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The Extended Phenotype: The Long Reach of the Gene

by Richard Dawkins  · 1 Jan 1982  · 506pp  · 152,049 words

the centre of a web of radiating power. The book is otherwise unchanged apart from minor corrections. Oxford Richard Dawkins May 1989 Contents Acknowledgements 1 Necker Cubes and Buffaloes 2 Genetic Determinism and Gene Selectionism 3 Constraints on Perfection 4 Arms Races and Manipulation 5 The Active Germ-Line Replicator 6 Organisms

Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. (USA) p. 16 ‘McAndrew’s Hymn’ by Richard Kipling. Extract reproduced by permission of Doubleday & Company Inc. The Extended Phenotype 1 Necker Cubes and Buffaloes This is a work of unabashed advocacy. I want to argue in favour of a particular way of looking at animals and plants

factual proposition. Rather, I am trying to show the reader a way of seeing biological facts. There is a well-known visual illusion called the Necker Cube. It consists of a line drawing which the brain interprets as a three-dimensional cube. But there are two possible orientations of the perceived cube

world at large, not just its effects on the individual body in which it happens to be sitting. To return to the analogy of the Necker Cube, the mental flip that I want to encourage can be characterized as follows. We look at life and begin by seeing a collection of interacting

this hard-won fastness that I may seem to be abandoning here, abandoning almost before it is properly secured; and for what? For a flickering Necker Cube, a metaphysical chimera called the extended phenotype? No, to renounce those gains is far from my intention. The paradigm of the selfish organism is vastly

with adaptation at the level of the group. The selfish organism, and the selfish gene with its extended phenotype, are two views of the same Necker Cube. The reader will not experience the conceptual flip-over that I seek to assist unless he begins by looking at the right cube. This book

that was hidden may show itself’ (p. 1). I came across this after writing my own Necker Cube passage, and was delighted to find the same views expressed by so respected an author. The trouble with my Necker Cubes, and with Bonner’s abstract painting, is that, as analogies, they may be too timid

and unambitious. The analogy of the Necker Cube expresses my minimum hope for this book. I am pretty confident that to look at life in terms of genetic replicators preserving themselves by means

for the wilder hopes rather than the more cautious minimum expectations. If these grandiose hopes are eventually realized, perhaps a less modest analogy than the Necker Cube will be pardoned. Colin Turnbull (1961) took a pygmy friend, Kenge, out of the forest for the first time in his life, and they climbed

work of advocacy, but it is a poor advocate that leaps precipitately to his conclusion when the jury are sceptical. The second face of my Necker Cube is unlikely to click into clear focus until near the end of the book. Earlier chapters prepare the ground, attempt to forestall certain risks of

misunderstanding, dissect the first face of the Necker Cube in various ways, point up reasons why the paradigm of the selfish individual, if not actually incorrect, can lead to difficulties. Parts of some early

’ at the outset. Chapter 4 opens the case for the prosecution against the selfish organism, and begins to hint at the second aspect of the Necker Cube. Chapter 5 opens the case for the ‘replicator’ as the fundamental unit of natural selection. Chapter 6 returns to the individual organism and shows how

and 13 are the heart of the book. They develop, by gradual degrees, the idea of the extended phenotype itself, the second face of the Necker Cube. Finally, in Chapter 14, we turn back with refreshed curiosity to the individual organism and ask why, after all, it is such a salient level

language of individual manipulation. The language of extended genetics is not demonstrably more correct. It is a different way of saying the same thing. The Necker Cube has flipped. Readers must decide for themselves whether they like the new view better than the old. I suggest that the way the extended geneticist

. The extended geneticist would, in fact, be quite happy to rewrite the whole of Chapter 4, fixing his gaze on the new face of the Necker Cube. I shall spare the reader any such rewriting, although it would be an interesting task to undertake. I shall not pile example on example of

is not something obvious, to be accepted without question. My hope is that this book has revealed that there is a second side to the Necker Cube. But Necker Cubes have a habit of flipping back again to their original orientation, and then continuing to alternate. Whatever it is that is special about the

individual organism as a unit of life, we should at least see it more clearly for having viewed the other side of the Necker Cube, for having trained our eyes to see through body walls into the world of replicators, and out and beyond to their extended phenotypes. So, what

mutation availability, 42–45 muton, 81, 86 myopia, 239 m-culture, 109 narcotic effect of pheromone, 71 Nasonia vitripennis, 140–141 Nature (journal), 156, 158 Necker Cube, 1, 4, 7, 232, 251 nematomorph worms, 216 nervous system clonal selection applied to, 169–170 as computer, 17–18, 129–130 neuro-economics, 113

