Stuxnet

Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World's First Digital Weapon
by Kim Zetter
Published 11 Nov 2014

It may not have worked as well or as quickly as the attackers had hoped, so in 2009 they changed tactics and focused on attacking the frequency converters instead—a more direct method of damaging the centrifuges. Although Stuxnet 0.5 had no kill date and should have still been active when later versions of Stuxnet were released, researchers never found this version on any machines when Stuxnet was discovered in 2010.30 This may have been because it got erased. One of the first things later versions of Stuxnet did when they landed on a machine was check for earlier versions of Stuxnet on the machine and replace them. So it was likely that Stuxnet 0.5 got automatically replaced on infected machines when the June 2009 version was launched.31 It’s also possible that samples of Stuxnet 0.5 were never found because this version was much more tightly controlled than later ones and only infected a limited number of machines.

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It took several days of digging, but when they had all the parts unlocked, they could finally see every step that Stuxnet took during its initial stages of infection.4 One of the first things Stuxnet did was determine if the computer was a 32-bit or 64-bit Windows machine; Stuxnet only worked with 32-bit Windows machines. It also determined if the machine was already infected with Stuxnet. If it was, Stuxnet made sure the resident malware was up to date and simply swapped out any old files for the latest ones. But if Stuxnet found itself on a new machine, it began an elaborate infection dance, racing rapidly through a succession of steps to scope out the landscape of the machine and determine the best way to proceed.

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All three of the drivers used algorithms and keys that were the same as or similar to those that the Stuxnet and Duqu drivers used, making it clear they were connected to the Tilde-d team. The first of these was the driver that had been found in July 2010 by the Slovakian antivirus firm ESET and was signed with the JMicron certificate.33 Because the driver was found days after the news of Stuxnet broke, everyone assumed it was related to Stuxnet, though it was not found on any system infected with Stuxnet. The driver was a hybrid of the Stuxnet and Duqu drivers, using code that was nearly identical to the Stuxnet driver and some of the same functions and techniques that the Duqu driver used.

The Hacker and the State: Cyber Attacks and the New Normal of Geopolitics
by Ben Buchanan
Published 25 Feb 2020

Ron Rosenbaum, “Richard Clarke on Who Was behind the Stuxnet Attack,” Smithsonian, April 2012. 18. For the seminal work on this part of the Stuxnet operation, see Ralph Langner, “Stuxnet’s Secret Twin,” Foreign Policy, November 19, 2013. For expanded later analysis, see Ralph Langner, “To Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis of What Stuxnet’s Creators Tried to Achieve,” Langner Group report, 2013, quote on 10. 19. Sanger, Confront and Conceal, 199–203. 20. Langner, “To Kill a Centrifuge,” 9–10. Later, officials would see benefits to the attack becoming public. 21. Langner, “To Kill a Centrifuge,” 10–14; Eric Chien, “Stuxnet: A Breakthrough,” Symantec, November 12, 2010; Ralph Langner, “Can You HEAR Stuxnet Damaging Centrifuges at Natanz?”

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Five contractors appear to have been the initial targets, the patient zeroes who unleashed the wider infection.13 Sure enough, Stuxnet eventually made its way into Natanz. Stuxnet’s creators programmed different versions of the code to talk to one another like gossiping teenagers. When a new version of Stuxnet infected a computer that had been previously infected by an earlier version, the two copies of the worm compared notes and combined their information. Versions landing on internet-connected computers sent their information back to Stuxnet’s creators in messages disguised to look like visits to innocuous soccer websites.14 Thus, the list of machines the operation had infected across Iran was constantly updated, and the data it had collected steadily accumulated.

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In national security, at least in the West, lawyers are ever-present, and the Stuxnet operation was no exception. At key moments, these attorneys raised concerns about unintended consequences—and rightly so. While the Stuxnet code tried to stay mostly contained within a fairly narrow set of targets, its worm-like nature made it far harder to control than other sophisticated cyber operations tools.15 Throughout the development and testing process, Stuxnet’s creators added a series of target verification checks, using information acquired from earlier reconnaissance. They made it so Stuxnet would cease creating new infections after a certain date, several years away, in June 2012, and the code would launch its most destructive payload only if it was sure it was in Natanz.16 There were so many of these self-restraints that former White House cybersecurity czar Richard Clarke remarked that it looked like a team of Washington lawyers had written the code.17 The Stuxnet payload, once launched, was unprecedented.

Cybersecurity: What Everyone Needs to Know
by P. W. Singer and Allan Friedman
Published 3 Jan 2014

Duqu, for example, was a worm that was discovered in the wild soon after Stuxnet using very similar Microsoft Windows–exploiting code. Many took to calling it “son of Stuxnet,” with the idea that it must be the next version designed by the same team. However, while there are key similarities, experts also have noticed key differences and thus now believe that it was more a case of inspiration than evolution. As Ralph Langner describes this new kind of proliferation problem: Son of Stuxnet is a misnomer. What’s really worrying are the concepts that Stuxnet gives hackers. The big problem we have right now is that Stuxnet has enabled hundreds of wannabe attackers to do essentially the same thing.

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Part of Langner’s original motivation to go public about Stuxnet was to encourage adoption of the vendor patches needed to prevent future exploitation among potential targets in the West. Yet a full year after Stuxnet was first revealed to the world, Langner and other security experts were lamenting that that a number of major public infrastructure companies had still not plugged the vulnerabilities that Stuxnet attacked. The more problematic proliferation path, however, is via inspiration. Each construction and use of a new type of cyber weapon lowers the bar for the rest of the crowd. Stuxnet had a complex infection package that included new zero-day attacks, as well as a novel payload that attacked SCADA controllers, but its beauty (and the lesson for others) was in how the different parts of this complex attack worked together.

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FOCUS: WHAT WAS STUXNET? “indiscriminate and destructive” Lucas, “Permissible Preventive Cyberwar.” A study of the spread of Stuxnet was undertaken by a number of international computer security firms, including Symantec Corporation. Their report, “W32.Stuxnet Dossier,” compiled by noted computer security experts Nicholas Falliere, Liam O’Murchu, and Eric Chien, and released in February 2011, showed that the main countries affected during the early days of the infection were Iran, Indonesia, and India: http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf, accessed August 11, 2013.

Black Code: Inside the Battle for Cyberspace
by Ronald J. Deibert
Published 13 May 2013

The connection between Flame and Stuxnet is discussed in Jim Finkle and Joseph Menn, “Some Flame Code Found in Stuxnet Virus: Experts,” Reuters, June 12, 2012, htt​p://www.r​euter​s.com​/art​icle​/201​2/0​6/1​2/u​s-med​ia-tech-sum​mit-fl​ame-id​US-B​RE85​A0TN​201​206​12; Greg Miller, Ellen Nakashima, and Julie Tate, “U.S., Israel Developed Flame Computer Virus to Slow Iranian Nuclear Efforts, Officials Say,” Wall Street Journal, June 19, 2011, http​://ww​w.wash​ingto​npo​st.com​/wor​ld/na​tion​al-secu​rit​y/us-i​srael-dev​elope​d-com-pu​ter-vir​as-to-sl​ow-iran​ian-nuc​lear-eff​orts-offi​cials-sa​y​/201​2/​06​/​19​/ gJQA​6xB​PoV_s​tor​y.html; and Kenneth Rapoza, “Kaspersky Lab: Same Countries Behind Stuxnet and Flame Malware,” Forbes, June 11, 2012, http​://ww​w.for​bes.co​m/si​tes/ke​nrap​oza/2​012​/06​/1​1​/kas​pers​ky-lab-sa​me-coun​tries-beh​ind-st​uxnet-an​d-fla​me-malw​are/. 11: STUXNET AND THE ARGUMENT FOR CLEAN WAR 1 a detailed “decoding” of the virus: For Langner’s research on Stuxnet, visit his blog at http://www.langner.com/en/blog/. See also Ralph Langner, “Stuxnet: Dissecting a Cyberwarfare Weapon,” Security & Privacy, IEEE 9, no. 3 (2011): 49–51. 2 the planning and operational process behind the Stuxnet virus: On June 1, 2012, the New York Times reported that anonymous current and former government officials of the U.S., Europe, and Israel had confirmed that Stuxnet was indeed the work of American and Israeli experts, under orders of President Obama, who wanted to slow Iran’s progress towards building an atomic bomb without launching a traditional attack.

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The virus leaked out and infected computers in India, Indonesia, and even the U.S., a leak that occurred through an error in the code of a new variant of Stuxnet sent into the Natanz nuclear enrichment facility. This error allowed the Stuxnet worm to spread into an engineer’s computer when it was hooked up to the centrifuges, and when he left the facility and connected his computer to the Internet the worm did not realize that its environment had changed. Stuxnet began spreading and replicating itself around the world. The Americans blamed the Israelis, who admitted nothing, but whoever was at fault, the toothpaste was out of the tube. The real significance of Stuxnet lies not in its complexity, or in the political intrigue involved (including the calculated leaks), but in the threshold that it crossed: major governments taking at least implicit credit for a cyber weapon that sabotaged a critical infrastructure facility through computer coding.

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Sanger, “Worm Was Perfect for Sabotaging Centrifuges,” New York Times, November 18, 2010, http​://www.n​ytimes.c​om/2010​/11/19/w​orld/mi​ddleeast​/19stux​net.h​tml. 3 the kinds of manoeuvres that could exploit holes: The Siemens and Idaho National Lab 2008 presentation of the PCS7’S vulnerabilities to cyber attacks is available at Marty Edwards and Todd Stauffer, “Control System Security Assessments,” Presentation prepared for the 2008 Siemens Automation Summit, http​://grap​hics8​.nyti​mes.co​m/pac​kages​/pdf/​scien​ce​/NS​TB.pdf. 4 code behind Stuxnet was far larger than a typical worm: Symantec reversed engineered Stuxnet and documented its findings in Nicolas Falliere, Liam Ó Murchú, and Eric Chien, “W32. Stuxnet Dossier Version 1.4,” Symantec, February 2011, http​://www.​symante​c.com/c​ontent/en/​us/enter​prise/m​edia/sec​urity​_respon​se/whi​tepapers​/​w32​_​stuxn​et​_​doss​ier.pdf. 5 an obscure date in the worm’s code: The clues of Israeli involvement in Stuxnet’s code have been reported by Michael Joseph Gross in “A Declaration of Cyberwar,” Vanity Fair, April 2011, http​://www.v​anityfair.​com/cultur​e/feature​s/2011/​04/st​uxnet-2​01104, 4; Paul Roberts, “Stuxnet Analysis Supports Iran-Israel Connections,” Threat Post, September 30, 2010, http​://thr​eatpo​st.com/e​n_​us/​blog​s​/stux​net-anal​ysis-sup​port​s-ira​n-isra​el-con​nectio​ns-093​010; John Markoff and David E.

Our Final Invention: Artificial Intelligence and the End of the Human Era
by James Barrat
Published 30 Sep 2013

The device that controlled DHS’ tortured generator: Associated Press, “US video shows hacker hit on power grid,” China Daily, September 27, 2007, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2007-09/27/content_6139437.htm (accessed February 10, 2012). it was built to kill industrial machines: Bres, Eric, “The Stuxnet Mystery Continues,” Tofino (blog), October 10, 2010, http://www.tofinosecurity.com/blog/stuxnet-mystery-continues (accessed June 14, 2012). holes that permit unauthorized access: IT Networks, “Stuxnet Things You Don’t Know,” last modified March 25, 2011, http://www.it-networks.org/2011/03/25/stuxnet-things-you-dont-know/ (accessed December 14, 2011). their operators didn’t sense anything wrong: Poeter, Damon, “Former NSA Head: Hitting Iran with Stuxnet Was a ‘Good Idea,’” PCMAG.COM, March 12, 2012, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2401111,00.asp (accessed April 22, 2012). two countries jointly created Stuxnet: Ibid. a joint U.S.

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[Stuxnet’s creators] opened up the box: Sean McGurk, former head of cybersecurity DHS, interview by Steve Kroft, “Stuxnet: Computer worm opens new era of warfare,” CBS News, March 4, 2012, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-57390124/stuxnet-computer-worm-opens-new-era-of-warfare/ (accessed June 3, 2012). Before, a Stuxnet-type attack: Clayton, Mark, “From the man who discovered Stuxnet, dire warnings one year later,” MinnPost, September 23, 2011, http://www.minnpost.com/christian-science-monitor/2011/09/man-who-discovered-stuxnet-dire-warnings-one-year-later (accessed January 14, 2012). the good luck did not last: Sanger (2012). Al Qaeda’s attacks of 9/11: Carter, Shan, and Amanda Cox, “One 9/11 Tally: $3.3 Trillion,” New York Times, September 8, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/09/08/us/sept-11-reckoning/cost-graphic.html (accessed January 14, 2012).

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SCADA has become almost a household acronym because of the phenomenon called Stuxnet. Stuxnet, and its cousins Duqu and Flame, have convinced even the most hardened skeptics that the energy grid can be attacked. Stuxnet is to malware what the atomic bomb is to bullets. It’s the computer virus IT people refer to in hushed tones as a “digital warhead” and the “first military grade cyber weapon.” But the virus isn’t just smarter than any other, it has completely different goals. While other malware campaigns stole credit card numbers and jet fighter plans, Stuxnet was created to destroy machinery. Specifically, it was built to kill industrial machines connected to a Siemens S7-300 logic controller, a component of a SCADA system.

Sandworm: A New Era of Cyberwar and the Hunt for the Kremlin's Most Dangerous Hackers
by Andy Greenberg
Published 5 Nov 2019

American and Israeli hackers had planted their digital sabotage code into the exact heart of the mechanical process that had brought the Middle East to the brink of war, and they were disrupting it with uncanny precision. Stuxnet had allowed them to pull off that coup without even tipping off their targets that they were under attack. Everything was going according to plan—until the summer of 2010, when the hackers behind Stuxnet would lose control of their creation, exposing it to the world. * * * ■ The discovery of Stuxnet began the same way as the discovery of Sandworm would years later: a zero day. In June 2010, VirusBlokAda, an obscure antivirus firm based in Minsk, Belarus, found that a computer of one of its customers in Iran had been stuck in a loop of repeated crashes and restarts.

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That application was one form of the software that allows industrial control system operators to monitor and send commands to equipment. Somehow, the analysts determined, Stuxnet’s goal seemed to be linked to physical machines—and probably in Iran. It was only in September 2010 that the German researcher Ralph Langner dove into the minutiae of that Siemens-targeted code and came to the conclusion that Stuxnet’s goal was to destroy a very specific piece of equipment: nuclear enrichment centrifuges. With that final discovery, the researchers could put together all of the links in Stuxnet’s intricate kill chain. First, the malware had been designed to jump across air gaps: Iran’s engineers had been careful enough to cut off Natanz’s network entirely from the internet.

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It would then play that recording to the plant’s operators while it committed its violence so that to an operator observing the Siemens display, nothing would appear amiss until it was far too late. Stuxnet’s only flaw was that it was too effective. Among computer security researchers, it’s practically a maxim that worms spread beyond their creators’ control. This one was no exception. Stuxnet had propagated far beyond its Natanz target to infect computers in more than a hundred countries across the world. Other than in the centrifuge caverns of Natanz, those collateral infections hadn’t caused physical destruction. But they had blown the ultrasecret malware’s cover, along with an operation that had been millions of dollars and years in the making. Once Stuxnet’s purpose became clear, the United States and Israel quickly became the prime suspects for its creation.

This Is How They Tell Me the World Ends: The Cyberweapons Arms Race
by Nicole Perlroth
Published 9 Feb 2021

In 2019, Kim Zetter and Huib Modderkolk reported in Yahoo News that an Iranian engineer, recruited by the Dutch intelligence agency AIVD, provided “critical data” and “much-needed inside access when it came time to slip Stuxnet onto those systems using a USB flash drive.” Other sources provided conflicting accounts, so I leave this as an open question. For details of Stuxnet’s zero-days, I owe a huge debt of gratitude to Eric Chien and Liam O’Murchu at Symantec, who were among the first to publish a detailed analysis of the Stuxnet code. Their analysis was later incorporated into a forensic dissection of Stuxnet by Carey Nachenberg at Stanford University Law School in 2012. I also must thank Ralph Langner, “The German,” for being so patient with me as I returned to this subject nearly a decade after he first started dissecting Stuxnet’s code.

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I also must thank Ralph Langner, “The German,” for being so patient with me as I returned to this subject nearly a decade after he first started dissecting Stuxnet’s code. Langner’s 2011 Ted Talk on Stuxnet is still one of the most easily digestible analyses there is. It is available here: www.ted.com/talks/ralph_langner_cracking_stuxnet_a_21st_century_cyber_weapon?language=en. To this day, Iranian officials still maintain that they were able to uncover Stuxnet before it could wreak havoc. The official numbers show otherwise: After steadily building up capacity between 2007 and 2009, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) records show a gradual drop-off starting in June 2009 that continued over the next year.

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Others allowed it to crawl across the network from there, climbing ever higher up the digital chain of command in search of its final destination: Iran’s Natanz nuclear plant, where it burrowed deep into the offline, or “air-gapped,” computers that controlled the rotors that spun Iran’s uranium centrifuges. And then, by remote command, Stuxnet silently spun some of Iran’s centrifuges out of control, while stopping others from spinning entirely. By the time Iran’s nuclear scientists discovered that a computer worm was responsible for the destruction of their centrifuges, Stuxnet had already destroyed a fifth of Tehran’s uranium centrifuges and set Iran’s nuclear ambitions back years. Langner had made a name for himself with his analysis of the Stuxnet code—and for having the chutzpah to be the first to call out the weapon’s two architects: the United States and Israel.

Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War
by Paul Scharre
Published 23 Apr 2018

In order to reach inside these protected networks, Stuxnet spread via removable USB flash drives. This also meant that once Stuxnet arrived at its target, it was on its own. Computer security company Symantec described how this likely influenced Stuxnet’s design: While attackers could control Stuxnet with a command and control server, as mentioned previously the key computer was unlikely to have outbound Internet access. Thus, all the functionality required to sabotage a system was embedded directly in the Stuxnet executable. Unlike other malware, it wasn’t enough for Stuxnet to give its designers access. Stuxnet had to perform the mission autonomously.

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Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, and Eric Chien, “W32.Stuxnet Dossier,” Symantec Security Response, February 2011, https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf. 214 two encrypted “warheads”: Gross, “A Declaration of Cyber War.” 214 Computer security specialists widely agree: Falliere et al., “W32.Stuxnet Dossier,” 2, 7. 214 Natanz nuclear enrichment facility: Gross, “A Declaration of Cyber War.” Ralph Langner, “Stuxnet Deep Dive,” S4x12, https://vimeopro.com/s42012/s4-2012/video/35806770. Kushner, imeopro.com/s42012/Stuxnet.t 214 Nearly 60 percent of Stuxnet infections: Falliere et al., “W32.Stuxnet Dossier,” 5–7.

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Stuxnet had to perform the mission autonomously. Like other malware, Stuxnet also had the ability to replicate and propagate, infecting other computers. Stuxnet spread far beyond its original target, infecting over 100,000 computers. Symantec referred to these additional computers as “collateral damage,” an unintentional side effect of Stuxnet’s “promiscuous” spreading that allowed it to infiltrate air-gapped networks. To compensate for these collateral infections, however, Stuxnet had a number of safety features. First, if Stuxnet found itself on a computer that did not have the specific type of PLC it was looking for, it did nothing.

Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber War
by Fred Kaplan
Published 1 Mar 2016

Murchu, and Eric Chien, “Symantec Security Response: W32.Stuxnet Dossier,” https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf; David Kushner, “The Real Story of Stuxnet,” IEEE Spectrum, Feb. 26, 2013, http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-real-story-of-stuxnet; Eugene Kaspersky, “The Man Who Found Stuxnet—Sergey Ulasen in the Spotlight,” Nota Bene, Nov. 2, 2011, http://eugene.kaspersky.com/2011/11/02/the-man-who-found-stuxnet-sergey-ulasen-in-the-spotlight/. Microsoft issued an advisory: “Microsoft Security Bulletin MS10—046—Critical: Vulnerability in Windows Shell Could Allow Remote Execution,” Aug. 2, 2010 (updated Aug. 24, 2010), https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms10-046.aspx; Zetter, Countdown to Zero Day, 279.

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In their probes: Ibid., 196ff; Kim Zetter, Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World’s First Digital Weapon (New York: Crown, 2014), Ch. 1. This would be a huge operation: Ellen Nakashima and Joby Warrick, “Stuxnet Was Work of U.S. and Israeli Experts, Officials Say,” Washington Post, June 2, 2012. uninterruptible power supplies: Zetter, Countdown to Zero Day, 200–201. A multipurpose piece of malware: Ibid., 276–79. Much of Zetter’s information comes from the computer virus specialists at Symantec and Kaspersky Lab who discovered Stuxnet. A typical malicious code took up, on average, about 175 lines.

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Gates doesn’t say that the classified program was Stuxnet, but it’s clear from the context—and from other sections of the book where he mentions a classified program related to Iran (190–91) and denounces the leak (328)—that it is. In March, the NSA shifted its approach: Zetter, Countdown to Zero Day, 303. The normal speed: David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Christina Walrond, “ISIS Reports: Stuxnet Malware and Natanz” (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security), Feb. 15, 2011, http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/stuxnet_update_15Feb2011.pdf. They’d experienced technical problems: An unclassified version of a 2007 National Intelligence Estimate noted that Iran was experiencing “significant technical problems operating” centrifuges (“Key Judgments from a National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s Nuclear Activity,” reprinted in New York Times, Dec. 4, 2007); this was well before Stuxnet was activated.

@War: The Rise of the Military-Internet Complex
by Shane Harris
Published 14 Sep 2014

Researchers generally credit Stuxnet with destroying one thousand centrifuges between 2009 and 2010. This was only about 20 percent of the total number operating at the plant, and the Iranians had more centrifuges in reserve to replace the damaged equipment. But Obama administration officials have said that Stuxnet set back Iran’s weapons program by up to two years. That’s precious and valuable time if, as appears to be the case, Stuxnet was designed to forestall a war, not to start one. But those aggressive programming features also increased the chances that Stuxnet would be discovered, which eventually it was, in June 2010, when an obscure security company in Belarus discovered the first evidence of a computer virus that would later be dubbed Stuxnet.

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Why would any of these features be necessary for a weapon that was built to attack machines behind an air gap, where they were separated from the Internet? The obvious answer is that Stuxnet’s designers knew it wouldn’t stay behind the air gap for long. And perhaps they didn’t want it to. Stuxnet was also designed to scout out networks and computers inside Natanz as it looked for the right target to attack. The contractors inside the plant worked for other clients as well. If their laptops became infected with Stuxnet, and they carried those computers to their other work sites, the worm might perform this reconnaissance function at other nuclear facilities in Iran. Stuxnet could tell the United States who those nuclear contractors were working for, where other nuclear facilities in Iran were located, and perhaps how far along those plants might be on their respective enrichment paths.

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Other officials, including David Petraeus, former commander of US forces in Iraq, have spoken publicly about cyber operations in Iraq and the contribution they made to the US victory there. [>] The president had already okayed: In addition to the author’s own interviews with current and former US officials and computer security experts, information about the Stuxnet campaign was drawn from voluminous research papers and news articles, of which the following provided key details: Ralph Langner, “Stuxnet’s Secret Twin,” Foreign Policy, November 21, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/19/stuxnets_secret_twin_iran_nukes_cyber_attack#sthash.nq7VuMAC.8FWcquMx.dpbs; David Sanger, “Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran,” New York Times, June 1, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html?

The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age
by David E. Sanger
Published 18 Jun 2018

Bush and Barack Obama, had both come to the decision to use the most sophisticated cyberweapon in history against Iran as the last, best chance to forestall a new war in the Middle East. Neither Rhodes nor Morell seemed surprised that I had pieced the story together; the weapon’s code, called “Stuxnet,” had accidentally spread around the world nearly two years before, making it evident that someone was using malware in an attempt to blow up Iran’s nuclear facilities. Stuxnet was filled with digital fingerprints and other clues about where and when it had been written. That someone eventually would follow those clues to discover the plan that had launched it seemed inevitable. The operation, which I learned through months of reporting had been code-named “Olympic Games,” was simply too big, and involved too many players, to stay secret forever.

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The only thing that was clear was that there would be no backpedaling. When Michael Hayden, who had been central to the early days of America’s experimentation with cyberweapons, said that the Stuxnet code had “the whiff of August 1945” about it—a reference to the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki—he was making clear that a new era had dawned. Hayden’s security clearances meant he couldn’t acknowledge American involvement in Stuxnet, but he left no doubt about the magnitude of its importance. “I do know this,” Hayden concluded. “If we go out and do something, most of the rest of the world now feels that this is a new standard, and it’s something that they now feel legitimated to do as well.”

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There has since been a lot of finger-pointing about who was responsible, with the Israelis claiming the United States moved too slowly, and the United States claiming the Israelis became impatient and sloppy. But one fact is indisputable: the Stuxnet worm got out into the wild in the summer of 2010 and quickly replicated itself in computer systems around the world. It showed up in computer networks from Iran to India, and eventually even wound its way back to the United States. Suddenly everyone had a copy of it—the Iranians and the Russians, the Chinese and the North Koreans, and hackers around the globe. That is when it was given the name “Stuxnet,” a blend of keywords drawn from inside the code. In retrospect, Operation Olympic Games was the opening salvo in modern cyber conflict.

The New Digital Age: Transforming Nations, Businesses, and Our Lives
by Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen
Published 22 Apr 2013

Yet less than a month after the public revelations about these cyber weapons, security experts at Kaspersky Lab, a large Russian computer-security company with international credibility, concluded that the two teams that developed Stuxnet and Flame did, at an early stage, collaborate. They identified a particular module, known as Resource 207, in an early version of the Stuxnet worm that clearly shares code with Flame. “It looks like the Flame platform was a kick-starter of sorts to get the Stuxnet project going,” a senior Kaspersky researcher explained. “The operations went separate ways, maybe because Stuxnet code was mature enough to be deployed in the wild. Now we are 100 percent sure that the Stuxnet and Flame groups worked together.” Though Stuxnet, Flame and other cyber weapons linked to the United States and Israel are the most advanced known examples of state-led cyber attacks, other methods of cyber warfare have already been used by governments around the world.

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references to dates and biblical stories: Elinor Mills, “Stuxnet: Fact vs. Theory,” CNET, October 5, 2010, http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-20018530-245.html. written by as many as thirty people: Michael Joseph Gross, “A Declaration of Cyber-War,” Vanity Fair, April 2011, http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/features/2011/04/stuxnet-201104. an early variant of Stuxnet: Elinor Mills, “Shared Code Indicates Flame, Stuxnet Creators Worked Together,” CNET, June 11, 2012, http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57450292-83/shared-code-indicates-flame-stuxnet-creators-worked-together/. Unnamed Obama administration officials confirmed: Sanger, “Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran,” http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html?

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security experts at Kaspersky Lab: “Resource 207: Kaspersky Lab Research Proves That Stuxnet and Flame Developers Are Connected,” http://www.kaspersky.com/about/news/virus/2012/Resource_207_Kaspersky_Lab_Research_Proves_that_Stuxnet_and_Flame_Developers_are_Connected; Mills, “Shared Code Indicates Flame, Stuxnet Creators Worked Together,” http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57450292-83/shared-code-indicates-flame-stuxnet-creators-worked-together/. identified a particular module, known as Resource 207: “Resource 207: Kaspersky Lab Research Proves That Stuxnet and Flame Developers Are Connected,” http://www.kaspersky.com/about/news/virus/2012/Resource_207_Kaspersky_Lab_Research_Proves_that_Stuxnet_and_Flame_Developers_are_Connected.

Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World
by Bruce Schneier
Published 2 Mar 2015

Schwartz (12 Nov 2012), “Cyber weapon friendly fire: Chevron Stuxnet fallout,” Information Week, http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-and-breaches/cyber-weapon-friendly-fire-chevron-stuxnet-fallout/d/d-id/1107339. industrial plants in Germany: Robert McMillan (14 Sep 2010), “Siemens: Stuxnet worm hit industrial systems,” Computer World, http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9185419/Siemens_Stuxnet_worm_hit_industrial_systems. failure of an Indian satellite: Jeffrey Carr (29 Sep 2010), “Did the Stuxnet worm kill India’s Insat-4B satellite?” Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/firewall/2010/09/29/did-the-stuxnet-worm-kill-indias-insat-4b-satellite.

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the only person convicted: Computer Weekly (13 Mar 2009), “Kids responsible for Estonia attack,” Computer Weekly, http://www.computerweekly.com/news/2240088733/Kids-responsible-for-Estonia-attack. Stuxnet is the first military-grade: David Kushner (26 Feb 2013), “The real story of Stuxnet,” IEEE Spectrum, http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-real-story-of-stuxnet. Kim Zetter (2014), Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World’s First Digital Weapon, Crown Publishers, http://books.google.com/books/? id=iBTpnQEACAAJ. It was launched in 2009: William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E.

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Techniques first developed: Tom Simonite (19 Sep 2012), “Stuxnet tricks copied by computer criminals,” MIT Technology Review, http://www.technologyreview.com/news/429173/stuxnet-tricks-copied-by-computer-criminals. software that Elcomsoft sells: Andy Greenberg (2 Sep 2014), “The police tool that pervs use to steal nude pics from Apple’s iCloud,” Wired, http://www.wired.com/2014/09/eppb-icloud. once-secret techniques: Mobistealth (2014), “Ultimate cell phone monitoring software,” http://www.mobistealth.com. Stuxnet’s target was Iran: Jarrad Shearer (26 Feb 2013), “W32.Stuxnet,” Symantec Corporation, http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?

When Computers Can Think: The Artificial Intelligence Singularity
by Anthony Berglas , William Black , Samantha Thalind , Max Scratchmann and Michelle Estes
Published 28 Feb 2015

By deploying Stuxnet, the USA greatly encouraged the development of such weapons. They also made their use acceptable. Before Stuxnet, the USA had warned that any cyber-attack would be considered to be a military attack that might produce a military response. After Stuxnet, that threat can no longer be taken seriously. Thowing stones from glass houses. Multiple Stuxnet was only intended to attack Iranian centrifuges. However, an updated version of the software had a bug which caused it to spread much more widely. That is how it was eventually discovered, on a computer outside of Iran. Stuxnet attacked any controller that looked, to Stuxnet, like an Iranian centrifuge.

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Stuxnet attacked any controller that looked, to Stuxnet, like an Iranian centrifuge. The Siemens controllers involved are quite common so Stuxnet could attack many different types of equipment throughout the world. Kaspersky had found Stuxnet in a Russian nuclear power plant, but fortunately Stuxnet included a self destruct date. Perhaps more importantly, the code of Stuxnet has now been carefully studied by numerous white hat and black hat security experts. It essentially provides an excellent manual as to how to produce top quality malware and viruses. In June 2014 new, high quality malware, known as Dragonfly or Havex, was found to have infected many energy producers, mainly in the USA and Western Europe.

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Modern anti-virus software needs to be much more intelligent in order to detect malware, but a substantial amount of malware remains undetected, and the anti-virus software can also attack normal, good software. Stuxnet was not intelligent in the sense of being an AGI, but it was autonomous in the sense that once it was released into the wild, it behaved in ways that its authors could not predict and control. Stuxnet could not call home when working in cognito behind an air gap, so it just did what it thought was best. That is how it escaped from the centrifuges and was eventually detected. As to the Iranian centrifuges, it is estimated that Stuxnet had destroyed about 20% of them and set the Iranian program back by several months. Stuxnet is gone, and the centrifuges replaced, and output actually increased slightly during 2010.

The Fifth Domain: Defending Our Country, Our Companies, and Ourselves in the Age of Cyber Threats
by Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake
Published 15 Jul 2019

This kind of mistaken collateral damage is not unique to NotPetya or to the GRU. The software used in the so-called Stuxnet attack on the Iranian nuclear enrichment plant reportedly carried out by the United States in 2010 somehow got out into the world, even though the Natanz plant was not connected to the internet or any other network. Stuxnet quickly spread around the globe, was captured by cybersecurity teams in many countries, and was decompiled, with parts of it later reused in new attack tools. Stuxnet, however, did not damage anything outside of Natanz, because it was written in a way that the only thing it could hurt was the Iranian nuclear enrichment processor.

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When we wrote Cyber War in 2009, we quoted a senior intelligence official who told us point-blank that his teams at the NSA carried out an undisclosed number of missions every month and never got caught. That was then. Only months after Cyber War was published, the cybersecurity community, and soon after the general public, began to learn about Stuxnet, the highly sophisticated malware attack on Iran’s nuclear centrifuges. Like Stuxnet, other campaigns and malware groups have also been solidly pinned to the NSA. In the case of Longhorn, not only had the group been caught in the act, but Symantec had traced its campaign across forty targets in fifteen countries. What many suspected was seemingly confirmed in stolen U.S. government files released by WikiLeaks.

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Obama himself was, as were many of his top advisers. They were disappointed with the first major U.S. cyber-war attack, the now infamous Stuxnet program. Officially known as Operation Olympic Games in the intelligence community, the operation seemed at first to have been a marvel of both covert action and cyber intrusion. (The attack is now the subject of many books and even a movie, Zero Days, directed by Alex Gibney.) Upon further examination, however, it had failed on several important criteria. The attack was supposed to remain covert. The Stuxnet attack software was discovered by the Iranians. How it worked was supposed to remain secret.

Smart Cities: Big Data, Civic Hackers, and the Quest for a New Utopia
by Anthony M. Townsend
Published 29 Sep 2013

id=2071893. 40Ellen Nakashima and Joby Warrick, “Stuxnet was work of U.S. and Israeli experts, officials say,” Washington Post, June 1, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-06-01/world/35459494_1_nuclear-program-stuxnet-senior-iranian-officials. 41Vivian Yeo, “Stuxnet infections spread to 115 countries,” ZDNet, August 9, 2010, http://www.zdnet.co.uk/news/security-threats/2010/08/09/stuxnet-infections-spread-to-115-countries-40089766/. 42Elinor Mills, “Ralph Langer on Stuxnet, copycat threats (Q&A),” CNet News, May 22, 2011, http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-20061256-245.html. 43Symantec Corporation, “W32.Stuxnet,” Security Responses, blog, last modified September 17, 2010, http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?

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Security experts believe Stuxnet, carried in on a USB thumb drive, infected and took over the SCADA systems controlling the plant’s equipment. Working stealthily to knock the centrifuges off balance even as it reported to operators that all was normal, Stuxnet is believed to have put over a thousand machines out of commission, significantly slowing the refinement process, and the Iranian weapons program.40 The wide spread of Stuxnet was shocking. Unlike the laser-guided, bunker-busting smart bombs that would have been used in a conventional strike on the Natanz plant, Stuxnet attacked with all the precision of carpet bombing.

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So you will find the same products in a power plant, even in elevators.”42 Skeptics argue that the threat of Stuxnet is overblown. Stuxnet’s payload was highly targeted. It was programmed to only attack the Natanz centrifuges, and do so in a very specific way. Most importantly, it expended a highly valuable arsenal of “zero-day” attacks, undocumented vulnerabilities that can only be exploited once, after which a simple update will be issued by the software’s supplier. In its report on the virus, security software firm Symantec wrote “Incredibly, Stuxnet exploits four zero-day vulnerabilities, which is unprecedented.”43 Stuxnet’s unique attributes aside, most embedded systems aren’t located in bunkers, and they are increasingly vulnerable to much simpler attacks on their human operators.

There's a War Going on but No One Can See It
by Huib Modderkolk
Published 1 Sep 2021

Several Iranian scientists were sacked and it is estimated that Iran’s nuclear weapons programme has been set back years. This digital attack was a joint operation by US and Israeli intelligence. They worked on it for years. They came up with and wrote the sabotage virus, dubbed Stuxnet by analysts who studied it afterwards. Thought to be the first-ever offensive cyberweapon, Stuxnet inaugurated a new phase in digital warfare. Without a single American or Israeli soldier having set foot on Iranian soil, it launched a precision attack every bit as destructive as bombs dropped from a plane. In time, the virus would spread beyond the plant and run amok to infect thousands of computers.

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Little wonder, then, that in 2004 the CIA and Mossad were already turning to the AIVD. This marked the beginning of preparations for what would be the deployment of the world’s first cyberweapon. Two years later, US President George Bush gave the official green light for Operation Olympic Games, and thus for the launch of Stuxnet. Little of what transpired after that is publicly known. It’s a fact that the Stuxnet virus struck at Natanz and that the AIVD played some kind of role, that it set up two front companies and recruited moles to infiltrate the facility. One front dead-ended because the recruit wasn’t allowed in, but the other, an Iranian engineer posing as a mechanic, succeeded.

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The AIVD-recruited engineer managed to enter Natanz on this pretext on multiple occasions, the first sometime before the summer of 2007, and to collect information from the plant’s internal network. Several updates of the Stuxnet virus were subsequently needed before it could be launched as planned. The engineer went back every few weeks or months to gather more information, and in the end to attempt to inject Stuxnet into the underground plant’s computers. He claimed that he’d succeeded. One source, describing this dangerous operation, told me the Iranian engineer was ‘the principal means of getting the virus inside Natanz’.

Click Here to Kill Everybody: Security and Survival in a Hyper-Connected World
by Bruce Schneier
Published 3 Sep 2018

Nathaniel Popper (21 Aug 2017), “Identity thieves hijack cellphone accounts to go after virtual currency,” New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/21/business/dealbook/phone-hack-bitcoin-virtual-currency.html. 49This is called a man-in-the-middle attack: Rapid7 (9 Aug 2017), “Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks,” Rapid7 Fundamentals, https://www.rapid7.com/fundamentals/man-in-the-middle-attacks. 49A credit card issuer might flag: Gartner (accessed 24 Apr 2018), “Reviews for online fraud detection,” https://www.gartner.com/reviews/market/Online Fraud DetectionSystems. 50This was one of the techniques: David Kushner (26 Feb 2013), “The real story of Stuxnet,” IEEE Spectrum, https://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-real-story-of-stuxnet. 50For years, though, hackers have been: Dan Goodin (3 Nov 2017), “Stuxnet-style code signing is more widespread than anyone thought,” Ars Technica, https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/11/evasive-code-signed-malware-flourished-before-stuxnet-and-still-does. Doowon Kim, Bum Jun Kwon, and Tudor Dumitras (1 Nov 2017), “Certified malware: Measuring breaches of trust in the Windows code-signing PKI,” ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS ’17), http://www.umiacs.umd.edu/~tdumitra/papers/CCS-2017.pdf. 51Facebook has a “real name” policy: Amanda Holpuch (15 Dec 2015), “Facebook adjusts controversial ‘real name’ policy in wake of criticism,” Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/15/facebook-change-controversial-real-name-policy. 51Google requires a phone number: Eric Griffith (3 Dec 2017), “How to create an anonymous email account,” PC Magazine, https://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2476288,00.asp. 52He was found by a dogged FBI agent: Nate Anderson and Cyrus Farivar (3 Oct 2013), “How the feds took down the Dread Pirate Roberts,” Ars Technica, https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/10/how-the-feds-took-down-the-dread-pirate-roberts. 52Pedophiles have been arrested: Joseph Cox (15 Jun 2016), “How the feds use Photo-shop to track down pedophiles,” Vice Motherboard, https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/8q8594/enhance-enhance-enhance-how-the-feds-use-photoshop-to-track-down-pedophiles.

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NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (Feb 2017), Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, 2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/law/humanitarian-law/tallinn-manual-20-international-law-applicable-cyber-operations-2nd-edition. 68Stuxnet, discovered in 2010: David Kushner (26 Feb 2013), “The real story of Stuxnet,” IEEE Spectrum, https://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-real-story-of-stuxnet. Ralph Langner (1 Nov 2013), “To kill a centrifuge,” Langner Group, https://www.langner.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/to-kill-a-centrifuge.pdf. Kim Zetter (2015), Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World’s First Digital Weapon, Crown Books, https://books.google.com/books?id=1l2YAwAAQBAJ. 68Targets are not limited to: These are often known as SCADA systems.

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Now, cybersecurity has its own separate event. We’re all within the blast radius. Even a well-targeted cyberweapon like Stuxnet damaged networks far away from the Iranian Natanz nuclear plant. In 2017, the global shipping giant Maersk had its operations brought to a halt by NotPetya, a Russian cyberweapon used against Ukraine. The company was a bystander caught in the cross fire of an international cyberattack. So far, most cyberattacks haven’t happened in wartime. There was no war when the US and Israel attacked Iran with Stuxnet in 2010, or when Iran attacked the Saudi national oil company in 2012. There was no war when North Korea used WannaCry to lock up computer systems around the world in 2017, or in the years prior when the US conducted cyber operations against North Korea in an attempt to sabotage its nuclear program.

Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: The History and Future of American Intelligence
by Amy B. Zegart
Published 6 Nov 2021

Carey Nachenberg, remarks, “A Forensic Discussion of Stuxnet,” Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, April 23, 2012. 100. Sanger, “Obama Order Sped Up.” 101. David Kushner, “The Real Story of Stuxnet,” IEEE Spectrum, February 26, 2013, https://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-real-story-of-stuxnet. 102. Sanger, Perfect Weapon, 21. 103. Nachenberg remarks; Ellen Nakashima and Joby Warrick, “Stuxnet Was Work of US and Israeli Experts, Officials Say,” Washington Post, June 2, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/stuxnet-was-work-of-us-and-israeli-experts-officials-say/2012/06/01/gJQAlnEy6U_story.html. 104.

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Adam Schiff, remarks, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing: National Security Challenges of Artificial Intelligence, Manipulated Media and Deepfakes, 116th Cong., 1st sess., June 13, 2019. 131. Sanger, Perfect Weapon; Kim Zetter, Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World’s First Digital Weapon (New York: Crown, 2015). Cybersecurity experts at Symantec believe a version of the Stuxnet virus was deployed as early as 2005 but the virus was not publicly discovered until 2010. Jim Finkle, “Researchers Say Stuxnet Was Deployed against Iran in 2007,” Reuters, February 26, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyberwar-stuxnet/researchers-say-stuxnet-was-deployed-against-iran-in-2007-idUSBRE91P0PP20130226. 132. Sanger, Perfect Weapon, 268–85. 133.

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Cartwright, who was then in charge of American nuclear deterrence, had been thinking about new technologies. What if the United States attacked Iran’s centrifuges with a cyberweapon?98 The result was Stuxnet, the most sophisticated cyber weapon in the world, with code fifty times larger than typical malware.99 The CIA, the NSA, and Israel’s elite cyber Unit 8200 reportedly joined forces.100 Forensics revealed that Stuxnet used four rare and valuable “zero day” vulnerabilities (coding flaws unknown to security researchers or software vendors) to find the precise software operating Iran’s centrifuges, spread inside, hide, and destroy without a trace.101 Still, the operation needed humans.

Whiplash: How to Survive Our Faster Future
by Joi Ito and Jeff Howe
Published 6 Dec 2016

When technicians do need to transfer data in or out of these systems, they do so by protected USB sticks. Stuxnet had either managed to get onto a plant employee’s jump drive, or it was an inside job. This feat gained considerably more stature once analysts determined that the virus had targeted five nuclear facilities in Iran—thought to be of the securest sites anywhere in the world. Stuxnet’s second great coup lay in avoiding detection until it had already destroyed nearly one thousand of Iran’s centrifuges and put the country’s nuclear program back years. What’s telling is that these systems turned out to have virtually no security at all. Once Stuxnet got past a first, supposedly impervious line of defense, it became a fox in a hen house.

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The malware would also cleverly alter the information sent back on the computer screens so that its sabotage of the turbine would remain undetected for a long time. Stuxnet’s two great accomplishments—the ability to infiltrate a highly secure industrial system and the ability to stay hidden for many years—made it the object of sustained fascination among cybersecurity professionals. It also, however, demonstrates why resilience is always preferable to strength: There is no Fort Knox in a digital age. Everything that can be hacked will, at some point, be hacked. To convey just how stunned security experts were when Stuxnet became public, consider this: The SCADA systems in use at a nuclear plant are “air-gapped.”

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The failure occurred in the imagination of the men who built it, the inability to imagine how to lose in a way that allows you to continue fighting, which is as neat a definition of resilience as you can find. Deception played an equally important role in Stuxnet’s success. The PLCs, programmable logic controllers, that controlled the turbines not only lacked a mechanism to detect malicious code designed to alter the behavior of the motors, but also had no means of detecting attempts to avoid detection by faking the data displayed to the system. Once Stuxnet bypassed the walls used to maintain security at the nuclear facilities, it never encountered another defensive measure. This failure of imagination, this inability to resist the allure of the impervious defense, is hardly limited to Iran or even nuclear plants.

The New Rules of War: Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder
by Sean McFate
Published 22 Jan 2019

Inflated cyber threats to U.S. electrical grid: Transforming the Nation’s Electricity System: The Second Installment of the Quadrennial Energy Review (Washington, DC: Department of Energy, January 2017), S-15. On varmint threat, see: Cyber Squirrel 1, 31 January 2018, http://cybersquirrel1.com. 9. Stuxnet hype: Michael Joseph Gross, “A Declaration of Cyber-War,” Vanity Fair, 21 March 2011, www.vanityfair.com/news/2011/03/stuxnet-201104; Kim Zetter, “An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World’s First Digital Weapon,” Wired, 3 November 2014, www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet. 10. Billy Mitchell predicts age of air power: William Mitchell, Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilities of Modern Air Power—Economic and Military (New York: G.

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However, cyber experts demur and showcase Stuxnet as proof that cybertechnology is not just a new weapon of war, but a new way of war. Stuxnet was an American-Israeli computer worm injected into Iran’s nuclear facility network at Natanz in 2010. The worm took control of some computers and ordered the nuclear centrifuges to spin apart, reportedly destroying a fifth of them. Many asserted (without evidence) that this caused significant damage to Iran’s nuclear weapons program, and everyone else weirdly believed this. A much-read Vanity Fair article claimed the episode represented the future of war, declaring: “Stuxnet is the Hiroshima of cyber-war.”9 In reality, Stuxnet had no effect on the Iranian nuclear program.

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A much-read Vanity Fair article claimed the episode represented the future of war, declaring: “Stuxnet is the Hiroshima of cyber-war.”9 In reality, Stuxnet had no effect on the Iranian nuclear program. It did not destroy it or even meaningfully delay it. The Iranians simply replaced the broken centrifuges, ran an antivirus program, and went back to developing nuclear weapons. Stuxnet is pure hype. Cyber is important, but not in ways people think. It gives us new ways of doing old things: sabotage, theft, propaganda, deceit, and espionage. None of this is new. Cyberwar’s real power in modern warfare is influence, not sabotage. Using the internet to change people’s minds is more powerful than blowing up a server, and there’s nothing new about propaganda.

DarkMarket: Cyberthieves, Cybercops and You
by Misha Glenny
Published 3 Oct 2011

We know that Bradley Manning, the man accused of having removed the US diplomatic cables that were subsequently published on WikiLeaks’ website, managed to download all the material onto a CD marked as a Lady Gaga album. We also know that Stuxnet – to date the world’s most sophisticated virus – must have been planted on its apparent target in Iran’s nuclear facilities by somebody (wittingly or otherwise) infecting the computer systems with a memory stick or CD. Iran’s nuclear operating systems are not connected to the Internet. But they are still networks, and their infection by Stuxnet proved that they were within reach of a professional intelligence agency. Stuxnet represented a significant escalation in the third major threat: cyber warfare. This piece of malware was so complicated that researchers estimated it must have taken in the region of several man-years to develop, which means that a dedicated team of coding engineers must have been working on it for an extended period.

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The only entity capable of developing Stuxnet was a nation state with a lot of resources to devote to the design and manufacture of both defensive and offensive cyber weapons. Nonetheless, whoever designed Stuxnet borrowed huge amounts of computer code and techniques from the many tens of thousands of blackhat or greyhat hackers out in cyberspace. Criminal hackers are a great driver of creativity in all areas of the Web’s darkside. Military, private-sector, police and intelligence agencies are always quick to adopt the tools that crackers and hackers are developing. When Stuxnet was successfully infiltrated into the control system of several nuclear facilities in Iran, the authorities admitted that it led to a major breakdown in the operation of a highly sensitive station.

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This means that even if a hacker is working on behalf of a boss (be it a capo, a CEO or a Commander), he will still need to know a great deal about the intended target if he is to design the right product. Whichever team of hackers designed Stuxnet, for example, had to know not just about the Iranian nuclear facilities that were the presumed targets; they also needed to understand the Siemens PLC network that ran it and the very specific compressor designed by Vachon, a Finnish company (although manufactured in China), as well as the Taiwanese company whose RealTek digital certificate was spoofed to fool the Iranian system’s anti-virus program. Anyone smart enough to work on Stuxnet would have been smart enough to work out its intended victim. In this respect, hackers are the key to cyber security as they hold the solution to the conundrum.

Future Crimes: Everything Is Connected, Everyone Is Vulnerable and What We Can Do About It
by Marc Goodman
Published 24 Feb 2015

If they spin too fast, the centrifuges begin to vibrate and shake uncontrollably until the pressure becomes so severe the motors burn out, requiring the centrifuge to be replaced. The authors of Stuxnet understood that no centrifuges meant no enrichment, thus no bomb and no threat. The Siemens PLCs were key to the attack, but the authors of Stuxnet were not impetuous cyber warriors with a pillage-and-burn mentality. They were patient, strategic, and cunning in their attack on Natanz. In the first phase of the assault on Natanz, Stuxnet did nothing but observe, sitting there silently, stealthily gathering information to understand how the enrichment centrifuges worked.

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A USB thumb drive. To sabotage the centrifuges at Natanz, a new class of cyber weapon was created, one that could leap from the virtual world of computers and enter the physical world of industrial control systems. Enter Stuxnet, a highly sophisticated computer worm widely believed to have been created by the United States and Israel to keep a notorious foe in check. The authors of Stuxnet copied the worm onto a simple USB flash drive, now locked and loaded, ready to seek out its quarry. How the drive came to be smuggled into Natanz and who inserted it into the computer network at the facility remain unknown, even today.

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As it turned out, the Iranians had placed too much trust in the computer screens governing their prized secretive nuclear enrichment site. The data logging and computer recording of the industrial control systems stealthily perpetrated by the Stuxnet worm in phase one of the attack had a clear, if not immediately obvious, purpose: to fully document what the Siemens PLCs looked like when they were in full, proper working order. Rotors spinning according to plan and pressure at expected levels yielded all systems go, all maintenance lights green. Stuxnet captured all of those data and recorded it on the PLC equivalent of a VCR, carefully saved for posterity. What happened next was straight out of a Hollywood blockbuster, portrayed many times in films such as Ocean’s Eleven and National Treasure.

Underground
by Suelette Dreyfus
Published 1 Jan 2011

Now there is Stuxnet which, after WikiLeaks, was probably the biggest technology story of 2010 and certainly the biggest worm of the year. WikiLeaks created an international news sensation on 16 July 2010 by announcing that a major nuclear incident had occurred in Iran.5 This incident turned out to be not a political worm but a military worm with destructive intent – Stuxnet. It seems all sorts of worms had turned. About the same time, Julian was prosecuting the case for peace – a defiant ex-hacker presenting evidence from Afghanistan on the ‘squalor of war’ (July 25).6 The Stuxnet story illustrates how worms have transformed from youthful experiments to potent weapons of the military, and how it is the intelligence agencies who are now the hackers.

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Alternatively, a hacker working for the criminal underworld might have used the vulnerabilities to write a worm that stole credit cards from thousands of home PCs, instead of disabling an obscure Siemens controller associated with operating centrifuges. Although no country has taken responsibility for Stuxnet, the media reports about the worm smell of gloating by the US and Israeli governments – the kind of gloating that comes from the pleasure of a job well done. While Stuxnet garnered the headlines, a much darker element of the worm-as-cyber-weapon story has received less attention in the hacker community. At the same time Stuxnet was weaving through Iran’s nuclear facility computers, someone was assassinating university professors and scientists in Iran. On 29 November 2011, someone tried to murder two senior Iranian nuclear scientists with similarly timed bombs.13 Dr Majid Shahriari, a member of the nuclear engineering department of Shahid Beheshti University, was killed.

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pagewanted=3&_r=1 8. Ibid. 9. CBS News, ‘Iran Confirms Stuxnet Worm Halted Centrifuges’, 29 November, 2010. See: http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/11/29/world/main7100197.shtml 10. William J. Broad, John Markoff and David E. Sanger, ‘Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay’, New York Times online, 15 January, 2011. See: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html?pagewanted=3&_r=1 11. Ibid. 12. Ryan Naraine, ‘Stuxnet attackers used 4 Windows zero-day exploits’, Zdnet, 14 September, 2010. See: http://www.zdnet.com/blog/security/stuxnet-attackers-used-4-windows-zero-day-exploits/7347 13.

Exponential: How Accelerating Technology Is Leaving Us Behind and What to Do About It
by Azeem Azhar
Published 6 Sep 2021

Correll, ‘Air Strike at Osirak’, Air Force Magazine, 1 April 2012 <https://www.airforcemag.com/article/0412osirak/> [accessed 26 April 2020]. 10 Patrick Jackson, ‘Osirak: Over the Reactor’, BBC News, 5 June 2006 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4774733.stm> [accessed 12 January 2021]. 11 Ralph Langner, To Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis of What Stuxnet’s Creators Tried to Achieve (The Langner Group, November 2013) <https://www.langner.com/to-kill-a-centrifuge/> [accessed 26 March 2020]. 12 Ellen Nakashima and Joby Warrick, ‘Stuxnet Was Work of U.S. and Israeli Experts, Officials Say’, Washington Post, 2 June 2012 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/stuxnet-was-work-of-us-and-israeli-experts-officials-say/2012/06/01/gJQAlnEy6U_story.html> [accessed 26 March 2021]. 13 Matthew Gooding, ‘Cyber Attacks: Damaging Breaches Hit 96 per cent of UK Businesses Last Year’, Computer Business Review, 5 August 2020 <https://www.cbronline.com/news/uk-businesses-cyber-attacks> [accessed 17 September 2020]. 14 ‘37 Billion Data Records Leaked in 2020, a Growth of 140 per cent YOY – Atlas VPN’ <https://atlasvpn.com/blog/37-billion-data-records-leaked-in-2020-a-growth-of-140-yoy> [accessed 24 February 2021]. 15 Azeem Azhar, ‘Cybersecurity in the Age of AI: My Conversation with Nicole Eagen’, Exponential View, 27 December 2019 <https://www.exponentialview.co/p/cybersecurity-in-the-age-of-ai> [accessed 3 August 2020]. 16 Matt Burgess, ‘To Protect Putin, Russia Is Spoofing GPS Signals on a Massive Scale’, Wired, 27 March 2019 <https://www.wired.co.uk/article/russia-gps-spoofing> [accessed 14 September 2020]. 17 Andy Greenberg, ‘The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in History’, Wired, 22 August 2018 <https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/> [accessed 3 August 2020]. 18 Donghui Park, ‘North Korea Cyber Attacks: A New Asymmetrical Military Strategy’, Henry M.

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Starting in early 2010, the site suffered a series of perplexing mishaps – around 1,000 centrifuges, a tenth of the site’s contingent, were destroyed. But the perpetrator was not a squadron of Israel’s feared top guns and their 20-ton aircraft. It was Stuxnet, a piece of malicious software code. The bug had buried into Iranian firms’ networks for a few days before arriving in Natanz. Designed specifically to target the software running on electronics made by the German firm Siemens, Stuxnet spent a month gently tampering with the operation of Iran’s computers. The goal was to damage the delicate centrifuges that were being used to purify uranium for military use.11 The effects went far beyond the digital world, destroying much of Iran’s nuclear capabilities.

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The goal was to damage the delicate centrifuges that were being used to purify uranium for military use.11 The effects went far beyond the digital world, destroying much of Iran’s nuclear capabilities. And it all happened without a ‘kinetic’ attack – that is, lobbing a bomb at an enemy. While nobody has ever officially claimed responsibility for Stuxnet, it has been widely alleged to be a joint creation of the Israeli and US governments.12 All states have vulnerabilities similar to the Natanz nuclear site. Today, everything has – or will soon have – a digital interface, probably connected to the internet. One effect of this transformation is to increase the number of attack surfaces within governments – be they nuclear reactors or military databases.

Pax Technica: How the Internet of Things May Set Us Free or Lock Us Up
by Philip N. Howard
Published 27 Apr 2015

One attack crippled the world’s most valuable company, the $10 trillion Saudi oil firm Aramco. Hackers wiped out data on three-quarters of the company’s computers.9 The attack was probably launched by Iran, and it came on a carefully chosen day when the impact would be severe. Stuxnet, the virus that crippled Iran’s uranium enrichment centrifuges, was probably developed by the United States and Israel.10 The same team that produced Stuxnet probably also produced the viruses Flame and Gauss, all of which have some shared code.11 These more recent viruses have basic data-mining goals, and Gauss seems to be targeting Lebanese banks. China is only one of several countries that have a full-time, professional cohort of hackers who aggressively attack information infrastructure in other countries and steal intellectual property.

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Erik Kirschbaum, “Snowden Says NSA Engages in Industrial Espionage: TV,” Reuters, January 26, 2014, accessed September 30, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/26/us-security-snowden-germany-idUSBREA0P0DE20140126. 9. Nicole Perlroth, “Cyberattack on Saudi Oil Firm Disquiets U.S.,” The New York Times, October 24, 2012, accessed September 30, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/24/business/global/cyberattack-on-saudi-oil-firm-disquiets-us.html. 10. “Stuxnet,” Wikipedia, accessed June 30, 2014, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stuxnet. 11. Nicole Perlroth, “Virus Seeking Bank Data Is Tied to Attack on Iran,” Bits, August 9, 2012, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/09/researchers-find-possible-state-sponsored-virus-in-mideast/. 12. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Wanted by the FBI: Wang Dong,” FBI, accessed June 30, 2014, http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/cyber/wang-dong. 13.

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Andrei Aliaksandrau and Alaksiej Lavoncyk, “Belarus: Pulling the Plug,” Xindex: The Voice of Free Expression (Budapest, HU, January 2013), accessed September 30, 2014, http://www.indexoncensorship.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/IDX_Belarus_ENG_WebRes.pdf. 12. “Stuxnet,” Wikipedia, accessed June 30, 2014, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stuxnet. 13. “Türk Genelkurmay Başkanlığı 27 Nisan 2007 Tarihli Basın Açıklaması,” Wikisource, accessed June 30, 2014, accessed September 30, 2014, http://tr.wikisource.org/wiki/T%C3%BCrk_Genelkurmay_Ba%C5%9Fkanl%C4%B1%C4%9F%C4%B1_27_Nisan_2007_tarihli_bas%C4%B1n_a%C3%A7%C4%B1klamas%C4%B1. 14.

Fancy Bear Goes Phishing: The Dark History of the Information Age, in Five Extraordinary Hacks
by Scott J. Shapiro

Seligman, “Learned Helplessness at Fifty: Insights from Neuroscience,” Psychological Review 123, no. 4 (2016): 349–67, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4920136/. five hacks: Some hacks have been extensively discussed by others, so I did not tell those stories again; e.g., STUXNET, in Kim Zetter, Countdown to Zero Day: STUXNET and the Launch of the World’s First Digital Weapon (New York: Crown, 2014); Conficker, in Mark Bowden, Worm: The First Digital World War (New York: Grove Press, 2012); Dark Energy, in Andy Greenberg, Sandworm: A New Era of Cyberwar and the Hunt for the Kremlin’s Most Dangerous Hackers (New York: Doubleday, 2019). 1.

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States disseminate propaganda on social media. In cyber-dependent war, by contrast, states use computers to attack the computers of another state. When Russia launched a three-week DDoS on Estonia in 2007, it was waging a cyber-dependent war. The United States also engaged in cyber-dependent war when, in partnership with Israel, it used the Stuxnet worm to infiltrate the computer networks at the Iranian nuclear facility in Natanz. Richard Clarke’s apocalyptic scene is also cyber-dependent. He imagines a terrorist hacking into the computer networks of oil refineries, power plants, airports, and banks to wreak havoc. These attacks target “critical infrastructure,” resources so vital to the physical security, economic stability, and public health or safety that their incapacitation or destruction would have debilitating effects on a society.

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Cyber-dependent war has worried analysts because “cyber-physical” systems—systems that use computers to control physical devices so as to maximize efficiency, reliability, and convenience—have become commonplace. The Internet of Things that Mirai exploited is a cyber-physical internetwork, as are industrial control systems used in power plants, chemical processing, and manufacturing, which were exploited by Stuxnet. By hacking into computer networks, attackers can now cause physical destruction and disruption using only streams of zeros and ones. Hyperspecialized Weapons With the exception of Live Free or Die Hard, the 2007 movie in which Bruce Willis saves the United States from a cyberterrorist who shuts down the entire country, the world has not seen anything like Clarke’s doomsday fantasy.

The Driver in the Driverless Car: How Our Technology Choices Will Create the Future
by Vivek Wadhwa and Alex Salkever
Published 2 Apr 2017

As high-speed, ubiquitous connectivity among all manner of devices binds us more tightly to technology and to the Internet, a crucial and frightening mega-trend for the next two decades is that cyber security will become a more important domestic-security issue. In 2007, the Stuxnet computer worm sent costly and critically important centrifuges spinning wildly out of control at Natanz, a secret uranium-enrichment facility in Iran.2 In a matter of months, American and Israeli security forces were able to remotely destroy 1,000 of the 5,000 centrifuges Iran had spinning at the time to purify uranium. The government program behind the virus, code-named “Olympic Games,” was developed during the Bush and Obama Administrations. Stuxnet was the first major publicly reported governmental cyber attack on industrial facilities of another nation.

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Dan Kloeffler and Alexis Shaw, “Dick Cheney feared assassination via medical device hacking: ‘I was aware of the danger,’ ” ABC News 19 October 2013, http://abcnews.go.com/US/vice-president-dick-cheney-feared-pacemaker-hacking/story?id=20621434 (accessed 21 October 2016). 2. Kim Zetter, “An unprecedented look at Stuxnet, the world’s first digital weapon,” WIRED 3 November 2014, https://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet (accessed 21 October 2016) 3. “What happened,” U.S. Office of Personnel Management (undated), https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents (accessed 21 October 2016). 4. Casey Newton, “The mind-bending messiness of the Ashley Madison data dump,” the Verge 19 August 2015, http://www.theverge.com/2015/8/19/9178855/ashley-madison-data-breach-implications (accessed 21 October 2016). 5.

Engineering Security
by Peter Gutmann

[423] “Malware Increasingly Being Signed With Stolen Certificates”, Robert Lemos, 21 July 2011, http://www.darkreading.com/advancedthreats/167901091/security/application-security/231000129/malware-increasingly-being-signed-with-stolen-certificates.html. [424] “W32.Duqu: The Precursor to the Next Stuxnet”, ‘Symantec Security Response’, 18 October 2011, http://www.symantec.com/connect/w32_duqu_precursor_next_stuxnet. [425] “Win32/Stuxnet Signed Binaries”, Pierre-Marc Bureau, 19 July 2010, http://blog.eset.com/2010/07/19/win32stuxnet-signed-binaries. [426] “Another Signed Stuxnet Binary”, Sean Sullivan, 20 July 2010, http://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00001993.html. [427] “New Stuxnet-Related Malware Signed Using Certificate from JMicron”, Lucian Constantin, 20 July 2010, http://news.softpedia.com/news/NewStuxnet-Related-Malware-Signed-Using-Certificate-from-JMicron148213.shtml

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action=dpl&char=s. [432] “A Quantitative Analysis of the Insecurity of Embedded Network Devices: Results of a Wide-Area Scan”, Ang Cui and Salvatore Stolfo, Proceedings of the 26th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC’10), December 2010, p.97. [433] “Enumerating Stuxnet’s exploits”, Ralph Langner, 7 June 2011, http://www.langner.com/en/2011/06/07/enumeratingstuxnet%E2%80%99s-exploits/. [434] “Rise of “forever day” bugs in industrial systems threatens critical infrastructure”, Dan Goodin, 9 April 2012, http://arstechnica.com/business/news/2012/04/rise-of-ics-forever-day-vulnerabiliitiesthreaten-critical-infrastructure.ars. [435] “W32.Stuxnet Dossier“, Nicolas Falliere, Liam Murchu and Eric Chien, Symantec Corporation, September 2010, http://www.symantec.com/[436] content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf.

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References 113 [419] “Signed Malware Used Valid Realtek Certificate”, Lucian Constantin, 16 July 2010, http://news.softpedia.com/news/Signed-Malware-Used-ValidRealtek-Certificate-147942.shtml. [420] “VeriSign working to mitigate Stuxnet digital signature theft”, Steve Ragan, 21 July 2010, http://www.thetechherald.com/article.php/201029/5921/VeriSignworking-to-mitigate-Stuxnet-digital-signature-theft. [421] “‘Want My Autograph?’: The Use and Abuse of Digital Signatures by Malware”, Mike Wood, presented at the 2010 Virus Bulletin Conference, October 2010, http://www.sophos.com/security/technicalpapers/digital_signature_abuse.pdf. [422] “AVG Community Powered Threat Report — Q2 2011”, 21 June 2011, http://www.avg.com/filedir/press/AVG_Community_Powered_Threat_Report_Q2_2011.pdf

The Autonomous Revolution: Reclaiming the Future We’ve Sold to Machines
by William Davidow and Michael Malone
Published 18 Feb 2020

In 1988, another warning shot was fired when Robert Tappan Morris released the first computer worm into the Internet—an act, he claimed later, that was intended to call attention to the vulnerability of the system and the inadequacy of its security measures.41 A year later, he earned the dubious distinction of being the first person to be indicted under the 1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.42 He was sentenced to three years of probation, community service, and a small fine. Over the subsequent thirty years, the United States has focused a great deal of its energy on building offensive cyber weapons. In 2009, Stuxnet was launched against the Iranian uranium enrichment facility at Natanz. Twenty-seven years after the pipeline explosion in Siberia, cyber experts nevertheless described Stuxnet as the world’s first digital weapon.43 The virus took control of the Natanz centrifuges and caused a thousand of them to self-destruct.44 The NSA has developed tool kits that can be used to engineer cyberattacks.

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“Robert Tappan Morris,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Tappan_Morris (accessed June 27, 2019); and “Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer_Fraud_and_Abuse_Act (accessed June 27, 2019). 43. Kim Zetter, “An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World’s First Digital Weapon,” Wired, November 3, 2014, https://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet/ (accessed June 28, 2019). 44. Gordon Corera, “21st Century Warfare,” BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/guides/zq9jmnb#ztq6nbk (accessed June 28, 2019). 45. Steve Morgan, “Cybercrime Damages $6 Trillion by 2021,” Cybersecurity Ventures, October 16, 2017, https://cybersecurityventures.com/hackerpocalypse-cybercrime-report-2016/ (accessed June 28, 2019). 46.

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Companies from Airbnb and Amazon to Starbucks, Twitter, Visa, and Zillow have been victims of these “denial of service” attacks. Then there are ransomware attacks, in which viruses seize control of computers and encrypt user files unless the user is willing to pay a ransom in a cryptocurrency. In some cases, malware can direct the system to shut down and erase itself, or, as in the case of Stuxnet, speed up until it destroys itself. Cyber weapons can disrupt or shut down power grids and communication, transportation, and financial networks, and bring commercial operations to a standstill. They can and do cause tremendous physical damage as well. Cybersecurity Ventures estimates the cost of cybercrime at $3 trillion in 2015 and projects that it will rise to $6 trillion by 2021.45 To put this number in perspective, that represents about 4 percent of the gross domestic product for the world.46 To date, most of the damage done by cyber criminals/terrorists/warriors has been economic.

Cult of the Dead Cow: How the Original Hacking Supergroup Might Just Save the World
by Joseph Menn
Published 3 Jun 2019

It rarely inducted new members, and when it did, cDc usually picked people already established through other groups, making it a supergroup in the rock-and-roll sense—a band formed of people from other bands. As cDc matured, its members became leaders in changing hacking from a hobby to a profession to a mode of warfare, or really several modes. That warfare has metastasized in the past decade, encompassing the US-led Stuxnet attack on Iran’s nuclear program, Russia’s blackouts of electrical systems in Ukraine, and China’s methodical pillaging of Western trade secrets. The unstoppable, semiautomated propaganda that helped propel the 2016 election of Donald Trump was just the latest, most complicated, and most effective twist.

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But they faced accusations of bias because their detection systems were only deployed in some countries, they had US government contracts, or they had marketing reasons for publishing what they did. Moscow-based Kaspersky Lab, likewise, became the best in the world at ferreting out US-sponsored cyberespionage campaigns, beginning with Stuxnet, the pathbreaking weapon that defanged Iranian nuclear centrifuges before its exposure in 2010 opened everyone’s eyes to the new era of cyberwarfare. But Kaspersky found very little new to say about Russian malware. Citizen Lab could call things as it saw them. And it extended its reach by working with researchers inside other companies, including Google, who would have found it hard to publish under the name of their principal employer.

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Inside, they had seen that the software was used to search for classified US documents, and they had warned the Americans. The consensus in the intelligence agencies was that the Russians had obtained at least some of the Shadow Brokers information in that manner. The disclosures badly hurt Kaspersky, which had enjoyed a remarkable run publicly exposing high-end US malware, starting with the Stuxnet virus, which had knocked out Iranian nuclear centrifuges. Kaspersky admitted it had taken some secret files from a US government employee, though it claimed that it had deleted them. The US banned it from federal government use. The Russians had the motive to steal US hacking tools, the means to do it, and the opportunity.

Demystifying Smart Cities
by Anders Lisdorf

FISMA defines it thus: “Guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity....” A loss of integrity is the unauthorized modification or destruction of information. In 2010 hackers used the Stuxnet worm to infiltrate Iran’s nuclear program, more specifically the centrifuges made for creating nuclear material. Stuxnet works by faking signals to control the centrifuges. By compromising the integrity of the data from sensors the centrifuges malfunctioned. Availability refers to the extent to which data can be accessed and not just suddenly disappear.

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Strogatz, Nature 393, 440–442 1998 https://web.archive.org/web/20140803231327/http://www.nyc.gov/html/doitt/downloads/pdf/payphone_rfi.pdf (October 2, 2019) the original RFI for what turned out to be LinkNYC from 2012 www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/923-14/de-blasio-administration-winner-competition-replace-payphones-five-borough (October 2, 2019) press release of the winner of the LinkNYC bid www.citylab.com/life/2015/04/de-blasios-vision-for-new-york-broadband-for-all-by-2025/391092/ (October 2, 2019) an article about Mayor of New York Bill De Blasio’s plan for broadband for all in New York by 2025 www1.nyc.gov/site/doitt/agencies/nycwin.page (October 2, 2019) a description of The New York City Wireless Network, known as NYCWiN www.thethingsnetwork.org (October 5, 2019) a project dedicated to building LoRaWAN solutions Chapter 3 https://dyn.com/blog/dyn-analysis-summary-of-friday-october-21-attack/ (October 2, 2019) the official analysis of the Dyn attack on October 21 https://citiesfordigitalrights.org (October 2, 2019) the official site for the Cities for Digital Rights coalition www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/28/fitness-tracking-app-gives-away-location-of-secret-us-army-bases (October 2, 2019) an article about the Strava fitness tracking incident involving a US Army base https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stuxnet (October 2, 2019) a description from Wikipedia of the Stuxnet worm https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.199.pdf (October 2, 2019) the official FIPS 199 standard for categorization of information and information systems https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Information_Security_Management_Act_of_2002 (October 2, 2019) a description of the FISMA framework from Wikipedia https://arrayofthings.github.io/ (October 2, 2019) the official site of the Array of Things project http://maps.nyc.gov/snow/# (October 2, 2019) the PlowNYC site where New Yorkers can track the progress of snow plows during wintertime Chapter 4 https://scijinks.gov/air-quality/ www.epa.gov/pm-pollution/particulate-matter-pm-basics (October 2, 2019) definition of what particulate matter is https://brightplanet.com/2013/06/twitter-firehose-vs-twitter-api-whats-the-difference-and-why-should-you-care/ (October 2, 2019) a description of how the Twitter Firehose works www.waze.com/ccp (October 2, 2019) official site of the Twitter Connected Citizens Program The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing , Peter M.

The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies
by Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee
Published 20 Jan 2014

Such a cascade, which sociologist Charles Perrow labeled a ‘system accident’ or ‘normal accident,’ characterized the 1979 meltdown of the Three Mile Island nuclear plant, the August 2003 electrical blackout that affected forty-five million people throughout the U.S. Northeast, and many other incidents.1 Second, complex, tightly coupled systems make tempting targets for spies, criminals, and those who seek to wreak havoc. A recent example here is the Stuxnet computer worm, which may have been incubated in government labs. In 2010 Stuxnet hobbled at least one Iranian nuclear facility by perverting the control systems of its Siemens industrial equipment. The worm entered its target sites and spread through them by jumping harmlessly from PC to PC; when it spotted an opportunity, it crossed over to the Siemens machines and did its damage there.2 Until recently, our species did not have the ability to destroy itself.

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Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); Interim Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout (New York Independent System Operator, January 8, 2004), http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/NYISO.blackout.report.8.Jan.04.pdf. 2. Steven Cherry, “How Stuxnet Is Rewriting the Cyberterrorism Playbook,” IEEE Spectrum podcast, October 13, 2010, http://spectrum.ieee.org/podcast/telecom/security/how-stuxnet-is-rewriting-the-cyberterrorism-playbook. 3. Bill Joy, “Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us,” Wired, April 2000, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.04/joy_pr.html. 4. The costs of gene sequencing are dropping even more quickly than those of computing.

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Schreyer, Peter Schumpeter, Joseph science: effect of digitization on government support of prizes in rapid progress in science fiction robots in SCIgen Sears Second Industrial Revolution second machine age: career opportunities in characteristics of complementary innovations in economic data relevant to intangible assets of interventions for key advances of long-term recommendations for mental power boosted by metrics of second machine age (continued) policy recommendations for Power Law distributions in reality of values of see also digitization SecondMachineAge.com self-organizing learning environments (SOLEs) semiconductors Sen, Amartya senses, human sensorimotor skills sensors, digital Shabtai, Ehud Shakespeare, William Shannon, Claude Shapiro, Carl Shinar, Amir Siciliano, Francis SIGGRAPH conference Silicon Valley Simon, Herbert Simon, Julian Sims, Peter Singapore: education system in Electronic Road Pricing System in singularity Singularity Is Near, The (Kurzweil) Siri Siu, Henry Sixteenth Amendment Skype smartphone applications smartphones Smith, Adam Smith, Michael social media Social Progress Index Social Security Socrates software open source solar flares Solow, Robert Sony PlayStation 3 South Korea, education system in Soviet Union speech recognition Spence, Michael Spiegel, Eric Spotify Sprague, Shawn spread bounty vs. in education productivity consequences of in wages see also inequality SRI International standardized testing Star Trek Startup America Partnership steam engine Stern, Scott Stiglitz, Joseph Stiroh, Kevin Stuxnet Summers, Lawrence superstars social acceptability of taxation of see also “winner-take-all” markets Sweden, income inequality in Systrom, Kevin Syverson, Chad Tabarrok, Alex Taipale, Kim Taiwan, automation in Target TaskRabbit taxes consumption on economic rents negative income payroll Pigovian value-added Tea Party technological progress adjusting to combinatorial nature of digitization in economic theories about employment implications of exponential nature of; see also innovation; Moore’s Law future of halting of interventions suggested for side effects of technology: in developing world history of major advances in see also digitization; general purpose technologies (GPTs) Teilhard de Chardin, Pierre teraflop Terenzini, Patrick Thackeray, William Makepeace Theory of Economic Development, The (Schumpeter) Thrun, Sebastian Time Tinbergen, Jan Tobin, James Tolkien, J.

Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World
by Ian Bremmer
Published 30 Apr 2012

Yet these new players balk at assuming the risks and burdens that come with a share of global leadership, focusing instead on managing each delicate stage of their countries’ economic development. This reluctance is at the heart of the G-Zero. NUCLEAR DIFFUSION Few challenges illustrate the dangers of a world without leadership more vividly than the proliferation of the world’s most dangerous weapons. In 2009, a previously unknown computer worm known as Stuxnet suddenly infected tens of thousands of computers in more than 150 countries. Though some experts called it the most sophisticated malicious computer program ever seen, this weapon did not draw much media attention until experts discovered that among its many features is an ability to send nuclear centrifuges spinning out of control.38 As a result, many analysts now believe it was designed as part of a joint U.S.

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International politics and cybersecurity have begun to collide. Threats to stand-alone computer networks have existed for years, but a sophisticated 2007 attack on Estonia’s parliament, banks, ministries, newspapers, and broadcasters, suspected to have come from inside Russia, and the previously mentioned Stuxnet worm attack on Iran’s nuclear program have underscored the reality that offensive cybercapabilities are outpacing the construction of defenses. As infrastructure networks like power grids are digitized—i.e., made “smart”—and the number of entry points expands exponentially, entire systems will become more susceptible to cyberattack.

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PwC, 2020: http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/business/chinese-economy-to-be-worlds-largest-by-2020/story-e6frez7r-1225822120372. IMF, 2016: http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php. 38. William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “Worm Was Perfect for Sabotaging Centrifuges,” New York Times, November 18, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/19/world/middleeast/19stuxnet.html?sq=stuxnet&st=cse&scp=2&pagewanted=print. 39. Neil MacFarquhar, “189 Nations Reaffirm Goal of Ban on Nuclear Weapons,” New York Times, May 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/29/world/middleeast/29nuke.html. 40. While the IAEA acknowledged “concern about the Israeli nuclear capabilities” for the first time in 2010, it stopped short of confirming Israel’s widely known nuclear status.

Mossad: The Greatest Missions of the Israeli Secret Service
by Michael Bar-Zohar and Nissim Mishal
Published 1 Jan 2010

Rejected Aid for Israeli Raid on Iranian Nuclear Site,” David Sanger, New York Times, January 10, 2009 “An Israeli Preventive Attack on Iran’s Nuclear Sites: Implications for the U.S.,” James Philips, Heritage Foundation, Heritage.org, January 15, 2010 “Facing Iran: Lessons Learned Since Iraq’s 1991 Missile Attack on Israel,” Moshe Arens, The Jerusalem Center for Public and State Matters, March 8, 2010 Segev, Shmuel, The Iranian Triangle, the Secret Relationship Between Israel, Iran, and USA, Maariv, 1981 (H) STUXNET AND ESPIONAGE “Computer Virus in Iran Actually Targeted Larger Nuclear Facility,” Yossi Melman, Haaretz, September 28, 2010 (H) “The Meaning of Stuxnet,” Economist, October 2, 2010 “Israel May or May Not Have Been Behind the Stuxnet ‘Worm’ Attack on Iran—and It Doesn’t Matter Whether It Was,” Yossi Melman, Tablet, October 5, 2010 “Iran Executes 2 Men, Saying One Was Spy for Israel,” William Yong, New York Times, December 28, 2010 “Iranian Citizen Hanged for Spying for Israel,” Yossi Melman, Haaretz, December 29, 2010 (H) “Iran: ‘We Hanged an Israeli Spy’—Ali Akbar Siadat Was Hanged for Spying for Israel, Which Paid Him US$60,000,” Smadar Perry, Yedioth Ahronoth, December 29, 2010 (H) “Tehran Demands UN Intervention, Accuses Israel of Killing Its Minister of Defense (Ali Riza Askari),” Yossi Melman, Haaretz, January 2, 2011(H) “Iran to the UN: Find Out What Happened to the Missing General,” YNET, December 31, 2010 (H) “Outgoing Mossad Head Delivers Farewell Words,” Jpost.com.staff, Jerusalem Post, January 7, 2011 “Netanyahu Bids Farewell to Mossad Chief,” Gil Ronen, Arutz Sheva, Israel National News.

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Because of planes crashing, laboratories set on fire, explosions in the missile and nuclear installations, defection of senior officials, deaths of top scientists, revolts and upheaval among the minorities’ groups—all those events and phenomena that Iran (correctly and incorrectly) attributed to Dagan’s people? Or was it because of Dagan’s last “major coup,” according to the European press? In the summer of 2010, thousands of computers controlling the Iranian nuclear project were infected with the perfidious Stuxnet virus. Labeled one of the most sophisticated in the world, Stuxnet struck computers controlling the Natanz centrifuges and wreaked havoc. Its complexity left no doubt that it was the product of a large team of experts and considerable funds. One of the virus’s distinctive features was that it could be targeted to a specific system, causing no harm to others en route.

