by Francis Fukuyama · 28 Feb 2006 · 446pp · 578 words
THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN Francis Fukuyama FREE PRESS NEW YORK LONDON TORONTO SYDNEY FREE PRESS A Division of Simon & Schuster, Inc. 1230 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020 Copyright © 1992, 2006 by Francis Fukuyama All rights reserved, including the right of reproduction in whole or in part in any form. First
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of America 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 The Library of Congress has catalogued the hardcover edition as follows: Fukuyama, Francis. The end of history and the last man / Francis Fukuyama p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. History—Philosophy. 2. World politics—1945-. I. Title. D16.8F85. 1992 91-29677 901—
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Unequal 30 Perfect Rights and Defective Duties 31 Immense Wars of the Spirit Afterword to the Second Paperback Edition of The End of History and the Last Man Notes Bibliography Index ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The “End of History” would never have existed, either as an article or as this present book, without the invitation to deliver a lecture
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that liberal democracy may constitute the “end point of mankind’s ideological evolution” and the “final form of human government,” and as such constituted the “end of history.” That is, while earlier forms of government were characterized by grave defects and irrationalities that led to their eventual collapse, liberal democracy was arguably free
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compatible with universal recognition, much like religion three or four centuries before. The fifth and final part of this book addresses the question of the “end of history,” and the creature who emerges at the end, the “last man.” In the course of the original debate over the National Interest article, many
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people assumed that the possibility of the end of history revolved around the question of whether there were viable alternatives to liberal democracy visible in the world today. There was a great deal of controversy
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of heaven, at which point the earth and earthly events would literally cease to exist. As the Christian account of history makes clear, an “end of history” is implicit in the writing of all Universal Histories. The particular events of history can become meaningful only with respect to some larger end or
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became evident over time and led to their downfall and replacement by something higher. And Marx shared Hegel’s belief in the possibility of an end of history. That is, he foresaw a final form of society that was free from contradictions, and whose achievement would terminate the historical process. Where Marx
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differed from Hegel was over just what kind of society emerged at the end of history. Marx believed that the liberal state failed to resolve one fundamental contradiction, that of class conflict, the struggle between the bourgeoisie and proletariat. Marx
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. Hegel believed that alienation—the division of man against himself and his subsequent loss of control over his destiny—had been adequately resolved at the end of history through the philosophical recognition of the freedom possible in the liberal state. Marx, on the other hand, observed that in liberal societies man remains
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. Hegel the philosopher did not achieve “absolute self-consciousness,” but was himself a product of his times, an apologist for the bourgeoisie. The Marxist end of history would come only with victory of the true “universal class,” the proletariat, and the subsequent achievement of a global communist utopia that would end class
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only of large political struggles and conflicts, but the end of philosophy as well; the European Community was therefore an appropriate institutional embodiment of the end of history. The Universal Histories represented by the monumental works of Hegel and Marx were followed by other, less impressive ones. The second half of the
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to look increasingly similar to one another, rather than less. While there are a variety of routes that countries can take to get to the end of history, there are few versions of modernity other than the capitalist liberal-democratic one that look like they are going concerns.2 Modernizing countries, from
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us with a framework for understanding whether the human historical process can be expected to continue indefinitely, or whether we have in fact reached the end of history. As a beginning point for this analysis, let us accept the Hegelian-Marxist thesis that past history has proceeded dialectically, or through a process
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contains an internal contradiction which over time leads to its own undermining and replacement by a different and more successful one. The problem of the end of history can be put in the following way: Are there any “contradictions” in our contemporary liberal democratic social order that would lead us to expect
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of the human personality proves to be correct. And if it is so, then we clearly have not reached the end of history. An alternative approach to determining whether we have reached the end of history might be termed a “trans-historical” one, or an approach based on a concept of nature. That is, we
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the trans-historical standards by which we evaluate the goodness or badness of any regime or social system. Kojève claims that we have reached the end of history because life in the universal and homogenous state is completely satisfying to its citizens. The modern liberal democratic world, in other words, is free
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the Lockean language of rights from sliding effortlessly and invisibly into the Hegelian language of recognition. The universal and homogeneous state that appears at the end of history can thus be seen as resting on the twin pillars of economics and recognition. The human historical process that leads up to it has
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of liberty and to consolidate its advances must be sensitive to these kinds of subpolitical constraints on the ability of states to arrive at the end of history successfully. There are, nonetheless, several fallacies about culture and democracy that should be avoided. The first is the notion that cultural factors constitute sufficient
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society is likely to give us greater insight into the adequacy of liberal democracy than would a similar analysis of desire. The question of the end of history then amounts to a question of the future of thymos: whether liberal democracy adequately satisfies the desire for recognition, as Kojève says, or whether
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more firmly to the faith in morality. It is impossible to complete our present discussion without referring to the creature who reportedly emerges at the end of history, the last man. According to Hegel, the universal and homogeneous state fully reconciles the contradiction that existed in the relationship of lordship and bondage
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abundance, then “Man properly so-called” will cease to exist because he will have ceased to work and struggle. The disappearance of Man at the end of History, therefore, is not a cosmic catastrophe: the natural World remains what it has been from all eternity. And therefore, it is not a biological
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fifteenth century, Japan experienced a state of internal and external peace for a period of several hundred years which very much resembled Hegel’s postulated end of history. Neither the upper nor lower classes struggled against each other, and did not have to work terribly hard. But rather than pursuing love or
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new rules and values divorced from any utilitarian purpose, as in sports—that suggested to Kojève the possibility of specifically human activity even after the end of history. Kojève playfully suggested that instead of Japan becoming Westernized, the West (including Russia) would become Japanized (a process now well under way, though not
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to become purely formal. Artists like to convince themselves that they are being socially responsible in addition to being committed to aesthetic values. But the end of history will mean the end, among other things, of all art that could be considered socially useful, and hence the descent of artistic activity into
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, Kojève—understood that the need to feel pride in one’s humanness would not necessarily be satisfied by the “peace and prosperity” of the end of history.1 Men would face the constant danger of degenerating from citizens to mere bourgeois, and feeling contempt for themselves in the process. The ultimate crucible
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economically grounded theory, which saw the means of production change as human societies evolved from prehuman to hunter-gatherer to agricultural to industrial ones; the end of history was thus a theory of modernization that raised the question of where that modernization process would ultimately lead. Many progressive intellectuals during the period between
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clarify, however, concerns the very widespread misapprehension that I was somehow arguing for a specifically American version of the end of history, what one author called “jingoistic triumphalism.”2 Many have taken the end of history to be a brief for American hegemony over the rest of the world, not just in the realm of
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according to American interests. Nothing could be further from the truth. Anyone familiar with Kojève and the intellectual origins of his version of the end of history would understand that the European Union is a much fuller real-world embodiment of the concept than is the contemporary United States. In line with