Machine Translation

by Thierry Poibeau  · 14 Sep 2017  · 174pp  · 56,405 words

Index About Author List of Tables Table 1 Example of possible translations in French for the English word “motion” List of Illustrations Figure 1 The Necker cube, the famous optical illusion published by Louis Albert Necker in 1832. (Image licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 via Wikimedia Commons. From https://commons

.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Necker_cube.svg.) Figure 2 Vauquois’ triangle (image licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0, via WikiMedia Commons). Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Direct_translation

the “right” meaning, without even considering alternate solutions. A parallel has sometimes been proposed with the Necker cube, the representation of a cube seen in perspective with no depth cue (figure 1). Figure 1 The Necker cube, the famous optical illusion published by Louis Albert Necker in 1832. (Image licensed under CC BY-SA

3.0 via Wikimedia Commons. From https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Necker_cube.svg.) The drawing is “ambiguous” in that no cue makes it possible to determine which side of the cube is in front and which side

complex forms from characteristic features, and can even extrapolate a complex representation from partial information (this is essentially what happens in the case of the Necker cube, where the brain infers a three-dimensional representation from a two-dimensional drawing; see figure 1 in chapter 2). In the case of machine translation

Foundation, 77 Natural language processing, 15–16, 21, 36, 50, 52, 56–58, 65, 73, 83, 101, 161, 165, 178, 182, 189, 199, 200, 250 Necker cube, 19–20, 183 Neural machine translation. See Deep learning Neural networks, 181, 185, 188–190, 193, 194, 261, 263. See also Deep learning Neuroimaging, 19

Time Paradox

by Philip G. Zimbardo and John Boyd  · 1 Jan 2008  · 297pp  · 96,509 words

-Lyer lines whose arrow-tipped ends made them appear as though they were different lengths even though a ruler showed them to be identical, the Necker cube that appeared to have an open side one moment and then an open top the next, the drawing of a chalice that suddenly became a

that an ambiguous stimulus mean one thing rather than another. Consider, for example, the drawing of a box in figure 18. This object (called the Necker cube after the Swiss crystallographer who discovered it in 1832) is inherently ambiguous, and you can prove this to yourself simply by staring at it for

your preferences influence your interpretations of stimuli in just the same way that context, frequency, and recency do. Fig. 18. If you stare at a Necker cube, it will appear to shift its orientation. This phenomenon is not limited to the interpretation of weird drawings. For example, why is it that you

reasons why most of us think of ourselves as talented, friendly, wise, and fair-minded is that these words are the lexical equivalents of a Necker cube, and the human mind naturally exploits each word’s ambiguity for its own gratification. Disambiguating Experience Of course, the richest sources of exploitable ambiguity are

not words, sentences, or shapes but the intricate, variegated, multidimensional experiences of which every human life is a collage. If a Necker cube has two possible interpretations and talent has fourteen possible interpretations, then leaving home or falling ill or getting a job with the U.S. Postal

in terms of its healthfulness—and unlike kale, ice cream and Spam are unhealthful. The odd reason isn’t really so odd. Just as a Necker cube is both across from you and below you, ice cream is both fattening and tasty, and kale is both healthful and bitter. Your brain and

it. Because experiences are inherently ambiguous, finding a “positive view” of an experience is often as simple as finding the “below-you view” of a Necker cube, and research shows that most people do this well and often. Consumers evaluate kitchen appliances more positively after they buy them,20 job seekers evaluate

Reinforcement,” Perceptual and Motor Skills 8: 183–93 (1958); and E. D. Turner and W. Bevan, “Patterns of Experience and the Perceived Orientation of the Necker Cube,” Journal of General Psychology 70: 345–52 (1964). 18. D. Dunning, J. A. Meyerowitz, and A. D. Holzberg, “Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation: The Role of

Wonderland: How Play Made the Modern World

by Steven Johnson  · 15 Nov 2016  · 322pp  · 88,197 words

-olds, others at neuroscientists—have cataloged a vast menagerie of optical illusions. Consider the two famous visual tricks, the Kanizsa triangle and the Necker cube. Left: Kanizsa triangle; Right: Necker cube In each case, the eye detects something that is quite literally not there: a white triangle and a three-dimensional box. In each

case, it is almost impossible to un-see the illusion. The Necker cube can be visually flipped between two different three-dimensional orientations, but most of us can’t perceive it as it actually is: twelve intersecting lines

a human voice. And the other senses—touch, smell, taste—are even less prone to being tricked the way our eyes are tricked by the Necker cube. A handful of tactile illusions exist; with taste, the closest equivalent might well be the way chili peppers trick our brains into perceiving heat. But

sight. For instance, when our eyes perceive two lines coinciding in a flat image, our brain assumes those lines intersect in three-dimensional space. (The Necker cube relies on this rule to create the sense of depth in the image.) Millions of years of evolution created rules for interpreting visual information, helping

architect Filippo Brunelleschi, though the fundamental rules that governed the technique were first outlined in the book On Painting by Leon Battista Alberti. Like the Necker cube, it is almost impossible not to perceive the depth relationships in a painting that successfully executes the principles Brunelleschi and Alberti devised. Technically speaking, linear

eye as the source of most illusions, 157–58, 159 Kanizsa triangle, 157, 158 Kopfermann cube, 158, 158 linear perspective, 160–61 “Moving Panorama,” 167 Necker cube, 157–58, 158, 159 Panorama paintings, 160–64 persistence of vision, 172, 184 thaumatrope, 172, 174 zoetrope, 172 Oram, Daphne, 102–106, 105 Orlando, Florida

