Greensill Capital

The Pyramid of Lies: Lex Greensill and the Billion-Dollar Scandal
by Duncan Mavin
Published 20 Jul 2022

On that day, Greensill Capital was to ‘purchase’ new Prospective Receivables in the amount of $15 million from Bluestone by wiring to Bluestone a discounted amount of $14,543,186 (with the ‘discount’ corresponding to the interest to be paid from the date of the new purchase until the next roll date). Bluestone then wired to Greensill Capital the $14,543,186 just received from Greensill Capital plus the difference between such amount and the $15 million to be repaid ($456,814 in this instance) back to Greensill Capital. The net result of that exchange was Bluestone’s payment to Greensill Capital of only the $456,814 in interest.’

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Cameron’s spokespeople later denied he’d made any kind of personal introduction, and the White House never seriously followed up on Lex’s proposals. FIVE Greensill Capital Lex Greensill’s work in government was getting him noticed and earning him status. But it wasn’t making him rich. Greensill Capital had launched in 2011, partly funded by watermelons. Lex and his youngest brother, Peter, had struck a deal that saw Peter – who was building a farming business – get a stake in Greensill Capital and Lex get access to some watermelon revenues to kickstart his company. But he needed more. Lex gradually collected a coterie of wealthy patrons.

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NINETEEN The Big Time By late 2019, Lex had definitively hit the big time. Greensill Capital was a ‘Unicorn’ – a private start-up company valued at more than $1 billion. (The term was meant to indicate the rarity of these ventures, but unicorns were flourishing, in part thanks to a flood of money in the market, and the largesse of investors like SoftBank’s Vision Fund.) Lex himself was a billionaire too, at least on paper. And though a large chunk of his wealth was tied up in Greensill Capital stock, Lex and his brother Peter had also taken hundreds of millions of dollars of cash out of the company. The trappings of wealth followed. Greensill Capital had not one but four private aircraft – two Piaggios, a Dassault Falcon, and a Gulfstream G650.

Vulture Capitalism: Corporate Crimes, Backdoor Bailouts, and the Death of Freedom
by Grace Blakeley
Published 11 Mar 2024

Richard Fuller, “Richard comments on Serious Fraud Office investigation into Gupta Family Group Alliance,” Richardfuller.co.uk, May 14, 2021, accessed October 7, 2023, https://www.richardfuller.co.uk/news/richard-comments-serious-fraud-office-investigation-gupta-family-group-alliance. 89. National Audit Office, “Investigation into the British Business Bank’s Accreditation of Greensill Capital,” July 7, 2021, https://www.nao.org.uk/reports/investigation-into-the-british-business-banks-accreditation-of-greensill-capital/. 90. There are, of course, plenty of challenges when it comes to talking about “the state”—a concept that covers so many different kinds of political organization throughout time and space, not to mention a range of different institutions and processes within any one society.

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Greensill later told an interviewer that watching his parents struggle while waiting for outstanding payments was what kindled his interest in finance.67 Eventually he traveled to London and started working for Morgan Stanley, where he spent most of his time trying to “turbocharge” the boring business of “supply chain financing.”68 A few years later he founded Greensill Capital, which specialized in this apparently mundane activity. So what, exactly, is “supply chain financing”? In a world where the production of even a single commodity takes place within multiple firms across different countries, there are always lots of invoices to collect and pay. Traditionally, banks would provide financing for firms when they paid invoices, or while they waited for invoices to be paid.

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Traditionally, banks would provide financing for firms when they paid invoices, or while they waited for invoices to be paid. But in the postcrisis world of low interest rates and tight regulation, supply chain financing was no longer profitable for traditional banks. That’s where Greensill Capital came in. Greensill would step in to pay a company’s outstanding invoices before collecting payment, plus interest, from the company in the future. But Greensill wasn’t a bank, so where did all its money come from? As it turned out, the company was sitting on an unsustainable mountain of debt. Greensill issued debt, backed by the debts owed to it by its own clients, and this debt was purchased by large investment funds.

