German hyperinflation

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Big Debt Crises

by Ray Dalio  · 9 Sep 2018  · 782pp  · 187,875 words

Currency Is Let Go) Normalization The Spiral from a More Transitory Inflationary Depression to Hyperinflation War Economies In Summary PART 2: Detailed Case Studies German Debt Crisis and Hyperinflation (1918-1924) US Debt Crisis and Adjustment (1928–1937) US Debt Crisis and Adjustment (2007–2011) PART 3: Compendium of 48 Case Studies

were caused by the political fallout from those depressions). PART 2: Detailed Case Studies German Debt Crisis and Hyperinflation (1918–1924) US Debt Crisis and Adjustment (1918–1924) US Debt Crisis and Adjustment (2007–2011) German Debt Crisis and Hyperinflation (1918-1924) * * * This section provides a detailed account of the most iconic inflationary depression

cycle in history—the German debt crisis and hyperinflation that followed the end of World War I and carried into the mid

goes through the particulars of the case in some detail with reference to the template laid out earlier in the “Archetypal Inflationary Depression.” Although the German hyperinflation took place almost a century ago, and amid exceptional political circumstances (Germany’s defeat in the First World War and the imposition of a huge

Currency Wars: The Making of the Next Gobal Crisis

by James Rickards  · 10 Nov 2011  · 381pp  · 101,559 words

in the interwar period. The Weimar hyperinflation actually achieved a number of important political goals, a fact that had repercussions throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Hyperinflation unified the German people in opposition to “foreign speculators” and it forced France to show its hand in the Ruhr Valley, thus creating a case for

German rearmament. Hyperinflation also evoked some sympathy from England and the United States for alleviation of the harshest demands for reparations emanating from the Versailles Treaty. While the

or some other tangible asset such as land could restore order when conditions seemed opportune—exactly what Germany did. This is not to argue that German hyperinflation in 1922 was a carefully thought-out plan, only that hyperinflation can be used as a policy lever. Hyperinflation produces fairly predictable sets of winners

among debtors, creditors, labor and capital, while gold is kept available to clean up the wreckage if necessary. Of course, the costs of hyperinflation were enormous. Trust in German government institutions evaporated and lives were literally destroyed. Yet the episode showed that a major country with natural resources, labor, hard assets and

gold available to preserve wealth could emerge from hyperinflation relatively intact. From 1924 to 1929, immediately after the hyperinflation, German industrial production expanded at a faster rate than any other major economy, including the United States. Previously countries had gone off the gold standard in

rent seeking embargoes Emergency Banking Act of 1933 emergent properties, in complex system energy, money-as-energy model England and depression of 1920–1921 and German hyperinflation gold reserves and gold standard London Gold Pool 1960s sterling crisis 1968 closing of gold market and Panic of 1931 and Paris Peace Conference of

seeking and European sovereign debt crisis of 2010 expatriates living in Paris exports increase FDR’s Executive Orders FDR’s gold confiscations and G20 and German hyperinflation Gini coefficient for and gold standard and IMF in London Gold Pool military monetarism and U.S. economy 1930s bank failures and bank runs 1930s

Triumph of the Optimists: 101 Years of Global Investment Returns

by Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh and Mike Staunton  · 3 Feb 2002  · 353pp  · 148,895 words

particularly 1923 in our calculations, the German arithmetic mean annual inflation rate over the 101 years from 1900–2000 would exceed two billion percent. The German hyperinflation had devastating consequences, wiping out all internal debts almost overnight, and ruining a substantial proportion of Germany’s middle class. Savings, bank balances, mortgages, annuities

Between 1919 and 1925, four other countries outside our sample, Austria, Hungary, Poland, and Russia, also experienced hyperinflation, although not quite on the German scale. The second Hungarian hyperinflation of 1945–46, however, dwarfed even Germany’s, with a compound rate of 19,800 percent per month. In more recent memory, there

.001 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 Start of year 1970 1980 1990 2000 As Figure 7-1 shows, by the middle of the German hyperinflation of 1922–23, that country’s currency debasement had taken the German mark off the vertical scale of the graph. Other currencies took longer to

