Kenneth Rogoff

House of Debt: How They (And You) Caused the Great Recession, and How We Can Prevent It From Happening Again
by Atif Mian and Amir Sufi
Published 11 May 2014

International Monetary Fund, “Chapter 3: Dealing with Household Debt,” in World Economic Outlook: Growth Resuming, Dangers Remain, April 2012. 16. Mervyn King, “Debt Deflation: Theory and Evidence,” European Economic Review 38 (1994): 419–45. 17. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, “Is the 2007 US Sub-Prime Financial Crisis So Different?: An International Historical Comparison,” American Economic Review 98 (2008): 339–44. 18. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, This Time Is Different (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). 19. Oscar Jorda, Moritz Schularick, and Alan M. Taylor, “When Credit Bites Back: Leverage, Business Cycles, and Crisis” (working paper no. 17621, NBER, 2011). 20.

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He has been a strong advocate for financial contracts that more equally share risk in the context of household and sovereign debt. See, for example, Stefano Athanasoulis, Robert Shiller, and Eric van Wincoop, “Macro Markets and Financial Security,” FRBNY Economic Policy Review, April 2009. Kenneth Rogoff has also advocated more equity-like instruments in the context of sovereign debt. See Kenneth Rogoff, “Global Imbalances without Tears,” Project Syndicate, March 1, 2011, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/global-imbalances-without-tears. Lord Adair Turner has summarized excellently the problems with debt and advantages of equity finance.

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Despite focusing on a completely different recession, King found exactly the same relation: Countries with the largest increase in household-debt burdens—Sweden and the United Kingdom, in particular—experienced the largest decline in growth during the recession. Another set of economic downturns we can examine are what economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff call the “big five” postwar banking crises in the developed world: Spain in 1977, Norway in 1987, Finland and Sweden in 1991, and Japan in 1992.17 These recessions were triggered by asset-price collapses that led to massive losses in the banking sector, and all were especially deep downturns with slow recoveries.

The Shifts and the Shocks: What We've Learned--And Have Still to Learn--From the Financial Crisis
by Martin Wolf
Published 24 Nov 2015

‘A Step in the Dark: Unconventional Monetary Policy after the Crisis’, Andrew Crockett Memorial Lecture, Bank for International Settlement, 23 June 2013. http://www.bis.org/events/agm2013/sp130623.pdf. Reinhart, Carmen M. and Kenneth S. Rogoff. This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009). Reinhart, Carmen M. and Kenneth S. Rogoff. ‘Growth in a Time of Debt’, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 15639, January 2010. www.nber.org. Report of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. Changing Banking for Good: Volume 1.

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In all, the legacy of the crises includes deep practical challenges to policymaking almost everywhere. As a result of these unexpected economic developments, crisis-hit countries have been forced to struggle with worse fiscal positions than they had previously imagined. As the work of Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, both now at Harvard University, has shown, fiscal crises are a natural concomitant of financial crises, largely because of the impact on government revenue and spending of declining profits and economic activity, together with rising unemployment. These come on top of the direct fiscal costs of bank bailouts.7 As was to be predicted, in the current crisis the biggest adverse fiscal effects were felt in countries that suffered a direct hit from the financial crises, such as the US, the UK, Ireland and Spain, rather than in countries that suffered an indirect hit, via trade.

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In fact, it was a pity that a form of ‘sticker shock’ over the scale of the unexpected deficits frightened policymakers into not giving the discretionary fiscal support then needed and, subsequently, as we shall see further below, into premature retrenchment. Nobody should be surprised by the huge fiscal deterioration that followed the crisis. In their seminal book, This Time is Different, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff argue that: ‘Declining revenues and higher expenditures, owing to a combination of bailout costs and higher transfer payments and debt service costs, led to a rapid and marked worsening in the fiscal balance.’48 In fact, they note from an analysis of crises in thirteen countries, the cumulative increase in real public debt was 86 per cent – close to a doubling.49 What happened after 2007 is in line with that prior experience.

Paper Promises
by Philip Coggan
Published 1 Dec 2011

Britain has not formally defaulted since 1672, although this record does not apply to its European neighbours. In the nineteenth century, for example, the Austro-Hungarian Empire defaulted or rescheduled its debt five times. In their magisterial study of the subject, This Time Is Different,15 Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff describe a cycle of sovereign defaults, with peaks in the Napoleonic Wars, the 1820s through to the 1840s, the 1870s to the 1890s and the Great Depression of the 1930s. Clearly, wars often played their part in this cycle, with defeated nations highly likely to renege on their debts. But economic and banking crises, often associated with the rise and fall of commodity prices, also played a big part.

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As Jeremy Grantham of the fund management company GMO has written, ‘Individuals, as well as institutions, were fooled into believing that the market signals were real, that they truly were rich. They acted accordingly, spending too much or saving too little, all the while receiving less than usual from their overpriced holdings.’1 It is not just investors who are fooled. Policymakers can be too. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff put it, ‘Debt-fuelled booms all too often provide false affirmation of a government’s policies, a financial institution’s ability to make outsized profits or a country’s standard of living. Most of these booms end badly.’2 FORTY YEARS OF BUBBLES The last forty years of economic history (since the collapse of Bretton Woods) have been remarkable.

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Good debtors, like Britain and the Netherlands, had financial advantages over bad debtors, like eighteenth-century France. Britain’s financial success encouraged other countries to follow its example. But the willingness of countries to follow prudent financial policies proved no more permanent than the willingness of most January revellers to follow their New Year’s resolutions. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff recount that sovereign default has occurred in a number of waves, starting with the Napoleonic Wars.1 In the 1840s cycle, nearly half the countries in the developed world were in default. There was a 1870s to 1890s wave, associated with falling commodity prices, and a 1930s to 1950s phase, linked to the Great Depression and the war.

Crisis Economics: A Crash Course in the Future of Finance
by Nouriel Roubini and Stephen Mihm
Published 10 May 2010

speech delivered at Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City symposium, “The Greenspan Era: Lessons for the Future,” Jackson Hole, Wyo., August 27, 2005. 3 “the greatest of all credit bubbles”: Justin Lahart, “NASDAQ: Five Years after the Peak,” Wall Street Journal, March 7, 2005. 3 William White: Beat Balzli and Michaela Schiessl, “The Man Nobody Wanted to Hear,” Der Spiegel, July 8, 2009. 3 Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff: Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff, “The Unsustainable US Current Account Position Revisited,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper no. 10869, November 2004. 3 Stephen Roach: Brett Arends, “Economic ‘Armageddon’ Predicted,” Boston Herald, November 23, 2004. 5 “animal spirits”: John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1936), 161. 5 “the ideas of economists . . .”: Ibid., 383. 11 “The decadent international . . .”: John Maynard Keynes, “National Self-Sufficiency,” Yale Review 22 (1933): 760-61.

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Other well-respected figures raised a similar warning: Wall Street legend James Grant warned in 2005 that the Federal Reserve had helped create one of “the greatest of all credit bubbles” in the history of finance; William White, chief economist at the Bank for International Settlements, warned about the systemic risks of asset and credit bubbles; financial analyst Nassim Nicholas Taleb cautioned that financial markets were woefully unprepared to handle “fat tail” events that fell outside the usual distribution of risk; economists Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff warned about the unsustainability of current account deficits in the United States; and Stephen Roach of Morgan Stanley and David Rosenberg of Merrill Lynch long ago raised concerns about consumers in the United States living far beyond their means. The list goes on. But for all their respectability, these and other economists and commentators were ignored, a fact that speaks volumes about the state of economics and finance over recent decades.

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Keynes is here, as is his most radical interpreter, Hyman Minsky, but so are economists from other camps: Robert Shiller, one of the most visible proponents of behavioral economics; Joseph Schumpeter, the grand theorist of capitalist “creative destruction”; and economists of a historical bent, from Charles Kindleberger to Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff. Their disparate strands of thought inform our idiosyncratic approach to understanding crises. When Markets Behave Badly Crisis economics is the study of how and why markets fail. Much of mainstream economics, by contrast, is obsessed with showing how and why markets work—and work well.

Seven Crashes: The Economic Crises That Shaped Globalization
by Harold James
Published 15 Jan 2023

There were also high levels of corporate and government savings, which held down demand and led to calls from the richer, older industrial countries that the new entrants should do more to boost global demand and hence growth. Surpluses in the newly globalizing economies corresponded to deficits in some but not all major industrial countries. The phenomenon was most pronounced, and most analyzed, in the United States and the UK. In the early 2000s, Kenneth Rogoff, then chief economist at the IMF, warned about expansionist “Bushonomics,” driven by the large tax cuts of 2001 and 2003, when the government’s fiscal position moved from a surplus of 1.2 percent of GDP in 2000 to a deficit of 4.7 percent of GDP by 2003. Rogoff conjectured: “Suppose for a minute that we were talking about a developing country that had gaping current account deficits year after year . . . a budget ink spinning from black into red . . . open-ended security costs, and a real exchange rate that had been inflated by capital inflows.

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A powerful book by Atif Mian and Amir Sufilater argued exactly that case for the central problem of highly indebted American households: that the mortgages that had provoked the subprime crisis should be written down, and that the application of such discipline would deter future overlending and misbehavior on the part of lenders.17 A substantial number of analysts, notably Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart, made a similar point about country debt; prominent officials at the IMF pushed the same case in May 2010 as the Greek financial crisis erupted onto the international stage, and called on the advice of the world’s foremost expert in debt write-off, Cleary Gottlieb’s Lee Buchheit.

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The foreign holders of American debt would eventually “get tired.”30 A second interpretation holds that it was the academic framing of the policy debate that changed perception to focus on the dangers of government overspending: in particular, one influential book might have played a key role. In September 2009, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff published their ironically titled study This Time Is Different. On one level, the book was a stark warning about the extent of the damage done by complex financial crises, and consequently of the long time (seven years on historical average) that recovery would take. It was inevitable that readers would ask whether there were shortcuts that might bring quicker recovery.

The Curse of Cash
by Kenneth S Rogoff
Published 29 Aug 2016

THE CURSE OF CASH THE CURSE OF CASH KENNETH S. ROGOFF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON AND OXFORD Copyright © 2016 by Kenneth S. Rogoff Requests for permission to reproduce material from this work should be sent to Permissions, Princeton University Press Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540 In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, 6 Oxford Street, Woodstock, Oxfordshire OX20 1TR press.princeton.edu Jacket design by Faceout Studio Excerpt from The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes copyright © 1931, 1972, 2010, 2013 The Royal Economic Society.

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Washington, DC. Reifschneider, David L., and John C. Williams. 2000. “Three Lessons for Monetary Policy in a Low-Inflation Era.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 32 (4): 936–66. Reinhart, Carmen M., Vincent Reinhart, and Kenneth S. Rogoff. 2015. “Dealing with Debt.” Journal of International Economics 96, suppl. 1 (July): S43–S55. Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth S. Rogoff. 2002. “The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation.” NBER Working Paper 8963 (June). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. ———. 2004. “The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation.”

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Rogoff Requests for permission to reproduce material from this work should be sent to Permissions, Princeton University Press Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540 In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, 6 Oxford Street, Woodstock, Oxfordshire OX20 1TR press.princeton.edu Jacket design by Faceout Studio Excerpt from The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes copyright © 1931, 1972, 2010, 2013 The Royal Economic Society. Reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press. All Rights Reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Rogoff, Kenneth S., author. Title: The curse of cash / Kenneth S. Rogoff. Description: Princeton : Princeton University Press, [2016] | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016014943 | ISBN 9780691172132 (hardback : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Paper money. | Money. | Currency question. | Monetary policy. Classification: LCC HG350 .R64 2016 | DDC 332.4—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016014943 British Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available This book has been composed in Sabon LT Std with DIN Pro Display Printed on acid-free paper. ∞ Printed in the United States of America 10987654321 To my parents, June and Stanley Rogoff CONTENTS Preface ix Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview 1 PART I: The Dark Side of Paper Currency: Tax and Regulatory Evasion, Crime, and Security Issues Chapter 2: The Early Development of Coins and Paper Currency 15 Chapter 3: Size and Composition of Global Currency Supplies, and the Share Held Abroad 31 Chapter 4: Holdings of Currency in the Domestic, Legal, Tax-Paying Economy 48 Chapter 5: Currency Demand in the Underground Economy 58 Chapter 6: Seigniorage 80 Chapter 7: A Plan for Phasing Out Most Paper Currency 92 PART II: Negative Interest Rates Chapter 8: The Cost of the Zero Bound Constraint 119 Chapter 9: Higher Inflation Targets, Nominal GDP, Escape Clauses, and Fiscal Policy 147 Chapter 10: Other Paths to Negative Interest Rates 158 Chapter 11: Other Possible Downsides to Negative Nominal Policy Rates 175 Chapter 12: Negative Interest Rates as a Violation of Trust and a Step Away from Rule-Based Systems 182 PART III: International Dimensions and Digital Currencies Chapter 13: International Dimensions to Phasing Out Paper Currency 199 Chapter 14: Digital Currencies and Gold 208 Final Thoughts 217 Acknowledgments 221 Appendix 225 Notes 233 References 257 Index 273 PREFACE This book deals with an issue that might seem stupefyingly mundane, more of a minor irritant than a curse.

China's Superbank
by Henry Sanderson and Michael Forsythe
Published 26 Sep 2012

In China, the rate depositors receive is often below inflation, and the lending rate has been kept below producer prices, meaning that bond market rates have also been kept artificially low. This is a classic example of “financial repression,” as economists describe it.72 As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff put it in their book on financial crises: “Under financial repression, banks are vehicles that allow governments to squeeze more indirect tax revenue from citizens by monopolizing the entire savings and payments system, not simply currency. Governments force local residents to save in banks by giving them few, if any, other options.

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“Missing Funds Spark Probe of Bank Vice President,” Economic Observer, June 27, 2008, http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/2008/0627/104454.shtml 71. Gao Jian, Debt Capital Markets in China (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2007). 72. Nicholas Lardy, “Financial Repression in China,” Policy Brief 08-8, Peterson Institute for International Economics (September 2008). 73. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). 74. CDB 2010 Annual Report. Available on their Web site at www.cdb.com.cn 75. Dealbook, “With Barclays, China Continues Overseas March,” July 24, 2007, www.cdb.com.cn/english/NewsInfo.asp?

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In the 1980s, debt in sub-Saharan Africa doubled, and real per-capita incomes were lower at the end of the period than at the beginning.43 Table 3.3 Africa’s Debt History Country Years of Default and Rescheduling Algeria 1991 Angola 1985 Central African Republic 1981, 1983 Côte d’Ivoire 1983, 2000 Egypt 1984 Kenya 1994, 2000 Nigeria 1982, 1986, 1992, 2001, 2004 South Africa 1985, 1989, 1993 Zambia 1983 Zimbabwe 1965, 2000 Source: Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. While Chen Yuan’s father, Chen Yun, advocated that China cross the river while feeling for the stones, the West took a different approach to Africa: Countries were urged to implement austerity and liberalize prices all at once. As China’s planners believed in the 1980s, excessive or too-quick market liberalization could be a disaster if countries had not built up strong enough institutions.

No Ordinary Disruption: The Four Global Forces Breaking All the Trends
by Richard Dobbs and James Manyika
Published 12 May 2015

This rapid expansion of buildings in turn fuels demand for resource-intensive infrastructure—utilities, roads, and transportation.21 These trends are likely to power through any short-term reversals. “The integration of 2.5 billion people (China and India alone) into the global economy is producing a demand shift that is likely to put far more upward pressure on commodity prices than any technology gains are likely to offset,” notes Kenneth Rogoff, professor of economics and public policy at Harvard University. “So, for at least the next 50 to 75 years, and perhaps until humans start mining on Mars sometime in the coming centuries, prices for many natural resources are headed up.”22 Resource prices have increased significantly since 2000 1 Based on arithmetic average of four commodity subindexes: food, nonfood agricultural items, metals, and energy.

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In this new macroeconomic territory, a traditional view of supply and demand fundamentals may no longer be a sufficient indicator for the future cost of capital. As illustrated by the European Central Bank’s move in the spring of 2014 to lower its benchmark deposit interest rate below zero, ultralow interest rates may remain the norm over the coming years.43 As economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff argued in a 2013 IMF paper, policy makers need to guard against overplaying the risks related to unconventional monetary support and limiting central banks’ room for policy maneuvering.44 HOW TO ADAPT As demand-supply dynamics change, business leaders need to be prepared to navigate both worlds.

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“GE partners with the Millennium Challenge Corporation to provide $500 million in financing to Ghana 1000 project” (press release), August 5, 2014, http://allafrica.com/stories/201408061542.html; “GE to invest $2 billion in Africa by 2018” (press release), Business Wire, August 4, 2014, www.businesswire.com/news/home/20140803005030/en/GE-Invest-2-Billion-Africa-2018#.VDQoFvk7u-0. 48. Daniel Gross, “Coke applies supply-chain expertise to deliver AIDS drugs in Africa,” The Daily Beast, September 25, 2012, www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/09/25/coke-applies-supply-chain-expertise-to-deliver-aids-drugs-in-africa.html. 49. Kenneth Rogoff, “Can Greece avoid the lion,” Project Syndicate, February 3, 2010, www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/can-greece-avoid-the-lion-. 50. Stephen Hall, Dan Lovallo, and Reinier Musters, “How to put your money where your strategy is,” McKinsey Quarterly, March 2012. 51. Katy George, Sree Ramaswamy, and Lou Rassey, “Next-shoring: A CEO’s guide,” McKinsey Quarterly, January 2014. 52.

The Currency Cold War: Cash and Cryptography, Hash Rates and Hegemony
by David G. W. Birch
Published 14 Apr 2020

As I have said before, and will say again, I think Craig Wright (the Australian who some people think is the mysterious Satoshi Nakamoto) made the key observation on this topic when he said: ‘The mining of Bitcoin is a security service that alone creates no wealth. Consequently, those using the network pay for the service.’ A shared security service that people will pay to use seems like a much better way to imagine future versions of Bitcoin than as a new form of payment or as a new kind of currency. Kenneth Rogoff, former IMF chief economist, echoes this perspective (Rogoff 2016). This shared security service may be used for a great many things, most of them as yet undiscovered, and I do not doubt that people will try and possibly manage to build a viable payment service on top of it: perhaps even a full-fledged digital currency.

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And if an ATM goes down, so what? When it comes back up, it can simply resynchronize itself. Part 3 The Currency Cold War The real challenge for the United States isn’t Facebook’s proposed Libra; it’s government-backed digital currencies like the one planned by China. — Kenneth Rogoff, professor of economics and public policy at Harvard University (November 2019) In the seventeenth century, the Bank of Amsterdam created an innovative financial instrument that was in effect a standing repurchase agreement (repo) facility (Quinn et al. 2020). Eligible coins could be sold to the bank and repurchased within six months at an interest rate of 0.25%.

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However, once the wind farm is up and running and producing electricity, the value of the money will rise. There might, in this case, be a demand for renewable energy that drives the value of the money higher than its original face value. Interest in the concept of privately issued money has been rekindled in the age of ‘platform’ technology firms such as Facebook. The economists Yang You and Kenneth Rogoff wrote in a recent paper on this topic that unless introducing tradability (which is Libra’s plan) creates very significant convenience for users, such platforms can potentially earn higher revenues by keeping tokens non-tradable. Their analysis suggests that if platforms have any comparative advantage in issuing tradable tokens, it comes from other factors (You and Rogoff 2019).

The Age of Stagnation: Why Perpetual Growth Is Unattainable and the Global Economy Is in Peril
by Satyajit Das
Published 9 Feb 2016

Lazear, Economic Imperialism, Hoover Institution and Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, May 1999. http://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/lazear/personal/pdfs/economic%20imperialism.pdf. 2 John Maynard Keynes, General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Atlantic Publishers & Distributors (1936) 2006, p. 272. 3 Raghuram Rajan, “The Paranoid Style in Economics,” Project Syndicate, 8 August 2013. www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-declining-quality-of-public-economic-debate-by-raghuram-rajan. 4 G. K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy, Chapter VI, 1908. http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/G._K._Chesterton. 5 Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton University Press, 2009. 6 See Patrick Bernau, “‘Eine Hexenjagd’—Keneth Rogoff Über seinen Excel-Fehler,” Fazit, 22 October 2013. http://blogs.faz.net/fazit/2013/10/22/kenneth-rogoff-ueber-excel-fehler-hexenjagd-2818/. 7 Frederic Mishkin, “The Economist's Reply to the ‘Inside Job,’” Financial Times, 8 October 2010. 8 Quoted in Robert John, “Behind the Balfour Declaration: Britain's Great War Pledge to Lord Rothschild,” The Journal of Historical Review, vol. 6, no. 4 (Winter 1985–6), pp. 389–450. 9 See Neil Irwin, “With Consumers Slow to Spend, Businesses Are Slow to Hire,” Washington Post, 21 August 2010. 10 Tim Duy, “Yes, I Am Optimistic,” 30 November 2014. http://economistsview.typepad.com/timduy/2014/11/yes-i-am-optimistic-1.html. 11 Wynne Godley, “Macroeconomics without Equilibrium or Disequilibrium,” The Jerome Levy Economics Institute, Working Paper No. 205, August 1997. www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp205.pdf. 12 Olivier Blanchard, “Monetary Policy Will Never Be the Same,” IMF Direct, 19 November 2013. http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2013/11/19/monetary-policy-will-never-be-the-same/. 13 Fyodor Dostoyevsky, trans.

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Similarly, expansionary fiscal policy in an environment of contracting private sector demand and reduction in debt can result in lower multipliers, as the government cannot fully offset the fall in private economic activity. Budget deficits must be financed, requiring governments to borrow. By 2009, there was increasing unease about rising government debt. Based on data from hundreds of years of financial crises, economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff argued that sovereign debt levels above 60–90 percent of GDP affected growth.5 In 2013, in the academic equivalent of Fight Club, three economists from the University of Massachusetts in Amherst published a paper alleging that Reinhart and Rogoff had exaggerated the decline in growth at higher debt levels, due to unorthodox statistical choices and a spreadsheet error.

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With their membership of the club of celebrity economists threatened, Reinhart and Rogoff mounted a desperate defense: they had not stressed any single number in their analysis; they had not implied causality; recalculation still supported their thesis. But in previous opinion pieces, speeches, and interviews, they had not mentioned these caveats, suggesting instead that the relationship held, and favoring cutting debt levels aggressively. Kenneth Rogoff darkly accused his critics of orchestrating a 1950s McCarthyist witch-hunt.6 Pressure for grant funding, the lure of lucrative commercial opportunities, and vanity have corrupted academic standards and reduced professional accountability. In his 2010 film Inside Job, Charles Ferguson interviewed former Federal Reserve vice chairman Frederic Mishkin, who was paid US$124,000 for a study on Iceland.

Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea
by Mark Blyth
Published 24 Apr 2013

It’s a problem, and those arguing for austerity out of more than just an innate hatred of the state and all its works are not tilting at windmills. While we may not be “drowning in debt,” there are many folks out there who are concerned that we will do a bit more than just get our feet wet if we are not careful. Carmen Reinhardt and Kenneth Rogoff’s much-cited paper, “Growth in a Time of Debt,” argues that government debt above a critical threshold of 90 percent can become a substantial drag on the economy.17 This claim is not without its critics, but notwithstanding those criticisms, the basic point can be rephrased as, why would any state want to carry and pay for such a debt load if it didn’t have to?

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In all cases, private-sector weaknesses ended up creating public-sector liabilities that European publics now have to pay for with austerity programs that make the situation worse rather than better. The fiscal crisis in all these countries was the consequence of the financial crisis washing up on their shores, not its cause. To say that it is the cause is to deliberately, and politically, confuse cause and effect. We really should know better. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, no friends of Keynesian policy, note that a banking crisis is followed by a sovereign debt crisis 80 percent of the time.42 Reinhardt and Rogoff stop short of using the word “cause.” However, as Moritz Schularick and Alan Taylor have shown, sovereign debt crises are almost always “credit booms gone bust.”43 They develop in the private sector and end up in the public sector.

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Leigh Phillips, “ECB Austerity Drive Raises Fears for Democratic Accountability in Europe,” The Guardian, August 22, 2011; Mort Zuckerman, “America Has No Choice but to Enter Its Own Age of Austerity,” Financial Times, July 14, 2011, “The A-List” Commentary; Alberto Alesina, Silvio Ardagna, Roberto Perotti, and Fabiano Schiantarelli (2002), “Fiscal Policy, Profits, and Investment,” American Economic Review, 92(3): 571–589; Peter Coy, “What Good Are Economists Anyway?” Bloomberg Business Week, April 16, 2009, cover story. 17. Carmen Reinhardt and Kenneth Rogoff, Growth in a Time of Debt, National Bureau of Economic Research (hereafter, NBER) working paper 15639, Cambridge, MA, January 2010. 18. See, for example, John Irons and Josh Bivens, “Government Debt and Economic Growth: Overreaching Claims of Debt ‘Threshold’ Suffer from Theoretical and Empirical Flaws,” Economic Policy Institute, Briefing Paper 271, Washington DC, July 16, 2010.

The Price of Time: The Real Story of Interest
by Edward Chancellor
Published 15 Aug 2022

Could it be that the monetary policy experiments after the Lehman crisis did more harm than good? That was the view of PIMCO’s ‘Bond King’ Bill Gross, who, displaying his own science credentials, suggested that just as Newtonian physics breaks down at the speed of light, so a market economy ceases to function normally when interest rates approach the zero lower bound.4 Harvard economist Kenneth Rogoff stuck with this theme: Just as the normal laws of physics seem to be upended when an object approaches a black hole (or, to be more precise, the normal laws imply weird consequences), the laws of economics seem to be upended when a recession-stricken economy hits (or at least approaches) the zero bound.5 In his letters to investors, PIMCO’s bond manager described how the financial system needs a positive spread or carry between borrowing and lending rates.

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By this date, there had been an estimated 637 rate cuts globally since the failure of Bear Stearns in early 2008, central banks had purchased more than $14 trillion worth of securities, and more than $8 trillion worth of government bonds yielded less than zero.22 11. By December 2020 nearly $18 trillion worth of bonds were yielding less than zero. Negative interest rates were intended, as Harvard’s Kenneth Rogoff put it, to ‘turbocharge the economy out of a deflationary recession’.23 But they failed to live up to this promise. In fact, they exacerbated the problems already produced by ultra-low rates. From the outset, negative rates created a tremendous challenge for conventional banks. When they were introduced into Europe, the head of Portugal’s central bank viewed them as a threat to the financial system.24 European banks felt unable to pass on the cost to depositors.

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After all, what is a negative interest rate but a tax on capital – taxation without representation, no less? There appeared to be no limit on how far central bankers might go to enforce their policies. If hoarding thwarted their negative interest-rate policy, then it was time to abolish cash.24 The ‘paper currency’, wrote Kenneth Rogoff in his 2016 book The Curse of Cash, ‘has become a major impediment to the smooth functioning of the global financial system.’25 What the former IMF chief economist meant was that the existence of banknotes impeded the central bankers’ ability to engage in radical monetary experiments. A cashless world, Rogoff admitted, would look different to the one we were used to.

Britannia Unchained: Global Lessons for Growth and Prosperity
by Kwasi Kwarteng , Priti Patel , Dominic Raab , Chris Skidmore and Elizabeth Truss
Published 12 Sep 2012

If it is really is impossible for countries to go bust, then it is strange that so many countries have failed to pay back their loans. From Edward III defaulting on his loans to Florence financiers in 134039 through to today’s Eurozone crisis, sovereign defaults have been a constant feature throughout history. In their definitive text, This Time is Different, economists Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff list hundreds of examples of default through the last 800 years. Default is not just not unknown, it is endemic. Only a small number of countries – such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Denmark, Thailand and the United States40 – have never defaulted. The UK has been relatively fortunate in past centuries, but it too defaulted.