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Once in the Iranian system, it could modify the speed of rotation of a centrifuge, making its product useless, without anyone being aware of it. Observers spoke of two countries as having the ability to carry out such cyber-attack: the United States and Israel. President Ahmadinejad tried to downplay the effect Stuxnet had had, and declared that Iran had the situation well in hand. The truth, though, was that at the beginning of 2011, about half of Iran’s centrifuges were immobilized. Dagan’s people allegedly delayed Iran’s nuclear weapons program with their incessant attacks on so many fronts over so many years: diplomatic pressure and sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council; counter-proliferation—keeping the Iranians from getting the materials needed to produce a bomb; economical warfare—prohibiting the banks in the free world from doing business with Iran; regime change, by supporting and fomenting political unrest and by fanning the ethnic divisions inside Iran, where Kurds, Azeris, Beloshis, Arabs, and Turkmen constitute 50 percent of the population; and most immediately, covert measures, black and special operations against the Iranian project.

The Future of War
by Lawrence Freedman
Published 9 Oct 2017

Given the resources allocated to this issue it could be assumed that the Americans were well able to interfere with the systems of others. Small but significant acts illustrated the possibilities. First Iraqi and then Serb air defences were degraded by messing with their software. The Israelis did something similar with Syrian air defences when they took out a nuclear reactor under construction in 2007. The Stuxnet virus, probably a joint US-Israeli project, was designed to set back uranium enrichment in Iran by disabling centrifuges.21 This had some effect but also showed how hard it was to stop these attacks spreading away from the original target. The virus was noticed when non-Iranian systems were hit. Every time national systems were tested to see how well they could defend against interference from others, they were found to be wanting, and for all types of networks, malevolent hacking became regular.

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‘The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945–1993’. American Political Science Review 89.3 (1995): 681–690. Liddell Hart, Basil. Paris or the Future of War. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1925. . Europe in Arms. London: Faber & Faber, 1937. . The Revolution in Warfare. London: Faber, 1946. Lindsay, Jon R., ‘Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare’. Security Studies 22.3 (2013). Lischer, S. K. ‘Security and displacement in Iraq: responding to the forced migration crisis’. International Security 33.2 (2008): 95–119. Livermore, Thomas. Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America, 1861–65. Boston: Houghton Mifflin & Co., 1900.

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Strategic Studies Institute: US Army War College, 2009. Zartman, William. Collapsed States: The disintegration and restoration of legitimate authority. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995. Zedong, Mao. On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000. Zetter, Kim. Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World’s First Digital Weapon. New York: Crown, 2014. Zimmerman, Warren. Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its Destroyers. New York: Times Books, 1996. Zwierzchowski, Jan, and Ewa Tabeau. ‘The 1992–95 War in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Census-based Multiple System Estimation of Casualties’ Undercount’.

New Dark Age: Technology and the End of the Future
by James Bridle
Published 18 Jun 2018

When researchers dug into Mirai, they discovered it targets poorly secured internet-connected devices – from security cameras to digital video recorders – and turns them into an army of bots capable of disrupting huge networks. In just a few weeks, Mirai infected half a million devices, and it needed just 10 per cent of that capacity to cripple major networks for hours.41 Mirai, in fact, looks like nothing so much as Stuxnet, another virus discovered within the industrial control systems of hydroelectric plants and factory assembly lines in 2010. Stuxnet was a military-grade cyberweapon; when dissected, it was found to be aimed specifically at Siemens centrifuges, and designed to go off when it encountered a facility that possessed a particular number of such machines. That number corresponded with one particular facility: the Natanz Nuclear Facility in Iran, the mainstay of the country’s uranium enrichment programme.

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When activated, the programme would quietly degrade crucial components of the centrifuges, causing them to break down and disrupt the Iranian enrichment programme.42 The attack was apparently partially successful, but the effect on other infected facilities is unknown. To this day, despite obvious suspicions, nobody knows where Stuxnet came from, or who made it. Nobody knows for certain who developed Mirai either, or where its next iteration might come from, but it might be there, right now, breeding in the CCTV camera in your office, or the Wi-Fi-enabled kettle in the corner of your kitchen. Or perhaps the crash will look like a string of blockbuster movies pandering to right-wing conspiracies and survivalist fantasies, from quasi-fascist superheroes (Captain America and the Batman series) to justifications of torture and assassination (Zero Dark Thirty, American Sniper).

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(von Neumann), 28 Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Piketty), 112 carbon dioxide, 75 Catch-22 (Heller), 187–8 ‘cautious regulator’ theory, 94–5 CCTV, 181–2 centaur chess, 159 Chanarin, Oliver, 143 chaotic storage, 115–6 Chargaff, Erwin, 96–7 Charlie Hebdo attacks, 212 chemtrails, 192–5, 206–8, 214 children’s television, 216–7 children’s YouTube, 219, 238 Cirrus homogenitus, 196, 197 Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), 161–2 clear-air turbulence, 68 climate carbon dioxide, 75 global warming, 73, 193, 214 permafrost, 47–9, 56–7 seed banks, 52–6 turbulence, 65–9 climate change patterns disrupted by, 72–3 resilience against, 59 climate crisis, 56 Clinton, Bill, 243 Clinton, Hillary, 207, 232–3 cloning, 86–8 closed-circuit television, 181–2 cloud(s), 6–7, 8, 17, 195–6 ‘The Cloud Begins with Coal-Big Data, Big Networks, Big Infrastructure, and Big Power’ report, 64 ‘The Cloud of Unknowing,’ 9 cloudy thinking, 9 coal deposits, discovery of, 52 coastal installations, 62 Cocks, Clifford, 167 code/spaces, 37–9 code words, 175 cognition about, 135–6 artificial intelligence (AI), 139 facial recognition, 141 image recognition, 139–40 machine translation, 147 ‘predictive policing’ systems, 144–6 collectivism, totalitarianism vs., 139 Commission on Government Secrecy, 169 complex systems about, 2–3 aggregation of, 40 high-frequency trading, 14, 106–7, 108, 122, 124 complicity computational logic, 184–5 Freedom of Information, 161–2, 165, 192 global mass surveillance, 179–80 Glomar response, 165, 186 public key cryptography, 167–8 computation calculating machines, 27 Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer (ENIAC), 27, 27–30, 33 flight trackers, 35–6, 36 IBM Selective Sequence Electronic Calculator (SSEC), 30, 30–2, 31, 146 opaqueness of, 40 computational logic, 184–5 computational thinking about, 4 evolution of, 248 importance of, 44–5 Concorde, 69, 70, 71 conspiracy chemtrails, 192–5, 206–8, 214 conspiracy theories, 195, 198–9, 205 contrails, 196–8, 197, 214 global warming, 73, 193, 214 9/11 terrorist attacks, 203–4, 206 ‘Conspiracy as Governance’ (Assange), 183 contrails, 196–8, 197, 214 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference (COP15), 199 Cowen, Deborah, 132 Credit Suisse, 109 cryptocurrency, 63 Cumulus homogenitus, 195–6 cyborg chess, 159 D Dabiq (online magazine), 212 Dallaire, Roméo, 243 darkness, 11–2 “Darkness” (poem), 201–2 dark pools, 108–9 DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), 33 Darwin, Charles, 78 data abundance of, 83–4, 131 big, 84 importance of, 245–6 realistic accounting of, 247 thirst for, 246 data dredging, 90–1 Debord, Guy, 103 DEC (Digital Equipment Corporation), 33 Decyben SAS, 110 Deep Blue, 148–9, 157–60 DeepDream, 153, 154–5 DeepFace software, 140 defeat devices, 120 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), 33 de Solla Price, Derek, 91–2, 93 Diffie-Hellman key exchange, 167 digital culture, 64–5 Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC), 33 digital networks, mapping, 104 digitisation, 108 ‘Discussion of the Possibility of Weather Control’ lecture, 26 diurnal temperature range (DTR), 204 DNA sequencing, 93 D-Notices, 179 domain name system, 79 doomsday vault, 52–3 Dow Jones Industrial Average, 121–2 drones, 161–2 drug discovery/research, 94–5 DTR (diurnal temperature range), 204 Duffy, Carol Ann, 201 Dunne, Carey, 194–5 E Elberling, Bo, 57 electromagnetic networks, 104 Electronic Computer Project, 27 Electronic Frontier Foundation, 177 Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer (ENIAC), 27, 27–30, 33 Elements of Chemistry (Lavoisier), 208–9 Elkins, Caroline, 183–4 Ellis, James, 167 encoded biases, 142 ‘End of Theory’ (Anderson), 83–4, 146 Engelbart, Douglas, 79 ENIAC (Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer), 27, 27–30, 33 Enlightenment, 10 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 119–20 EPA (Environmental Protection Agency), 119–20 Epagogix, 130 epidemic type aftershock sequence (ETAS) model, 145–6 Epimetheus, 132–4 Equinix LD4, 104 Eroom’s law, 86, 93–6 ETAS (epidemic type aftershock sequence) model, 145–6 Euronext Data Center, 104, 105, 106 Evangelismos Hospital, 130–1 evolution, theory of, 78 exploitation, 229–30 Eyjafjallajökull, eruption of, 200–1, 202 F Facebook, 39–40, 156–7 facial recognition, 141 Fairchild Semiconductor, 80 Farage, Nigel, 194 Fat Man bomb, 25 Fermi, Enrico, 250 Ferranti Mark I, 78 fiat anima, 19–20 fiat lux, 19–20 Finger Family, 221–2, 224, 227 ‘Five Eyes,’ 174 Flash Boys (Lewis), 111–2 flash crash, 121–2, 130–1 FlightRadar24, 36, 189, 191 flight trackers, 35–6, 36 ‘Fourteen Eyes,’ 174 Fowler, R.H., 45 Frankenstein (Shelley), 201 fraud, 86–8, 91 Freedom of Information, 161–2, 165, 192 Friends’ Ambulance Unit, 20 Fuller, Buckminster, 71 Futurama exhibit, 30–1 ‘Future Uses of High Speed Computing in Meteorology’ lecture, 26 G Gail, William B., 72–3 Galton, Francis, 140 game developers, 130 Gates’s law, 83 GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters), 167, 174, 176–9, 189 genocide, 243 ghost cars (Uber), 118–9 G-INFO, 190 global mass surveillance, 179–80 Global Positioning System (GPS), 36–7, 42–3 Global Seed Vault, 54 global warming, 73, 193, 214 Glomar response, 165, 186 Godard, Jean-Luc, 143 Google, 84, 139, 230, 242 Google Alerts, 190 Google Brain project, 139, 148, 149, 156 Google Earth, 35–6 Google Home, 128–9 Google Maps, 177 Google Translate, 147–8, 156 Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), 167, 174, 176–9, 189 GPS (Global Positioning System), 36–7, 42–3 Graves, Robert, 159 Gravity’s Rainbow (Pynchon), 128 gray zone, 212–4 Great Nōbi Earthquake, 145 Greenland, 57–8 Green Revolution, 53 Greyball programme, 119, 120 guardianship, 251–2 H Hankins, Thomas, 102 Haraway, Donna, 12 Harvard Mark I machine, 30 Hayek, Friedrich, 156–7 The Road to Serfdom, 139 The Sensory Order: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Theoretical Psychology, 138–9 HealthyFoodHouse.com (website), 231–2 Heller, Joseph Catch-22, 187–8 Hermes, 134 Hersh, Seymour, 164 Hewlett-Packard, 143 hidden technological processes, 120 high-frequency trading, 14, 106–7, 108, 122, 124 high-throughput screening (HTS), 95–6 Hillingdon Hospital, 110–1, 111 Hippo programme, 32 Hofstadter, Douglas, 205–6 Hola Massacre, 170 homogenitus, 195, 196 Horn, Roni, 50, 201 How-Old.net facial recognition programme, 141 ‘How the World Wide Web Just Happened’ lecture, 78 HTS (high-throughput screening), 95–6 Hughes, Howard, 163 Hughes Glomar Explorer, 163–5 human genome project, 93 Human Interference Task Force, 251 human violence, 202 Humby, Clive, 245, 246 Hwang Woo-suk, 86–8 hyperobjects, 73, 75, 76, 194 hypertext, 79 I IBM Selective Sequence Electronic Calculator (SSEC), 30, 30–2, 31, 146 ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organisation), 68 ICARDA (International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas), 53–4, 55 ICT, 60–2 image recognition, 139–40 Infinite Fun Space, 149–50, 156 information networks, 62 information superhighway, 10 Infowars (Jones), 207 In Place of Fear (Bevan), 110 Institute of the Aeronautical Sciences, 26 integrated circuits, 79, 80 Intel, 80 International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA), 53–4, 55 International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), 68 International Cloud Atlas, 195 Internet Research Agency, 235, 237 Inuit Knowledge and Climate Change, 199 The Invisibles (Morrison), 196–7 Isaksen, Ketil, 54 ISIL, 212–3 J Jameson, Fredric, 205 Jelinek, Frederick, 146–7 Jones, Alex Infowars, 207 Joshi, Manoj, 68–9 journalism, automated, 123–4 just-in-time manufacturing, 117 K K-129, 162–3 Karma Police operation, 175 Kasparov, Garry, 148–9, 157–8 Keeling Curve, 74, 74 Kennedy, John F., 169–70 Kinder Eggs, 215–6 Kiva robots, 114 Klein, Mark, 176–7 Kodak, 143 Krakatoa, eruption of, 202 Kunuk, Zacharias, 199, 200 Kuznets curve, 113 L Large Hadron Collider, 93 Lavoisier, Antoine, 78 Elements of Chemistry, 208–9 Lawson, Robert, 175–6 LD4, 104, 105 Leave Campaign, 194 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 78 Levy, David, 158, 159 Lewis, Michael Flash Boys, 111–2 LifeSphere, 125 literacy in systems, 3–4 Lockheed Ocean Systems, 163 Logan, Walt (pseudonym), 165 Lombroso, Cesare, 140 London Stock Exchange, 110–1 Lovecraft, H.P., 11, 249 ‘low-hanging fruit,’ 93–4 M Macedonia, 233–4 machine learning algorithms, 222 machine thought, 146 machine translation, 147 magnetism, 77 Malaysian Airlines, 66 manganese noodles, 163–4 Manhattan Project, 24–30, 248 Mara, Jane Muthoni, 170 Mark I Perceptron, 136–8, 137 Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, 128–9 Matthews, James Tilly, 208–10, 209 Mauro, Ian, 199 McCarthy, Joe, 205 McGovern, Thomas, 57–8 McKay Brothers, 107, 110 memex, 24 Mercer, Robert, 236 Merkel, Angela, 174 metalanguage, 3, 5 middens, 56 migrated archive, 170–1 Minds, 150 miniaturisation principle, 81 Mirai, 129 mobile phones, 126 The Modern Prometheus (Shelley), 201 monoculture, 55–6 Moore, Gordon, 80, 80, 83 Moore’s law, 80–3, 92–4 Mordvintsev, Alexander, 154 Morgellons, 211, 214 Morrison, Grant The Invisibles, 196–7 Morton, Timothy, 73, 194 Mount Tambora, eruption of, 201 Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, 169 Munch, Edvard The Scream, 202 Mutua, Ndiku, 170 N NarusInsight, 177 NASA Ames Advanced Concepts Flight Simulator, 42 Natanz Nuclear Facility, 129 National Centre for Atmospheric Science, 68–9 National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, 243 National Health Service (NHS), 110 National Mining Association, 64 National Reconnaissance Office, 168, 243 National Security Agency (NSA), 167, 174, 177–8, 183, 242–3, 249–50 National Security Strategy, 59 natural gas, 48 neoliberalism, 138–9 network, 5, 9 networks, 249 Newton, Isaac, 78 NewYorkTimesPolitics.com, 221 New York World’s Fair, 30–1 NHS (National Health Service), 110 9/11 terrorist attacks, 203–4, 206 ‘Nine Eyes,’ 174 1984 (Orwell), 242 NORAD (North American Air Defense Command), 33 North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), 33 ‘The Nor’ project, 104 Not Aviation, 190–1 NSA (National Security Agency), 167, 174, 177–8, 183, 242–3, 249–50 nuclear fusion, 97–8, 100 nuclear warfare, 28 Numerical Prediction (Richardson), 45 Nyingi, Wambugu Wa, 170 Nzili, Paulo Muoka, 170 O Obama, Barack, 180, 206, 231 Official Secrets Act, 189 Omori, Fusakichi, 145 Omori’s Law, 145 Operation Castle, 97 Operation Legacy, 171–2 Optic Nerve programme, 174 Optometrist Algorithm, 99–101, 160 O’Reilly, James, 185–6 Orwell, George 1984, 242 ‘Outline of Weather Proposal’ (Zworykin), 25–6 P Paglen, Trevor, 144 ‘paranoid style,’ 205–6 Patriot Act, 178 Penrose, Roger, 20 Perceptron, 136–8, 137 permafrost, 47–9, 56–7 p-hacking, 89–91 Phillippi, Harriet Ann, 165 photophone, 19–20 Pichai, Sundar, 139 Piketty, Thomas Capital in the Twenty-First Century, 112 Pincher, Chapman, 175–6 Pitt, William, 208 Plague-Cloud, 195, 202 Poitras, Laura, 175 Polaroid, 143 ‘predictive policing’ systems, 144–6 PredPol software, 144, 146 Priestley, Joseph, 78, 208, 209 prion diseases, 50, 50–1 PRISM operation, 173 product spam, 125–6 Project Echelon, 190 Prometheus, 132–4, 198 psychogeography, 103 public key cryptography, 167–8 pure language, 156 Putin, Vladimir, 235 Pynchon, Thomas Gravity’s Rainbow, 128 Q Qajaa, 56, 57 quality control failure of, 92–3 in science, 91 Quidsi, 113–4 R racial profiling, 143–4 racism, 143–4 ‘radiation cats,’ 251 raw computing, 82–3 Reagan, Ronald, 36–7 Reed, Harry, 29 refractive index of the atmosphere, 62 Regin malware, 175 replicability, 88–9 Reproducibility Project, 89 resistance, modes of, 120 Reuter, Paul, 107 Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, 181 Richardson, Lewis Fry, 20–1, 29, 68 Numerical Prediction, 45 Weather Prediction by Numerical Process, 21–3 Richardson number, 68 The Road to Serfdom (Hayek), 139 Robinson, Kim Stanley Aurora, 128 robots, workers vs., 116 ‘Rogeting,’ 88 Romney, Mitt, 206–7 Rosenblatt, Frank, 137 Roy, Arundhati, 250 Royal Aircraft Establishment, 188–9 Ruskin, John, 17–20, 195, 202 Rwanda, 243, 244, 245 S Sabetta, 48 SABRE (Semi-Automated Business Research Environment), 35, 38 SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment), 33, 34, 35 Samsung, 127 Scheele, Carl Wilhelm, 78 Schmidt, Eric, 241–5 The Scream (Munch), 202 Sedol, Lee, 149, 157–8 seed banks, 52–6 Seed Vault, 55 seismic sensors, 48 self-excitation, 145 ‘semantic analyser,’ 177 Semi-Automated Business Research Environment (SABRE), 35, 38 Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE), 33, 34, 35 semiconductors, 82 The Sensory Order: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Theoretical Psychology (Hayek), 138–9 Shelley, Mary Frankenstein, 201 The Modern Prometheus, 201 SIGINT Seniors Europe, 174 simulation, conflating approximation with, 34–5 Singapore Exchange, 122–3 smart products, 127–8, 131 Smith, Robert Elliott, 152 smoking gun, 183–4, 186 Snowden, Edward, 173–5, 178 software about, 82–3 AlphaGo, 149, 156–8 Assistant, 152 AutoAwesome, 152 DeepFace, 140 Greyball programme, 119, 120 Hippo programme, 32 How-Old.net facial recognition programme, 141 Optic Nerve programme, 174 PredPol, 144, 146 Translate, 146 Solnit, Rebecca, 11–2 solutionism, 4 space telescopes, 168–9 speed of light, 107 Spread Networks, 107 SSEC (IBM Selective Sequence Electronic Calculator), 30, 30–2, 31, 146 Stapel, Diederik, 87–8 Stapledon, Olaf, 20 steam engines, 77 Stellar Wind, 176 Stewart, Elizabeth ‘Betsy,’ 30–1, 31 Steyerl, Hito, 126 stock exchanges, 108 ‘The Storm-Cloud of the Nineteenth Century’ lecture series, 17–9 Stratus homogenitus, 195–6 studios, 130 Stuxnet, 129–30 surveillance about, 243–4 complicity in, 185 computational excesses of, 180–1 devices for, 104 Svalbard archipelago, 51–2, 54 Svalbard Global Seed Vault, 52–3 Svalbard Treaty (1920), 52 Swiss National Bank, 123 Syed, Omar, 158–9 systemic literacy, 5–6 T Taimyr Peninsula, 47–8 Targeted Individuals, 210–1 The Task of the Translator (Benjamin), 147, 155–6 TCP (Transmission Control Protocol), 79 technology acceleration of, 2 complex, 2–3 opacity of, 119 Teletubbies, 217 television, children’s, 216–7 Tesco Clubcard, 245 thalidomide, 95 Thatcher, Margaret, 177 theory of evolution, 78 thermal power plants, 196 Three Guineas (Woolf), 12 Three Laws of Robotics (Asimov), 157 Tillmans, Wolfgang, 71 tools, 13–4 To Photograph the Details of a Dark Horse in Low Light exhibition, 143 totalitarianism, collectivism vs., 139 Toy Freaks, 225–6 transistors, 79, 80 Translate software, 146 translation algorithms, 84 Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), 79 Tri Alpha Energy, 98–101 Trinity test, 25 trolling, 231 Trump, Donald, 169–70, 194–5, 206, 207, 236 trust, science and, 91 trusted source, 220 Tuktoyaktuk Peninsula, 49 turbulence, 65–9 tyranny of techne, 132 U Uber, 117–9, 127 UberEats app, 120–1 unboxing videos, 216, 219 United Airlines, 66–7 Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, Dragnet-collection and Online Monitoring Act (USA FREEDOM Act), 178 USA FREEDOM Act (2015), 178 US Drug Efficacy Amendment (1962), 95 V van Helden, Albert, 102 Veles, objectification of, 235 Verizon, 173 VHF omnidirectional radio range (VOR) installations, 104 Vigilant Telecom, 110–1 Volkswagen, 119–20 von Neumann, John about, 25 ‘Can We Survive Technology?

Strategy Strikes Back: How Star Wars Explains Modern Military Conflict
by Max Brooks , John Amble , M. L. Cavanaugh and Jaym Gates
Published 14 May 2018

Operation Olympic Games is the name widely used by the media to refer to the operation that launched the first serious state-versus-state offensive cyberattack.4 It was the advent of a new way of warfare. The operation’s goal was to set back the Iranian nuclear-enrichment program. The weapon, the Stuxnet computer virus, was designed not only to damage the centrifuges Iran used in its enrichment efforts but also to hide from the centrifuge operators that there was anything amiss.5 The worm virus was introduced into the closed networks through the laptops and personal electronic devices of civilian scientists working on the program.

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The employment of this new weapon was, based on the assessed aim, successful; however, the unintended consequence was that this new weapon was now also in an adversary’s hands (and due to a bug in the virus’s code that let it spread beyond the enrichment facility, in the hands of the wider public as well). In short, the target of the operation, or another potential adversary, could reverse engineer the weapon, strengthen their defenses, or even use it for their own ends. The parallel between the Death Star and the Stuxnet virus is not technological; rather, it is in the failure to identify the consequences of using the weapon in the first place. The destruction of the Death Star after its use against Alderaan was not simply a matter of the Rebels destroying a key weapon system. It was an example of Rebels removing the means with which the Empire intended to implement its new strategy of deterrence.

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It was an example of Rebels removing the means with which the Empire intended to implement its new strategy of deterrence. The Rebel forces could, essentially, respond in kind to the destruction of Alderaan and score both a moral victory by avenging innocent lives lost and a political one by undermining the Empire’s new strategy. The employment of Stuxnet opened a discussion of the moral ambiguity of cyberweapons and endowed the target with the potential ability to re-create its capabilities, a possibility somewhat akin to how the Rebel destruction of the Death Star mirrored the destruction of Alderaan, on a smaller scale.6 In each case, a new weapon’s user had achieved tactical and operational goals, but with a strategy that did not account for second- and third-order effects.

The Seventh Sense: Power, Fortune, and Survival in the Age of Networks
by Joshua Cooper Ramo
Published 16 May 2016

Complex Software Systems,” ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review—Proceedings of the 2006 EuroSys Conference 40, no. 4 (October 2006): 295 “We are not experts”: Stephen Cobb and Andrew Lee, “Malware Is Called Malicious for a Reason: The Risks of Weaponizing Code,” in 6th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Proceedings 2014, ed. Pascal Brangetto, Markus Maybaum, and Jan Stinissen (Tallinn, Estonia: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence Publications, 2014), 71–82. And “Stuxnet: Tsunami of Stupid or Evil Genius?” (June 1, 2012) by Ali-Reza Anghaie at http://infosecisland.com/blogview/21507-Stuxnet-Tsunami-of-Stupid-or-Evil-Genius.html. What makes a city: Colin McFarlane, “The Geographies of Urban Density: Topology, Politics, and the City,” Progress in Human Geography (October 7, 2015): 2. Such a possibility: Lindner and Gaycken, “Back to Basics,” 58.

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These successors to the warez dudes work for cybercriminal billionaires, for intelligence agencies, and even (often) just for themselves. They help find and deploy the sorts of really deep system exploits that enable brazen cyberthefts of millions of pieces of personal data or attacks such as the Stuxnet virus, which caused thousands of Iranian nuclear centrifuges to vibrate themselves apart. And they do still more: Most of the attacks we’ve talked about so far occur in installed, running boxes. But the companies that make those boxes oversee a whole process of design, testing, manufacturing, and installation.

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Not surprisingly, hackers have mimicked the design of the technology companies they aim to exploit. What was once done by a single warez dude is now often handled with a division of labor, technical specialization, and intensive pre-attack research. Every innovation in “righteous malware” is quickly copied and transformed into attack tools. Criminals examined the clever modular design of Stuxnet, for instance, and years later similar features popped up in attacks against banks, credit card companies, and health insurance firms. “We are not experts in military history, doctrine, or philosophy,” cybersecurity researchers Stephen Cobb and Andrew Lee have written, “so we are unaware of the correct word for the following category of weapons: the ones you deliver to your enemies in re-usable form.”

Spam Nation: The Inside Story of Organized Cybercrime-From Global Epidemic to Your Front Door
by Brian Krebs
Published 18 Nov 2014

That blog post was the first widely read story about a piece of malware of unprecedented sophistication that would become known as “Stuxnet”—a computer worm that experts later discovered was a cyberweapon created by Israeli and U.S. intelligence agencies in a successful bid to delay Iran’s nuclear ambitions. But I filed the Stuxnet post just as I was leaving for a week-long vacation with my wife and mother in York, Maine, and I’d promised to give work a rest. While follow-up reporting on Stuxnet would take dozens of telephone interviews, delving into the scoop that my anti-spam source was handing me could be done without letting my family know I was back on the clock.

The System: Who Owns the Internet, and How It Owns Us
by James Ball
Published 19 Aug 2020

The reality of life online is a complex set of battles between states, businesses, criminal hackers and regular internet users – with companies turning essentially to the online equivalent of mercenaries to defend their systems. One of those online defenders is Symantec, the company who discovered the Stuxnet worm targeted at Iran’s nuclear-enrichment facilities. Symantec is US-based but keeps facilities across the world, and works to protect clients there. Brands like Symantec and Kaspersky are familiar to regular users as our anti-virus software – if we’ve heard of them at all – but behind the scenes these companies work in a much more sophisticated way, operating war rooms to look out for major events and tackle them when they occur.

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v=XEVlyP4_11M 8Optic Nerve was first disclosed in a 2014 Snowden story, reported with Spencer Ackerman: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/27/gchq-nsa-webcam-images-internet-yahoo 9https://www.ft.com/content/93fe2e28-d83c-11e2-b4a4-00144feab7de 10https://www.propublica.org/article/claim-on-attacks-thwarted-by-nsa-spreads-despite-lack-of-evidence 11https://www.npr.org/2018/12/28/677414459/in-chinas-push-for-high-tech-hackers-target-cutting-edge-u-s-firms?t=1550197762515 12To learn more about Stuxnet, and the massive cyber-programme it was part of, the best source is Alex Gibney’s documentary Zero Days. I reported some of its revelations, with independent corroboration, here: https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/jamesball/us-hacked-into-irans-critical-civilian-infrastructure-for-ma 13https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2018-09-13/bureau-wins-case-to-defend-press-freedom-at-the-european-court-of-human-rights 14https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/nsa-surveillance-world-leaders-calls 15As with other stories, they did agree to redact certain specific details (for example, particular models of software, or company names, when specific reasons were given). 16The Guardian version of this story can be viewed here: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security 17This was helpfully tweeted by the BBC’s technology editor, Rory Cellan-Jones: https://twitter.com/ruskin147/status/1096327971131088896/photo/1 18The following account of WannaCry is based on interviews with the Symantec staff in the chapter, my own reporting from the time (https://www.buzzfeed.com/jamesball/heres-why-its-unlikely-the-nhs-was-deliberately-targeted-in, https://www.buzzfeed.com/jamesball/gchq-is-facing-questions-over-last-weeks-ransomware-attack, https://www.buzzfeed.com/jamesball/a-highly-critical-report-says-the-nhs-was-hit-by-the), and some details from this later Washington Post report: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-set-to-declare-north-korea-carried-out-massive-wannacry-cyber-attack/2017/12/18/509deb1c-e446-11e7-a65d-1ac0fd7f097e_story.html?

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That digital divide will only widen. 7https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/27/facebook-free-basics-developing-markets Index Aadhaar, here Abramson, Jill, here Ackerman, Spencer, here Acquisti, Alessandro, here ad blockers, here, here advertising, online, here, here, here, here, here, here complexity of, here, here and consumer benefits, here CPM (cost per mille), here programmatic advertising, here, here, here see also surveillance airspace spectrum, here Al Shabab, here Alexander, General Keith, here, here, here Alibaba, here al-Qaeda, here Amazon, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here and advertising, here and centralisation of power, here and regulation, here Andreessen, Marc, here, here Android, here, here angel investors, here, here, here, here, here antitrust laws, here AOL, here, here, here Apple, here, here, here, here, here, here AppNexus, here, here, here ARPANET, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here separation of military elements, here, here see also DARPA Ars Technica, here artificial intelligence (AI), here, here, here Associated Press, here AT&T, here, here, here, here Atlantic, here Baidu, here Barlow, John Perry, here, here, here batch processing, here Bell, Emily, here, here Berners-Lee, Tim, here, here, here betaworks, here, here Bezos, Jeff, here bit.ly, here Bitcoin, here, here, here blackholing, here blockchains, here Bomis, here book publishers, here Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), here Borthwick, John, here, here, here, here, here, here botnets, here Brandeis, Louis, here broadband customers, here, here BT, here, here BuzzFeed, here cable companies, here lobbying, here peering agreements, here profits, here, here reputation and trust, here tier one providers, here, here traffic blocking, here transit fees, here cable TV, here, here, here Cambridge Analytica, here Carnegie, Andrew, here celebrities, here Cerf, Vint, here, here, here, here Certbot, here Chicago School of Economics, here China, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here Chrome, here CIA, here Cisco, here Clinton, Hillary, here ‘cloud, the’, here CNN, here Cohn, Cindy, here, here Cold War, here, here Comcast, here, here, here, here, here CompuServe, here computers, early, here content farms, here, here cookies, here, here, here, here, here Cox, Ben, here credit cards, here Crimea, here Crocker, Steve, here, here, here, here, here, here, here cryptocurrencies, here, here, here, here Daily Caller, here, here Daly, Tom, here, here, here DARPA, here, here, here, here, here data brokers, here, here, here Defense Communications Agency, here del.icio.us, here Deliveroo, here ‘digital colonialism’, here DirecTV, here distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, here, here, here Dolby, here Domain Name System (DNS), here, here, here, here, here, here Dots and Two Dots, here DoubleClick, here duolingo, here Duvall, Bill, here Dyn attack, here eBay, here, here Eisenstein, Elizabeth, here elections, interference in, here Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), here, here Eliason, Frank, here, here, here, here, here Encarta, here encryption, here, here Engelbart, Doug, here Etsy, here European Union (EU), here, here, here, here, here, here see also General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) Facebook, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here acquisition of WhatsApp, here, here, here, here and advertising, here, here, here, here, here, here and centralisation of power, here and ‘digital colonialism’, here and government entities, here influence on elections, here Menlo Park campus, here privacy scandals, here and regulation, here, here, here, here Facetime, here facial recognition, here FakeMailGenerator, com, here Fastclick, here Fastly, here FBI, here, here Federal Communications Commission (FCC), here, here, here financial crash, here, here FireEye, here First World War, here, here Five Eyes, here, here, here Flickr, here Flint, Michigan, here Foreign Policy, here, here Fotolog, here, here, here Foursquare, here Franz Ferdinand, Archduke, here Free Basics, here free speech, here, here, here, here, here Freedom of Information Act, here GCHQ, here, here, here, here, here and encryption, here General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), here, here, here George V, King, here Ghonim, Wael, here Gibson, Janine, here, here, here Gilded Age, here, here, here Gilmore, John, here Gimlet media, here Giphy, here Gizmodo blog, here Gmail, here Goodwin, Sir Fred, here Google, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here and advertising, here, here, here, here, here, here, here and centralisation of power, here London headquarters, here and regulation, here, here, here Grateful Dead, here Greene, Jeff, here, here, here Greenwald, Glenn, here Grindr, here Guardian, here, here, here, here and Snowden leaks, here, here Guo Ping, here Gutenberg press, here Heatherwick, Thomas, here Herzfeld, Charles, here Hoffman, Reid, here Hong Kong, here HOSTS.TXT, here Hotmail, here HTML, here HTTP, here, here HTTPS Everywhere, here Huawei, here, here Hutchins, Marcus, here IBM, here identity, here India, here, here Industrial Revolution, here Instagram, here intellectual property, here, here internet, origins of, here, here commercialisation and globalisation, here gradual expansion, here logging and security, here the name, here origins of networking, here separation of military elements, here, here see also ARPANET Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), here, here, here, here Internet Hall of Fame, here, here Internet of Things, here internet service providers (ISPs), here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here and Pakistan/YouTube incident, here intranets, here IP (Internet Protocol), here IP addresses, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here and blackholing attacks, here iPhones, here, here Iran, here, here, here, here Stuxnet worm attack, here, here ISIS, here Jackson, Steve, here Jarvis, Jeff, here journalism, here see also newspapers Kaspersky, here key cards, here Kickstarter, here, here, here Kidane v. Ethiopian government, here Kleinrock, Leonard, here, here, here, here, here Kline, Charley, here Knight Foundation, here Kunlun, here Leigh, David, here LinkedIn, here London Olympics, here Lukasik, Steve, here Lumley, Joanna, here Luther, Martin, here MacAskill, Ewen, here machine learning, here, here Marby, Göran, here, here, here, here Markota, Martina, here Mastering the Internet programme, here Meckl, Steve, here, here Medium, here Menwith Hill, here MI5, 146 Microsoft, here, here, here see also Encarta; Windows Millar, Stuart, here Minecraft, here Morgan, J.P., here music publishers, here MySpace, here NASA, here National Health Service (NHS), here National Science Foundation, here National Security Agency (NSA), here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here and encryption, here NBC, here net neutrality, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here Netflix, here, here, here, here Netscape, here network effects, here network slicing, here neurolinguistic programming, here New York magazine, here New York Times, here, here, here, here New Yorker, here newspapers, here, here, here, here see also journalism North Korea, here nuclear weapons and warfare, here, here, here Obama, Barack, here, here, here O’Kelley, Brian, here, here, here, here, here, here, here Oliver, John, here, here OpenSecrets database, here Opera, here Optic Nerve programme, here Outbrain, here, here packet switching, here, here Page, Larry, here Pai, Ajit, here, here, here Pakistan Telecom, here Panopticlick 3.0, here Parker, Sean, here PayPal, here, here, here, here, here People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), here Philippines, human rights violations, here pinging, here Pizzagate conspiracy, here Poitras, Laura, here populism, here, here pornography, here, here Postel, Jon, here privacy, here, here, here, here see also surveillance Privacy Badger, here Prodigy, here ProPublica, here, here publishers, and advertising, here, here, here railways, here, here, here, here, here Read, Max, here Reagan, Ronald, here Reddit, here Register, The, here Rekhter, Yakov, here, here Requests for Comments (RFCs), here, here, here, here Right Media, here, here Roberts, Brian, here, here, here Rockefeller, John D., here Roosevelt, Franklin D., here routers, here, here Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), here, here Rubenstein, Michael, here Rusbridger, Alan, here Russia, here, here, here, here Sainsbury’s/Asda merger, here Schneidermann, Eric, here secure operations centres (SOCs), here sensitive compartmented information facilities (SCIFs), here Shaw, Mona, here Silicon Valley, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here Sinclair Broadcast Group, here Skype, here, here, here, here Snapchat, here, here Snowden, Edward, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here ‘social credit’, here Soundcloud, here South Korea, here sovereign immunity, here Spotify, here Stanford Research Institute (SRI), here, here, here, here, here, here, here Stripe, here Sun, The, here Sun Microsystems, here surveillance, here, here, here, here resistance to, here Symantec, here, here, here Syria, here, here Taboola, here, here TCP/IP, here, here Telefonica, here Telegram, here telephone networks, here, here, here Tempora, here, here TenCent, here, here terror plots, foiled, here Texas A&M, here Thatcher, Margaret, here Thiel, Peter, here, here Tibet, here Time Warner, here, here Times, The, here Tishgart, Barry, here Topolski, Robb, here traceroute, here, here tracking, see cookies trade unions, here, here, here trademark law, here transatlantic cables, here Tribune newspaper group, here Trump, Donald, here, here, here, here Tuchman, Barbara, here Tumblr, here, here Turkey, bans Wikipedia, here Tweetdeck, here Twitter, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here Uber, here Ukraine, here Union Square Ventures (USV), here Universal Declaration of Human Rights, here Universal Studios, here University College, London, here University of California, Los Angeles UCLA, here, here, here, here University of Maryland Law School, here US Congress, here US Constitution, here, here US culture, and internet regulation, here US Department of Commerce, here, here US Department of Defense, here, here, here, here, here, here, here US Department of Energy, here US internet infrastructure, here, here US Supreme Court, here venture capital, here, here, here, here funding phases, here funding series, here, here Verizon, here, here Wales, Jimmy, here WannaCry attack, here Washington Post, here, here, here, here, here web addresses (URLs), here, here, here top-level domains (TLDs), here and WannaCry attack, here WeChat, here Wenger, Albert, here, here, here, here, here WhatsApp, here, here, here, here, here, here, here Wheeler, Tom, here, here, here WikiLeaks, here, here, here Wikipedia, here, here Williams, Evan, here Windows, vulnerability in, here wired.com, here wireless internet, here, here wiretapping, here Woodward, Bob, here World Economic Forum, here World Wide Web, here, here, here, here, here, here, here Wu, Tim, here Yahoo, here, here, here YouTube, here, here, here, here, here, here Zittrain, Jonathan, here Zuckerberg, Mark, here, here, here, here, here, here Zynga, here BLOOMSBURY PUBLISHING Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1b 3DP, UK BLOOMSBURY, BLOOMSBURY PUBLISHING and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain 2020 This electronic edition published 2020 Copyright © James Ball, 2020 James Ball has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work All rights reserved.

Future War: Preparing for the New Global Battlefield
by Robert H. Latiff
Published 25 Sep 2017

Cyber Command have to date successfully defended critical national security networks from intrusions and attacks. In cyber operations, the vulnerabilities of weapons platforms, as well as a nation’s infrastructure, are exploited or destroyed. Such techniques loom large as expertise grows and proliferates. The ability to destroy equipment and possibly military capability was evident in the Stuxnet attack on the Iranian nuclear centrifuges. The ability to destroy information, reputation, and financial resources was evident in the North Korean attack on Sony Pictures. There have been instances of passengers hacking into aircraft flight systems from their coach seats, and it was recently determined that control systems for a dam in upstate New York had been penetrated by Iranian hackers.

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Is it ethical to attack when the identity of parties is uncertain? In classical combat and decision making, the identity of your opposing force is relatively well understood. Experts say that once a weapon is “released into the wild” it is difficult to predict exactly where it will propagate. The Stuxnet virus targeting the Iran nuclear program is a case in point. That software was looking across networks for a specific type of industrial controller and found its way onto systems all over the world. Even then, it was designed to damage only a specific configuration. While it did not damage any other systems, there was a cost, in time or money, to innocent users to have it removed.