, the figure was 46 percent. The First World War had a major dampening effect on international investment. Capital controls proliferated, and then in the 1920s, German hyperinflation and the Wall Street Crash crushed confidence. Foreign investment collapsed after 1929, and capital controls and protectionism characterized the period until the Second World War

having been afflicted by inflation, the countries identified above as having the lowest real bill and bond returns had worse experiences. In addition to the German hyperinflation of 1922–23, France, Italy, Japan, and to a lesser extent Belgium, all experienced very high inflation around the end of the Second World War

Money Mischief: Episodes in Monetary History

by Milton Friedman  · 1 Jan 1992  · 275pp  · 82,640 words

power. They retained their value precisely because no new czarist rubles could be created, and hence the quantity available to circulate was fixed. During the German hyperinflation after World War I, currencies of foreign countries served as a substitute currency. After World War II, the Allied occupational authorities exercised sufficiently rigid control

of gold in the nineteenth century illustrate. The modern forms of money—paper and bookkeeping entries—are subject to no such physical limits. During the German hyperinflation after World War I, hand-to-hand money increased at the average rate of more than 300 percent a month for more than a year

The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World

by Niall Ferguson  · 13 Nov 2007  · 471pp  · 124,585 words

post-war recession, caused an even bigger surge in imports, thus negating the economic pressure they had hoped to exert. At the heart of the German hyperinflation was a miscalculation. When the French cottoned on to the insincerity of official German pledges to fulfil their reparations commitments, they drew the conclusion that

their money; and this becomes worse and worse. Together they are all at its mercy and all feel equally worthless.’60 The price of hyperinflation: a German billion mark note from November 1923 Worthlessness was the hyperinflation’s principal product. Not only was money rendered worthless; so too were all the forms

: weakened banks and chronically high interest rates, which now incorporated a substantial inflation risk premium. But it was the social and political consequences of the German hyperinflation that were the most grievous. The English economist John Maynard Keynes had theorized in 1923 that the ‘euthanasia of the rentier’ through inflation was preferable

Seven Crashes: The Economic Crises That Shaped Globalization

by Harold James  · 15 Jan 2023  · 469pp  · 137,880 words

lead weight of the billions around the necks of the defeated powers. After the lost war, he misunderstood completely the character of the gathering German inflation and hyperinflation, engaged in savage polemics against the leading politicians of the early Weimar Republic, and contributed a stabilization plan that aimed at ending inflation. He

War is a turning point in the story of modern globalization. It also produced the most devastating demonstration of the destructive effects of inflation: the German hyperinflation. That experience remained, along with the Great Depression, as the great bogey of economic history and analysis. The memory of both continues to haunt policy

a way of wriggling out of the reparations settlement imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. Chancellor Wilhelm Cuno privately confessed in July 1923, as the German hyperinflation reached its terminal extreme phase, that “naturally the wish had been to deal with reparations first and clean up the tax problem afterward.”54 Even

, predictably, from Helfferich’s vicious rhetoric did not end his career—on the contrary, he played a central role in the last phases of the German hyperinflation that took off after the Rathenau assassination, with a stabilization plan that envisaged a new currency based on a mortgage on rye production. Temporary banknotes

The End of Alchemy: Money, Banking and the Future of the Global Economy

by Mervyn King  · 3 Mar 2016  · 464pp  · 139,088 words

–201, 206, 307, 368; 1920-1 depression, 326–7; 1931 crisis, 41; ‘Black Monday’ (19 October 1987), 149; Finnish and Swedish crises (early 1990s), 279; German hyperinflation (early 1920s), 52, 68, 69, 86, 158–9, 190; Latin American debt crisis (1980s), 339; London banking crises (1825-66), 92, 188–90, 191–2

The Downfall of Money: Germany's Hyperinflation and the Destruction of the Middle Class

by Frederick Taylor  · 16 Sep 2013  · 473pp  · 132,344 words

By the Same Author Also by Frederick Taylor Introduction This book seeks to provide a narrative description of the origins, progression and effects of the German hyperinflation and to place this extraordinary phenomenon in the turbulent, ominous human context of the world in which it occurred. It is not by any means

long-established and seemingly inevitable demographic trend: the steady urbanisation of the Reich. During the early post-war years, including the time of the hyperinflation, 2 million Germans emigrated from the urban areas back to the countryside.23 The city dweller who stayed put, who had no rural relations, who worked in

dreams of even the most optimistic German politician during the 1920s. Moreover, none of this was achieved on the back of inflation, let alone hyperinflation. In fact, the German government, under the watchful eye of the all-powerful Bundesbank (Federal Bank) – part of whose formal remit became precisely the prevention of inflation