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The whole purpose of the Golden Rule was to allow greater discretionary deficits in economic downturns; the Government could point to the surpluses it had already run since 1997. As long as its budget forecasts were reasonably accurate, Brown should meet his primary fiscal rule, to balance the budget ‘over the course of the cycle’. Even Kenneth Rogoff, then the Chief Economist of the IMF, gave the plans his cautious approval.67 He did, however, warn that deficits should not be allowed to rise above their currently forecast path. The forecasts did not prove to be accurate. The Government’s budget never moved back into structural surplus,68 let alone ran an actual surplus.

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Macaulay, History of England. 30. http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/04/british-debt-history/ 31. http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/bleeding-britain/ 32. http://johannhari.com/2011/03/29/the-biggest-lie-in-british-politics/ 33. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a9042452-1a3c-11de-9f91-0000779fd2ac. html#axzz1gJPBneNS 34. http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/david-blanchflower/2011/06/creditcard-cameron-basic 35. Niall Ferguson, The Cash Nexus: Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700–2000 (Penguin, 2001), p. 53. 36. Ferguson, The Cash Nexus, p. 129. 37. Ferguson, The Cash Nexus, p. 130. 38. Office for Budget Responsibility, Economic and Fiscal Outlook, March 2012. 39. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton University Press, 2009). 40. Reinhart and Rogoff, This Time is Different. 41. http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/11/27/an-empire-at-risk.html 42. http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/11/27/an-empire-at-risk.html 43.

Breakout Nations: In Pursuit of the Next Economic Miracles
by Ruchir Sharma
Published 8 Apr 2012

The growing ties between nations over the last decade have made every one of them less inclined to allow their trade partners to go under. For all the current discussion about debt defaults, stemming from the crisis in Greece, the reality is that default has largely disappeared from the international economic scene. In their book, This Time Is Different, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff chart how surprisingly commonplace default used to be: In a typical year between the 1920s and 2003, nations representing at least 5 to 10 percent of global income were in default, and that proportion spiked up to 40 percent during the Depression and World War II, and close to 15 percent in the late 1980s.

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The high debt burden is indeed weighing on the long-term U.S. growth rate, which is widely believed to have fallen from 3.4 percent between 1950 and 2007 to 2 percent, which is slower than during the recovery phase of most postwar recessions. There is a widespread sense that America has lost its mojo. In a recent paper, however, Harvard economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff point out that the relevant comparison is not previous U.S. recessions but the very different case of systemic financial crises. These are much more traumatic and rare, and by this standard the United States is recovering lost per capita output faster than it did following previous systemic crises, from the meltdown of 1873 through the Great Depression, and faster than most Western nations following the systemic crisis of 2008.

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As Tyler Cowen points out, the United States is a leading exporter of products that lie in the “sweet spot” for future demand from the emerging world, including civilian aircraft, semiconductors, cars, pharmaceuticals, machinery and equipment, automobile accessories, and entertainment. Technology, Inequality, and the Debt Threat There is an undeniable and scary connection between technology and persistent or rising income inequality, an issue that has remarkable resonance everywhere I travel, from Chile to South Korea. Kenneth Rogoff has called inequality “the single biggest threat to social stability around the world,” and for good reason. A decade ago the technorati were predicting that a wireless, digital world would give working people a welcome windfall in leisure time, but the reality looks a lot less comfortable. As companies employ digital machines more efficiently, they need fewer people and will pay more for the relatively few people skilled in handling digital machines.

Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste: How Neoliberalism Survived the Financial Meltdown
by Philip Mirowski
Published 24 Jun 2013

In subscribing to this notion, the left unconsciously accepts the key notion of the populist right and the neoclassical orthodoxy, that “nothing is substantially different between then and now.” Markets are timeless entities with timeless laws, they insist. Indeed, this is the identical premise of some of the most popular crisis books of the last few years, from Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart’s This Time Is Different to David Graeber’s Debt: The First 5,000 Years.24 Yet that is precisely where the polemical divergence should originate on the left. Things are profoundly different about the economy, the society, and in the global political arena than they were during the Cold War: some recent neoliberal innovations have lent the current crisis its special bitter tang; understanding precisely how and where they are different is a necessary first step in developing a blueprint for a better world.

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(The free flow of labor enjoys no similar right.97) Since that entails persistent balance-of-payments problems in a nonautarkic world, neoliberals took the lead in inventing all manner of transnational devices for the economic and political discipline of nation-states.98 They began by attempting to reintroduce what they considered to be pure market discipline (flexible exchange rates, dismantling capital controls) during the destruction of the Bretton Woods system, but over the longer term learned to appreciate that suitably staffed international institutions such as the WTO, the World Bank, the IMF, and other units are better situated to impose neoliberal policies upon recalcitrant nation-states. Initially strident demands to abolish global financial (and other) institutions on the part of early neoliberals such as Friedman and some denizens of the Cato Institute were subsequently tempered by others—such as Anne Krueger, Stanley Fischer, and Kenneth Rogoff—and as these neoliberals came to occupy these institutions, they used them primarily to influence staffing and policy decisions, and thus to displace other internationalist agendas. The role of such transnational organizations was recast to exert “lock-in” of prior neoliberal policies, and therefore to restrict the range of political options of national governments.

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While both divergences could be traced to specific neoliberal triumphs in the teeth of the crisis—namely, the direct bailouts of large financial firms and their financialized counterparts in other sectors, combined with a ferocious resistance to any controls imposed upon capital flows and international trade—and as such might betoken further weakness down the line, journalists instead rapidly lost interest in the ways in which the current crisis might be “different” than the Great Depression. Indeed, they were rescued from having to seriously confront history by the intervention of a famous Harvard professor, and thus endorsed the convenient Kenneth Rogoff mantra that we could ignore anyone who insisted upon structural specificity in history, because every financial crisis was essentially the same.26 At that juncture, journalists just lost all interest in the Great Depression. * * * Figure 4.2: Index of World Equity Market Prices, Great Depression and Current Crisis * * * * * * Figure 4.3: Index Volume of World Trade, Great Depression and Current Crisis * * * * * * Source: voxeu.org This blasé line emanating from Harvard and the National Bureau of Economic Research committed the ultimate historical solecism by lumping together two centuries of credit crises as somehow “the same,” attempting to reduce them all to a few implausible quantitative indicators of sovereign debt to GNP and a “capital mobility index.”

Paper Money Collapse: The Folly of Elastic Money and the Coming Monetary Breakdown
by Detlev S. Schlichter
Published 21 Sep 2011

Ben Bernanke, Remarks before the National Economics Club, Washington, DC, Nov. 21, 2002, http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2002/20021121/default.htm 2. Carmen M. Reinhart, Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 204–207. 3. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/Current/ 4. Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.6 Money Stock Measures, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/hist/ 5. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/publications/ERP/page/7254/download/46604/7254_ERP.pdf 6. Carmen M. Reinhart, Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, p. 207 7.

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For a historian’s account of these events, see Adam Ferguson, When Money Dies (London: Old Street Publishing, 2010/1975). 19. Peter Bernholz, Monetary Regimes and Inflation, p. 8. 20. Carmen M. Reinhart, Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, p. 112. 21. Milton Friedman/Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960, pp. 461–493. 22. Quoted from John Laughland, The Tainted Source, p. 41. 23. Carmen M. Reinhart, Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, pp. 204–206. Part Five: BEYOND THE CYCLE Paper Money Collapse Chapter 8 The Beneficiaries of the Paper Money System By now we have fully exposed the disadvantages and dangers of elastic money.

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The inevitable consequences of the new infrastructure and policy have become ever more manifest. Since 1971 the decline in the purchasing power of pound and dollar—two of the oldest currencies in the world—has been the steepest in their long history. Debt levels have risen sharply and the financial industry has greatly expanded. As economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff demonstrated in their extensive study of financial crises, the number and intensity of international banking crises has risen markedly since 1971.2 Japan experienced an enormous money-driven housing boom in the 1980s and has still not recovered from the dislocations this created. The United States and Western Europe (with the exception of the Scandinavian countries) have, until recently, escaped major crises.

Capitalism 4.0: The Birth of a New Economy in the Aftermath of Crisis
by Anatole Kaletsky
Published 22 Jun 2010

The question that needs to be asked about the Japanese experience is whether government support for struggling banks and overindebted borrowers caused the twenty years of stagnation or whether twenty years of economic stagnation prevented a recovery for weak borrowers and banks. A similar question must be asked about a fascinating and much-quoted historic study, coauthored by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, the IMF’s former chief economist, which looked at the macroeconomic effect of financial crises in dozens of countries over the past six hundred years. This study concluded that recessions accompanied by banking crises are generally much longer and deeper than recessions in which banks avoid serious losses.12 The question is whether this historic evidence proves that banking crises cause particularly severe recessions or that particularly severe recessions cause banking crises, which then make these recessions even worse.

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Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), OECD Outlook 86 (November 2009). 4 There has been a long history of debt defaults by sovereign governments, and in every case creditors have been left with no legal or political redress. See Anatole Kaletsky, The Costs of Default, and Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. 5 The figures for Treasury securities exclude the notional holdings owned by the federal government itself through the Social Security Trust Fund and other purely notional accounting entities. Federal Reserve Board, “Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States: Flows and Outstandings, Third Quarter 2009,” December 10, 2009. 6 Strictly speaking, the current account deficit is slightly different from the trade deficit, as explained in the text. 7 The current account deficit for the first three quarters of 2009, annualized, was $407 billion. 8 To be precise, real incomes sixty years from now will be 3.2 times higher if U.S. growth averages 1.96 percent per head, as it has since 1950, and 1.8 times higher if growth slows to 1 percent per head. 9 This assumes real economic growth of 3 percent real and 2 percent inflation. 10 International Monetary Fund, “Fiscal Implications of the Global Economic and Financial Crisis,” IMF Staff Position Note SPN/09/13, June 2009. 11 Japan suffered five recessions in the twenty years since 1990, while the United States had three recessions and Britain and the eurozone suffered two each. 12 Reinhart and Rogoff, This Time Is Different. 13 Kaletsky, The Costs of Default. 14 See “Continental Illinois and ‘Too Big to Fail,’” in FDIC Division of Research and Statistics, History of the Eighties—Lessons for the Future, vol. 1, 235-257.

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This was followed by the Louvre Accord of February 22, 1987, which helped to stabilize the dollar-yen exchange rate for the next five years in the range of 125-150, but was subsequently blamed for contributing to the 1987 crash on Wall Street and the Japanese bubble economy of 1988-89. 24 A good summary of recent thinking is John Williamson, “The Choice of Exchange Rate Regime: The Relevance of International Experience to China’s Decision,” Lecture at the Central University of Finance and Economics in Beijing on September 7, 2004. Available from the Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC, at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/williamson0904.pdf. A more detailed study is Kenneth Rogoff et al., “Evolution and Performance of Exchange Rate Regimes,” IMF Occasional Paper 229, May 2004. 25 Michal Kalecki, Political Aspects of Full Employment, Political Quarterly 14 (1943), reprinted in Michal Kalecki, Selected Essays on the Dynamics of the Capitalist Economy. Chapter Seventeen 1 International Monetary Fund, “Fiscal Implications of the Global Economic and Financial Crisis.” 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid.

The Cost of Inequality: Why Economic Equality Is Essential for Recovery
by Stewart Lansley
Published 19 Jan 2012

Rising inequality may also have increased vulnerability to crisis.’47 Similar views were aired at the 2011 World Economic Forum, the influential gathering of the world’s political, economic and business elites held each year in the small Swiss ski resort of Davos. Here the question of the growing global divide became something of a theme in an agenda crowded with topics from stalling recovery to the tackling of mounting budget deficits. ‘Inequality is the big wildcard in the next decade of global growth’, Kenneth Rogoff, a leading authority on the history of financial crises, told one gathering at the Forum. At another session, Min Zhu, former Deputy Governor of the People’s Bank of China and a special adviser at the International Monetary Fund, told his audience: ‘The increase in inequality is the most serious challenge facing the world.’

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Despite a series of economic, business and financial crises in the immediate postmillennium years—from the bursting of the dot-com bubble to the collapse of the energy-trading giant, Enron—the belief in markets proved remarkably resilient. Across the globe, regulators, politicians and financiers had come round to the view that, after a shaky decade and a half, the market model had finally triumphed. According to Kenneth Rogoff, chief economist at the IMF from 2001 to 2003, ‘the policy community has developed a smug belief that enhanced macroeconomic stability at the national level combined with continuing financial innovation at the international level have obviated any need to tinker with the (international financial) system’.206 The prophets of market ideology made grand claims for their beliefs.

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As the American international investor and a man who knows a little about speculation and destabilisation, George Soros, has put it, ‘the salient feature of the current financial crisis is that it was not generated by some external shock like OPEC… The crisis was generated by the system itself.’261 Notes 206 Kenneth Rogoff, ‘No Grand Plans, but the Financial System Needs Fixing’, Financial Times, 8 February 2007. 207 IMF, World Economic Outlook, Database, April 2009. 208 Ibid. 209 T Morgan, ‘No Way Out’, Tullett Prebon Strategy Note 23, 2011. 210 GDP adjusted for inflation. 211 R Skidelsky, Keynes: The Return of the Master, Allen Lane, 2009, p 118-120. 212 Annual change in GDP, chained volume measure, seasonally adjusted (Office for National Statistics, series ABMI); http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/TSDdownload2.asp. 213 Ibid. 214 Glyn, Capitalism Unleashed, op. cit. p 131. 215 Ibid. 216 World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report, 2009-10, 2009. 217 G L Bernstein, The Myth of Decline, Pimlico, 2004, p 572. 218 ONS, output per job for whole economy (series LNNP).

Economics Rules: The Rights and Wrongs of the Dismal Science
by Dani Rodrik
Published 12 Oct 2015

If instead government is hopelessly corrupt, industrial policy will likely make things worse. Note how, in this case, research has pushed the disagreement onto a domain—public administration—in which economists have no particular expertise. Models, Authority, and Hierarchy Two well-known economists, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, published a paper in 2010 that would become fodder in a political battle with high stakes.18 The paper appeared to show that public-debt levels above 90 percent of GDP significantly impede economic growth. Conservative US politicians and European Union officials latched on to this work to justify their ongoing call for fiscal austerity.

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Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson, and David Schmeidler, “Economic Models as Analogies” (unpublished paper, January 27, 2013), 6–7. 17. See, for example, my online debate for the Economist magazine with Harvard Business School professor Josh Lerner, July 12–17, 2010, http://www.economist.com/debate/debates/overview/177. 18. Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, Growth in a Time of Debt, NBER Working Paper 15639 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010). 19. Thomas Herndon, Michael Ash, and Robert Pollin, “Does High Public Debt Consistently Stifle Economic Growth? A Critique of Reinhart and Rogoff” (Amherst: University of Massachusetts at Amherst, Political Economy Research Institute, April 15, 2013). 20.

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Edward López and Wayne Leighton, Madmen, Intellectuals, and Academic Scribblers: The Economic Engine of Political Change (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012). 15. Francisco Rodríguez and Dani Rodrik, “Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic’s Guide to the Cross-National Evidence,” in Macroeconomics Annual 2000, eds. Ben Bernanke and Kenneth S. Rogoff (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press for NBER, 2001). 16. Mankiw, “News Flash: Economists Agree.” 17. Mark R. Rosenzweig and Kenneth I. Wolpin, “Natural ‘Natural Experiments’ in Economics,” Journal of Economic Literature 38, no. 4 (December 2000): 827–74. 18. Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy (New York: W.

10% Less Democracy: Why You Should Trust Elites a Little More and the Masses a Little Less
by Garett Jones
Published 4 Feb 2020

, you’re still better off if you delegated the job of running monetary policy to a “conservative central banker,” one who only cares about a low, stable inflation rate and doesn’t care at all about the unemployment rate. This theory, created by former chess champion and current Harvard economist Kenneth Rogoff, goes something like this . . .¹⁰ The Conservative Central Banker: An Origin Story The only way to use monetary policy to boost the real economy is to surprise the citizens with cheap money. The cheap money gets people more spending and creates more jobs in the short run (before prices rise).

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Alesina and Summers, “Central Bank Independence,” 159. 9. Alex Cukierman, “Central Bank Independence and Policy Results: Theory and Evidence,” lecture prepared for the Bank of Mexico international conference, “Stability and Economic Growth: The Role of the Central Bank,” Mexico City, 2005. 10. Kenneth Rogoff, “The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 100, no. 4 (1985): 1169–1189. 11. Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott, “Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations,” Econometrica (1982): 1345–1370. Also see John B. Long Jr. and Charles I.

The Road to Ruin: The Global Elites' Secret Plan for the Next Financial Crisis
by James Rickards
Published 15 Nov 2016

On February 16, 2016, former secretary of the treasury Larry Summers: See Lawrence H. Summers, “It’s Time to Kill the $100 Bill,” The Washington Post, February 16, 2016, accessed August 7, 2016, www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/02/16/its-time-to-kill-the-100-bill/?postshare=8671455627637815&tid=ss_tw. On August 30, 2016, Kenneth Rogoff: Kenneth S. Rogoff, The Curse of Cash (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016). On November 10, 2014, the Financial Stability Board: See “Adequacy of Loss-Absorbing Capacity of Global Systemically Important Banks in Resolution,” Financial Stability Board, November 10, 2014. On May 3, 2016, the Federal Reserve: “Restrictions on Qualified Financial Contracts of Systemically Important U.S.

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Existing €500 notes would still be legal tender, yet would be in short supply. This ban raised the possibility of buyers’ paying a premium in digital money, say €502, for available €500 notes. A premium purchase amounts to a negative interest rate on physical cash, a heretofore unheard-of result. On August 30, 2016, Kenneth Rogoff, Harvard professor and former chief economist of the IMF, published a manifesto called The Curse of Cash, an elite step-by-step plan to eliminate cash entirely. The war on cash and the rush to negative interest rates are advancing in lockstep, two sides of the same coin. Before cattle are led to slaughter, they are herded into pens so they can be easily controlled.

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The Open Society and Its Enemies: Volume 2, The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971. Rappleye, Charles. Herbert Hoover in the White House: The Ordeal of the Presidency. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016. Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth S. Rogoff. This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009. Ricardo, David. The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2004. Rickards, James. Currency Wars: The Making of the Next Global Crisis. New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2011. ———.

Stakeholder Capitalism: A Global Economy That Works for Progress, People and Planet
by Klaus Schwab
Published 7 Jan 2021

Marc Weiss, and Guang Yang, Global Urban Development, June 2004, http://www.globalurban.org/GUD%20Singapore%20MES%20Report.pdf. 29 “Singapore Faces Biggest Reskilling Challenge in Southeast Asia,” Justina Lee, Nikkei Asian Review, December 2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Singapore-faces-biggest-reskilling-challenge-in-Southeast-Asia. 30 “PwC's Hopes and Fears Survey,” p. 4, PwC, September 2019, https://www.pwc.com/sg/en/publications/assets/new-world-new-skills-2020.pdf. 31 Interview with Tim Wu by Peter Vanham, New York, October 2019. 32 “The 100 Largest Companies by Market Capitalization in 2020,” Statista, consulted in October 2020, https://www.statista.com/statistics/263264/top-companies-in-the-world-by-market-capitalization. 33 Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, Lina M. Kahn, The Yale Law Journal, January 2017 34 “Big Tech Has Too Much Monopoly Power—It's Right to Take It On,” Kenneth Rogoff, The Guardian, April 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/apr/02/big-tech-monopoly-power-elizabeth-warren-technology; Quote: “Here are titles of some recent articles: Paul Krugman's “Monopoly Capitalism Is Killing US Economy,” Joseph Stiglitz's “America Has a Monopoly Problem—and It's Huge,” and Kenneth Rogoff's “Big Tech Is a Big Problem”; “The Rise of Corporate Monopoly Power,” Zia Qureshi, Brookings, May 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2019/05/21/the-rise-of-corporate-market-power/. 35 “Steve Wozniak Says Apple Should've Split Up a Long Time Ago, Big Tech Is Too Big,” Bloomberg, August 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2019-08-27/steve-wozniak-says-apple-should-ve-split-up-a-long-time-ago-big-tech-is-too-big-video. 36 Some scholars do dispute this notion.

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When I visited US Senator Elizabeth Warren in Washington, DC, at the end of 2018, she was already contemplating a similar stance against the market leaders in many of America's industries, including technology, the pharmaceutical sector, and finance. Wu's colleague at Columbia Law School Lina Khan in 2016 wrote a seminal paper (while at Yale), taking a similar stance: “Amazon's Antitrust Paradox.”33 Economists such as Gabriel Zucman, Emmanuel Saez, Kenneth Rogoff, and Nobel Prize winners Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz have also stated Big Tech has “too much power”34 or needs to be more strictly regulated. Leading journalists including Nicholas Thompson, the editor in chief of Wired, and Rana Foroohar, associate editor of the Financial Times, favor antitrust action against Big Tech too.

Stakeholder Capitalism: A Global Economy That Works for Progress, People and Planet
by Klaus Schwab and Peter Vanham
Published 27 Jan 2021

Marc Weiss, and Guang Yang, Global Urban Development, June 2004, http://www.globalurban.org/GUD%20Singapore%20MES%20Report.pdf. 29 “Singapore Faces Biggest Reskilling Challenge in Southeast Asia,” Justina Lee, Nikkei Asian Review, December 2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Singapore-faces-biggest-reskilling-challenge-in-Southeast-Asia. 30 “PwC's Hopes and Fears Survey,” p. 4, PwC, September 2019, https://www.pwc.com/sg/en/publications/assets/new-world-new-skills-2020.pdf. 31 Interview with Tim Wu by Peter Vanham, New York, October 2019. 32 “The 100 Largest Companies by Market Capitalization in 2020,” Statista, consulted in October 2020, https://www.statista.com/statistics/263264/top-companies-in-the-world-by-market-capitalization. 33 Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, Lina M. Kahn, The Yale Law Journal, January 2017 34 “Big Tech Has Too Much Monopoly Power—It's Right to Take It On,” Kenneth Rogoff, The Guardian, April 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/apr/02/big-tech-monopoly-power-elizabeth-warren-technology; Quote: “Here are titles of some recent articles: Paul Krugman's “Monopoly Capitalism Is Killing US Economy,” Joseph Stiglitz's “America Has a Monopoly Problem—and It's Huge,” and Kenneth Rogoff's “Big Tech Is a Big Problem”; “The Rise of Corporate Monopoly Power,” Zia Qureshi, Brookings, May 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2019/05/21/the-rise-of-corporate-market-power/. 35 “Steve Wozniak Says Apple Should've Split Up a Long Time Ago, Big Tech Is Too Big,” Bloomberg, August 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2019-08-27/steve-wozniak-says-apple-should-ve-split-up-a-long-time-ago-big-tech-is-too-big-video. 36 Some scholars do dispute this notion.

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When I visited US Senator Elizabeth Warren in Washington, DC, at the end of 2018, she was already contemplating a similar stance against the market leaders in many of America's industries, including technology, the pharmaceutical sector, and finance. Wu's colleague at Columbia Law School Lina Khan in 2016 wrote a seminal paper (while at Yale), taking a similar stance: “Amazon's Antitrust Paradox.”33 Economists such as Gabriel Zucman, Emmanuel Saez, Kenneth Rogoff, and Nobel Prize winners Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz have also stated Big Tech has “too much power”34 or needs to be more strictly regulated. Leading journalists including Nicholas Thompson, the editor in chief of Wired, and Rana Foroohar, associate editor of the Financial Times, favor antitrust action against Big Tech too.

The Death of Money: The Coming Collapse of the International Monetary System
by James Rickards
Published 7 Apr 2014

Plugging these actual numbers into the PDS framework results in: (2.5 + 1) – 1.5 < 4, or 2 < 4 In this example, real growth plus inflation minus interest expense is less than the primary deficit, which means that debt as a percentage of GDP is increasing. This is the unsustainable condition. Again, what matters in this model is not the level but the trend, as played out in the dynamics of the BRITS and their interactions. Contrary to the oft-cited Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff thesis, the absolute level of debt to GDP is not what triggers a crisis; it is the trend toward unsustainability. One beauty of PDS is that the math is simple. Starting with the identity as 2 < 4 means that to achieve sustainability, either the 2 must go up, the 4 must go down, or both. Real growth in the United States today is stuck at 2.5 percent, partly due to policy uncertainty.

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CHAPTER 10 CROSSROADS I’m the fellow who takes away the punch bowl just when the party is getting good. William McChesney Martin Jr. Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, 1951–70 The trouble is that this is no ordinary recession, and a lot of people have not had any punch yet. Kenneth Rogoff June 6, 2013 Developed countries have no reason to default. They can always print money. George Soros April 9, 2013 ■ The Inflation-Deflation Paradox Federal Reserve policy is at a crossroads facing unpleasant paths in all directions. Monetary policy around the world has reached the point where the contradictions embedded in years of market manipulation have left no choices that do not involve either contraction or catastrophic risk.

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the relationship of U.S. debt and deficits . . . : John H. Makin, “Trillion-Dollar Deficits Are Sustainable for Now, Unfortunately,” American Enterprise Institute, December 13, 2012, http://www.aei.org/outloook/trillion-dollar-deficits-are-sustainable-for-now-unfortunately. Contrary to the oft-cited . . . : Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, “Growth in a Time of Debt,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper no. 15639, January 2010, http://www.nber.org/papers/w15639. “The Liquidation of Government Debt”: Carmen M. Reinhart and M. Belen Sbrancia, “The Liquidation of Government Debt,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper no. 16893, March 2011, http://www.nber.org/papers/w16893.

EuroTragedy: A Drama in Nine Acts
by Ashoka Mody
Published 7 May 2018

Sweden and the United Kingdom, having consciously stayed out of the eurozone, had also achieved irrational exuberance 173 low inflation rates. Even Poland, much poorer than euro-​area countries and hence more likely to experience bursts of inflation, had contained its inflation to near the euro-​area average. Indeed, inflation had rapidly come down throughout the world. As Kenneth Rogoff, then the IMF’s chief economist and director of its research department, explained, competition from Chinese and other Asian exporters had “put downward pressure” on prices.78 Inflation had come down everywhere, in large part because cheap Chinese manufactured goods were keeping a lid on prices.

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Another Princeton economist, Christopher Sims, spoke next, and he had the same message: “Opening up capital markets in poor countries has often led initially to large inflows and later to financial problems.”137 Sims also warned of the risk of sovereign defaults. In August 2003, economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff noted that Greece and Portugal belonged to the small club of “serial defaulters.”138 Both had defaulted on external creditors multiple times in the nineteenth century. Rogoff was still the IMF’s chief economist and Reinhart was one of his deputies. Together with their colleague, Miguel Savastano, they reported that serial defaulters had “weak fiscal structures and weak financial systems,” which persisted for years.

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Bailout” Paulson, feeling political heat, decided that this was the time to stand firm against rescuing Lehman.92 Without Bear Stearns-style protection for its creditors, there was no buyer for Lehman. On September 15, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. Stock prices declined. The stress in the interbank market rose. Kenneth Rogoff—​Harvard University economics professor, former chief economist of the IMF, and a man who had dropped out of high school to become a chess grand master—​was prominent among commentators who welcomed the decision to let Lehman fall. In an op-​ed piece for the Washington Post on September 16, Rogoff’s theme was “The Government is willing to let Wall Street firms fail.

The Only Game in Town: Central Banks, Instability, and Avoiding the Next Collapse
by Mohamed A. El-Erian
Published 26 Jan 2016

The good news from this book is that if policymakers get their act together, things could be a lot better. The bad news is that this seasoned and influential veteran isn’t at all sure this will happen. The Only Game in Town is simply a must-read for anyone trying to understand how the global economy might unfold in the next five years.” —Kenneth Rogoff, Thomas D. Cabot Professor of Public Policy at Harvard University, and former chief economist and director of research at the International Monetary Fund “In his next book, The Only Game in Town, Mohamed El-Erian has done several important things superbly. First, he has presented the first really comprehensive assessment of the multiple challenges to sustainable and inclusive growth facing a wide range of countries and the global economy.

