Mao Beijing, under Deng Xiaoping, emerged as a major Western strategic partner, further isolating Moscow and post-unification Hanoi.19 The decisive collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 sparked a triumphalist celebration of American prowess, with conservative thinkers such as Francis Fukuyama prematurely declaring “The End of History.” For Fukuyama, the apparent defeat of communism supposedly underscored the emergence of democratic capitalism as the ideological endpoint of human history, with US hegemony defining and underpinning the architecture of the post–Cold War global order.20 America’s wholesale embrace of its newfound role as the sole global superpower was starkly evident in key strategic documents such as the infamous 1992 Defence Planning Guidance, under the administration of George H.

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,” p. 16. 17Benedict Anderson, “From Miracle to Crash,” London Review of Books, April 16, 1998. 18Walden Bello, Dilemmas of Domination: The Unmaking of the American Empire (New York: Holt, 2006); Benedict Anderson, “Exit Suharto: Obituary for a Mediocre Tyrant,” New Left Review II/50 (March 2008). 19Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin, 2011). 20Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” National Interest, Summer 1989. 21“Excerpts From Pentagon’s Plan: ‘Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival,’”New York Times, March 8, 1992. 22Bello, Dilemmas of Domination. 23Eric Schmitt, “US-Philippine Command May Signal War’s Next Phase,” New York Times, January 16, 2002. 24Richard Javad Heydarian, “The China-Philippines-US Triangle,” Foreign Policy in Focus, Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, DC, December 16, 2010. 25Ibid; Achariya and Arabinda Achariya, “The Myth of the Second Front: Localizing the ‘War on Terror’ in Southeast Asia,” Washington Quarterly, Fall 2007. 26It was common knowledge, reflected in Washington’s statements in Obama’s trips to these countries, that the US has been irked by the supposedly protectionist policies of these countries, which had affected American companies’ ability to increase their exports. 27Richard Javad Heydarian, “Obama’s Free Trade Strategy Falters in Asia,” Inter Press Service, June 14, 2014, at ipsnews.net; “Japan, America and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Stalemate,” The Economist, October 4, 2014. 28Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World (New York: Yale University Press, 2007). 29Amado Mendoza and Richard Javad Heydarian, “Member Country: Philippines,” ASEAN-CHINA Free Trade Area: Challenges, Opportunities, and the Road Ahead, Monograph No. 22, National University of Singapore, 2012. 30Heydarian, “China-Philippines-US Triangle.” 31Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive. 32Kurt Campbell and Ely Ratner, “Far Eastern Promises,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2014. 33Kissinger, On China. 34Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive. 35American popularity in the Philippines is in fact consistently reflected in surveys by Gallup and Pew.

Slouching Towards Utopia: An Economic History of the Twentieth Century
by J. Bradford Delong
Published 6 Apr 2020

George Orwell, “In Front of Your Nose,” London Tribune, March 22, 1946, reprinted at Orwell Foundation, www.orwellfoundation.com/the-orwell-foundation/orwell/essays-and-other-works/in-front-of-your-nose. 7. John Lukacs, A Short History of the Twentieth Century, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2013; Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York: Free Press, 1992. 8. The best thing I have read about people’s reactions to the figure of Hitler—then and since—is Ron Rosenbaum, Explaining Hitler: The Search for the Origins of His Evil, New York: Random House, 1998. 9. I still like, as a general history of Nazism more than any other, William L.

Four Battlegrounds
by Paul Scharre
Published 18 Jan 2023

“Tiananmen Square Protests,” History.com, updated June 9, 2020, https://www.history.com/topics/china/tiananmen-square; “Tiananmen Square Protest Death Toll ‘was 10,000,’” BBC News, December 23, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-42465516; “Timeline: What Led to the Tiananmen Square Massacre,” PBS Frontline, June 5, 2019, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/timeline-tiananmen-square/. Thanks to CNAS research assistant Katie Galgano for background research. 68“the triumph of the West”: Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” National Interest 16 (Summer 1989), https://www.jstor.org/stable/24027184. 68wouldn’t “dance on the [Berlin] wall” to celebrate: Richard Fontaine, “American Foreign Policy Could Use More Prudence,” The Atlantic, December 3, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/the-prudence-of-george-h-w-bushs-foreign-policy/577192/. 69“As people have commercial incentives”: Orville Schell, “The Death of Engagement,” The Wire China, June 7, 2020, https://www.thewirechina.com/2020/06/07/the-birth-life-and-death-of-engagement/. 69China’s annual GDP growth: “GDP Growth (Annual %)—China,” World Bank, 2020, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?

