Hush-A-Phone

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description: privacy enhancing telephone device

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The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires

by Tim Wu  · 2 Nov 2010  · 418pp  · 128,965 words

is—really at stake. CHAPTER 7 The Foreign Attachment Henry Tuttle was, for much of his life, president of the Hush-A-Phone Corporation, manufacturer of a telephone silencer. Apart from Tuttle, Hush-A-Phone Inc. employed his secretary. The two of them worked alone out of a small office near Union Square in New York

City. Hush-A-Phone’s signature product was shaped like a scoop, and it fit around the speaking end of a receiver, so that no one could hear what

sections. This one from the October 14, 1940, edition of The New York Times is typical: PHONE TALK ANNOYS? HUSH-A-PHONE PREVENTS. DEMONSTRATION EITHER TYPE PHONE. HUSH-A-PHONE CORP., CHELSEA, 3–7202. If the Hush-A-Phone never became a household necessity, Tuttle did a decent business, and by 1950 he would claim to have sold 125

,000 units. But one day late in the 1940s, Henry Tuttle received alarming news. AT&T had launched a crackdown on the Hush-A-Phone and similar products, like the Jordaphone, a creaky precursor of the modern speakerphone, whose manufacturer had likewise been put on notice. Bell repairmen began warning

customers that Hush-A-Phone use was a violation of a federal tariff and that, failing to cease and desist, they risked termination of their telephone service.2 Leo Beranek

and the Hush-A-Phone Was AT&T merely blowing smoke? Not at all: the company was referring to a special rule that was part of their covenant with the

whether AT&T, the nation’s regulated monopolist, could punish its customers for placing a plastic cup over their telephone mouthpiece. The story of the Hush-A-Phone and its struggle with AT&T, for all its absurdist undertones, offers a window on the mind-set of the monopoly at its height, as

moment. As such, the case is an object lesson in the advantages and disadvantages of monopoly. For while it may seem a minor matter, the Hush-A-Phone affair raised fundamental questions about innovation in the age of information monopoly. AT&T’s crackdown wasn’t the only challenge Tuttle faced in the

1940s. Over the years, as the telephone had assumed its “modern” design, the Hush-A-Phone, first conceived in the 1920s, was obliged to adapt. Tuttle sought solutions to his hurdles in academia, specifically at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and

Center in New York, and for the Tokyo Opera City Concert Hall, as well as writing the classic textbook Acoustics. Rather more relevant to the Hush-A-Phone challenge, during World War II Beranek had worked with a team of scientists at Harvard on the problem of communications in the din of airborne

independent, outside inventors was a minor improvement to the telephone handset, and an ungainly one at that. So why was AT&T determined to run Hush-A-Phone out of business? Caught in this seemingly trivial battle over a bauxite cup is a debate over the merits of two alternative models of innovation

: centralized and decentralized. Representing the decentralized model was Hush-A-Phone, with Beranek operating, in effect, as Tuttle’s system of innovation—a lone inventor of sorts, qualified in acoustics but unaffiliated with Bell. Representing the

the instinct for self-preservation? Certainly not a plastic cup. THE TRIAL OF INNOVATION Thus did AT&T in deadly earnest go about hushing the Hush-A-Phone. At the two-week trial (technically a hearing), the company showed up with dozens of attorneys, including a top litigator from New York City, and

the twenty-one regional Bells came as well, necessitating that extra seats be installed in the hearing room—bleachers for AT&T’s lawyers. On Hush-A-Phone’s side were Harry Tuttle, his lawyer, the acoustics professor Leo Beranek, and one expert witness, a man named J.C.R. Licklider.7 Bell

’s lawyers mounted a powerful assault against the cup and the cup-bearing company itself. The argument was that the Hush-A-Phone posed substantial harm to telephone service, and at the same time, that the company by that same name, in selling a useless device, was essentially

perpetrating a fraud on the public. Bell led with a Bell Labs engineer, W. H. Martin, who set out to show that the Hush-A-Phone impaired telephone service. According to his tests, it created a “transmission loss” of 13 decibels and “receiving loss” of 20 decibels. The loss, he said

. It was among the firm’s duties to protect the consumer from such useless gimmicks, he maintained. And if there was any use to a Hush-A-Phone, he suggested, unembarrassed by his own casuistry, AT&T would have invented and marketed it. Nor was uselessness the gravest threat. Foreign attachments created outside

a reporter summarized his perfect corporate smugness, “it would clearly be brought to his attention.” The proof was that hardly anyone was actually using the Hush-A-Phone, and so the consequences of banning it were furthermore negligible. That there might be some good in the operation of the free market per se