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They avoided talking about debt reduction despite the fact that their emergency liquidity support to highly indebted countries was associated with growth rates that consistently undershot their own expectations and projections. And they underestimated the societal and political implications of a prolonged period of economic underperformance and financial insecurity. The harmful consequences have been material. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff have noted, because the advanced economies have not been able to also use other options, such as debt restructuring and conversions, which were used in the 1930s, they have been undermined by a “forgotten lesson.”6 It is high time to change this. 4. GETTING THE ARCHITECTURE RIGHT (OR, AT LEAST, LESS WRONG) A.

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“The Fund’s Lending Framework and Sovereign Debt,” International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., June 2014, http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/052214a.pdf. 5. See, for example, “Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative,” IMF Factsheet, Washington, D.C., September 2014, https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm. 6. Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, “Financial and Sovereign Debt Crises: Some Lessons Learned and Those Forgotten,” IMF Working Paper, WP/13/266, December 2013, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13266.pdf. 7. “Bleak Words and Difficult Homework from the IMF,” Financial Times, October 5, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/53516aec-4af6-11e4-b1be-00144feab7de.html. 8.

Shocks, Crises, and False Alarms: How to Assess True Macroeconomic Risk
by Philipp Carlsson-Szlezak and Paul Swartz
Published 8 Jul 2024

However, when assessing risk, a focus on the quantity of debt is either outright deceptive (if quoted in nominal terms, as in our chart, the debt is not meaningfully compared over time) or not particularly helpful (showing debt as a share of income still says little about the sustainability of that debt). The focus on levels harbors an assumption that there is a tipping point. This levels focus became academic dictum in the early 2010s when economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff concluded that the data said external debts in excess of 90% of GDP would drastically reduce growth rates.6 This added a counterproductive urgency to austerity and gave credence to the feeling that at some level, an extra billion dollars in debt will deliver a Shriverian dystopia. But that’s not how it works—at all.

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It merely states that the conditions for global business interests were predominantly favorable and stable. 2. “And I don’t know how long it’s going to take us to get back to the 2019 per capita GDP. I would say, looking at it now, five years would seem like a good outcome out of this,” said Kenneth Rogoff in “This Time Really Is Different,” Bloomberg Markets, June–July 2020, https://www.magzter.com/stories/Investment/Bloomberg-Markets/This-Time-Really-is-Different. See also Nouriel Roubini, “The Coming Greater Depression of the 2020s,” Project Syndicate, April 28, 2020, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/greater-depression-covid19-headwinds-by-nouriel-roubini-2020-04, and Stephen Roach, “The Dollar’s Crash Is Only Just Beginning,” Bloomberg, January 25, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-01-25/the-dollar-s-crash-is-only-just-beginning. 3.

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Drucker, “The Changed World Economy,” Foreign Affairs, Spring 1986, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1986-03-01/changed-world-economy. 5. Philipp Carlsson-Szlezak and Paul Swartz, “Why High Debt Levels Don’t Worry Us (Too Much)—r-Minus-g, Its Spread, and Its Quality,” Sanford C. Bernstein, October 7, 2019. 6. Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, “Growth in a Time of Debt,” American Economic Review, May 2010. (Note: While the authors in their academic works are more nuanced about the causal linkages, little nuance survived in the political debate around debt that this article triggered. Ultimately the debate faded as this article by Reinhart and Rogoff was found to have mechanical errors.) 7.

The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy
by Dani Rodrik
Published 23 Dec 2010

Similarly, a paper I wrote calling into question the widely held view that freer trade has promoted growth around the world was published in a publication of the National Bureau of Economic Research, the premier network for applied economists—Francisco Rodriguez and Dani Rodrik, “Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic’s Guide to the Cross-National Evidence” in Ben Bernanke and Kenneth S. Rogoff, eds., Macroeconomics Annual 2000 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press for NBER, 2001). 20 Driskill, “Deconstructing the Argument for Free Trade,” p. 6. 21 Ibid., p. 2. 4. Bretton Woods, GATT, and the WTO 1 John Maynard Keynes, “National Self-Sufficiency,” The Yale Review, vol. 22, no. 4 (June 1933), pp. 755–69.

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Calvo, “Explaining Sudden Stops, Growth Collapse and BOP Crises: The Case of Distortionary Output Taxes,” in his Emerging Capital Markets in Turmoil: Bad Luck or Bad Policy? (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005). 30 Laeven and Fabian, “Systemic Bank Crises,” p. 25. 31 Charles P. Kindleberger, Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises (New York: Basic Books, 1989). 32 Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, “This Time Is Different: A Panoramic View of Eight Centuries of Financial Crises,” Unpublished paper, Harvard University, April 16, 2008, p. 7 (http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/ rogoff/files/This_Time_Is_Different.pdf). 33 Research at the IMF has shown that the volatility of consumption in the developing economies rose under financial globalization—M.

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Norton, 2002). 13 Jagdish Bhagwati, “The Capital Myth: The Difference Between Trade in Widgets and Dollars,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 77, no. 3 (May–June 1998), pp. 7–12. 14 Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 239. 15 M. Ayhan Kose, Eswar Prasad, Kenneth Rogoff, and Shang-Jin Wei, “Financial Globalization: A Reappraisal,” IMF Staff Papers, vol. 56, no. 1 (April 2009), pp. 8–62. 16 Louise Story, Landon Thomas, Jr., and Nelson D. Schwartz, “Wall St. Helped to Mask Debt Fueling Europe’s Crisis,” New York Times, February 13, 2010 (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/14/ business/global/14debt.html?

The Butterfly Defect: How Globalization Creates Systemic Risks, and What to Do About It
by Ian Goldin and Mike Mariathasan
Published 15 Mar 2014

Nestor A. Espenilla Jr., 2009, “Regulatory Factors That Contributed to the Global Financial Crisis,” Asia-Pacific Social Science Review 9 (1): 35–40. 40. James H. Stock and Mark W. Watson, 2002. “Has the Business Cycle Changed and Why?,” in NBER Macroeconomics Annual, vol. 17, ed. Mark Gertler and Kenneth Rogoff (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 159–218. 41. Andrew G. Haldane, 2009, “Rethinking the Financial Network,” speech delivered to the Amsterdam Student Association, April, accessed 21 January 2013, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/speeches/2009/speech386.pdf. 42. Authors’ calculation based on data from Lucinda Maer and Nida Broughton, 2012, “Financial Services: Contribution to the UK Economy,” SN/EP/06193, House of Commons Library (Economics, Politics, and Statistics Section), p. 3, table 1, accessed 22 January 2013, http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06193.pdf. 43.

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Global Study Magazine 4 (3): 36–49. Pongsiri, Monitira J., Joe Roman, Vanessa O. Ezenwa, Tony L. Goldberg, Hillel S. Koren, Stephen C. Newbold, Richard S. Ostfeld, Subhrendu K. Pattanayak, and Daniel J. Salkeld. 2009. “Biodiversity Loss Affects Global Disease Ecology.” BioScience 59 (11): 945–954. Prasad, Eswar S., Kenneth Rogoff, Shang-Jin Wei, and M. Ayan Kose. 2003. “Effects of Financial Globalization on Developing Countries: Some Empirical Evidence.” IMF Occasional Paper 220. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. Pritchett, Lant. 1997. “Convergence, Big Time.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 11 (3): 3–17.

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London: Vintage. Stiglitz, Jospeh E. 2006. Making Globalization Work. London: W. W. Norton. ———. 2012. The Price of Inequality. London: Allen Lane. Stock, James H., and Mark W. Watson. 2002. “Has the Business Cycle Changed and Why?” In NBER Macroeconomics Annual, vol. 17, ed. Mark Gertler and Kenneth Rogoff. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 159–218. Strasburg, Jenny, and Jacob Bunge. 2012. “Loss Swamps Trading Firm: Knight Capital Searches for Partner as Tab for Computer Glitch Hits $440 Million.” Wall Street Journal, 2 August. Accessed 21 January 2013. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443866404577564772083961412.html.

Prosperity Without Growth: Foundations for the Economy of Tomorrow
by Tim Jackson
Published 8 Dec 2016

Online at www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/dp-a-safe-and-just-space-for-humanity-130212-en_5.pdf (accessed 30 March 2016). Reay, David, Colin Ramshaw and Adam Harvey 2008. Process Intensification: Engineering for Efficiency, Sustainability and Flexibility. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann. Reinhart, Carmen and Kenneth Rogoff 2013. ‘Financial and sovereign debt crises: some lessons learned and those forgotten’. IMF Working Paper WP/13/266. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. Reinhart, Carmen and Kenneth Rogoff 2010. ‘Growth in a time of debt’. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 100: 573–578. Ridley, Matt 1996. The Origins of Virtue. London: Penguin Books. Ridley, Matt 1994. The Red Queen – Sex and the Evolution of Human Nature.

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Rogelj, Joeri, Michiel Schaeffer, Pierre Friedlingstein, Nathan Gillett, Detlef van Vuuren, Keywan Riahi et al. 2016. ‘Differences between carbon budget estimates unravelled’. Nature Climate Change 6: 245–252. doi:10.1038/nclimate2868. Rogoff, Kenneth 2015. ‘Oil prices and global growth. Project syndicate’. Online at www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/oil-prices-global-growth-by-kenneth-rogoff-2015-12?utm_source=Project+Syndicate+Newsletter&utm_campaign=c9ff3f432f-Rogoff_Oil_Prices_and_Global_Growth_12_20_2015&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_73bad5b7d8-c9ff3f432f-104293997 (accessed 18 December 2015). Rose, Hilary and Stephen Rose 2000. Alas, Poor Darwin – Arguments Against Evolutionary Psychology.

Them And Us: Politics, Greed And Inequality - Why We Need A Fair Society
by Will Hutton
Published 30 Sep 2010

Equally problematic is determining a sustainable level of public debt, which is certain to rise to maintain economic activity in almost every country as private debt starts to fall. Most countries can handle public debt up to 90 per cent of GDP; above that level, the ratio of debt service to any reasonable level of tax receipts as a share of GDP starts to nudge above 10 per cent, which causes problems for most states over time. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff say that once ratios of public debt to GDP exceed 90 per cent, median growth rates fall by 1 per cent a year, but there is no association between growth and public debt below 90 per cent.5 Indeed, if rising public debt is associated with an increase in capital investment, it can even stimulate growth rates.

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See also Julia Jones, Piyamas Nanork and Benjamin Oldroyd (2007) ‘The Role of Genetic Diversity in Nest Cooling in a Wild Honey Bee, Apis florea’, Journal of Comparative Physiology a-Neuroethology Sensory Neural and Behavioral Physiology 193 (2): 159–65. 55 Dean Amel, Colleen Barnes, Fabio Panetta and Carmelo Salleo (2004) ‘Consolidation and Efficiency in the Financial Sector: A Review of the International Evidence’, Journal of Banking and Finance 28: 2493–519. 56 ACT Response to the Turner Review of Banking Regulation, at http://www.treasurers.org/reviewbankingregulation/actresponse/0609. 57 Peter Boone and Simon Johnson, ‘Bernanke on Banking’, Economix, 19 October 2009, at http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/29/bernankeon-banking/. 58 Manmohan Singh (2010) ‘Collateral, Netting and Systemic Risk in the OTC Derivatives Market’, IMF Working Paper No. 10/99. 59 Michael Lewis (2010) The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine, Allen Lane. Chapter Eight: The £5 Trillion Mistake 1 Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff (2010) This Time is Different, Princeton University Press. 2 HM Treasury (2009) Pre-Budget Report 2009: Securing the Recovery: Growth and Opportunity, HMSO. See also Martin Wolf, ‘Britain’s Dismal Choice: Sharing the Losses’, Financial Times, 15 December 2009, at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f693b6a4-e9af-11de-9f1f-00144feab49a,s01=1.html. 3 OECD (2009) OECD Factbook, OECD, with Treasury figures and estimates for 2008 and 2009. 4 Robert Chote, Carl Emmerson and Jonathan Shaw (eds) (2010) The Institute for Fiscal Studies Green Budget, IFS. 5 Francesco Guerrera, ‘Welch Denounces Corporate Obsessions’, Financial Times, 13 March 2009, at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3ca8ec2e-0f70-11de-ba10-0000779fd2ac.html. 6 Max Hastings, ‘The End of Britain’s Long Weekend’, Financial Times, 20 December 2009, at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1e9f7cdc-ed8e-11de-ba12-00144feab49a.html. 7 Internal Cabinet Office analysis. 8 Chris Giles, ‘Manufacturing Fades under Labour’, Financial Times, 2 December 2009, at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f32a3392-df7a-11de-98ca-00144feab49a.html. 9 Leonard Trelawny Hobhouse (1911) Liberalism, at socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/hobhouse/liberalism.pdf. 10 Buffett, Gates and Simon are all cited in Gar Alperovitz and Lew Daly (2008) Unjust Deserts: How the Rich Are Taking Our Common Inheritance and Why We Should Take It Back, The New Press. 11 Antonio Afonso, Ludger Schuknecht and Vito Tanzi (2005) ‘Public Sector Efficiency: An International Comparison’, Public Choice 123 (3–4): 321–47.

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Portsmouth’s predicament compares starkly with the current approach favoured by its south-coast neighbours, Southampton, of building up the side over time. 3 Margot Finn (2003) The Character of Credit: Personal Debt in English Culture, 1740–1914, Cambridge University Press. 4 McKinsey Global Institute (2010) ‘Debt and Deleveraging: The Global Credit Bubble and its Economic Consequences’, report. 5 Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff (forthcoming) ‘Growth in a Time of Debt’, prepared for the American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings. 6 McKinsey Global Institute (2010) ‘Debt and Deleveraging: The Global Credit Bubble and its Economic Consequences’, report. 7 Richard Koo (2008) The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics: Lessons from Japan’s Great Recession, John Wiley & Sons. 8 Robert Chote, Carl Emmerson and Jonathan Shaw (eds) (2010) The Green Budget 2010, Institute for Fiscal Studies. 9 Ken Coutts and Robert Rowthorn (2009) ‘Prospects for the UK Balance of Payments’, University of Cambridge Centre for Business Research Working Paper No. 394. 10 Kenneth Rogoff (2003) ‘Globalisation and Global Disinflation’, presented to the Conference on Monetary Policy and Uncertainty: Adapting to a Changing Economy, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. 11 Olivier Blanchard and John Simon, ‘The Long and Large Decline in US Output Volatility’, Brooklyn Papers on Economic Activity 1 (2001): 135–64. 12 On similar themes, see Jonathan McCarthy and Egon Zakrajsek (2003) ‘Inventory Dynamics and Business Cycles: What Has Changed?’

13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown
by Simon Johnson and James Kwak
Published 29 Mar 2010

Quoted in Wessel, In Fed We Trust, supra note 3, at 23. 25. Sorkin, Too Big to Fail, supra note 2, at 2. 26. Troubled Asset Relief Program Office of the Special Inspector General, Quarterly Report to Congress, April 21, 2009. 27. See Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, “Is the 2007 U.S. Subprime Crisis So Different? An International Historical Comparison,” American Economic Review 98 (2008): 339–44; and Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, “The Aftermath of Financial Crises” (paper presented at the meetings of the American Economic Association, January 3, 2009), available at http://www.aeaweb.org/annual_mtg_papers/2009/retrieve.php?pdfid=140. 28.

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In January 2008, just as the economy was tipping into recession, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projected that, by the end of 2018, U.S. government debt would fall to $5.1 trillion, or 22.6 percent of GDP. Surveying the wreckage in August 2009, the CBO projected that debt at the end of 2018 would rise to $13.6 trillion, or 67.0 percent of GDP—a difference of $8.5 trillion.78 This should come as no surprise; Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff have shown that, on average, modern banking crises lead to an 86 percent increase in government debt over the three years following the crisis.79 The financial crisis and the government’s emergency response also increased the likelihood of two bleak scenarios. First, the enormous amount of liquidity that the Federal Reserve poured into the economy created the long-term potential for high inflation; if the Fed cannot “mop up” that liquidity when the economy recovers, all that excess money could make dollars less valuable, driving up prices.

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Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2008 to 2018, January 2008, available at http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/89xx/doc8917/01–23–2008_BudgetOutlook.pdf; Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update, August 2009, available at http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/105xx/doc10521/08–25-BudgetUpdate.pdf. 79. Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 231–32. 80. Maura Reynolds and Janet Hook, “Critics Say Bush Is Not Doing Enough,” Los Angeles Times, March 18, 2008, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/mar/18/nation/na-bush18; cited in Sorkin, Too Big to Fail, supra note 2, at 38. 81.

What Went Wrong: How the 1% Hijacked the American Middle Class . . . And What Other Countries Got Right
by George R. Tyler
Published 15 Jul 2013

The discipline of the gold standard and prudence of American presidents produced some global fiscal stability in the post–World War II era. Between 1960 and the early 1980s, for example, severe sovereign credit crises involving default or restructuring afflicted fewer than 15 percent of countries. That was easily the lowest share since 1827. But, as economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff document in their book, This Time is Different, the number of profligate nations that became severely indebted leaped in the Reagan era. By the end of Ronald Reagan’s Presidency, nearly 40 percent of nations across the globe had succumbed to his siren song of wildcat banking and were dealing with severe debt crises.38 America hopefully will not face a debt crisis in the years ahead.

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The added responsibility the current system imposes on trade union and employer negotiators has had similar salutary effects on inflation in Australia.26 CHAPTER 18 GLOBALIZATION CAN BE A BOON OR A BANE “The positive conclusions of the cross-country study of inequality were that widening income gaps were not inevitable and technology forces driving incomes apart could be successfully countered with active government policies…. Globalisation had little impact on the gap between rich and poor.”1 Editorial, Financial Times, December 2011 “Germany has been the winner in the globalization process.”2 KENNETH ROGOFF, Der Spiegel, February 20, 2012 “67 percent of French employees believe globalization is ‘good for employment in France.’”3 ANNE RODIER, Le Monde, June 26, 2011 Globalization holds a potent lesson for America. But as we are learning, it isn’t the one you might anticipate: families in almost all other rich democracies benefited from the acceleration of international trade in recent decades.

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In contrast, the profit share from manufacturing has slumped to a de minimus 10 or 12 percent. Easy credit and especially deregulation hastened growth in the financial sector, featuring rising bank leverage, opaque off-balance-sheet entities, and abuse of borrowers. The Harvard banking expert Kenneth Rogoff argues that this growth occurred because deregulation created vast new—if risky—opportunities for the financial sector to speculate: “How could financial services be a third of the economy? And the answer was that it was taking much bigger risks that it should have.”9 Peter Boone of the London School of Economics and Simon Johnson also finger deregulation: “Before 1935 and after 1980, however, the Fed’s financial regulation was and has been weak.

War and Gold: A Five-Hundred-Year History of Empires, Adventures, and Debt
by Kwasi Kwarteng
Published 12 May 2014

Such eighteenth-century luminaries as Edmund Burke, Thomas Jefferson and David Hume were all fervent in their denunciations of paper money. Today government debt and deficits are arguably the greatest challenge facing the developed economies of the world. In a widely cited book, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff analysed the nature of government indebtedness over 800 years of ‘financial folly’. Debt crises have been punctuating world history for centuries, as governments continued to spend beyond their resources. This is the theme of Reinhart and Rogoff’s work.6 My book implicitly argues a rather different case.

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As George Papandreou swept into power after the elections of 4 October 2009, he promised a new beginning. Behind the optimism and the vague and cloudy phrases lay the reality of 200 years of Greek financial history. ‘From 1800 to well after World War II, Greece found itself virtually in continual default,’ noted Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff in their important history of financial crises, This Time is Different.40 Such a history would perhaps have disqualified Greece automatically from ever being considered as a full participant in the euro. But it became such a participant, because political considerations were paramount in the promotion of the European single currency; economics played only a minor part.

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Williamson, ‘The Price of Gold, 1257–2011’, MeasuringWorth, 2012, http://www.measuringworth.com/gold Total world gold stock: ‘Thomson Reuters GFMS Historic Gold Stock’, in James Turk, The Aboveground Gold Stock: Its Importance and Its Size, GoldMoney Foundation, http://www.goldmoney.com/documents/goldmoney-gold-stock.xls Notes Introduction 1John Maynard Keynes, ‘Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren’, in Essays in Persuasion, London, 1972 (1st edn 1931), p. 323. 2Joseph Schumpeter, The Crisis of the Tax State, Vienna, 1919. 3F. W. Maitland, Domesday Book and Beyond, Cambridge, 1907, p. 9. 4Ian Fleming, Goldfinger, London, 1959. 5Philip Coggan, Paper Promises: Money, Debt and the New World Order, London, 2011, p. 3. 6Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton, 2009. 7B. R. Mitchell, British Historical Statistics, Cambridge, 1988, pp. 601–3. 8Niall Ferguson, The Cash Nexus, London, 2001, p. 126. 9A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, London, 1961, p. 25. 10John Maynard Keynes, General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, London, 2007 (1st edn 1936), p. 383. 11Peer Vries, Public Finance in China and Britain in the Long Eighteenth Century, London School of Economics, Working Papers no. 167/12, London, August 2012, p. 17. 12John Kenneth Galbraith, Money: Whence It Came, Where It Went, 2nd edn, London, 1995 (1st edn 1975), pp. 3–4.

The Classical School
by Callum Williams
Published 19 May 2020

“Adam Smith’s Rise to Fame: A Reexamination of the Evidence”. The Eighteenth Century 23, no. 1 (1982): 64–85. Rashid, Salim. “Mandeville’s Fable: Laissez-faire or Libertinism?”. Eighteenth-Century Studies 18, no. 3 (1985): 313–330. Reeves, Richard. John Stuart Mill: Victorian Firebrand. Atlantic Books Ltd, 2015. Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth S. Rogoff. 2009. This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Riley, Jonathan. “Mill’s Political Economy: Ricardian Science and Liberal Utilitarian Art”. In J. Skorupski, ed., The Cambridge Companion to John Stuart Mill. pp. 293–337. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

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Under the cooperative system the workers would own the capital that they worked with, rather than working on someone else’s capital. So all the value created in the production process would end up accruing to the workers in their joint role as labourers and owners. Chapter 10–Jean-Baptiste Say (1767–1832) 1. This is an estimate from Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart’s database. 2. For this biographical information I am grateful to William Baumol’s research. 3. No relation to David, unfortunately. 4. As Joseph Schumpeter points out, in the United States a professorship of Moral Philosophy and Political Economy was founded at Columbia in 1818. 5.

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This is where George Stigler’s characterisation of Ricardo as proposing a “93% labour theory of value” comes from. 14. Rothbard’s analysis of the Marx–Engels intellectual tangle is particularly interesting. Chapter 16–Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) 1. These estimates are from Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff’s database. 2. Stalin argued that “[t]o keep on strengthening state power in order to prepare the conditions for the withering away of state power–that is the Marxist formula.” Chapter 17–William Stanley Jevons (1835–1882) 1. It is not a settled question who was the first person to suggest “economics” in place of “political economy”.

Cloudmoney: Cash, Cards, Crypto, and the War for Our Wallets
by Brett Scott
Published 4 Jul 2022

A number of macro-economists are excited about this latter property, because it opens up the potential for ‘negative interest rates’ – the ability to get banks to erode people’s digital deposits, which, if done during a recession, might hypothetically inspire people to spend rather than hoard money. Along with researchers at the IMF, the Harvard professor Kenneth Rogoff has been at the forefront of attacking cash on these grounds, arguing that it stands in the way of this hidden monetary policy tool. Despite this, many central bankers officially describe themselves as ‘neutral’ on cash, neither overtly supporting it nor discouraging it. The problem, though, is that being neutral on an uneven playing field is roughly the same as supporting the most powerful party.

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Venture to any trendy café where the clientele have good credit ratings, and you will quickly see that digital payment thrives among social climbers who see themselves as sophisticated. This is not often reflected in commentary about the future of money, because commentary tends to be a speciality of people in higher-status social circles. Take, for example, Kenneth Rogoff, the high-profile author of The Curse of Cash, formerly head economist at the IMF, and now a professor at Harvard. His anti-cash opinions get easy access to politicians, high-profile academics and the media. Others, like Richard Thaler – who won the Nobel Prize in economics for his work on nudge theory – publicly praised India’s Modi government for clamping down on cash.

The End of Alchemy: Money, Banking and the Future of the Global Economy
by Mervyn King
Published 3 Mar 2016

Bank Underground, Bank of England website. Rae, John (1895), The Life of Adam Smith, Macmillan and Co., London. Reddaway, W. Brian (1939), The Economic Consequences of a Declining Population, Allen and Unwin, London. Reinhart, Carmen M. and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2009), This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. Reinhart, Carmen, Vincent Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff (2015), ‘Dealing with Debt’, Journal of International Economics, forthcoming. Ricardo, David (1816), Proposals for an Economical and Secure Currency, T. Davison, London. Roberts, Andrew (2014), Napoleon the Great, Allen Lane, London.

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So why, after the biggest monetary stimulus the world has ever seen, and six years after the end of the banking crisis, is the world recovery so slow? Some economists believe that we are experiencing what they call ‘secular stagnation’, a phrase coined by the American economist Alvin Hansen in his 1938 book Full Recovery or Stagnation?36 Today’s American economists, such as Ben Bernanke, Paul Krugman, Kenneth Rogoff and Larry Summers, have been using the more modern literary form of blogging to debate the issue. But it is not exactly clear what they mean by secular stagnation. Does it refer to stagnation of supply or of demand, or indeed both? Growth today seems possible only if interest rates are much lower than normal – at present the long-term real rate of interest is close to zero.

Naked Economics: Undressing the Dismal Science (Fully Revised and Updated)
by Charles Wheelan
Published 18 Apr 2010

Mary Ellen Moore and Danielle Kutasov offered excellent research assistance, finding the facts, figures, and anecdotes that had eluded me. Three accomplished economists were kind enough to take time from their busy schedules to read the first edition manuscript and make helpful comments: Burton Malkiel, Robert Willis, and Kenneth Rogoff. These three men are giants of the profession, and each had many other things that they might have done with their time. Robert Johnson was kind enough to read the international economics chapter that has been added to the second edition. I appreciate his willingness to share his expertise on the topic.

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To the rest of the world, Brazil had thrown a giant half-price sale and Argentina could do nothing but stand by and watch. As the Argentine economy limped along, economists debated the wisdom of the currency board. The proponents argued that it was an important source of macroeconomic stability; the skeptics said that it would cause more harm than good. In 1995, Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff, economists at UC Berkeley and Princeton, respectively, had published a paper warning that most attempts to maintain a fixed exchange rate, such as the Argentine currency board, were likely to end in failure.7 Time proved the skeptics right. In December 2001, the long-suffering Argentine economy unraveled completely.

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Sylvia Nasar, “Weak Dollar Makes U.S. World’s Bargain Bazaar,” New York Times, September 28, 1992. 5. Ian Rowley, “Why Japan Hasn’t Stopped the Yen’s Rise,” Business Week (online), January 15, 2009. 6. Paul Krugman, “Misguided Monetary Mentalities,” New York Times, October 12, 2009. 7. Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff, “The Mirage of Fixed Exchange Rates,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper W5191, July 1995. 8. Anthony Ramirez, “Pepsi Will Be Bartered for Ships and Vodka in Deal With Soviets,” New York Times, April 9, 1990. 9. Peter Gumble, “Iceland: The Country That Became a Hedge Fund,” CNN Money.com, December 4, 2008. 10.