The Death of Money: The Coming Collapse of the International Monetary System
by James Rickards
Published 7 Apr 2014

. : Leading documented studies and white papers on the scope and pervasiveness of cyberattacks on U.S. systems, including financial systems, originating from various sources including China and Iran, are: “Global Energy Cyberattacks: ‘Night Dragon,’” McAfee Foundstone Professional Services and McAfee Labs White Paper, February 10, 2011, http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-global-energy-cyberattacks-night-dragon.pdf; Nicolas Falliere, Liam O. Murchu, and Eric Chien, “W.32.Stuxnet Dossier Version 1.4,” Symantec, February 2011, http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf; and Mandiant, “APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units,” 2013, Mandiant Intelligence Center Report, http://intelreport.mandiant.com. The official was Mary Shapiro . . . : Senior SEC official, conversation with author, September 2012.

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“Japan’s Shinzo Abe Prepares to Print Money for the Whole World.” Telegraph, December 17, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/9751609/Japans-Shinzo-Abe-prepares-to-print-money-for-the-whole-world.html. Falliere, Nicolas, Liam O. Murchu, and Eric Chien. “W.32.Stuxnet Dossier Version 1.4,” Symantec, February 2011, http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf. Farchy, Jack. “Iran Bought Gold to Cut Dollar Exposure.” Financial Times, March 20, 2011, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cc350008-5325-11e0-86e6-00144feab49a.html. Farchy, Jack, and Roula Khalaf. “Gold Key to Financing Gaddafi Struggle.”

I, Warbot: The Dawn of Artificially Intelligent Conflict
by Kenneth Payne
Published 16 Jun 2021

Questions of attribution feature prominently in the debate about cyber warfare. How do you know who has attacked you? But attribution seems not to be the conundrum that many suppose—if high quality investigative reporters can glean insights as to who was responsible for an attack (the US and Israel for Stuxnet; North Korea for the WannaCry ransomware), then the extensive resources of state security apparatus will often be able to do likewise. The Mueller inquiry into foreign interference in the 2016 US Presidential election provided an insight into these formidable capabilities, as US investigators indicted a number of Russian nationals on charges of hacking American computers.

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A-10 Warthog abacuses Abbottabad, Pakistan Able Archer (1983) acoustic decoys acoustic torpedoes Adams, Douglas Aegis combat system Aerostatic Corps affective empathy Affecto Afghanistan agency aircraft see also dogfighting; drones aircraft carriers algorithms algorithm creation Alpha biases choreography deep fakes DeepMind, see DeepMind emotion recognition F-117 Nighthawk facial recognition genetic selection imagery analysis meta-learning natural language processing object recognition predictive policing alien hand syndrome Aliens (1986 film) Alpha AlphaGo Altered Carbon (television series) Amazon Amnesty International amygdala Andropov, Yuri Anduril Ghost anti-personnel mines ants Apple Aristotle armour arms races Army Research Lab Army Signal Corps Arnalds, Ólafur ARPA Art of War, The (Sun Tzu) art Artificial Intelligence agency and architecture autonomy and as ‘brittle’ connectionism definition of decision-making technology expert systems and feedback loops fuzzy logic innateness intelligence analysis meta-learning as ‘narrow’ needle-in-a-haystack problems neural networks reinforcement learning ‘strong AI’ symbolic logic and unsupervised learning ‘winters’ artificial neural networks Ashby, William Ross Asimov, Isaac Asperger syndrome Astute class boats Atari Breakout (1976) Montezuma’s Revenge (1984) Space Invaders (1978) Athens ATLAS robots augmented intelligence Austin Powers (1997 film) Australia authoritarianism autonomous vehicles see also drones autonomy B-21 Raider B-52 Stratofortress B2 Spirit Baby X BAE Systems Baghdad, Iraq Baidu balloons ban, campaigns for Banks, Iain Battle of Britain (1940) Battle of Fleurus (1794) Battle of Midway (1942) Battle of Sedan (1940) batwing design BBN Beautiful Mind, A (2001 film) beetles Bell Laboratories Bengio, Yoshua Berlin Crisis (1961) biases big data Bin Laden, Osama binary code biological weapons biotechnology bipolarity bits Black Lives Matter Black Mirror (television series) Blade Runner (1982 film) Blade Runner 2049 (2017 film) Bletchley Park, Buckinghamshire blindness Blunt, Emily board games, see under games boats Boden, Margaret bodies Boeing MQ-25 Stingray Orca submarines Boolean logic Boston Dynamics Bostrom, Nick Boyd, John brain amygdala bodies and chunking dopamine emotion and genetic engineering and language and mind merge and morality and plasticity prediction and subroutines umwelts and Breakout (1976 game) breathing control brittleness brute force Buck Rogers (television series) Campaign against Killer Robots Carlsen, Magnus Carnegie Mellon University Casino Royale (2006 film) Castro, Fidel cat detector centaur combination Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) centre of gravity chaff Challenger Space Shuttle disaster (1986) Chauvet cave, France chemical weapons Chernobyl nuclear disaster (1986) chess centaur teams combinatorial explosion and creativity in Deep Blue game theory and MuZero as toy universe chicken (game) chimeras chimpanzees China aircraft carriers Baidu COVID-19 pandemic (2019–21) D-21 in genetic engineering in GJ-11 Sharp Sword nuclear weapons surveillance in Thucydides trap and US Navy drone seizure (2016) China Lake, California Chomsky, Noam choreography chunking Cicero civilians Clarke, Arthur Charles von Clausewitz, Carl on character on culmination on defence on genius on grammar of war on materiel on nature on poker on willpower on wrestling codebreaking cognitive empathy Cold War (1947–9) arms race Berlin Crisis (1961) Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) F-117 Nighthawk Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) joint action Korean War (1950–53) nuclear weapons research and SR-71 Blackbird U2 incident (1960) Vienna Summit (1961) Vietnam War (1955–75) VRYAN Cole, August combinatorial creativity combinatorial explosion combined arms common sense computers creativity cyber security games graphics processing unit (GPU) mice Moore’s Law symbolic logic viruses VRYAN confirmation bias connectionism consequentialism conservatism Convention on Conventional Weapons ConvNets copying Cormorant cortical interfaces cost-benefit analysis counterfactual regret minimization counterinsurgency doctrine courageous restraint COVID-19 pandemic (2019–21) creativity combinatorial exploratory genetic engineering and mental disorders and transformational criminal law CRISPR, crows Cruise, Thomas Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) culmination Culture novels (Banks) cyber security cybernetics cyborgs Cyc cystic fibrosis D-21 drones Damasio, Antonio dance DARPA autonomous vehicle research battlespace manager codebreaking research cortical interface research cyborg beetle Deep Green expert system programme funding game theory research LongShot programme Mayhem Ng’s helicopter Shakey understanding and reason research unmanned aerial combat research Dartmouth workshop (1956) Dassault data DDoS (distributed denial-of-service) dead hand system decision-making technology Deep Blue deep fakes Deep Green DeepMind AlphaGo Atari playing meta-learning research MuZero object recognition research Quake III competition (2019) deep networks defence industrial complex Defence Innovation Unit Defence Science and Technology Laboratory defence delayed gratification demons deontological approach depth charges Dionysus DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) dodos dogfighting Alpha domains dot-matrix tongue Dota II (2013 game) double effect drones Cormorant D-21 GJ-11 Sharp Sword Global Hawk Gorgon Stare kamikaze loitering munitions nEUROn operators Predator Reaper reconnaissance RQ-170 Sentinel S-70 Okhotnik surveillance swarms Taranis wingman role X-37 X-47b dual use technology Eagleman, David early warning systems Echelon economics Edge of Tomorrow (2014 film) Eisenhower, Dwight Ellsberg, Daniel embodied cognition emotion empathy encryption entropy environmental niches epilepsy epistemic community escalation ethics Asimov’s rules brain and consequentialism deep brain stimulation and deontological approach facial recognition and genetic engineering and golden rule honour hunter-gatherer bands and identity just war post-conflict reciprocity regulation surveillance and European Union (EU) Ex Machina (2014 film) expert systems exploratory creativity extra limbs Eye in the Sky (2015 film) F-105 Thunderchief F-117 Nighthawk F-16 Fighting Falcon F-22 Raptor F-35 Lightning F/A-18 Hornet Facebook facial recognition feedback loops fighting power fire and forget firmware 5G cellular networks flow fog of war Ford forever wars FOXP2 gene Frahm, Nils frame problem France Fukushima nuclear disaster (2011) Future of Life Institute fuzzy logic gait recognition game theory games Breakout (1976) chess, see chess chicken Dota II (2013) Go, see Go Montezuma’s Revenge (1984) poker Quake III (1999) Space Invaders (1978) StarCraft II (2010) toy universes zero sum games gannets ‘garbage in, garbage out’ Garland, Alexander Gates, William ‘Bill’ Gattaca (1997 film) Gavotti, Giulio Geertz, Clifford generalised intelligence measure Generative Adversarial Networks genetic engineering genetic selection algorithms genetically modified crops genius Germany Berlin Crisis (1961) Nuremburg Trials (1945–6) Russian hacking operation (2015) World War I (1914–18) World War II (1939–45) Ghost in the Shell (comic book) GJ-11 Sharp Sword Gladwell, Malcolm Global Hawk drone global positioning system (GPS) global workspace Go (game) AlphaGo Gödel, Kurt von Goethe, Johann golden rule golf Good Judgment Project Google BERT Brain codebreaking research DeepMind, see DeepMind Project Maven (2017–) Gordievsky, Oleg Gorgon Stare GPT series grammar of war Grand Challenge aerial combat autonomous vehicles codebreaking graphics processing unit (GPU) Greece, ancient grooming standard Groundhog Day (1993 film) groupthink guerilla warfare Gulf War First (1990–91) Second (2003–11) hacking hallucinogenic drugs handwriting recognition haptic vest hardware Harpy Hawke, Ethan Hawking, Stephen heat-seeking missiles Hebrew Testament helicopters Hellfire missiles Her (2013 film) Hero-30 loitering munitions Heron Systems Hinton, Geoffrey Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy, The (Adams) HIV (human immunodeficiency viruses) Hoffman, Frank ‘Holeshot’ (Cole) Hollywood homeostasis Homer homosexuality Hongdu GJ-11 Sharp Sword honour Hughes human in the loop human resources human-machine teaming art cyborgs emotion games King Midas problem prediction strategy hunter-gatherer bands Huntingdon’s disease Hurricane fighter aircraft hydraulics hypersonic engines I Robot (Asimov) IARPA IBM identity Iliad (Homer) image analysis image recognition cat detector imagination Improbotics nformation dominance information warfare innateness intelligence analysts International Atomic Energy Agency International Criminal Court international humanitarian law internet of things Internet IQ (intelligence quotient) Iran Aegis attack (1988) Iraq War (1980–88) nuclear weapons Stuxnet attack (2010) Iraq Gulf War I (1990–91) Gulf War II (2003–11) Iran War (1980–88) Iron Dome Israel Italo-Turkish War (1911–12) Jaguar Land Rover Japan jazz JDAM (joint directed attack munition) Jeopardy Jobs, Steven Johansson, Scarlett Johnson, Lyndon Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) de Jomini, Antoine jus ad bellum jus in bello jus post bellum just war Kalibr cruise missiles kamikaze drones Kasparov, Garry Kellogg Briand Pact (1928) Kennedy, John Fitzgerald KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti) Khrushchev, Nikita kill chain King Midas problem Kissinger, Henry Kittyhawk Knight Rider (television series) know your enemy know yourself Korean War (1950–53) Kratos XQ-58 Valkyrie Kubrick, Stanley Kumar, Vijay Kuwait language connectionism and genetic engineering and natural language processing pattern recognition and semantic webs translation universal grammar Law, Jude LeCun, Yann Lenat, Douglas Les, Jason Libratus lip reading Litvinenko, Alexander locked-in patients Lockheed dogfighting trials F-117 Nighthawk F-22 Raptor F-35 Lightning SR-71 Blackbird logic loitering munitions LongShot programme Lord of the Rings (2001–3 film trilogy) LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide) Luftwaffe madman theory Main Battle Tanks malum in se Manhattan Project (1942–6) Marcus, Gary Maslow, Abraham Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Matrix, The (1999 film) Mayhem McCulloch, Warren McGregor, Wayne McNamara, Robert McNaughton, John Me109 fighter aircraft medical field memory Merkel, Angela Microsoft military industrial complex Mill, John Stuart Milrem mimicry mind merge mind-shifting minimax regret strategy Minority Report (2002 film) Minsky, Marvin Miramar air base, San Diego missiles Aegis combat system agency and anti-missile gunnery heat-seeking Hellfire missiles intercontinental Kalibr cruise missiles nuclear warheads Patriot missile interceptor Pershing II missiles Scud missiles Tomahawk cruise missiles V1 rockets V2 rockets mission command mixed strategy Montezuma’s Revenge (1984 game) Moore’s Law mosaic warfare Mueller inquiry (2017–19) music Musk, Elon Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) MuZero Nagel, Thomas Napoleon I, Emperor of the French Napoleonic France (1804–15) narrowness Nash equilibrium Nash, John National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) National Security Agency (NSA) National War College natural language processing natural selection Nature navigation computers Nazi Germany (1933–45) needle-in-a-haystack problems Netflix network enabled warfare von Neumann, John neural networks neurodiversity nEUROn drone neuroplasticity Ng, Andrew Nixon, Richard normal accident theory North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) North Korea nuclear weapons Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) dead hand system early warning systems F-105 Thunderchief and game theory and Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings (1945) Manhattan Project (1942–6) missiles Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) second strike capability submarines and VRYAN and in WarGames (1983 film) Nuremburg Trials (1945–6) Obama, Barack object recognition Observe Orient Decide and Act (OODA) offence-defence balance Office for Naval Research Olympic Games On War (Clausewitz), see Clausewitz, Carl OpenAI optogenetics Orca submarines Ottoman Empire (1299–1922) pain Pakistan Palantir Palmer, Arnold Pandemonium Panoramic Research Papert, Seymour Parkinson’s disease Patriot missile interceptors pattern recognition Pearl Harbor attack (1941) Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE) Pentagon autonomous vehicle research codebreaking research computer mouse development Deep Green Defence Innovation Unit Ellsberg leaks (1971) expert system programme funding ‘garbage in, garbage out’ story intelligence analysts Project Maven (2017–) Shakey unmanned aerial combat research Vietnam War (1955–75) perceptrons Perdix Pershing II missiles Petrov, Stanislav Phalanx system phrenology pilot’s associate Pitts, Walter platform neutrality Pluribus poker policing polygeneity Portsmouth, Hampshire Portuguese Man o’ War post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) Predator drones prediction centaur teams ‘garbage in, garbage out’ story policing toy universes VRYAN Prescience principles of war prisoners Project Improbable Project Maven (2017–) prosthetic arms proximity fuses Prussia (1701–1918) psychology psychopathy punishment Putin, Vladimir Pyeongchang Olympics (2018) Qinetiq Quake III (1999 game) radar Rafael RAND Corporation rational actor model Rawls, John Re:member (Arnalds) Ready Player One (Cline) Reagan, Ronald Reaper drones reciprocal punishment reciprocity reconnaissance regulation ban, campaigns for defection self-regulation reinforcement learning remotely piloted air vehicles (RPAVs) revenge porn revolution in military affairs Rid, Thomas Robinson, William Heath Robocop (1987 film) Robotics Challenge robots Asimov’s rules ATLAS Boston Dynamics homeostatic Shakey symbolic logic and Rome Air Defense Center Rome, ancient Rosenblatt, Frank Royal Air Force (RAF) Royal Navy RQ-170 Sentinel Russell, Stuart Russian Federation German hacking operation (2015) Litvinenko murder (2006) S-70 Okhotnik Skripal poisoning (2018) Ukraine War (2014–) US election interference (2016) S-70 Okhotnik SAGE Said and Done’ (Frahm) satellite navigation satellites Saudi Arabia Schelling, Thomas schizophrenia Schwartz, Jack Sea Hunter security dilemma Sedol, Lee self-actualisation self-awareness self-driving cars Selfridge, Oliver semantic webs Shakey Shanahan, Murray Shannon, Claude Shogi Silicon Valley Simon, Herbert Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) singularity Siri situational awareness situationalist intelligence Skripal, Sergei and Yulia Slaughterbots (2017 video) Slovic, Paul smartphones Smith, Willard social environments software Sophia Sorcerer’s Apprentice, The (Goethe) South China Sea Soviet Union (1922–91) aircraft Berlin Crisis (1961) Chernobyl nuclear disaster (1986) Cold War (1947–9), see Cold War collapse (1991) Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) early warning systems Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) Korean War (1950–53) nuclear weapons radar technology U2 incident (1960) Vienna Summit (1961) Vietnam War (1955–75) VRYAN World War II (1939–45) Space Invaders (1978 game) SpaceX Sparta Spike Firefly loitering munitions Spitfire fighter aircraft Spotify Stanford University Stanley Star Trek (television series) StarCraft II (2010 game) stealth strategic bombing strategic computing programme strategic culture Strategy Robot strategy Strava Stuxnet sub-units submarines acoustic decoys nuclear Orca South China Sea incident (2016) subroutines Sukhoi Sun Tzu superforecasting surveillance swarms symbolic logic synaesthesia synthetic operation environment Syria Taliban tanks Taranis drone technological determinism Tempest Terminator franchise Tesla Tetlock, Philip theory of mind Threshold Logic Unit Thucydides TikTok Tomahawk cruise missiles tongue Top Gun (1986 film) Top Gun: Maverick (2021 film) torpedoes toy universes trade-offs transformational creativity translation Trivers, Robert Trump, Donald tumours Turing, Alan Twitter 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968 film) Type-X Robotic Combat Vehicle U2 incident (1960) Uber Uexküll, Jacob Ukraine ultraviolet light spectrum umwelts uncanny valley unidentified flying objects (UFOs) United Kingdom AI weapons policy armed force, size of Battle of Britain (1940) Bletchley Park codebreaking Blitz (1940–41) Cold War (1947–9) COVID-19 pandemic (2019–21) DeepMind, see DeepMind F-35 programme fighting power human rights legislation in Litvinenko murder (2006) nuclear weapons principles of war Project Improbable Qinetiq radar technology Royal Air Force Royal Navy Skripal poisoning (2018) swarm research wingman concept World War I (1914–18) United Nations United States Afghanistan War (2001–14) Air Force Army Research Lab Army Signal Corps Battle of Midway (1942) Berlin Crisis (1961) Bin Laden assassination (2011) Black Lives Matter protests (2020) centaur team research Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Challenger Space Shuttle disaster (1986) Cold War (1947–9), see Cold War COVID-19 pandemic (2019–21) Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) culture cyber security DARPA, see DARPA Defense Department drones early warning systems F-35 programme Gulf War I (1990–91) Gulf War II (2003–11) IARPA Iran Air shoot-down (1988) Korean War (1950–53) Manhattan Project (1942–6) Marines Mueller inquiry (2017–19) National Security Agency National War College Navy nuclear weapons Office for Naval Research Patriot missile interceptor Pearl Harbor attack (1941) Pentagon, see Pentagon Project Maven (2017–) Rome Air Defense Center Silicon Valley strategic computing programme U2 incident (1960) Vienna Summit (1961) Vietnam War (1955–75) universal grammar Universal Schelling Machine (USM) unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), see drones unsupervised learning utilitarianism UVision V1 rockets V2 rockets Vacanti mouse Valkyries Van Gogh, Vincent Vietnam War (1955–75) Vigen, Tyler Vincennes, USS voice assistants VRYAN Wall-e (2008 film) WannaCry ransomware War College, see National War College WarGames (1983 film) warrior ethos Watson weapon systems WhatsApp Wiener, Norbert Wikipedia wingman role Wittgenstein, Ludwig World War I (1914–18) World War II (1939–45) Battle of Britain (1940) Battle of Midway (1942) Battle of Sedan (1940) Bletchley Park codebreaking Blitz (1940–41) Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings (1945) Pearl Harbor attack (1941) radar technology V1 rockets V2 rockets VRYAN and Wrangham, Richard Wright brothers WS-43 loitering munitions Wuhan, China X-37 drone X-drone X-rays YouTube zero sum games

…

A-10 Warthog abacuses Abbottabad, Pakistan Able Archer (1983) acoustic decoys acoustic torpedoes Adams, Douglas Aegis combat system Aerostatic Corps affective empathy Affecto Afghanistan agency aircraft see also dogfighting; drones aircraft carriers algorithms algorithm creation Alpha biases choreography deep fakes DeepMind, see DeepMind emotion recognition F-117 Nighthawk facial recognition genetic selection imagery analysis meta-learning natural language processing object recognition predictive policing alien hand syndrome Aliens (1986 film) Alpha AlphaGo Altered Carbon (television series) Amazon Amnesty International amygdala Andropov, Yuri Anduril Ghost anti-personnel mines ants Apple Aristotle armour arms races Army Research Lab Army Signal Corps Arnalds, Ólafur ARPA Art of War, The (Sun Tzu) art Artificial Intelligence agency and architecture autonomy and as ‘brittle’ connectionism definition of decision-making technology expert systems and feedback loops fuzzy logic innateness intelligence analysis meta-learning as ‘narrow’ needle-in-a-haystack problems neural networks reinforcement learning ‘strong AI’ symbolic logic and unsupervised learning ‘winters’ artificial neural networks Ashby, William Ross Asimov, Isaac Asperger syndrome Astute class boats Atari Breakout (1976) Montezuma’s Revenge (1984) Space Invaders (1978) Athens ATLAS robots augmented intelligence Austin Powers (1997 film) Australia authoritarianism autonomous vehicles see also drones autonomy B-21 Raider B-52 Stratofortress B2 Spirit Baby X BAE Systems Baghdad, Iraq Baidu balloons ban, campaigns for Banks, Iain Battle of Britain (1940) Battle of Fleurus (1794) Battle of Midway (1942) Battle of Sedan (1940) batwing design BBN Beautiful Mind, A (2001 film) beetles Bell Laboratories Bengio, Yoshua Berlin Crisis (1961) biases big data Bin Laden, Osama binary code biological weapons biotechnology bipolarity bits Black Lives Matter Black Mirror (television series) Blade Runner (1982 film) Blade Runner 2049 (2017 film) Bletchley Park, Buckinghamshire blindness Blunt, Emily board games, see under games boats Boden, Margaret bodies Boeing MQ-25 Stingray Orca submarines Boolean logic Boston Dynamics Bostrom, Nick Boyd, John brain amygdala bodies and chunking dopamine emotion and genetic engineering and language and mind merge and morality and plasticity prediction and subroutines umwelts and Breakout (1976 game) breathing control brittleness brute force Buck Rogers (television series) Campaign against Killer Robots Carlsen, Magnus Carnegie Mellon University Casino Royale (2006 film) Castro, Fidel cat detector centaur combination Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) centre of gravity chaff Challenger Space Shuttle disaster (1986) Chauvet cave, France chemical weapons Chernobyl nuclear disaster (1986) chess centaur teams combinatorial explosion and creativity in Deep Blue game theory and MuZero as toy universe chicken (game) chimeras chimpanzees China aircraft carriers Baidu COVID-19 pandemic (2019–21) D-21 in genetic engineering in GJ-11 Sharp Sword nuclear weapons surveillance in Thucydides trap and US Navy drone seizure (2016) China Lake, California Chomsky, Noam choreography chunking Cicero civilians Clarke, Arthur Charles von Clausewitz, Carl on character on culmination on defence on genius on grammar of war on materiel on nature on poker on willpower on wrestling codebreaking cognitive empathy Cold War (1947–9) arms race Berlin Crisis (1961) Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) F-117 Nighthawk Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) joint action Korean War (1950–53) nuclear weapons research and SR-71 Blackbird U2 incident (1960) Vienna Summit (1961) Vietnam War (1955–75) VRYAN Cole, August combinatorial creativity combinatorial explosion combined arms common sense computers creativity cyber security games graphics processing unit (GPU) mice Moore’s Law symbolic logic viruses VRYAN confirmation bias connectionism consequentialism conservatism Convention on Conventional Weapons ConvNets copying Cormorant cortical interfaces cost-benefit analysis counterfactual regret minimization counterinsurgency doctrine courageous restraint COVID-19 pandemic (2019–21) creativity combinatorial exploratory genetic engineering and mental disorders and transformational criminal law CRISPR, crows Cruise, Thomas Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) culmination Culture novels (Banks) cyber security cybernetics cyborgs Cyc cystic fibrosis D-21 drones Damasio, Antonio dance DARPA autonomous vehicle research battlespace manager codebreaking research cortical interface research cyborg beetle Deep Green expert system programme funding game theory research LongShot programme Mayhem Ng’s helicopter Shakey understanding and reason research unmanned aerial combat research Dartmouth workshop (1956) Dassault data DDoS (distributed denial-of-service) dead hand system decision-making technology Deep Blue deep fakes Deep Green DeepMind AlphaGo Atari playing meta-learning research MuZero object recognition research Quake III competition (2019) deep networks defence industrial complex Defence Innovation Unit Defence Science and Technology Laboratory defence delayed gratification demons deontological approach depth charges Dionysus DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) dodos dogfighting Alpha domains dot-matrix tongue Dota II (2013 game) double effect drones Cormorant D-21 GJ-11 Sharp Sword Global Hawk Gorgon Stare kamikaze loitering munitions nEUROn operators Predator Reaper reconnaissance RQ-170 Sentinel S-70 Okhotnik surveillance swarms Taranis wingman role X-37 X-47b dual use technology Eagleman, David early warning systems Echelon economics Edge of Tomorrow (2014 film) Eisenhower, Dwight Ellsberg, Daniel embodied cognition emotion empathy encryption entropy environmental niches epilepsy epistemic community escalation ethics Asimov’s rules brain and consequentialism deep brain stimulation and deontological approach facial recognition and genetic engineering and golden rule honour hunter-gatherer bands and identity just war post-conflict reciprocity regulation surveillance and European Union (EU) Ex Machina (2014 film) expert systems exploratory creativity extra limbs Eye in the Sky (2015 film) F-105 Thunderchief F-117 Nighthawk F-16 Fighting Falcon F-22 Raptor F-35 Lightning F/A-18 Hornet Facebook facial recognition feedback loops fighting power fire and forget firmware 5G cellular networks flow fog of war Ford forever wars FOXP2 gene Frahm, Nils frame problem France Fukushima nuclear disaster (2011) Future of Life Institute fuzzy logic gait recognition game theory games Breakout (1976) chess, see chess chicken Dota II (2013) Go, see Go Montezuma’s Revenge (1984) poker Quake III (1999) Space Invaders (1978) StarCraft II (2010) toy universes zero sum games gannets ‘garbage in, garbage out’ Garland, Alexander Gates, William ‘Bill’ Gattaca (1997 film) Gavotti, Giulio Geertz, Clifford generalised intelligence measure Generative Adversarial Networks genetic engineering genetic selection algorithms genetically modified crops genius Germany Berlin Crisis (1961) Nuremburg Trials (1945–6) Russian hacking operation (2015) World War I (1914–18) World War II (1939–45) Ghost in the Shell (comic book) GJ-11 Sharp Sword Gladwell, Malcolm Global Hawk drone global positioning system (GPS) global workspace Go (game) AlphaGo Gödel, Kurt von Goethe, Johann golden rule golf Good Judgment Project Google BERT Brain codebreaking research DeepMind, see DeepMind Project Maven (2017–) Gordievsky, Oleg Gorgon Stare GPT series grammar of war Grand Challenge aerial combat autonomous vehicles codebreaking graphics processing unit (GPU) Greece, ancient grooming standard Groundhog Day (1993 film) groupthink guerilla warfare Gulf War First (1990–91) Second (2003–11) hacking hallucinogenic drugs handwriting recognition haptic vest hardware Harpy Hawke, Ethan Hawking, Stephen heat-seeking missiles Hebrew Testament helicopters Hellfire missiles Her (2013 film) Hero-30 loitering munitions Heron Systems Hinton, Geoffrey Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy, The (Adams) HIV (human immunodeficiency viruses) Hoffman, Frank ‘Holeshot’ (Cole) Hollywood homeostasis Homer homosexuality Hongdu GJ-11 Sharp Sword honour Hughes human in the loop human resources human-machine teaming art cyborgs emotion games King Midas problem prediction strategy hunter-gatherer bands Huntingdon’s disease Hurricane fighter aircraft hydraulics hypersonic engines I Robot (Asimov) IARPA IBM identity Iliad (Homer) image analysis image recognition cat detector imagination Improbotics nformation dominance information warfare innateness intelligence analysts International Atomic Energy Agency International Criminal Court international humanitarian law internet of things Internet IQ (intelligence quotient) Iran Aegis attack (1988) Iraq War (1980–88) nuclear weapons Stuxnet attack (2010) Iraq Gulf War I (1990–91) Gulf War II (2003–11) Iran War (1980–88) Iron Dome Israel Italo-Turkish War (1911–12) Jaguar Land Rover Japan jazz JDAM (joint directed attack munition) Jeopardy Jobs, Steven Johansson, Scarlett Johnson, Lyndon Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) de Jomini, Antoine jus ad bellum jus in bello jus post bellum just war Kalibr cruise missiles kamikaze drones Kasparov, Garry Kellogg Briand Pact (1928) Kennedy, John Fitzgerald KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti) Khrushchev, Nikita kill chain King Midas problem Kissinger, Henry Kittyhawk Knight Rider (television series) know your enemy know yourself Korean War (1950–53) Kratos XQ-58 Valkyrie Kubrick, Stanley Kumar, Vijay Kuwait language connectionism and genetic engineering and natural language processing pattern recognition and semantic webs translation universal grammar Law, Jude LeCun, Yann Lenat, Douglas Les, Jason Libratus lip reading Litvinenko, Alexander locked-in patients Lockheed dogfighting trials F-117 Nighthawk F-22 Raptor F-35 Lightning SR-71 Blackbird logic loitering munitions LongShot programme Lord of the Rings (2001–3 film trilogy) LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide) Luftwaffe madman theory Main Battle Tanks malum in se Manhattan Project (1942–6) Marcus, Gary Maslow, Abraham Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Matrix, The (1999 film) Mayhem McCulloch, Warren McGregor, Wayne McNamara, Robert McNaughton, John Me109 fighter aircraft medical field memory Merkel, Angela Microsoft military industrial complex Mill, John Stuart Milrem mimicry mind merge mind-shifting minimax regret strategy Minority Report (2002 film) Minsky, Marvin Miramar air base, San Diego missiles Aegis combat system agency and anti-missile gunnery heat-seeking Hellfire missiles intercontinental Kalibr cruise missiles nuclear warheads Patriot missile interceptor Pershing II missiles Scud missiles Tomahawk cruise missiles V1 rockets V2 rockets mission command mixed strategy Montezuma’s Revenge (1984 game) Moore’s Law mosaic warfare Mueller inquiry (2017–19) music Musk, Elon Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) MuZero Nagel, Thomas Napoleon I, Emperor of the French Napoleonic France (1804–15) narrowness Nash equilibrium Nash, John National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) National Security Agency (NSA) National War College natural language processing natural selection Nature navigation computers Nazi Germany (1933–45) needle-in-a-haystack problems Netflix network enabled warfare von Neumann, John neural networks neurodiversity nEUROn drone neuroplasticity Ng, Andrew Nixon, Richard normal accident theory North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) North Korea nuclear weapons Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) dead hand system early warning systems F-105 Thunderchief and game theory and Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings (1945) Manhattan Project (1942–6) missiles Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) second strike capability submarines and VRYAN and in WarGames (1983 film) Nuremburg Trials (1945–6) Obama, Barack object recognition Observe Orient Decide and Act (OODA) offence-defence balance Office for Naval Research Olympic Games On War (Clausewitz), see Clausewitz, Carl OpenAI optogenetics Orca submarines Ottoman Empire (1299–1922) pain Pakistan Palantir Palmer, Arnold Pandemonium Panoramic Research Papert, Seymour Parkinson’s disease Patriot missile interceptors pattern recognition Pearl Harbor attack (1941) Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE) Pentagon autonomous vehicle research codebreaking research computer mouse development Deep Green Defence Innovation Unit Ellsberg leaks (1971) expert system programme funding ‘garbage in, garbage out’ story intelligence analysts Project Maven (2017–) Shakey unmanned aerial combat research Vietnam War (1955–75) perceptrons Perdix Pershing II missiles Petrov, Stanislav Phalanx system phrenology pilot’s associate Pitts, Walter platform neutrality Pluribus poker policing polygeneity Portsmouth, Hampshire Portuguese Man o’ War post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) Predator drones prediction centaur teams ‘garbage in, garbage out’ story policing toy universes VRYAN Prescience principles of war prisoners Project Improbable Project Maven (2017–) prosthetic arms proximity fuses Prussia (1701–1918) psychology psychopathy punishment Putin, Vladimir Pyeongchang Olympics (2018) Qinetiq Quake III (1999 game) radar Rafael RAND Corporation rational actor model Rawls, John Re:member (Arnalds) Ready Player One (Cline) Reagan, Ronald Reaper drones reciprocal punishment reciprocity reconnaissance regulation ban, campaigns for defection self-regulation reinforcement learning remotely piloted air vehicles (RPAVs) revenge porn revolution in military affairs Rid, Thomas Robinson, William Heath Robocop (1987 film) Robotics Challenge robots Asimov’s rules ATLAS Boston Dynamics homeostatic Shakey symbolic logic and Rome Air Defense Center Rome, ancient Rosenblatt, Frank Royal Air Force (RAF) Royal Navy RQ-170 Sentinel Russell, Stuart Russian Federation German hacking operation (2015) Litvinenko murder (2006) S-70 Okhotnik Skripal poisoning (2018) Ukraine War (2014–) US election interference (2016) S-70 Okhotnik SAGE Said and Done’ (Frahm) satellite navigation satellites Saudi Arabia Schelling, Thomas schizophrenia Schwartz, Jack Sea Hunter security dilemma Sedol, Lee self-actualisation self-awareness self-driving cars Selfridge, Oliver semantic webs Shakey Shanahan, Murray Shannon, Claude Shogi Silicon Valley Simon, Herbert Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) singularity Siri situational awareness situationalist intelligence Skripal, Sergei and Yulia Slaughterbots (2017 video) Slovic, Paul smartphones Smith, Willard social environments software Sophia Sorcerer’s Apprentice, The (Goethe) South China Sea Soviet Union (1922–91) aircraft Berlin Crisis (1961) Chernobyl nuclear disaster (1986) Cold War (1947–9), see Cold War collapse (1991) Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) early warning systems Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) Korean War (1950–53) nuclear weapons radar technology U2 incident (1960) Vienna Summit (1961) Vietnam War (1955–75) VRYAN World War II (1939–45) Space Invaders (1978 game) SpaceX Sparta Spike Firefly loitering munitions Spitfire fighter aircraft Spotify Stanford University Stanley Star Trek (television series) StarCraft II (2010 game) stealth strategic bombing strategic computing programme strategic culture Strategy Robot strategy Strava Stuxnet sub-units submarines acoustic decoys nuclear Orca South China Sea incident (2016) subroutines Sukhoi Sun Tzu superforecasting surveillance swarms symbolic logic synaesthesia synthetic operation environment Syria Taliban tanks Taranis drone technological determinism Tempest Terminator franchise Tesla Tetlock, Philip theory of mind Threshold Logic Unit Thucydides TikTok Tomahawk cruise missiles tongue Top Gun (1986 film) Top Gun: Maverick (2021 film) torpedoes toy universes trade-offs transformational creativity translation Trivers, Robert Trump, Donald tumours Turing, Alan Twitter 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968 film) Type-X Robotic Combat Vehicle U2 incident (1960) Uber Uexküll, Jacob Ukraine ultraviolet light spectrum umwelts uncanny valley unidentified flying objects (UFOs) United Kingdom AI weapons policy armed force, size of Battle of Britain (1940) Bletchley Park codebreaking Blitz (1940–41) Cold War (1947–9) COVID-19 pandemic (2019–21) DeepMind, see DeepMind F-35 programme fighting power human rights legislation in Litvinenko murder (2006) nuclear weapons principles of war Project Improbable Qinetiq radar technology Royal Air Force Royal Navy Skripal poisoning (2018) swarm research wingman concept World War I (1914–18) United Nations United States Afghanistan War (2001–14) Air Force Army Research Lab Army Signal Corps Battle of Midway (1942) Berlin Crisis (1961) Bin Laden assassination (2011) Black Lives Matter protests (2020) centaur team research Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Challenger Space Shuttle disaster (1986) Cold War (1947–9), see Cold War COVID-19 pandemic (2019–21) Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) culture cyber security DARPA, see DARPA Defense Department drones early warning systems F-35 programme Gulf War I (1990–91) Gulf War II (2003–11) IARPA Iran Air shoot-down (1988) Korean War (1950–53) Manhattan Project (1942–6) Marines Mueller inquiry (2017–19) National Security Agency National War College Navy nuclear weapons Office for Naval Research Patriot missile interceptor Pearl Harbor attack (1941) Pentagon, see Pentagon Project Maven (2017–) Rome Air Defense Center Silicon Valley strategic computing programme U2 incident (1960) Vienna Summit (1961) Vietnam War (1955–75) universal grammar Universal Schelling Machine (USM) unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), see drones unsupervised learning utilitarianism UVision V1 rockets V2 rockets Vacanti mouse Valkyries Van Gogh, Vincent Vietnam War (1955–75) Vigen, Tyler Vincennes, USS voice assistants VRYAN Wall-e (2008 film) WannaCry ransomware War College, see National War College WarGames (1983 film) warrior ethos Watson weapon systems WhatsApp Wiener, Norbert Wikipedia wingman role Wittgenstein, Ludwig World War I (1914–18) World War II (1939–45) Battle of Britain (1940) Battle of Midway (1942) Battle of Sedan (1940) Bletchley Park codebreaking Blitz (1940–41) Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings (1945) Pearl Harbor attack (1941) radar technology V1 rockets V2 rockets VRYAN and Wrangham, Richard Wright brothers WS-43 loitering munitions Wuhan, China X-37 drone X-drone X-rays YouTube zero sum games

On the Future: Prospects for Humanity
by Martin J. Rees
Published 14 Oct 2018

Chapter 2 will address the twenty-first-century sciences—bio, cyber, and AI—and what they might portend. Their misuse looms as an increasing risk. The techniques and expertise for bio- or cyberattacks will be accessible to millions—they do not require large special-purpose facilities like nuclear weapons do. Cybersabotage efforts like ‘Stuxnet’ (which destroyed the centrifuges used in the Iranian nuclear weapons programme), and frequent hacking of financial institutions, have already bumped these concerns up the political agenda. A report from the Pentagon’s Science Board claimed that the impact of cyberattack (shutting down, for instance, the US electricity grid) could be catastrophic enough to justify a nuclear response.4 But before that let’s focus on the potential devastation that could be wrought by human-induced environmental degradation, and by climate change.

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See also planets; Sun space, threats to stability of, 112–13, 118 space elevator, 148–49 spaceflight: fuel as impediment to, 148–49; manned, 143–52; pioneering exploits, 138–40 (see also Apollo programme); private companies in, 146–48 space shuttle, 145, 148 space technology: international regulation of, 219; satellites, 140–42 space telescopes, 137, 142, 143 space tourism, 148 SpaceX, 146, 149 speech recognition, 85, 88 spiritual values, environmentalist, 33 Sputnik 1, 138 squirrels, genetic alteration of, 74 stars: as fairly simple objects, 173; in modern cosmology, 214 stem cells, 65 Stern, Nicholas, 42 strangelets, 112, 114 string theory, 169, 180, 187 Stuxnet, 20 Sun: ancient and modern understanding of, 3; eventual doom of Earth due to, 2; galactic location of, 124; life cycle of, 177–78; magnetic storms caused by, 16; nuclear fusion in, 54, 122; origin of, 122. See also solar system Sundback, Gideon, 202 superconductors, 190–91 sustainability, Vatican conference on, 34 sustainable development, 26–27, 28 sustainable intensification of agriculture, 23, 24 technology: improvement in most people’s lives due to, 6, 60, 215; need for appropriate deployment of, 4, 26, 60; optimism about, 5, 225–26; as practical application of science, 202; preserving basic methods for the apocalypse, 216–17; for scientific experiments, 206–7; timescales for advance of, 152; unintended destructive consequences of, 215 telescopes: on far side of Moon, 144; optical Earth-based, 134–35, 137; radio telescopes, 134, 144, 157, 207; space telescopes, 137, 142, 143 Teller, Edward, 110 telomeres, 79 terrorism: biological techniques and, 73, 75, 77–78; in interconnected world, 215; new technology and, 100; nuclear weapons and, 20 Thomas, Chris, 74 thorium-based reactor, 54 3D printing: making consumer items cheaper, 31; of replacement organs, 72 tidal energy, 50–51 timescales: of planning for global challenges, 3–4, 59–60, 217.