How the Mind Works

by Steven Pinker  · 1 Jan 1997  · 913pp  · 265,787 words

object, not just its parts, can be interpreted in two ways. If you stare at the drawing of a cube on page 107 (called a Necker cube), your perception will flip from a downward view of its top face to an upward view of its bottom face. When the global flip occurs

satisfy them. Chicken-and-egg problems can sometimes be solved with the technique called constraint satisfaction that we met in Chapter 2 when looking at Necker cubes and accented speech. When the parts of a puzzle cannot be solved one at a time, the puzzle-solver can keep in mind several guesses

cardboard with a gray horizontal stripe, folded vertically and lit from the side. (If you stare long enough, either might flip in depth, like a Necker cube; let’s ignore that for now.) But the ink on the page (and the projection on your retina) is virtually the same in the two

to how people interpret the original image. Does the program do anything else reminiscent of humans? Remember how the fanfold flips in depth like a Necker cube. The outer fold becomes an inner one, and vice versa. The program, in a way, can see the flip, too; the flipped interpretation is shown

actually flip between the two interpretations, but if Adelson and Pentland had had the specialists pass around their guesses in a constraint network (like the Necker cube network on p. 107 or the stereo vision model), rather than in an assembly line, it might have done so. The workshop parable clarifies the

What We Cannot Know: Explorations at the Edge of Knowledge

by Marcus Du Sautoy  · 18 May 2016

fore. But then, as you stare at it, suddenly the cube flips and it seems as if another square is to the fore. Called the Necker cube, the image hasn’t changed but what you are conscious of has. What has happened in the brain? Is consciousness really just a story that

trouble is that the fMRI and EEG scanners are too crude to pick up changes as subtle as the flip from one view of the Necker cube to the other. But in 2004 Koch, together with his team at Caltech, spotted an opportunity to ask an individual neuron questions about what stimulated

trying to impose structure on the cacophony of information it is being bombarded with. When the information is ambiguous, as in the example of the Necker cube or the McGurk effect, the brain has to choose. These illusions are a warning to all of us trying to know things about our universe

, 342–5, 346, 347, 349, 352, 353–4; mind-body problem and 330–2; mirror recognition test and 317–19; mysterianism and 349–50, 351; Necker cube and 321, 323; neurons and 311–14, 323–9, 340, 341, 342, 343–6, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 353, 359, 376–7; out-of

, 314, 369, 419 mysterianism 349–50, 351 National Physical Laboratory, London 252, 254 Nature 8, 48, 53 Navier–Stokes equations 34 Ne’eman, Yuval 115 Necker cube 321, 323, 328 Neddermeyer, Seth 104 negative curvature 210 negative numbers 371–2 Neptune 197, 227 neurons: ageing and 258, 259; C. elegans worm complete

The Master and His Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of the Western World

by Iain McGilchrist  · 8 Oct 2012

) Fig. 2.11 Cube drawing before and after commissurotomy (Gazzaniga & Le Doux, 1978) Fig. 2.12 Duck-rabbit (Popular Science Monthly, 1899) Fig. 2.13 Necker cube Fig. 4.1 Drawing Hands, by M. C. Escher Fig. 4.2 Pyramid of values according to Scheler Fig. 4.3 Creation of Man, by

of an ambiguous figure that can be seen in one way or another, but not both simultaneously, such as the duck–rabbit above or the Necker cube opposite446) right frontal cortex is more active.447 Fig. 2.13 Is this a cube seen from above right, or from below left? Blurred or

, Wapner et al., 1983. 442. Wolford, Miller & Gazzaniga, 2000. 443. Unturbe & Corominas, 2007. 444. Yellott, 1969. 445. Goel, Tierney, Sheesley et al., 2007. 446. The Necker cube is attributed to a Swiss crystallographer, Louis Albert Necker, who in 1832 described the way in which the structure of crystals appeared to reverse spontaneously