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moderation and good judgment on the part of political leaders, something not automatically guaranteed by the modernization process itself. The second important critique of my “End of History” hypothesis concerns the question of democracy at an international level. When I wrote about liberal democracy constituting the final form of government, I was speaking
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many respects autonomous from economic development, though the two, as noted earlier, do interact in certain ways. What we need, then, and what The End of History and the Last Man did not supply, is a theory of political development that is independent of economics. State formation and state-building, how this
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has been a great deal of political decay in the past generation, and its sources need to be explored systematically. The final objection to the “End of History” hypothesis, which has been made in a variety of forms, concerns technology, and the possibility that the historical process that is driven by technological
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, “But We Follow the Worse …” The National Interest 18 (Winter 1989-90): 99-103. 10 See Gertrude Himmelfarb’s response to the original article “The End of History?” The National Interest 16 (Summer 1989): 25-26. See also Leszek Kolakowsky, “Uncertainties of a Democratic Age,” Journal of Democracy 1 no. 1 (1990):
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of course, challenge liberal democracy through terrorist bombs and bullets, a significant but not vital challenge. 10 The suggestion made in my original article “The End of History?” that there were no viable alternatives to liberal democracy drew a number of indignant responses from people who pointed to Islamic fundamentalism, nationalism, fascism, and
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, see Michael S. Roth, Knowing and History (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 225-227. On Kojève, see also Barry Cooper, The End of History: An Essay on Modern Hegelianism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984). 29 Raymond Aron, Memoirs (New York and London: Holmes and Meier, 1990), pp. 65
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1987), p. 447. Chapter 6. The Mechanism of Desire 1 This cyclical theory has certain contemporary proponents; see Irving Kristol’s response to my original “End of History?” article, The National Interest 16 (Summer 1989): 26-28. 2 The cumulative and progressive nature of modern natural science has been challenged by Thomas Kuhn
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given their rootedness in the particular cultural experiences of the countries from which they came. 10 It is not clear whether Kojéve believed that the end of history required the creation of a literally universal and homogeneous state. On the one hand, he spoke of history having ended in 1806, when the
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these points are made by Ernest Gallner in Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983). 5 See, for example, John Gray, “The End of History—or of Liberalism?” The National Review (October 27, 1989): 33-35. 6 Gellner (1983), p. 34. 7 The Francophilism of the Russian aristocracy is
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Milovan Djilas, The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System (New York: Praeger, 1957). 6 Virtually all of those who criticized my original “End of History?” article from the Left pointed to the numerous existing economic and social problems of contemporary liberal societies, but not one of these critics was willing
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of the Spirit 1 Hegel in the Philosophy of Right states very clearly that there will still be wars at the end of history. On the other hand, Kojève suggests that the end of history will mean the end of all large disputes, and hence the elimination of the need for struggle. Why Kojève chooses
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IV, 440b, 440e. 9 I am grateful to Henry Higuera for providing this formulation of the problem. Afterword to the Second Paperback Edition of The End of History and the Last Man 1 Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994). 2 Nicolas van de
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University Press, New York. Colton, Timothy. 1986. The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union. Council on Foreign Relations, New York. Cooper, Barry. 1984. The End of History: An Essay on Modern Hegelianism. University of Toronto Press, Toronto. Coverdale, John F. 1979. The Political Transformation of Spain after Franco. Praeger, New York. Craig
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Press, Cambridge, Mass. Friedrich, Carl J., and Zbigniew Brzezinski. 1965. Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, second edition. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. “The End of History?” The National Interest no. 16 (Summer): 3-18. Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. “A Reply to My Critics.” The National Interest no. 18 (Winter): 21-28. Fullerton
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, Cambridge, Mass. Goldman, Marshall I. 1987. Gorbachev’s Challenge: Economic Reform in the Age of High Technology. Norton, New York. Gray, John. 1989. “The End of History—Or the End of Liberalism?” National Review (October): 33-35. Greenstein, Fred I., and Nelson Polsby. 1975. Handbook of Political Science, volume 3. Addison-Wesley
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Economic Growth from David Hume to the Present. Oxford University Press, New York. Roth, Michael S. 1985. “A Problem of Recognition: Alexandre Kojève and the End of History.” History and Theory 24, no. 3: 293-306. Roth, Michael S. 1988. Knowing and History: Appropriations of Hegel in Twentieth Century France. Cornell University
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, 116-117 and last man, 306-307 liberal democracy and, 116, 122 Egypt, 74, 236, 260 Ellison, Ralph, 176 El Salvador, 79 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 4 End of history, 56, 58, 64-67, 136-139, 144, 207, 288, 289, 310-311, 320 Engels, Friedrich, 61, 91 English Civil War, 271 Enlightenment, 57 Entrepreneurship,
by Francis Fukuyama · 1 Jan 2002 · 350pp · 96,803 words
TODAY RULES FOR AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY HUMAN BIOTECHNOLOGY 12 - POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE WHERE DO WE DRAW RED LINES? THE BEGINNING OF POSTHUMAN HISTORY? ALSO BY FRANCIS FUKUYAMA NOTES BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX Notes Copyright Page PREFACE Writing a book on biotechnology might seem to be quite a leap for someone who in recent years
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madness. In early 1999, I was asked by Owen Harries, editor of The National Interest, to write a ten-year retrospective on my article “The End of History?” which he had originally published in the summer of 1989. In that article I argued that Hegel had been right in saying that history had
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been put forward, it seemed to me that the only one that was not possible to refute was the argument that there could be no end of history unless there was an end of science. As I had described the mechanism of a progressive universal history in my subsequent book The
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End of History and the Last Man, the unfolding of modern natural science and the technology that it spawns emerges as one of its chief drivers. Much of
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them was shaped by new empirical information from fields like ethology, evolutionary biology, and cognitive neuroscience. But the invitation to write a retrospective on the “end of history” was the occasion to begin thinking about the future in a more systematic way, which resulted in an article published in The National Interest in
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a vast expansion of the themes first undertaken there. The terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, again raised doubts about the end-of-history thesis, this time on the grounds that we were witnessing a “clash of civilizations” (to use Samuel P. Huntington’s phrase) between the West and
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not interfering excessively with natural patterns of behavior. There were many other factors affecting the trajectory of history, which I discussed in my book The End of History and the Last Man.7 One of the basic drivers of the human historical process has been the development of science and technology, which is
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and led to the revitalization of the institution of slavery there. As the more perceptive critics of the concept of the “end of history” have pointed out, there can be no end of history without an end of modern natural science and technology.10 Not only are we not at an end of science and technology
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freedom that we need to exercise with regard to the biotechnology revolution today. ALSO BY FRANCIS FUKUYAMA The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity The End of History and the Last Man The Soviet Union and the Third World: The Last Three
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. Weightman, June 24, 1826, in The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson (New York: Modern Library, 1944), pp. 729–730. 7 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 8 Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard/Belknap, 1983). 9 On this
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,” in Technology in the Western Political Tradition, ed. Arthur M. Melzer et al. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 10–14. 10 See Francis Fukuyama, “Second Thoughts: The Last Man in a Bottle,” The National Interest, no. 56 (Summer 1999): 16–33. CHAPTER 2: SCIENCES OF THE BRAIN 1 Quote
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Press, 1993). 46 For an account of the rise and fall of crime rates in the United States and other Western countries after 1965, see Francis Fukuyama, The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order (New York: Free Press, 1999), pp. 77–87. 47 Martin Daly and Margo Wilson
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: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985). 11 For an extended discussion of the role of recognition in history, see Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992), pp. 143–244. 12 Frans de Waal, Chimpanzee Politics: Power and Sex among Apes (Baltimore