A Hacker's Mind: How the Powerful Bend Society's Rules, and How to Bend Them Back
by Bruce Schneier
Published 7 Feb 2023

VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY 100We don’t want some central planner: Eric Levitz (3 Dec 2020), “America has central planners. We just call them ‘venture capitalists,’ ” New York Magazine, https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/12/wework-venture-capital-central-planning.html. 102the case of Greensill Capital: Eshe Nelson, Jack Ewing, and Liz Alderman (28 March 2021), “The swift collapse of a company built on debt,” New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/28/business/greensill-capital-collapse.html. 25. HACKING AND WEALTH 104cum-ex trading: David Segal (23 Jan 2020), “It may be the biggest tax heist ever. And Europe wants justice,” New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/23/business/cum-ex.html. 104Germany recently sentenced: Karin Matussek (1 Jun 2021), “A banker’s long prison sentence puts industry on alert,” Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-01/prosecutors-seek-10-years-for-banker-in-398-million-cum-ex-case. 104Two London bankers: Olaf Storbeck (19 Mar 2020), “Two former London bankers convicted in first cum-ex scandal trial,” Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/550121de-69b3-11ea-800d-da70cff6e4d3. 104A former senior German tax inspector: Olaf Storbeck (4 Apr 2022), “Former German tax inspector charged with €279mn tax fraud,” Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/e123a255-bc52-48c4-9022-ac9c4be06daa. 104Frankfurt offices of Morgan Stanley bank: Agence France-Presse (3 May 2022), “German prosecutors raid Morgan Stanley in cum-ex probe,” Barron’s, https://www.barrons.com/news/german-prosecutors-raid-morgan-stanley-in-cum-ex-probe-01651575308. 105Donald Trump famously said: Daniella Diaz (27 Sep 2016), “Trump: ‘I’m smart’ for not paying taxes,” CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2016/09/26/politics/donald-trump-federal-income-taxes-smart-debate/index.html. 105if he only exploited legal loopholes: A 1935 US Supreme Court ruling confirmed this: “Anyone may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes.”

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When private equity firms take on a majority stake to acquire companies, they can use less of their equity and rely on debt. They can use this to saddle the firms they acquire with debt, extract money from them, leave them with more debt, then sell them for even more profit—with all the debtors left holding the (empty) bag. Consider the case of Greensill Capital, which collapsed spectacularly in 2021. Its unsustainable expansion over the course of ten years—from supply-chain finance startup, to multinational middleman with a $4.6 million debt load, to insolvency—was accelerated by investments and loans from SoftBank, who made millions in funds available in spite of the company’s increasingly fishy accounting.