The Limits of the Market: The Pendulum Between Government and Market
by Paul de Grauwe and Anna Asbury
Published 12 Mar 2017

This euphoria has a blinding effect, and few people notice the risks. Real estate prices and share prices continue to rise. The markets exercise no disciplining influence whatsoever on people’s behaviour. On the contrary, they lead the way to increased euphoria and an ever greater lack of discipline. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff emphasize in their book This Time is Different,8 in periods of euphoria people tell tales which suggest that the price rises in shares or real estate are the result of fundamental developments. They believe that these high prices are the consequence of new technological developments and are completely justified.

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See for example <http://www.iflscience.com/environment/climatologistarctic-carbon-release-could-mean-“were-fucked”>. . Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (New York: Viking, ). . See Alan Greenspan, The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World (London: Allen Lane, ). . Carmen M. Reinhardt and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, ). . Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (London: Allen Lane, ). . Kenneth J. Arrow, ‘Gifts and exchanges’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, / (), pp. –. .

The Captured Economy: How the Powerful Enrich Themselves, Slow Down Growth, and Increase Inequality
by Brink Lindsey
Published 12 Oct 2017

The problem of regressive regulatory rents is much bigger than these specific instances, but we hope that a close look at these instances will suffice to give a well-grounded appreciation of how widespread and serious the problem has become. 3 FINANCE IN ANY SEARCH FOR POLICIES that slow growth and drive inequality, financial regulation is an obvious place to start. After all, the financial sector was Ground Zero for the worst economic crisis to hit this country since the Great Depression. As Harvard economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff have documented, financial crises are terrible for growth because recoveries from them are generally slow and arduous.1 The US experience since the bursting of the housing bubble certainly jibes with Reinhart and Rogoff’s analysis, as the expansion in the aftermath of the Great Recession has been the slowest on record since World War II.

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Regulatory Reform,” Progressive Policy Institute Policy Memo, May 2013, http://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/05.2013-Mandel-Carew_Regulatory-Improvement-Commission_A-Politically-Viable-Approach-to-US-Regulatory-Reform.pdf. Chapter 3 1.See Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time It’s Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011). 2.See Tyler Atkinson, David Luttrell, and Harvey Rosenblum, “How Bad Was It? The Costs and Consequences of the 2007–09 Financial Crisis,” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Staff Paper no. 20, July 2013, https://dallasfed.org/assets/documents/research/staff/staff1301.pdf. 3.See Jon Bakija, Adam Cole, and Bradley T.

The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World
by Niall Ferguson
Published 13 Nov 2007

In countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand there was a very severe recession in 1998. Yet neither Stiglitz nor Krugman offers a convincing account of how the East Asian crisis might have been better managed on standard Keynesian lines, with currencies being allowed to float and government deficits to rise. In the acerbic words of an open letter to Stiglitz by Kenneth Rogoff, who became chief economist at the IMF after the Asian crisis: Governments typically come to the IMF for financial assistance when they are having trouble finding buyers for their debt and when the value of their money is falling. The Stiglitzian prescription is to raise . . . fiscal deficits, that is, to issue more debt and to print more money.

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Others estimated costs of a trillion dollars or more: Pontell and Calavita, ‘Savings and Loan Industry’, p. 203. 51 For a vivid account, see Michael Lewis, Liar’s Poker (London, 1989), pp. 78-124. 52 Bernanke, ‘Housing, Housing Finance, and Monetary Policy’. 53 I am grateful to Joseph Barillari for his assistance with these calculations. Morris A. Davisa, Andreas Lehnert and Robert F. Martin, ‘The Rent-Price Ratio for the Aggregate Stock of Owner-Occupied Housing’, Working paper (December 2007). 54 Shiller, ‘Recent Trends in House Prices’. 55 Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, ‘Is the 2007 Sub-Prime Financial Crisis So Different? An International Historical Comparison’, Draft Working Paper (14 January 2008). 56 Mark Whitehouse, ‘Debt Bomb: Inside the “Subprime” Mortgage Debacle’, Wall Street Journal, 30 May 2007, p. A1. 57 See Kimberly Blanton, ‘A “Smoking Gun” on Race, Subprime Loans’, Boston Globe, 16 March 2007. 58 ‘U.S.

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sid=04/11/09/1526251. 62 John Perkins, Confessions of an Economic Hit Man (New York, 2004), p. xi. 63 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York, 2002), pp. 12, 14, 15, 17. 64 Abdelal, Capital Rules, pp. 50f., 57-75. 65 Paul Krugman, The Return of Depression Economics (London, 1999). 66 ‘The Fund Bites Back’, The Economist, 4 July 2002. 67 Kenneth Rogoff, ‘The Sisters at 60’, The Economist, 22 July 2004. Cf. ‘Not Even a Cat to Rescue’, The Economist, 20 April 2006. 68 See the classic study by Fritz Stern, Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichröder and the Building of the German Empire (Harmondsworth, 1987). 69 George Soros, The Alchemy of Finance: Reading the Mind of the Market (New York, 1987), pp. 27-30. 70 Robert Slater, Soros: The Life, Times and Trading Secrets of the World’s Greatest Investor (New York, 1996), pp. 48f. 71 George Soros, The New Paradigm for Financial Markets: The Credit Crash of 2008 and What It Means (New York, 2008), p. x. 72 Slater, Soros, p. 78. 73 Ibid., pp. 105, 107ff. 74 Ibid., p. 172. 75 Ibid., pp. 177, 182, 188. 76 Ibid., p. 10. 77 Ibid., p. 159. 78 Nicholas Dunbar, Inventing Money: The Story of Long-Term Capital Management and the Legends Behind It (New York, 2000), p. 92. 79 Dunbar, Inventing Money, pp. 168-73. 80 André F.

The End of Growth: Adapting to Our New Economic Reality
by Richard Heinberg
Published 1 Jun 2011

Moreover, much of this apparent growth has come about because of enormous injections of stimulus and bailout money from the Federal government. Subtract those, and the GDP growth of the past year or so almost disappears. On the basis of historical analysis of previous financial crises, economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff conclude that the economic crisis of 2008 will have “. . .deep and lasting effects on asset prices, output and employment. Unemployment rises and housing price declines extend out for five and six years, respectively. On the encouraging side, output declines last only two years on average. Even recessions sparked by financial crises do eventually end, albeit almost invariably accompanied by massive increases in government debt....

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See Stephen Broadberry et al., “British Economic Growth, 1270–1870,” University of Warwick, UK, published online December 6, 2010. 7. “GDP United States (Recent History),” Data360.org, data360.org/dsg.aspx?Data_Set_Group_Id=353&page=3&count=100. 8. “‘Great Recession’ Over, Research Group Says,” msnbc.msn.com, posted September 20, 2010. 9. Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, “The Aftermath of Financial Crises,” (presented at the meeting of the American Economic Association, San Francisco, CA, January 3, 2009). 10. In philosophy this is called the problem of induction. One cannot infer that a series of events will happen in the future just as they have in past.

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The Atlantic, 9/21/2010theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/09/why-we-dont-need-to-pay-down-the-national-debt/63273. 17. For a perspective on why US government debt may not face limits anytime soon, as long as the economy returns to growth, see James K. Galbraith, “Casting Light on ‘The Moment of Truth,’” The Huffington Post, posted December 3, 2010. 18. Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009). 19. See Paul Krugman, “The burden of debt,” New Y Times. 4/28/2009. krugman.blogs. nytimes.com/2009/08/28/the-burden-of-debt/; Daniel Berger, “The Deficit: Size Doesn’t Matter” (2009).

The Price of Everything: And the Hidden Logic of Value
by Eduardo Porter
Published 4 Jan 2011

What’s more, whatever we do to prevent financial turmoil, we must acknowledge an important limitation: we are unlikely to stamp out bubbles and crashes entirely. Financial crises spawned by investment surges, credit booms, and asset bubbles appear to be a standard feature of the landscape of capitalism. Economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff found that of the world’s sixty-six major economies—including developed nations and the largest developing countries—only Portugal, Austria, the Netherlands, and Belgium had avoided a banking crisis between 1945 and 2007. By the end of 2008 no country was unscathed. Every time investors become enthusiastic about some new investment proposition, they assure us that this time will be different.

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Lansing, “Speculative Growth, Overreaction, and the Welfare Cost of Technology-Driven Bubbles,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper, August 2009 (www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/papers/2008/wp08-08bk.pdf, accessed 08/08/2010); and James Edward Meeker, The Work of the Stock Exchange (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1922), p. 419. The tally of countries that have escaped banking crises is by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, “Banking Crises: An Equal Opportunity Menace,” NBER Working Paper, December 2008. 236-239 What Rationality?: Eugene Fama’s quote is in Douglas Clement, “Interview with Eugene Fama,” The Region, Federal Reserve Bank of Minnesota, December 2007. Keynes’s quote is in John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1965), p. 161.

Better, Stronger, Faster: The Myth of American Decline . . . And the Rise of a New Economy
by Daniel Gross
Published 7 May 2012

The weight of history suggested that the United States, overextended and debt-ridden, was likely to suffer the same fate in the early twenty-first century that befell the British Empire in the mid-twentieth. “It’s not a thousand years that separates imperial zenith from imperial oblivion,” he said in a May 2010 speech. “It’s really a very, very short ride from the top to the bottom.”1 Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart, economists who data-mined history in This Time Is Different, a comprehensive look at financial debacles going back to the 1300s, arrived at a similar conclusion. Centuries worth of data on finance-induced crises suggest the United States won’t be bouncing back any time soon, they concluded.

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These recessions were unusually shallow too, with 1.49 and 0.62 percent declines in output from peak to trough, respectively.7 The only contraction worse than the one we just lived through was the Great Depression, a forty-three-month doozy that ran from August 1929 to March 1933. Our balance sheets, bank accounts, egos, and psyches simply weren’t prepared for the depth and degree of shrinkage. Or for the slowness of the recovery. As Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart document in This Time Is Different, not all recessions are created equal. Economies recover relatively quickly from downturns that are natural outcomes of the business cycle. Having produced too much or too exuberantly, companies idle capacity until inventories are worked down, and then reopen factories when demand rises again.

Stolen: How to Save the World From Financialisation
by Grace Blakeley
Published 9 Sep 2019

The pre-crisis boom had merely disguised an underlying trend towards stagnation that had set in decades earlier. And since the crisis, the problem has only grown worse. Whilst GDP growth, wages, and employment have all fallen, Summers’ biggest worry was productivity — the long-term driver of economic growth in capitalist economies. Summers’ remarks have divided economists. Some, like Kenneth Rogoff, argue that slow growth and productivity are to be expected in the wake of a massive financial crisis.20 Households and businesses will all be attempting to deleverage at the same time, creating a Keynesian “paradox of thrift” — the kind of reverse economic multiplier caused when governments, households, or businesses cut their spending.

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The idea that the UK is on the verge of a sovereign debt crisis is laughable. If anything, investors are demanding more government bonds than states like the UK are willing to issue. The second argument for austerity is that high levels of debt curb economic growth. This argument has featured heavily in the debate about austerity thanks to Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, the authors of This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, the book used to justify George Osborne’s austerity agenda. This Time Is Different argues that above a particular level — 90% of GDP — government debt has a negative and statistically significant impact on growth. This argument has a long history.

The Economists' Hour: How the False Prophets of Free Markets Fractured Our Society
by Binyamin Appelbaum
Published 4 Sep 2019

The Italian economists Alberto Alesina and Silvia Ardagna published a study in October 2009 that said governments could spur economic growth by reducing budget deficits — in other words, by spending less money rather than more.6 A few months later, in January 2010, the American economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff published a paper purporting to identify a kind of red line for government borrowing: they said that when debts exceeded 90 percent of a nation’s annual economic output, growth declined.7 The European Commission’s head of economic and monetary affairs, Olli Rehn, started talking about a “90-percent rule.”

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He predicted, incorrectly, that the effort could end in a return to double-digit inflation. See Alan Greenspan, The Map and the Territory (New York: Penguin Press, 2013), 269. 111. The worldwide decline in inflation was driven in large measure by globalization, rather than the specific policy choices of central banks. See Kenneth S. Rogoff, “Globalization and Global Disinflation,” in Monetary Policy and Uncertainty: Adapting to a Changing Economy (Kansas City, Mo.: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 2003), 81. 112. Greg Ip, “Is Bernanke an Inflation Dove? Yes, but . . .,” Wall Street Journal, October 31, 2005. 113. Lawrence H.

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Alan Greenspan, “Testimony Before the Joint Economic Committee, June 9, 2005,” Joint Economic Committee. 81. By some estimates, the inflow of global savings reduced interest rates in the United States by as much as a full percentage point. For more on the interplay of trade imbalances and the financial crisis, see Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff, “Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis: Products of Common Causes,” November 2009; available at https://eml.berkeley.edu/~obstfeld/santabarbara.pdf. 82. Much of the money came from Asia. In his book Crashed, Adam Tooze documents that Europe played a substantial role, too. Some economists argue the Fed could have limited the credit bubble by raising interest rates more sharply and quickly.

Hubris: Why Economists Failed to Predict the Crisis and How to Avoid the Next One
by Meghnad Desai
Published 15 Feb 2015

–Apr. 1971). 4.Gerard Duménil and Dominique Lévy, “The Crisis of the Early 21st Century: Marxian Perspectives,” in R. Bellofiore and G. Vertova, eds, The Great Recession and the Contradictions of Contemporary Capitalism (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2014). 5.Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, ch. 5. 6.Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2009). 7.Lawrence Summers, “Why Stagnation May Prove to Be the New Normal,” Financial Times, Dec. 15, 2013. 8.Julia Leung, The Tides of Capital: How Asia Surmounted the Crisis and Is Now Guiding World Recovery (Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum, London, 2015). 9.Karl Marx, Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859), trans.

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(i) Phillips curve (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) Friedman’s challenge (i) Friedman’s version (i) Phillips’ historical study (i) Pigou, Arthur Cecil (i), (ii), (iii) equation (i) “The Classical Stationary State” (i) Piketty, Thomas (i), (ii) Pitt, William (younger) (i) point of maximum efficiency (i) policy, responses to (i) politics, effect of economic change (i) population aging (i), (ii) growth (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) Malthus’ law (i) portfolio selection (i) Post-Keynesians (i) postwar economic order, planning for (i) poverty, urban (i) precautionary motive (i) precious metals acquisition of (i) as indicators of wealth (i) predictive modeling (i), (ii) preemptive tax cut (i) preference shocks (i) price, as value (i) price levels, new classical model (i) price rises 1492 to 1589 (i) and inflation (i) post-World War I (i) vs. value (i) price takers, vs. price setters (i) price volatility, Smith’s theory (i) prices agricultural (i) determination (i) empirical analysis of asset prices (i) and productivity (i) sticky (i) Prices and Production (Hayek) (i) pricing, monopoly power (i) Prince, Chuck (i) Principle of Motion (i) Principles of Economics (Marshall) (i) private spending, control of (i) privatization (i) problems, concealment by accounting (i) productivity and price of goods (i) and prosperity (i) professionalization, of economics (i) profit (i) dependence on market (i) effects of progress (i) vs. interest (i) maximization (i) realization of (i) as unearned income (i) profit rates, and unrestricted movement of capital (i) profit squeeze (i) profitability (i) progress, effects on profit (i) Progressive Movement, United States (i) prospect of recovery (i) prosperity (i), (ii), (iii) protectionism (i), (ii) public debt (i) as intergenerational (i) Keynesian models (i) public policy, inflation targeting (i) purchasing power parity (PPP) theory (i) quantitative easing (i) see also liquidity injecting quantity theory of money (i), (ii), (iii) railroads (i), (ii) Rajan, Raghuram (i), (ii) random events (i), (ii), (iii) rate of profit, and unrestricted movement of capital (i) rates of return, ex ante/ex post calculations (i) rational expectations (RE) (i), (ii), (iii) ready cash (i) Reagan, Ronald (i) real balance effect (i) real interest parity (i) real wages (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) see also money wages; wages recapitalization, banks (i) reconstruction (i), (ii) recovery, prospect of (i) redistribution (i) regulation of banks (i) financial and commodity markets (i) UK approach (i) Reinhardt, Carmen M. (i) “This Time is Different” (with Kenneth Rogoff) (i) relative value (i) Ricardo (i) religion, prohibition of usury (i) religious beliefs (i) rentier class (i) rents, as unearned income (i), (ii) research tradition, constraints of (i) reserve currency (i), (ii) residual (i) resource exploitation, effects of (i) resources, reactivation (i) restricted capital movements (i) retrenchment, post-World War I (i) return, and risk (i) Ricardian Equivalence (i), (ii) Ricardian theory, failure of (i) Ricardo, Abraham Israel (i) Ricardo, David (i) character and biography (i) context of writings (i) free trade (i) iron law of wages (i), (ii) pessimism (i) on population growth (i) on profit (i) relative value (i) on rents (i) significance of work (i), (ii) theory of depreciation (i) theory of equilibrium (i), (ii), (iii) theory of the markets (i) trade doctrine (i) right of revolt (i) right-wing politics (i), (ii) risk (i) management and pricing (i) perpetuation (i) and return (i) spreading (i) Roaring Twenties (i) Robinson, Joan (i) rocking horse analogy (i), (ii) Rogoff, Kenneth S.

European Spring: Why Our Economies and Politics Are in a Mess - and How to Put Them Right
by Philippe Legrain
Published 22 Apr 2014

Along with Alesina’s claptrap, another flawed economic study that was influential with eurozone policymakers, notably European Commission fiscal enforcer Olli Rehn, purported to show that the economy grinds to a halt once public debt exceeds 90 per cent of GDP.202 Since government debt in the eurozone as a whole was nearing that apparent threshold in 2010 – and had exceeded it in several countries – this appeared to warrant immediate, front-loaded austerity.203 But the “findings” in the paper published in January 2010 by Harvard economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff were always dubious – and they were later discredited.204 Reinhart and Rogoff found that high public debt was associated with slow growth but did not establish that the former caused the latter. While high debt may lead to slow growth, it is more plausible that slow growth leads to high debt, and that a third factor may determine both.

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“Stability Programme for Spain, 2011–2014” http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nrp/sp_spain_en.pdf 200 http://www.cnbc.com/id/38987325/Austerity_Equals_Confidence_Trichet 201 http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/annrep/ar2010annualaccounts_en.pdf 202 For example, in a speech to the Council of Foreign Relations in Brussels on 1 June 2011, Olli Rehn said "Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff have coined the ‘90 per cent rule’, that is, countries with public debt exceeding 90 per cent of annual economic output grow more slowly. High debt levels can crowd out economic activity and entrepreneurial dynamism, and thus hamper growth. This conclusion is particularly relevant at a time when debt levels in Europe are now approaching the 90% threshold, which the US has already passed." http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-407_en.htm Even in February 2013, when the devastating consequences of austerity were apparent, Rehn wrote to EU finance ministers stating that "it is widely acknowledged, based on serious academic research, that when public debt levels rise above 90 per cent they tend to have a negative impact on economic dynamism, which translates into low growth for many years.

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That is why consistent and carefully calibrated fiscal consolidation remains necessary in Europe.” http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/rehn/documents/cab20130213_en.pdf 203 Eurostat, general government consolidated gross debt. Code: tsieb090. In the eurozone as a whole this was 85.4 per cent of GDP in 2010, 87.3 per cent in 2011 and 90.6 per cent in 2012. 204 Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, "Growth in a Time of Debt", NBER working paper 15639, January 2010 205 http://www.nextnewdeal.net/rortybomb/guest-post-reinhartrogoff-and-growth-time-debt 206 A point eloquently made by Adam Posen here: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a6d94b02-a774-11e2-9fbe-00144feabdc0.html 207 Thomas Herndon, Michael Ash and Robert Pollin, "Does High Public Debt Consistently Stifle Economic Growth?

Profiting Without Producing: How Finance Exploits Us All
by Costas Lapavitsas
Published 14 Aug 2013

At the time neither the British, nor the world economy possessed sufficiently mature credit mechanisms to allow circulation to thrive on inconvertible credit money. 49 Banknotes also function in criminal, illicit or ‘grey’ transactions, and large volumes are typically held outside their country of issue; for evidence on the largest countries, see Kenneth Rogoff, ‘Blessing or Curse? Foreign and Underground Demand for Euro Notes’, Economic Policy 13:26, April 1998. This issue is also briefly considered in the following section. 50 As is clearly established in Charles Freedman, ‘Monetary Policy Implementation: Past, Present and Future’, International Finance 3:2, 2000. 51 This essential similarity creates technical problems of classification and presentation of figures, which are apparent, for instance, in the sudden jumps of the time series for Japan in Figures 4 and 5.

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Prescott, ‘Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans’, Journal of Political Economy 85:3, 1977; Robert Barro and David Gordon, ‘A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model’, Journal of Political Economy 91:4, 1983; Barro and Gordon, ‘Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy’, Journal of Monetary Economics 12:1, 1983; Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini, ‘Rules and Discretion with Non-coordinated Monetary Policies’, Economic Enquiry 25:4, 1987; Kenneth Rogoff, ‘The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 100:4, 1985; Rogoff, ‘Reputational Constraints on Monetary Policy’, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 26, Spring 1987. For a critique see Bennett T. McCallum, ‘Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence’, American Economic Review 85:2, May 1995; and McCallum, ‘Crucial Issues Concerning Central Bank Independence’, Journal of Monetary Economics 39:1, 1997.

Phishing for Phools: The Economics of Manipulation and Deception
by George A. Akerlof , Robert J. Shiller and Stanley B Resor Professor Of Economics Robert J Shiller
Published 21 Sep 2015

Bokhari et al., “Why Did Household Mortgage Leverage Rise from the Mid-1980s until the Great Recession?” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Real Estate, January 2013, last accessed May 12, 2015, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.269.5704&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 22. See Carmen M. Reinhardt and Kenneth Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 23. John Kenneth Galbraith, The Great Crash, 50th anniversary ed. (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1988), Kindle location 1943–45 out of 4151. 24. James Harvey Young, The Toadstool Millionaires: A Social History of Patent Medicines in America before Federal Regulation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 248. 25.

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Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (Spring 2010): 129–99. Raymond, Nate, and Jonathan Stempel. “Big Fine Imposed on Ex-Goldman Trader Tourre in SEC Case.” Reuters, March 12, 2014. Accessed March 15, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/12/us-goldmansachs-sec-tourre-idUSBREA2B11220140312. Reinhardt, Carmen M., and Kenneth Rogoff. This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009. Reyes, Sonia. “Ocean Spray Rides Diet Wave.” Adweek, February 6, 2006. Accessed November 18, 2014. http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising/ocean-spray-rides-diet-wave-83901. Richert, Lindley B.

A Nation of Takers: America’s Entitlement Epidemic
by Nicholas Eberstadt and Nick Eberstadt
Published 18 Oct 2012

Derived from life tables presented in the Human Mortality Database, University of California–Berkeley and Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, http://www.mortality.org. 36. Alberto F. Alesina, Edward L. Glaeser, and Bruce Sacerdote, “Work and Leisure in the U.S. and Europe: Why So Different?” In Mark Gertler and Kenneth Rogoff, eds., NBER Macroeconomic Annual 2005 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), Table 2 See http://www.nber.org/ chapters/c0073.pdf. 37. International Labor Office Department of Statistics, LABORSTA Database, “Total and Economically Active Population by Age Group” for USA and EU-15 Countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom).

The Health Gap: The Challenge of an Unequal World
by Michael Marmot
Published 9 Sep 2015

As so often, what should be an informed debate about evidence is a none-too-veiled contest about prior political beliefs, or short-term low-level politics. It is difficult for a non-economist to penetrate the argument and form an independent judgement. It can be noted that the intellectual case for austerity has suffered a couple of recent blows. Austerians have cited, among others, the Harvard economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, who set out to show that when national debt climbs above 90 per cent of GDP, economic growth slows.30 They showed it, except that a graduate student checking their figures found elementary errors that cast considerable doubt on their conclusions.31 Second, the IMF, which arguably has wreaked great havoc globally with its universal prescription to cut government spending, has published new estimates that austerity has a bigger effect on slowing economic growth than it used to think.32 In Britain, the Office of Budget Responsibility says that it subscribes to the widely held assumption that fiscal contraction damages growth.

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It had gone from being a well-organised society based on fishing and huge supplies of geothermal energy – hence aluminium smelting – to housing three private banks that represented everyone’s worst nightmare of what reckless cowboys can do when let loose on the global economy. In Chapter 6, I referred to the debate around the work of Harvard economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff who showed that when national debt climbs above 90 per cent of GDP, economic growth slows.2,3 At its peak, Iceland’s debt was 850 per cent of GDP! Icelandic banks bought assets round the world, as though all curves go ever upwards without a day of reckoning. The butterfly that flapped its wings might have been the collapse of sub-prime mortgages in the USA, but it caused a hurricane in Iceland and, predictably, the castles in the air were reduced to rubble.

Bad Money: Reckless Finance, Failed Politics, and the Global Crisis of American Capitalism
by Kevin Phillips
Published 31 Mar 2008

Debt to foreigners expanded, as the enlargement of the annual U.S. current account deficit, in turn, required more and more foreign loans and investments to finance the things the United States needed to import—oil and manufactures—because our factories and oil fields no longer made or produced enough. The current account deficit had been $79 billion in 1990, then $420 billion in 2000, before mounting to $857 billion in 2006. Some economists thought that, too, constituted a potential menace. International economists Kenneth Rogoff and Maurice Obstfeld argued that “any sober policymaker or financial analyst ought to regard the United States’ current account deficit as a potential sword of Damocles hanging over the global economy.”22 Let me stipulate: there is a banal side to throwing around figures like $5 trillion or $6 trillion or even $857 billion.

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Although OPEC’s recent take from high oil prices can be exaggerated by failure to recognize the erosion of the declining dollar, the annual receipts and estimates remain substantial: $506 billion in 2006, $508 billion in 2007, and $530 billion in 2008, according to the London-based Centre for Global Energy Studies. A different series issued by the U.S. Energy Information Administration put the 2007 figure at $658 billion and the 2008 estimate at $762 billion.50 “There’s never been anything like this on a sustained basis the way we’ve seen the last couple of years,” asserted Harvard economist Kenneth Rogoff. Oil prices “are not spiking; they’re just rising.”51 Over the next twenty years, and despite probable production plateaus or declines, the OPEC members in the Middle East, with most of the longer-lived reserves, can presumably expect receipts of $5 trillion to $10 trillion. FIGURE 5.3 Central Bank Reserves and Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Heavy Hitters, 2007 Source: International Monetary Fund official reserve assets.

Doughnut Economics: Seven Ways to Think Like a 21st-Century Economist
by Kate Raworth
Published 22 Mar 2017

Today, an increasing number of governments in high-income countries face very real prospects of low or no GDP growth over the coming decades and, for the first time, some are quietly asking if economists have ideas about how to embrace that reality. Support for such thinking is emerging from the most unexpected of places, such as the influential mainstream US economist Kenneth Rogoff, whose career has spanned the IMF, the US Federal Reserve and Harvard University. ‘In a period of great economic uncertainty,’ he wrote in 2012, ‘it may seem inappropriate to question the growth imperative. But then again, perhaps a crisis is exactly the occasion to rethink the longer-term goals of global economic policy.’47 Let’s take up the opportunity of this prolonged crisis and start identifying the various ways – financial, political and social – in which today’s high-income economies, and others following their path, are locked into and addicted to pursuing GDP growth.

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Home to over 550 million people and 25% of World GDP, these cities – and their economic vision – will be profoundly influential far beyond their city limits.66 New games help, but the compulsion of the old GDP game holds its grip because GDP brings both global market power and global military power. This geopolitical lock-in demands far more strategic attention. ‘An economic race for global power is certainly an understandable rationale for focusing on long-term growth,’ argues Kenneth Rogoff, ‘but if such competition is really a central justification for this focus, then we need to re-examine standard macroeconomic models, which ignore this issue entirely.’67 Beyond merely rewriting macroeconomic models, however, this lock-in highlights the need for innovative thinkers in international relations to turn their attention to strategies that could help to usher in a future of growth-agnostic global governance.