The Deluge: The Great War, America and the Remaking of the Global Order, 1916-1931

by Adam Tooze  · 13 Nov 2014  · 1,057pp  · 239,915 words

inflation American: inflation tax 216; inflation–deflation succession (1919–1920) 342–7 British 356–8 and the British Empire 374 French 355–6, 469 German 355, 371, 454; hyperinflation 443, 444–5, 454, 464 global 212–15, 355–8; and wholesale price dislocation 213–14 interwar hyperinflations 37, 212, 362; Germany 443

Brest-Litovsk Treaty see also specific treaties peasantry 408, 415–16, 420–22, 483 Chinese 421, 479, 480, 481, 483 First International Peasant Conference 421 German hyperinflation 443 Peng Pai 479 Penrose, Boise 372 Pentland, John Sinclair, 1st Baron 182 Pershing, John J. 202, 206 independent American Army see United States of

Lords of Finance: The Bankers Who Broke the World

by Liaquat Ahamed  · 22 Jan 2009  · 708pp  · 196,859 words

between. During the war, France had expanded its currency by 350 percent, pushing up prices equivalently. After the war, the Banque de France avoided German-style hyperinflation and currency collapse by putting a lid on the issue of new currency. However, France continued to flirt with disaster by running budget deficits of

personal dealings with Keynes. After the war, Norman, agreeing with much of Keynes’s argument on reparations, had consulted him at the height of the German hyperinflation. But Keynes’s vocal opposition to the war-debt settlement with the United States, which Norman had been responsible for engineering, created a rift. Norman

schedule, at least temporarily, to which they would only agree if stringent foreign controls were imposed on the management of German finances. The French saw German hyperinflation as part of a deliberate campaign by its officials to wreck their own economy and thus prevent reparations from being paid. Some mechanism for preventing

-off toward European financial affairs had left him relegated to the sidelines. In 1922, he had tried to involve himself in crafting a solution to German hyperinflation but had been expressly warned off by the secretary of state. For much of 1923 he had been ill. Then, earlier in 1924, he had

a break from gold loomed, he would portray the consequences in apocalyptic terms—an evaporation of confidence in money such as had occurred during the German hyperinflation, a collapse in currency values, spiraling prices, food shortages, strikes, rationing, and riots. So exaggerated and gloomy was the portrait he painted that Russell Leffingwell

The Alchemists: Three Central Bankers and a World on Fire

by Neil Irwin  · 4 Apr 2013  · 597pp  · 172,130 words

23 Things They Don't Tell You About Capitalism

by Ha-Joon Chang  · 1 Jan 2010  · 365pp  · 88,125 words

Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea

by Mark Blyth  · 24 Apr 2013  · 576pp  · 105,655 words

Money: 5,000 Years of Debt and Power

by Michel Aglietta  · 23 Oct 2018  · 665pp  · 146,542 words

1929: Inside the Greatest Crash in Wall Street History--and How It Shattered a Nation

by Andrew Ross Sorkin  · 14 Oct 2025  · 664pp  · 166,312 words

When the Money Runs Out: The End of Western Affluence

by Stephen D. King  · 17 Jun 2013  · 324pp  · 90,253 words

Endless Money: The Moral Hazards of Socialism

by William Baker and Addison Wiggin  · 2 Nov 2009  · 444pp  · 151,136 words

Paper Promises

by Philip Coggan  · 1 Dec 2011  · 376pp  · 109,092 words

Slouching Towards Utopia: An Economic History of the Twentieth Century

by J. Bradford Delong  · 6 Apr 2020  · 593pp  · 183,240 words

War and Gold: A Five-Hundred-Year History of Empires, Adventures, and Debt

by Kwasi Kwarteng  · 12 May 2014  · 632pp  · 159,454 words

Free to Choose: A Personal Statement

by Milton Friedman and Rose D. Friedman  · 2 Jan 1980  · 376pp  · 118,542 words

The End of Money: Counterfeiters, Preachers, Techies, Dreamers--And the Coming Cashless Society

by David Wolman  · 14 Feb 2012  · 275pp  · 77,017 words

Hubris: Why Economists Failed to Predict the Crisis and How to Avoid the Next One

by Meghnad Desai  · 15 Feb 2015  · 270pp  · 73,485 words

The Euro and the Battle of Ideas

by Markus K. Brunnermeier, Harold James and Jean-Pierre Landau  · 3 Aug 2016  · 586pp  · 160,321 words