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.doi.gov/nrl/statAbst/Aidemo.pdt. 15 Nicholas Eberstadt, “World Population Implosion?,” Public Interest, no. 129 (February 1997): 3–12. 16 On this issue, see Francis Fukuyama, “Women and the Evolution of World Politics,” Foreign Affairs 77 (1998): 24–40. 17 Pamela J. Conover and Virginia Sapiro, “Gender, Feminist Consciousness, and War
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(1993): 1079–1099. 18 Edward N. Luttwak, “‘Toward Post-Heroic Warfare,” Foreign Affairs 74 (1995): 109–122. 19 For a longer discussion of this, see Francis Fukuyama, The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order (New York: Free Press, 1999), pp. 212–230 20 This point is made by
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, 1987). 29 For numerous examples of this, see Frans de Waal, Chimpanzee Politics: Power and Sex among Apes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989). 30 Francis Fukuyama, The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order (New York: Free Press, 1999), pp. 174–175. 31 “Defensive modernization” describes a process
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military competition drive internal sociopolitical organization and innovation. There are many examples of this, from reforms in post-Meiji Restoration Japan to the Internet. 32 Francis Fukuyama, “Women and the Evolution of World Politics,” Foreign Affairs 77 (1998): 24–40. 33 Robert Wright, Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny (New York: Pantheon
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Elliott Sober, Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998). 35 For an overview, see Francis Fukuyama, “The Old Age of Mankind,” in The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). CHAPTER 8: HUMAN NATURE 1 Paul Ehrlich, Human Natures: Genes, Cultures, and
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the Human Prospect (Washington, D.C./Covelo, Calif.: Island Press/Shearwater Books, 2000), p. 330. See Francis Fukuyama, review of Ehrlich in Commentary, February 2001
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, Doc. 7884, July 16, 1997. 3 This is the theme of the second part of Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 4 For an interpretation of this passage in Tocqueville, see Francis Fukuyama, “The March of Equality,” Journal of Democracy 11 (2000): 11–17. 5 John Paul II
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Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 6–7. 13 For a fuller defense of this proposition, see Francis Fukuyama, The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order, part II (New York: Free Press, 1999). 14 Aristotle, Politics I.2.13, 1254b
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are not adequately represented, which would seem to be the case with cloning. 4 I myself have been guilty of this kind of thinking. See Francis Fukuyama, Caroline Wagner, et al., Information and Biological Revolutions: Global Governance Challenges—A Summary of a Study Group (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand MR-1139-DARPA, 1999
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277 (1997): 195–197. See also the different perspectives in Glenn McGee, The Human Cloning Debate (Berkeley, Calif.: Berkeley Hills Books, 1998). 6 See also Francis Fukuyama, “Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Health, Committee on Energy and Commerce, Regarding H.R. 1644, ‘The Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001,’ and H.R
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, M. J. “Debating Pros and Cons of Stem Cell Research.” Journal of the American Medical Association 284, no. 6 (2000): 681–684. Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press, 1992. ———. The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order. New York: Free Press, 1999
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Founding Fathers Fourteenth Amendment Fox, Robin France Franco, Francisco Frank, Robert Freedom Party free will French Revolution Freud, Sigmund Freudianism Friedman, Thomas Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History and the Last Map g (intelligence factor) Galileo Galston, William Galton, Francis gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA) system Gardner, Howard gay activism “gay gene” geeks gender
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them they are morally wrong or if they depart significantly from the materialist worldview that the scientists hold dear. OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE. Copyright © 2002 by Francis Fukuyama. All rights reserved. For information, address Picador, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010. www.picadorusa.com Picador® is a U.S. registered trademark
by Francis Fukuyama · 11 Apr 2011 · 740pp · 217,139 words
THOMAS MALTHUS POLITICS IN A MALTHUSIAN WORLD DEVELOPMENT UNDER CONTEMPORARY CONDITIONS THE MODERN DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM WHAT HAS CHANGED ACCOUNTABILITY TODAY WHAT COMES NEXT ALSO BY FRANCIS FUKUYAMA NOTES BIBLIOGRAPHY ACKNOWLEDGMENTS INDEX A NOTE ABOUT THE AUTHOR Copyright Page PREFACE This book has two origins. The first arose when my mentor, Samuel Huntington
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FRANCIS FUKUYAMA America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy State-Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-first Century Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity The End of History
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and the Last Man NOTES PREFACE 1 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies. With a New Foreword by Francis Fukuyama (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). 2 Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca
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World (New York: Times Books, 2008), pp. 41, 50. 2 Larry Diamond, “The Democratic Recession: Before and After the Financial Crisis,” in Nancy Birdsall and Francis Fukuyama, eds., New Ideas in Development After the Financial Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011). 3 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the
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trillion to $61.1 trillion from 1970 to 2008. Sources: World Bank Development Indicators and Global Development Finance; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 8 Francis Fukuyama and Seth Colby, “What Were They Thinking? The Role of Economists in the Financial Debacle,” American Interest 5, no. 1 (2009): 18–25. 9 Fareed
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(New York: Grand Central Publishing, 2009); Charles Murray, What It Means to Be a Libertarian: A Personal Interpretation (New York: Broadway Books, 1997). 24 See Francis Fukuyama, ed., Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). 25 “Getting to Denmark” was actually the original title of Lant Pritchett
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the Evolution of Alarm Calls,” Science 197 (1977): 1246–53. 7 For a more detailed account of the game theoretic grounds of social cooperation, see Francis Fukuyama, The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order (New York: Free Press, 1999), chap. 10; and Matt Ridley, The Origins of Virtue
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legitimacy.” Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 1981), pp. 46–47. 31 Trivers, “Reciprocal Altruism.” 32 On this general topic, see Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992), chap. 13–17. 33 Robert H. Frank, Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest
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Michael T. McGuire, The Neurotransmitter Revolution: Serotonin, Social Behavior, and the Law (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1994), p. 10. 35 On this issue, see Francis Fukuyama, “Identity, Immigration, and Liberal Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 17, no. 2 (2006): 5–20. 36 See Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of
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. 124. 10 Chang et al., Formation of Chinese Civilization, p. 170. 11 Ibid., pp. 164–65. 12 On the survival of familism in China, see Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: Free Press, 1996), pp. 69–95. 13 See Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society
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, Heavenly Clockwork: The Great Astronomical Clocks of Medieval China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960). 22: THE RISE OF POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY 1 For a discussion, see Francis Fukuyama, “The March of Equality,” Journal of Democracy 11, no. 1 (2000): 11–17. 2 Tocqueville discusses at length the impact of the changing intellectual climate
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, Grenada, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Source: World Bank website. 2 See the chapters by James Robinson, Adam Przeworski, and Jorge Dominguez in Francis Fukuyama, ed., Falling Behind: Explaining the Development Gap Between the United States and Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 3 Latin America has been
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notably more democratic than East Asia, both before and after the onset of the third wave. See Francis Fukuyama and Sanjay Marwah, “Comparing East Asia and Latin America: Dimensions of Development,” Journal of Democracy 11, no. 4 (2000): 80–94. 4 On the decline
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Religion. Atlanta: Scholars Press. Berman, Sheri. 1997. “Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic.” World Politics 49(3):401–29. Birdsall, Nancy, and Francis Fukuyama, eds. 2011. New Ideas in Development After the Financial Crisis. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Blackstone, William. 1803. Commentaries on the Laws of England. Philadelphia
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, Straus and Giroux. Frykenberg, Robert E., ed. 1969. Land Control and Social Structure in Indian History. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press. ———. 1996. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York: Free Press. ———. 1999. The Great
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Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Oklahoma City: University of Oklahoma Press. ———. 2006. Political Order in Changing Societies. With a New Foreword by Francis Fukuyama. New Haven: Yale University Press. Hurstfield, Joel. 1973. Freedom, Corruption and Government in Elizabethan England. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hutton, Ronald. 1985. The Restoration