The Butterfly Defect: How Globalization Creates Systemic Risks, and What to Do About It
by Ian Goldin and Mike Mariathasan
Published 15 Mar 2014

National e-government services as well as the national infrastructure, including power plants, electricity grids, and oil pipelines, use networked control systems to decrease their operational costs. The concentration of information and power in these digital systems creates points of vulnerability that are open to attack by malevolent forces. One example of such an attack is the deployment of the Stuxnet virus, discovered in 2010, which is widely thought to have caused damage to a uranium enrichment plant in Iran. The virus is believed to have been developed for this purpose by experts with detailed knowledge of Iranian systems and with the involvement of at least one government. Another threat to the virtual integrity of the Internet is cybercrime.

…

See trade Internet: access to, 14, 180, 196; business use of, 75–77, 112, 114, 118, 193; complexity of, 117–18; cyberaggression on, 40, 114–16, 122, 193; cyberattacks on, 113–16; governance of, 122; growth of, 11, 13, 112, 113f, 114f, 224n22; information spread through, 148–49, 193, 194; infrastructure risks, 112–18, 122, 193–94; managing risks on, 122, 193–94, 195; mobile access to, 14; pandemic monitoring on, 165–66; physical infra structure of, 14, 112, 117, 118, 196; servers for, 118, 120f; social risks of, 118–19; traffic on, 112, 114f; users by income bracket, 119, 119f; viruses and worms on, 114–15, 117; vulnerability of, 112–17, 118, 122, 193. See also information technology intuition, 68–69 invasive species, 29, 137, 158 inventories: accounting for, 97; buffer stocks, 84, 85, 95, 98, 207, 208, 213, 214. See also supply chains investment banks. See banks; financial sector Iran, Stuxnet virus, 114–15 IT. See information technology Italy: government debt of, 188; social mobility in, 186; transportation in, 103 Jackson, Michael, 117 Japan: sarin gas attacks, 194; tsunami and earthquake in, 30, 80, 126 Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), 145 just-in-time manufacturing, 78, 79, 85 Kennedy, John F., 34–35 Keohane, Robert O., 201, 211 Kilbourne, Edwin D., 152 Kilpatrick, A.

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See also inequality; political stability SoftLayer, 118 Spanish flu, 149, 150–51. See also influenza spatial risks, 29, 102–4 special-purpose vehicles (SPVs), 42b, 45 Squire, Lynn, 176 Stanford Research Institute, 11 Starbucks, 181, 205 Stern, Nicholas H., 134 Stiglitz, Joseph E., 195 stock markets, 24, 29, 40. See also financial markets Stuxnet virus, 114–15 subcontracting. See outsourcing subsidiarity, 202 Suez Canal, 105–6, 117, 239n14 supply chain risk: complexity of, 92–93; contagion, 92–93, 93f; counterparty, 96–97; definition of, 94; management of, 79, 90–97, 98; systemic, 80–81, 84, 91–93, 95 supply chains: accountability in, 67; accounting issues in, 97–98; connectivity of, 70; definition of, 70; disruptions of, 79–81, 84, 91; diversification of, 96; emergency plans for, 97; financial links, 90, 92; flexibility of, 214; fragmentation of, 78, 81, 84, 91, 92; global, 12, 70–72, 73, 75, 93–94; local, 91; management of, 72, 78, 80, 84–85, 93–99; modular, 91, 95; resilience of, 70, 80–81, 91, 94, 95–96, 213–14; shocks in, 92–93, 93f.

Age of Discovery: Navigating the Risks and Rewards of Our New Renaissance
by Ian Goldin and Chris Kutarna
Published 23 May 2016

Symantec (2015). 2015 Internet Security Threat Report. Volume 20. Mountain View, CA: Symantec. Retrieved from www.symantec.com/security_response/publications/threatreport.jsp 89. Kushner, David (2013, February 26). “The Real Story of Stuxnet.” IEEE Spectrum. Retrieved from spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security. 90. Menn, Joseph (2015, May 29). “US Tried Stuxnet-Style Campaign against North Korea but Failed—Sources.” Reuters. Retrieved from www.reuters.com. 91. Bundesamt fur Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (2014). Die Lage Der IT-Sicherheit in Deutschland 2014. Berlin: German Federal Office for Information Security.

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More recently, in mid-2015, personnel records of 21.5 million current and former employees of the US government, including 5.6 million fingerprint images, were stolen when the Office of Personnel Management was hacked—possibly by a foreign government aiming to recruit informants or identify spies.87 Other highly sophisticated malware initiatives, likely state-sponsored, have likewise penetrated embassies, research institutes and other sensitive targets of governments around the world.88 The rising scale of critical infrastructure connected to the Internet—including defense, chemical, food, transportation, nuclear, water, financial, energy and other systems—means that not just cybercrime, but cyber warfare is now possible. As of 2016, two major cyber attacks causing physical infrastructure damage have been publicly confirmed. In 2010, the Stuxnet worm sabotaged Iran’s uranium enrichment infrastructure by infecting control systems and causing the uranium centrifuges to tear themselves apart.89 (A similar worm had been aimed at North Korea’s facilities, but failed to reach its target because of the country’s extreme isolation.)90 And in 2014, a German steel mill suffered “massive damage” after cyber attackers gained access to the plant’s control systems and caused critical components to fail.91 Many more such strikes are being attempted.

The Great Firewall of China
by James Griffiths;
Published 15 Jan 2018

Within months of Mandiant’s first report on Unit 61398, former National Security Agency contractor, Edward Snowden, flew to Hong Kong, from where he began making dramatic revelations about the extent of US government surveillance and spying. The US had also allegedly built and deployed – along with Israeli intelligence – the Stuxnet virus, a carefully designed cyber-weapon that wreaked havoc on Iran’s nuclear energy programme. But to the Americans, this type of espionage was wholly different to the Chinese hacking, which often targeted private companies and appeared to be done for the benefit of Chinese businesses. It was one thing to steal plans for a fighter jet in order to better defend against it, and quite another to hack a company to uncover information about civil suits against a Chinese competitor, or steal files relating to a merger to undermine negotiations, as Unit 61398 was accused of doing.

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Wu, X. (2005) Chinese Cyber Nationalism: evolution, characteristics and implications, Lanham MD: Lexington Books. Xin, X. (2012) How the Market Is Changing China’s News: the case of Xinhua news agency, Lanham MD: Lexington Books. Yang, G. (2009) The Power of the Internet in China: citizen activism online, New York NY: Columbia University Press. Zetter, J. (2014) Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the launch of the world’s first digital weapon, New York NY: Crown/Archetype. Zhu, Y. (2012) Two Billion Eyes: the story of China Central Television, New York NY: The New Press. Zittrain, J. and B. Edelman (2003) ‘Empirical analysis of internet filtering in China’, Cambridge MA: Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society, https://cyber.harvard.edu/filtering/china/.

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Index Abbott, Tony, 203 acceptable criticism, boundaries of, 75 Access Now, 236 Adelaide, Australia, 206 Adkins, Heather, 169 Admiralty, camp, 19 Adobe, 170 Africa: China presence, 287–8; Huawei earnings, 304; internet in, 291; Xinhua success, 80 Agora, dark web, 100 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 111 AI software, 200 Ai Weiwei, 170, 214 Albert Einstein College of Medicine, 38 Al-Assad, Bashir, 209 Al-Bashir, Omar, 291 Al-Ghanim, Mohamed Nasser, 231 Algeria, 230 Ali, Guzelnur, 195, 198 Alibaba, 200, 235, 242, 279; Alipay, 281; Taobao online marketplace, 210; Yahoo stake in, 67 Allawi, Ayad, 223 Alphabet, 315 Al Qaeda, 199 American Civil Liberties Union, 245 Amir-Ebrahimi, Masserat, 150 Amnesty International, 280 Andreessen Horowitz, 279 Angola, 289 Anhui province, 78 Anite, Evelyn, 303 Anonymous, 185–6, 188 Anti, Michael, 36, 93, 116 anti-Rightist Movement, Xinjiang avoidance, 133 anti-surveillance tools, 5 Antonov, Polina, 254–5 Antonov, Vadim, 253–4 Apple, 1990s faltering, 277 Applebaum, Jacob, 104–5 APT1, 186–7 Arab Spring, 8, 10, 264, 311 Artux, 132, 134 Asia-America Gateway, underwater cable system, 155 AsiaInfo, 31 Asiaweek, 54 Associated Press, 80 Aum Shinrikyo cult, 49 Australia, censorship, 315 Aximujiang Aimaiti, killing of, 146 Azat, Nijat, 157 baby formula scandal, 204 Badiucao, 175, 178–9, 184, 204–5, 207–8, 211–12, 215; smear attempts, 214; ‘traitor’ accusation, 210; Weibo account deleted, 206 Baidu, 4, 63, 171–2, 242, 260; Baike web site, 210; market share growth, 126; party members, 235; patriotism boast, 124; search engine, 165 balinghou generation, 204 Bandurski, David, 212 Bardin, Valery, 253, 255–6 Barlow, John Perry, 6, 243, 246; utopian language, 7 Barlow, Norman, 243 Barr, Aaron, 185–6, 188 Bastrykin, Alexander, 251 Beach, Sophie, 212 Beidaihe, China resort, 47, 89 Beijing, 29; academia elite circles, 134; Beihang University, 234; Engagement Centre ICANN, 234; jamming signals, 107; Medical University, 37; Niujie mosque, 138; Youth Daily, 73 Berners-Lee, Tim, 252 Besigye, Kizza, 292–3, 295–6; ‘preventative arrest’, 298; treason charge, 299 Big Vs, 180 Bijie, 95 Bildt, Carl, 223 Bingtuan, 134 BitTorrent, 5 Blocked on Weibo, 183 blogging, 93 Bloomberg, 80 Bluetooth, communication use, 19 Brand, Stewart, 244 Brautigam, Deborah, 290 Brin, Sergey, 62–3, 116, 119, 168, 315; family history, 171 Brito, Jerry, 229 broadband connection, 155 Brown University, USA, 85 Burkina Faso, 288 Burkov, Dmitry, 253 Bush, George W., 110, 246 BuzzFeed, 199 Charlie Hebdo, attacks on, 209 Callahan, Michael, 119 Cambridge Analytica, 313, 317 Cambridge University, 162 Canada, 232; Tibet Committee, 85–6 Cankao Xiaoxi, 36 Cao Guowei, 182–3 Carnegie, Dale, 117 Cartoonists, persecution of, 209 Catalonia, 2017 referendum, 316 Causeway Bay, camp, 19 CCTV International, 287 censorship: AI-based, 315; anti-tools, 102–3; in-house, 183; manual, 75; software, 101 Cerf, Vint, 221, 228 CERN, 252 Chan, Connie, 279 Chen Jieren, 171 Chen, Kathy, 312 Cheney, Dick, 243–4 Cheng Jianping, 74 China, People’s Republic of, 137, 204; Academy of Sciences, 49, 51; Africa criticism Western hypocrisy, 290–1; Africa investments, 305; censorship, 27; Central Television, 181; Civil Aviation Administration, 310; courts conviction rates, 198; cyber sovereignty doctrine, 8, 234, 292; cybersecurity law 2017, 280; Cyberspace Administration of, 3; Democracy Party, 41–2, 92; Development Bank, 304;domestic security profits, 201; early internet enthusiasm, 32; elite, 90, 117; elite hackers, 172, 192; entertainment industry, 215; factory sexual harassment, 145; first commercial internet service, 25; globalised online influence, 212; Google compromised, 315; high-speed rail system, 176–7; human rights lawyers, 206; internet companies overseas business, 236; Internet Network Information Centre, 235; Internet Society of, 64; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 165, 167; Ministry of Public Security, 26; National Electronics Import & Export Corporation, 303; National Defence Daily, 153; nationalised internet, 231; Netcom Communications, 31–2; official aid budget, 289; PLA, see below; Qigong Science Research Society, 48; Qing Empire era, 205; social credit system, 281–3; State Council, 42, 11, 181, 241; tech firms security contracts, 200; Telecom, 30–1, 156; telecoms buying, 30; 2008 Olympics, 180; UN advocacy, 233; Unicom, 156; US Embassy in, 180; -US relations, 109; WTO joining, 91, 92; Youth Daily, 64, 172 China Digital Times, US-based, 76 ChinaNet, 30 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), CCP, 8, 42, 74, 288; internal politics, 312; Politburo Standing Committee, 165 Chinese Golden Shield, 104 Chinese Institute of Computer Applications, 24 Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, 77 choke points, China internet, 29 CIA (US Central Intelligence Agency), 85, 161; Q-Tel venture capital arm, 108 circumvention tools: Tor, 101; user lack, 71 Cisco, 29, 32, 115, 119, 236, 304; basic filtering technology, 32 Citizen Lab, 159–60, 163–4, 276 Civic Square, Hong Kong, 15, 17, 20; pro-democracy rally 2014, 16 ‘civilized behaviour’, as censorship, 240 Clarke, Ian, 99 Clinton, Bill, 43, 246; China internet optimism, 42 Clinton, Hillary, 173, 211, 264 CNET.com, 84 CNN, 56–7 Coca Cola, 187 Cohen, Jared, 111 Cold War, 106 collective action, China surveillance attention, 74 Columbia Law School, 241 Comey, James, 190–1 Comment Crew, 187 Communications Decency Act, USA, 245 Communist Youth League, 171 “Complete IT Intrusion Portfolio”, 293 Confucius Institute, 288 Connaught Road camp, Hong Kong, 17 Contemporary Business News, 64 Crimea, Russian invasion, 267 CQRS, 49 Crowley, P.J., 111 Cuba, 237 Cultural Revolution, 8, 23, 24, 48, 176, 205; Xinjing avoidance, 133 ‘cyber-sovereignty’, China doctrine, 8, 234, 237–8, 242, 250 Cyberspace Administration of China, 181 Da Cankao, 35–6, 79, 91, 93, 97; back issues, 100; defeat of, 92; first issue, 39 Dalai Lama, 84–5, 87, 160, 206, 309; office hacked, 162 Darfur, 291 Deibert, Ron, 159–60 Delta Airlines, 309 Democracy Forum, 65, 66 Democratic National Committee, Russian hacking of, 192 Demos/Relcom, Russia, 252–3, 255–6 Deng Xiaoping, 21–4, 47, 89; martial law declaration, 37 Dharamsala, 85–8, 160, 163, 276; internet, 84, 160 ‘digital divide’, 222 Dilshat Perhat, 150 Ding, James, 30–1 DIT, Broadcasting Board of Governors, 108 Diyarim.com, 150–1, 157 Djibouti naval base, 289 domain name system (DNS), 220 Dorsey, Jack, 111 dot.com bubble, first, 84 Dourado, Eli, 228–32 Dow Chemical, 170 Dow Jones, 81 Downey, Brandon, 314 Dreazen, Yochi, 110 DropBox, 276 Drummond, David, 61–2, 171 Dunhuang, 154 Durov, Pavel, 259–63, 265–6, 268–9, 272; Dubai exile, 270; flight, 267 Dynamic Internet Technology, 104, 106–7; Broadcasting Board of Governors, 108 DynaWeb, 101–2; Foundation, 106 Dzungaria, 136 ‘East Turkestan’, 136, 149; question of, 152 Eastern Buddhas Study Falun Dafa Association, 97 Education Computer Resource Centre, India, 86 Egypt, 230–1; Twitter, 264 Eiffel Tower, website crash, 2 Electronic Frontier Foundation, 244–6 elite, Chinese, 90, 117 email address grabbing, 35 encryption, 268–9 Epoch Times, 96–8 Epstein, Helen, 297 Ethiopia, 10, 289, 304 EU (European Union), WSIS stance, 223 Eudora, 88 Eximbank, 288 Facebook, 18, 242, 264, 282, 286, 297, 301, 303, 312–13, 317; banned, 183; censoring by, 314; Firewall blocked, 259, 278; Internet.org, 291 ‘fake news’ panic, 311, 314 Falun Gong, 9, 28, 45–6, 49, 59, 62, 91, 96, 102, 107–8, 112, 118; anti- campaign, 48, 58; blocking of, 99; China mass detentions, 54; community, 103; CRQS withdrawal, 51; members self-immolating, 56; -neoconservatives link, 98; North America shift, 96–7; online censorship, 55; origins, 47 Research Society, 54 FalunDafa.org, 97 Fang Binxing, 249–50 FBI (US Federal Bureau of Investigations), 186, 190–1 FDC (Forum for Democratic Change, 294–6, 300 Ferzat, Ali, 209 filters, border, 29 financial crash 2008, 8, 289 FinFisher, 293, 294 FireChat, 19 FireEye, 192 foreign media coverage, importance of, 255 France, Rwanda Hutu aid, 291 Freedom House, 104 FreeGate, 95–6, 103, 105, 107–9, 110, 112–13; successful, 104; user-friendly, 102 FreeNet China, 99, 101; 2001 launched, 100 freetibet.org, 163 Friedman, Tom, 90, 246 Friendster, 260 Friends of Tibet, 308 FSB, Russia, 265–6, 269 Fuyou Street, Beijing, 45 Gaddafi, Muammar, 290 Gallagher, Ryan, 314 Gamma Group, 293 Gang of Eight, USSR, 254–5 Gauthier, Ursula, 199 George Mason University, 228 Geshe Sopa, 84 Ghost Remote Administration Tool (Gh0st Rat), 162–3; hackers, 164 Gilmore, John, 244 Github, DDos attack, 1–4, 310 global governance, cycles of, 236 Global Internet Freedom Consortium (GIFC), 102, 110; funding boom, 109; projects, 112 Global Internet Inc, 106 Global Times, 172 GoAgent, 5, 6 Golden Shield project, 26–7, 91 Goldsmith, Jack, 30, 219, 243 gongfu, Chinese martial art, 48 Google, 64, 113; 2002 blocked, 91, 2006 China attitude, 115, 2009 accusations, 167, censorship compliance, 118, censorship reversal, 172, China ‘foreignness’ accusation, 125, China blocked, 166, China brand, 117, China cultural errors, 126, China operating, 116, China strategy, 119, Chinese-language search engine, 62, Congressional hearing, 120, 124, cultural mistakes, 125; Dragonfly, 314, Google China, 61, 62, 165, 246; Google Drive, 162; hacked, 168, Schrage accusation, 121, shareholder critique, 168, US criticism, 173, US media criticism, 115 Google.cn search engine, 117 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 75, 173, 252, 255–6; KGB detained, 253 Gordon, Richard, 176 Gore, Al, 31 government commentators employed, 213 Grateful Dead, 244 Great Cannon, China cyber weapon, 3–4 ‘Great Firewall’, 5, 8, 9, 26–7, 29, 43, 46, 58, 66, 71, 90, 92, 99, 101, 107, 112, 117, 159, 199, 207, 242, 311; Cisco help, 116; costs of fighting it, 106; export of, 10; Google brief ejection, 124; international spreading of, 310; keywords detection, 28; Kremlin copy, 260; Uganda import, 287; upgrading of, 92; US components, 30 Great Hall of the People, 23 Great Leap Forward, 8, 138; Xinjiang avoidance, 133 Great Wall, historical, 25 GreatFire.org, 3–4 ‘Green Dam Youth Escort’, 27, 98 Greenwald, Glenn, 268 Group of 77, 237 Gu Ge, name error, 125 see also NoGuGe Guangdong, 143, 201 Guangxi, 78 Guangzhou, 29 Gulf of Aden, 289 Guo Wengui, 92 Guomindang, 49 Guonei Dongtai Qingyang, 79 Haig, Dan, 83–4, 86–8, 160 Hainan, Lingshui: signals intelligence, 164; servers in, 163 ‘Harmony’ CCP-speak, 72 Harris, Rachel, 151 Harvard, 71, 74, 91; Law, 244 HBGary Federal, 185–6; hack, 188 He Guoqiang, 171 He Zuoxiu, 49 Hefei, anti-corruption case, 280 Hinton, Carma, 176 Hitchens, Christopher, 49 Hoglund, Greg, 186 Holder, Eric, 189 Holdstock, Nick, 137, 149 home routers, 217 Hong Kong: Admiralty, 18; Broadband, 155; Chinese University, 217; Civic Square, 15; independence discussions, 20; Internet Exchange, 217–18; parliamentary elections, 19; Science Park, 200; 2014 effect, 19; Umbrella Movement, 255 Horowitz, Michael, 107, 109 hosts.txt file, 219 HP corporation, 245 Hsu, Stephen, 108 Hu Jintao, 184 Hu Qiheng, 234 Hu Yaobang, 21 Huai Jinping, 234 Huang Cuilian, 145 Huang Shike, arrest of, 280 Huang, Alan, 102 Huawei, 251, 288; military ties, 235; Uganda censorship profits, 304 Hudson Institute, 107 Human Rights in China, New York, 76 Human Rights Watch, 147, 234 Hvistendahl, Mara, 281 IBM Nazi Germany connection comparison, 119, 122–3 ICANN see Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers Ilham, Jewher, 141, 195–8 images, censorship challenges, 208 India, blackouts, 87 Indiana University, 195–6 Infocom, 222; prosecution of, 223 Inner Mongolia massacre, 133 Instagram, 309, 316 intellectuals, anti-qigong, 49 International Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, 30 International Criminal Court, 299 international telecommunications, access as human right, 232 internet: access points, 28; Africa blackouts, 10; China war on, 6; Chinese characters, 31; construction control, 156; content providers government registration, 72; founders, 219; governance, 225, 228; intergovernmental control, 223; unwritten rules, 72; US control conflict, 222; utopianism, 245; workings of, 155 Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, 219, 222 Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), 221–5, 228, 230, 256; China influence, 234; China pushing, 237 Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), 234 Internet Explorer browser, 169 Internet Governance Forum, 224 Internet Society of China, 234–5 IP server connection, 28, 155; addresses workings of, 154; numbers, 219 Iran, 111; Green revolution, 311; social networking blocking, 111; 2009 election protests, 110, 112, 246 Iraq: US invasion of 2003, 223; Uyghur fighters, 199 ‘iron rice bowl’ jobs, 47 Isa, Aziz, 151 Islamic State, 199; internet use, 9; Paris attacks, 269 Islamists, 195 Israeli intelligence, 190 Jacobs, Justin, 137 Jiang Qing, 133 Jiang Zemin, 32, 78, 90–1, 184 Jiangsu province, 74 Jiao Guobiao, dismissal of, 95 Jilin, China, 47–8 Jobs, Steve, 117, 259 Jones, Roy, 307–9 Kadeer, Rebiya, China riots blame, 152 Kaifu Lee, 116–17, 124–6, 165–6, 171–2; government fights, 167; Making a World of Difference, 118 Kalathil, Shanthi, 236 Kang Xiaoguang, 54 Kapor, Mitch, 244 Kaspersky Labs, Moscow, 192 keywords, 184; Chinese language filtering, 208; detection, 28 KGB/FSB (USSR/Russia), 256–7, 265–6, 269 Kirillovich, Vladimir, 249 Kiselyov, Dmitry, 247 Kissinger, Henry, 108 Kleinwächter, Wolfgang, 223 Kot, Edward, 264–5 Kramer, Terry, 228–9, 232–3 Kremlin, deep packet inspection, 266 Kristof, Nick, 46 Krumholtz, Jack, 122–3 Kryuchkov, Vladimir, 253 Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy, 252, 256, 261 LAN protocols, 241 Lantos, Tom, 122 Leach, Jim, 120; censorship accusation, 121 Leavy, Penny, 186 Leo Technology, Urumqi-based, 200 letter substitutions, 107 Leung Chun-ying, 19 Leviev, Lev, 267 Levy, Stephen, 118 Lhasa, 85 Li Chang, 54 Li Changchun, 165–6, 171 Li Dongxiao, 178 Li Gang, 5 Li Hongkuan, 35–6, 38–9, 79, 91–3, 99 Li Hongzhi, 47–50, 53–6, 96–7, 99, 103; books banned, 46; teachings of, 52; USA move, 51 Li Keqiang, 240 Li Peng, 26, 42; martial law declaration, 21 Li Yuanlong, 95; son’s arrest, 96 Li Zhi, 148 Li, Robin, 124–6, 172 Lin Hai, 39 Link, Parry, 73 Liu Xiaobo, 66, 198 LiveJournal, DDoS attack, 264 Lo, Kenneth, 217–18 Lockheed Martin, 187 Lokodo, Simon, 304 love bug, 161 Lu, Phus, 5–6 Lu Wei, 78, 80–1, 207, 237, 242, 249, 312; downfall of, 313; promotion, 181; rise of, 79 Luo Fuhe, 77 Ma Zhaoxu, 173 Ma, Jack, 67 Ma, Pony, 280 MacArthur Genius Grant, 76 MacKinnon, Rebecca, Consent of the Networked, 72 Mail.ru, 267 Makanim.com, 149 Makerere University, 295, 300 Malofeev, Konstantin, 248–51 malware, 162; specialised, 163 Mandiant, malware, 186, 188–90 Manitsme, malware family, 188 Manning, Chelsea, 229; defence fund, 186 Mao Zedong, 184, 240; Anti-Rightist campaigns, 205; death of, 23; Great Leap Forward, 89 Marczak, Bill, 3 Marriott Global Reservations Sales and Customer Care Centre, 307–8; China apology, 309; Chinese language website, 308 Martínez, Antonio García, 317 mass mailings, 103 May Fourth Movement, 176 McLaughlin, Andrew, 117 Medvedev, Dmitry, 263 melamine, contaminated, 204 Messi, Lionel, 278 Micek, Peter, 236 Microsoft, 115–16, 119, 245 Millward, James, 133, 137 Minghui.org, 97 Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 235–6 Minzu Iniversity, 134 Mirilashvili, Vyacheslav, 260, 267 MIT Media Lab, 243 mobile payments, 279 Moma, Google intranet, targeted, 169 Mong Kok, camp, 19 Montreal, 85 Morozov, Evgeny, 110 Mountain View Google HQ, 116, 169 Mugabe, Robert, 285, 290 Murong Xuecun, 205 Museveni, Yoweri, 285, 287, 292–3, 296–8, 300, 301–3, 305; Kampala opposition, 286; 2016 swearing in, 299 Museveni, Janet, 286 MySpace, 260 Nagaraja, Shishir, 162 Nairobi, Chinese language signs, 288 Namubiru, Lydia, 305 Nanfang Daily, 64 Nanjing, 36; University, 212 Nasa, Goddard Space Flight Center, 99 National Endowment for Democracy, 92, 108 National Reconciliation Day, 158 nationalism, Chinese, 8 Navalny, Alexei, 263–5 Negroponte, Nicholas, 243 Network Solutions, 220–1 New Tang Dynasty Television, 97 Newland, Jesse, 2 Ng, Jason Q., 183 Nigeria, 232 Noah, Trevor, 302 NoGuGe.com, 126 non-aggression, cyber pact, 251 Northrop Grumman, 170 Nossik, Anton, 257, 262 Nur Bekri, 146, 148 Nureli, 157 Nyanzi, Stella, 286–7, 303, 305; imprisoned, 301–2; Stella, persecution of, 300 Obama, Barack, 157, 165, 191, 228, 246; ‘pivot to Asia’, 192 Obote, Milton, 292; overthrow of, 285 Occupy movement, 9 Office of Personnel Management (OPM), 190, Chinese hacked, 191 “Operation Fungua Macho”, 293 Ownby, David, 55, 98 Page, Larry, 116, 168, 171 Palmer, David, 50 Palmer, Mark, 107–9 Pan Shiyi, 180–2 Pan Yiheng, 177 Panama Papers, 251 ‘patriotic hackers’,161 peer-to-peer software, Chinese, 101 Pegasus, early email software, 86 Pentagon, the, 161 perestroika, 75 Perhat, Dilshat, 157 Pfeifle, Mark, 110 Philippines, 161; China boycotts call, 77 Piccuta, Dan, 165–6 Pirate Bay, file-sharing website, 185 PLA (Chinese People’s Liberation Army), 22, 37, 132, 240, 242, 251, 312; Third Technical Department, 164; US indictment, 189 pornography, 91, 105–6 Postel, John, 219, 221–2, 228; ‘benevolent dictator’, 220 Press, Larry, 254–5 Prophet Muhammed, image forbidden, 209 proxies: sharing of, 102; use of, 101 ‘public opinion channellers’, 214 ‘public order’, CCP-speak, 72 Public Pledge on Self-Discipline for the Chinese Internet, 64 Public Security Bureau, 149 Putin, Vladimir, 228, 247, 249, 251, 257, 262–6; internet concern, 261 qigong, 55; enthusiasm for, 47; groups, 50 masters’ absurd claims, 49; opinion shift against, 48 Qin Yongmin, 42 Qin Zhihui, arrest, 182 Qing Gang, 35 QQ, 182, 277 Qzone, 182, 278 Radio Free Asia, 106, 147, 248, 311 Rajagopalan, Megha, 199 Rand Corporation, 192 Razak, Najib, 209 Reagan, Ronald, 248 Rebel Pepper, 212, 215 Red Guards, 133 Reincarnation Party, 209 Relcom see Demos/Relcom Ren Zhengfei, 251 RenRen, 182 Reporters Without Borders, 64 Republic of China (ROC/Taiwan), 288 Reuters, 80–1 RFA, 108; 1994 launch, 107 riots, Urumqi, 148 ‘River Elegy’, TV programme, 20 Robinson, Michael, 30–2 Roldugin, Sergei, 251 root authority, 201 rootkit.com, 186, 188 Rosenberg, Jonathan, 117 Roskomnadzor, 266, 269, 270 Ross, Alec, 264 Rossiya Segodnya, 247–8 RSA, hacked, 187 RT, TV station, 247, 311 Runet, 257, 270 Russian Federation, 10, 237; early years of, 256; FAPSI, 257; firewall urgency of, 251; internet blacklist, 266; internet use surge, 257; liberal internet era, 262; Libertarian Party, 272 nationalised internet, 231; Safe Internet Forum, 248; 2012 election protests, 251 Sadikejiang Kaze, killing of, 146 Safe Internet League, 249–50 Safe Web, Triangle Boy, 108 Sakharov, Andrei, 270 Salkin.com, 157 Samdup, Thubten, 85–6, 160 Saudi Arabia, 230 Saulsbury, Brendan, 190 Schmidt, Eric, 116, 124, 127, 168; China strategy support, 126; Google outvoted, 171 Schneider, Rick, 87 Schrage, Elliot, 120–4 ‘secret backdoors’, 162 Seldon, Tenzin, 170 self-censorship, Google justification, 120 self-immolation, 58 SenseTime, 200 Sha Tin New Town, Hong Kong, 217 Shambaugh, David, 233 Shanghai, 29; Cooperation Organisation, 251; Cyberspace Administration, 308; European Jews haven, 205; Expo 2010, 180; police computer security, 35 Shaoguan incident see Xuri Toy factory Shchyogolev, Igor, 248, 250 Shen Yun, performance group, 97 Shenzhen, 143; public security bureau, surveillance division, 72–3 Shi Caidong, 51–3 Shi Tao, 64–5 67, 76, 116, 119; prison sentence, 66 Sichuan province, 201 Siemens BS2000 mainframe computer, 24 Signal, encryption app, 268 Silicon Valley, 1; biggest companies, 59; private enterprise victory, 7 Silk Road, dark web, 100 Sima Nan, 49 Sina Weibo, 182–3, 278; censors at, 75 Sino-Soviet split, 288 Sither, Lobsang Gyatso, 276–7, 283 Smirnov, Sergei, 266 Smith, Chris, 115 Smith, Craig, 90, 309 Snapchat, 260 Snowden, Edward, 190, 268, 269; revelations of, 313 Sobel, David, 245 social media, companies, 7 Soldatov, Alexey, 256, 261 solidarity: surveillance attention, 74; threat of, 10 Solzhenitsyn, Alexander, 5 Song Zheng, 235 South China Sea: Chinese ambitions, 192; international court ruling, 77 spammers, trading among, 39 ‘spear-phishing’, 159, 187 ‘spiritual pollution’, 35 Sprint, 30–1 St Petersburg: briefcase bomb 2017, 269; State University, 260 Stanford Research Institute, 220 State Commission of Machine Industry, 24 Steve Jackson Games, 245 Stevens, John Paul, 245 Students for a Free Tibet, 170 Stuxnet virus, 190 Sudan, 230, 290 Sullivan, Andrew, 110 Sulzberger Jr, Arthur Ochs, 89–90 supremacist ideology, Han, 133 Surkov, Vladislav, 262–3 Sweden, 232 Symantec, 108, 170 Syria, Uyghur fighters, 199 System of Operative Search Measures, Russia, 257 Taiwan see Republic of China Tanzania, 288; Tan–Zam railway line, 287 Tarim Basin, 136 Tarnoff, Ben, 317 tear gas, 18 tech giants, collaboration accusation, 119 techno-libertarians, 243, 246 Telegram app, 268, 272; banned, 269; blocked, 270 Tencent, 182, 235, 279, 281–2; data hoovering, 280; leg up, 278; WeChat, 277; Weibo, 278 The Atlantic, 110 The Gate of Heavenly Peace, subtitled version, 176 The New Republic, 110 The New York Times, 3, 89–90, 100, 111, 179, 211, 223, 257 The People’s Daily, 21, 79, 172, 178, 246 The Wall Street Journal, 110, 309 The Washington Post, 57, 110, 302 Third World Academy of Sciences, 24 Tian, David, 99 Tian, Edward, 30–1 Tiananmen Square, 9, 21, 25, 46, 62, 99, 175; anger, 38; crackdown, 89, 107; massacre, 22, 26, 3, 208; massacre 20th anniversary, 166; Mothers, 65; movement, 20, 76; Papers, 100; protests, 78; self-immolation, 56–7; Tianjin protest, 52–4 Tibet, 83–4, 98, 106, 138, 149, 210; Action Institute, 274, 276; Computer Resource Centre, 86, 161; diaspora battling cyberspies, 276; Freedom Movement fund for, 163; Institute of the Performing Arts, 85; PLA victory, 85; Youth Congress, 85 Tohti, Ilham, 132, 134, 140–1, 143, 150, 152, 158, 195, 199; detention, 157; father killing, 133; harassment experience, 135; trial of, 131, US exile, 140 Tor Browser, 100, 102 Touré, Hamadoun, 228, 231, 236 traffic spikes, websites, 2 Trivedi, Aseem, 209 trolls: Badiucao attacks, 211; pro-China government, 92, 212 Trump, Donald, 192 Tsai Ing-wen, 212 Tsang, Donald, 15 Tunis Agreement 2005, 237 Tunisia, 9; Facebook, 264 Turnbull, Malcolm, 203 Tusiime, Samson, 295–6, 304; arrest of, 300 Twitter, 111, 207, 211, 246, 296–7, 303, 307, 309, 311–12; banned, 183; blocked, 27; ‘Revolution’, 110 UAE (United Arab Emirates), 230 Uganda: Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence, 293; Communications Commission, 303–4; Computer Misuse Act, 300; fake wireless hotspots, 294; security services, China learning, 295, 303; Special Investigations Unit, 300; Telecom, 304; Trojan horse viruses, 294; Twitter, 300; 2016 election, 296–8; ‘walk to work’ protests, 292 UgandaDecides, hashtag, 297 UglyGorilla, 187–8 UK (United Kingdom), 232 Ukraine, 250 Ulhaque, Zulkiflee Anwar (Zunar), 209 UltraSurf, 102, 105, 107–10, 112; programming, 106; successful, 104 Umbrella Movement/generation, 16, 19–20 United Nations, 10, 313; ‘cyber-sovereignty’, concept of, 224; ITU, 225, 227–32, 236; ITRs, 225, 233; WSIS, 222 Unit 61398, 190–1; indictment of, 189 United Arab Emirates, 230 United Russia party 2011 rally, 263 University of British Columbia, 309 University of California, Berkeley, 30 University of Edinburgh, 99 University of Helsinki, 253 University of Southern California, 220–1 University of Toronto, 159; Citizen Lab, 3–4 university servers, 35 URLs: blocking of, 29; proxies, 102–3 Urumqi, 132, 136, 153–4, 201; -Beijing link, 156; Han revenge attacks, 149; internet cut-off, 151; People’s Intermediate Court, 131; police attack, 148; proxies, 102–3; riots, 183; student protest, 146–7 USA: Chinese Embassy protests, 98; -China relationship, 112; Commerce Department, 222; Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 219; Google Congressional hearing, 122; House Subcommittee on Human Rights, 115; imperialism internet use, 112; National Security Agency, 170, 244, 268, 293, 313; Republican Party, 244; Senate Sub-Committee on Human Rights, 108; State Department, 22, 81, 109–11, 166, 298 UseNet, 253 Usmanov, Alisher, 261, 267 USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): dissolution of, 256; 1990s internet start, 252 Uyghurs, Chinese language forums, 157, dangerous vagabonds characterised, 132; discrimination against, 138–9, 152; doppa headgear, 132; internet, 143, 150; pervasive unemployment, 134; stereotyping of, 140; terrorism label, 140; Uyghur Online, 131, 135, 139, 151, 157; websites control, 149 Villeneuve, Nart, 159–60, 162–3 VIP Reference, 35 virtual private networks (VPNs), 9, 103, 113, 157, 299; apps, 297; users, 28 VKontakte (VK), 259–60, 262, 267; customer support, 265; groups, 270; user base growth, 261 Voice of America, 106–8, 248, 311 Voice of China, 287 Voice of Russia, 247 “Walk to Work” protests, 294 Walton, Greg, 160–3, 276 Wang Baodong, 109 Wang Dong, 188–9 Wang Lequan, 152 Wang Liming, 209, 210 Wang Yongping, 178 Wang Youcai, 42 Wang Yunfeng, 24, 25 Wang Zhiwen, 54 Wang, Jack, 188 ‘War on Terror’, 290 WCITLeaks, 229–31, 233, 236 Weaver, Nicholas, 3 WeChat (Weixin), 207, 242, 277–8, 281–3; censorship challenge, 268; monopoly of, 278; payments system, 279–80 Weibo, 46, 177–9, 181, 184, 206–7, 210, 268, 277; failure, 215; ingenuity of, 182; microbloggers use, 180; muzzling of, 214; public offering, 182; surveillance sidestep attempts, 208; Weiboscope, 77 Weigel, Moira, 317 Weir, Bob, 244 Wen Jiabao, 79–80 Wenhui Daily, 173 Wenzhou train crash, 177, 179; internet revealed, 178 Westinghouse, 187 Wexler, Robert, 123 WhatsApp, 16, 268, 278, 296, 303, 316 Whole Earth ‘Lectronic Link, 244 WikiLeaks, 104, 185–6, 315–16 Wikipedia, specific pages blocked, 27 Wired, 84, 106, 243–4 World Bank, 24 World Conference on International Telecommunications, 227; Leaks see above World Internet Conference 2015, 241 World Uyghur Congress, 152 World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), 234 WSIS 10, 237; US victory, 224 WTO (World Trade Organization), 80–1; China joining, 42, 91–2 Wu, Dandan, 125 Wu, Tim, 30, 219, 241, 243 wumao, 212 wumaodang, recruited students, 213 Wuyi, Zhejiang province, 310 Wuzhen, 239–40 Xabnam.com, 157 Xi Jinping, 81, 181, 191, 203, 207, 238–40, 281, 312; internet clampdown, 78 Xia, Bill, 99–100, 102–3, 107, 112 Xiao Qiang, 76, 21 Xi’an, Shaanxi province, 154 Xinhua, 56–7, 64, 77, 78, 156, 181; commercial offerings, 80; Hong Kong bureau, 79; journalists’ watchdog role, 79; official line, 148 Xinjiang Autonomous Region, 107, 131–2, 135, 140, 148, 156, 195, 199, 210, 280; Beijing terrorism lens, 152; famine avoidance, 138; internet access, 156; internet blackout, 153; new policies of control, 200; Qing Empire, 137; Shanshan county, 201; University, 150 Xu Hong, 39 Xu Wendi, 42 Xue, Charles, 180, 181 Xuri Toy Factory/Shaoguan incident, 143, 146; footage of, 151; Uyghur workers, 144–5 Yahoo, 115, 119, 170; arrest responsibility, 116; China subsidiary, 63–4, 67; informer role criticised, 66 Yanayev, Gennady, 253 Yang Jisheng, 20 Yang, Jerry, 66–7 Yanukovych, Viktor, 267 Yeltsin, Boris, 75, 254–5, 257; resignation, 261 YouTube, 167, 246, 274, 303, 314, 316; blocked, 183 Yu Jie, China’s Best Actor, 80 Yu Wanli, 173–4, 246 Yuan Zengxin, 138 Zambia, 304 Zara, 309 Zhang Zhenhuan, 49 Zhang Jianchuan, 235 Zhang, Shawn, 309 Zhao Houlin, 236–7 Zhao Jing, 36 Zhao Ziyang, 80, 889; house arrest, 21–2 Zhongnanhai complex, 45; 1999 protest, 46, 52–3, 55 Zhou Yongkang, 171 Zhu Rongji, 53 Zhu, Julie, 62 Zhuan Falun, 50; text banned, 52 Zimbabwe, 10, 290, 304 Zorn, Werner, 24–5 ZTE, 288 Zuckerberg, Mark, 260, 312 Zed is a platform for marginalised voices across the globe.