’s counsel left no stone unturned, subsequent witnesses reaffirming the same points made by earlier ones, until finally, one made the startling charge that the Hush-A-Phone was unhygienic. As related in Telecommunications Reports, “Mr. Burden [stated] that he had sufficient experience as a plant man cleaning the cone-shaped transmitters formerly

used by operators to realize that a receptacle such as the Hush-A-Phone would collect food particles, odors, and whatnot over a period of time.” With that, AT&T rested its case. The theory of

Hush-A-Phone’s case was, in bald contradiction to AT&T’s claims, that the phone silencer was indeed an effective and useful device, and one that

mental health of employees,” in his view. Privacy was another, a necessity for many professionals and businessmen, which claim he supported with a list of Hush-A-Phones in use in Washington, D.C., including a number in congressional committee rooms. In addition, Tuttle distributed a collection of testimonials called “Phone Conversations Overheard

’d been disinherited when his uncle overheard his nephew making unflattering remarks about him on the telephone. If only he’d had a Hush-A-Phone … But the strongest part of Hush-A-Phone’s case was the technical aspect. In addition to Beranek, who already enjoyed some eminence, Tuttle brought in, on his designer’s

the “Bellheads.” Never mind that it was 1950 and they were arguing over a plastic cup sold in classified ads. To close their case, the Hush-A-Phone team offered dramatic demonstration to rival O.J.’s bloody glove. Tuttle called his secretary and asked her to speak into a telephone receiver, first

with, then without the Hush-A-Phone attached. In accordance with Licklider’s findings, the device did indeed alter the acoustics of the telephone transmission, making it sound more “boomy.” Yet, as

was evident to all, the speech remained intelligible. The Hush-A-Phone, in other words, indubitably worked. ONE MIND OR MANY? Bell was right about one thing at least: the Hush-A-Phone wasn’t terribly popular, and it showed few signs of catching on. To understand AT&T

idea of the relative fitness of individuals in determining the evolution of species, and like natural selection it depends on the power of accidents.10 Hush-A-Phone was a forerunner in this latter-day approach to innovation. Looking at the telephone and AT&T’s network, Tuttle saw what we today would

forms of data. But AT&T believed that if phone subscribers wanted privacy, they could cup their hands over the receiver. The irony of the Hush-A-Phone affair is that no company should have understood the importance of outside invention better than Bell, whose eponymous founder was the very archetype of the

one exactly like its founder, and the only strategy was to temporize. Eventually, a meal gets away even from Kronos. HUSH-A-PHONE DECIDED Bernard Strassburg, chief counsel to the FCC during the Hush-A-Phone trial, considered the result of the proceedings to be preordained. “In my view, Tuttle’s prospects of winning his case

carrier’s control of all facilities that made up the network supplying that service.”11 After the hearing in 1950, the FCC sat on the Hush-A-Phone case for five years. Federal agencies have some discretion about when they will decide things, and the FCC elected to stall, allowing AT&T to

attachments. It was not until late in 1955 that the FCC issued a brief decision. AT&T, the federal agency decided, had been right: the Hush-A-Phone was indeed a danger to the telephone system and a nuisance to consumers—“deleterious to the telephone system and injures the service rendered by it

D.C. court of appeals released its decision. The panel of federal judges, headed by David Bazelon, reversed the commission and vindicated Tuttle and the Hush-A-Phone. In a scene reminiscent of the conclusion of Lord of the Flies, the D.C. court administered the judicial version of a reality check on

Bazelon affirmed that the subscriber has the “right reasonably to use his telephone in ways which are privately beneficial without being publicly detrimental.”14 With Hush-A-Phone’s modest victory, the door was cracked not only to every manner of ancillary device in the 1970s, but, as we shall see, to the

against a genuine rival in the form of MCI. But in 1956 that eventuality was as yet in the distant future. Having won its case, Hush-A-Phone ran a series of advertisements proclaiming its device newly approved for use by federal tariff. Unfortunately, it could not keep up with Bell’s own

stately pace of product design, and when the phone company began to sell new handsets again, sometime in the 1960s, Hush-A-Phone folded. Such are the wages of stifling innovation: to this day, while the annoyance of mobile phone chatter, the banality of overheard conversations, has become

a cliché, there is not a Hush-A-Phone or its equivalent to be found. Hush-A-Phone’s valiant founder died sometime in the 1970s, to be forgotten, apart from one great cultural reference. In the 1985 film Brazil