The Economics of Enough: How to Run the Economy as if the Future Matters
by Diane Coyle
Published 21 Feb 2011

And a mix of the various possibilities is likely. Higher growth would be terrific but is hard to achieve. Additional migration on a large scale is probably unlikely given that it has already reached such high levels compared with the recent past, although it will continue. According to Carmen Reinhardt and Kenneth Rogoff, default is a surprisingly common policy response to financial crisis, in a mix of the forms described above, and often described as “restructuring.” In their thorough study of the history of financial crises, they conclude that not only do crises commonly cause very large increases in public debt, but also that subsequent default on this wide definition is nearly universal.22 It seems only realistic in the light of their findings to expect many governments to take this route.

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Rajan, Raghuram G., and Luigi Zingales. 2004. Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists: Unleashing the Power of Financial Markets to Create Wealth and Spread Opportunity. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Ramsey, Frank P. 1928. “A Mathematical Theory of Saving.” Economic Journal 38:4, pp 543–49. Reinhardt, Carmen M., and Kenneth Rogoff. 2010. This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Rivoli, Pietra. 2005. The Travels of a T-Shirt in the Global Economy: An Economist Examines the Markets, Power, and Politics of World Trade. New York: Wiley. Roach, Stephen S. 2009. “Whither Capitalism?”

The Price of Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers Our Future
by Joseph E. Stiglitz
Published 10 Jun 2012

Like a good magician, a free-market economist succeeds by drawing spectators’ attention to what he wants them to see—the rabbit jumping out of the hat—while distracting their attention from other things—how the rabbit got into the hat in the first place. 6. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776; New York: P. F. Collier, 1902), p. 207. 7. See Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 8. A derivative is just a financial instrument the return to which is derived on the basis of something else, e.g., the performance of a stock or the price of oil or the value of a bond.

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In a study with Scott Wallstein prepared while I was chairman of President Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers: “Supporting Research and Development to Promote Economic Growth: The Federal Government’s Role,” Council of Economic Advisers, October 1995. 56. As measured, e.g., by the UNDP Human Development Indicators. See the discussion in the final section of this chapter. 57. Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen M. Reinhardt, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), describe hundreds of financial crises in the last eight hundred years, eighteen banking crises in the developed world since World War II alone. Earlier, the late Charles Kindleberger of MIT described repeated crises in his classic Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises (New York: Basic Books, 1978). 58.

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If they had all moved to a flexible exchange rate system, would that, by itself, have been sufficient to restore the global economy to prosperity? I doubt it. 42. For a discussion of these bubbles and the repeated financial crises that are often associated with the bursting of the bubbles, see Charles Kindleberger, Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises (New York: Basic Books, 1978), and Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen M. Reinhardt, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 43. Or, similarly, increasing margins in the purchase of stock (which act like a house down payment). Interestingly, in the tech bubbles of the 1990s, the possibility of increasing margin requirements was briefly discussed, but then evidently dismissed: perhaps the free marketers that dominated the Fed didn’t like this kind of interference with the wonders of the market.

Makers and Takers: The Rise of Finance and the Fall of American Business
by Rana Foroohar
Published 16 May 2016

On top of this, it’s quantitatively increasing market volatility and risk of the sort that wiped out $16 trillion in household wealth during the Great Recession.59 Evidence shows that the number of wealth-destroying financial crises has risen in tandem with financial sector growth over the last several decades. In their book This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, academics Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff describe how the proportion of the world affected by banking crises (weighed by countries’ share of global GDP) rose from some 7.5 percent in 1971 to 11 percent in 1980 and to 32 percent in 2007.60 And economist Robert Aliber, in updating one of the seminal books on financial bubbles, the late Charles Kindleberger’s Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, issued a grave warning in 2005, well before the 2008 meltdown: “The conclusion is unmistakable that financial failure has been more extensive and pervasive in the last thirty years than in any previous period.”61 This is a startling illustration of how finance has transitioned from an industry that encourages healthy risk taking to one that simply creates debt and spreads unproductive risk in the market system as a whole.

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See also Atif Mian and Amir Sufi, House of Debt: How They (and You) Caused the Great Recession and How We Can Prevent It from Happening Again (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014). 19. Raghuram G. Rajan, Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 21. 20. Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). 21. McKinsey Global Institute, “Debt and (Not Much) Deleveraging,” February 2015, 98–99. 22. Greenwood and Scharfstein, “The Growth of Finance,” 21. 23. Financial efficiency is defined here as the amount of money and engagement that finance provides to Main Street, rather than to the capital markets themselves. 24.

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Rajan, Raghuram G. Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010. Reich, Robert B. Supercapitalism: The Transformation of Business, Democracy, and Everyday Life. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007. Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth S. Rogoff. This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009. Roth, Alvin E. Who Gets What—and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2015. Rothkopf, David. Power, Inc.: The Epic Rivalry Between Big Business and Government—and the Reckoning That Lies Ahead.

MegaThreats: Ten Dangerous Trends That Imperil Our Future, and How to Survive Them
by Nouriel Roubini
Published 17 Oct 2022

For the record, I don’t hang my hat on these inflation expectations. They are wrong most of the time, usually because they fail to anticipate the kinds of aggregate supply shocks that loom directly in our path. Warning signs resist accurate interpretation. Even experts require course corrections. Harvard professor and former IMF chief economist Kenneth Rogoff tried to ease concern in a Financial Times op-ed with the title, “Don’t Panic: A Little Inflation Is No Bad Thing.” He reckoned that after a decade of lower than expected inflation, a pendulum swing in the other direction might be welcome. “US inflation today is much more like good news than bad,” Rogoff wrote.

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But It Brings Some Big Risks, Too,” Washington Post, February 4, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/02/04/larry-summers-biden-covid-stimulus/. 26. Gwynn Guilford, “A Key Gauge of Future Inflation Is Easing,” Wall Street Journal, July 26, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-key-gauge-of-future-inflation-is-easing-11627291800?tpl=centralbanking. 27. Kenneth Rogoff, “Don’t Panic: A Little Inflation Is No Bad Thing,” Financial Times, July 16, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/a7c101be-7361-4307-981d-b8edf6d002be. 28. Lawrence Goodman, “Inflation Fears Offers the Fed a Chance to Modernize with Money,” Center for Financial Stability, April 26, 2021, http://www.centerforfinancialstability.org/research/Modernize_Money_042621.pdf 29.

After the Music Stopped: The Financial Crisis, the Response, and the Work Ahead
by Alan S. Blinder
Published 24 Jan 2013

Instead, the euro kept Greece expensive, and antiausterity riots scared tourists away. The third critical difference between the United States and Europe is perhaps too obvious to state: They had to deal with Greece; we didn’t. The Greek situation is, if you’ll pardon the Latin, sui generis. Greece has a dismal fiscal history. Economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff found that Greece has been in default on its public debt roughly 50 percent of the time since gaining independence in the 1830s! More recently, Greece’s budget deficits were large before the crisis and huge thereafter. The Greeks also turn out to be pretty poor tax collectors—some would say they hardly try.

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CNBC, April 30, 2009. www.cnbc.com/id/30502091?slide=1. Pozsar, Zoltan, Tobias Adrian, Adam Ashcraft, and Hayley Boesky. “Shadow Banking.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report 458 (July 2010). Protess, Ben. “Mortgage Executive Receives 30-Year Sentence.” New York Times, June 30, 2011. Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth Rogoff. This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009. Rogers, Will. Sanity Is Where You Find It. Selected and edited by Donald Day. Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1955. Rogoff, Kenneth. “The Bullets Yet to Be Fired to Stop the Crisis.”

Expected Returns: An Investor's Guide to Harvesting Market Rewards
by Antti Ilmanen
Published 4 Apr 2011

Reinhart, Carmen M. (2010), “This time is different chartbook: Country histories on debt, default, and financial crises,” NBER working paper 15815. Reinhart, Carmen M.; and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2008), “This time is different: A panoramic view of eight centuries of financial crises,” NBER working paper 13882. Reinhart, Carmen M.; and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2009), This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Reinhart, Carmen M.; and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2010), “From financial crash to debt crisis,” NBER working paper 15795, forthcoming in American Economic Review. Ribeiro, Ruy; and Jan Loeys (2006), “Exploiting cross-market momentum,” Investment Strategies 14, J.P.

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Sustained inflation only became pervasive in the 20th century: Median inflation rate (5-year moving average) for all countries, 1500–2010. Sources: Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2008), “This time is different: A panoramic view of eight centuries of financial crises,” NBER working paper 13882, March 2008. Carmen M. Reinhart (2010), “This time is different chartbook: Country histories on debt, default, and financial crises,” NBER working paper 15815. Reproduced by permission of Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff. During the gold standard (Britain adopted it in 1717, other developed countries in the 19th century), inflations and deflations took turns with no persistence, and long-run inflation expectations were likely near zero most of the time.

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After a quarter-century when bearing duration risk was amply rewarded, Treasuries may provide neither safety nor performance in the coming decade. Figure 27.6. Global perspective on inflation and external default histories. Source: Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2008), “This time is different: A panoramic view of eight centuries of financial crises,” NBER working paper 13882. Reproduced by permission of Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff. Figure 27.7. Sovereign CDS spreads, July 2007–July 2010. Source: Bloomberg. Finally, the last innings of the debt supercycle may arrive even before the demographic costs balloon. Market participants are turning their focus on the magnitude of the fiscal problem just when G7 economies face extraordinary borrowing needs and sharply rising debt/GDP ratios.

Straight Talk on Trade: Ideas for a Sane World Economy
by Dani Rodrik
Published 8 Oct 2017

Economics Hijacked When the stakes are high, it is no surprise that battling political opponents use whatever support they can garner from economists and other researchers. That is what happened when conservative American politicians and European Union officials latched on to the work of two Harvard professors—Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff—to justify their support of fiscal austerity.9 Reinhart and Rogoff had published a paper that appeared to show that public-debt levels above 90 percent of GDP do significant damage to economic growth. The paper was criticized by three economists from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, who argued their findings were brittle.10 They had found a relatively minor spreadsheet error.

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New York Times, Opinion Pages, January 26, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/26/opinion/whats-our-duty-to-the-people-globalization-leaves-behind.html?_r=2. 8. Fabrice Defever and Alejandro Riaño, “China’s Pure Exporter Subsidies,” Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Paper No. 1182, London School of Economics and Political Science, December 2012. 9. The original paper is Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, “Growth in the Time of Debt,” NBER Working Paper No. 15639, January 2010. 10. Thomas Herndon, Michael Ash, and Robert Pollin, “Does High Public Debt Consistently Stifle Economic Growth? A Critique of Reinhart and Rogoff,” Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 38(2), 2014: 257–279. 11. Alberto F.

Destined for War: America, China, and Thucydides's Trap
by Graham Allison
Published 29 May 2017

Some observers claim the twenty-first century is so different from the past that lessons from previous experience are no longer relevant. To be sure, it is difficult to find precedents for current levels of economic integration, globalization, and ubiquitous worldwide communication, or global threats from climate disruption to violent Islamic extremism. But as my colleagues Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff remind us in their analysis of 350 financial crises over the past eight centuries, many previous generations have imagined that This Time Is Different. 56 Reinhart and Rogoff side with Thucydides in reasoning that, as long as men are men, we can anticipate recurring patterns in human affairs.

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For a definitive account of Soviet and American interventions in the Third World during this era, see Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). For an illuminating narrative history of American covert operations in the Cold War that were aimed at foreign regime change, see Stephen Kinzer, Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq (New York: Times Books, 2006), 111–216. [back] 56. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). [back] 57. See Howard Weinroth, “Norman Angell and The Great Illusion: An Episode in Pre-1914 Pacifism,” Historical Journal 17, no. 3 (September 1974), 551–74. [back] 58. Harvard Nuclear Study Group, Living with Nuclear Weapons (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 43–44.

Science Fictions: How Fraud, Bias, Negligence, and Hype Undermine the Search for Truth
by Stuart Ritchie
Published 20 Jul 2020

Just as physicists would love to discover a new law (or a way to break the ones we already know), and just as mathematicians work endlessly to prove their theorems, many social scientists, particularly economists, long to discover a stylised fact that can be associated with their name – and that the people who make important decisions can easily keep in mind. When they published a major paper in 2010, the economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff thought they’d hit the stylised-fact jackpot. For two years, politicians had been frantically trying to address the fallout of the 2008 financial crisis and the ensuing Great Recession. Amid all the conflicting advice, Reinhart and Rogoff’s paper, entitled ‘Growth in a Time of Debt’, was a godsend, providing strong evidence to recommend one particular course of economic action: austerity.2 Reinhart and Rogoff had studied the debt-to-GDP ratio – the relationship between what a country owes to its creditors (its public debt, which, perhaps confusingly, is also known as its government debt or its sovereign debt) and what new goods and services it can produce (its Gross Domestic Product).

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Daniel Hirschman, ‘Stylized Facts in the Social Sciences’, Sociological Science 3 (2016): pp. 604–26; https://doi.org/10.15195/v3.a26 2.  The study was an online ‘working paper’ for a while (as is normal in economics, as we’ll see in the final chapter), but it was eventually officially published as Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, ‘Growth in a Time of Debt’, American Economic Review 100, no. 2 (May 2010): pp. 573–78; https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.2.573 3.  Osborne: George Osborne, ‘Mais Lecture – A New Economic Model’, 24 Feb. 2010; https://conservative-speeches.sayit.mysociety.org/speech/601526; Republican members: United States Senate Committee on the Budget, ‘Sessions, Ryan Issue Joint Statement On Jobs Report, Call For Senate Action On Budget’, 8 July 2011; https://www.budget.senate.gov/chairman/newsroom/press/sessions-ryan-issue-joint-statement-on-jobs-report-call-for-senate-action-on-budget 4.  

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Thomas Herndon et al., ‘Does High Public Debt Consistently Stifle Economic Growth? A Critique of Reinhart and Rogoff’, Cambridge Journal of Economics 38, no. 2 (April 2013): pp. 257–79; https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/bet075 6.  Reinhart and Rogoff admitted the Excel error, though they didn’t agree with the critics on many of their other points: Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, ‘Reinhart-Rogoff Response to Critique’, Wall Street Journal, 16 April 2013; https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2013/04/16/reinhart-rogoff-response-to- critique/ 7.  Herndon et al., ‘High Public Debt’, p. 14. 8.  Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, ‘Refereeing Reinhart-Rogoff Debate’, Bloomberg Opinion, 28 April 2013; https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2013-04-28/refereeing-the-reinhart-rogoff-debate 9.  

Slouching Towards Utopia: An Economic History of the Twentieth Century
by J. Bradford Delong
Published 6 Apr 2020

But those costs were trivial relative to the damage avoided by maintaining full employment and growth through what was, elsewhere, the Great Recession. During the Great Recession, China gained from five to ten extra years in its race to catch up to the global north. We can begin to theorize explanations for such irrationality. Some highly capable and competent economists, such as Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, saw the dangers of the financial crisis but greatly exaggerated the risks of public spending to boost employment in its aftermath.32 Other highly capable and competent economists, including Federal Reserve chair Bernanke, understood the importance of keeping interest rates low but overestimated the effectiveness of additional monetary-policy tools such as quantitative easing.33 Still others, perhaps less capable and competent, like me, understood that expansionary monetary policies would not be enough but, because we had looked at global imbalances the wrong way, missed the principal source of risk—US financial misregulation—and found ourselves still trying to catch up to the situation in order to give accurate policy advice in real time.34 In hindsight, technocrats’ errors of judgment and failures of communication seem to me a large part of how events unfolded so disastrously—if we economists had spoken up sooner about what we knew about depressions and their cure, had been more convincing on the issues where we were right, and had been better at recognizing where we were wrong, the situation today might be considerably better.

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Olivier Blanchard and Lawrence Summers, “Hysteresis and the European Unemployment Problem,” National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) working paper 1950, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1 (1986): 15–78, available at NBER, www.nber.org/papers/w1950. 8. The rough consensus is represented by Ben Bernanke, “Japanese Monetary Policy: A Case of Self-Induced Paralysis?,” Princeton University, December 1999, www.princeton.edu/~pkrugman/bernanke_paralysis.pdf; Kenneth Rogoff, “Comment on Krugman,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2 (1998): 194–199, www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/1998/06/1998b_bpea_krugman_dominquez_rogoff.pdf. 9. Raghuram Rajan, “Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?,” in The Greenspan Era: Lesson for the Future, Kansas City: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 2005, 313–369, www.kansascityfed.org/documents/3326/PDF-Rajan2005.pdf.

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Carol Loomis, “Robert Rubin on the Job He Never Wanted,” Fortune, November 26, 2007, available at Boston University Economics Department, www.bu.edu/econ/files/2011/01/Loomis.pdf. 13. See, for example, Chris Giles, “Harvard President Warns on Global Imbalances,” Financial Times, January 28, 2006, www.ft.com/content/f925a9e0-9035-11da-9e7e-0000779e2340; Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff, “The Unsustainable U.S. Current Account Position Revisited,” in G7 Current Account Imbalances: Sustainability and Adjustment, ed. Richard Clarida, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007, 339–375, available at National Bureau of Economic Research, www.nber.org/system/files/chapters/c0127/c0127.pdf. 14.

Red Flags: Why Xi's China Is in Jeopardy
by George Magnus
Published 10 Sep 2018

However, the almost fourfold rise in the old-age dependency ratio will subject China to a substantial fiscal burden. The development of coping mechanisms can help to mitigate the burden, but China will also have to make difficult decisions affecting taxation and spending to keep public debt on an even keel. In their seminal work in the wake of the financial crisis, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff asserted that economic growth slows sharply, or even falls, once the ratio of public debt to GDP breaches 90 per cent.17 While the mechanical implication here has been disputed, and may in any case be uncertain in a state-driven economy, economists are right to say that the debt to GDP ratio cannot increase continuously without important economic implications, even if precise thresholds of risk are hard to define.

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‘China Plans Immigration Agency to Lure Overseas Talent’, Bloomberg, 18 July 2016, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-18/china-said-to-create-new-office-to-lure-overseas-work-talent>. 16. ‘China 2030’, World Bank and Development Research Center of the State Council, 2013. 17. Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton University Press, 2009. 18. IMF, ‘Older and Smaller’, Finance and Development, vol. 53, no. 1, March 2016. 19. IMF, Fiscal Monitor, October 2016. 20. Hu Jiye, China University of Political Science and Law, cited in Wynne Wang, ‘The Silver Age: China’s Aging Population’, Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business (CKGSB) Knowledge, 17 October 2016. 21.

Who Needs the Fed?: What Taylor Swift, Uber, and Robots Tell Us About Money, Credit, and Why We Should Abolish America's Central Bank
by John Tamny
Published 30 Apr 2016

It did not matter what the Federal Reserve said.1 In 1933, FDR made the decision to devalue the dollar from 1/20th of an ounce of gold to 1/35th of an ounce.2 Forgetting the lesson of the early 1920s, when the integrity of the dollar was maintained, Roosevelt devalued the dollar and thereby marked the first time the United States defaulted on its debt. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff describe in This Time Is Different (2009), “The abrogation of the gold clause in the United States in 1933, which meant that public debts would be repaid in fiat currency rather than gold, constitutes a restricting of nearly all the government’s domestic debt.”3 With the United States heavily in debt thanks to spending that was logically failing to stimulate the economy, FDR reduced the value of the dollars being returned to holders of U.S. debt.

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John Balassi and Josie Cox, “Apple Wows Market with Record $17 Billion Bond Deal,” Reuters, April 30, 2013. 4. Smith, Dead Bank Walking, 163. 5. Ibid. CHAPTER TWENTY 1. Amity Shlaes, The Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 147. My emphasis. 2. Lewis, Gold: The Once and Future Money. 3. Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009). 4. Thiel, Zero to One, 44. 5. Shlaes, Forgotten Man, 148. 6. Eric Rauchway, The Money Makers: How Roosevelt and Keynes Ended the Depression, Defeated Facism, and Secured a Prosperous Peace (New York: Basic Books, 2015). 7.

The Great Economists Ten Economists whose thinking changed the way we live-FT Publishing International (2014)
by Phil Thornton
Published 7 May 2014

His work on revealed preferences is central to understanding consumer demand while his overlapping generations model still underpins the increasingly fraught debate over funding ageing populations. Samuelson’s ideas on trade still inform the debate between free traders and protectionists, who can both take ammunition from his wide-ranging research. As Kenneth Rogoff, an economics professor at Harvard University, said in a collection 190 The Great Economists of essays celebrating Samuelson’s work:8 ‘If and when interplanetary trade ever commences (say, via radio beam exchanges of technological blueprints and music), economists of the day will quickly find themselves trotting out expositions of Samuelson’s 1948 paper.’

The Blockchain Alternative: Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy and Economic Theory
by Kariappa Bheemaiah
Published 26 Feb 2017

Brain Arthur, Doyne Farmer, Andreas Antonopoulos, Satyajit Das, Joyce Appleby, Yanis Varoufakis, Patrick O’Sullivan, Nigel Allington, Mark Esposito, Sitabhra Sinha, Thomas Sowell, Niall Ferguson, Andy Stern, Alan Kirman, Neel Kashkari, Danny Dorling, David Graeber, Amir Sufi, Atif Mian, Vitalik Buterin, Andy Haldane, Gillian Tett, Martin Sandbu, Robert Reich, Kenneth Rogoff, Paul Beaudry, Michael Kumhof, Diane Coyle, Ben Dyson, Dirk Helbing, Guy Michaels, David Autor, Richard Gendal Brown, Tim Swanson, David Andolfatto, Paul Pfleiderer, Zoltan Pozsar, Frank Levy, Richard Murnane, César Hidalgo, and Robin Hanson, among others. An equal measure of thanks also needs to be given to all the academics and researchers whom I had the chance to meet via the Institute of New Economic Thinking.

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But the physical printing of cold hard cash is still the right of the government, and the revenues from paper currency are considerable enough to offer the biggest counterargument to moving to a cashless system. But in light of the costs of the illegal activities that cash facilitates, the profits earned by Seigniorage are a pittance in comparison. As stated by Kenneth Rogoff in The Curse of Cash (2016), The “profits” governments reap by blindly accommodating demand for cash are dwarfed by the costs of the illegal activity that cash, especially big bills, facilitates. The effect of curtailing paper currency on tax evasion alone would likely cover the lost profits from printing paper currency, even if tax evasion fell by only 10–15%.

End This Depression Now!
by Paul Krugman
Published 30 Apr 2012

The Road Not Taken Historically, financial crises have typically been followed by prolonged economic slumps, and U.S. experience since 2007 has been no different. Indeed, U.S. numbers on unemployment and growth have been remarkably close to the historical average for countries experiencing these kinds of problems. Just as the crisis was gathering momentum, Carmen Reinhart, of the Peterson Institute of International Economics, and Kenneth Rogoff, of Harvard, published a history of financial crises with the ironic title This Time Is Different (because in reality it never is). Their research led readers to expect a protracted period of high unemployment, and as the story unfolded, Rogoff would note that America was experiencing a “garden-variety severe financial crisis.”

Everydata: The Misinformation Hidden in the Little Data You Consume Every Day
by John H. Johnson
Published 27 Apr 2016

Food and Drug Administration (FDA) allows foods with less than half a gram of fat per serving to still be called “fat-free.” So, if you eat more than one serving of a few “fat-free” foods per day, you could easily be consuming a few grams of fat.27 Tough cell—It was, as Bloomberg Business called it, “the Excel Error that Changed History.”28 Two Harvard University economists—Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff—ended up in the headlines for all the wrong reasons when they made a spreadsheet mistake in a paper that examined the effects of government debt on economic growth. They forgot to include five rows in one of their calculations, which made a key result turn out to be -0.1 percent instead of +0.2 percent.

Cryptoassets: The Innovative Investor's Guide to Bitcoin and Beyond: The Innovative Investor's Guide to Bitcoin and Beyond
by Chris Burniske and Jack Tatar
Published 19 Oct 2017

Typically, the logic goes that the markets have evolved from more primitive years, and financial engineering innovations have led to robust markets that can’t possibly crash. Time and again this thesis has been refuted by subsequent market crashes. In their well-regarded book This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff deliver a 300-page tour de force to prove that this time is never different. They describe how “this time is different” thinking was used to justify the sustainability of jubilant markets prior to the 1929 crash that led to the Great Depression. Proponents of “this time is different” thinking claimed that business cycles had been cured by the creation of the Federal Reserve in 1913.

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Edward Chancellor, Devil Take the Hindmost: A History of Financial Speculation (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999). 2. http://www.thebubblebubble.com/mississippi-bubble/. 3. http://www.thebubblebubble.com/south-sea-bubble/. 4. Edward Chancellor, Devil Take the Hindmost. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. Carmen M. Rinehart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time Is Different (Princeton University Press, 2011). 10. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/06/08/bitcoin-isnt-the-future-of-money-its-either-a-ponzi-scheme-or-a-pyramid-scheme/?utm_term=.39f7a8895637. 11. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/660611468148791146/pdf/WPS6967.pdf. 12. https://cointelegraph.com/news/one-coin-much-scam-swedish-bitcoin-foundation-issues-warning-against-onecoin. 13. https://news.bitcoin.com/beware-definitive-onecoin-ponzi/. 14. https://www.fca.org.uk/news/news-stories/beware-trading-virtual-currencies-onecoin. 15. https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/ia_virtualcurrencies.pdf. 16.

Investment: A History
by Norton Reamer and Jesse Downing
Published 19 Feb 2016

Given the still novel nature of many of the monetary responses and the almost accidental nature of some, but not all, of the fiscal support, it is unfortunate that a significant number of Americans seem to have drawn incorrect interpretations of the efficacy of what was done as well as the intended purpose. Not surprisingly, in view of the research published by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, the recovery has been slow and not extraordinarily dynamic. Through an exhaustive historical compilation of past economic crises, Reinhart and Rogoff seem to have established that a serious recession accompanied by a financial crisis normally results in a slow, drawn-out recovery.50 In fact, that is what the United States appears to have experienced since 2009.

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Stewart, “Volcker Rule, Once Simple, Now Boggles,” New York Times, October 21, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/22 /business/volcker-rule-grows-from-simple-to-complex.html. Ibid.; Dan Kedmey, “2 Years and 900 Pages Later, the Volcker Rule Gets the Green Light,” TIME.com, December 11, 2013, http://business.time .com/2013/12/11/2-years-and-900-pages-later-the-volcker-rule-gets -the-green-light. Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), xliv–xlv and 238–239. 7. THE EMERGENCE OF INVESTMENT THEORY 1. Jean-Michel Courtault et al., “Louis Bachelier on the Centenary of Théorie de la Spéculation,” Mathematical Finance 10, no. 3 (July 2000): 342–343. 370 7.

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Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1946. “Ranking America’s Top Money Managers.” Institutional Investor. August 1992, 75–101. Rathbone, Dominic. Economic Rationalism and Rural Society in ThirdCentury A.D. Egypt: The Heroninos Archive and the Appianus Estate. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth S. Rogoff. This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011. Ricketts, Lowell R. “Quantitative Easing Explained.” Liber8 Economic Information Newsletter (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis), April 2011. http://research.stlouisfed.org/pageone-economics/uploads/newsletter /2011/201104_ClassroomEdition.pdf.

The Great Divide: Unequal Societies and What We Can Do About Them
by Joseph E. Stiglitz
Published 15 Mar 2015

At the same time, the person has to have the confidence of the financial markets, and a deep understanding of those markets. Ms. Yellen has managed to do this—an impressive achievement in its own right. One might say that the country is fortunate to have two candidates who, as the Harvard economist Kenneth S. Rogoff, a former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, writes, are “brilliant scholars with extensive experience in public service.” But brilliance is not the only determinant of performance. Values, judgment, and personality matter, too. The choices have seldom been so stark, the stakes so large.