The Curse of Cash

by Kenneth S Rogoff  · 29 Aug 2016  · 361pp  · 97,787 words

The Simple Path to Wealth (Revised & Expanded 2025 Edition): Your Road Map to Financial Independence and a Rich, Free Life

by JL Collins  · 191pp  · 66,998 words

Money Free and Unfree

by George A. Selgin  · 14 Jun 2017  · 454pp  · 134,482 words

More: The 10,000-Year Rise of the World Economy

by Philip Coggan  · 6 Feb 2020  · 524pp  · 155,947 words

Narrative Economics: How Stories Go Viral and Drive Major Economic Events

by Robert J. Shiller  · 14 Oct 2019  · 611pp  · 130,419 words

Rigged Money: Beating Wall Street at Its Own Game

by Lee Munson  · 6 Dec 2011  · 236pp  · 77,735 words

The Simple Path to Wealth: Your Road Map to Financial Independence and a Rich, Free Life

by J L Collins  · 17 Jun 2016  · 194pp  · 59,336 words

Rethinking Money: How New Currencies Turn Scarcity Into Prosperity

by Bernard Lietaer and Jacqui Dunne  · 4 Feb 2013

The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It

by Yascha Mounk  · 15 Feb 2018  · 497pp  · 123,778 words

The Power of Gold: The History of an Obsession

by Peter L. Bernstein  · 1 Jan 2000  · 497pp  · 153,755 words

Priceless: The Myth of Fair Value (And How to Take Advantage of It)

by William Poundstone  · 1 Jan 2010  · 519pp  · 104,396 words

A Man for All Markets

by Edward O. Thorp  · 15 Nov 2016  · 505pp  · 142,118 words

End This Depression Now!

by Paul Krugman  · 30 Apr 2012  · 267pp  · 71,123 words

Aftershocks: Pandemic Politics and the End of the Old International Order

by Colin Kahl and Thomas Wright  · 23 Aug 2021  · 652pp  · 172,428 words

The Armchair Economist: Economics and Everyday Life

by Steven E. Landsburg  · 1 May 2012

The Four Pillars of Investing: Lessons for Building a Winning Portfolio

by William J. Bernstein  · 26 Apr 2002  · 407pp  · 114,478 words

Corporate Finance: Theory and Practice

by Pierre Vernimmen, Pascal Quiry, Maurizio Dallocchio, Yann le Fur and Antonio Salvi  · 16 Oct 2017  · 1,544pp  · 391,691 words

State of Emergency: The Way We Were

by Dominic Sandbrook  · 29 Sep 2010  · 932pp  · 307,785 words

The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000

by Paul Kennedy  · 15 Jan 1989  · 1,477pp  · 311,310 words

Losing Control: The Emerging Threats to Western Prosperity

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Principles of Corporate Finance

by Richard A. Brealey, Stewart C. Myers and Franklin Allen  · 15 Feb 2014

And Finally

by Henry Marsh  · 167pp  · 57,175 words

Social Capital and Civil Society

by Francis Fukuyama  · 1 Mar 2000

The Future of Money

by Bernard Lietaer  · 28 Apr 2013

Culture & Empire: Digital Revolution

by Pieter Hintjens  · 11 Mar 2013  · 349pp  · 114,038 words

The Spinoza Problem

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Horizons: The Global Origins of Modern Science

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Boomerang: Travels in the New Third World

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Money: The True Story of a Made-Up Thing

by Jacob Goldstein  · 14 Aug 2020  · 199pp  · 64,272 words

In Europe

by Geert Mak  · 15 Sep 2004

The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989

by Frederick Taylor  · 26 May 2008  · 564pp  · 182,946 words