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Cornman, 113 explainability problem, 212–15, 234 exploits, 21, 22 externalities, 63–64 Facebook, 184, 236, 243 facial recognition, 210, 217 fail-safes, 61, 67 Fairfield, Joshua, 248 fake news, 81 Fate of the Good Soldier Švejk during the World War, The (Hašek), 116 fear, 195–97 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 96 Federal Election Campaign Act (1972), 169 federal enclaves, 113–14 Fifteenth Amendment, 161, 164 filibuster, 154–55 financial exchange hacks, 79–82, 83–85 Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, 84 financial system hack normalization as subversive, 90–91 banking, 75, 76–77, 119, 260n financial exchange hacks, 84, 85 index funds, 262n innovation and, 72, 90 wealth/power and, 119 financial system hacks AI and, 241–43, 275n banking, 74–78, 119, 260n financial exchanges, 79–82, 83–85 identifying vulnerabilities and, 77–78 medieval usury, 91 See also financial system hack normalization Fischer, Deb, 190 Fitting, Jim, 1 flags of convenience, 130 foie gras bans, 113–14 foldering, 26 food delivery apps, 99, 124 Ford, Martin, 272n foreknowledge, 54 Fourteenth Amendment, 141 Fourth Amendment, 136 Fox News, 197 frequent-flier hacks, 38–40, 46 Friess, Foster, 169 front running, 80, 82 Fukuyama, Francis, 140 Gaedel, Ed, 41 gambling, 186 gambrel roof, 109 GameStop, 81 Garcia, Ileana, 170 Garland, Merrick, 121 General Motors, 104 genies, 232–33 geographic targeting orders, 87–88 gerrymandering, 165–66 “get out of jail free” card, 260n Getty, Paul, 95 Ghostwriter, 201 gig economy, 99, 100, 101, 116, 123–25, 264n Go, 212, 241 Gödel, Kurt, 25, 27 Goebbels, Joseph, 181 Goldin, Daniel, 115 Goodhart’s law, 115 Google, 185 GPT-3, 220 Great Depression, 74 Great Recession, 96, 173–74 Greensill Capital, 102 Grossman, Nick, 245 Grubhub, 99 Hacker Capture the Flag, 228 hackers competitions for, 228 motivations of, 47 types, 22 hacking as parasitical, 45–47, 84, 173 by the disempowered, 103, 119, 120, 121–22, 141 cheating as practicing for, 2–3 context of, 157–60, 237 defined, 1–2, 9–12, 255n destruction as result of, 172–75 existential risks of, 251–52 hierarchy of, 200–202 innovation and, 139–42, 158–59, 249–50, 252 life cycle of, 21–24 public knowledge of, 23, 256n ubiquity of, 25–28 hacking defenses, 48–52, 53–57 accountability and, 67–68 AI hacking and, 236–39 cognitive hacks and, 53–54, 182, 185, 198–99 detection/recovery, 54–56 economic considerations, 63 governance systems, 245–48 identifying vulnerabilities, 56–57, 77–78, 237–38 legislative process hacks and, 147–49, 151, 154, 156 reducing effectiveness, 53–54, 61 tax hacks and, 15–16 threat modeling, 62–63, 64 See also patching hacking normalization as subversive, 90–91 casino hacks, 35–36, 37 hacking as innovation and, 158–59 “too big to fail” hack, 97–98 wealth/power and, 73, 104, 119, 120, 122 See also financial system hack normalization Hadfield, Gillian, 248 Han, Young, 170 Handy, 124 Harkin, Tom, 146 Harris, Richard, 35 Hašek, Jaroslav, 116 Haselton, Ronald, 75 hedge funds, 82, 275n Herd, Pamela, 132 HFT (high-frequency trading), 83–85 hierarchy of hacking, 200–202 high-frequency trading (HFT), 83–85 hijacking, 62 Holmes, Elizabeth, 101 hotfixes, 52 Huntsman, Jon, Sr., 169 illusory truth effect, 189 Independent Payment Advisory Board (IPAB), 153–54 “independent spoiler” hack, 169–70 index funds, 262n indulgences, 71–72, 73, 85, 260n innovation, 101, 139–42, 158–59, 249–50, 252 insider trading, 79–80 intention ATM hacks and, 32 definition of hacking and, 2, 10, 16 definition of system and, 19 Internet, 64–65 See also social media Internet of Things (IoT) devices bugs in, 14 patching for, 23, 49 reducing hack effectiveness in, 54 Intuit, 190 Investment Company Act (1940), 82 Jack, Barnaby, 34 jackpotting, 33–34 Jaques, Abby Everett, 233 Joseph Weizenbaum, 217 jurisdictional rules, 112–13, 128–31 Kemp, Brian, 167 Keynes, John Maynard, 95 Khashoggi, Jamal, 220 King Midas, 232 labor organizing, 115–16, 121–22 Law, John, 174 laws accountability and, 68 definition of hacking and, 12 market and, 93 rules and, 18, 19 threat model shifts and, 65 See also legal hacks; tax code legal hacks, 109–11 bureaucracy and, 115–18 common law as, 135–38 Covid-19 payroll loans and, 110–11 loopholes and, 112–14 tax code and, 109–10 legislative process hacks, 145–49 defenses against, 147–49, 151, 154, 156 delay and delegation, 153–56 lobbying and, 146–47 must-pass bills, 150–52 vulnerabilities and, 147–48, 267n Lessig, Lawrence, 169 Levitt, Arthur, 80 literacy tests, 162 lobbying, 77, 78, 146–47, 158 lock-in, 94 loopholes deliberate, 146 legal hacks and, 112–14 systems and, 18 tax code and, 15, 16, 120 See also regulation avoidance loot boxes, 186 Luther, Martin, 72 luxury real estate hacks, 86–88 Lyft, 101, 123, 125 machine learning (ML) systems, 209 Malaysian sharecropping hacks, 116 Manafort, Paul, 26 Mandatory Worldwide Combined Reporting (MWCR), 129 mansard roof, 109 market hacks capitalism and, 92–93 market elements and, 93–94 private equity, 101–2 “too big to fail,” 95–98 venture capital as, 99–101 Mayhem, 228–29 McSorley, Marty, 44 medical diagnosis, 213 medieval usury hacks, 91 Meltdown, 48 MercExchange, 137 microtargeting, 184, 185, 216 Mihon, Jude (St.