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All of this exposes the Republicans’ argument in favor of these food policies—a concern for our future, particularly the impact of the national debt on our children—as a dishonest and deeply cynical pretense. Not only has the intellectual undergirding of debt fetishism been knocked out (with the debunking of work by the Harvard economists Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff that tied slowed growth to debt-to-GDP ratios above 90 percent). The Republicans’ farm bill also clearly harms both America’s children and the world’s in a variety of ways. For these proposals to become law would be a moral and economic failure for the country. ______________ * New York Times, November 16, 2013.

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As in many other countries, conservative governments are arguing for cutbacks in government spending, on the grounds that fiscal deficits imperil their future. In the case of Australia, however, such assertions ring particularly hollow—though that has not stopped Abbott’s government from trafficking in them. Even if one accepts the claim of the Harvard economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff that very high public debt levels mean lower growth—a view that they never really established and that has subsequently been discredited—Australia is nowhere near that threshold. Its debt-to-GDP ratio is only a fraction of that of the U.S., and one of the lowest among the OECD countries. What matters more for long-term growth are investments in the future—including crucial public investments in education, technology, and infrastructure.

The Rise and Fall of Nations: Forces of Change in the Post-Crisis World
by Ruchir Sharma
Published 5 Jun 2016

* I focused only on large economies because the current account in smaller ones can swing sharply with one big investment from abroad, skewing the results. Large is defined as an economy representing at least 0.2 percent of global GDP, which in 2015 would be an economy of more than $150 billion. † I say “of some kind” because this definition includes banking, currency, inflation, or debt crises as defined by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff. Data on these kinds of crises is available for 34 of the 40 cases, and 31 of them, or 91 percent, suffered at least one of these crises. ‡ The revival of savings is demonstrated, in technical terms, by the global correlation between domestic savings and domestic investment, which fell from 0.8 in 1980 to −0.1 in 2007 and has since climbed back up to 0.7. 9 THE KISS OF DEBT Is debt growing faster or slower than the economy?

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† By 2015, I should note, some private financial industry researchers were publishing pieces on the connection between credit binges and slower economic growth, including “Untangling China’s Credit Conundrum” from Goldman Sachs that January and “Keeping a Wary Eye on the EM Credit Cycle” by JP Morgan that November. ‡ In most of these cases, GDP growth was strong during the five-year period when credit was growing dangerously fast, so credit growth was the main reason the credit/GDP ratio was rising § Here I use financial crisis to mean a banking crisis as defined by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff in This Time Is Different (2009), which captures bank runs that force a government to close, merge, bail out, or take over one or more financial institutions. ¶ In twenty-six of the thirty cases, the average annual rate of growth fell over the next five years. The other four—Malaysia, Uruguay, Finland, and Norway—experienced a serious contraction in the economy, but the recovery came soon enough to lift the average rate of growth for the next five years

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“Unnatural Selection: Perverse Incetives and the Misallocation of Credit in Japan.” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper no. 9643, April 2003. Pettis, Michael. Avoiding the Fall: China’s Economic Restructuring. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013. Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth S. Rogoff. “Banking Crises: An Equal Opportunity Menace.” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper no. 14587, December 2008. ——. “From Financial Crash to Debt Crisis.” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper no. 15795, March 2010. ——. “Financial and Sovereign Debt Crises: Some Lessons Learned and Those Forgotten.”

Smart Money: How High-Stakes Financial Innovation Is Reshaping Our WorldÑFor the Better
by Andrew Palmer
Published 13 Apr 2015

From Breakthrough to Meltdown The previous chapter described how breakthroughs in finance have helped to propel enterprise and realize ambitions throughout human history. But anyone who seeks to defend the industry must also recognize how often, and how badly, it goes wrong. In This Time Is Different, their excellent survey of debt crises across the centuries, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff analyze episodes of banking crises. Such meltdowns are depressingly common in both developed and emerging economies: Britain, America, and France have experienced twelve, thirteen, and fifteen episodes of banking crisis, respectively, since 1800, for example.1 The first bailout in the United States happened way back in 1792, when a bubble and then a slump in the price of the country’s federal debt helped spark widespread panic.

Adam Smith: Father of Economics
by Jesse Norman
Published 30 Jun 2018

D., The Impartial Spectator: Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy, Oxford University Press 2007 Rasmussen, Dennis, The Infidel and the Professor: David Hume, Adam Smith, and the Friendship that Shaped Modern Thought, Princeton University Press 2017 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press 1974 Reinhart, Carmen and Kenneth Rogoff, This Time is Different, Princeton University Press 2011 Ricardo, David, On the Principles of Political Economy, and Taxation, John Murray 1817 Ridley, Matt, The Rational Optimist, Fourth Estate 2010 Robbins, Lionel, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, Macmillan 1932 Roberts, Russ, How Adam Smith Can Change your Life, Penguin 2014 Rodrik, Dani, Economics Rules, Oxford University Press 2015 Rodrik, Dani, The Globalisation Paradox, Oxford University Press 2011 Rosling, Hans, Ola Rosling and Anna Rosling RÖnnlund, Factfulness: Ten Reasons We’re Wrong About the World—And Why Things Are Better Than You Think, Sceptre 2018 Rothbard, Murray, Economic Thought before Adam Smith: An Austrian Perspective, Edward Elgar 1995 Rothschild, Emma, Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the Enlightenment, Harvard University Press 2001 Samuelson, Paul, Economics, 19th edn, rev.

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History of manias, bubbles and crashes: there is considerable controversy as to the correct explanation for different bubbles or manias. See e.g. Charles P. Kindleberger, Manias, Panics, and Crashes, 4th edn, John Wiley 2000; Robert Shiller, Irrational Exuberance, Princeton University Press 2000; Peter Garber, Famous First Bubbles: The Fundamentals of Early Manias, MIT Press 2000; and for finance, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, This Time is Different, Princeton University Press 2011 Keynes’s beauty competition: J. M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Macmillan 1936 Asset markets and credit creation: see George Cooper, The Origin of Financial Crises, 2nd edn, Harriman House 2010 Hyman Minsky: see his Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, Yale University Press 1986.

Vulture Capitalism: Corporate Crimes, Backdoor Bailouts, and the Death of Freedom
by Grace Blakeley
Published 11 Mar 2024

Zia Qureshi, “The Rise of Corporate Market Power,” Brookings Institute, May 21, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-rise-of-corporate-market-power/. 126. Rana Foroohar, Don’t Be Evil: The Case against Big Tech (London: Penguin UK, 2019). 127. Kenneth Rogoff, “Big Tech Is a Big Problem,” Project Syndicate, July 2, 2018, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/regulating-big-tech-companies-by-kenneth-rogoff-2018-07. 128. Qureshi, “The Rise of Corporate Market Power.” 129. Michał Kalecki, Collected Works, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). 130. Galbraith, The New Industrial State. 131. For an outline of Marx’s theory of centralization, see Thier, A People’s Guide to Capitalism. 132.

The Bankers' New Clothes: What's Wrong With Banking and What to Do About It
by Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig
Published 15 Feb 2013

Jordà et al. (2011) and Schularick and Taylor (2012) show that historically, recessions that have been associated with credit booms gone bust and with subsequent financial crises have been much larger and costlier than other types of recessions. On the slow recovery from the financial crisis in the United States, see Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, “Sorry, U.S. Recoveries Really Aren’t Different,” Bloomberg, October 15, 2012, and Martin Wolf, “A Slow Convalescence under Obama,” Financial Times, October 24, 2012. 20. For example, according to the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, from February 2008 to September 2009, total nonfarm employment declined by 8.138 million.

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———. 1998. “Debt Folklore and Cross-Country Differences in Financial Structure.” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 10: 102–107. Rajan, Uday, Amit Seru, and Vikrant Vig. 2010. “The Failure of Models to Predict Models.” Working paper. University of Chicago, Chicago. Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth Rogoff. 2009. This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ———. 2010. “Growth in a Time of Debt.” American Economic Review 100 (2): 573–578. Reiss, Peter. 1990. “Economic and Financial Determinants of Oil and Gas Exploration Activity.” In Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance and Investment, ed.

Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
by Daron Acemoğlu and James A. Robinson
Published 28 Sep 2001

Lang, Sean (1999) Parliamentary Reform, 1785–1928; New York: Routledge. 390 Bibliography Lapp, Nancy D. (2004) Landing Votes: Representation and Land Reform in Latin America; New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Leamer, Edward E. (1995) “International Trade Theory: The Evidence,” in James Levinson, Gene M. Grossman, and Kenneth Rogoff (eds.). The Handbook of International Economics, Volume III; Amsterdam: North-Holland. Leamer, Edward E. (1998) “In Search of Stolper–Samuelson Effects on U.S. Wages,” in Susan M. Collins (ed.). Imports, Exports, and the U.S. Worker; Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Lee, Stephen J. (1994) Aspects of British Political History, 1815–1914; New York: Routledge.

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Bibliography 395 Potter, Anne L. (1981) “The Failure of Democracy in Argentina 1916–1930: An Institutional Perspective,” Journal of Latin American Studies, 13, 83–109. Powell, Robert (2004) “The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information,” American Political Science Review, 98, 231–41. Prasad, Eswar, Kenneth Rogoff, Shang-jin Wei, and M. Ayhan Kose (2002) “Effects of Financial Globalization on Developing Countries: Some Empirical Evidence,” International Monetary Fund: March 17, 2003. Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/docs/ 2003/031703.pdf. Price, Robert M. (1991) The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa 1975–1990; New York: Oxford University Press.

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Washington, DC: Institute of International Economics. Rodrik, Dani (1999) “Democracies Pay Higher Wages,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXIV, 707–38. Rodrik, Dani, and Francisco Rodriguez (2000) “Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic’s Guide to the Cross-National Evidence,” in Ben S. Bernanke and Kenneth S. Rogoff (eds.). NBER Macroeconomic Annual; Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Roemer, John E. (1995) “Rationalizing Revolutionary Ideology: A Tale of Lenin and the Tsar,” Econometrica, 53, 85–108. Roemer, John E. (1998) “Why the Poor Don’t Expropriate the Rich in Democracies,” Journal of Public Economics, 70, 399–424.

The End of Wall Street
by Roger Lowenstein
Published 15 Jan 2010

Bernanke argued that their dollars had to flow somewhere, and the United States was merely an attractive destination. The curious financing of rich nations by poor ones reversed a long tradition. During previous eras, the U.S. had loaned money to developing nations, and had often come to rue the day. This time, as two professors, Carmen Reinhart of the University of Maryland and Kenneth Rogoff of Harvard, put it, “a large chunk of money had been recycled to a developing economy that exists within the United States’ own borders [emphasis added].”8 Surplus credit was flowing not to weak borrowers overseas, but to a Subprime Nation inside the United States. Generally, it is the job of the Fed to mitigate potentially destabilizing financial currents.

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Household growth was 2.5 percent. 6 Martin Wolf, “Asia’s Revenge,” Financial Times, October 9, 2008, and also Martin Wolf, “Seeds of Its Own Destruction,” Financial Times, March 9, 2009. 7 Ben S. Bernanke, Sandridge Lecture, Virginia Association of Economics, Richmond, March 10, 2005. 8 Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, draft of “Is the 2007 U.S. Sub-Prime Financial Crisis So Different? An International Historical Comparison,” February 5, 2008; subsequently published in American Economic Review, May 2009. 9 Fannie Mae found 932 articles in a Google search of “housing bubble” in the first four months of 2005, and 1,248 such articles in just the next two months—a sharp acceleration.

23 Things They Don't Tell You About Capitalism
by Ha-Joon Chang
Published 1 Jan 2010

The fact is that the world has become more stable only if we regard low inflation as the sole indicator of economic stability, but it has not become more stable in the way most of us experience it. One sense in which the world has become more unstable during the last three decades of free-market dominance and strong anti-inflationary policies is the increased frequency and extent of financial crises. According to a study by Kenneth Rogoff, a former chief economist of the IMF and now a professor at Harvard University, and Carmen Reinhart, a professor at the University of Maryland, virtually no country was in banking crisis between the end of the Second World War and the mid 1970s, when the world was much more unstable than today, when measured by inflation.

The Scandal of Money
by George Gilder
Published 23 Feb 2016

The profits largely flow to the employees [i.e., the bankers], while the losses are defrayed by the taxpayers and shareholders and even retirees (through artificially low interest rates). The Fed also provided $1.2 trillion in loans to banks (mostly secret at the time).” 4.Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011). 5.Mark Skousen, Vienna & Chicago, Friends or Foes? A Tale of Two Schools of Free-Market Economics (Washington, DC: Capital Press, 2005). Skousen superbly covers the canonical sources of Austrian and Chicago economic thought.

The Production of Money: How to Break the Power of Banks
by Ann Pettifor
Published 27 Mar 2017

This loss of democratic power hollowed out democratic institutions – parliaments and congresses – while ‘privatisation’ diminished whole sectors of the economy that had been subject to democratic oversight. Source: This Time is Different: A Panoramic View of Eight Centuries of Financial Crises by Carmen M. Reinhart, University of Maryland and NBER; and Kenneth S. Rogoff, Harvard University and NBER. Fig. 1. Financial crises during periods of high capital mobility after financial liberalisation. The economics profession and the universities stood aloof, as enormous power was concentrated in the hands of small groups of reckless financiers. Academic economists tended to focus myopically on microeconomic issues and lose sight of the macroeconomy.

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If rates of interest are too high, debtors have to raise the funds for debt repayment by increasing rates of profit, and by the further extraction of value. Source: This Time is Different: A Panoramic View of Eight Centuries of Financial Crises by Carmen M. Reinhart, University of Maryland and NBER; and Kenneth S. Rogoff, Harvard University and NBER. Fig. 2. Illustrations of different growth patterns. These pressures to increase income at exponential rates for the repayment of debt implies that both labour and the land (defined broadly) have to be exploited at ever-rising rates. Those who labour by hand or brain work harder and longer to repay rising, real levels of mortgage or credit card debt.

Firefighting
by Ben S. Bernanke , Timothy F. Geithner and Henry M. Paulson, Jr.
Published 16 Apr 2019

Paulson, Jr., with Nellie Liang, eds., First Responders: Inside the U.S. Strategy for Fighting the 2007–2009 Global Financial Crisis (New Haven: Yale University Press, forthcoming). U.S. strategy was able to limit the damage: Data for 63 financial crises in advanced economies, 1857 to 2013, were taken from Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, “Recovery from Financial Crises: Evidence from 100 Episodes,” American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 104(5) (2014): 50–55, https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/rogoff/files/aer_104-5_50-55.pdf. Based on Nellie Liang, Margaret M. McConnell, and Phillip Swagel, “Evidence on Outcomes,” in Ben S.

The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor
by William Easterly
Published 4 Mar 2014

When financial markets and institutions mobilize savings from disparate households to invest in these promising projects, this represents a second crucial step in fostering growth.33 There may indeed be more scope in finance than in goods markets for activities that generate private returns that are not social returns, such as deception, embezzlement, and outright Ponzi schemes. As explained by the great book satirically titled This Time Is Different, by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, cheating in finance did not start with the horrific financial crisis of 2007 to 2008; it has been happening for centuries.34 Yet somehow, despite the cheating, finance keeps providing the essential services without which large-scale success would not be possible. ADAM SMITH AND DEVELOPMENT In 1986, just as Hyundai was cracking the US market, the Journal of Political Economy, one of the most prestigious journals in economics, published an article titled “Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth.”

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Douglas Evanoff, Cornelia Holthausen, George Kaufman, and Manfred Kremer (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Company, 2013), 2011 working paper available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/ross_levine/Papers/2011_ChicagoFed_DefenseofWallStreet.pdf, accessed September 12, 2013. 34. Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). CHAPTER 12: TECHNOLOGY: HOW TO SUCCEED WITHOUT KNOWING HOW 1. Broadband Commission, The State of Broadband 2012: Achieving Digital Inclusion for All (Geneva, Switzerland: International Telecommunication Union, 2012), 5, 35, 43.

The Euro: How a Common Currency Threatens the Future of Europe
by Joseph E. Stiglitz and Alex Hyde-White
Published 24 Oct 2016

But such analyses have no bearing in a postcrisis world experiencing massive unemployment—in the eurozone, unemployment stands at 10.2 percent as this book goes to press.59 In fact, when there is already a high level of unemployment, there is a “multiplier”—that is, reductions in government spending can lead to reductions in GDP that are a multiple of the cutbacks.60 Another strand of academic work cited by austerity advocates focuses on the consequences of the debt that arises when government spending is financed by borrowing. Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhardt argued that countries with debt-to-GDP ratios in excess of 80 percent would grow more slowly.61 Upon closer scrutiny, there were major “spreadsheet” and other technical mistakes in their work. More significantly, however, Rogoff and Reinhart failed to test whether growth was lower at higher debt ratios in a way that was statistically significant, and whether this was true always or only under certain conditions.

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article=1026&context=econ_faculty_pubs. 58 See, for example, International Monetary Fund, “Will It Hurt? Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal Consolidation,” chapter 3 in 2010 World Economic Outlook. 59 Eurostat figures for the eurozone for March 2016. 60 See, for example, International Monetary Fund, “Will It Hurt?” 62 Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, “Growth in a Time of Debt,” American Economic Review 100, no. 2 (May 2010): 573–78. 62 By now, there is a large literature on the subject. See, for example, Thomas Herndon, Michael Ash, and Robert Pollin, “Does High Public Debt Consistently Stifle Economic Growth? A Critique of Reinhart and Rogoff,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 38, no. 2 (2014): 257–79; Ugo Panizza and Andrea F.

The Fissured Workplace
by David Weil
Published 17 Feb 2014

National income is the sum of employee, proprietor, rental, corporate, interest, and government income less the subsidies paid by government to any of those groups. Analysis of the percentage of gross domestic product shows the same trends: corporate profits after tax hit an all-time high as a percentage of GDP (over 10%), while the share of GDP going to wages and salary fell to an all-time low of 44%. 47. Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart have objected that the term “Great Recession” itself is unhelpful since it implies that the recent recession is similar to typical downturns, just a particularly deep one. Instead, they refer to it as the “second great contraction” (the first being the Great Depression). See Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). 48.

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“Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Labor Markets.” Handbook of Labor Economics. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Reich, Michael, David Gordon, and Richard Edwards. 1973. “A Theory of Labor Market Segmentation.” American Economic Review 63, no. 2: 359–365. Reinhart, Carmen, and Kenneth Rogoff. 2009. This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rogers, Brishen. 2010. “Toward Third-Party Liability for Wage Theft.” Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law 30, no. 1: 1–64. Rosen, Sherwin. 1988. “Implicit Contracts: A Survey.”

The Devil's Derivatives: The Untold Story of the Slick Traders and Hapless Regulators Who Almost Blew Up Wall Street . . . And Are Ready to Do It Again
by Nicholas Dunbar
Published 11 Jul 2011

The creeping malaise caused by too much debt was never going to be easy to fix. What was clear by the end of summer 2010 was that a crisis forged in the workshops of investment bank financial innovators had metamorphosed into a crisis all too familiar to economic historians. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff point out in their book, This Time Is Different, there is a clear pattern to the credit booms that have bankrupted banks and nation states over the past eight centuries.5 What was different in 2010 was the global scale of the problem, and how regulators in the world’s developed countries, led by the United States and Britain, were ill suited to handle the burden of their failed consumer finance and banking systems.

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Office of Budget Responsibility prebudget report, June 2010, http://budgetresponsibility.independent.gov.uk/index.html. 3. James Sassoon, interview by author, November 2009. 4. Nicholas Dunbar, “Revealed: Goldman Sachs’ Mega-Deal for Greece,” Risk, July 2003, 20. 5. Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). Acknowledgments Someone who fits Amartya Sen’s description of a rational fool would be fairly close to a psychopath. The economic world is full of these psychopaths: they are corporations.

Unfinished Business
by Tamim Bayoumi

Norton, New York and London, 2016. Stock and Watson (2003): James H. Stock and Mark W. Watson, “Has the Business Cycle Changed and Why?”, in Mark Gertler and Kenneth Rogoff (eds), NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2002, Vol. 17, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2003. Svensson (2016): Lars E. Svensson, “A Simple Cost-Benefit Analysis of Using Monetary Policy for Financial Stability Purposes”, in Olivier J. Blanchard, Raghuram G. Rajan, Kenneth S. Rogoff, and Lawrence H. Summers (eds), Progress and Confusion: The State of Macroeconomic Policy, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2016. Tarullo (2008): Daniel K. Tarullo, Banking on Basel: The Future of International Financial Regulation, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington DC, 2008.

Boomerang: Travels in the New Third World
by Michael Lewis
Published 2 Oct 2011

Yeah, and that will happen right after monkeys fly out of your ass.” Still, he wondered if perhaps he was missing something. “I went looking for someone, anyone, who knew something about the history of sovereign defaults,” he said. He found the leading expert on the subject, a professor at Harvard named Kenneth Rogoff, who, as it happened, was preparing a book on the history of national financial collapse, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, with fellow scholar Carmen Reinhart. “We walked Rogoff through the numbers,” said Bass, “and he just looked at them, then sat back in his chair, and said, ‘I can hardly believe it is this bad.’

Rethinking Capitalism: Economics and Policy for Sustainable and Inclusive Growth
by Michael Jacobs and Mariana Mazzucato
Published 31 Jul 2016

The presumption that ‘the self-interest of organisations, specifically banks, is such that they were best capable of protecting shareholders and equity in the firms’ had proved incorrect.8 Contrary to the claims of the ‘efficient markets hypothesis’ which underpinned that assumption, financial markets had systematically mispriced assets and risks, with catastrophic results.9 The financial crash of 2008 was the most severe since that of 1929. But as Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff have pointed out, since most countries undertook financial liberalisation in the 1970s and 1980s, there has been a marked increase in the frequency of banking crises (see Figure 1).10 Globally, in the period 1970 to 2007, the International Monetary Fund has recorded 124 systemic bank crises, 208 currency crises and 63 sovereign debt crises.11 For modern capitalism instability has become, not the exception, but a seemingly structural feature.

SUPERHUBS: How the Financial Elite and Their Networks Rule Our World
by Sandra Navidi
Published 24 Jan 2017

He excelled at academics, graduating from Harvard University and earning a PhD at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Stanley Fischer, who later became the governor of the Bank of Israel and thereafter Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve, was his thesis adviser. While at Harvard, his path crossed with many who would later become key figures in the crisis: Lloyd Blankfein, CEO of Goldman Sachs; Kenneth Rogoff of Harvard University; and Paul Krugman, Nobel laureate and Princeton professor. Both Bernanke and Larry Summers earned degrees at MIT. Bernanke went on to become a professor at Stanford Business School and a visiting professor at New York University before receiving tenure at Princeton University.

The Wisdom of Finance: Discovering Humanity in the World of Risk and Return
by Mihir Desai
Published 22 May 2017

Journal of Financial Economics 13, no. 2 (1984): 187–221. For debt overhang, in particular, see Ishiguro, Kazuo. The Remains of the Day. New York: Knopf, 1989; Myers, Stewart. “Determinants of Corporate Borrowing.” Journal of Financial Economics 5, no. 2 (1977): 147–75. For an application of these ideas to sovereign debt, see Bulow, Jeremy, and Kenneth Rogoff. “Cleaning Up Third-World Debt Without Getting Taken to the Cleaners.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 4 (1990): 31–42. On the importance of regret, see Roese, Neal J., and Amy Summerville. “What We Regret Most . . . and Why.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 31, no. 9 (September 2005): 1273–85; and Parker-Pope, Tara.

Belt and Road: A Chinese World Order
by Bruno Maçães
Published 1 Feb 2019

Voon, “China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative: Political-Economic Calculations of Southeast Asian States”, Asian Survey, 2017, p. 422. 24. 印度洋海权格局与中国海权的印度洋拓展, 《太平洋学报》2014年5期 作者: 李剑 陈文文 金晶. 3. THE BELT AND ROAD AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 1. Richard Baldwin, The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization (Harvard University Press, 2016), p. 161. 2. Kenneth Rogoff, “Will China Really Supplant US Economic Hegemony?,” Project Syndicate, April 2, 2008. 3. Wang Jisi, “North, South, East, and West—China is in the ‘Middle’: A Geostrategic Chessboard,” China International Strategy Review, p. 39. 4. Interconnected Economies: Benefiting from Global Value Chains, OECD, 2013. 5.

The Great Reversal: How America Gave Up on Free Markets
by Thomas Philippon
Published 29 Oct 2019

TABLE 13.1 Top Ten Global Firms, Spring 2018 Company Country Market value ($ billion) Apple US 926.9 Amazon US 777.8 Alphabet US 766.4 Microsoft US 750.6 Facebook US 541.5 Alibaba China 499.4 Berkshire Hathaway US 491.9 Tencent Holdings China 491.3 JPMorgan Chase US 387.7 ExxonMobil US 344.1 These companies are stars, undoubtedly. But there have always been stars in the economy. Are these stars different? Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff (2009) have famously shown that thinking “this time is different” is the shortest way to a financial crisis. In macroeconomics, there is no such thing as “this time is different.” But, perhaps, matters could be different where the internet is concerned. There are some technological reasons to believe this time might be different.

More Money Than God: Hedge Funds and the Making of a New Elite
by Sebastian Mallaby
Published 9 Jun 2010

Dornbusch’s argument did not hinge on the trend following by speculators that Soros emphasized; instead, he explained that currencies overshoot in response to monetary shocks because of the interplay between sticky prices for goods and fast-adjusting capital markets. However, Dornbusch’s sticky-price assumption was a minority view within academic macroeconomics through the 1980s. On this point, see Kenneth Rogoff, “Dornbusch’s Overshooting Model After Twenty-Five Years,” IMF Working Paper No. 02/39. Presented at the Second Annual Research Conference, International Monetary Fund (Mundell-Fleming Lecture), November 30, 2001, revised January 22, 2002. Given that Dornbusch represented a minority view, Soros was not attacking a straw man.

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Thus, in November 1984, a fall in U.S. interest rates had been followed after a short pause by a jump in the dollar. The market’s logic was that if the dollar did not drop in response to falling interest rates, the upward trend must be robust and it was time to buy the life out of the currency. 19. In this conclusion, Soros anticipated the views of the economics profession. Writing in 2002, Kenneth Rogoff, a Harvard professor then serving as the International Monetary Fund’s chief economist, commented, “If there is a consensus result in the empirical literature, it has to be that nothing, but nothing, can systematically explain exchange rates between major currencies with flexible exchange rates.”

Extreme Money: Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk
by Satyajit Das
Published 14 Oct 2011

Detractors argue that Roubini predicted a different kind of crisis for a long time, switching in late 2006 to warnings about U.S. housing and a global recession, adroitly fitting his narrative to events.7 Financial people believe strongly in their superior intelligence. On July 22, 2001, in an open letter to the economist Joseph Stiglitz, Kenneth Rogoff wrote: “One of my favourite stories...is a lunch with you...you started discussing whether Paul Volcker merited your vote for a tenured appointment at Princeton. At one point, you turned to me and said, ‘Ken, you used to work for Volcker at the Fed. Tell me, is he really smart?’ I responded something to the effect of ‘Well, he was arguably the greatest Federal Reserve Chairman of the twentieth century.’

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Nomi Prins (2004) Other People’s Money: The Corporate Mugging of America, The New Press, New York. John Quiggin (2010) Zombie Economics: How Dead Ideas Still Walk Among Us, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford. Raghuram G. Rajan (2010) Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff (2010) This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford. Barry Ritholtz (2009) Bailout Nation: How Greed and Easy Money Corrupted Wall Street and Shook The World Economy, John Wiley, New Jersey. David Roche and Bob McKee (2008) New Monetarism, Independent Strategy Publications, London.