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and Autumn period; Warring States period); feudalism of; Later; Mandate of Heaven and; Western Zhu Yuangzhang Zi Chan Zoloft Zoroastrianism A NOTE ABOUT THE AUTHOR Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and Resident at the Center for Democracy, Development, and
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staff. He is the author of The End of History and the Last Man, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, and America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy. He lives with his wife in Palo Alto, California. Copyright © 2011 by Francis Fukuyama All rights reserved FARRAR, STRAUS AND GIROUX
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permission of the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Fukuyama, Francis. The origins of political order : from prehuman times to the French Revolution / Francis Fukuyama.—1st ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. State, The—History. 2. Order—History. 3. Comparative government— History. 4. Democracy—History. I. Title
by Francis Fukuyama · 1 Jan 1995 · 585pp · 165,304 words
by Simon & Scbuster FREE PRESS PAPERBACKS A Division of Simon & Schuster Inc. 1230 Avenue of the Americas New York, N.Y. 10020 Copyright © 1995 by Francis Fukuyama All rights reserved, including the right of reproduction in whole or in part in any form. First Free Press Paperback Edition 1996 FREE PRESS PAPERBACK
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17 16 15 14 13 12 11 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Fukuyama, Francis. Trust : The social virtues and the creation of prosperity / Francis Fukuyama. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-0-684-82525-0 eISBN-13: 978-1-4391-0747-8 1. Economics—Moral and
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Preface PART I The Idea of Trust: The Improbable Power of Culture in the Making of Economic Society 1. On the Human Situation at the End of History 2. The Twenty Percent Solution 3. Scale and Trust 4. Languages of Good and Evil 5. The Social Virtues 6. The Art of Association Around
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he remained until his death in 1968. In the light of this progression, it seemed only natural that I also should follow my own The End of History and the Last Man with a book about economics. It seems to me that the emphasis on economics is almost inevitable. There has, of course
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depended. I THE IDEA OF TRUST The Improbable Power of Culture in the Making of Economic Society CHAPTER I On the Human Situation at the End of History As we approach the twenty-first century, a remarkable convergence of political and economic institutions has taken place around the world. Earlier in this century
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in the direction of market-oriented economies and integration into the global capitalist division of labor. As I have argued elsewhere, this movement constitutes an “end of history,” in the Marxist-Hegelian sense of History as a broad evolution of human societies advancing toward a final goal.1 As modern technology unfolds, it
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can be richer or poorer, or have more or less satisfying social and spiritual lives. But a corollary to the convergence of institutions at the “end of history” is the widespread acknowledgment that in postindustrial societies, further improvements cannot be achieved through ambitious social engineering. We no longer have realistic hopes that we
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satisfaction we derive from being connected to others in the workplace grows out of a fundamental human desire for recognition. As I argued in The End of History and the Last Man, every human being seeks to have his or her dignity recognized (i.e., evaluated at its proper worth) by other human
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have the effect of depleting social capital, they have great difficulties understanding how to build it up again. The liberal democracy that emerges at the end of history is therefore not entirely “modern.” If the institutions of democracy and capitalism are to work properly, they must coexist with certain premodern cultural habits that
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Engineering The worldwide convergence in basic institutions around liberal democracy and market economics forces us to confront the question of whether we have reached an “end of history,” in which the broad process of human historical evolution culminates not, as in the Marxist version, in socialism but rather in the Hegelian vision of
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is crucial to stable democracy in an even more fundamental way, one that is related to the ultimate end of all human activity. In The End of History and the Last Man, I argued that the human historical process could be understood as the interplay between two large forces.2 The first was
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institutions has been settled, the preservation and accumulation of social capital will occupy center stage. NOTES CHAPTER 1. ON THE HUMAN SITUATION AT THE END OF HISTORY 1See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 2For an excellent discussion of the origins of civil society and its relationship to democracy
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, see Ernest Gellner, Conditions and Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1994). 3For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Francis Fukuyama, “The
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Art of Archery (New York: Pantheon Books, 1953); and Soetsu Yanagi, The Unknown Craftsman: A Japanese Insight into Beauty (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1989). See also Francis Fukuyama, “Great Planes,” New Republic, September 6, 1993. For a point of view questioning the degree to which Buddhist doctrine can be properly used as a
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Political Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes: It’s Basis and Genesis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952); see also my discussion of this issue in The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992), pp. 153-161. 3Aristotle, Politics I i. 11-12. 4On this point, see Mary Ann Glendon
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Peter N. Dale, The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986). CHAPTER 30. AFTER THE END OF SOCIAL ENGINEERING 1See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 2In addition, virtually all of the central themes of this book concerning the importance of culture
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to economic behavior were anticipated in my earlier work. See Fukuyama (1992), chaps. 20, 21; and “The End of History?” National Interest, no. 16 (Summer 1989): 3-18, where I discuss the Weber hypothesis and the impact of culture. 3This point is argued in David
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point, see Larry Diamond, “Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered,” American Behavioral Scientist 15 (March-June 1992): 450-499. 2For a summary of this argument, see Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992), pp. xi-xxiii. 3This is described on pp. 143-180 of Fukuyama (1992). 4Adam Smith
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.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988). Fua, Giorgio and Zacchia, Carlo, Industrilizzazione senza fratture (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1983). Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). -----, “The End of History?” National Interest (1989): 3-18. -----, “Great Planes,” New Republic (1993): 10-11. -----, “Immigrants and Family Values,” Commentary 95 (1993): 26
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, 237-241 in Great Britain, 248, 249 inJapan, 54, 187-189, 240 Electrical industry, 212-214 ELF, 123 Emergency Decree of 1972 (South Korea), 138 End of History and the Last Man, The (Fukuyama), 6, 358, 359 Engels, Friedrich, 47 Enlightenment, 287 Equity markets, 330-331 Erhard, Ludwig, 216, 218 Ethical habits, 34
by Quinn Slobodian · 4 Apr 2023 · 360pp · 107,124 words
economic unions—must be flipped to show the depth of the secessionist energy and zeal for experiments in micro-ordering. When the political scientist Francis Fukuyama speculated about “the end of history” in 1989, he meant the convergence of the world around the model of liberal democracy but also the uncontested reign of a particular
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off, as state spending was only continuing to grow. Maybe for the true victory of capitalism, it was necessary to go further. What if the end of history was not the checkerboard of two-hundred-plus nation-states existing under conditions of liberal democracy, but tens of thousands of jurisdictions of various political
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in exchange for stability and order.17 Fukuyama has been invoked already for his pronouncement that liberal democracy was the last model left at the “end of History.” But we might also direct attention to the piece he published right afterward, where he found “one potential competitor to Western liberal democracy” in what
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York: Zone Books, 2010), 35. 31. For documentation see the International Organization on Migration’s Missing Migrants Project, https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean. 32. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” National Interest, no. 16 (Summer 1989): 3–18. 33. Angus Cameron and Ronen Palan, The Imagined Economies of Globalization (London: Sage, 2003), 157; and
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and State Capitalism in Singapore, 6–7; and Denny Roy, “Singapore, China, and the ‘Soft Authoritarian’ Challenge,” Asian Survey 34, no. 3 (1994): 234. 18. Francis Fukuyama, “Asia’s Soft-Authoritarian Alternative,” New Perspectives Quarterly (Spring 1992): 60. 19. Janet Lippman Abu-Lughod, “The World System in the Thirteenth Century: Dead-End
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-sorting Elizabeth, Queen El Salvador Emirates Stadium empire(s) end of narratives about nation-states and rehabilitation of Enchanted Ground enclave-building projects enclave economies “end of history” English Heritage enterprise zones entrepreneurial spirit Ernst & Young Escobar, Pablo Estonia Ethiopia ethnicity. See also race ethnostates Europe. See also specific locations integration of polities