The Eureka Factor

by John Kounios  · 14 Apr 2015  · 262pp  · 80,257 words

they yield, often literally, a different way of looking at things. Consider the cube on the left side of figure 1.1. This is a Necker cube. The interesting thing about it is that its appearance is ambiguous. As you can see in the right side of the figure, either the lower

squares to the other, the change in your interpretation is abrupt. This kind of perspective shift is a prototype for insight. FIGURE 1.1: The Necker cube. Wikicommons (commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Necker%27s_cube.svg) The Gestalt psychologists of the early twentieth century liked to point out that we can

a problem it’s often because you are thinking about the problem in the wrong way. Just as a simple visual scene such as a Necker cube can be radically reinterpreted in an instant, so can a complex problem be “restructured,” yielding an aha moment about the solution. An object that was

Everything Is Predictable: How Bayesian Statistics Explain Our World

by Tom Chivers  · 6 May 2024  · 283pp  · 102,484 words

them to evidence from the senses. He demonstrated that when two hypotheses explain the evidence equally well, the brain can flip between those hypotheses. The “Necker cube” is the most famous example: if you’re like me, you should be able to “choose” to see it as either viewed from above and

confirm or disconfirm them—that’s your likelihood, your data. And you combine them to get a posterior probability distribution. In the case of the Necker cube, you have no strong reason to prefer either of your two hypotheses (the cube viewed from below or the cube viewed from above), so your

lighting. What’s interesting about The Dress is that most people are unable to pop back and forth between those two hypotheses, as with the Necker cube, and once the “real” color of the dress was revealed, it didn’t then snap into place as with the picture of the cow. (The

Ajax: The Definitive Guide

by Anthony T. Holdener  · 25 Jan 2008  · 982pp  · 221,145 words

unpredictable changes in how the brain spontaneously views patterns that can be considered ambiguous. Probably the most famous pattern is the Necker cube (http://www. hypnosisnetwork.com/articles/a/76/The-Necker-Cube:-An-Experiment-in-Perception)— a line drawing of a cube that does not give any visual cue as to which lines

sources come from above and not below, and so on. The unpredictable changes occur the longer a pattern is viewed. As you look at the Necker cube, suddenly your brain will pick up that you could view the cube from below. Many examples of this illusion exist, and they are part of

, 360–362 replacing alerts, prompts, confirms, etc., 349–355 confirmation window, 349–351 larger forms, 353–355 prompt window, 351–353 tool tips, 355–360 Necker cube, 183 Nederlof, Peter, 188 .NET Framework, 41, 58 architecture, 58 assemblies, 59 .NET Remoting, 596 NETaccounts (financial accounting), 626, 904 Netscape browsers browser wars with

From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds

by Daniel C. Dennett  · 7 Feb 2017  · 573pp  · 157,767 words

A Theory of the Drone

by Gregoire Chamayou  · 23 Apr 2013  · 335pp  · 82,528 words

The Selfish Gene

by Richard Dawkins  · 1 Jan 1976  · 365pp  · 117,713 words

Richard Dawkins: How a Scientist Changed the Way We Think

by Alan Grafen; Mark Ridley  · 1 Jan 2006  · 286pp  · 90,530 words

Physics in Mind: A Quantum View of the Brain

by Werner Loewenstein  · 29 Jan 2013  · 362pp  · 97,862 words

Unweaving the Rainbow

by Richard Dawkins  · 7 Aug 2011  · 339pp  · 112,979 words

A Devil's Chaplain: Selected Writings

by Richard Dawkins  · 1 Jan 2004  · 460pp  · 107,712 words

Science in the Soul: Selected Writings of a Passionate Rationalist

by Richard Dawkins  · 15 Mar 2017  · 420pp  · 130,714 words

The Evolution of Everything: How New Ideas Emerge

by Matt Ridley  · 395pp  · 116,675 words

The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion

by Jonathan Haidt  · 13 Mar 2012  · 539pp  · 139,378 words

Rationality: From AI to Zombies

by Eliezer Yudkowsky  · 11 Mar 2015  · 1,737pp  · 491,616 words

On Intelligence

by Jeff Hawkins and Sandra Blakeslee  · 1 Jan 2004  · 246pp  · 81,625 words

Deep Utopia: Life and Meaning in a Solved World

by Nick Bostrom  · 26 Mar 2024  · 547pp  · 173,909 words

Halting State

by Charles Stross  · 9 Jul 2011  · 350pp  · 107,834 words

Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience

by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi  · 1 Jul 2008  · 453pp  · 132,400 words

The Upstarts: How Uber, Airbnb, and the Killer Companies of the New Silicon Valley Are Changing the World

by Brad Stone  · 30 Jan 2017  · 373pp  · 112,822 words

The God Delusion

by Richard Dawkins  · 12 Sep 2006  · 478pp  · 142,608 words

50 Psychology Classics

by Tom Butler-Bowdon  · 14 Oct 2007  · 363pp  · 109,374 words