Pegasus: How a Spy in Your Pocket Threatens the End of Privacy, Dignity, and Democracy
by Laurent Richard and Sandrine Rigaud
Published 17 Jan 2023

Unlike any other Mexican governmental office I have been to, there are no plants, no decoration, no grass, nothing. Basic waste of money.” Vincenzetti and his acolytes had a good laugh at that, and as this confirmed their suspicions that Pegasus was a horse that didn’t hunt, they breathed a little easier. But not entirely easy. Because, first of all, NSO was an Israeli company, and recent press about Stuxnet, the spectacular malware that single-handedly set back Iran’s nuclear program by years (if not decades), suggested the exploit was built on the brain power of Israeli techs. Israeli technology, Vincenzetti occasionally lamented, was “invariably overvalued.” More worrisome, NSO’s real strength was in selling, and at enormously inflated prices.

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The cyberintelligence specialists in 8200 worked long and hard—sometimes full twenty-four-to-forty-eight-hour shifts during special operations. The young techs might spend their days and nights listening in on suspected terrorist cells, disabling an enemy’s early-warning system before an Israeli airstrike, helping to engineer the Stuxnet malware that crippled Iran’s nuclear program, or providing eyes and ears (by remote) for a secret combat mission. A young cybersoldier could find herself on the phone with a curious cabinet minister or an Israeli general or a commander whose troops were, at that very moment, in a life-and-death firefight.

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See Amnesty International, Security Lab Security Tracking Devices, SA de CV (STDi) Security Without Borders Sempra Shackleton, Fiona Signal 60 Minutes Smith, Matthew Noah SMS messages Snowden, Edward SoCalGas social media Le Soir Somalia sources, protection of South Sudan spyware. See cybersurveillance software Stahl, Lesley Stark, Holger State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) Stuxnet Sudan Süddeutsche Zeitung Sullivan, Drew the Sun Sunray, Shmuel Susumo Azano SwissLeaks scandal Switzerland Symbian cell phones Syria Szabó, András Tahrir Square, occupation of Tajikistan Tehelka Tel Aviv, Israel terrorism Thakurta, Paranjoy Guha Timberg, Craig Time magazine Togo Tolfi, Lahcen Tor Travère, Audrey Truecaller Trump, Donald Trump, Donald, Jr.

Liars and Outliers: How Security Holds Society Together
by Bruce Schneier
Published 14 Feb 2012

Other cities followed J.L. Lyman (1964), “The Metropolitan Police Act of 1829: An Analysis of Certain Events Influencing the Passage and Character of the Metropolitan Police Act in England,” The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, & Police Science, 55:141–54. Internet worm Stuxnet Kim Zetter (2011), “How Digital Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, the Most Menacing Malware in History,” Threat Level blog, Wired.com. salami attacks Michael E. Kabay (24 Jul 2002), “Salami Fraud,” Network World. just use software Bruce Schneier (2000), Secrets & Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World, John Wiley & Sons. delayed publishing Eric Lichtblau (26 Mar 2008), “The Education of a 9/11 Reporter: The Inside Drama Behind the Times' Warrantless Wiretapping Story,” Slate.

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We've seen music and movie piracy grow from a minor annoyance to an international problem due to the ease of distributing pirated content on the Internet. We've seen Internet worms progress from minor annoyances to criminal tools to military-grade weapons that cause real-world damage, like the Internet worm Stuxnet, the first military-grade cyberweapon the public has seen. All this has come about because information technology increases the scope of defection in several ways: Migration of all data onto the Internet. As data moves onto computer networks, there are more—and, more importantly, different—risks.

The Stack: On Software and Sovereignty
by Benjamin H. Bratton
Published 19 Feb 2016

In this large-scale bandwidth, provision and access becomes a core spatial planning strategy, whether for small market cities like Kansas City, Missouri, the first test bed for Google's 100 megabyte fiber network, or for large market actors like traders who relocate their offices farther down the island in Manhattan to get closer to the central switches on Wall Street and shave nanoseconds off high-speed trading cycles. Despite its global spread and horizontal ubiquity, for Stack urbanism, proximity to the center, as defined by supermassive concentrations of bit flows, is seen as essential. 12.  See David Kusner, “The Real Story of Stuxnet,” IEEE Spectrum, February 23, 2013, http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-real-story-of-stuxnet. 13.  As well as simulations of all of these, as evidenced by the imaginary ISIS attack on Louisiana as invented by Russian mischief makers. See Cory Doctorow, “Imaginary ISIS Attack on Louisiana and the Twitterbots Who Loved It,” http://boingboing.net/2015/03/08/imaginary-isis-attack-on-louis.html. 14. 

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We will see that this integration of one into the other looks less like Leon Battista Alberti's organismic city, all parts fitting into natural wholes, than gory multispecies nested parasitism, one organism living inside another, itself perhaps living inside yet another, and shuttling energy in and out, through skins and interfaces. For this figure, the City layer is an urbanism of catalytic digestion more than settled homeostasis; its appetites are computational but no less violent for it. The Stack is also expressed in City versus City remote warfare, as dramatized by the launching of the Stuxnet virus into Iranian nuclear facilities (perhaps physically installed there by hand, perhaps inadvertently downloaded), where the software took hold of specific centrifuges and tricked them into malfunctioning but reporting themselves as fully operational.12 This sort of weaponized transurban code is not so unlike a parasitoid fungus, Orphiocordyceps unilateralis, for example, which infects the brain of a species of ant and directs its zombie to crawl to the precise height in the jungle canopy suitable by temperature and humidity for the fungus to fully spore and where the ant husk becomes a factory for the production of more fungus.

…

A User could be as “small” as an algorithm executed on a particular server or as “large” as the human population of a City combined over the span of a year. A Stack will work just as well with a tight scalar fit between what is situated at different layers (i.e., a human User and a standard keyboard Interface) or a loose scalar fit (i.e., a tiny algorithm and a distant megastructure, such as for Stuxnet). The Stack, and therefore also the design of The Stack, is qualified by these kinds of simultaneities, correspondences, parallels, desynchronizations, mismatches, and phase shifts. As far as geodesign is concerned, that blur between one Stack and another is not a symptom to be clarified and cured; rather, the blur is a high-resolution image of what is actually happening, which itself is blurry.

Four Battlegrounds
by Paul Scharre
Published 18 Jan 2023

Knopf, 1993), 3, 12. 280“I’m certainly questioning my original premise”: Aaron Mehta, “AI Makes Mattis Question ‘Fundamental’ Beliefs About War,” C4ISRNET, February 17, 2018, https://www.c4isrnet.com/intel-geoint/2018/02/17/ai-makes-mattis-question-fundamental-beliefs-about-war/. 281AI could, in theory, change the nature of war: Frank Hoffman, “Squaring Clausewitz’s Trinity in the Age of Autonomous Weapons,” Orbis 63, no. 1 (Winter 2019): 44–63, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2018.12.011; and Paul Scharre, “White Walkers and the Nature of War” in Winning Westeros: How Game of Thrones Explains Modern Military Conflict (Sterling, VA: Potomac Books, 2019), 253–264. 282a war without political purpose: It is possible to imagine extreme political purposes for which human extinction would, in fact, be the goal, such as a madman’s act of revenge on humanity or an extreme act of ecoterrorism to wipe humanity from the face of the earth. 283The very first internet worm: Ted Eisenberg et al., “The Cornell Commission: On Morris and the Worm,” Communications of the ACM 32, no. 6 (June 1989): 706–709, http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/63526.63530. 282spread far beyond its intended target: Nicolas Falliere, Liam O. Murchu, and Eric Chien, W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Symantec Security Response, February 2011), https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf (page discontinued). 282an instrumental goal that intelligent systems adopt: Stephen M. Omohundro, The Basic AI Drives (wordpress.com, n.d.), httpsaselfawaresystems.files.wordpress.com/2008/01/ai_drives_final.pdf; Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, May 5, 2015), 131–139, https://www.amazon.com/Superintelligence-Dangers-Strategies-Nick-Bostrom/dp/0199678111/. 284variation, selection, and replication: Joel Lehman et al., “The Surprising Creativity of Digital Evolution: A Collection of Anecdotes from the Evolutionary Computation and Artificial Life Research Communities,” Artificial Life 26, no. 2 (2020). 284artificial general intelligence (AGI): Vincent C.

…

It is possible to envision in the future advanced forms of adaptive and intelligent malware that are able to replicate, acquire resources, evade defenses, and cause significant harm without any human intent behind them. Such systems could be released by accident or, even if released intentionally, proliferate or evolve beyond human control. The computer worm Stuxnet appears to have spread far beyond its intended target, despite multiple protocols in place to limit its proliferation. If a future form of malware was adaptive, intelligent, or evolving, attempts to combat it could look like a form of warfare, with violence and fights to control resources. Yet it would be a conflict against a nonhuman entity.

…

Able Archer, 287 academic espionage, 163–64 accidents, 255 ACE (Air Combat Evolution), 1–2, 222 ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union), 111, 113 Acosta, Jim, 128 Advanced Research Projects Agency, 72 Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy, 40 adversarial examples, 239–44, 240f adversarial patches, 241–42, 242f Aether Committee, 159 Afghanistan, 45–46, 54, 255 African Union, 108 AFWERX (Air Force Works), 214 Agence France-Presse, 139 AGI (artificial general intelligence), 284 AI Global Surveillance Index, 109 AI Index, 333–34 airborne warning and control system (AWACS), 196 Air Combat Evolution (ACE), 1–2, 222 aircraft, 191, 255 aircraft availability rates, 197 aircraft carriers, 191–92 AI Research SuperCluster, 296 Air Force 480th ISR Wing, 54 Air Force Works (AFWERX), 214 airlines, 100 AI Task Force, 193–94 AI Technology and Governance conference, 177 AITHOS coalition, 136 alchemy, 232 algorithmic warfare, 53, 56, 58 Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team (AWCFT), See Project Maven algorithm(s), 288; See also machine learning computer vision, 202–3 efficiency, 51, 297–98 real world situations, vs., 230–36 in social media, 144–51 for surveillance, 82 training, 25 Alibaba, 37, 91, 212 Alibaba Cloud, 160 All-Cloud Smart Video Cloud Solution, 107 Allen, John, 280 Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany, 82 Alphabet, 26, 296 AlphaDogfight, 1–3, 220–22, 257, 266, 272 AlphaGo, 23, 73, 180, 221, 266, 271, 274, 284, 298, 453, 454 AlphaPilot drone racing, 229–30, 250 AlphaStar, 180, 221, 269, 271, 441 AlphaZero, 267, 269–71, 284 Amazon, 32, 36, 215–16, 224 Deepfake Detection Challenge, 132 and facial recognition, 22–23 and Google-Maven controversy, 62, 66 and government regulation, 111 revenue, 297 AMD (company), 28 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 111, 113 Anandkumar, Anima, 32, 120 Anduril, 66, 218, 224 Angola, 107, 108 Apollo Program, 297 Apple, 92, 95–96 application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), 180 Applied Intuition, 224 arms race, 254, 257 Army Command College, 279 Army of None (Scharre), 196 artificial general intelligence (AGI), 284 artificial intelligence (AI) agents, 271 community, publication norms, 125 cost of, 296–97 ethics, 159 future of, 294–301 general, 284 as general-purpose enabling technology, 3–4 impact on economic productivity, 72–73 implementation, 31 indices, global, 15–17 narrowness, 233 outcomes, 299–301 regulation of, 111–13 safety, 286, 289, 304 specialized chips for, 28–29, 180, 185 “Artificial intelligence: disruptively changing the ‘rules of the game’” (Chen), 279 Artificial Intelligence Industry Alliance, 172 artificial intelligence (AI) systems future of, 294–301 humans vs., 263–75 limitations of, 229–37 roles in warfare, 273 rule-based, 230, 236 safety and security challenges of, 249–59 arXiv, 163 ASICs (application-specific integrated circuits), 180 ASML (company), 181 Associated Press, 139 Atari, 235 Atlantic, The, 173 atoms, in the universe, number of, 335 AUKUS partnership, 76 Austin, Lloyd, 292 Australia, 76, 108, 158, 182, 187 Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 82, 98, 158 Autodesk, 162 automated surveillance, 103 automatic target recognition, 56–58 automation bias, 263 autonomous cars, 23, 65 autonomous weapons, 61, 64–66, 256 autonomous weapons, lethal, 286 AWACS (airborne warning and control system), 196 AWCFT (Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team), See Project Maven Azerbaijan, 108 BAAI (Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence), 172, 455 backdoor poisoning attacks, 245 badnets, 246 BAE (company), 211 Baidu, 37, 92, 160, 172, 173, 212 Baise Executive Leadership Academy, 109 “Banger” (call sign), 1 Bannon, Steve, 295 Battle of Omdurman, 13 BBC, 138 BeiDou, 80 Beijing, 84, 92, 159 Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence (BAAI), 172, 455 Beijing AI Principles, 172, 173 Beijing Institute of Big Data Research, 157 Belt and Road Initiative, 105, 108–10 BERTLARGE, 294 Betaworks, 127–28 Bezos, Jeff, 215 biases, 234, 236 Biddle, Stephen, 219 Biden, Hunter, 131 Biden, Joe, and administration, 33–34, 147, 166–67, 184, 252, 292 big data analysis, 91 Bing, 160 Bin Salman, Mohammed, 141 biometrics, 80, 84; See also facial recognition “Bitter Lesson, The” (Sutton), 299 black box attacks, 240–41 blacklists, 99–100 BlackLivesMatter, 143, 148 “blade runner” laws, 121–22, 170 blind passes, 249 Bloomberg, 118 Bloomberg Government, 257 Boeing, 193, 216 Bolivia, 107 bots, 118, 121–22, 142, 144–49, 221 Bradford, Anu, 112 Bradshaw, Samantha, 141–42 brain drain, 31, 304 “brain scale” models, 300 Brands, Hal, 223 Brazil, 106, 107, 110 Breakfast Club, 53 Brexit referendum, 122 Bridges Supercomputer, 44 brinkmanship, 281 Brokaw, Tom, 143 Brooks, Rodney, 233 “brothers and sisters,” Han Chinese, 81 Brown, Jason, 54–55, 57, 201–3 Brown, Michael, 49, 196–97 Brown, Noam, 44, 48, 50 Bugs Bunny (fictional character), 231 Bureau of Industry and Security, 166 Burundi, 110 Buscemi, Steve, 130 Bush, George W., and administration, 68–70 ByteDance, 143 C3 AI, 196, 224 C4ISR (Command, Control, Communication, Cloud, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), 107 CalFire, 201–2 California Air National Guard, 201, 203 Caltech, 32, 120 Cambridge Innovation Center, 135 cameras, surveillance, 6, 86–87, 91 Campbell, Kurt, 292 Canada, 40, 76, 158, 187 Capitol insurrection of 2021, 150 car bombs, 54–55 Carnegie Mellon University, 31–32, 45–46, 66, 193, 196, 207 Carnegie Robotics, 193 cars, self-driving, 23 Carter, Ash, 57 casualties, military, 255 CBC/Radio-Canada, 138 CCP, See Chinese Communist Party Ceaușescu, Nicolae, 345 CEIEC (China National Electronics Import and Export Corporation), 106 censorship, 175–76 centaur model, 263 Center for a New American Security, 36, 71, 222 Center for Data Innovation, 15 Center for Security and Emerging Technology, 33, 139, 162, 185, 298, 323 Center on Terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism, 124 Central Military Commission, 292 Central Military Commission Science and Technology Commission, 36 central processing units (CPUs), 25 CFIUS (Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States), 179 C-5 cargo plane, 196 chance, 282 character of warfare, 280 checkers, 47 Chen Hanghui, 279 Chen Weiss, Jessica, 110 Chesney, Robert, 130 chess, 47, 267, 269, 271, 275 Chile, 107 China AI research of, 30 bots, 142 Central Military Commission Science and Technology Commission, 36 commercial tech ecosystem, 223 data privacy regulations of, 21–22 ethics standards, 171–75 High-End Foreign Expert Recruitment Program, 33 human rights abuses, 63 in industrial revolution, 12–13 internet use, 22 nuclear capabilities, 50 ranking in government strategy, 40 semiconductor imports, 29 synthetic media policies of, 140 technology ecosystem, 91–96 Thousand Talents Plan, 32 China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, 290 China Initiative, 164, 167 China National Electronics Import and Export Corporation (CEIEC), 106 China National Intellectual Property Administration (CNIPA), 353 China Security and Protection Industry Association, 91 China Telecom, 169 Chinese Academy of Sciences, 88, 158 Chinese Academy of Sciences Institute of Automation, 172 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) economic history, 85–86 human rights abuses, 79–80, 83 surveillance, 97–104, 174–77 Chinese graduate students in U.S., 31 Chinese military aggression, 76; See also People’s Liberation Army (PLA) AI dogfighting system, 257 and Google, 62–63 investments in weapons, 70 scientists in U.S., 5 and Tiananmen massacre, 68 U.S. links to, 157–58, 161, 166, 303 Chinese Ministry of Education, 162 Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, 173 Chinese Talent Program Tracker, 33 chips, See semiconductor industry; semiconductors CHIPS and Science Act, 40, 180 Cisco, 109, 246 Citron, Danielle, 121, 130 Civil Aviation Industry Credit Management Measures, 100 Clarifai, 60–61, 63, 66, 224 Clark, Jack, 31, 117, 119–25 Clinton, Bill, and administration, 69–70, 97 CLIP (multimodal model), 295–96 cloud computing, 91, 215–16 CloudWalk, 105, 156, 389 CNIPA (China National Intellectual Property Administration), 353 COBOL (programming language), 204 cognitive revolution, 4 cognitization of military forces, 265 Colombia, 107 Command, Control, Communication, Cloud, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR), 107 command and control, 268 Commerce Department, 155–57, 166, 171, 184 Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), 179 computational efficiency, 297–300 computational game theory, 47–50 compute, 25–29 control over, 27 global infrastructure, 178 hardware, 297–99 resources, size of, 294–96 trends in, 325 usage of, 26, 51 computer chips, See semiconductor industry; semiconductors Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL), 156 computer vision, 55–57, 64, 224 Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition conference, 57 concentration camps, 81 confidence-building measures, 290–93 confinement, 82 content recommendations, 145 Cook, Matt, 203 cooperation, research, 303–4 Cornell University, 124 cost, of AI, 296–97 Côte d’Ivoire, 107 Cotton, Tom, 164 counter-AI techniques, 248 COVID pandemic, 74–75 CPUs (central processing units), 25 Crootof, Rebecca, 123 CrowdAI, 202, 224 CSAIL (Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory), 156 Cukor, Drew, 57, 58–59 Customs and Border Patrol, 110–11 cyberattacks, 246 Cyber Grand Challenge, 195–96 Cybersecurity Law, 95, 174 “cyberspace,” 102 Cyberspace Administration of China, 99 cyber vulnerabilities, 238 adversarial examples, 239–44 data poisoning, 244–47 discovery, 195–96 model inversion attacks, 247 Czech Republic, 108 Dahua, 89, 156, 169, 353, 354–55, 388–89 Dalai Lama, 80 Dalian University of Technology, 212 DALL·E, 295 Darcey, Brett, 220, 249–50 DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), 1, 195, 210–13, 220 DARPA Squad X, 231, 233, 236 data, 18–24 explosion, 18–19 mapping, 204 open-source, 288 poisoning, 238, 244–47 privacy laws, 21–22, 111–12, 170–71, 174–77 storage, 91 usage, 51 Data Security Law, 95, 174 datasets publicly available, 139 reliance on, 323 training, see training datasets DAWNBench, 57 D-Day Invasion of Normandy, 46 dead hand, 289–90 Dead Hand, 447; See also Perimeter deception in warfare, 45 Deep Blue, 275 deepfake detection, 127, 132–33, 137–38 Deepfake Detection Challenge, 132–33 deepfake videos, 121, 130–32 deep learning, 2, 19, 31, 210, 236 Deep Learning Analytics, 209–13, 233 DeepMind, 23, 26, 32, 180, 221, 271–72, 295–96, 298–99, 441, 454 Deeptrace, 121, 130–33 defense acquisition policy, 217 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), 1, 195, 210–13, 220 Defense Innovation Board, 65–66 Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), 35, 49, 57, 195–99, 214, 252 Defense One, 58 Defense Sciences Office, 231 defense start-ups, 222 Dell, 162 Deloitte, 246 Deng Xiaoping, 75, 85 Denmark, 108 Department of Defense, 35, 51–52, 56, 60–67, 70, 160, 166, 194 AI principles, 65–66 AI strategy, 249 budget, 297 contracts, 214–18 cyberattacks on, 246 innovation organizations, 198f reform, 225 Department of Energy, 246 Department of Energy’s Office of Science, 40 Department of Homeland Security, 246 Department of Justice, 164, 246 destruction, extinction-level, 282 deterrence, 51 DiCaprio, Leonardo, 130 Dick, Philip K., 81 dictator’s dilemma, 69 Didi, 92 digital devices, 18 DigitalGlobe, 204 Digital Silk Road, 110 DiResta, Renée, 139 disaster relief, 201, 204 disinformation, 117–26 AI text generation, 117–21 deepfake videos, 121 GPT-2 release, 123–24 Russian, 122 voice bots, 121–22 distributional shift, 233, 426 DIU, See Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) DNA database, 89–90 dogfighting, 1, 249–50, 272; See also Alpha Dogfight “Donald Trump neuron,” 295 Doom bots, 221 doomsday device, 282 Dota 2 (game), 26, 117, 267–72, 298 Dragonfly, 62 Drenkow, Nathan, 247 drone pilots, 223 drones, 229–30, 257, 286–87 drone video footage, 36, 53–56, 61, 65, 202–3; See also image processing; video processing drugs, 251 Dulles Airport, 110–11 Dunford, Joe, 62 Duplex, 121 Easley, Matt, 193 Eastern Foundry, 209 Economist, The, 18 Ecuador, 106 efficiency, algorithmic, 51 Egypt, 109 XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, 194 elections, 122, 128, 129, 131, 134, 150 Elmer Fudd (fictional character), 231 Entity List, 155–57, 161, 163, 166–67, 171, 182, 184, 388–89 Environmental Protection Agency, 40 Erasmus University Medical Center, 158, 393–94 Esper, Mark, 67, 197, 205 espionage, 33, 163–64 Estonia, 108 “Ethical Norms for New Generation Artificial Intelligence,” 172 ethical use of technology, 140 ethics censorship, 175–76 Chinese standards, 171–75 data privacy, 176–77 international standards, 169–71 Ethiopia, 108 E-3 Sentry, 196 Europe AI research of, 30 in industrial revolution, 12–13 internet use, 22 and semiconductor market, 27 European Union, 76, 187 Europe Defender, 194 EUV (extreme ultraviolet lithography), 181 explainable AI, 237 export controls, 166–67, 181–86, 300 extinction-level destruction, 282 extreme ultraviolet lithography (EUV), 181 Eyes in the Sky (Michel), 54 F-35 stealth fighter jet, 254–55 Faber, Isaac, 193–94, 203 Face++, 88 Facebook account removal, 142 algorithms, 144–46 content moderation, 149 Deepfake Detection Challenge, 132 manipulated media policies of, 140 number of users, 22 and Trusted News Initiative, 139 face swapping, 121, 130–31 facial recognition attacks on, 241, 245 challenges in, 426 in China, 5–6, 80, 88–91, 103, 167 Chinese export of technology, 105–7 laws and policies for, 113, 159, 170 poor performance outside training data, 64–65 of Uighurs, 88–89, 158 in U.S., 22–23, 111, 159 fake news, 117–19, 122, 124–25 Falco (call sign), 1–2, 221, 226 Fan Hui, 298 FBI, 95–96, 164 Fedasiuk, Ryan, 162 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 204 FedRAMP, 213 FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency), 204 Fidelity International, 157 field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), 180 “50 cent army,” 125 Fighting to Innovate (Kania), 222 filtering, of harmful content, 144 Financial Times, 157–58 Finland, 40, 187 fire perimeter mapping, 201–4 5G wireless networking, 37, 108, 182–83 Floyd, George, 143, 148 flu, H5N1 avian bird, 123 ForAllSecure, 196 Forbes magazine, 202 Ford, Harrison, 121 480th ISR Wing, 54 FPGAs (field-programmable gate arrays), 180 France, 40, 76, 108, 158, 187 Frazier, Darnella, 143 Frederick, Kara, 105 French Presidential election, 2017, 122 future, uncertainty of, 276 G7 group, 76, 187 Gab, 149 Gabon, 134 Gadot, Gal, 121 Game Changer, 206 games and gaming, 43–51, 266–73; See also specific games game trees, 47–49 GANs (generative adversarial networks), 127, 133 GAO, See Government Accountability Office (GAO) Garcia, Dominic, 203 Gates, Bill, 159 Gato, 295 GDP (gross domestic product), 69f, 85, 85f GDPR, See General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) General Dynamics, 209, 212–13 generative adversarial networks (GANs), 127, 133 generative models, 125 genomics, 37 geopolitics, 129, 317 Germany, 12, 76, 107, 108, 158, 187 Gibson, John, 61 Gibson, William, 101, 102 Gizmodo, 120 Global AI Index, 15, 40 Global AI Vibrancy Tool, 319 go (game), 23, 47–48, 73, 180, 271, 275, 298 Golden Shield Project, 87 Goodfellow, Ian, 239 Google, 31, 32, 36, 57, 224, 294 and ASICs, 180 and Dragonfly, 339 Duplex, 121 Meena, 125 and Seven Sons of National Defense, 162 social app dominance, 143 and Trusted News Initiative, 139 work with Chinese researchers, 157, 392, 396 Google AI China Center, 62, 159, 167 Google Brain, 32, 294–96, 299 Google-Maven controversy, 22, 60–67 Google Photos, 64 Googleplex, 195 Google Translate, 234 Gorgon Stare, 53–55, 58 “Governance Principles for a New Generation of Artificial Intelligence,” 173 “Governance Principles for a New Generation of Artificial Intelligence: Develop Responsible Artificial Intelligence,” 172 Government Accountability Office (GAO), 195, 215, 217, 248 government contracting, 215–16, 222, 224–25 government-industry relationship, 95–96 government subsidies, 179–80 GPT-2 (language model), 20, 117–20, 122–25, 139, 294 GPT-3 (language model), 139, 294 GPUs (graphics processing units), 25, 28–29, 185, 296 Grace, Katja, 298 Great Britain, 191–92 Great Firewall, 62, 70, 102, 166 Great Gatsby, The (film), 130 Great Leap Forward, 85 Great Wall, 101 Greitens, Sheena, 105 Griffin, Michael, 200, 257 Guardian, The, 120, 148 Gulf War, 1991, 14, 219 HA/DR (humanitarian assistance/disaster relief), 201, 204 Hamad Bin Khalifa University, 142 Han Chinese, 81, 88 Harbin Institute of Technology, 161 hardware, computing, See compute Harvard University, 32 hashtags, 141 Hate Crimes in Cyberspace (Citron), 121 Heinrich, Martin, 37 Heritage Foundation, 105 Heron Systems in AlphaDogfight Trials, 1–2, 266, 272 background, 220–22 as defense start-up, 224 and real-world aircraft, 249–50 heuristics, 274 Hewlett Packard Enterprise, 157, 392 Hicks, Kathleen, 252 High-End Foreign Expert Recruitment Program, 33 Hikvision, 89, 91, 107, 156, 157, 353, 355, 389, 390 Hikvision Europe, 389 Himalayan border conflict, 75 Hindu, The, 139 Hinton, Geoffrey, 210 HiSilicon, 91 Hoffman, Samantha, 82, 98–99, 101, 102, 174 HoloLens, 160, 217 Honeywell, 162 Hong Kong, 75, 148, 175 Hoover Institution, 162 Horner, Chuck, 14 Howard, Philip, 141–42 Howell, Chuck, 250–51 Huawei, 29, 76, 88–89, 91, 92, 106–9, 169, 171, 182–85, 353, 354, 357, 409 Huawei France, 354 Huffman, Carter, 135–37 human cognition, 275 Human Genetics, 158 human intelligence, 284–85 humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), 201, 204 human-machine teaming, 263–64, 273, 276–86 human psychology, 274 human rights abuses, 63, 155, 158, 176–77 Human Rights Watch, 79, 81–82, 95, 170, 174 Hungary, 110 Hurd, Will, 39 Hurricane Dorian, 204 Husain, Amir, 66, 280 Hwang, Tim, 139, 323 hyperwar, 280 IARPA (Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity), 91, 246 IBM, 32, 109, 162, 215 IDG Capital, 157 IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission), 169 IEDs (improvised explosive devices), 45–46 IEEE (Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers), 171 iFLYTEK, 37, 91, 93–95, 104, 156, 157, 169 IJOP (Integrated Joint Operations Platform), 81–82 image classification systems, 64–65 image misclassification, 296 Imagen, 295 ImageNet, 19, 54, 210 image processing, 53–55, 58, 61 immigration policies, 33–34, 331 improvised explosive devices (IEDs), 45–46 iNaturalist, 211–12, 233 India, 75, 76, 108, 110, 187 bots, 142 in industrial revolution, 12–13 internet use, 22 industrial revolutions, 4–5, 11–13, 264–65 infant mortality, 85, 87f inference, 25, 180, 298 information processing, scale of, 269 information revolution, 14 insecure digital systems, 248 Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 171 institutions, 35–40 Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP), 81–82 Intel, 27, 29, 156, 162, 179, 181–82, 246, 390–91 intellectual property, 33, 71, 92, 163–64, 179 Intellifusion, 88, 156 intelligence, human, 284–85 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), 53–54 Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA), 91, 246 intelligence analysis, 55 intelligentization of military, 37, 53, 222, 265 intelligentization of surveillance systems, 88 Intelligent Systems Center, 238, 247–48 Intelligent Trial System, 95 Intelligent UAV Swarm System Challenge, 36 international cooperation, 76 International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), 169 International Organization for Standardization (ISO), 169 international stability, 286–93 international standard-setting, 169–71 International Telecommunication Union (ITU), 169 internet in China, 87, 92, 97, 99 data capacity of, 18 usage, 22 IP Commission, 164 iPhone encryption, 174 Iran, 142 Iraq, 45–46, 58, 253, 255–56 ISIS, 58, 63 ISO (International Organization for Standardization), 169 ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), 53–54 Israel, 187, 278 IS’Vision, 156 Italy, 76, 108, 187 ITU (International Telecommunication Union), 169–70 JAIC (Joint AI Center), 35, 66, 200–208, 214, 289 jamming and anti-jamming strategies, 50 Japan, 27, 76, 108, 158, 181–82, 187 JASON scientific advisory group, 251 Javorsek, Dan “Animal,” 3, 230 jaywalking, 99 JEDI (Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure), 61, 214–18, 224 Jennings, Peter, 143 Johansson, Scarlett, 121, 130 Johns Hopkins University, 223 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 238, 247 Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (JEDI), 61, 214–18, 224 “Joint Pledge on Artificial Intelligence Industry Self-Discipline,” 172 Jones, Marc Owen, 142 Jordan, 109 Joske, Alex, 158 Kania, Elsa, 36, 96, 222–24 Kasparov, Garry, 275 Katie Jones (fake persona), 131 Kaufhold, John, 209, 213 Kazakhstan, 108, 155–56 Keegan, John, 443 Ke Jie, 73 Kelly, Kevin, 4 Kelly, Robin, 39 Kennedy, Paul, 12, 13 Kenya, 107 Kernan, Joseph, 200 Kessel Run, 214 KFC, 92 KGB, 122 Khan, Saif, 185–86, 298 Khashoggi, Jamal, 141–42 kill chain, 263 Kim Jong-un, 131 King’s College London, 273 Kingsoft, 160 Kocher, Gabriel “Gab707,” 230 Komincz, Grzegorz “MaNa,” 270 Kovrig, Michael, 177 Krizhevsky, Alex, 210 Kuwait, 46 Lamppost-as-a-Platform, 107 language models, 20, 118–20, 124–25, 232, 234, 294; See also GPT-2; GPT-3; OpenAI Laos, 108 Laskai, Lorand, 96 Laszuk, Danika, 128, 140 Latvia, 108 Lawrence, Jennifer, 130 laws and regulations, 111–13 “blade runner,” 121–22, 170 data privacy, 21–22, 111–12, 170–71, 174–77 facial recognition, 113 and Microsoft, 111 for surveillance, 108–9 learning, unintended, 234 learning hacks, 234–35 Lebanon, 109 Lee, Kai-Fu, 22 Lee, Peter, 165, 167 legal reviews, 259 Le Monde, 108 Les, Jason, 46, 48 lethal autonomous weapons, 286 “liar’s dividend,” 130 Li Bin, 291 Libratus, 43–51, 266–67, 271 Libya, 109 Li Chijiang, 290–91 life expectancy, 85, 86f Li, Fei-Fei, 62 Lin Ji, 93–95, 104 Liu Fan, 393–94 LinkedIn, 131 lip-syncing, 130–31 lithography, extreme ultraviolet (EUV), 181 Liu He, 76 Liu Qingfeng, 156 Llorens, Ashley, 248, 249 Lockheed Martin, 1, 57, 211 London, 109 Long Kun, 291 long-term planning, 270 Lord, Ellen, 217 Lucky, Palmer, 66 Luo, Kevin, 161 Machine Intelligence Research Institute (MIRI), 298 machine learning and compute, 25–26, 32, 296–97 failure modes, 64, 232–33, 236–39, 243–44, 246–49 at Heron Systems, 220–21 opacity of algorithms, 145 and synthetic media, 127, 139 training data for, 202–5, 230 and voice synthesis, 137 at West Point, 194–95 MacroPolo, 30 Made in China 2025, 37, 183 Malaysia, 106 Management Action Group, 56 maneuver warfare, 442 Manhattan Project, 297 Mao Zedong, 85, 97 Marines, 231 marriage, coerced, 81 Martin, Rachael, 206 Martin Aspen (fake persona), 131 Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 31, 156, 157, 165, 233 Mattis, Jim, 53, 61, 197, 209, 215, 280 MAVLab (Micro Air Vehicle Lab), 250–52 Max Planck Society, 158, 393 McAulay, Daniel, 267 McCord, Brendan, 52, 56–57, 200 McKinsey, 25 McKinsey Global Institute, 72–73 McNair, Lesley, 192 McQuade, Michael, 66 media, AI-generated, 118–20 media conferences, 109 Meena, 125 Megatron-Turing NLG, 20, 294 Megvii, 88–89, 156, 160, 212, 353, 354, 357, 388 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters, 292 Meng Wanzhou, 177 Merrill Lynch, 162 Meta, 22, 143, 296 metrics, 320 Mexico, 107 Michel, Arthur Holland, 54 Micron, 182 Microsoft, 294 China presence, 159 and computer vision, 57 and cyberattacks, 246–47 deepfake detection, 132, 138–39 and Department of Defense, 36, 62, 66, 215–17, 224–25 digital watermarks, 138 and facial recognition, 23, 111 financial backing of AI, 296–97 funding, 296 and Google-Maven controversy, 62, 66 and government regulation, 111 and ImageNet, 54 Megatron-Turing NLG, 20, 294 and OpenAI, 26 revenue, 297 and Seven Sons of National Defense, 162 and Trusted News Initiative, 139 work with Chinese researchers, 157, 393, 396 Microsoft Research, 31, 167 Microsoft Research Asia, 157–63, 165–67 Microsoft’s Asia-Pacific R&D Group, 161 Middlebury Institute, 124 military AI adoption, 35–37, 219–26 applications, 191–94 military capabilities, 47 military-civil fusion, 5, 95, 161–63 military competition, 304 military forces cognitization, 265 military organization, 278–79 military power, potential, 13 military tactics, future, 277 Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 87 Ministry of Public Security, 87, 89–90, 158 Ministry of Public Security (MPS), 95 Ministry of Science and Technology, 172, 173 Minneapolis police, 143 minority identification technology, 88–89 “Minority Report, The” (Dick), 81 MIRI (Machine Intelligence Research Institute), 298 Missile Defense Agency, 218 MIT, See Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) MITRE, 250 MIT-SenseTime Alliance on Artificial Intelligence, 156 MIT Technology Review, 93, 159 mobile devices, 18 Mock, Justin “Glock,” 2 model inversion attacks, 247 Modulate, 135–36, 138 monitoring and security checkpoints, 80 Moore’s law, 26, 28, 325 Morocco, 109 Mozur, Paul, 101, 102 MPS Key Lab of Intelligent Voice Technology, 95 MQ-9 Reaper, 53 Mulchandani, Nand, 207, 214, 217 multimodal models, 295–96 multiparty game theory, 50 mutism, 128 Mutsvangwa, Christopher, 105 NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration), 40, 72, 220 national AI research cloud, 32 National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act of 2020, 32 National Artificial Intelligence Research Resource, 32 National Defense Education Act, 33 National Defense Strategy, 52 National Development and Reform Commission, 88 National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), 56 National Institute of Standards and Technology, 40 National Institutes of Health, 40 National Instruments, 162 National Intelligence Law, 95, 174 National New Generation Artificial Intelligence Governance Expert Committee, 172 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 40, 204 national power, 13, 318 National Robotics Engineering Center (NREC), 193 National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, 123 National Science Foundation, 40 National Security Agency, 216 National Security Commission on AI, 33, 39, 73, 186, 250, 252, 258 National Security Law, 95, 174 national security vulnerabilities, 239 National University of Defense Technology (NUDT), 157, 161 NATO, 287 natural language processing, 206 Nature (journal), 123 nature of war, 280–84 Naval Air Station Patuxent River, 220 Naval Research Laboratory, 162 Naval War College, 219 negative G turns, 249 Netherlands, 158, 181, 187 NetPosa, 156, 391 Neural Information Processing Systems, 232 neural networks, 19f, 25 applications, 54 badnets, 246 and Deep Learning Analytics, 210 explainability, 236–37 failure modes, 232–34, 250 and Heron Systems, 220 training, 19 NeurIPS, 30 Neuromancer (Gibson), 101 “New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan,” 71, 169 New H3C Technologies, 157 “new oil,” 11–17 news articles, bot-generated, 118 new technologies, 255–56 new technologies, best use of, 191–92 New York Times, 31, 118, 125, 138, 290 NGA (National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency), 56 Nieman Journalism Lab, 145 1984 (Orwell), 97–98, 103 NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology), 91 Nixon, Richard, and administration, 68 NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration), 40, 204 Nokia Bell Labs, 157 Normandy, France, 46 North Korea, 50, 117–18 Northrop Grumman, 57, 211, 216 NREC (National Robotics Engineering Center), 193 nuclear war, 288 nuclear weapons, 11, 50 NUDT (National University of Defense Technology), 157, 161 NVIDIA, 20, 28–29, 32, 120, 156, 246, 294, 390–91 Obama, Barack, and administration, 70, 71, 73, 137 object recognition and classification, 55–58 Office of Inspector General (OIG), 216 Office of Naval Research, 157 Office of Responsible AI, 159 Office of Technology Assessment, 162 OIG (Office of Inspector General), 216 oil, 20–21; See also “new oil” 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, 207 OpenAI, 26, 117–20, 122–25, 272, 294, 295–97, 299; See also GPT-2 (language model); GPT-3 (language model) OpenAI Five, 268, 270–71 Operation RYaN, 445; See also RYaN; VRYAN Oracle, 215–18, 224 Orwell, George, 97–98, 103 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft, 255 O’Sullivan, Liz, 60–61, 63, 65 OTA (other transaction authority), 217 outcomes of AI, 299–301 of war, 282–83 Owen, Laura Hazard, 145 Oxford Internet Institute, 141 Pakistan, 107, 142 Palantir, 109 PaLM, 294–95 Pan, Tim, 160, 161, 163 Papernot, Nicolas, 239 Pappas, Mike, 135–38, 140 Paredes, Federico, 250 Parler, 149 Partnership on AI, 132 patches, adversarial, 241–42, 242f Patrini, Giorgio, 130, 132–34, 137, 140 Patriot air and missile defense system, 253 Payne, Kenneth, 273–74 Pelosi, Nancy, 76, 128 Pence, Mike, 295 pension funds, 157 People’s Liberation Army (PLA); See also military-civil fusion affiliated companies, 166–67 and drone pilots, 222–23 researchers funded by, 158, 164 Percent Corporation, 107 Percipient.AI, 224 Perimeter, 289; See also Dead Hand Persian Gulf War, 46, 318 Personal Information Protection Law, 174, 176 pharmaceuticals, 251 phenotyping, DNA, 90 Philippines, 109 phones, 89 phone scanners, 89 photoresist, 182 phylogenic tree, 211 physical adversarial attacks, 242f, 243f, 429 Pichai, Sundar, 62 Pittsburgh, Pa., 44, 193 Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center, 44 PLA, See People’s Liberation Army Pluribus, 50, 51 poisonous animal recognition, 211 poker, 43–44, 46–48, 50, 266–67, 269–73, 335 Poland, 108 Police Audio Intelligent Service Platform, 95 Police Cloud, 89–90 policy analysis, automated, 206 Politiwatch, 124 pornography, 121, 130 Portman, Rob, 37 Poseidon, 289; See also Status-6 post-disaster assessment, 204 power metrics, 13 Prabhakar, Arati, 210 prediction systems, 287–88 predictive maintenance, 196–97, 201 Price, Colin “Farva,” 3 Primer (company), 224 Princeton University, 156, 157 Project Maven, 35–36, 52–53, 56–59, 194, 202, 205, 224; See also Google-Maven controversy Project Origin, 138 Project Voltron, 195–99 Putin, Vladimir, 9, 131, 304–5 Q*bert, 235 Quad summit, 76 Qualcomm Ventures, 157 Quantum Integrity, 132 quantum technology, 37 “rabbit hole” effect, 145 race to the bottom on safety, 286, 289, 304 radar, synthetic aperture, 210 Rahimi, Ali, 232 Raj, Devaki, 202, 207, 213, 224 Rambo (fictional character), 130 RAND Corporation, 252 ranking in government strategy, 40 Rao, Delip, 120, 123 Rather, Dan, 143 Raytheon, 211 reaction times, 272–73 real-time computer strategy games, 267–69 real-world battlefield environments, 264 situations, 230–36 Rebellion Defense, 224 Reddit, 140 reeducation, 81 Reface app, 130 reinforcement learning, 221, 232, 243, 250 repression, 81, 175–77 research and development funding, 35–39, 36f, 38f, 39f, 333–34 Research Center for AI Ethics and Safety, 172 Research Center for Brain-Inspired Intelligence, 172 research communities, 327 responsible AI guidelines, 252 Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy, 252 résumé-sorting model, 234 Reuters, 95, 139 Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, The (Kennedy), 12 risk, 271, 290–93 robotic nuclear delivery systems, 289 robotic process automation tools, 206 robotic vehicles, 266 robots, 92–94, 265–66, 286 Rockwell Automation, 162 Rockwell Collins, 193 Romania, 108 Root, Phil, 231 Roper, Will, 55–56, 214, 224, 225, 257 Rubik’s cube, 26 rule-based AI systems, 230, 236 Rumsfeld, Donald, 61 Russia, 12, 40, 52, 108, 110 bots, 142 cyberattacks of, 246 disinformation, 122 invasion of Ukraine, 129, 196, 219, 288 nuclear capabilities, 50 submarines, 255 Rutgers University Big Data Laboratory, 156 RYaN (computer program), 287, 445; See also Operation RYaN; VRYAN safe city technology, 107–8 safety of AI, 286, 289, 304 Samsung, 27–29, 179, 181 Sandholm, Tuomas, 43–51 Sasse, Ben, 184 satellite imagery, 56 Saudi Arabia, 40, 107, 109, 141–42 Scale AI, 224 scaling of innovation, 224 Schatz, Brian, 37 schedule pressures, 254–55 Schmidt, Eric, 39, 40, 71–73, 150, 164–65 Schumer, Chuck, 39 Science (journal), 123 Seagate, 156, 390 security applications, 110–11, 315 security dilemma, 50–51, 289 Sedol, Lee, 23, 266, 274–75, 298 self-driving cars, 23, 65 semiconductor industry; See also semiconductors in China, 178–79 chokepoints, 180–81 export controls, 181–86 global chokepoints in, 178–87 globalization of, 27–29 international strategy, 186–87 in Japan, 179 supply chains, 26, 76, 300 in U.S., 179–80 Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), 178, 181, 184 semiconductor(s) fabrication of, 32 foundries, 27–28 improvements in, 325 manufacturing equipment, 179 market, 27 as strategic asset, 300 Seminar on Cyberspace Management, 108–9 SenseNets, 91, 156, 357 SenseTime, 37, 88–89, 91, 156, 160, 169, 353–54, 357, 388 SensingTech, 88 Sensity, 130–33 Sentinel, 132 Sequoia, 157 Serbia, 107, 110 Serelay, 138 servicemember deaths, 255 Seven Sons of National Defense, 161–62 “shallow fakes,” 129 Shanahan, Jack on automated nuclear launch, 289 on international information sharing, 258, 291–92 and JAIC, 66, 201, 203, 205–6, 214 and Project Maven, 57–58 on risks, 254, 256 Sharp Eyes, 88, 91 Shenzhen, China, 37 Shield AI, 66, 196, 222, 224 shortcuts, 254–56 Silk Road, 110 SIM cards, 80, 89 Singapore, 106, 107, 158 singularity in warfare, 279–80 Skyeye, 99 Skynet, 87–88, 90, 91 Slashdot, 120 Slate, 120 smartphones, 26, 80 SMIC (Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation), 178, 181, 184 Smith, Brad, 159, 163, 166, 167 social app dominance, 149–50 social credit system, 99–100 social governance, 97–104 social media, 126, 141–51 socio-technical problems, 65 soft power, 317 SOFWERX (Special Operations Forces Works), 214 SolarWinds, 246 South Africa, 107 South China Sea militarization, 71, 74 South Korea, 27, 40, 182, 185, 187 Soviet Union, 287, 289, 447 Spain, 40, 107 SparkCognition, 66, 224 Spavor, Michael, 177 Special Operations Command, 218 Special Operations Forces Works (SOFWERX), 214 speech recognition, 91 “Spider-Man neuron,” 295 Springer Nature, 158 Sputnik, 33, 71–72 Stability AI, 125, 295 stability, international, 286–93 Stable Diffusion, 125, 139, 295 Stallone, Sylvester, 130 Stanford Internet Observatory, 139 Stanford University, 31, 32, 57, 162 Starbucks, 92 StarCraft, 180, 298 StarCraft II, 267, 271, 441 Status-6, 289; See also Poseidon Steadman, Kenneth A., 192 STEM talent, 30–34 sterilization and abortion, 81 Strategic Capabilities Office, 56 strategic reasoning, 49 Strategy Robot, 44–45, 49, 51 Strike Hard Campaign, 79–80 Stuxnet, 283 subsidies, government, 179–80 Sullivan, Jake, 186 Sun Tzu, 45 superhuman attentiveness, 269–70 superhuman precision, 270 superhuman reaction time, 277 superhuman speed, 269, 271 supervised learning, 232 supply chain(s), 300 attacks, 246 global, 76, 179, 183 “Surprising Creativity of Digital Evolution, The,” 235 surveillance, 79–90 cameras, 6, 86–87, 91 laws and policies for, 108–9 throughout China, 84–90 in Xinjiang, 79–83 Sutskever, Ilya, 210 Sutton, Rich, 299, 455 swarms and swarming, 277–79 autonomous systems, 50, 220 demonstrations, 257 Sweden, 108, 158, 187 Switch-C, 294 Synopsys, 162 synthetic aperture radar, 210 synthetic media, 127–34, 138–39 criminal use, 128–29 deepfake detectors, 132–33 deepfake videos, 130–32 geopolitical risks, 129–30 watermarks, digital, 138–39 Syria, 58 system integration, 91 tactics and strategies, 270 Taiwan, 27, 71, 76, 100, 175, 178, 185–86 Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), 27–28, 179, 181, 184 Taiwan Strait, 71, 75–76 talent, 30–34, 304 Tang Kun, 393 tanks, 192 Tanzania, 109 targeting cycle, 263 target recognition, 210 Target Recognition and Adaptation in Contested Environments (TRACE), 210–12 Tay, chatbot, 247 TDP (thermal design power), 454 TechCrunch, 120 technical standards Chinese, 171–75 international, 169–71 techno-authoritarianism, 79–110, 169 China’s tech ecosystem, 91–96 global export of, 105–10, 106f social governance, 97–104 throughout China, 83–90 in Xinjiang, 79–83 technology ecosystem, Chinese, 91–96 platforms, 35 and power, 11 transfer, 33, 163–64 Tektronix, 162 Tencent, 37, 143, 160, 169, 172 Tensor Processing Unit (TPU), 180 Terregator, 193 Tesla, 65, 180 TEVV (test and evaluation, verification and validation), 251–52 Texas Instruments, 162 text generation, 117–21, 123 text-to-image models, 125, 295 Thailand, 107, 109 thermal design power (TDP), 454 Third Offset Strategy, 53, 61 “Thirteenth Five-Year Science and Technology Military-Civil Fusion Special Projects Plan,” 73 Thousand Talents Plan, 32, 164 “Three-Year Action Plan to Promote the Development of New-Generation AI Industry,” 73 Tiananmen Square massacre, 68, 97–98, 103, 148, 160, 341, 359 tic-tac-toe, 47, 336 TikTok, 146–49 Tortoise Market Research, Inc., 15, 40 TPU (Tensor Processing Unit), 180 TRACE (Target Recognition and Adaptation in Contested Environments), 210–12 Trade and Technology Council (TTC), 187 training costs, 296–97 training datasets, 19–23 attacks on, 238–40, 244–45 of drone footage, 203 “radioactive,” 139 real world environments, vs., 58, 64, 233, 264 size of, 294–96 transistor miniaturization, 28 transparency among nations, 258–59, 288 Treasury Department, 246 Trump, Donald, and administration; See also “Donald Trump neuron” budget cuts, 39–40 and COVID pandemic, 74 and Entity List, 166 GPT-2 fictitious texts of, 117–19 graduate student visa revocation, 164 and Huawei, 182–84 and JEDI contract, 215–16 national strategy for AI, 73 relations with China, 71 and TikTok, 147 Twitter account, 150 trust, 249–53 Trusted News Initiative, 138–39 “truth,” 130 Tsinghua University, 31, 93, 173, 291 TSMC, See Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) TTC (Trade and Technology Council), 187 Turkey, 107, 108, 110 Turkish language, 234 Twitter, 139–40, 142, 144, 149, 247 Uganda, 108, 109 Uighurs; See also Xinjiang, China facial recognition, 88–89, 158, 353–55 genocide, 79, 304 mass detention, 74, 79–81, 102, 175 speech recognition, 94 surveillance, 82, 155–56 Ukraine, 108, 129, 196, 219, 288 United Arab Emirates, 107, 109 United Kingdom, 12, 76, 108, 122, 158, 187, 191–92 United States AI policy, 187 AI research of, 30 Chinese graduate students in, 31 competitive AI strategy, 185 United States Presidential election, 2016, 122 United States Presidential election, 2020, 128, 131, 134, 150 University of Illinois, 157 University of Richmond, 123 Uniview, 89, 355 unsupervised learning, 232 Ürümqi, 80, 84 Ürümqi Cloud Computing Center, 156 U.S.