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Whereas communist regimes in Europe had declined to fire on their people, and fallen to political revolution, the Chinese Communist Party had opted for force. The United States had a choice to make. There was little stomach in Washington for a strategy of containing China. U.S. policymakers saw the collapse of communism in Europe as “the triumph of the West” and “the end of history.” President George H. W. Bush was a sober pragmatist who had quipped he wouldn’t “dance on the [Berlin] wall” to celebrate the end of communism, and likewise cautioned against an “overly emotional” reaction to Tiananmen. As the need to triangulate the global balance of power against the Soviet Union faded, Bush sought to “engage” China, in part citing the powerful momentum of history toward freedom.

Liberalism at Large: The World According to the Economist
by Alex Zevin
Published 12 Nov 2019

‘If he succeeded, “the West” would no longer mean what it has meant for the last 40 years’; while the DDR in East Germany, its economy ‘long the best in the region’, its Politburo (whose members, implicitly, refused to talk to him) most in tune with its leader, Erich Honecker, ‘looks as if it could go on forever’.139 Less than six months off, he never imagined the fall of the Berlin Wall. Even after it crumbled, a sense of disorientation pervaded his articles. Rejecting the idea that history was at an end, as Francis Fukuyama first opined in 1989, Beedham pointed to real threats – from terrorism to Iraq to Russia – but without his trademark enthusiasm. ‘Perhaps history got its timing wrong’, he mused in 1990. ‘A generation later, the countries of democratic Europe might have been cohesive enough to cope with the consequences’ of the collapse of communism in Europe.140 Could the West retain its edge with no competitors?

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Meanwhile, the list of accidents – innocents bombed, aircraft lost – grows longer.’57 Over time, this position softened: ‘the West was not wrong in principle to intervene, whatever the legal position’, reasoned the Economist by April, though it still insisted the bombing was doing more harm than good.58 Emmott had deferred to his more experienced foreign editor during the conflict, but doubts set in soon after, as the glow of victory cast it in a new light – and senior British and American officials pelted the paper with angry letters, stunned by its uncharacteristic criticism. By July, Emmott had reconsidered his foreign policy. ‘The post-communist, post-Kosovo world now taking shape will not be an end-of-history sort of place in which all good democrats can put their feet up. It will be a world of clashing interests and outrageous atrocities, in which democrats will have to get involved.’59 Emmott then demoted Grimond to lead the Britain section, and gave the Bagehot columnist his job. For a world that must be made safe for democracy, Peter David was a better fit: passionate Zionist, whose Lithuanian Jewish parents moved to England from South Africa as critics of apartheid in 1960, Beedham had hired him to cover the Middle East in 1984.

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With plenty of that today, its underlying vitality seems assured. The growth of income inequality and fiscal overstretch are also worrying problems, which need to be addressed. But it would be a mistake for liberals to abandon their values in the face of them. A seductive belief in spontaneous economic order, or reliance on providential narratives of the end of history, should be avoided. Rather, politics remains the priority – which means managing contingency and chance, as liberals have always done. In the West, there may be a touch of melancholy in wondering what more is to be accomplished, but that is not true of Brazil, China, India or Iran, where liberals ‘can afford to be more forward-looking and zestful.

Roller-Coaster: Europe, 1950-2017
by Ian Kershaw
Published 29 Aug 2018

Three years later, in his celebrated Age of Extremes, Eric Hobsbawm also portrayed the demise of the Soviet Union as the end of the ‘short twentieth century’, an era that had come to a close, one defined by the contest between capitalism and communism. From a conservative perspective, the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama even went so far as to claim that it marked ‘the end of History’. In his book, The End of History and the Last Man, published in 1992, he drew upon a widely read and controversial essay he had published three years earlier, as the sweeping changes in Eastern Europe were taking hold. Fukuyama was not making the patently absurd claim, as some critics naively presumed, that events would not continue, that history in this sense would cease.

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NS-Täter in der Bundesrepublik, Frankfurt am Main, 1984. Friedrich, Jörg, Yalu. An den Ufern des dritten Weltkriegs, Berlin, 2007. *Fritzsche, Peter (ed.), The Turbulent World of Franz Göll: An Ordinary Berliner Writes the Twentieth Century, Cambridge MA, 2011. *Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History and the Last Man, London, 1992. Fukuyama, Francis, ‘The End of History?’, The National Interest (Summer 1989), 3–18. Fukuyama, Francis, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalisation of Democracy, London, 2015. Fulbrook Mary, Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR 1949–1989, Oxford, 1995.