by Tim Wu · 4 Nov 2025 · 246pp · 65,143 words
this way. Not so long ago many were looking to the twenty-first century with a broad sense of optimism, reflected well in Francis Fukuyama’s famous 1992 book The End of History and the Last Man.[2] He proclaimed that we were witnessing not just “the passing of a particular period of post-war
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history, but the end of history as such.” We had reached “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of
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for a particularly vivid example of the difference land reform can make. Today, Denmark is among the wealthiest and most equalitarian nations on earth. As Francis Fukuyama wrote: “Denmark is a mythical place that is known to have good political and economic institutions: it is stable, democratic, peaceful, prosperous, and inclusive.” But
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International Peace, October 20, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2022/10/understanding-and-responding-to-global-democratic-backsliding?lang=en. BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 1 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 2 11. ECONOMIC MANIA Jon Henley, “Haiti: A Long Descent to
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, 135–41, 137n wealth redistribution as tool for, 152–56 The Economist, 150 ELIZA chatbot, 90 Ellison, Larry, 34 El Salvador, currency of, 150 The End of History and the Last Man (Fukuyama), 117 Evans, Benedict, 53 Evans, David, 15 the everything model, 73–80 extraction of attention, 4–5, 57, 68, 73
by Gideon Rachman · 1 Feb 2011 · 391pp · 102,301 words
: The Second Asian Giant Awakes 9. The Gulf War, 1991: The Unipolar Moment PART TWO: THE AGE OF OPTIMISM, 1991–2008 Introduction 10. Democracy: Francis Fukuyama and the End of History 11. Prosperity: Alan Greenspan and the End of Economic History 12. Progress: Bill Gates and the Triumph of Technology 13. Peace: Bill Clinton and
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political and intellectual support by a new group of reforming economists including Abel Aganbegyan, Leonid Abalkin, and Grigory Yavlinsky—people who, as the political scientist Francis Fukuyama puts it, were the products of a “remarkable intellectual revolution … within the Soviet economic establishment.” They were familiar with liberal economics and were “convinced that
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“win-win world” that diminished the chances of international conflict. The first American writer to capture the spirit of the new age was Francis Fukuyama, whose famous essay on the “end of history” was published in the summer of 1989, just as the revolutionary transformation of the Soviet bloc was gathering pace. Fukuyama’s argument
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democracy at the center of their foreign policies—and both believed that they were putting themselves on the right side of the end of history by doing so. When Fukuyama proclaimed the “end of history,” he was thinking above all about politics and the triumph of liberal democracy. But when Americans asked themselves what it was
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an American effort to remake the world in its own image. But the model formed in America had failed in America. 10 DEMOCRACY FRANCIS FUKUYAMA AND THE END OF HISTORY In early 1989, Francis Fukuyama returned to the University of Chicago, his alma mater, to give a lecture. His talk was part of a series on the
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said, okay, fine, whatever. So I gave the talk in February of 1989.”2 The thesis that Fukuyama outlined in Chicago became famous as “the end of history.” A soft-spoken Asian-American, with an academic manner and conservative views, Fukuyama was thirty-six in 1989. He had done his doctorate on Soviet
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we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human
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seemed to be tottering. Talk of the collapse of communism and the final triumph of democracy did not seem fanciful. The buzz generated by the end-of-history thesis was intensified by the fact that by the time his article appeared, Fukuyama was back in government, working as deputy director of the State
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democracy would reign supreme. In subsequent years, it has become almost compulsory for political commentators to take a sideswipe at Fukuyama and to dismiss the end-of-history thesis as hubristic nonsense.5 Part of the problem is often a misunderstanding of what Fukuyama was actually saying. He was not predicting the end
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natural order of political organization in today’s world. All alternative systems … are in varying degrees an aberration.”10 For the United States, however, the end-of-history thesis answered one question only to pose another. Was history going to end of its own accord, or might it need a helping hand? Put
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States simply wait for democracy to triumph around the globe, or should it pursue a policy aimed at actively promoting democracy? One interpretation of the end-of-history thesis was that Americans should take a well-earned rest after the cold war, and enjoy their “peace dividend.” Newt Gingrich, the architect of the
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war “didn’t make sense.”15 Many of Fukuyama’s old colleagues felt betrayed by his repudiation of neoconservatism. And Fukuyama himself acknowledges that his end-of-history thesis could indeed have been read as providing the basis for the neocon view of the world. Some neoconservatives, he noted, “compared me to Lucy
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they invaded Iraq.”16 Fukuyama, however, insists that nothing he said in Chicago in February 1989 or in his subsequent article and book on the “end of history” could be read as a justification for the invasion of Iraq. Yes, he believed in a worldwide trend toward democracy. But “the idea that American
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a lot of cultural restraints is something I never believed in.”17 Democracy advanced around the world during the Age of Optimism, but Fukuyama’s end-of-history thesis seemed to become more, not less, controversial. By the end of the Bush administration, many foreigners regarded American talk of the globalization of democracy
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one of the most important strands of thinking of the Age of Optimism—the theory of the “democratic peace.” The democratic peace was where the “end of history,” the “end of economic history,” and faith in technology and in globalization all came together. The idea was that capitalism, democracy, and technology would advance
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intellect and his forceful writing to become the most articulate popularizer of a foreign policy based on the unapologetic deployment of American power. Along with Francis Fukuyama, who was in the audience at the AEI dinner, Krauthammer was one of the first analysts to spell out the implications of U.S. victory
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overwhelming confidence was reflected in Krauthammer’s speech to the American Enterprise Institute almost a year after the fall of Saddam. Seated in the audience, Francis Fukuyama found it odd that Krauthammer and the applauding crowd seemed to regard the war as a “virtually unqualified success … given that the United States had
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, powered by high tech and high finance, America looked in the mirror and thought it saw an artificial boom, built on credit and foreign borrowing. Francis Fukuyama, who had epitomized the sunny optimism of 1989, now took an altogether more gloomy view of the American system, lamenting that “we have lost a
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January 2010.24 But where were these inspiring new examples of global cooperation to be found? In Washington, D.C., Francis Fukuyama came up with a surprising answer. Reflecting on his end-of-history thesis in 2009, twenty years after the publication of the original article, Fukuyama mused that one respect in which he might
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. And the man who twenty years earlier had been seen as the very epitome of American triumphalism argued that “the End of History was never about Reaganism, you know … the true exemplar of the End of History is the European Union, not the United States, because the European Union is trying to transcend sovereignty and power
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politics; it’s trying to replace that with the global rule of law, and that’s what ought to happen at the end of history.”25 In Brussels, capital of the EU, there were plenty of people who did indeed see the global economic crisis as a unique opportunity to
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recovered from the Great Depression, and over time it will prove its resilience again. When it comes to politics, the long-term trends highlighted by Francis Fukuyama in 1989 remain impressive. As Fukuyama argued, “The growth of liberal democracy … has been the most remarkable macropolitical phenomenon of the last four hundred years
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.” 18. James Kynge, China Shakes the World (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006), 14. 19. Ibid., 16. 20. Quoted in “Second Long March.” 21. Quoted in Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 1992), 98. 2. BRITAIN, 1979: THATCHERISM 1. Quoted in Richard Roberts and David Kynaston, City State: A Contemporary History
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James, Europe Reborn: A History, 1914–2000 (London: Longman, 2003), 372. 6. Roxburgh, Second Russian Revolution, 27. 7. Ibid., 25. 8. Ibid., 38. 9. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 1992), 29. 10. Roxburgh, Second Russian Revolution, 35. 11. Ibid., 59. 12. Judt, Postwar, 596. 13. Quoted in Ibid
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. Quoted in Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11 (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008), 195. 10. DEMOCRACY: FRANCIS FUKUYAMA AND THE END OF HISTORY 1. Bloom’s book was published in 1987. Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987). 2. Interview with