Bibi: The Turbulent Life and Times of Benjamin Netanyahu
by Anshel Pfeffer
Published 30 Apr 2018

The prime suspect, Israel, never took responsibility. The United States was a partner in the secret campaign against Iran. Bush had authorized the cooperation, which continued, and even intensified, under Obama. Their most famous success was Stuxnet, a malicious computer worm that found its way into the operating system of Iran’s uranium enrichment centrifuges. According to the New York Times, Stuxnet had been developed by a joint American-Israeli team in “Operation Olympic Games” to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program.8 Contrary to the “throwing Israel under the bus” narrative pushed by Netanyahu’s people in Jerusalem and Washington, Obama authorized taking the intelligence-sharing and operational coordination between the two countries to unprecedented levels.

…

Begin’s resignation, 152–153 direct election law, 183–184 Gulf War, 178 Hebron Agreement controversy, 246 Madrid Conference, 182 national unity government, 153–154, 161–163, 169 replacing Moshe Dayan, 139 resignation as Likud leader, 185 Revisionist movement, 19 right-wing coalition government, 175–178 Soviet Jewish emigration, 181–182 US foreign policy under Bush, 174–175 Wye River Agreement, 268 Shapiro, Dan, US ambassador, 345–346 Shaqaqi, Fathi, 214 Sharansky, Natan, 230–231, 299 Sharon, Ariel advocating a Palestinian state, 288–289 Barak’s declining government, 285 defense minister, 139 disdain for Netanyahu, 329–330 dissolving the Knesset, 296 entry into politics, 108–109 foreign minister, 263–264 Gaza disengagement, 293–296, 349 illness and death, 297, 331 Lebanon war, 143 Likud’s financial crisis, 192 national unity government, 163, 169–170 Netanyahu’s boasting about, 101 Netanyahu’s first cabinet, 239 1992 elections, 184, 186 1999 elections, 278–279 private income, 283–284 recruiting the Chabad rabbis for Netanyahu’s campaign, 233 resignation from the military, 108 special election after Barak’s loss of mandate, 286–287 strike on Iran’s nuclear installments, 327 US policy on settlements, 315 war in Lebanon, 142–144, 149 War of Attrition with Egypt, 83 Wye River summit negotiations, 265–266 Yoni’s military service, 65 Shas party, 193, 207, 220–221, 248, 258, 275, 286 Shavit, Ari, 252 Shaw, Tanya, 241 Sheves, Shimon, 252 Shimron, David, 189, 191–192, 381 Shin Bet, 87, 211–212, 218, 221, 323, 329–330 Shnitzer, Shmuel, 109 Shomron, Dan, 121 Shultz, George, 147, 159, 165, 171 shuttle diplomacy, Kissinger’s, 110–111 Sinai Campaign, 58–59 al-Sisi, Abdel Fattah, 379 Six-Day War, 69–72, 74, 76, 78, 105–106, 152 social media, 365 socialism, combining Zionism with, 24 Solov, Larry, 372–373 Soviet Union, 57–58, 85, 105, 171, 176, 180–182 Spanish Inquisition, 54 statehood, Israel’s, 40–45 Stengel, Richard, 337 Stern, Avraham, 29–30 Stern Gang, 29–30, 40–41 Sternhell, Zeev, 200 Stewart, Jon, 355 Stuxnet, 329 Suez Canal, 58–59, 73, 78, 81–83, 86, 93, 95–96 suicide attacks, 203–204, 207, 221–222, 250–251, 292 Summit of Peacemakers, 228 Syria as the source of conflict in the Middle East, 176 Barak’s summit with, 281 chemical weapons, 346–348 Hamas’s prisoner exchange, 322 Israeli air strikes, 324–325, 347–348 Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy, 110 plan to retake the Golan Heights, 255–256 Rabin’s negotiations over territory, 205–206 Six-Day War, 70–71 Soviet support, 58 Summit of Peacemakers, 228 Trump’s lack of interest in foreign policy, 376–378 water rights conflict, 68–69 Yom Kippur War, 96–99 A Tale of Love and Darkness (Oz), 53 temporary government, 49–50 Terrorism: How the West Can Win (Netanyahu, ed.), 159–160 terrorist activities American embassy in Beirut, 146 Baruch Goldstein’s attack on the Tomb of the Patriarchs, 202–203 Black September group, 93–94 informing the 1999 election campaigns, 274 Jerusalem Conference, 134–136 Netanyahu’s hardline policy towards Hamas, 250–251 Netanyahu’s Wye River summit demands regarding, 265 raid on Entebbe, 118 Sabena airliner hijacking, 87–89 September 11, 2001, 287–288 US air strike on Libya, 159–160 Time magazine, 337 Truman, Harry, 41–42 Trump, Donald, 3–4, 157, 372–378 Turkish-Israeli relations, 345–346 Tzomet party, 183, 226–227 Uganda Plan, 10–11 United Kingdom.

Digital Bank: Strategies for Launching or Becoming a Digital Bank
by Chris Skinner
Published 27 Aug 2013

McAfee Labs researchers recently debated the leading threats for the coming year and show that it’s only going to get worse: “Hacking as a Service”: Anonymous sellers and buyers in underground forums exchange malware kits and development services for money The decline of online hacktivists Anonymous, to be replaced by more politically committed or extremist groups Nation states and armies will be more frequent sources and victims of cyberthreats Large-scale attacks like Stuxnet, an attack on Iranian nuclear plants, will increasingly attempt to destroy infrastructure, rather than make money Mobile worms on victims’ machines that buy malicious apps and steal via tap-and-pay NFC Malware that blocks security updates to mobile phones Mobile phone ransomware “kits” that allow criminals without programming skills to extort payments Covert and persistent attacks deep within and beneath Windows Rapid development of ways to attack Windows 8 and HTML5 A further narrowing of Zeus-like targeted attacks using the Citadel Trojan, making it very difficult for security products to counter Malware that renews a connection even after a botnet has been taken down, allowing infections to grow again The “snowshoe” spamming of legitimate products from many IP addresses, spreading out the sources and keeping the unwelcome messages flowing SMS spam from infected phones.

…

When governments engage in cyberwars that focus upon the bank system first, there’s going to be a meltdown at some point, and potentially these developments are far more threatening than those of the paltry hacktivists. For example, just as pure speculation, here is a short fiction about a cyberattack on Wall Street: Shaiming Zheng had finally finished his masterpiece. He had created a worm that would infiltrate the heart of the American dream: Wall Street. Like the Israeli Stuxnet attack on the Iranian nuclear facilities in 2010, Shaiming had been hired to achieve the same result on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). NYSE claim that their servers are bullet proof, and can survive attacks that are even more viral and malevolent than those that would target the US defence systems, but they were wrong and Shaiming had the means to prove it.

Dawn of the Code War: America's Battle Against Russia, China, and the Rising Global Cyber Threat
by John P. Carlin and Garrett M. Graff
Published 15 Oct 2018

While we’ve spent the last decade primarily thinking about cybersecurity as the theft or leaking of data, increasingly the threat comes from the alteration and destruction of data. Cybersecurity’s next great fear is about undermining confidence—banks unsure their records are correct, military commanders unsure their positions or radars are correct, citizens unsure their votes are correctly tallied. We’ve seen this in the real world with Stuxnet, a piece of malware targeting Iran’s nuclear system that made machines go haywire and led its scientists to think they made errors, and now with Twitter and Facebook, where the efforts of groups like the Russian Internet Research Agency have made us wonder: Is that voice online a real human and is that a real news story or headline?

…

Written quickly, with minimal research and with no response from an attempt to ask Sony for comment, the nine-paragraph story alluded only in passing to the hack’s unknown origins, referencing briefly that Sony was “reportedly investigating whether North Korea could be involved,” in part because of the controversial movie, The Interview, about North Korea that Sony soon planned to release.8 Kim Zetter at Wired magazine, one of the industry’s most knowledgeable security writers and the author of a book about the Stuxnet Worm, all but dismissed the North Korea theory—the attack was just too bizarre, too showy, and too unprofessional: “If that sounds outlandish, that’s because it likely is. The focus on North Korea is weak and easily undercut by the facts.”9 The “likely culprits,” she wrote, “are hacktivists—or disgruntled insiders.”

…

See Saturday Night Live Snowden, Edward, 24, 55, 122, 252–254, 254n SoBig virus, 119–120, 281 Sochi Olympics, 383 software piracy, 134 SOLAR SUNRISE, 102 SolarWorld, 58, 263–265 Sonic.net, 102 Sony Pictures Entertainment, 64, 307, 309–311, 335; cyberattack on, 31, 55, 308, 319, 323–334, 337–339; emails released by hackers, 333; FBI statement on hack of, 337; North Korea concerns about, 313; Obama, B., on hack of, 338 Soofi, Nadir, 20 Sorkin, Aaron, 334 South Korea, 316, 319, 321 Space Rogue, 124 spam, 116–117, 119–121 SpamHaus, 121 spear phishing, 161–163, 193, 247, 305 Spy Schools (Golden), 259 SpyEye, 202 Stallman, Richard, 86 Stanley, Sara, 36 State Department, spear phishing attacks against, 161–162 state-controlled media, 5 Stephens, Paul, 349 Stimpy, 102, 103 Stokes, Bruce, 161 Stokes, Mark, 275 Stoll, Clifford, 76 Stone-Gross, Brett, 292, 294, 295, 300, 301 Storm Worm, 117 The Story of an American Jihadi: Part One (Hammami), 9 Strait of Hormuz, 212 Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC), 144, 307 study abroad policy, 260 Stuxnet, 56, 311 Su Bin, 62, 272–277, 381 Sullivan, Justin Nojan, 21 Sun Army, 230 Sun Kailiang, 265 supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA), 229 Surespot, 20 surveillance programs, 252–254 Sushchin, Igor Anatolyevich, 302, 303 Swartz, Aaron, 94n Symantec, 220, 247, 356–357 Syrian Computer Society, 375 Syrian Electronic Army (SEA), 47, 62, 64, 374–381 System Account Manger database (SAM database), 124 Taddeo, Leo, 291 Tan, 124 tax law, 75 Taylor, Francis, “Frank,” 101, 101n TCP/IP, 84 TeaMp0isoN, 2, 3, 19 Tenenbaum, Ehud, “The Analyzer,” 102, 103 Tenet, George, 193 terror groups, 59 terrorism, 5, 8, 176n terrorists: “flash-to-bang” time, 20; franchises, 5; tracking signatures of, 17–18.

Pay Any Price: Greed, Power, and Endless War
by James Risen
Published 15 Feb 2014

But a fact rarely mentioned in the rush to grant the NSA more power over cybersecurity—and greater access to the Internet—is that the NSA is now one of the world’s leaders in the use of offensive cyberattacks. The NSA has been behind some of the most sophisticated and damaging cyberattacks ever mounted, including the Stuxnet and Flame viruses that targeted the Iranian nuclear program. But when the New York Times reported the fact that the NSA was behind Stuxnet in 2012, the government reacted in a depressingly familiar fashion. It launched a leak investigation, one that this time turned on Obama’s inner circle. Afterword One day in the summer of 2007, my wife, Penny, called me to say that a FedEx envelope had arrived at our home.

How Long Will Israel Survive Threat Wthn
by Gregg Carlstrom
Published 14 Oct 2017

Some employers use army service as a criterion for hiring, which effectively discriminates against Christian and Muslim applicants. And the army can provide useful skills: many of Israel’s high-tech entrepreneurs, for example, are veterans of Unit 8200, an elite branch of the intelligence services. (It cocreated the Stuxnet virus that wreaked havoc on Iran’s nuclear facilities, causing centrifuges to spin out of control.) Yet these benefits have not accrued to the Arab communities that send their sons into the army. The Druze have a higher unemployment rate than Jews or Christians, and their villages have historically been underfunded.

…

Peter: 15 Levanon, Elyakim: 36 Levy, Gideon: 49; hara’im l’tayyis, 50–1 Lieberman, Avigdor: xv, xvii–xviii, 115–16, 118, 156, 217; background of, 177; Israeli Defence Minister, xiii, 168, 178; Israeli Foreign Minister, 58, 73, 106, 113 Likud Party: xv–xvi, xvii–xviii, 11, 27, 29, 32, 51, 60, 103, 108, 185, 211, 218, 229; Central Committee of, 58; electoral campaign of (2009), 107–8; electoral campaign of (2015), 119–20, 234; electoral performance of (1981), 125; electoral victory of (1977), 17, 43, 124, 201; electoral victory of (1996), 121; members of, 32–3, 87, 98, 106, 117, 170, 175–6, 180, 189, 228, 232; supporters of, 112, 125 Lipkin-Shahak, Amnon: 159–60; background of, 158–9; meeting with Yasser Arafat (1994), 159 Lithuania: 28 Litzman, Ya’akov: Israeli Health Minister, 137 Livni, Tzipi: 7–8, 105, 119, 121–2, 187, 219; firing of (2014), 90–1; opposition to, 113 Luntz, Frank: 130 Ma’ale Adumim: 234 Ma’ale Shomron: 118 Ma’arachot: 168 Macau Daily Times: 177 Macro Center for Political Economics: reports of, 235 Madrid Conference (1991): 152 Makor Rishon: purchased by Sheldon Adelson (2015), 176 Malaysia: 231 Mali, Eliyahu: 196; rabbi of Shirat Moshe, 195 mamlachtiyut: concept of, 18 Mandatory Palestine (1920–48): demolition of homes in, 70; territory of, 16 Mandelblit, Avichai: Israeli Attorney General, 184 Mansour, Bahij: 89 Maoz, Ze’ev: 160 Mapai: 185; members of, 200 Maronites: 20–1 Maroun, Saint: 20 Marzel, Baruch: 65, 170 Matzliach, Rima: 104 May, Theresa: 232 McCain, John: 140–1; Israeli public support for, 141 Meir, Golda: 10, 77, 132, 135 Melman, Yossi: 38 Meretz: 100–1, 104, 109, 221–2; electoral performance of (2015), 120; members of, 196; supporters of, 125 Merkel, Angela: 236 Meron, Theodor: 15–16 Mesha’al, Khaled: 59; attempted assassination of (1997), 163 Microsoft Corporation: 138 Migron: demolition of (2012), 226 Mimran, Arnaud: alleged role in carbon-trading fraud, 182; funding of Benjamin Netanyahu reelection campaign (2016), 182 Mishpacha: editorial staff of, 191 Mitchell, George: 152 Mitchell Report: findings of, 152 mizrahim: 99, 112; insulting of, 122 Mohammed, Prophet: 67 Mola, Shula: Chair of Israeli Association for Ethiopian Jews, 76 Molcho, Yitzhak: 31 Moldova: Kishinev, 38 Monte Carlo: 182 Mordechai, Yitzhak: 160 Mossad: 4, 16, 158, 163; personnel of, 109, 144, 161, 163, 167–9 Mozes, Noni: 103 Mu’awiyah: 21 Mubarak, Hosni: 28 Mughniyeh, Imad: assassination of, 161 Muslim Brotherhood: 18, 84, 141–2; electoral victory of (2012), 89 Nachman, Yossi: 21 Naddaf, Father Gabriel: 23–4 Nafar, Tamer: co-founder of DAM, 115, 174 Nagosa, Avraham: xv–xvi Nahal Oz (kibbutz): 55, 59 Naim, Bassem: xviii Naor, Miriam: 138, 155; Israeli Chief Justice, 230 Narkis, Naor: 81 National Front (France): 210 National Public Radio (NPR): 130 National Religious Party: electoral performance of (2015), 117; members of, 117 nationalism: xv, 8, 45, 123, 146, 186, 217–18, 236; Arab, 29, 213; Jewish, 62, 66; ultranationalism, 41; white, 141 Navon, Yitzhak: presence at Ben-Gurion-Karelitz Meeting (1952), 94; President of Israel, 26; visit to Cairo (1980), 26 neoliberalism: 213, 215 Netanyahu, Benjamin: xiii, xv–xvi, 4–5, 14, 17, 23, 27, 36–7, 42, 48, 57, 59–60, 64, 79, 84, 86, 88–9, 95, 100, 103, 106–7, 110–12, 116–17, 119, 135–8, 146, 150, 155, 159–61, 164–7, 177–80, 189–90, 204–5, 219–21, 227, 231–3; address to Jewish Federations of North America (2015), 164; administration of, 6, 25, 27, 99–100, 168–9, 178–9, 185; allegations of personal corruption, 108, 182; background of, 218; collapse of administration (1998), 160; electoral campaign of (2015), 112–13, 119–21; electoral victory of (1996), 121–2; family of, 27, 108, 169, 183, 220; meetings with John Kerry and Mahmoud Abbas (2014–15), 31; opposition to, 58; opposition to Reuven Rivlin’s presidential candidacy, 27–8; presence at funeral of Shimon Peres (2016), 198; proposal for nation-state bill (2014), 86–7; speech to Congress (2011), 109, 112, 162; visit to Moscow (2016), 181–2 Netanyahu, Sara: civil lawsuits filed against (2016), 183; family of, 27, 108, 169, 183; ‘Sara Stories’, 183–4 Netanyahu, Yair: family of, 220 New York Times: 5, 28, 100, 134, 186, 230, 234 New Zealand: 231 Newsweek: 130 Nir, Amiram: 44; death of (1988), 45 Nir-Mozes, Judy Shalom: 117 Nirim (kibbutz): 56 non-governmental organizations (NGOs): 76, 181, 186, 221, 229; liberal, 176 Nordau, Max: 91 Norquist, Grover: 143 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): 140 Obama, Barack: 17, 26, 113, 142–3, 164–5, 203, 232, 236; administration of, 231; foreign policy of, 139, 143, 152; Israeli public support for, 141; Shabbat address of (2015), 10; speech at funeral of Shimon Peres, 197–8, 204 Od Yosef Chai (‘Joseph Still Lives’): 20; shuttering of (2014), 14, 19; students of, 149 Odeh, Ayman: 116; background of, 114–15; members of, 111 Ofra: 200, 225, 229; establishment of (1975), 26–7 Ofran, Hagit: 54 Ohana, Eli: 118 Olmert, Ehud: 17, 218–19, 229; imprisonment of, 183; Mayor of Jerusalem, 159 Operation Brother’s Keeper (2014): 46 Operation Cast Lead (2008–9): 2, 46, 50, 107 Operation Protective Edge (2014): 2, 5, 44–6, 48–9, 52–3, 56, 60, 87, 176, 185; casualties of, 46–7, 61; political impact of, 61–2; use of ‘Hannibal doctrine’, 49 Ophir Awards: 174 Or, Theodor: head of Or Commission, 73 Or Commission: findings of, 73–5; members of, 73, 75 Oren, Michael: 110, 135–6, 186, 231 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): 4, 107, 184 Oslo Accords: 6, 32, 82, 152, 159, 177, 199; implementation of, 44; signing of (1993), 117 Ottoman Empire: 21, 70; fall of (1923), 216–17; Jewish population of, 191–2 Oz, Amos: 176, 199 Pakada, Damas: attack on (2014), 75–6; background of, 76 Palestine: xviii, 5, 152–3, 191, 213, 232; Douma, 20, 145, 149; Ramallah, 2, 33, 141, 153, 200, 204, 225; Urif, 18 Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research: 59 Palestine Riots (1929): 66 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO): 30, 43, 151, 159, 173; members of, 167 Palestinian Authority (PA): 14, 21, 57–8, 64–5, 116, 206 Palmor, Yigal: 81 Pardo, Tamir: 167; retirement of, 169 Peace Now: protests organised by, 44–5, 53, 201 Peres, Shimon: 23, 26, 30–1, 93, 199, 202–5, 218; authorization of Ofra (1975), 26–7; awarded Medal of Freedom (2012), 26, 203; background of, 199–200; death of (2016), 197–8, 200; economic stabilization plan (1985), 202; electoral defeat of (1996), 121; funeral of (2016), 197–8, 204; Israeli Defence Minister, 26, 200–1; power-sharing agreement with Yitzhak Shamir (1984), 198, 202; role in furthering of Camp David Accords (1978), 202; role in negotiating Oslo Accords, 199; Tomorrow Is Now (1978), 201 Peretz, Amir: 113 Persian Empire: xi Persico, Oren: 177, 185 Pew Research Center: 6, 10–11, 133; polling efforts of, 146 Pfeffer, Anshel: 177, 221 Piron, Shai: Israeli Education Minister, 91 Plesner, Yohanan: President of IDI, 125 Poland: 9–10; Katowice (Kattowitz), 92 Porat, Hanan: 15 Power, Samantha: US Ambassador to UN, 231 ‘price tag’ attacks: 17, 20, 148; concept of, 14 Putin, Vladimir: 181, 216–17 Al-Qaeda: 107; Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, 25 Qatar: Doha, 48, 59 Qattoush, Jawad: 208 Rabin, Yitzhak: 1, 44, 158–9, 198, 218; administration of, 200; assassination of (1995), xiv, 18, 35, 38, 159–60, 221; Israeli Defense Minister, 152; no-confidence vote against (1976), 190; resignation of (1977), 184; role in ethnic cleansing of Lydda/Lod, 167; signing of Oslo Accords (1993), 117 Rabinovich, Beni: 190–1 al-Rai, Bishara: 22–3 Ravid, Barak: 110 Regev, Mark: 70 Regev, Miri: 170, 180; background of, 171–2; Israeli Culture Minister, 171, 176; restriction of funding for Israeli cultural institutions unwilling to perform in underdeveloped regions, 172, 221 Reider, Dimi: 221 Remley, Rennick: 100 Republican Party (USA): 6, 210; ideology of, 125; support for sanctions, 142; supporters of, 140–1 Reshet: 179 Revisionism: 9 Rivlin, Reuven: xv, 27, 29–31, 38–9, 78–9, 87, 98, 125–7, 146, 181, 204; election to Knesset (1988), 28; family of, 28–9; opposition to ‘Boycott Law’ (2011), 29 Rivlin, Ya’akov: 191 Rivlin, Yosef: family of, 28–9 Romney, Mitt: 141; Israeli public support for, 141 Rosenblum, Herzl: 44 Rosner, Shmuel: 230 Russian Federation: 216; Kremlin, 181; Moscow, 181–2 Sa’ad, Omar: 88 Sa’ar, Gideon: 32–3 Sabbah, Michel: 24 Saban Forum: 9 Sabra/Shatila Massacres (1982): 83, 132; political impact of, 201–2 Salafism: 18 Samri, Luba: 73 Sarid, Yossi: 173 Sarna, Yigal: 183 Saudi Arabia: 135 Sayeret Matkal: background of, 117 Schneider, Tal: 57, 114 Sea of Galilee: 148 Second Intifada (2000–5): 14, 33, 70, 151; casualties of, 152–3; political impact of, 52; riots prior to (2000), 73 Second World War (1939–45): 92, 125; Holocaust, xvii, 10, 28–9, 82, 146, 212 Segal, Amit: 106, 121, 179–80 Seidemann, Daniel: 72 Seif, Zidan: death of (2014), 87 Senegal: 231–2 settler movement/settlements: 19–20, 33, 104–5, 142, 172, 226–7, 233–4; boycotting of, 132; dismantling of, 118, 148, 226; establishment of, 15–16; lobbying efforts, 118; violence and arson committed by inhabitants, 13–15, 42 Shaer, Gilad: abduction of (2014), 33–4, 117 Shaffir, Stav: 8, 84 Shaked, Ayelet: 8, 36–7, 135, 234; Israeli Justice Minister, 171, 175, 212, 226 Shalem Center: funding of, 187 Shalev, Chemi: 51, 203 Shalit, Gilad: capture of (2006), 46, 56, 61, 188 al-Shalloudi, Abdel Rahman: family of, 69; role in Ammunition Hill Attack (2014), 64, 69, 72–3 Shamir, Yitzhak: power-sharing agreement with Shimon Peres (1984), 198, 202 Shani, General Udi: 70 Shani Commission: 70; findings of, 71 Shapira, Yitzhak: Torat HaMelech (‘The King’s Torah’), 14 Shapira, Yosef: 184 Shapiro, Dan: US Ambassador to Israel, 138, 232 al-Sharif, Abdel Fattah: shooting conducted by (2015), xii Sharon, Ariel: 17, 231; dismantling of settlements in Gaza (2005), 148, 218; Israeli Defence Minister, 44, 167; visit to Temple Mount (2000), 73 Shas: Council of Sages, 130; ideology of, 114; members of, 65, 114, 130 Shavit, Ari: 113 Sheinman, Hanoch: 52 Shikaki, Dr Khalil: Director of Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research, 59 Shimron, David: 182 Shin Bet: xiii, 19, 149, 158, 208, 230; personnel of, 4, 90, 148, 161, 167, 169 Shinui: members of, 220 Shirat Moshe: founding of (2008), 195 Shkolnik, Melania: 113 Shlissel, Yishai: Attack on Jerusalem Gay Pride Parade (2016), 98 shmita: concept of, 191–2 Shmueli, Eitan: 196 Shoval, Zalman: 142–3 Silwan: 41–2, 67, 69, 72; purchasing of homes in, 70–1 Simha, David: Head of Israeli-Palestinian Chamber of Commerce, 135 al-Sisi, Abdel Fattah: 156–7, 231 Six-Day War (1967): 10, 12, 43, 132; political impact of, 131–2, 144; territory occupied during, 15, 66, 201, 231 Smotrich, Bezalel: 157 Social Justice Protests (2011): 109; development of tent city during, 82–4 socialism: 92, 184, 202, 215 Soviet Union (USSR): 79, 177, 179; collapse of (1991), 216–17 Sprung, Brachie: 69 StandWithUs: advertising campaign in New York Times (2014), 99–100 Steinitz, Yuval: Israeli Intelligence Minister, 57 Stern, Yedidia: 86 Streisand, Barbara: 26 Stuxnet (computer virus): use of, 25 Sudan: asylum seekers from, 171 Suleiman, General Muhammad: assassination of, 161 Supreme Court: xiv, 37, 90, 117, 168, 218, 226–7; ruling on military seizure of land for civilian settlements (1979), 226; upholding of legality of admission committees (2014), 74 Sweden: Stockholm, 221 Sweid, Hana: 115 Switzerland: 101, 123 Syria: 24, 68; borders of, 107; Civil War (2011–), 24–5, 212; Damascus, 21, 161; Raqqa, 68 Ta’al: members of, 116 Taub Center: 84 Taybeh: 225 Tebeka: personnel of, 76 tefillin: 64 Temple Institute: aims of, 64 Temple Mount: xiv–xv, 66–7, 73, 150; campaigns for Jewish access to, 64; police raiding of compound (2015), 150 Thailand: 55 Third Reich (1933–45): xvii, 54, 164; Schutzstaffel (SS), 30 ThyssenKrupp: 182 Tibi, Ahmad: 29, 42, 77; head of Ta’al, 116 Tikvah Fund: Mosaic, 187 Times, The: 1 Times of Israel: editorial staff of, 212 Toner, Mark: 124 Tragerman, Daniel: 56 Trajtenberg, Manuel: 83 Transparency International: 183; branches of, 184 Trump, Donald: 6, 171, 231, 236; administration of, 196; electoral victory of (2016), 188–9; family of, 142; US Presidential Election Campaign of (2016), 140–1, 210, 212 Trump, Ivanka: 143 Tubi, Ezri: 15 Tunisia: Tunis, xviii, 159 Turkey: 216; attempted military coup (2016), 210; Istanbul Suicide Bombing Attack (2016), 210; Kurdish population of, 218; postmodern coup (1997), 217 Twitter: 190 Tzabari, Yossi: 174 Ukraine: 37; Russian annexation of Crimea (2015), 80 ultra-Orthodox Jews (haredim): xv, 4, 11, 32, 47, 82, 94–5, 98, 101, 106, 126, 129, 136–7, 141, 190–2, 194–7, 213–14, 222, 235; exemption from military service, 91–3, 219; lack of conventional education, 95–6; political representation of, 65, 111, 114; territory inhabited by, 63 Union for Reform Judaism (Union of American Hebrew Congregations): members of, 131 Unit 8200: 25 United Kingdom (UK): 43, 80, 200; Brexit Referendum (2016), 209–13; Jewish diaspora in, 79; London, 1, 10, 22, 70, 184, 187; Northern Ireland, 110 United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP): 209 United Nations (UN): 14, 17–18, 67, 219, 232; Convention against Corruption, 31; General Assembly, 150, 231; Geneva Conventions, 19, 71; Security Council, 139, 230–2 United States of America (USA): 5–6, 9, 39, 67, 129, 137, 144, 167, 186, 206, 210, 231; 9/11 Attacks, xiv; Congress, 109, 162, 164–5, 226; Jewish diaspora in, 5, 79–80, 131–3, 140–2, 163–4, 212; Los Angeles, CA, 80; Miami, FL, 80; New York, 10, 41, 119, 133, 187, 192, 200, 214, 216; Pentagon, 143; Pulse Nightclub Shooting (2016), 210; Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 182; State Department, 108, 117, 124, 139, 227; Washington DC, 2, 9–10, 17, 111, 133, 135, 141, 143, 184, 197 United Torah Judaism: 111, 137, 190 Venezuela: 231 Veolia: 40 Vorspan, Albert: 131 Walla: 181 Wasserstein, Bernard: 66 Waxman, Dov: Trouble in the Tribe (2016), 132 al-Wazir, Khalil: death of (1988), xviii Weinstein, Esti: suicide of, 96–8 Weinstein, Yehuda: 171; Israeli Attorney General, 184 Weiss, Dana: 113 Weizmann, Chaim: 7, 91; Chairman of Zionist Commission for Palestine, 66 West Bank: 1, 3, 18, 23, 37, 75, 116, 118, 147–8, 152–3, 169, 201, 225, 229; Amona, 170, 225–30, 234; Area C, 3–4, 32, 73; Beit El, 141; Bil’in, 167; Israeli Occupation of, 3, 6, 15–17, 32–3, 151; Qalandia, 167; settlements in, 142, 172; standard of living conditions in, 52 Western Wall: 65–6, 129, 143, 214, 222; ultra-Orthodox supervision of, 136 WhatsApp: xvi, 230 Wolfson, Noah: 206 World Jewish Congress: personnel of, 79 World Zionist Organization: 7, 215 Wye River Memorandum: 160 Ya’akov, Doron: 83–4 Ya’alon, Moshe: xvii–xviii, 166, 182; Israeli Defence Minister, xvi, 3, 19, 71, 171, 185; relations with settler movement, 19–20; resignation of (1997), 178, 217 Yachad: formation of, 114; ideology of, 17; supporters of, 17 Yachimovich, Shelly: 8 Yadlin, Amos: 57, 166 Yated Ne’eman: editorial staff of, 190–1 Yatom, Danny: head of Mossad, 163 Yediot Aharonot: 20, 103–4, 135, 159, 177, 179, 183, 186; anti-BDS summit sponsored by, 133–4; editorial staff of, 44; founding of (1939), 185 Yesh Atid: 178, 222; members of, 32, 220; supporters of, 125 Yesh Din: appeal filed against development of new Amona site, 229 Yesh Gvul: 44 Yesha Council: members of, 19, 111 yeshiva: 14–15, 19, 33, 94, 98, 195 Yifrach, Eyal: abduction of (2014), 33–4, 117 Yishai, Eli: 114 Yisrael Beiteinu: 178, 222; members of, 113; supporters of, 125 Yitzhar (settlement): attacks carried out by, 14–15, 18–20; relationship with Israeli military, 18; residents of, 14, 17 Yom Kippur War (1973): xiv, 43, 51 Yosef, David: member of Shas Party’s Council of Sages, 130 Yosef, Ovadia: 114 Yosef, Yitzhak: xvi YouTube: xii, 56, 130 Zaher, Sawsan: 25–6 ZAKA: personnel of, 63–4 Zalzberg, Ofer: 197 Zamir, Ifat: 184 Zertal, Idith: Lords of the Land, 16 Zionism: xv, 8, 24, 45, 58–9, 65–6, 77, 91, 103, 110, 115, 123–6, 144, 167, 192, 216, 235; anti-Zionism, 92; definitions of, 9; liberal, 5–6, 10–12, 203; political, 7, 66; religious, 185; secular, 9, 213–14 Zionist Camp: 110, 112–13, 116, 119; electoral performance of (2015), 119–21, 234; members of, 104, 166 Zionist Commission for Palestine: members of, 66 Zionist Organization of America: 142 Zionist Union: 156; electoral performance of (1981), 124; internal conflicts within, 157 Zivan, Yair: 220 Zoabi, Hanin: 117; participation in Turkish aid flotilla to Gaza, 29; suspension from Knesset (2014), 117 el-Zoubi, Abd el-Aziz: 24 Zuckerberg, Mark: 203

Rise of the Robots: Technology and the Threat of a Jobless Future
by Martin Ford
Published 4 May 2015

For example, if automated trucks and trains eventually move food and other critical supplies under centralized control, such a system might create extreme vulnerabilities. There is already great concern about the vulnerability of industrial machinery, and of vital infrastructure like the electrical grid, to cyber attack. That vulnerability was demonstrated by the Stuxnet worm that was created by the US and Israeli governments in 2010 to attack the centrifuges used in Iran’s nuclear program. If, someday, important infrastructure components are dependent on centralized machine intelligence, those concerns could be raised to an entirely new level. Robots in Agriculture Of all the employment sectors that make up the US economy, agriculture stands out as the one that has already undergone the most dramatic transformation as a direct result of technological progress.