is little room for the independent inventor to score, it removes the potent incentive for becoming a Jenkins, a Bell, or an Edison. As the Hush-A-Phone affair makes plain, the conditions facing entrepreneurs determine how much innovation happens. There are yet more subtle social costs to a rigged game. Sarnoff’s

who would chuckle,” said his colleague, Leo Beranek, “even though he had said something quite ordinary.” We met both men, readers will recall, during the Hush-A-Phone affair. Born in St. Louis in 1915, Licklider undertook a protracted curriculum at Washington University, emerging with undergraduate degrees in psychology, mathematics, and physics. He

second pool of competition was in devices that attached to the phone lines (“foreign attachments” or “consumer premises equipment”). In functionality, these devices made the Hush-A-Phone that Bell had fended off in the 1950s seem a mere doodad. In a seminal case in 1968, the FCC ordered Bell to allow the

the FCC was trying to do—with provisions, for instance, that simply outlawed MCI as a threat to universal service, and reversed Carterfone and even Hush-A-Phone. When that failed, AT&T returned to its most tried-and-true modus operandi: a campaign of industrial warfare designed to exterminate its competitors.8

New America Foundation provided indispensable help with this book. Their ranks initially included Hailey DeKraker, the lead research assistant, Alex Middleton, who dug out the Hush-A-Phone hearings, and Luis Villa. Later help came from Anna-Marie Anderson, Kendra Marvel, and Judd Schlossberg, who provided research rescue at a critical hour. Faith

, 1956), 19–20. CHAPTER 7: THE FOREIGN ATTACHMENT 1. Leo Beranek supplied a copy of Hush-A-Phone’s letterhead. The product was the subject of an article in Popular Mechanics, February 1941, 230. 2. Much of the Hush-A-Phone story is based on interviews with Leo Beranek and on his autobiography, Riding the Waves

Industry (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 91. The hearing and appeal may be found respectively at “In the Matter of Hush-A-Phone Corp. et al., Decision,” 20 FCC 391 (1955), and Hush-A-Phone v. U.S., 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956). 3. The early voice mail machine is described in Mark

published record have rendered a highly incomplete picture of Bell Laboratories’ activities.” Clark, “Suppressing Innovation,” 517, 536. 6. Ibid., 534. 7. The descriptions of the Hush-A-Phone hearing with the FCC, and all direct quotes from the hearing, are from Telecommunication Reports, January 30, 1950. Additional material comes from Beranek, Riding the

tell him.” 9. This AT&T quality control argument is drawn from the initial 1950 hearing with the FCC, reported in “In the Matter of Hush-A-Phone Corp. et al., Decision,” 20 FCC 415 (1955). 10. Nelson and Winter’s absorbing “evolutionary” theory—the book’s jacket flap calls it “the most

Slope: The Long Road to the Breakup of AT&T (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 38. 12. “In the Matter of Hush-A-Phone Corp. et al., Decision,” 20 FCC 419. 13. Hush-A-Phone, 238 F.2d 269. 14. Ibid. CHAPTER 8: THE LEGION OF DECENCY 1. Daniel A. Lord, “George Bernard Shaw,” Catholic World

The Open Revolution: New Rules for a New World

by Rufus Pollock  · 29 May 2018  · 105pp  · 34,444 words

story of Henry Tuttle and America’s gigantic corporation AT&T. Mr. Henry Tuttle was the proud inventor of a telephone silencer, unpromisingly called the Hush-a-Phone. It was a large plastic cup that you attached to the speaking end of a telephone handset so that no one around you could hear

and top-level executives. Tuttle had only himself, his lawyer, and two acoustic professors from Harvard. For AT&T this case was not about the Hush-a-Phone but about the principle of connecting to the phone system. And behind that, something much bigger was at stake: who had control. For if Mr

its operation, however peripheral, and even if it didn’t offer any equivalent. After a five-year delay, the FCC issued a ruling that the Hush-a-Phone was indeed “deleterious to the telephone system and injures the service rendered by it”, so AT&T had the right to forbid it, and devices

like it. And there the case might have rested, so dooming the internet even before it was conceived. Really? The internet and the Hush-a-Phone are utterly different. Yes, but they share two key common features. First, both can be construed as attachments to the phone network. No one was

going to buy a Hush-a-Phone silencer without a phone that could make calls. And the internet has to send its data either down wires – metal or optical cables – or as