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It was also widely regarded as the reflection of triumphalist American neo-conservatism. The subsequent course of world history has indeed done little to uphold Fukuyama’s argument. The cultural and political rejection of the principles of liberal democracy in large parts of the world casts doubt on the teleological presumption of the ‘end of History’. The Chinese model of economic liberalism and political authoritarianism, which successfully produced extraordinary growth in China, has posed a serious challenge to those, not just in the West, who long presumed that a market economy would inevitably lead to liberal democracy. The future is as unpredictable as it was when Hegel first determined that ‘History’ had reached its end.

Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress
by Steven Pinker
Published 13 Feb 2018

The Berlin Wall was torn down in 1989, freeing the nations of Eastern Europe to establish democratic governments, and communism imploded in the Soviet Union in 1991, clearing space for Russia and most of the other republics to make the transition. Some African countries threw off their strongmen, and the last European colonies to gain independence, mostly in the Caribbean and Oceania, opted for democracy as their first form of government. In 1989 the political scientist Francis Fukuyama published a famous essay in which he proposed that liberal democracy represented “the end of history,” not because nothing would ever happen again but because the world was coming to a consensus over the humanly best form of governance and no longer had to fight over it.8 Fukuyama coined a runaway meme: in the decades since his essay appeared, books and articles have announced “the end of” nature, science, faith, poverty, reason, money, men, lawyers, illness, the free market, and sex.

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Citizens in democracies are healthier: Besley 2006. Citizens in democracies are better educated: Roser 2016b. 5. Three waves of democratization: Huntington 1991. 6. Democracy in retreat: Mueller 1999, p. 214. 7. Democracy is obsolete: quotes from Mueller 1999, p. 214. 8. “The end of history”: Fukuyama 1989. 9. For quotations, see Levitsky & Way 2015. 10. Not getting the concept of democracy: Welzel 2013, p. 66, n. 11. 11. This is a problem for the annual counts by the democracy-tracking organization Freedom House; see Levitsky & Way 2015; Munck & Verkuilen 2002; Roser 2016b. 12.

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Critical Review, 11, 407–67. Fryer, R. G. 2016. An empirical analysis of racial differences in police use of force. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Papers, 1–63. Fukuda, K. 2013. A happiness study using age-period-cohort framework. Journal of Happiness Studies, 14, 135–53. Fukuyama, F. 1989. The end of history? National Interest, Summer. Furman, J. 2005. Wal-mart: A progressive success story. https://www.mackinac.org/archives/2006/walmart.pdf. Furman, J. 2014. Poverty and the tax code. Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, 32, 8–22. Future of Life Institute. 2017. Accidental nuclear war: A timeline of close calls. https://futureoflife.org/background/nuclear-close-calls-a-timeline/.

The Atlantic and Its Enemies: A History of the Cold War
by Norman Stone
Published 15 Feb 2010

So had the invasion of Afghanistan. And two very vulnerable places, Chile and Turkey, had shown that the Soviet formula was quite misplaced. The eighties economy was defeating not just Marx, but Lenin and Mao Tsetung as well. The most characteristic book of the eighties was written not long after the decade ended, Francis Fukuyama’s End of History (1992). The title seemed funny when the book appeared, and seemed even funnier afterwards, but it was not senseless. The claim (a quote from Hegel) was that democracy and capitalism (‘free markets’) had spread from period to period after the Second World War, that dictatorships, Communism, wars, etc. would be things of the past, and that the world would move more and more in the direction of, say, Denmark.

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He braved extreme unpopularity, deserved well of the Republic, and received the best sort of flattery, in that there are now two dozen imitations of Bilkent in Turkey, and private universities all over the European area. America in a Turkish mirror made for a contrast with Chile. In Chile there was a general in charge, and there were no elections for ten years while Chicago economists sorted things out. Then she experienced the end of history. Turkey did not, although there was a brave try. There, the army did not want formal power: no Pinochet. It was happier with professors of Political Science, and wanted figureheads. Turhan Feyzioğlu had thought that he would be indispensable to the generals, as an old, reliable republican alternative to the wayward Ecevit.