Inflated: How Money and Debt Built the American Dream
by R. Christopher Whalen
Published 7 Dec 2010

“Instead, every such loan has been subjected to major currency devaluation, rolled over, suspended, rescheduled, or otherwise restructured, repudiated, reduced, cancelled, or forgiven. The more drastic steps, leading to eventual, partial or complete cancelation of debt have been surprisingly frequent.”39 The views of researchers such as Walker Todd and Gerry O’Driscoll on foreign lending are confirmed in the more recent work of Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, This Time it is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. The book is another monumental research effort in the fine tradition of Freidman and Schwartz’s Monetary History of the United States and Allan Meltzer’s updates of that work, albeit focused on the foreign debt component of the economic story.

Investing Demystified: How to Invest Without Speculation and Sleepless Nights
by Lars Kroijer
Published 5 Sep 2013

If you have a longer investment horizon, then match the investment horizon with the maturity of your minimal risk bond portfolio. You will have to accept interest rate risk even if you avoid inflation risk by buying inflation-adjusted bonds. 1 For those who don’t think government bonds can default I would encourage you to read This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff (Princeton University Press, 2011). The authors make a mockery of the belief that governments rarely default and that we are somehow now protected from the catastrophic financial events of the past. 2 There are cases where the yield curve is reversed and shorter-term bonds yield more than longer-term ones, but these cases are less frequent. 3 Imagine the scenario where you want to hold one-month government bonds.

In Defense of Global Capitalism
by Johan Norberg
Published 1 Jan 2001

See also James Tobin, ‘‘Financial Globalization: Can National Currencies Survive?’’ (paper presented at the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, April 20–21, 1998, Washington), http://www.worldbank.org/html/rad/abcde/tobin.pdf. 14. Concerning variable exchange rates, see Radelet and Sachs, p. 13. Fixed exchange rates: Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff, ‘‘The Mirage of Fixed Exchange Rates,’’ Journal of Economic Perpectives 9, no. 4 (Fall 1995): 73–96. 15. In China the advocates of WTO membership were critics of the regime, reformists and liberals, while the opponents were to be found among the big corporations, the security service, and the army.

Cogs and Monsters: What Economics Is, and What It Should Be
by Diane Coyle
Published 11 Oct 2021

, Dani Rodrik’s web blog, 7 May, https://rodrik.typepad.com/dani_rodriks_weblog/2013/05/what-is-wrong-and-right-in-economics.html. Rodrik, D., 2018, ‘Is Populism Necessarily Bad Economics?’, AEA Papers & Proceedings, 108, 196–199. Rogoff, K., 2019, ‘Modern Monetary Nonsense’, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/federal-reserve-modern-monetary-theory-dangers-by-kenneth-rogoff-2019–03, accessed 6 August 2020. Romer, P. M., 1986a, ‘Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth’, Journal of Political Economy, 94 (5), 1002–1037. Romer, P. M., 1986b, ‘Endogenous Technological Change’, Journal of Political Economy, 98 (5), S71–S102. Romer, P., 1994, ‘The Origins of Endogenous Growth’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8 (1), 3–22.

Fed Up!: Success, Excess and Crisis Through the Eyes of a Hedge Fund Macro Trader
by Colin Lancaster
Published 3 May 2021

TALF (Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility) allowed the Fed to lend money to banks and other financial institutions on a nonrecourse basis. Because the money came from the Fed and not the Treasury, there was no congressional oversight of how the funds were doled out. 8 “Growth in a Time of Debt,” also known by its authors’ names as Reinhart–Rogoff, is an economics paper by American economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff. The paper argues that when “gross external debt reaches 60% of GDP,” a country’s annual growth declines by 2%, and “for levels of external debt in excess of 90%,” GDP growth is “roughly cut in half.” Appearing in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007–2008, the evidence for the 90% debt threshold hypothesis provided support for pro-austerity policies. 9 Thank you Hunter Thompson.

Making Globalization Work
by Joseph E. Stiglitz
Published 16 Sep 2006

See OECD, “Preliminary Official Development Assistance (ODA) by Donor in 2004, as Announced on April 11, 2005,” at www.oecd.org/document/7/0,2340, en_2649_34485_35397703_1_1_1_1, 00.html. 9.See HM Treasury, “G-8 Finance Ministers’ Conclusions on Development, London 10–11, June 2005,” at www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/otherhmtsites/g7/news/ conclusions_on_development_110605.cfm. 10.See Table A.24 of World Bank, Global Development Finance: The Development Potential of Surging Capital Flows (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006); available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGDF2006/Resources/GDF06 _complete.pdf. 11.See UNDP, Making Global Trade Work for People (London and Sterling, VA: Earthscan Publications, 2003). 12.See Oxfam, “Running into the Sand: Why Failure at the Cancun Trade Talks Threatens the World’s Poorest People,” Oxfam Briefing Paper 53, September 2003. 13.Eswar Prasad, Kenneth Rogoff, Shang-Jin Wei, and M. Ayhan Kose, “Effects of Financial Globalization on Developing Countries: Some Empirical Evidence,” IMF Occasional Paper 220, March 2003. Even the Economist, long a committed advocate of deregulated markets in general and capital market liberalization in particular, conceded the issue in their excellent article “A Fair Exchange?

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Perry (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995), pp. 1–95. A compelling critique of the econometric studies is provided by Dani Rodrik and Francisco Rodríguez, “Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic’s Guide to the Cross-National Evidence” in NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, ed. Ben S. Bernanke and Kenneth S. Rogoff (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 261–325. 23.There is a large “fair trade” movement, which has been particularly influential in Europe. It focuses on a slightly different set of questions: it worries that farmers in the developing world get such a small share of the ultimate price paid by consumers, with middlemen taking most of the money—a tiny percentage of the cost of the cup of coffee actually goes to the coffee grower—and it seeks ways to ensure that the farmers are treated more fairly.

Treasure Islands: Uncovering the Damage of Offshore Banking and Tax Havens
by Nicholas Shaxson
Published 11 Apr 2011

Another famous study found that between 1940 and 1971, a period mostly covering the time of the golden age, developing countries suffered no banking crises and only sixteen currency crises, whereas in the quarter century after 1973 there were 17 banking crises and 57 currency crises. A major new study in 2009 by the economists Carmen Reinhardt and Kenneth Rogoff, looking back over eight hundred years of economic history, concluded that, as reviewer Martin Wolf put it, “Financial liberalisation and financial crises go together like a horse and carriage.”23 We cannot infer too much from these very different episodes. Other reasons exist for the high growth rates during the golden age, not least postwar rebuilding and productivity improvements during the war.

Before Babylon, Beyond Bitcoin: From Money That We Understand to Money That Understands Us (Perspectives)
by David Birch
Published 14 Jun 2017

The World Economic Forum talks about ‘natural identity networks’ (World Economic Forum 2016) based not only on traditional national or geographic networks but also on affiliations ‘with a supervisory entity’ (i.e. the replacement for the central bank, in this context), industries and asset classes (and here I include Ringland’s speculation about demographic asset classes). Here comes the smarter money The money created by the communities of the future will be very different from the money of today because it will be smart money. Economist Kenneth Rogoff put this nicely in his The Curse of Cash, noting that digital currencies offer the capacity for more complex kinds of transactions because they enable so much more information, including a history of transactions. While early experiments with Bitcoin and smart contracts give us a sense of the direction of travel, it is hardly wild speculation to assume that as new technologies connect with these basic building blocks of smart money, a new smarter money will emerge in the fusion of reputation, authentication, identification, machine learning and artificial intelligence.

The Global Minotaur
by Yanis Varoufakis and Paul Mason
Published 4 Jul 2015

Chapter 2 1. See Jared Diamond (2006) Guns, Germs and Steel, New York: Norton. 2. Ibn Khaldun (1967) The Muqaddimah: An introduction to history, trans. Franz Rosenthal, Bollingen Series XLIII, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 3. For a good account of such calamities, see Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff (2009) This Time Is Different: Eight centuries of financial folly, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 4. Once all your music, films, applications, addresses, etc. are on iTunes and readily accessible by any Apple product (iPod, iPhone, iPad, etc.), the opportunity cost of buying a Nokia or a Sony device is huge (even if these companies bring a better device to market) – you need to spend literally hours setting the new gadget up.

The Economics of Belonging: A Radical Plan to Win Back the Left Behind and Achieve Prosperity for All
by Martin Sandbu
Published 15 Jun 2020

Olivier Blanchard, “Public Debt and Low Interest Rates” (presidential address, American Economic Association, January 2019), https://www.aeaweb.org/aea/2019conference/program/pdf/14020_paper_etZgfbDr.pdf. Chapter 9. A Smarter Financial System 1. For a view of why this was, see Martin Sandbu, “Talking ’bout a Revolution,” Financial Times, 19 April 2013, https://www.ft.com/content/91a3782a-a80f-11e2-b031-00144feabdc0. 2. See, for example, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009; Atif Mian and Amir Sufi, House of Debt: How They (and You) Caused the Great Recession, and How We Can Prevent It from Happening Again, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015; and Valerie Cerra and Sweta Saxena, “Growth Dynamics: The Myth of Economic Recovery,” American Economic Review 98, no. 1 (2008): 439–57, https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.1.439. 3.

That Used to Be Us
by Thomas L. Friedman and Michael Mandelbaum
Published 1 Sep 2011

It stood at $5.6 trillion in 2001, but over the next nine years it increased dramatically. By 2011, it had reached $14 trillion—the equivalent of the country’s GDP—with the prospect of increasing to $16 trillion by 2012 without countervailing steps. “Total American general government debt today is at a phenomenal level,” said Kenneth Rogoff, a professor of economics and public policy at Harvard University and formerly the chief economist at the International Monetary Fund. Rogoff is also the co-author with Carmen Reinhart of This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, which surveys the history of debt and financial crises.

The Signal and the Noise: Why So Many Predictions Fail-But Some Don't
by Nate Silver
Published 31 Aug 2012

Act III: This Time Wasn’t Different Once the housing bubble had burst, greedy investors became fearful ones who found uncertainty lurking around every corner. The process of disentangling a financial crisis—everyone trying to figure out who owes what to whom—can produce hangovers that persist for a very long time. The economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, studying volumes of financial history for their book This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, found that financial crises typically produce rises in unemployment that persist for four to six years.86 Another study by Reinhart, which focused on more recent financial crises, found that ten of the last fifteen countries to endure one had never seen their unemployment rates recover to their precrisis levels.87 This stands in contrast to normal recessions, in which there is typically above-average growth in the year or so following the recession88 as the economy reverts to the mean, allowing employment to catch up quickly.

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Per interview with George Akerlof. “You may know what to pay for House A versus House B versus House C because you can say one has a kitchen with gadgets that is worth $500 more than House B, which has a kitchen with no gadgets. But you don’t know what the price of a house should be.” 86. Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, “The Aftermath of the Financial Crisis,” Working Paper 14656, NBER Working Paper Series, National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2009. http://www.bresserpereira.org.br/terceiros/cursos/Rogoff.Aftermath_of_Financial_Crises.pdf. 87. Carmen M. Reinhart and Vincent R. Reinhart, “After the Fall,” presentation at Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Jackson Hole Symposium, August 2010. http://www.kcfed.org/publicat/sympos/2010/reinhart-paper.pdf. 88.

Foolproof: Why Safety Can Be Dangerous and How Danger Makes Us Safe
by Greg Ip
Published 12 Oct 2015

The Causes of the Foreclosure Crisis,” Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Public Policy Discussion Paper, July 2012, available at http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/ppdp/2012/ppdp1202.pdf. 8 Greenspan took office in 1987: The events involving Alan Greenspan are based primarily on interviews I conducted with him after his retirement, his speeches, testimony, and books, and my reporting. 9 inflation slid further, to below 3 percent: This is based on the consumer price index, excluding food and energy. 10 “the Great Moderation”: From James H. Stock and Mark W. Watson, “Has the Business Cycle Changed and Why?,” in NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2002, 17, Mark Gertler and Kenneth Rogoff, eds., available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11075.pdf. The term may have been used earlier, but Stock and Watson are generally credited with popularizing it. 11 the more investors will pay: A standard valuation model calculates a present value of a stream of income by discounting future cash flow by some discount rate, which is a function of both interest rates and perceived risk.

The Art of Statistics: How to Learn From Data
by David Spiegelhalter
Published 2 Sep 2019

All these issues should have been foreseen and avoided by careful piloting. The easiest way for Analysis to go wrong is simply to make a mistake. Many of us will have made errors in coding or spreadsheets, but perhaps not with the consequences of the following examples: • Prominent economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff published a paper in 2010 which strongly influenced attitudes to austerity. A PhD student later found that five countries had been inadvertently left out of their main analysis due to a simple spreadsheet error.*4 • A programmer for AXA Rosenberg, a global equity investment firm, incorrectly programmed a statistical model so that some of its calculated risk elements were too small by a factor of ten thousand, leading to $217 million in losses to clients.

The Art of Statistics: Learning From Data
by David Spiegelhalter
Published 14 Oct 2019

All these issues should have been foreseen and avoided by careful piloting. The easiest way for Analysis to go wrong is simply to make a mistake. Many of us will have made errors in coding or spreadsheets, but perhaps not with the consequences of the following examples: Prominent economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff published a paper in 2010 which strongly influenced attitudes to austerity. A PhD student later found that five countries had been inadvertently left out of their main analysis due to a simple spreadsheet error.fn2 4 A programmer for AXA Rosenberg, a global equity investment firm, incorrectly programmed a statistical model so that some of its calculated risk elements were too small by a factor of ten thousand, leading to $217 million in losses to clients.

Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism
by Ha-Joon Chang
Published 26 Dec 2007

Bordo (2002), ‘Crises Now and Then:What Lessons from the Last Era of Financial Globalisation’, NBERWorking Paper, no. 8716, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), Cambridge, Massachusetts. 14 This is the title of chapter 13 of J. Bhagwati (2004), In Defense of Globalization (Oxford University Press, New York). 15 The new, more nuanced view of the IMF is set out in detail in two papers written by Kenneth Rogoff, a former chief economist of the IMF (2001–2003), and three IMF economists. E. Prasad, K. Rogoff, S-J. Wei & A. Kose (2003), ‘Effects of Financial Globalisation on Developing Countries: Some Empirical Evidence’, IMF Occasional Paper, no. 220, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Washington, DC, and Kose et al. (2006). 16 Kose et al. (2006), pp. 34–5.

Everything Is Obvious: *Once You Know the Answer
by Duncan J. Watts
Published 28 Mar 2011

A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. Raynor, Michael. 2007. The Strategy Paradox: Why Committing to Success Leads to Failure. New York: Doubleday. Reid, T. R. 2009. “The Healing of America: A Global Quest for Better, Cheaper, and Fairer Health Care.” New York: Penguin. Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth Rogoff. 2009. This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rescher, Nicholas. 2005. Common-Sense: A New Look at Old Tradition. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press. Rice, Andrew. 2010. “Putting a Price on Words.” New York Times Magazine, May 10.

The Upside of Inequality
by Edward Conard
Published 1 Sep 2016

“Global Wealth Report 2015,” Credit Suisse Research, October 2015, https://publications.credit-suisse.com/tasks/render/file/?fileID=F2425415-DCA7-80B8-EAD989AF9341D47E. 14. Chris Gaither and Dawn Chmielewski, “Fears of Dot-Com Crash, Version 2.0,” Los Angeles Times, July 16, 2006, http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jul/16/business/fi-overheat16. 15. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). 16. Lawrence Summers, “The Future of Work in the Age of the Machine: A Hamilton Project Policy Forum,” National Press Club, February 19, 2015, http://www.hamiltonproject.org/events/the_future_of_work_in_the_age_of_the_machine. 17.

Bad Samaritans: The Guilty Secrets of Rich Nations and the Threat to Global Prosperity
by Ha-Joon Chang
Published 4 Jul 2007

Bordo (2002), ‘Crises Now and Then: What Lessons from the Last Era of Financial Globalisation’, NBER Working Paper, no. 8716, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), Cambridge, Massachusetts. 14 This is the title of chapter 13 of J. Bhagwati (2004), In Defense of Globalization (Oxford University Press, New York). 15 The new, more nuanced view of the IMF is set out in detail in two papers written by Kenneth Rogoff, a former chief economist of the IMF (2001–2003), and three IMF economists. E. Prasad, K. Rogoff, S-J. Wei & A. Kose (2003), ‘Effects of Financial Globalisation on Developing Countries: Some Empirical Evidence’, IMF Occasional Paper, no. 220, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Washington, DC, and Kose et al. (2006). 16 Kose et al. (2006), pp. 34–5.

The Myth of Capitalism: Monopolies and the Death of Competition
by Jonathan Tepper
Published 20 Nov 2018

Tepper makes a compelling case that the government’s failure to rein in tech titans and other corporate behemoths is at the root of perhaps the most troubling macroeconomic trends of our time, including rising inequality and slowing productivity. Clear and highly accessible, the book takes no prisoners, arguing that monopolists’ funding and sloppy thinking has corrupted every aspect of the system, from politicians to regulators to academics.” —Kenneth Rogoff, Thomas D. Cabot Professor of Public Policy and Professor of Economics at Harvard University, author of the bestselling book This Time is Different “Slowing growth and rising inequality have become a toxic combination in western economies, notably including the US. This combination now threatens the survival of liberal democracy itself.

How to Be a Liberal: The Story of Liberalism and the Fight for Its Life
by Ian Dunt
Published 15 Oct 2020

They started to treat traditionally safe government bonds – the IOUs issued for national borrowing – as uncertain. That drove up interest rates on borrowing, which would in turn plunge countries further into the red, trapping them in debt servitude. This argument was given additional potency in 2010 by the publication of a research paper by two former IMF economists, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, called Growth in a Time of Debt. It contained an alarming finding. Once public debt passed 90 per cent of GDP, it said, something happened. Economic growth slowed. The economy couldn’t get out from under the sheer weight of state borrowing. Government revenue dwindled, more and more money was spent on servicing the debt, and hopes of ever paying it off vanished.

Thinking with Data
by Max Shron
Published 15 Aug 2014

The rebuttals to a cost/benefit analysis are that costs and benefits have been miscalculated, that this is generally not the right method to make such a decision, or that the calculations for cost and benefit do not take into account other costs or benefits that reorder the answers. Next-quarter cash earnings may conflict with long-term profitability, or with legal restrictions that would land a decision maker in jail. * * * [6] Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth S. Rogoff. Growth in a Time of Debt. NBER Working Paper No. 15639, 2010. http://www.nber.org/papers/w15639. [7] Herndon, Thomas, Michael Ash, and Robert Pollin. Does High Public Debt Consistently Stifle Economic Growth? A Critique of Reinhart and Rogoff. PERI Working Paper No. 322, 2013. http://bit.ly/1gIDQfN

Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy
by Raghuram Rajan
Published 24 May 2010

Public confidence in authority was badly shaken. Of course, it is incorrect to say that no one saw this crisis coming. Some hedge fund managers and traders in investment banks put their money instead of their mouths to work. A few government and Federal Reserve officials expressed deep concern. A number of economists, such as Kenneth Rogoff, Nouriel Roubini, Robert Shiller, and William White, repeatedly sounded warnings about the levels of U.S. house prices and household indebtedness. Niall Ferguson, a historian, drew parallels to past booms that ended poorly. The problem was not that no one warned about the dangers; it was that those who benefited from an overheated economy—which included a lot of people—had little incentive to listen.

The Physics of Wall Street: A Brief History of Predicting the Unpredictable
by James Owen Weatherall
Published 2 Jan 2013

New York: Viking Press. Radelet, Steven, and Jeffrey D. Sachs. 2000. “The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis.” In Currency Crises, ed. Paul Krugman, 105–62. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Rajan, Raghuram G. 2010. Faultlines. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth Rogoff. 2009. This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rhodes, Richard. 1995. The Making of the Atomic Bomb. New York: Simon & Schuster. Rogers, Simon. 2010. “NASA Budgets: US Spending on Space Travel Since 1958.” The Guardian, February 1.

The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics
by William R. Easterly
Published 1 Aug 2002

“A Theory of the Low-Level Equilibrium Trap in Underdeveloped Economies,” American Economic Review 46, no. 5 (December): 894-908. Nordhaus, William. 1994, “Do RealOutput and Real Wage Measures Capture Reality? The History of Lighting Suggests Not.” Yale Cowles Foundation discussion paper: 1078, September. Obstfeld, Maurice, and Kenneth Rogoff.1996. economics. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Foundations of InternationalMacro- Ogaki, Masao, Jonathan D. Ostry, and Carmen M. Reinhart. 1995. ”Saving Behavior in Low- and Middle-Income Developing Countries: A Comparison.” IMF Working Paper WP/95/3. Pack, Howard, and John M. Page, Jr. 1994.

Money: The Unauthorized Biography
by Felix Martin
Published 5 Jun 2013

Readers rushed to consult the great financial historian, Charles Kindleberger.1 To learn of his discovery that “financial crises have tended to appear at roughly ten-year intervals for the last 400 years or so” was either disturbing or comforting, depending on one’s perspective.2 Within a couple of years, however, the economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff had published an even more comprehensive investigation into the history of financial crises. Its ominous subtitle warned the reader to expect not just four but “Eight Centuries of Financial Folly.”3 And as Tactitus’ account of the credit crunch under the Emperor Tiberius shows, monetary society has been prone to the problem of growing indebtedness ending in a crisis of solvency for much longer even than that.

Don't Be Evil: How Big Tech Betrayed Its Founding Principles--And All of US
by Rana Foroohar
Published 5 Nov 2019

Lance Whitney, “Apple, Google, Others Settle Antipoaching Lawsuit for $415 Million,” CNET News, September 3, 2015. 38. Dan Levine, “Apple, Google Agree to Settle Lawsuit Alleging Hiring, Salary Conspiracy,” The Washington Post, April 24, 2014. 39. Author interview with Peter Harter, 2017. 40. James Thomson, “Tech Giants Buy Start-ups to Kill Competition, Kenneth Rogoff Tells Summit,” Financial Review, March 7, 2018. 41. Olivia Solon, “As Tech Companies Get Richer, Is It ‘Game-Over’ for Startups?” The Guardian, October 20, 2017. 42. Marc Doucette, “Visualizing Major Tech Acquisitions,” Visual Capitalist, July 24, 2018. 43. “American Tech Giants Are Making Life Tough for Startups,” The Economist, June 2, 2018. 44.

Nobody's Fool: Why We Get Taken in and What We Can Do About It
by Daniel Simons and Christopher Chabris
Published 10 Jul 2023

Across three studies, including one with a nationally representative sample of 1,109 people, ideological match increased the chances of rating something as logical by at least 15 percent and sometimes more than doubled it. The tendencies to apply greater scrutiny to outcomes we don’t predict and to accept conclusions that match what we already believe contribute to a wide range of errors in science, business, and daily life. The economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff learned this lesson the hard way. When analyzing historical data about the relationship between government debt and economic growth, they accidentally failed to “fill down” a formula to the bottom of a column in their Excel spreadsheet. As a result, they mistakenly concluded that once a country’s debt reaches 90 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP), the growth prospects for its economy are fatally weakened.

Adaptive Markets: Financial Evolution at the Speed of Thought
by Andrew W. Lo
Published 3 Apr 2017

Eichler, Mark Stoneking, Michael Richards, Sahra Talamo, Michael V. Shunkov, Anatoli P. Derevianko, Jean-Jacques Hublin, Janet Kelso, Montgomery Slatkin, and Svante Pääbo. 2010. “Genetic History of an Archaic Hominin Group from Denisova Cave in Siberia.” Nature 468: 1053–1060. Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth S. Rogoff. 2009. This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rhode, Paul W., and Koleman Strumpf. 2004. “Historical Presidential Betting Markets.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 18: 127–142. Rizzolatti, Giacomo, and Maddalena Fabbri-Destro. 2010, “Mirror Neurons: From Discovery to Autism.”

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In The Random Character of Stock Market Prices, edited by Paul Cootner. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2009. “Capitalist Fools.” Vanity Fair, January. Stock, James H., and Mark W. Watson. 2003. “Has the Business Cycle Changed and Why?” In NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2002, edited by Mark Gertler and Kenneth Rogoff, 159–230. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Striedter, Georg F. 2005. Principles of Brain Evolution. Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates. ___. 2006. “Précis of Principles of Brain Evolution.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29: 1–36. Sulloway, Frank. 1982. “Darwin and His Finches: The Evolution of a Legend.”

Not Working: Where Have All the Good Jobs Gone?
by David G. Blanchflower
Published 12 Apr 2021

Galbraith also noted that “the descent is always more sudden than the increase: a balloon that has been punctured does not deflate in an orderly way” (xiv). And so it was. The Great Recession started in the Arizona, Florida, California, and Nevada housing markets and grew and grew as the subprime housing market collapsed. It spread around the world and took banks down with it. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff (2009) have famously noted, financial crises take an inordinate amount of time for economies to recover from. This book will be published a dozen years after the start of the Great Recession, which the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) estimates started in the United States in December 2007.7 In most other advanced countries, including the UK, France, Japan, and Italy, it started a few months later.

Men Without Work
by Nicholas Eberstadt
Published 4 Sep 2016

It is possible that the anemic state of the U.S. macroeconomy is being exaggerated by measurement issues—productivity improvements from information technology, for example, have been oddly elusive in our officially reported national output—but few today imagine that such concealed gains would totally transform our view of the real economy’s true performance. 4.Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, “Recovery from Financial Crises: Evidence from 100 Episodes,” American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 104, no. 5: 50–55. http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/rogoff/files/aer_104-5_50-55.pdf. 5.Cf. Robert J. Gordon, The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living since the Civil War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016); see for example, Lawrence H.

What's Next?: Unconventional Wisdom on the Future of the World Economy
by David Hale and Lyric Hughes Hale
Published 23 May 2011

The two IEA scenarios that we have referred to are associated with respective oil import prices of $90 and $100 in 2020 and $90 and $115 in 2030 (in 2008 dollars). A Reuters poll of twenty-five leading crude oil analysts that was taken at the end of November 2009 foresaw an average price of $75.40 per barrel in 2010, and forecasts for the early spring of 2010 did not differ by much.39 As Harvard’s Kenneth Rogoff observed, the price range at which oil prices had stabilized for half a year by spring 2010 could be seen as a “sweet spot” for both the oil markets—providing incentives to invest—and for the global economy as a whole, as they did not threaten a still-fragile OECD recovery or discourage investment in alternative energy sources.

How Will Capitalism End?
by Wolfgang Streeck
Published 8 Nov 2016

CHAPTER TWO 1An earlier version of this chapter was given as the 2011 Max Weber Lecture at the European University Institute, Florence. I am grateful to Daniel Mertens for his research assistance. Published in: New Left Review 71, September/October 2011, pp. 5–29. 2For the term ‘Great Recession’, see Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2009. 3The classic statement is Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. 4See Edward Thompson, ‘The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century’, Past & Present, vol. 50, no. 1, 1971; and James Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1976.

Hard Times: The Divisive Toll of the Economic Slump
by Tom Clark and Anthony Heath
Published 23 Jun 2014

One analysis of post-war financial crises estimates that unemployment rises by an average of 7 percentage points, while output falls an average of 9%, the latter taking place over the course of two years; whereas the average ‘non-financial’ recession lasts less than a year. See Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, ‘The aftermath of financial crises’, American Economic Review, 99:2 (2009), pp. 466–72, at: www.ems.bbk.ac.uk/for_students/msc_ec­on/ETA2_EMEC025P/GZrhein.pdf 5. The 2001 census recorded a UK population of 59,113,500, whereas the 2011 census recorded a total of 63,285,100. That implies population growth of around 1.25% a year.