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the author, Washington, D.C. May 27, 2009. 3. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” National Interest, June 1989. The article was subsequently turned into a book, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 1992). 4. Ibid. 5. See for example Vince Cable, The Storm: The
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It Means (London: Atlantic Books, 2009), 3, and Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams (London: Atlantic Books, 2008). 6. Fukuyama, End of History, 280. 7. Ibid., 50. 8. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2009 (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009). 9. Quoted in Strobe Talbott, The Great Experiment
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and Wolfowitz appear lightly disguised in Saul Bellow’s novel, Ravelstein (New York: Penguin, 2001). 14. Chollet and Goldgeier, America Between the Wars, 277. 15. Francis Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative Legacy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2006), x and xi. 16. Interview with the author
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identity of the individual involved. 9. Quoted in Andrew Bacevich, The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism (New York: Metropolitan, 2008), 126. 10. Francis Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative Legacy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2006), xi–xii. Fukuyama was appalled by Krauthammer’s
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. 4. Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (New York: Norton, 2008), 199. 5. John Plender, “Decline but not fall,” Financial Times, November 12, 2009. 6. Francis Fukuyama, “Thinking About the Future of American Capitalism,” American Interest blog, March 13, 2009. Available from http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/. 7. Gideon Rachman, “Asia
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1. Conversation with the author. 2. Andrew Sullivan, “America wakes up to the shift in global power,” Sunday Times, London, December 6, 2009. 3. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 1992), 48. 4. Kishore Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East (New
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insights into the Clinton era and some interesting reflections on the problem of global governance. Anyone wanting to understand the “end of history” debate has to go back to Francis Fukuyama’s original work, The End of History and the Last Man (Penguin, 1992). Fukuyama’s later disavowal of neoconservatism, America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the
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, 176, 230, 231, 233–35, 237–46, 261, 262, 266, 279, 281–85, 290, 291, 299n in China, 18, 25–28, 140, 168, 237, 238 end-of-history thesis and, 94, 99–105 Gorbachev and, 55, 58, 61 in India, 80, 85, 169 in Latin America, 16, 17–18, 71–73, 77, 78
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education, 27, 80–82, 122, 216 Egypt, 206, 256, 257, 270, 272 ElBaradei, Mohamed, 211–12 Emmott, Bill, 84 end of economic history, 94, 127 end of history, 94, 99–105, 127, 213, 301n End of Influence, The (Cohen and DeLong), 183 energy, 199, 201, 202–3, 207, 263, 274, 280 see also
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, 17, 31, 35, 42, 75, 118 Friedman, Thomas, 84, 122, 127–28, 261, 304n Fukuyama, Francis, 56–57, 94, 163, 167–68, 182, 282–83 end-of-history thesis and, 94, 99–105, 213 G2, 223–25, 227 G8, 156, 218, 219, 220, 285 G20, 112, 175, 217–22, 227, 259, 274, 276
by Francis Fukuyama · 22 Dec 2005
Nation-Building Forum on Constructive Capitalism Francis Fukuyama, Series Editor Nation-Building Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq • • Edited by Francis Fukuyama The Johns Hopkins University Press • B A LT I M O R E • © 2006 The Johns Hopkins University Press All rights reserved. Published 2006 Printed
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Charles Street Baltimore, Maryland 21218-4363 www.press.jhu.edu Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Nation-building : beyond Afghanistan and Iraq / edited by Francis Fukuyama. p. cm. “Product of a conference held at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), the Johns Hopkins University, in April 2004
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this book is available from the British Library. Contents Acknowledgments vii List of Abbreviations ix INTRODUCTION Nation-Building and the Failure of Institutional Memory 1 Francis Fukuyama Part I • The Historical Experience of Nation-Building • CHAPTER 1 • From Consensus to Crisis: The Postwar Career of Nation-Building in U.S. Foreign Relations
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: How Postconflict Reconstruction Went Awry 196 Johanna Mendelson Forman • CHAPTER 10 • Learning the Lessons of Iraq 218 James Dobbins • CONCLUSION Guidelines for Future Nation-Builders Francis Fukuyama Contributors Index 251 • vi • 245 231 145 125 Acknowledgments THIS BOOK is the product of a conference held at the Paul H. Nitze School of
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Children’s Fund United Nations Monitoring, Inspection, and Verification Commission United States Agency for International Development INTRODUCTION Nation-Building and the Failure of Institutional Memory Francis Fukuyama I don’t think our troops ought to be used for what’s called nation-building. I think our troops ought to be used to
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to support nation-building efforts at different times—conservatives as part of the “war on terrorism” and liberals for the sake of humanitarian intervention. • 1 • • Francis Fukuyama The frequency and intensity of U.S. and international nation-building efforts have increased since the end of the Cold War, which, as Michael Ignatieff
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powers had such a large and durable effect on their subject peoples. For all practical purposes, what passes for nation-building is a much • 3 • • Francis Fukuyama more limited exercise in political reconstruction or re-legitimation, or else a matter of promoting economic development. Outside powers can succeed at negotiating and enforcing
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a prime example. Economic planning fell out of favor intellectually with the Reagan-Thatcher revolution in the late 1980s and was replaced by orthodox • 5 • • Francis Fukuyama economic liberalism as the dominant conceptual framework. But most importantly, none of the approaches popular in any given decade proved adequate to promote sustained long
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clarity about their own impact on local populations. They chant the mantra of institutionor capacity-building, and they fail to understand how their continued • 7 • • Francis Fukuyama presence in the country tends to weaken precisely those institutions they are seeking to strengthen. The Failure of Institutional Memory None of these problems is
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. The lesson that Rumsfeld drew from Bosnia was that split authority on the U.S. side tends to tie U.S. forces down, because • 9 • • Francis Fukuyama the civilian side is always good at devising reasons why U.S. troops are politically necessary and thus cannot be withdrawn. In addition, a poisonous
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of the reconstruction; in reality, the administration had planned on this shift from before the war. A full history remains to be written, but, • 11 • • Francis Fukuyama even at this early juncture, the very structure and mission of the CPA raise a number of interesting questions from the standpoint of the proper
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embassy. It is of course impossible to know what would have happened under such a counterfactual scenario, but it is extremely doubtful that anything • 13 • • Francis Fukuyama like it could have materialized. The United States was able to go into Afghanistan with light forces because it had a powerful internal ally, the
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Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); World Bank, World Bank Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004). 10. Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin, “Lessons from
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-Building. See also the chapters by Michèle A. Flournoy and James Dobbins. 13. Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004). 14. Francis Fukuyama, “Nation-Building 101,” Atlantic Monthly, January/February 2004, 159–62. 15. James Fallows, “Blind into Baghdad,” Atlantic Monthly, January/February 2004, 52–77; Kenneth M
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, “After Saddam: Assessing the Reconstruction of Iraq,” Saban Center Analysis Paper no. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Saban Center, 2004). 16. Woodward, Plan of Attack. • 15 • • Francis Fukuyama 17. Robert M. Perito, The American Experience with Police in Peace Operations (Clementsport, Canada: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2002). 18. This was not true of Garner
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Responsibility of the World’s Only Superpower (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, Summer 2003), available at www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/summer2003/nation1.html. 9. Francis Fukuyama, “Nation-Building 101,” Atlantic Monthly, January 20, 2004, 159–63. 10. Jean-Paul Azam, Paul Collier, and Anke Hoeffler, “International Policies in Civil Conflict: An
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to the lessons so painfully learned, and in many cases, relearned in Iraq. • 229 • This page intentionally left blank CONCLUSION Guidelines for Future Nation-Builders Francis Fukuyama THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE in reconstructing Afghanistan and Iraq following the occupation of these countries in 2001 and 2003 adds considerably to the pool of knowledge
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been matched, unfortunately, by a development of doctrine and a systematic effort to analyze the experience on the part of the U.S. government. • 231 • • Francis Fukuyama Although the United Nations, which has also had extensive experience in nation-building, may have done a bit better in preserving institutional knowledge, it has