The Nowhere Office: Reinventing Work and the Workplace of the Future
by Julia Hobsbawm
Published 11 Apr 2022

Leaders should be looked at only in tandem with their followers.’5 This sensible advice is never heeded often enough. Every corporate scandal features followers who enable bad leaders. This is as true of the Wirecard insolvency scandal of 2019 in which a $1-billion fraud was exposed by a whistleblower at the Munich-based payment firm; or the Greensill Capital lobbying scandal of 2020 which engulfed the reputation of former Prime Minister David Cameron.6 It seems as if corporations are often not good at practising what they preach and acting on ‘lessons learned’. Of course, plenty do, but the question is whether the greater exposure which the Nowhere Office has brought about simply by upending all the old systems and throwing some sunlight on them can make lasting change.

The Enablers: How the West Supports Kleptocrats and Corruption - Endangering Our Democracy
by Frank Vogl
Published 14 Jul 2021

In early 2021, for example, Credit Suisse announced that it was taking a loss of Swiss Francs 4.4 billion (about $4.7 billion)14 related to its investments with a finance company called Archegos Capital Management, which followed major other losses running into further billions of dollars related to the collapse of another finance company called Greensill Capital. The cumulative losses were so large that it said it would cut its dividend by two-thirds, suspend a planned stock buyback program, and cut senior executive bonuses; moreover, both the chief risk and compliance officer and the head of investment banking, as well as five other senior staff, would leave this major Swiss bank.

MegaThreats: Ten Dangerous Trends That Imperil Our Future, and How to Survive Them
by Nouriel Roubini
Published 17 Oct 2022

The Archegos collapse ranks as “one of the most spectacular on Wall Street,” the Financial Times reported.3 Five global banks swallowed losses exceeding $10 billion, their penalty for too much faith in a bubble. Archegos is far from the only player that became too enamored of risk as borrowing costs became dirt-cheap. Its debacle came within weeks of news that regulators seized Greensill Capital, an investment firm that proposed financing arrangements for risky start-up companies, including makers of a nuclear submarine, and facilities used in the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca, the Wall Street Journal informed readers. “While some of Mr. Greensill’s more speculative ideas never got off the ground, they illustrate the scale of his ambition and his high tolerance for riskier investments,” according to the Journal.4 A report from Bloomberg captured the heady climate as the first round of COVID-19 began to recede.

The Cult of We: WeWork, Adam Neumann, and the Great Startup Delusion
by Eliot Brown and Maureen Farrell
Published 19 Jul 2021

The company was nearly out of cash and was expecting billions from the IPO. Son then introduced a surprise guest, a forty-two-year-old banker with a boyish face and a toothy grin. He was Lex Greensill, an Australian whom Son introduced as someone who would be able to fix WeWork’s need for billions. He breezed over a plan whereby the banker’s company—Greensill Capital—would provide WeWork with a loan. The offer was immediately greeted with skepticism by the WeWork team. Were they really going to rely on someone they’d never heard of to give them billions of dollars? There were also eyebrow-raising tangles of potential conflicts: SoftBank had just invested in Greensill’s business.

Seven Crashes: The Economic Crises That Shaped Globalization
by Harold James
Published 15 Jan 2023

She later acknowledged the mistake, but claimed that lobbying abroad for German companies was part of her job, and that there was “no 100 percent protection against criminal behavior.”87 There was a UK equivalent to Wirecard in the combination of a promise of transformational finance with the centrality of access to government and the levers of power. A few months after a $7 billion IPO was being discussed, Greensill Capital was no longer in business. The company became insolvent in March 2021, after $4.6 billion insurance cover lapsed and the firm’s funding sources, above all from Credit Suisse and Soft-Bank, dried up. The UK fintech company had been created in 2011 by Lex Greensill, an Australian farmer turned banker.