it, could operate in the US only with access to AT&T’s network. So AT&T went to extraordinary lengths to suppress the innocuous Hush-a-Phone. Such devices, they claimed in evidence, posed a threat to the safety and functionality of their network, and vivid pictures were painted of repairmen being

lines. Of course the FCC couldn’t know that its anti-competitive ruling of 1955 might have the effect of muffling not only the humble Hush-a-Phone but also the greatest technical breakthrough of the following half-century. That is one of the great ironies and challenges of innovation policy: we don

pouring through that breach and its once all-powerful empire was to be fundamentally and fatally undermined. * * * The two expert witnesses in the FCC’s Hush-a-Phone hearing in 1950 were the Harvard acoustics professors J. C. R. Licklider and Leo Beranek. Both were to play central roles in the establishment of

Open Standards and the Digital Age: History, Ideology, and Networks (Cambridge Studies in the Emergence of Global Enterprise)

by Andrew L. Russell  · 27 Apr 2014  · 675pp  · 141,667 words

end of World War II. An initial attack on AT&T’s right to control attachments to the telephone network came in 1948, when the Hush-A-Phone Corporation filed a complaint against AT&T to establish the legal right to attach their cuplike device to telephone handsets. Two acoustic scientists – the Boston

entrepreneur Leo Beranek and the Harvard researcher J. C. R. Licklider – testified that the Hush-A-Phone would not endanger the technical capabilities of the Bell System.13 Despite the testimony of Beranek, Licklider, and other communications experts, the FCC remained steadfast

, particularly at MIT.19 Subsequent challenges to AT&T’s control over the interfaces of the telephone network followed the same pattern established by the Hush-A-Phone case in the mid-1950s and the Computer Inquiry begun in 1966: an entrepreneur would first introduce a new service or device, then encounter resistance

, that built equipment for the Arpanet; and Licklider as a critic of AT&T and an inspiration for a generation of packet-switching researchers. 14 Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (1956); Henck and Strassburg, A Slippery Slope, 32–67. 15 Bernard Strassburg, interview by James Pelkey, Washington

–14, 203 HTML language 19 Hubbard, Gardiner 32–33, 34–35, 99–100 Hughes, Thomas 3 Huitema, Christian 251 Huizer, Erik 244 Hunt, Robert 54 Hush-A-Phone Corporation 138, 140–141, 168 Hutcheon, Neil 12, 15–16 Hybrid nature of standards organizations 265 IBM. See International Business Machines (IBM) Ideological origins AESC

Exploding the Phone: The Untold Story of the Teenagers and Outlaws Who Hacked Ma Bell

by Phil Lapsley  · 5 Feb 2013  · 744pp  · 142,748 words

component.” This logic extended not just to telephone lines but to telephones themselves. Consider the case of the Hush-A-Phone. This was a product first manufactured in the 1920s by, you guessed it, the Hush-A-Phone Corporation. It was not a sophisticated electrical circuit that connected up to Ma Bell’s fragile network. No

telephone with “any device not furnished by the phone company.” AT&T threatened to disconnect the telephone service of both vendors and users of the Hush-A-Phone for violating these rules. Hush-A-Phone Corporation complained to the Federal Communications Commission in 1948. In 1951 the FCC decided in favor of the telephone company

. Hush-A-Phone objected; briefs were filed. The FCC took the matter “under advisement” for four more years. In late 1955 the communications commission officially sided with AT&

rendered by it” because its use sometimes “results in a loss of voice intelligibility, and also has an adverse affect on voice recognition and naturalness.” Hush-A-Phone filed suit in federal court—and won. The D.C. court of appeals decided in 1956 that the tariff-imposed ban was “unwarranted interference with

Deal of the Century: The Break Up of AT&T (New York: Atheneum, 1986), p. 105. 158–159 Hush-A-Phone: “Phone Company Upheld in Ban on Hush-A-Phone,” New York Times, February 17, 1951, p. 29 <db1018>; “Hush-A-Phone Hits Back at AT&T,” New York Times, March 24, 1951, p. 25 <db1019>; “Phone Device Ban

24, 1955 <db1020>, p. 20; “Court Removes Ban Against Phone Device,” New York Times, November 9, 1956, p. 25 <db1021>; and 238 F.2d 266, HUSH-A-PHONE CORPORATION and Harry C. Tuttle, Petitioners, v. UNITED STATES of America and Federal Communications Commission, Respondents, American Telephone and Telegraph Company et al., and United