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-building operations, with the United States and Britain often doing the heavy lifting—combat—and other European forces taking on constabulary and police roles. • 233 • • Francis Fukuyama There is a conceptual distinction between reconstruction and development as well. Reconstruction involves returning a society ravaged by war or natural disaster back to something
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units, and be given other functions in the civilian economy so that they no longer have an incentive to fight. The disarmament and demobilization • 235 • • Francis Fukuyama phases are relatively straightforward; reintegration has usually been much more difficult because it requires resources (essentially, a jobs program) to implement. In Iraq, as the
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excluded Shiite and Kurdish communities. The election date selected, January 30, 2005, was the earliest possible, given the technical constraints faced by occupation authorities. • 237 • • Francis Fukuyama Beyond the national elections in Iraq, however, there were other available routes to creating legitimate political authority that were not taken. In his chapter, Diamond
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. The desire to maintain American—and indeed, Pentagon— ownership of the reconstruction reflected a misplaced confidence about how easy the process would ultimately be. • 239 • • Francis Fukuyama The Problem of Coordination The single, simple lesson pointed out by many of the chapters in this book relates to the absence in the U
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place because there was no functioning local government, but the outside provision of government services becomes an obstacle to the creation of new state • 241 • • Francis Fukuyama institutions that can stand on their own. Nonetheless, it is precisely the creation of self-sustaining local institutions that provides an graceful exit strategy for
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1960s has been replaced today by a high degree of pessimism that donor countries can do much to promote development. And yet surprising success • 243 • • Francis Fukuyama stories abound. The Republic of Korea was written off, after all, as a basket case at the end of the Korean War. The Bush administration
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security issues. She holds a B.A. in social studies from Harvard University and an M.Litt. in international relations from Balliol College, Oxford University. Francis Fukuyama is Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of the Johns Hopkins University
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the International Development program at SAIS. Dr. Fukuyama has written widely on issues relating to questions concerning democratization and international political economy. His book, The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press, 1992) has appeared in over twenty foreign editions. He is also the author of Trust: The Social Virtues and
by Francis Fukuyama · 29 Sep 2014 · 828pp · 232,188 words
the Repatrimonialization of American Politics 34. America the Vetocracy 35. Autonomy and Subordination 36. Political Order and Political Decay Notes Bibliography Acknowledgments Index Also by Francis Fukuyama A Note About the Author Copyright INTRODUCTION Development of Political Institutions to the French Revolution Consider a number of very different scenarios that have been
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Poverty (New York: Crown, 2012). 5. For definitions of these terms, see Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, pp. 12–24; also the discussion in Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), pp. 450–51. 6. The argument
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Finance; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 11. Figures are taken from Larry Diamond, “The Financial Crisis and the Democratic Recession,” in Nancy Birdsall and Francis Fukuyama, eds., New Ideas in Development after the Financial Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011). See also Huntington, The Third Wave. 12. See Alfred C
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, Clientelism, Interests, and Democratic Representation, p. 46. 9. Keith R. Legg, Politics in Modern Greece (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 36–37. 10. Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: Free Press, 1995), pp. 97–101. 11. Papakostas, “Why Is There No Clientelism in
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(2007): 13–27; Robert Kagan, “The Ungreat Washed: Why Democracy Must Remain America’s Goal Abroad,” New Republic, July 7 and 14, 2003, 27–37; Francis Fukuyama, “Is There a Proper Sequence in Democratic Transitions?” Current History 110, no. 739 (2011): 308–10. 14: NIGERIA 1. Peter Cunliffe-Jones, My Nigeria: Five
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. Mahoney, Colonialism and Postcolonial Development, pp. 46–49; Skidmore and Smith, Modern Latin America, pp. 27–28. 19. For an overview of this process, see Francis Fukuyama, ed., Falling Behind: Explaining the Development Gap Between Latin America and the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), chap. 10. 20. Mahoney, Colonialism
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to land alienation are usually severely entailed by obligations to kin. The chief is more like a custodian acting on behalf of the group. See Francis Fukuyama, Origins of Political Order, chap. 4; T. Olawale Elias, The Nature of African Customary Law (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1956), pp. 162–66. 16
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postcolonial Singapore and Malaysia, see Slater, Ordering Power. 27: WHY DID DEMOCRACY SPREAD? 1. Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy. 2. Tocqueville, Democracy in America, introdution; Francis Fukuyama, “The March of Equality,” Journal of Democracy 11, no. 1 (2000): 11–17. 3. On this correlation, see Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of
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of this argument is also made in Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). See also Francis Fukuyama, “Identity, Immigration, and Liberal Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 17, no. 2 (2006): 5–20. 30: THE MIDDLE CLASS AND DEMOCRACY’S FUTURE 1. This chapter
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expands on Francis Fukuyama, “The Future of History,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 1 (2012): 53–61. 2. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p. 124. Gellner also makes this argument in
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POLITICS 1. See the discussion of reciprocal altruism in Fukuyama, Origins of Political Order, pp. 30–31; see also the discussion of moral reciprocity in Francis Fukuyama, The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order (New York: Free Press, 1999), pp. 259–62. 2. Lawrence Lessig, Republic, Lost: How
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: Making Services Work for Poor People (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2003). 2. For a longer discussion of principal-agent theory and its limitations, see Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), chap. 2. 3. Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German
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German army from the end of World War I through the beginning of World War II; mission orders are an American version of Aufstragstaktik. See Francis Fukuyama and Abram N. Shulsky, The “Virtual Corporation” and Army Organization (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 1997). 9. Ringen, Nation of Devils, pp. 24–29. 36
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Freedom (New York: Knopf, 1999), p. 27. 5. For a much longer discussion of the role of recognition and dignity in politics, see Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, pp. 162–208. 6. On China’s challenges in moving from middle- to high-income status, see the World Bank, China
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Press. Biles, Roger. 1984. Big City Boss in Depression and War: Mayor Edward J. Kelly of Chicago. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. Birdsall, Nancy, and Francis Fukuyama, eds. 2001. New Ideas in Development After the Financial Crisis. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Bodde, Derk, and Clarence Morris. 1967. Law in Imperial China
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and Giroux. Friedrich, Carl J., and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski. 1965. Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press. ______. 1995. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York: Free Press. ______. 1999. The Great
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. Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity. New York: Simon & Schuster. ______. 2006. Political Order in Changing Societies. With a New Foreword by Francis Fukuyama. New Haven: Yale University Press. Hutchcroft, Paul D. 1997. “The Politics of Privilege: Assessing the Impact of Rents, Corruption, and Clientelism on Third World Development
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, Viktor Yar’Adua, Umaru Musa Yemen Yrigoyen, Hipólito Yugoslavia Zaire Zakaria, Fareed Zambia Zanzibar Zenawi, Meles Zhao, Dingxin Zhou Enlai Zhu Yuangzhang Zimbabwe ALSO BY FRANCIS FUKUYAMA The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy State-Building: Governance
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The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity The End of History and the Last Man About the Author Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. He has previously taught at the
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is the author of The Origins of Political Order, The End of History and the Last Man, Trust, and America at the Crossroads. He lives with his wife in California. Farrar, Straus and Giroux 18 West 18th Street, New York 10011 Copyright © 2014 by Francis Fukuyama All rights reserved First edition, 2014 eBooks may be
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@macmillan.com. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Fukuyama, Francis. Political order and political decay: from the industrial revolution to the globalization of democracy / Francis Fukuyama. pages cm ISBN 978-0-374-22735-7 (hardback)—ISBN 978-1-4299-4432-8 (e-book) 1. State, The—History. 2. Order—History. 3
by Michael Kimmage · 21 Apr 2020 · 378pp · 121,495 words