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Fortunelist Foster, William Foucault, Michel, Madness and Civilization Fouchet, Christian Fourier, Charles Fowler, Henry France: agriculture aircraft industry and Algerian oil Algerian war aristocracy austerity programmes automobile industry balance of payments banking system Bibliothèque Nationale bicentenary of Revolution birth rates bourgeoisie Catholic Church Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) civil service Code Napoléon colonies Communist Party cultural institutions currency controls Depression (1930s) and division of Germany economic recovery and success education system (see also universities) and EEC/EU and Egypt election of 1958 and establishment of NATO and European Defence Community Fifth Republic, establishment of film industry First World War Fourth Republic, fall of franc fort Franco-German reconciliation Free French gold reserves ‘Grand Schools’ and Helsinki conference (1975) immigration imports Indo-China war industrial unrest inflation intelligentsia and Kurdish nationalism and Marshall Plan Marxism Monnet Plan nationalization of industry Nazi occupation nuclear power nuclear weapons peasantry pieds noirs Popular Front post-war claims to German resources post-war shortages and rationing productivity levels protectionism republicanism resistance to American cultural domination Revolution (1789-99) revolution of 1830 revolution of 1848 and Romania Second Empire and spread of Marxism Stavisky scandal (1934) steel production strikes student demonstrations (1968) and Suez crisis and ‘Swedish model’ technological developments television theatre Third Republic trade unions unemployment universities UNR (Union pour la Nouvelle République) Vichy government war damage withdrawal from NATO military command zone of occupation in Germany Franco, Francisco Frankfurt Frankfurt School Free Democrats (German; FDP) Free French freeways French Foreign Legion French language: anglicization of attempts to promote in Belgium French Revolution bicentenary Friedan, Betty, The Feminine Mystique Friedman, Milton ‘Fritalux’ (proposed European free-trade area) Frum, David Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History Fulbright, J. William Fumaroli, Marc G7 (group of industrial nations) G10 (group of industrial nations) Gaddafi, Muammar al Gagarin, Yuri Gage, Nicholas, Eleni Gaillard, Félix Galata Galbraith, John Kenneth Affluent Society Galkovskiy, V. N. 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Arabs: A 3,000 Year History of Peoples, Tribes and Empires
by Tim Mackintosh-Smith
Published 2 Mar 2019

There was no concept of a Holy Spirit to inspire the community world without end and to reinterpret revelation through successive and changing ages. Muhammad’s state was thus extraordinarily centralized, not geographically but temporally. History, in a sense, had ended, or entered an eternal present that would become an ever-present past. As with Francis Fukuyama’s more recent pronouncements, however, rumours of the end of history are usually exaggerated. With the end of revelation, a major theme of history – God’s relationship with His creation – had indeed ended. But earthly events continued. The clock had stopped, but time went on. Ibn Khaldun was to write with 750 years of hindsight that ‘Arabs can only attain kingship through prophecy’.

…

For traditional badw in Hadramawt and elsewhere, to replace your string of camels with a Bedford lorry was acceptable. But to beat your sword or rifle into a ploughshare has always been anathema; it is to cease to be armigerous, arms-bearing, honourable. Peace, passivity, settlement, quiescence, cultivation, following the furrow, living by the sweat of one’s brow, mean the end of history in the Fukuyaman sense. And yet, for a couple of decades, it did seem that the old time was over. Of the Hadrami badw in the decades of British-brokered peace, one observer who thought he knew them well said, ‘They are dead’. The announcement was premature; time was only on pause. THE MUDDLED EAST As the last of the Ottomans lived out his Parisian exile, arranging his butterfly collection, many Arabs regretted the end of the slow, simple centuries in the penumbra of the Sublime Porte.

Vanished Kingdoms: The Rise and Fall of States and Nations
by Norman Davies
Published 30 Sep 2009

Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford, 1997); idem, Seven Years that Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective (Oxford, 2007). 82. Leonid Batkin, as quoted by Shane, Dismantling Utopia, p. 5. 83. Edward Lucas, The New Cold War: How the Kremlin Threatens Both Russia and the West (London, 2007). 84. Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’ National Interest, 16 (1989). 85. Paul Kennedy, in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (London, 1988). 86. Michael Cox, US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Superpower without a Mission (London, 1995); Bill Emmott, Rivals: The Power Struggle between China, India and Japan (London, 2008); Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World (London, 2009); Lauren Phillips, International Politics in 2030: The Transformative Power of Large Developing Countries (Bonn, 2008). 87.