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A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1971. Rector, Robert. How Poor are America's Poor? Examining the ‘plague’ of poverty in America, Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, 2007, available at: www.heritage.org/research/reports/2007/08/how-poor-are-americas-poor-examining-the-plague-of-poverty-in-america Reinhart, Carmen M. and Kenneth S. Rogoff. ‘The aftermath of financial crises’, American Economic Review, 99:2 (2009), pp. 466–72, available at: www.ems.bbk.ac.uk/for_stude­nts/msc_econ/ETA2_EMEC025P/GZrhein.pdf Resolution Foundation. Gaining from Growth, Resolution Foundation, London, 2012, available at: www.resolutionfoundation.org/media/media/downl­oads/Gaining_from_growth_-_The_final_rep­ort_of_the_Commission_on_Living_Standards.pdf Rosenzweig, M. and O.

Arguing With Zombies: Economics, Politics, and the Fight for a Better Future
by Paul Krugman
Published 28 Jan 2020

NASA’s Mars Orbiter crashed because engineers forgot to convert to metric measurements; JPMorgan Chase’s “London Whale” venture went bad in part because modelers divided by a sum instead of an average. So, did an Excel coding error destroy the economies of the Western world? The story so far: at the beginning of 2010, two Harvard economists, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, circulated a paper, “Growth in a Time of Debt,” that purported to identify a critical “threshold,” a tipping point, for government indebtedness. Once debt exceeds 90 percent of gross domestic product, they claimed, economic growth drops off sharply. Ms. Reinhart and Mr. Rogoff had credibility thanks to a widely admired earlier book on the history of financial crises, and their timing was impeccable.

Value of Everything: An Antidote to Chaos The
by Mariana Mazzucato
Published 25 Apr 2018

These numbers are taken out of thin air, supported by neither theory nor practice. Let's start with debt. In 2010 the American Economic Review published an article by two top economists, professors at Harvard University: Carmen Reinhart, ranked the following year by the Bloomberg Markets magazine among the ‘Most Influential 50 in Finance'; and Kenneth Rogoff, a former chief economist of the IMF.4 In this piece the pair claimed that when the size of government debt (as a proportion of GDP) is over 90 per cent (much higher than the 60 per cent of the Maastricht Treaty, but still lower than that of many countries), economic growth falls. The results showed that rich countries whose public debt exceeded that percentage experienced a sharp drop in growth rate for the period 19462009.

The Making of Global Capitalism
by Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin
Published 8 Oct 2012

Although Arrighi derided the statement, it was proved far more right than wrong. 77 See Japanese External Trade Organization (jetro.go.jp.en.reports). 78 Murphy, “A Loyal Retainer?” and Weight of the Yen, pp. 236, 263. 79 See especially Richard Katz, Japan: The System that Soured, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998. 80 Paul Burkett and Martin Hart-Landsberg, Development, Crisis and Class Struggle, New York: St. Martin’s, 2000, p. 127. 81 M. Ayhan Kose, Eswar Prasad, Kenneth Rogoff, and Shang-Jin Wei, “Financial Globalization: A Reappraisal,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 12484, August 2006, Table I; Peter Dicken, Global Shift: Reshaping the Global Economic Map in the 21st Century, New York: Guilford, 2003, pp. 34–42. See generally IMF (imf.org), UNCTAD (stats.unctad.org) and WTO (stat.wto.org). 82 For the classic early recognition of this, see Folker Fröbel, Jürgen Heinrichs, and Otto Kreye, The New International Division of Labour: Structural Unemployment in Industrialised Countries and Industrialisation in Developing Countries, Cambridge: CUP, 1980. 83 Vivek Chibber, Locked in Place: State-Building and Late Industrialization in India, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003, pp. 234–5. 84 Ibid., p. 238.

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The quotation here is from the full transcript of the interview with Rubin for the PBS 2002 documentary The Commanding Heights, available at pbs.org. 5 Robert Litan, with Jonathan Roach and a Preface by Robert Rubin, American Finance for the 21st Century, Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1998, p. 5. 6 Quoted in Blustein, The Chastening, p. 295. 7 Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, “This Time is Different: A Panoramic View of Eight Centuries of Financial Crises,” NBER Working Paper No. 13882, March 2008, Table A.3. 8 Pauly, Who Elected the Bankers? esp. p.121. See also Michael Bordo, Ashoka Mody, and Nienke Oomes, “Keeping the Capital Flowing: The Role of the IMF,” IMF Working Paper WP/04/197, October 2004; and Barry Eichengreen and Richard Portes, “Managing the Next Mexico,” in Peter Kenen, ed., From Halifax to Lyon: What Has Been Done about Crisis Management?

The Future of Money: How the Digital Revolution Is Transforming Currencies and Finance
by Eswar S. Prasad
Published 27 Sep 2021

Thus, the elimination of cash could bring more economic activity out of the shadows and into the tax net. To sum up, a CBDC would discourage illicit activity and rein in the shadow economy by reducing the anonymity and nontraceability of transactions now provided by the use of banknotes. This point has been made forcefully by Kenneth Rogoff of Harvard University, especially in the context of high-denomination banknotes. A CBDC would also affect tax revenues, both by bringing more activities out of the shadows and into the tax net and also by enhancing the government’s ability to collect tax revenues more efficiently. As with most other factors, a CBDC by itself will not eliminate the shadow economy.

Money and Government: The Past and Future of Economics
by Robert Skidelsky
Published 13 Nov 2018

By November 2010 he was writing: ‘sometimes, not always, some fiscal adjustments based upon spending cuts are not associated with economic downturns’.21 But the damage had been done. Since 2011 little has been heard of ‘expansionary fiscal contraction’. We got the contraction, but not the expansion. 231 M ac roe c onom ic s i n t h e C r a s h a n d A f t e r , 2 0 0 7 – Reinhart and Rogoff and the 90 per cent barrier Two American economists, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, produced another correlation to bolster the austerity case. They attributed the ‘vast range of crises’ they had analysed to ‘excessive debt accumulation’.22 They noticed that, once the public debt–GDP ratio crashed through the 90 per cent barrier, ‘growth rates are roughly cut in half’. 23 Early in 2013 researchers at the University of Massachusetts examined the data behind the Reinhart–Rogoff work and found that the results were partly driven by a spreadsheet error: More importantly, the results weren’t at all robust: using standard statistical procedures rather than the rather odd approach Reinhart and Rogoff used, or adding a few more years of data, caused the 90% cliff to vanish.

The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World
by Daniel Yergin
Published 14 May 2011

Chapter 4: “Supermajors” 1 Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy (New York: HarperCollins, 1991). 2 New York Times, December 1, 1997 (“reasonable”); Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, December 8, 1997 (“economic stars”). 3 Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 18, 157 (“darling”); Timothy J. Colton, Yeltsin: A Life (New York: Basic Books, 2008), p. 411–15 (93 percent); interview with Stanley Fischer, Commanding Heights; interview with Robert Rubin, Commanding Heights. 4 New York Times, December 26, 1998 (“understatement”), January 10, 1999 (cafeteria). 5 Interview with Robert Maguire (“roster”); Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, August 31, 1998 (“Were he alive today”); Douglas Terreson, “The Era of the Super-Major,” Morgan Stanley, February 1998. 6 Ronald Chernow, Titan: The Life of John D.

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Edited by Kiron Skinner, Annelise Anderson, and Martin Anderson. New York: Free Press, 2003. Reilly, W. K. “Breakdown on the Road from Rio: Reform, Reaction, and Distraction Compete in the Cause of the International Environment, 1993–94.” Arthur and Frank Payne Lecture. Stanford University. Reinhart, Carmen, and Kenneth Rogoff. This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009. REN21. Renewables 2010 Global Status Report. September 2010. Report of the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island. October 1979. Revelle, Roger. “Sun. Sea and Air: IGY Studies of the Heat and Water Budget of the Earth.”

The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War
by Benn Steil
Published 13 Feb 2018

Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986. Rees, David. Harry Dexter White: A Study in Paradox. New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghan, 1973. Reichlin, Lucrezia. “The Marshall Plan Reconsidered.” In Europe’s Postwar Recovery, edited by Barry Eichengreen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Reinhart, Carmen, and Kenneth Rogoff. This Time It’s Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009. Reymen, Dafne C. “The Economic Effects of the Marshall Plan Revisited.” In The Marshall Plan Today: Model and Metaphor, edited by John Agnew and J. Nicholas Entrikin. London: Routledge, 2004.

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“ECA Weighs Aiding German Refugees: Influx of Millions in West Area Creates Extremely Critical Economic Situation.” New York Times. May 29, 1949. Raymont, Henry. “Leaders’ Papers Reveal a Light Spirit of Yalta.” New York Times. May 21, 1972. Reedy, Tom. “Ruthless Stalin Favorite Is New Dictator of East Germany.” Washington Post. August 27, 1950. Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth S. Rogoff. “From Financial Crash to Debt Crisis.” NBER Working Paper Series. No. 15795 (March 2010). Reston, James. “The No. 1 No. 2 Man in Washington.” New York Times Magazine. August 25, 1946. ———. “U.S. Weighs Aid to Greece of 350 Millions in 3 Years.” New York Times. March 1, 1947. ———. “Truman Plans Dual Policy to Meet Russian Expansion.”

The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good
by William Easterly
Published 1 Mar 2006

And a big thanks to those who generously gave of their time to read some or all of previous drafts and give enormously helpful feedback: Maryam Abolfazli, Emma Aisbett, Alberto Alesina, Nava Ashraf, Donald Boudreaux, Gerald Caprio, Ron Clark, Michael Clemens, Ravina Daphtary, Jess Diamond, Paul Dower, William Duggan, Kareen El Beyrouty, Stanley Engerman, Helen Epstein, Daphne Eviatar, Kurt Hoffman, Patricia Hoon, Roumeen Islam, Charles Kenny, Peter Lindert, Janina Matuszeski, Taye Mengistae, Edward Miguel, Josepa Miguel-Florensa, Frederic Mishkin, Jonathan Morduch, Stewart Parkinson, Elizabeth Potamites, S. Ramachandran, James Rauch, Kenneth Rogoff, Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Julia Schwenkenberg, Richard Sylla, Leonard Wantchekon, Dennis Whittle, Geoffrey Williams, Michael Woolcock, and Treena Wu. I benefited greatly from discussions with some really smart people on topics covered by this book: Daron Acemoglu, Carol Adelman, Martha Ainsworth, Abhijit Banerjee, Reza Baqir, Robert Barro, William Baumol, Jess Benhabib, Arne Bigsten, Nancy Birdsall, Peter Boettke, Robert Borens, Eduardo Borensztein, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Craig Burnside, Charles Calomiris, Stephen Cohen, Susan Collins, Kevin Davis, Allan Drazen, Esther Duflo, Steven Durlauf, Marcel Fafchamps, Niall Ferguson, Raquel Fernandez, Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, Stanley Fischer, Paul Glewwe, April Harding, Ann Harrison, Ricardo Hausmann, Peter Heller, Arye Hillman, Judith Justice, Boyan Jovanovic, Ravi Kanbur, Devesh Kapur, Hiro Kohama, Lawrence Kotlikoff, Michael Kremer, Mari Kuraishi, Ruben Lamdany, Adam Lerrick, Ruth Levine, David Levy, Dyan Machan, Bertin Martens, John McMillan, Allan Meltzer, Janvier Nkurunziza, Yaw Nyarko, José Antonio Ocampo, Mead Over, Sandra Peart, Guillermo Perry, Adam Przeworski, Dilip Ratha, Shamika Ravi, Sergio Rebelo, Ritva Reinikka, Ariell Reshef, Mario Rizzo, David Roodman, Dani Rodrik, Claudia Rosett, Frederic Sautet, Anya Schiffrin, Paul Smoke, T.

Reinventing Organizations: A Guide to Creating Organizations Inspired by the Next Stage of Human Consciousness
by Frederic Laloux and Ken Wilber
Published 9 Feb 2014

Hope can come also from the millennial generation: it used to be that people shifted to a Teal perspective mostly in their 40s or 50s; more and more millennials make the shift in their 20s and 30s. We seem increasingly ready and hungry for change. On a small scale, Buurtzorg gives a hopeful example of an entire industry—neighborhood nursing in the Netherlands—that in less than 10 years transitioned smoothly from Orange to Teal, breathing truth into the affirmation of Harvard economist Kenneth Rogoff: “Systems often hold longer than we think, but they end up by collapsing much faster than we imagine.” Teal Organizations in a Teal society The Teal Organizational model described in Part 2 of this book is derived from early pioneers that operate in a predominantly Amber/ Orange world. Let’s assume for a minute that some of the commonly made predictions about future Teal societies summarized earlier in this chapter do play out.

The Tyranny of Nostalgia: Half a Century of British Economic Decline
by Russell Jones
Published 15 Jan 2023

Moreover, policies such as those advocated by Alesina and his colleagues can be especially damaging if they are applied when output is already falling, while economic performance is generally better when fiscal stimulus is not withdrawn too soon.11 Again, however, by the time Alesina et al. had been forced to row back, the damage was done. A third inspiration for fiscal conservatives emerged from the magisterial work of Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff on the history of financial crises. Their research suggested that sovereign debt crises followed banking crises some 80% of the time. More pertinently, they claimed that when the public debt burden exceeded a figure of around 90% of GDP, growth tended to decelerate.12 But this too proved bogus.

When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Rise of the Middle Kingdom
by Martin Jacques
Published 12 Nov 2009

Flynt Leverett, a former senior National Security Council official under President George W. Bush, has argued that: ‘What has been said about the fall of the dollar is almost all couched in economic terms. But currency politics is very, very powerful and is part of what has made the US a hegemon for so long, like Britain before it.’48 Similarly Kenneth Rogoff, former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, wrote: ‘Americans will find global hegemony a lot more expensive if the dollar falls off its perch.’49 The consequences of a falling dollar could be manifold: nations will prefer to hold a growing proportion of their reserves in currencies other than the dollar; countries that previously pegged their currency to the dollar, including China, will choose no longer to do so; the US will find that economic sanctions against countries like Iran and North Korea no longer carry the same threat because access to dollar financing has less significance for them; countries will no longer be so willing to hold their trade surpluses in US Treasury bonds; US military bases overseas will become markedly more expensive to finance; and the American public may be less prepared to accept the costs of expensive overseas military commitments.

Model Thinker: What You Need to Know to Make Data Work for You
by Scott E. Page
Published 27 Nov 2018

Stiglitz, Joseph. 2013. The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society Endangers Our Future. New York: W. W. Norton. Stock, James H., and Mark W. Watson. 2003. “Has the Business Cycle Changed and Why?” In National Bureau of Economic Research Macroeconomics Annual 2002, vol. 17, ed. Mark Gertler and Kenneth Rogoff, 159–218. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Stone, Lawrence D., Colleen M. Keller, Thomas M. Kratzke, and Johan P. Strumpfer. 2014. “Search for the Wreckage of Air France Flight AF 447.” Statistical Science 29, no. 1: 69–80. Storchmann, Karl. 2011. “Wine Economics: Emergence, Developments, Topics.” Agrekon 50, no. 3: 1–28.

MONEY Master the Game: 7 Simple Steps to Financial Freedom
by Tony Robbins
Published 18 Nov 2014

and my team said, “Greece is eleven basis points.” Eleven basis points! That’s 11/100ths of 1%. And I said, “Well, we need to go buy a billion of that one.” TR: Wow, that’s incredible. KB: Mind you, this is third-quarter 2008. TR: The writing was on the wall at that stage. KB: I called Professor Kenneth Rogoff at Harvard University, who didn’t know me from Adam. And I said, “I’ve spent several months constructing a world balance sheet and trying to understand this.” I said, “The results of our construct, they’re too negative for me.” I literally said, “I think I must be misinterpreting these. Could I come sit down and share with you the results of my work?”

The Euro and the Battle of Ideas
by Markus K. Brunnermeier , Harold James and Jean-Pierre Landau
Published 3 Aug 2016

They received the Nobel Prize in Economics later for this insight. Barro and Gordon (1983) and Rogoff (1985) proposed to delegate monetary policy to conservative central bankers. Robert Barro and David Gordon, “Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy,” NBER Working Paper No. 1079, February 1983; and Kenneth Rogoff, “The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 100 (1985): 1169–189. Lohmann (1992) shows that after an extreme adverse event the independence of central can be temporarily broken. Susanne Lohmann, “Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility,” American Economic Review 82 (1992): 273–86. 6.

Who Stole the American Dream?
by Hedrick Smith
Published 10 Sep 2012

Some quick symbolic steps such as closing corporate tax loopholes, raising taxes on the rich, and imposing new fees on Wall Street’s stock transactions and executive stock options could help restore government’s credibility with ordinary people. But a more central long-term yardstick of fairness to the middle class is how the Congress and the White House handle housing, since homes are the heart of the American Dream and the cornerstone of middle-class wealth. As Harvard economist Kenneth Rogoff noted, “There is widespread agreement among economists that housing debt is at the heart of the slow recovery, and that finding a way to bring it down faster would accelerate the recovery.” The biggest debt now overhangs twenty-two million families stuck in homes that are “under water.” Like the big Wall Street banks, which were bailed out not only with $700 billion in taxpayer funds, but with $7.7 trillion in loans from the Federal Reserve, these creditworthy homeowners desperately need help with rewriting and refinancing their mortgages, and smart economists have spelled out steps to speed massive refinancing—steps that would be a shot in the arm to the whole nation.

The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order
by Benn Steil
Published 14 May 2013

Financial News. Stein, Herbert. 1996. The Fiscal Revolution in America: Policy in Pursuit of Reality. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute. Stock, James H., and Mark W. Watson. 2002. “Has the Business Cycle Changed and Why?” In NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2002, Volume 17, ed. Mark Gertler and Kenneth Rogoff. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Summers, Lawrence H. Mar. 23, 2004. “The United States and the Global Adjustment Process.” Speech at the Third Annual Stavros S. Niarchos Lecture, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C. Available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?

The World's Banker: A Story of Failed States, Financial Crises, and the Wealth and Poverty of Nations
by Sebastian Mallaby
Published 24 Apr 2006

The World Bank, according to this argument, should now stand back and allow private capital markets to finance development without its mediation. As the Bush administration began to contemplate its World Bank appointment, these arguments rumbled in the background. Stanford’s Jeremy Bulow and Harvard’s Kenneth Rogoff, who had advanced an early version of the case against the Bank’s involvement in middle-income countries, returned to it again in another coauthored paper in January 2005. Meanwhile Allan Meltzer, the Carnegie Mellon professor who had advanced a similar position as head of a congressionally appointed commission in 2000, continued to press the case against the Bank’s commercial lending, and his views were widely shared in Republican circles.

Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World
by Adam Tooze
Published 31 Jul 2018

The fate of Greece in 2010 seemed to spell out what lay in store for any state that slid over the edge into insolvency. Warnings ranged from outrageous rants and scaremongering from the likes of Beck to ultrarespectable academic research, most notably by two former IMF economists, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff. Following their surprise bestseller This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, in January 2010 Reinhart and Rogoff launched a research paper with the title “Growth in a Time of Debt.”2 This purported to show that as public debts passed the threshold of 90 percent of GDP, economic growth slowed down sharply.

Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism
by Wolfgang Streeck
Published 1 Jan 2013

Rademacher, Inga, National Tax Policy in the EMU: Some Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Common Monetary Policy on the Distribution of Tax Burdens, unpublished thesis, social sciences faculty, Frankfurt/Main, 2012. Raithel, Thomas et al. (eds), Auf dem Weg in eine neue Moderne? Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in den siebziger und achtziger Jahren, Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2009. Rappaport, Alfred, Creating Shareholder Value, New York: The Free Press, 1986. Reinhart, Carmen M. and Kenneth S. Rogoff, Growth in a Time of Debt, NBER Working Paper No. 15639, Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009. Reinhart, Carmen M. and M. Belen Sbrancia, The Liquidation of Government Debt, NBER Working Paper No. 16893, Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011. Rose, Richard, ‘Inheritance Before Choice in Public Policy’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, vol. 2/3, 1990, pp. 263–91. ———. and Phillip L.

A Beautiful Mind
by Sylvia Nasar
Published 11 Jun 1998

The sketch of Bart Hoselitz is based on an interview with his friend Sherman Robinson, professor of economics, University of Chicago, 7.95, and questionnaires, letters, and a curriculum vitae from Carnegie-Mellon University archives. 18. This bit of history about international trade theory after World War II was supplied by Kenneth Rogoff, professor of economics, Princeton University, interview. 19. John Nash, Les Prix Nobel 1994, op. cit., pp. 176–77. 20. Nash told Myerson that he was inspired by a problem posed by Hoselitz. Roger Myerson, professor of economics, Northwestern University’, interview, 8.7.97. 21. Myerson, e-mail, 8.11.97. 22.

Currency Wars: The Making of the Next Gobal Crisis
by James Rickards
Published 10 Nov 2011

New York: Wiley, 1994. Rajan, Raghuram G. Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Ray, Christina. Extreme Risk Management: Revolutionary Approaches to Evaluating and Measuring Risk. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2010. Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth S. Rogoff. This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009. Roett, Riordan. The New Brazil. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2010. Rothbard, Murray N. The Case Against the Fed. Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1994. ———. A History of Money and Banking in the United States: The Colonial Era to World War II.

The Power Surge: Energy, Opportunity, and the Battle for America's Future
by Michael Levi
Published 28 Apr 2013

In recent decades, though, economic growth has not translated into higher wages for most, suggesting that one ought to be cautious in expecting this phenomenon to increase the total number of U.S. jobs. 45. Alex Kowalski, “Trade Deficit of U.S. Unexpectedly Surges on Increase in Crude-Oil Imports,” Bloomberg, July 12, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/ news/2011-07-12/trade-deficit-of-u-s-unexpectedly-surges-on-increasein-crude-oil-imports.html. 46. Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009). 47. Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 613. 48. Clifford Krauss and Eric Lipton, “U.S. Inches Toward Goal of Energy Independence,” New York Times, March 22, 2012. 49.

The Glass Half-Empty: Debunking the Myth of Progress in the Twenty-First Century
by Rodrigo Aguilera
Published 10 Mar 2020

That’s the spirit that made the American economy work.13 Figure 5.1 The post-war period was also more stable Notes: This chart shows the number of countries experiencing banking or external debt crises. Contrary to what the advocates of market liberalization would predict, the Bretton Woods system provided the most stable period in the history of capitalism and also its fastest growing. Source: Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2009). What has changed since the crisis is the opposition to capitalism. Whether it comes in the form of grassroots movements like Occupy Wall Street, the rise of the populist left through figures like Bernie Sanders in the US or Jeremy Corbyn in Britain, or the anti-globalization backlash from the supporters of Brexit and Trump, there is a growing sense that the last four decades of Western history under liberal capitalism have been a disappointment.

An Extraordinary Time: The End of the Postwar Boom and the Return of the Ordinary Economy
by Marc Levinson
Published 31 Jul 2016

Kaminsky and Alfredo Pereira, “The Debt Crisis: Lessons of the 1980s for the 1990s,” Federal Reserve Board, international finance discussion paper 481, September 1994; FDIC, An Examination, 206. 10. For a history of the many instances in which governments defaulted on their foreign debts, see Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 68–118. 11. Federally chartered banks in the United States were prohibited by law from lending more than 10 percent of their capital to a single borrower, but their lead supervisor, the Comptroller of the Currency, allowed them to circumvent that law by deciding that a country’s national government was a separate borrower from a state-owned oil company or a state development bank.

Green Tyranny: Exposing the Totalitarian Roots of the Climate Industrial Complex
by Rupert Darwall
Published 2 Oct 2017

America in Lilliput 1Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine,” The Atlantic, April 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/ (accessed March 14, 2016). 2Roland Huntford, The New Totalitarians (London, 1971), p. 20. 3Ibid., p. 37. 4Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time Is Different (Princeton and Oxford, 2009), p. xxxvii. 2. The Great Transformation 1UN Regional Information Centre for Western Europe, “Figueres: First Time the World Economy Is Transformed Intentionally,” February 3, 2015, http://www.unric.org/en/latest-un-buzz/29623-figueres-first-time-the-world-economy-is-transformed-intentionally. 2BBC News Magazine, “How Parasites Manipulate Us,” February 19, 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-26240297. 3Barack Obama, State of the Union address, January 20, 2015, http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepressoffice/2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-union-address-january-20-2015. 4John C.

The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality
by Katharina Pistor
Published 27 May 2019

Reuters Staff, “IMF projects Venezuela inflation will hit 1,000,000 percent in 2018. Reuters Business News, July 23, 2018, available online at www.reuters.com (last accessed August 8, 2018). 57. Kim Oosterlinck, “Sovereign Debt Defaults: Insights from History,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 29, no. 4 (2013):697–714; see also Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). 58. M. Aycard, Credit Mobilier (Brussels, Leipzig, Livourne: A. Lacroix, Verboeckhoven & Cie, 1867). 59. Merton as quoted in McKinsey Global Institute, “Mapping Global Capital Markets” (New York: McKinsey Global Institute, 2008), p. 136. 60.

The Man Who Knew: The Life and Times of Alan Greenspan
by Sebastian Mallaby
Published 10 Oct 2016

Glenn Hubbard estimate that a 1-percent-of-GDP increase in the federal deficit raises interest rates by 18 basis points on five-year-ahead rates and 24 basis points on current rates. See Eric M. Engen and R. Glenn Hubbard, “Federal Government Debt and Interest Rates,” in NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2004, ed. Mark Gertler and Kenneth Rogoff, vol. 19 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004), 83–138. William Gale, Peter Orszag, and colleagues find larger effects: an increase of 25 to 35 basis points on five-year-forward interest rates for each percent-of-GDP increase in the future unified deficit and 40 to 70 basis points for each percent-of-GDP increase in the future primary deficit.

Capitalism in America: A History
by Adrian Wooldridge and Alan Greenspan
Published 15 Oct 2018

Alan Greenspan, The Map and the Territory 2.0: Risk, Human Nature, and the Future of Forecasting (New York: Penguin Press, 2013), 38. 4. Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights: The Battle Between Government and the Marketplace That Is Remaking the Modern World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), 168. 5. Mallaby, The Man Who Knew, 617. 6. Ibid., 466. 7. See Carmen M. Reinhardt and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011). Twelve. America’s Fading Dynamism 1. Deirdre Nansen McCloskey, Bourgeois Equality: How Ideas, Not Capital or Institutions, Enriched the World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016), 500. 2.

The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths
by Mariana Mazzucato
Published 1 Jan 2011

Principles of Corporate Finance
by Richard A. Brealey , Stewart C. Myers and Franklin Allen
Published 15 Feb 2014

Why Are Financial Systems So Prone to Crisis? The crisis that started in 2007 was an unwelcome reminder of the fragility of financial systems. One moment everything seems to be going fine; the next moment markets crash, banks fail, and before long the economy is in recession. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff have documented the effects of banking crises in many countries.14 They find that systemic banking crises are typically preceded by credit booms and asset price bubbles. When the bubbles burst, housing prices drop on average by 35% and stock prices fall by 55%. Output falls by 9% over the following two years and unemployment rises by 7% over a period of four years.

Termites of the State: Why Complexity Leads to Inequality
by Vito Tanzi
Published 28 Dec 2017

Rawls, John, 1971, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press). Reich, Robert B., 2015, Saving Capitalism: For the Many, Not the Few (New York: Chicago: Knopf ). Reid, T. R., 2017, A Fine Mess: A Global Quest for a Simpler, Fairer, and More Efficient Tax Systems (New York, NY: Penguin Press). Reinhart, Carmen M. and Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). Rakoff, Jed S., 2015, “The Cure for Corporate Wrongdoing: Class Actions vs. Individual Prosecutions,” The New York Review of Books (November 19), pp. 38–40. 2016, “Why You Won’t Get Your Day in Court,” The New York Review of Books LXIII (18) (September 24), pp. 4–6.

Finance and the Good Society
by Robert J. Shiller
Published 1 Jan 2012

Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State
by Paul Tucker
Published 21 Apr 2018