EuroTragedy: A Drama in Nine Acts
by Ashoka Mody · 7 May 2018
a recent development. All these years, national supervisors had been responsible for monitoring and disciplining the banks operating in the country. But the Irish and Spanish credit and property bubbles had led many observers to conclude that national supervisors were likely to become too cozy with their own banks and would, therefore, allow
European Spring: Why Our Economies and Politics Are in a Mess - and How to Put Them Right
by Philippe Legrain · 22 Apr 2014 · 497pp · 150,205 words
for its actions – but rather for amplifying instability. It entrenched governments’ backstopping of bank debts, sparking fears about countries that had experienced an Irish-style bank-financed property bubble, notably Spain. And it threatened to drag even countries with a reasonably sound banking system, such as Italy, into the doom loop if the
The Default Line: The Inside Story of People, Banks and Entire Nations on the Edge
by Faisal Islam · 28 Aug 2013 · 475pp · 155,554 words
the start of Ireland’s descent into the bailout club. Anglo Irish was a basket-case bank, an all-encompassing bet on a never-ending Irish property bubble. Once awarded the title of ‘world’s best bank’, it was fairly close to being the worst, in a competitive field. The skeleton of Anglo
Other People's Money: Masters of the Universe or Servants of the People?
by John Kay · 2 Sep 2015 · 478pp · 126,416 words
bail-out was essentially a redistribution within Ireland to the spivs, speculators and ordinary opportunistic Irish folk who had taken advantage of the country’s property bubble, from Irish taxpayers (thus relieving foreign lenders to Irish banks of their potential losses). If Scotland had been an independent country, a similar promise to its
The Euro and the Battle of Ideas
by Markus K. Brunnermeier, Harold James and Jean-Pierre Landau · 3 Aug 2016 · 586pp · 160,321 words
domestic housing sector and extremely reliant on wholesale funding on the euro-area interbank market. As this market dried up, credit extension collapsed, and the Irish property bubble popped. Existing loans thus turned sour, and liabilities started to exceed assets: Irish banks had become insolvent. Given this insolvency, it is not surprising that
The City
by Tony Norfield · 352pp · 98,561 words
there. By 2007, Ireland’s financial and insurance services accounted for nearly 11 per cent of GDP.42 This was not directly linked to the Irish property bubble and bust that left the economy under a mountain of debt, but both were results of the same magical thinking that often accompanies the expansion