…

Others, including Estonia, declined, and within a short time were heading eagerly towards membership both of NATO and of the European Union. The vacuum in international politics took at least a decade to fill. Some American analysts, preoccupied for the whole of their adult lives by rivalry with the Soviet Union, assumed that US-led capitalist democracy would henceforth have no more major competitors, that they had reached the ‘End of History’.84 Others concluded that the twenty-first century would be the ‘American Century’. All of this was questionable. It was just as possible to argue, as one prescient historian did in 1988, that American power had passed its peak,85 that the US lead had been squandered by a neo-conservative administration, or that the new century heralded the rise of new powers like China, India and Brazil.86 The geopolitics of the world were changing from ‘bipolar’ to polygonal.

Vanished Kingdoms: The History of Half-Forgotten Europe
by Norman Davies
Published 27 Sep 2011

Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford, 1997); idem, Seven Years that Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective (Oxford, 2007). 82. Leonid Batkin, as quoted by Shane, Dismantling Utopia, p. 5. 83. Edward Lucas, The New Cold War: How the Kremlin Threatens Both Russia and the West (London, 2007). 84. Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’ National Interest, 16 (1989). 85. Paul Kennedy, in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (London, 1988). 86. Michael Cox, US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Superpower without a Mission (London, 1995); Bill Emmott, Rivals: The Power Struggle between China, India and Japan (London, 2008); Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World (London, 2009); Lauren Phillips, International Politics in 2030: The Transformative Power of Large Developing Countries (Bonn, 2008). 87.

…

Others, including Estonia, declined, and within a short time were heading eagerly towards membership both of NATO and of the European Union. The vacuum in international politics took at least a decade to fill. Some American analysts, preoccupied for the whole of their adult lives by rivalry with the Soviet Union, assumed that US-led capitalist democracy would henceforth have no more major competitors, that they had reached the ‘End of History’.84 Others concluded that the twenty-first century would be the ‘American Century’. All of this was questionable. It was just as possible to argue, as one prescient historian did in 1988, that American power had passed its peak,85 that the US lead had been squandered by a neo-conservative administration, or that the new century heralded the rise of new powers like China, India and Brazil.86 The geopolitics of the world were changing from ‘bipolar’ to polygonal.

A Classless Society: Britain in the 1990s
by Alwyn W. Turner
Published 4 Sep 2013

As a police officer commented in an episode of Between the Lines, looking at an anti-cuts demonstration outside a town hall: ‘It’s hardly ’84, is it?’ A number of factors contributed to this decline, most spectacularly the unqualified victory of the West in the Cold War, and the subsequent collapse of communism in the Eastern bloc. In 1989, while the Berlin Wall was still standing, the American commentator Francis Fukuyama had published his essay ‘The End of History’, arguing that the world’s ideological conflicts had been resolved in favour of capitalist democracy. Whether or not this were true, the proposition found a receptive audience and confirmed what had become unavoidably apparent over the last decade: that the intellectual tide had turned in favour of free-market economics.

Europe: A History
by Norman Davies
Published 1 Jan 1996

Winiecki, The Structural Legacy of the Soviet-type Economies (London, 1992). 39. Arpad Goncz, quoted by Garton Ash, op. cit, 60. 40. Conor Cruise O’Brien, ‘A Grave marked Maastricht’, The Times, 30 Apr. 1992. 41. Gyorgi Konrad, in Antipolitics (London, 1982). 42. Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’ in The National Interest (1989); also ‘The End of History Is Still Nigh’, Independent, 3 Mar. 1992. 43. Zbigniew Brzeziński, speaking at Bologna, Feb. 1992; see J. Moskwa, ‘Brzeziński o trzech Europach’, Nowy świat, 3 Mar. 1992. 44. Prof. Ken Jowitt (UC Berkeley) at the International Security Conference, Yale University, 2–4 Apr. 1992.

…

Moscow’s retreat from Eastern Europe and from critical regions such as that of oil-rich Baku would create new arenas where the new Russia might feel compelled to resist expanding Western firms and institutions. To some, the common denominator seemed to lie in the universal attachment to liberal democracy and free market economics. The Western victory appeared to be so complete that one academic gained instant fame by asking whether the world had reached ‘the End of History’.42 Nothing could have been further from the truth: Europe was locked in an intense period of historical change with no end in view. In the eyes of one ex-statesman, the revolution of 1989–91 had given rise to three Europes. ‘Europe One’ consisted of the established democracies of Western Europe.