–27, 236, 298–301 Culture, straightjacketed 190–192 Discrimination 189–190 Electronic toll fraud 91 FCC investigations 189–190 Formation and structure 22, 27–28 Hush-a-Phone 158–159 Rate increases 187–188 Scandal 303–306 Service failures 188–189 See also: Bell, Alexander Graham; Bell Laboratories; Bell Telephone; Caming, H. W

, Steve, blue box note 223–224 YIPL/TAP newsletter 240–241, 276–277, 321 Federal Communications Commission Antitrust laws 302 Carterfone/foreign attachments 298–299 Hush-a-Phone hearing 159 Laws against telephone fraud 90 MCI 299–300, 302 Investigation into AT&T service failures 189 Investigation into AT&T discrimination 190 Rate

121–124 Hopper, Ken 93–95, 182–183, 257, 277–279, 315–316, 322, 331 Hotel Diplomat: See Conventions, phone phreak Hubbard, Gardiner 17–18 Hush-a-Phone 158–159 In-band signaling 48–49, 62, 74, 85 Independent telephone companies 22, 26–28, 57, 72, 124, 138, 161 See also: competition, General

See also: Hanna, Kenneth Modem 43, 296–297, 313, 320, 322, 332 Monopoly 18, 27–28, 158, 187, 236, 301 See also: antitrust, Carterfone, competition, Hush-a-Phone, MCI Moog synthesizer 222 Morris, IL (ESS prototype) 234–236 Morse code 16, 37, 141–142, 208 Morse, Samuel 15 Moscow 130, 181, 225 Mountain

box 238–240, 256, 273, 291, 315 Regulating the Phone Company in Your Own Home: See Ramparts Regulation: See antitrust, Carterfone, competition, Federal Communications Commission, Hush-a-Phone, monopoly, MCI Rehearing 113–115 Reid, Ernie 77, 79–80 Rental of telephones 19–20, 188, 299 Rice University 86 Riddell, Bob 325 Ring forward

The Future of the Internet: And How to Stop It

by Jonathan Zittrain  · 27 May 2009  · 629pp  · 142,393 words

no AT&T phone police to see what customers were doing, but AT&T could and did go after the sellers of accessories like the Hush-A-Phone, which was invented in 1921 as a way to have a conversation without others nearby overhearing it.3 It was a huge plastic funnel enveloping

to their handsets, and manufacturers to produce and distribute those additions. AT&T could have invented the Hush-A-Phone funnel itself. It did not; it took outsiders to begin changing the system, even in small ways. Hush-A-Phone was followed by more sweeping outside innovations. During the 1940s, inventor Tom Carter sold and installed

units. AT&T told its customers that they were not allowed to use Carterfones, because these devices hooked up to the network itself, unlike the Hush-A-Phone, which connected only to the telephone handset. Carter petitioned against the rule and won.5 Mindful of the ideals behind the

Hush-A-Phone decision, the FCC agreed that so long as the network was not harmed, AT&T could not block new devices, even ones that directly hooked

, where AT&T attempted to extend its control through the network and into the endpoint devices hooked up to the network, at first barring the Hush-A-Phone and the Carterfone. The telephone system was stable and predictable; its uses evolved slowly if at all from its inception in the late nineteenth century

and economic interaction: the Web and Web sites, online shopping, peer-to-peer networking, wikis, and blogs. The hostility of AT&T toward companies like Hush-A-Phone and of the proprietary networks to the innovations of enterprising subscribers is not unusual, and it is not driven solely by their status as monopolists

to it. The entire video rental industry was not anticipated by publishers, yet it became a substantial source of revenue for them.93 Had the Hush-A-Phones, Carterfones, and modems of Chapter Two required preapproval, or been erasable at the touch of a button the way that an EchoStar DVR of today

, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847, 1878—79 (2006); Kevin Werbach, The Federal Computer Commission, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1, 18—22 (2005). 3. See Hush-A-Phone v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956). 4. Id. at 269. 5. See Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll

Tel. Serv, 13 F.C.C. 2d 420 (1968). The FCC held that there was “no material distinction between a foreign attachment such as the Hush-A-Phone and an interconnection device such as the Carterfone… so long as the interconnection does not adversely affect the telephone company’s operations or the telephone

–81 honor codes, 128–29 Horsley, Neal, 215 Hotmail, 169 “How’s My Driving” programs, 219, 229 HTML (hypertext markup language), 95 Hunt, Robert, 190 Hush-A-Phone, 21–22, 81, 82, 121 hyperlinks, 56, 89 hypertext, coining of term, 226 IBM (International Business Machines): antitrust suit against, 12; business model of, 12