. It was civilization on the frontier, the opposite of civilization as decadence or overrefinement, civilization honored in the breach, mythically vigorous and thrilling. (Francis Fukuyama would conclude the End of History [1992] with a long comparison of the Western triumph after 1989 and the winning of the American West in the nineteenth century.) The historical
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in 1989 than it had been in the 1940s and 1950s. A Reagan administration official would equate the end of the Cold War with the end of history itself. Reagan’s optimism obscured much history that was not triumphant. It obscured the political divisions over Vietnam, which by the 1970s were divisions about
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of our given task is great, and it is very much in doubt how the future will judge our stewardship.31 IN 1981 AND 1982, Francis Fukuyama, a thirty-year-old holder of a bachelor’s degree in classics and a former student of Allan Bloom at Cornell (class of ’74), held
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the Theory and Practice of Democracy to lecture on politics and history. The lecture must have gone well, for it resulted in an article. “The End of History?” was published in the summer 1989 issue of the National Interest, a neoconservative foreign-policy magazine founded in 1985. Fukuyama’s article could be compared
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had some remarkable similarities to the book Fukuyama elaborated from his National Interest article. In the words of the journalist Charles Krauthammer, who blurbed The End of History and the Last Man (1992), which had gained a clause and lost a question mark from the article, Fukuyama’s theses were “bold, lucid, scandalously
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liberations were the most captivating news of 1989 and 1990.33 Liberation had great currency for the author of The End of History and the Last Man. From the nineteenth-century German philosopher Hegel, Francis Fukuyama adopted the notion that all people seek recognition in addition to physical well-being. Tracking this notion, Fukuyama regarded
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what Whittaker Chambers had put together for Time in the 1940s, with somewhat more political economy and less religion in the civilizational mix. In The End of History and the Last Man, political liberty demands economic liberty (capitalism): Ronald Reagan had hit each of these themes, including Christian doctrine, in his 1987 speech
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, together with its companion, economic liberalism has been the most remarkable macropolitical phenomenon of the last four hundred years.”34 Fukuyama’s opponent in The End of History and the Last Man was not the Left. His opponent was pessimism about the West, which was the problem of America’s educated classes (Right
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and Left). “We in the West,” he wrote in The End of History, “have become thoroughly pessimistic with regard to the possibility of overall progress in democratic institutions.” In this “we” he included those who deconstructed the political
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not be another Christopher Columbus. He would not explore, conquer and convert. He would vote, compromise and shop.36 Many, perhaps most readers of The End of History and the Last Man ignored the last man altogether. They latched onto the title’s delirious termination. Western Europe and the United States had won
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treatise than a dystopian novel, a rewrite of Orwell’s 1984 for the twenty-first century. Many professors, and even more graduate students, read The End of History as the road map of the coming capitalist catastrophe. On the Right, Reagan’s and Fukuyama’s optimism was mainstream in 1989, but just beneath
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the rights revolutions of the 1960s, the creeping secularism and the ceaseless technological change had deprived the West of its soul. Conservatives could read The End of History as the road map to the coming liberal catastrophe. In 1964, Burnham’s Suicide of the West had been a defense of nationalism and the
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be indefinite. It was not a policy but a progression that resembled the settlement of the American West, the image with which Fukuyama closed The End of History and the Last Man, with the pioneers gliding from East to West. The world’s countries were like “a long wagon train strung out along
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expansion into Eastern Europe was a political and security culture in Poland, Hungary and the Baltic States based on civilizational borders, whatever Thomas Friedman or Francis Fukuyama might contend about unbound Westernization. These countries defined themselves against the Muslim Middle East in the South and against Russia in the East. Russia was
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Lectures at the American Enterprise Institute in 1992. Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations?” article in Foreign Affairs (summer 1993) was as seminal as Fukuyama’s “End of History?” essay had been three years earlier. Also like Fukuyama, Huntington had transposed his article into a book, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of
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for confusion about the West, but not Edward Said, per se. Huntington was well aware of Fukuyama, of course, and Huntington disagreed completely with the end-of-history hypothesis. Even if the Cold War was over, there was and would be no diminution of cultural conflict, Huntington was sure. Post–Cold War culture
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new vulgarity set in, leading Huntington to the revealing quip—a parodic reply to the decade’s economic-minded optimists, its Tom Friedmans and its Francis Fukuyamas—that “the essence of Western civilization is the Magna Carta not the Magna Mac.” Yet it was McDonald’s Big Mac, as well as Pizza
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the death. If one of them was right, the other two had to be wrong. The clash was coming. The clash was not coming. The end of history was at hand. The sins of Orientalism, of Western imperialism, would have to be repented before East and West could be forgotten and something more
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enlightened put in their place. Clinton stood nearest to Fukuyama: the end of history was the Washington consensus, and there could be consensus blossoming out from Washington precisely because history had come to a satisfactory end. For the Clinton
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. Huntington challenged the presumption that a Huntingtonian would favor war in the Middle East. Moving toward war in the Middle East, Bush remained in the end-of-history fold, seeking a translation of Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy, in which Fukuyama had been involved directly, from the late twentieth to the twenty-first
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W. Bush spoke as an Old Testament prophet who lived in an impure world but whose eyes could see the end of tyranny, the end of history after the end of history. Bush was not to be pinned down to hemispheric or civilizational or national categories. “The best hope for freedom in our world,” he proclaimed
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of 1989 were an effortless metaphor, in part because the Iraq War had been fought in the name of democracy. The Iraq War muddied the end of history, as Fukuyama himself had admitted. In office, Obama chose not to withdraw entirely from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but his personal charisma and
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that led to his downfall. (The activist whose Facebook posting began the Maidan uprisings, Mustafa Nayyem, went in the summer of 2014 to study with Francis Fukuyama, who encouraged Nayyem to launch a political career, which he did.) In Kyiv, young Ukrainians waved EU flags at the protests. In the eyes of
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“the last year when foreign policy felt somewhat routine” in the White House, the feeling of routine punctured by chaos in the Middle East. The end of history came closest to occurring in the Middle East in 2011, when grassroots protest and social media combined to generate the Arab Spring, popular uprisings against
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passed in the summer of 2016, a referendum on British concerns that took on more than British meanings. Another way for Fukuyama to ponder the end of history was to write about “getting to Denmark,” a turn of phrase from his 2011 book, The Origins of Political Order. To get to Denmark was
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Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” National Interest, no. 16 (Summer 1989): 3–18; and Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). 33. On the CIA and Nelson Mandela, see Borstelmann, Cold War and the Color Line, 156. 34. Fukuyama, End of History, 323, 48. 35. Fukuyama, End of History, xiii, 7, 48. 36. Fukuyama, End of History, 18. 37. Fukuyama, End of History
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, “while Columbus,” quoted in Jacobson, Roots Too, 340. National Council of Churches, “for the descendants,” quoted in Muccigrosso, Celebrating the New World, x. 4. Fukuyama, End of History, 338, 339. 5. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956–1961: The White House Years (New York: Doubleday, 1965), 658. 6. George H. W. Bush, “A
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, Clash of Civilizations, 65, 83, 58. 17. Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, 303, 305, 321. 18. Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, 306, 307, 318, 308. 19. See Francis Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006). 20. Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books
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-in-europe-and-asia/. 39. Rhodes, World as It Is, 267. Chollet, Long Game, 170. Rhodes, World as It Is, 230. On Mustafa Nayyem and Francis Fukuyama, see Joshua Yaffa, “Reforming Ukraine After the Revolutions,” The New Yorker, August 29, 2016, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/09/05/reforming-ukraine-after
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York: William Morrow, 2004), 61, 62. 41. Rhodes, World as It Is, 149. 42. Rhodes, World as It Is, 91. 43. “Getting to Denmark,” in Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2011), 25. 44. For a transcript of the
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