The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World

by Lawrence Lessig  · 14 Jul 2001  · 494pp  · 142,285 words

to the telephone system that AT&T didn't build or expressly authorize. In 1956, for example, a company built a device called a “Hush-a-Phone.” The Hush-a-Phone was a simple piece of plastic that attached to the mouthpiece of a telephone. Its design was to block noise in a room so that

plastic receiver. All it did was block noise, the way a user might block noise by cupping his hand over the phone.18 When the Hush-a-Phone was released on the market, AT&T objected. This was a “foreign attachment.” Regulations forbade any foreign attachments without AT&T's permission. AT&T

had not given Hush-a-Phone any such permission. The FCC agreed with AT&T. Hush-a-Phone was history. Hush-a-Phone is an extreme case.19 The real purpose of the foreign attachments rule was, at least as AT&T saw

Canada; New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1994), 268-69; Huber, Kellogg, and Thorne, 416. 19 And the decision was reversed by the D.C. circuit. Hush-a-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F. 2d 266 (D.C. Cir., 1956). 20 The idea is developed in Kleinrock's dissertation: Leonard Kleinrock, Message Delay

The Idea Factory: Bell Labs and the Great Age of American Innovation

by Jon Gertner  · 15 Mar 2012  · 550pp  · 154,725 words

. Some of the competition to the Bell System dates back to the 1950s and 1960s, to cases involving two independent companies and their devices, Hush-a-Phone and Carterfone. Hush-a-Phone was an attachment to a handset’s mouthpiece that allowed customers to talk or whisper into the phone with more confidentiality; Carterfone was a

Where Wizards Stay Up Late: The Origins of the Internet

by Katie Hafner and Matthew Lyon  · 1 Jan 1996  · 352pp  · 96,532 words

telephone system. Everything added to the system had to work with existing equipment. In the early 1950s a company began manufacturing a device called a Hush-A-Phone, a plastic mouthpiece cover designed to permit a caller to speak into a telephone without being overheard. AT&T succeeded in having the Federal Communications

Commission ban the device after presenting expert witnesses who described how the Hush-A-Phone damaged the telephone system by reducing telephone quality. In another example of AT&T’s zeal, the company sued an undertaker in the Midwest who

holographic images Honeywell BBN relations with computers built by, see DDP-516 computer; Honeywell-316 computer Honeywell-316 computer hospitals, computer technology for Hughes Aircraft Hush-A-Phone IBM (International Business Machines Corporation) computers built by IBM cards IBM IBM IBM 7094 computer ideal auditory detection ILLIAC IV computer Illinois, University of Center

The Innovators: How a Group of Inventors, Hackers, Geniuses and Geeks Created the Digital Revolution

by Walter Isaacson  · 6 Oct 2014  · 720pp  · 197,129 words

were clunky and costly and designed mainly for industrial or military use, rather than being conducive to homebrew hobbyists creating virtual communities. Then came the Hush-A-Phone case. It involved a simple plastic mouthpiece that could be snapped onto a phone to amplify your voice while making it harder for those nearby

, ref1 Human-Computer Interaction Group, ref1 human-machine interaction, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8, ref9, ref10, ref11, ref12, ref13, ref14, ref15, ref16 Hush-A-Phone case, ref1 hydrogen bomb, ref1, ref2 HyperCard, ref1 hypertext, ref1, ref2 limitation of, ref1 Hypertext Markup Language (HTML), ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 Hypertext Transfer Protocol

The End of Ownership: Personal Property in the Digital Economy

by Aaron Perzanowski and Jason Schultz  · 4 Nov 2016  · 374pp  · 97,288 words

., January 9, 2007, http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/01/09Apple-Reinvents-the-Phone-with-iPhone.html, accessed September 7, 2015. 11. Ibid. 12. Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956). 13. See, e.g., Andrew “bunnie” Huang, Hacking the Xbox: An Introduction to

Hesse, Thomas, 136 Higgins, Parker, 230 Hoofnagle, Chris Jay, 214 Houweling, Molly Shaffer Van, 198 Huang, Andrew “bunnie Hulu, 48–49 Humphrey, Watts S., 209 Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 227 IBM, 40, 62–63 Image Comics, 85–86, 212 In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 214 Information costs, 7–10, 17

The Code: Silicon Valley and the Remaking of America

by Margaret O'Mara  · 8 Jul 2019

Chokepoint Capitalism

by Rebecca Giblin and Cory Doctorow  · 26 Sep 2022  · 396pp  · 113,613 words