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See also basic income guarantee Social Security disability program, 43, 262 Social Security income, 222 solar power, 282 Solow, Robert, 65, 203 Sony Corporation, 4 Soviet Union, 161n Spain, 221 Sprague, Shawn, 281 Spread Networks, 114 stagflation, 33 stagnant wages, 34–38 Stanek, Roman, 107 Stanford University, 6, 70n, 182 MOOCs and, 132, 133, 135–136, 142 Staples, 17 Star Trek (television program), 246, 247 “StatsMonkey” software, 84 Stiglitz, Joseph, 203 student identification, online courses and, 136, 137 student loans, 124, 126, 140, 196, 214, 217, 251 Suitable Technologies, Inc., 8 Summers, Larry, 274n Sun Microsystems, 243 Super Crunchers (Ayres), 125 super-intelligence, 236, 236n Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, 201–202 surgical robots, 154–155 Stuxnet worm, 22 Switzerland, 268 SyNAPSE, 72, 80n Taibbi, Matt, 56 Target, Inc., 88, 159 taxes, 271–273, 275, 277–278 Taylor, John B., 37 Teamsters Union, 17 techno-feudalism, 204n, 266 technological change/progress economic growth and, 65 productivity and, 33 S-curves of, 66–67, 68 skill biased, 48 welfare of American workforce and, x technology disruptive, xviii, 66 golden era of, 51 graying workforce and, 220–223 historical narrative of modern, 51–58 investment in labor-saving, 227–228 manufacturing jobs and, 55 relationship between employment and, 175–176 unskilled worker wages and, 208–209 Tegmark, Max, 229, 237 telepresence robots, 119–120, 157 Terminator movies, 22, 157n Tesla, 3 textile industry, US, 8–9 Thatcher, Margaret, 258 “There’s Plenty of Room at the Bottom” (Feynman), 241 Thiel, Peter, 64, 236 thinking machine, 229–233.

Culture & Empire: Digital Revolution
by Pieter Hintjens
Published 11 Mar 2013

It's estimated that 40-90% of Windows PCs are infected by some kind of rogue software -- viruses, trojans, worms, and so on. The measured level is 42%, for known vulnerabilities. What about unknown holes in Windows, a so-called "zero-day attack"? In June 2010, the Stuxnet worm was found to be sabotaging Iran's nuclear program in a very sophisticated attack that looked for specific Siemens industrial control hardware, and interfered with it when it found it. Stuxnet is significant for several reasons, two of which are worth paying particular attention to. It was built by the NSA's hackers, and it used no less than four Windows zero-days. Zero-days are very rare in theory.

The Fourth Industrial Revolution
by Klaus Schwab
Published 11 Jan 2016

Defence, military and national security strategists focused on a limited number of traditionally hostile states, now they must consider a near-infinite and indistinct universe of hackers, terrorists, activists, criminals, and other possible foes. Cyber warfare can take many different forms – from criminal acts and espionage to destructive attacks such as Stuxnet – that remain largely underestimated and misunderstood because they are so new and difficult to counter. Since 2008, there have been many instances of cyber attacks directed at both specific countries and companies, yet discussions about this new era of warfare are still in their infancy and the gap between those who understand the highly technical issues of cyber warfare and those who are developing cyber policy widens by the day.

Warnings
by Richard A. Clarke
Published 10 Apr 2017

The wear and tear destroyed them from the inside out. Yet all the while, the sensors that should have reported the variations in spin rate to the control room showed that all equipment was performing nominally. Thus did the United States slow the Iranian nuclear weapons program for a time, using a hack, a piece of malware known as Stuxnet. Why Natanz is important, says Weiss, is that it showed how corrupting digital control system software allows a hacker to send the wrong signals to a programmable logic controller (PLC), the computer inside machines that controls what that machine does and how it does it. Digital control system software packages are running millions of PLCs throughout the U.S. infrastructure, not just in the power grid, but also in pipelines, refineries, and manufacturing facilities.

…

See Gulf War Personal investment, of critics, 187–88 Personalized medicine, 331–32, 342 Personal responsibility, sense of, 185–86 Persuasion campaign, 364–65 Pessimism, 2, 3, 50, 236 “Pet Rock problem,” 321 Piccone, Michele, 380n Pielke, Roger, Jr., 254 Planetary Defense Program Office, 317, 322–23 Plant elevation, and Fukushima nuclear disaster, 89–90 Plaquemines Parish, 39 Plutonium spheres (pits), 83 Polar ice melt, 239, 245–52, 258–60, 360 Political threshold problem, 321–22 Polk Prize, 226 Pollack, James B., 273 Pomona College, 327 Pontchartrain, Lake, 40 Ponzi, Charles, 105 Ponzi scheme, 102–3, 105, 110–11, 113, 115 Population bomb, 192–93 Population Bomb, The (Ehrlich), 192–93 Population growth, 16, 192–93 Predictions, 13–15 Predictor (possible Cassandra), 168, 170, 182–86 President’s Daily Briefing, 24, 35 Prevention strategy, 362–64 Prince, Chuck, 145, 154, 156, 157 Professional investment, of critics, 187–88 Programmable logic controller (PLC), 291–92 Protecting Industrial Control Systems from Electronic Threats (Weiss), 286 Protein & Cell, 340 Providian, 152 Prykarpattyaoblenergo, 284–85 Public Health Service, 354–55 Pulitzer Prize, 50, 226 Putin, Vladimir, 285 Pyrrho of Elis, 185 Questioners, 184–85 Radiation exposure, 88 Ramadi, Iraq, 69 Rampart Investment Management, 101, 102, 105, 106, 109, 110 Raqqa, 68 Reacting, Ronald, 26 Reagan, Ronald, 21, 32, 277–78, 280 Recombinant DNA technology, 336–40 Red Army, 25, 26, 266 Red Team (Zenko), 379n Regulatory capture, 94–95, 96, 98, 115, 177–78 Reid, Ann, 222 Reis Crater, 307 Rendezvous with Rama (Clarke), 313 Response Availability, 170–71 Response strategies, 358–64 hedging, 361–62 mitigation and prevention, 362–64 surveillance, 359–60 Responsibility, diffusion of, 176–77, 215, 235, 321, 348 Revkin, Andrew, 244 Ribozymes, 328 Ring of Fire, 94 RNA, 327–28 Robock, Alan, 261, 273–74, 277–82 Robo-traders, 211 Roche, 225 Rockefeller Institute, 193 Roedersheimer, Keefe, 205 Rolling Stone (magazine), 338 Rometty, Ginni, 209 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 213 Roper, William, 214 Ross, Bill, 136 Ross, Lee, 184 Royal Academy, 345 Royal Air Force, 10 Royal Navy, 9 Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute, 253 Rubenstein, Ariel, 380n Ruby, Jack, 99 Rumsfeld, Donald, 28–29 Russo, Rene, 219 Rutgers University, 261 Sagan, Carl, 273–77 Sago Mine disaster, 129–30 Salling, John Peter, 122 Samuel, Arthur, 381n San Bruno pipeline explosion of 2010, 293–94 Sandler O’Neill & Partners, 154 Sandworm, 285 Sanriku earthquake of 869, 77–81, 91, 97–98 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), 157 Sarin, 23, 230 Satisficing, 116, 117, 180–81, 319, 322, 359 Savage, Stefan, 297–98 Scacco, Gus, 149 Scanning for problems, 354–56 Scarface (movie), 99 Scenario modeling, 360, 363–64 Schapiro, Mary, 118–19 Schlesinger, Michael, 240–41 Schneider, Stephen, 241 Science (journal), 242 Science Story (show), 226 Scientific American, 278–79 Scientific method, 248–49 Scientific reticence, 79–80, 186–87, 234, 248–49, 259, 335 “Scope neglect,” 174 Sea-level rise, 238, 244–60, 360 Search for extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI), 304 Seawalls, and Fukushima nuclear disaster, 77, 85, 89–90, 92–93 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 100, 105–12, 114–20, 189–90 Security by obscurity, 270 Seismologist Warns, A (Ishibashi), 91–92 Selection effect, 380n Self-confidence, 184, 240, 365 Self-interest, of critics, 187–88 Sendai, Japan, 80, 81, 82 Sentinel intelligence, 3, 16, 356 “Separation of parts” policy, 270 September 11 attacks, 7–9, 230, 361–62 Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (Lawrence), 57 Sextus Empiricus, 185 Shearson Lehman, 162 Shia Muslims, 63 Shoemaker, Gene, 306–7 Shultz, George, 280 Siberian Unified Dispatch Control Center (SUDCC), 290 Siegel, Jeremy, 157–58 Siegfried Line, 10 Sieur de Bienville, Jean-Baptiste Le Moyne, 41 Signal and the Noise, The (Silver), 15 Signal from noise, separating, 356–58 Silver, Nate, 13, 15 Silver mining, 128–29 Simon, Herbert, 180–81, 322 Simons, Daniel, 175 Singularity, the, 209 60 Minutes (TV show), 119, 162, 244 Skepticism, 151–53, 168, 185, 240, 248–49 Skynet, 205 Smith & Wesson, 99, 109 Snowden, Edward, 211 Solid rocket boosters, and Challenger disaster, 11–13 Somalia, 65 Soothsayers, 1–2 “Sophistication effect,” 187 South Africa, 42–43 Soviet Union, 25–26, 266, 267–68, 271, 273–74, 277–78 Spaceguard goal, 312–17, 319 Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, 11–13 SpaceX, 202 Spanish flu pandemic of 1918, 195, 198, 217, 221–24 Spielberg, Steven, 101 Split-strike conversion, 103–5 SSH (Sayano-Shushenskaya Hydro), 289–2917 Stalin, Joseph, 174, 213 Standard project hurricane (SPH), 52–53 “Standing start,” 266 Stanford University, 89, 184, 192, 226, 337, 338 Steam engine, 174–75 Stock trading. See also Financial crisis of 2008 weak AI and, 211–12 Storm, The (van Heerden), 51 Stuxnet, 291–92 Subprime mortgage crisis, 147–48, 153–54, 157, 162 Suh, Simona, 117–18 Sunni Muslims, 63 Sunshine Mine disaster of 1972, 128–29 Sun Yat-sen University, 340 SUNY Downstate Medical Center, 186 Super Aegis II, 214 Superintelligence, 201, 203–16 Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA), 292, 293 Surveillance, 359–60 “Swarm boats,” 214 Swine flu, 195–98, 218 Symposium Greek Restaurant (New York City), 237, 252–53 Syria, 57–74 Ford scenario, 65–66, 67–69 slippery slope of intervention, 70–74 Syrian Civil War, 60–61, 62–64, 72–73 Szostak, Jack, 327 Tactical nuclear weapons, 267–69 “Take It Easy” (song), 305 Tamiflu, 225, 233 Taubenberger, Jeffery, 222 Team Louisiana Report, 55 Technical expertise, 182–83 Technological evolution, 212–13 Technological singularity, 209 Tectonic plates, 80, 81 “Tells,” 25–27, 29–30, 36–37 Tenet, George, 8 Terminator, The (movie), 205 Tesla, 202 Tetlock, Philip, 13–15 Thierry de la Villehuchet, René, 102–3, 109, 113 “Tickling the dragon’s tail,” 83 Titan III rockets, 11–12 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami of 2011, 81–82, 84–85 Tohoku Electric Power Co., 91 Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), 76–78, 86–98, 92–98 Toon, Owen, 273, 278–79 Trenberth, Kevin, 253 Troy, 1–2 Truman, Harry, 127 TTAPS, 273–77 Tunguska event, 301–3, 316 Tunisia, 57, 58 Turco, Richard P., 273, 276–77 Turkey, 62–63 Tyrosinemia, 332, 334 UBS, 149 Ukraine power grid cyber attack of 2015, 283–85, 287–88, 289, 291 Umea University, 329 Unemployment, 212–13 United Arab Emirates (UAE), 28 United Nations Climate Change Conference (2015), 247–50 United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), 88 Universal hackability, 296–300 University of California, Berkeley, 13–14, 226, 327, 329 University of California, San Diego, 297 University of Colorado, 254, 328 University of Hawaii, 256, 315, 326 University of Iowa, 238, 243 University of Massachusetts, 296 University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center, 332 University of Tokyo School of Engineering, 92 Upper Big Branch Mine disaster, 121–22, 130–37 accident report, 133 Cassandra system, 137–38, 140–41 ventilation system, 133–37 Van Allen, James, 238 Van Heerden, Ivor, 41–55 background of, 41, 42–43 coastal restoration program, 43–44, 53 government failures and, 50–55 New Orleans Scenario, 45, 46–50, 52 resignation of, 44 Veracode, 295 Vinge, Vernor, 202 Vulnerabilities, and complexity, 366–67 Wall Street Journal, 115, 119, 154, 158, 163 Ward, Grant, 106 Warfare and AI, 199, 200, 213–14 Warning, the, 168, 170, 170–76 Warsaw Pact, 278 Washington Post, 243, 340 Waterman Award, 328–29 Watson (computer), 202, 209 Watson, James, 328 Watt, James, 174–75 Weak AI, 201, 210–13 Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), 30–31, 358 Webster, Robert G., 223–25, 231–32, 235–36 Weidner, David, 158, 163 Weiss, Joe, 283–84, 286–89, 291–96, 298–300 West Antarctic Ice Sheet, 239, 246, 360 West Berlin, 25 Wharton School, 157–58 White, Ryan, 227, 384n White House National Warning Office, 355–56 Principals Committee, 29 Situation Room, 26–27, 181 Whitney, Meredith, 143–46, 148–54, 160–65 background of, 151, 153–54 Citigroup downgrade, 143–46, 154, 156–60, 164–65 Wide-field Infrared Survey Explorer (WISE), 315–16 Wiesel, Elie, 113 Wilson, E.

Connectography: Mapping the Future of Global Civilization
by Parag Khanna
Published 18 Apr 2016

Cyber war is a quantum type of conflict: Weapons are intangible, their power can be observed but not measured, and there are no fixed stockpiles or arsenals. There are also no laws of war for cyber war, nor is deterrence simply a matter of correlating forces. It is a perpetual war of hack attacks to damage military hardware (as the Stuxnet virus did to the Iranian nuclear program), steal corporate data (as Russian hackers have done to Western banks), or access government data and advanced technological intellectual property (as China’s PLA cyber unit 61398 has successfully done against prominent American companies). The alleged Chinese hack of the U.S. government’s Office of Personnel Management, in which data on up to four million federal employees was lifted from federal servers, shows that data is as susceptible to invasion as borders.

…

The Twilight of Sovereignty: How the Information Revolution Is Transforming Our World. Scribner, 1992. Zakaria, Fareed. The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. W. W. Norton, 2007. Zeihan, Peter. The Accidental Superpower: The Next Generation of American Preeminence and the Coming Global Disorder. Twelve, 2015. Zetter, Kim. Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World’s First Digital Weapon. Penguin Random House, 2014. Zhang Weiwei. The China Wave: Rise of a Civilizational State. World Century, 2012. Zheng, Y. De Facto Federalism in China: Reforms and Dynamics of Central-Local Relations. World Scientific, 2007. ———. “Institutional Economics and Central-Local Relations in China: Evolving Research.”

The Age of AI: And Our Human Future
by Henry A Kissinger , Eric Schmidt and Daniel Huttenlocher
Published 2 Nov 2021

In the contingency of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks (as on communication systems), a swarm of seemingly valid information requests may be used to overwhelm systems and make them unavailable for their intended use. In such cases, the true sources of the attack may be masked, making it difficult or impossible to determine (at least in the moment) who is attacking. Even one of the most famous instances of cyber-enabled industrial sabotage—the Stuxnet disruption of manufacturing control computers used in Iranian nuclear efforts—has not been formally acknowledged by any government. Conventional and nuclear weapons are targetable with relative precision, and moral and legal imperatives direct that they target military forces and installations. Cyber weapons can affect computing and communications systems broadly, often hitting civilian systems with particular force.

50 Future Ideas You Really Need to Know
by Richard Watson
Published 5 Nov 2013

Many people nowadays cannot even wire a plug or fix a broken vehicle let alone kill an animal for food or deal with dead bodies. We would eventually recover from any such incident, I imagine, but in the shorter term, chaos and lunacy would almost certainly reign. the condensed idea Beware terrorists with nuclear materials timeline 1995 Terrorists attempt to detonate dirty bomb in Moscow 2010 Stuxnet virus attacks nuclear facilities in Iran 2018 Man arrested after attempting to sell radioactive materials on eBay 2022 Al-Qaeda attempts to detonate dirty devices on three subway systems 2030 Tactical nuclear weapons used in Georgia 2060 25 percent of nations found to have secret nuclear programs 2080 Nuclear development abandoned in favor of dark-matter weapons 44 Volcanoes & quakes In 1815, a volcano known as Tambora erupted on an island called Sumbawa in Indonesia.

Disrupt and Deny: Spies, Special Forces, and the Secret Pursuit of British Foreign Policy
by Rory Cormac
Published 14 Jun 2018

After 9/11, disruption focused on terrorist networks but it extended to other areas too. Sawers has admitted, for example, that SIS ran a series of covert operations to slow down Iranian nuclear development in the late 2000s.121 And it appears that senior intelligence personnel in SIS and GCHQ contributed to the US–Israeli cyberattack on Iranian nuclear facilities, known as Stuxnet, whilst GCHQ may have been involved in the espionage precursor to the sabotage known as Flame.122 Facing a gap between capabilities and the desire to play a global role, Britain is still turning to covert action. The past decade has witnessed a growing fusion between intelligence and special forces, as well as SIS and GCHQ working proactively and operationally in their own right.

…

D. 55 Jackson, Geoffrey 186 Jagan, Cheddi 144, 148, 149 Jamaat-i-Islami group 225 Japan, covert action in 136 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 06/02/18, SPi I n de x387 Jay, Michael 253 Jebb, Gladwyn 24, 33, 58, 60, 62–3, 65–6, 68 Jebb Committee see AC(O) JIC (Joint Intelligence Committee) 13, 19, 22, 26, 52, 80, 82, 84, 91, 123, 156, 157, 163, 183, 190, 217, 242, 253 John Paul II, Pope 228, 229 Johnson, Jim 167, 235 Jones, R.V. 220 Jordan, covert action in 113 Josey, Alex 146 Kabbah, Tejan 247–8 Kane, Ray 191 Kashmir dispute 36 Kaunda, Kenneth 147 Kedourie, Elie 219 Keenie-Meenie Services 235, 237, 242 Kellar, Alex 144 Kelly, Oliver 214 Kennan, George 27–8 Kennedy, John F. 141, 148–9, 150, 157, 158 Kenya, insurgency in 6, 110, 142 Khalil, Isameddine Mahmoud 122 Khmer Rouge guerrillas 241–2 Khrushchev, Nikita 80, 81–2, 85, 129, 143, 151 kidnapping 87, 185–6, 237–8 Killearn, Lord 31 King, Tom 202, 213–14 Kirkpatrick, Ivone 22, 30, 32, 82, 110, 114, 135, 143, 144–5, 285 Kissinger, Henry 193 Kitson, Frank 204, 207 Kock, Stephan 239–40 Korean War 60, 66, 69, 70, 72 Kupi, Abas 45 Kuwait, Iraqi invasion of 243 Labour Party International Department 25–6 Lamb, Graeme 250, 255–6 Lambton, Ann Nancy 92–3, 95, 97 Landon, Tim 190, 220 Latin America, UK covert operations in 4 Latvia, SIS and partisans 34 Lebanon covert action in 113, 128 elections in 2, 128 Lee Kuan Yew 146 Lennox-Boyd, Alan 142, 143 liberation policy, UK 32–56, 57, 85 failure of 49–51 value of 51–6 Libya civil war in 258–9 covert action in 184–5, 258–60 Libyan Oil Cell 259 Lipsey, David 195 Lisburn Lie Machine 201 Lloyd, Selwyn 95, 115, 118, 124, 132–3, 134, 139 Lobban, Ian 258 Lonrho 239 Louis, Roger 107 Luce, William 188–9 Lumumba, Patrice 6, 150–3, 275 Lyautey Principle 74–5, 82, 85, 87 McColl, Colin 243, 245 McDermott, Geoffrey 124 McFarlane, Bud 238 McGregor, Hamish 205, 207 McGrory, Paddy 214 Maclean, Donald 41 McLean, Neil (Billy) 44–6, 121–2, 153, 166, 167, 217, 220, 234–5, 239, 271, 278 Macmillan, Harold 81, 88, 109, 112, 115, 120, 127–8, 131, 132, 135–7, 137, 139–40, 148–51, 156, 158, 165, 267, 271, 272 McNeil, Hector 27, 28 Maginn, Loughlin 212 Major, John 213–14, 242, 244 Makins, Roger 42–3 Malaya, insurgency in 110, 142 Mallaby, Christopher 218 Mann, Simon 248 Manning, David 253 Marshall Plan 24 Masaryk, Jan 24 Maskey, Alex 211 Mason, Roy 208 Massoud, Ahmed Shah 232–3, 235, 251 Matrix Churchill 239 Maudling, Reginald 191 Mau Mau (Kenya) 6, 110 May, Theresa 257, 262–3 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 06/02/18, SPi 388 I n de x Menzies, Stewart 8, 26, 29, 30, 40, 46–7, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 70, 71, 77, 112, 202–3 mercenary activity 248 in Africa 9 and SIS 185 MI5 10, 113, 143, 148, 155, 202, 211, 213, 268 MI6 see SIS Miami Showband 212 Middle East and CIA 92 oil 91–108 UK policy/SIS operations 2, 3, 21–2, 30–2, 91–141 Middleton, George 95–6 Military Reaction Force (Northern Ireland) see MRF Ministry of Defence (UK) 155, 162, 189, 224, 254, 259, 262 Mitchell, Colin 234 Mobutu, Joseph 152, 153 Montgomery, Bernard 12, 15 Mooney, Hugh 199, 200, 202 Morrison, Herbert 24, 62, 63, 92, 93, 94 Mossad 185, 264 Mossadeq, Mohammad 91–5, 96, 98–100, 101, 102, 104, 106, 108, 110, 185, 269, 272, 275 Mountbatten, Lord 165, 166 MRF (Military Reaction Force) (Northern Ireland) 203–8 Mulley, Fred 208 Murray, Ralph 26, 133 Muslim Brotherhood 121, 122, 123, 134, 231 Nasser, Gamal Abdel 6, 110–11, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119–29, 150, 156, 157, 166, 168, 169, 177, 269, 274, 275, 280 National Council of Nigerian Citizens 147 national deviationism 59 nationalism, rise of 110–13, 142–3 National Liberation Front (Yemen) 155 national security advisor (UK) 251 National Security Council (UK) see NSC National Security Council (US) 227 NATO and Iceland 83 Soviet action against 87 NCFA (National Committee for a Free Albania) 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 55 Neguib, Mohammad 96, 122, 124 Nelson, Brian 211, 213 neutral countries, and economic warfare 69 Nicaragua Contras resistance 236–8, 240 covert operations in 236–8 Nicholls, Jack 156, 160 Nigeria covert action in 184 election rigging 147 9/11 terrorist attacks 250 Nkrumah, Kwame 146 Nobel Peace Prize, and Churchill 76 non-interventionism 3 Non-Proliferation Treaty (UN) 245 North, Oliver 237, 238 Northern Alliance 251 Northern Ireland black propaganda 198 CA (counter-action) activity 202 collusion allegations 210–14 effectiveness in 280 hit squad allegations 202–9 propaganda in 198, 200–1 SAS in 202–9, 212 troop deployment 197 UK covert operations in 4, 7, 9, 197–214 Ulsterization 211–12 see also IRA Northern People’s Congress Party (Nigeria) 147 North Yemen, covert action in 218 NSA (National Security Agency) (US) 261 NSC (National Security Council) (UK) 258–61, 263–4, 278 nuclear deterrence 80 Nuri al-Said 115, 117 Nutting, Anthony 123 Nyerere, Julius 147 Obama, Barack 264 Obote, Milton 185 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 06/02/18, SPi I n de x389 Occupied Yemen 137 Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism 256 OID (Overseas Information Department) 195, 222 Oldfield, Maurice 110, 122, 124, 149, 181–2, 195–6, 216, 278 Oman covert action in 128, 137–8, 187–96 SAS in 138, 191–6 and SIS 128, 137–8, 187–96 Omand, David 251, 253, 277 online disruption operations 261–2 OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) 27, 43, 49 Operation Aileron 146 Operation Alismah 146 Operation Avalon 132–3, 137 Operation Boot 91–108, 109, 113, 114, 116, 121, 122, 138, 269 Operation Claret 170 Operation Climber 35 Operation Cupcake 262 Operation Dhib 193–4 Operation Dragon Return 65 Operation Embarrass 23 Operation Flame 266 Operation Flitter 67 Operation Haik 139–40 Operation Heaven 100 Operation Jungle 81 Operation Lightning 65 Operation Mask 126 Operation Mass Appeal 245 Operation RANCOUR 166, 168, 169 Operation Razzle 114 Operation Sawdust 120–1, 125, 129 Operation Scion 146 Operation Scream 128 Operation Sipony 129 Operation Storm 191–6 Operation Straggle 115–17, 276 Operation Trumpet 113 Operation Tutor 128 Operation Valuable 38–56, 57 Order Book (SIS charter) 244 organized crime, and SIS 243–5 Osborne, George 260 Overseas Planning Committee (UK Foreign Office) 112 Overseas Planning Section (UK Foreign Office) 59, 72, 77 Owen, David 182, 195, 215, 216 Pakistan covert action in 263, 264 independence for 142 Palestine 23, 110, 142, 204, 252 paramilitary activities, in Cold War 2 Park, Daphne 147, 151–2, 153, 238 Parker Hale arms company 169 Parti Populaire Syrien 116 Paulson, Paul 167 Peck, Edward 190 penetration operations 52 People’s Progressive Party (British Guiana) 144 Perkins, Harold 44–6 Permanent Under-Secretary’s Committee (UK Foreign Office) 41, 77, 159 Persia see Iran Peterson, Maurice 19 Philby, Kim 35, 50, 52–3, 65, 100 Pinay, Antoine 220 pinprick approach 59–70, 71–2, 73–4, 77, 79, 87, 88, 95, 108, 272, 280, 282 pixie teams 47–8 PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) 174–6 plausible deniability 138, 284 Poland anti-Soviet riots 83 dissent in 86 KGB concerns over 228 SIS airdrop into 76 SIS and resistance 34 Solidarity crisis 227–30 UK covert operations in 4 Political Intelligence Group (UK Foreign Office) 112 political intervention, criticisms of 1 political warfare 151 Political Warfare Executive see PWE Porter, Ivor 40 PREDATORS FACE online disruption 261–2 private security firms 235, 237, 242, 248 Production and Targeting, Counter-Proliferation section (SIS) 244 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 06/02/18, SPi 390 I n de x Profumo affair 156 Project Wizard (CIA) 151 propaganda in Afghanistan 225 by al-Qaeda 256 anti-communist 27, 28, 29 anti-Soviet 6, 21–2, 25 black propaganda 6, 24, 31, 39, 102, 142, 151, 154, 186–7, 198, 201–2, 203, 214, 235 black radio stations 51, 125 and collusion 214 counter-propaganda 222, 257 covert 8, 22, 82 effectiveness of 279 false flag operations 102 in France 29 funding for 128 grey propaganda 6, 129 and internal disputes 134 by IRA 207 in Iran (Persia) 22, 104 in Italy 28, 29 MI5 202 in Middle East 128 in Northern Ireland 198, 200–1 and operations 7 radio 51, 83–4 RICU 256–7 and sabotage 23 in Second World War 3 SIS/CIA coordinated 51 in Southeast Asia 70 Soviet 24 and terrorism 250 unattributable 124, 199, 201–2 US anti-communist 27 in Yemen 168 see also IRD Provisional IRA see IRA psychics, use of 186–7 psychological warfare 28, 74, 133, 136, 198 PWE (Political Warfare Executive) 3, 6, 8, 25, 70, 220 Pym, Francis 220 Q patrols 204 Qavam, Ahmad 95, 96 Quilliam Foundation 257 Quinlan, Michael 244 Radio Free Europe 83–4 Radio Free Iraq 243 Rashidian brothers 94, 101, 104, 105, 107 Rayner, John 70 Reagan, Ronald 219, 221, 227, 228, 229, 230, 233, 236, 238, 281 Reddaway, Norman 174, 175, 199 Regional Information Office, Singapore 70 Reilly, Patrick 33, 39, 57, 62, 65, 68, 73–4, 76, 77, 79, 95 Rennie, John 181–2, 184–5 Revolutionary Movement of the 8th of October 186 Rhodesia, covert action in 183–4 Richards, David 260 RICU (Research, Information and Communications Unit) (UK) 256–7, 262–3, 279, 284 Robertson, James 147 Rogers, Philip 183–4 ROLLING THUNDER online disruption 261–2 Roosevelt, Kermit 101, 103, 104, 106–7, 108, 116, 137 Ross, Archibald 99 RUC (Royal Ulster Constabulary) 201, 204, 210 Special Branch 210, 211, 213, 214 Rumbold, Anthony 49 Rusk, Dean 148, 157 Russia, current threat 285–6 Russia Committee (UK Foreign Office) 20–1, 22, 32–3, 35, 40, 57 sabotage, by UK 7, 23 SAF (Sultan’s Armed Forces) 189, 190 Sakbout, Sheikh 188–9 Salisbury, Lord 102, 106, 108 Sanders, Arthur 62, 71 Sandline International 247–8 Sandys, Duncan 149, 156, 159 Saqr, Sheikh 188 Sargent, Orme 22–3, 26, 29, 30, 35–6, 40 SAS (Special Air Service) see special forces satire, use by SIS 199 Saudi Arabia covert action in 113 and Egypt 117–18 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 06/02/18, SPi I n de x391 expansion by 118 importance as oil producer 117–18 SAVAK secret police (Iran) 113 Sawers, John 258, 259–60, 266 SBS (Special Boat Service) see special forces Scant 120–1, 125, 128 Scarlett, John 253, 255 Schapiro, Leonard 219 Scott, Ian 151, 153 Scott, Robert 139–40, 141 SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organization) 158 Second World War, covert organizations in 2–3 Secret Vote (UK) 94, 112, 113, 159, 183 Security Service see MI5 Selborne, Lord 11–12 Services Liaison Department (UK Foreign Office) 20 Seymour, Horace 38 Shackleton, Lord 177 Sharjah, covert action in 188 Sharq-al-adna radio station 129 Shield Committee 219 Shishakli, Adib 116, 135, 274 shoot and scoot 205 Shuckburgh, Evelyn 109, 115, 119–20, 131 Sierra Leone, SIS covert action in 247–8 Sinclair, John 52, 77, 100, 102, 106–7, 112, 113 Singapore covert action in 146 strategic value of 158 SIS (Secret Intelligence Service) and Callaghan 216 and CIA 31, 35, 42, 51–6, 79, 96–108, 110, 113, 115–16, 119, 131–41, 147, 149–54, 185, 187, 219, 223–30, 235–42, 251–2, 264, 276–7 and CIA congressional enquiries 194–5 clear objectives of 282–3 and Communism 77, 82, 268 coordination failures 154–61 and counter-terrorism 250–66 covert propaganda 33, 222 and David Stirling 185 deniable operations 58–9, 128, 138, 164–9, 253, 261, 273–7, 284 Denial of Service attacks 261–2 domestic intelligence 183 and GCHQ 258, 261, 265–6 global thinking 183–7 gradualist approach 272 HAM fund 112–13, 130 Increment teams 232 integration with Whitehall 244 and liberation 35–6, 50, 52 and mercenary activity 185 and Mossad 264 and narcotics 243–5 new agenda for 243–9 online disruption operations 261–2 Order Book 244 and organized crime 243–5 and Pakistani Intelligence 235–6 paramilitary capabilities 164–5 pinprick approach see pinprick approach political control over 86 post-Cold War 243–9 and Project Wizard 151 psychological warfare 28–9 remit of 5, 7–15 and resistance movements 34–5 and second Cold War 215–22 secret funds 94, 112, 113, 130 SPA section 145 and special forces 165, 166 stink bombs 151–2 subversive role 143 use of satire 199 working with emigrés 50 in WW2 2, 8 see also UK SIS Directorate of Training and Development 12 SIS Directorate of War Planning 12, 13, 51 SIS General Support Branch 232 Slessor, John 24–5, 285 Slim, William 20 Smiley, David 23, 42, 44, 47, 50, 93, 138, 165, 166, 167, 169 Smith, Harold 147 Smith, Howard 153 Smith, Ian 184 Snowden, Edward 284 Social Democratic Party (West Germany) 64 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 06/02/18, SPi 392 I n de x Socialist Unity Party (East Germany) 64, 66 SOE (Special Operations Executive) 2–3, 4, 6, 8, 11–12, 14, 23, 31, 33, 35, 38, 44, 58, 70, 164, 220, 274 Solidarity 227–30 Somalia airplane hijacking 216 al-Qaeda in 253 covert action in 263, 264 Southeast Asia pinprick approach 70–2 SIS in 36, 110 UK covert operations in 4, 36 South Yemen, covert action in 193–4, 224–5 Soviet Union in Afghanistan 222–3, 236 in Africa 215–16 after Stalin 80–8 and American dominance 19 assassinations by 24 being undermined in Europe 63–70 and China 35 clandestine economic action against 67–8 covert action against 74, 80–8 defectors from 29 defectors to 35, 41, 50, 52–3 and Eastern Europe 19, 24 and Indonesia 174 in Iran 22–3 KGB operations 24, 81 and Marshall Plan 24 in Middle East 110 military downsizing 82 pinprick approach to see pinprick approach propaganda 24 and SIS 22, 26–7, 29–30, 33, 34, 35, 67–8, 73–4, 79, 81, 87, 111, 160, 215–16, 222–30, 268 splits in dominance 34 terrorist acts by 87 twentieth Congress of the Communist Party 81 and United Arab Republic 129 see also Cold War Spain, Dutch protestant revolt against 2 SPA (Special Political Action) section (SIS) 145, 154, 156, 173, 182, 195, 215 special forces 4, 7, 10, 13, 276–7 Australian 162 E squadron 259 14th Intelligence Company 208, 209 SAS (Special Air Service) 13, 39, 123, 138, 156, 162, 165, 166–7, 170, 171–2, 176, 184, 186, 191–6, 204–9, 212, 213, 216, 217, 235, 240–2, 243, 246–7, 254–5, 261 SBS (Special Boat Service) 13, 162, 165, 170, 173, 191, 196, 208, 254–5, 261 Special Reconnaissance Regiment 259, 265 and terrorism 249 Special Forces Operations Sub-Committee (UK Ministry of Defence) 194 Special Reconnaissance Regiment see special forces Spedding, David 248 Sporborg, Harry 219 Sri Lanka, independence for 142 SRU (Special Reconnaissance Unit) 207–8 Stalin, Joseph 19, 24, 69, 80, 81–2, 103 Stasi 65, 66, 86 State Department (US) 43, 49, 52, 94–5, 97, 131, 135, 140, 141, 149, 157 Steele, Frank 145, 220 Stevens, Sir John 210 Stevenson, Ralph 36 Stewart, Brian 202, 203 Stewart, Michael 189–90 Stirling, David 166, 184–5 Stokes, Richard 92 Strang, William 40–1, 42, 58, 59, 74–7, 93, 99, 100, 105, 107, 112, 161 Strauss, Franz Josef 221 Straw, Jack 251 Strong, Kenneth 164 Stuxnet 266 Sudan covert action in 185 independence 146 Suez Canal Company 127 Suez crisis 84, 85, 86, 120, 127, 131 covert action after 127–41 covert action before 109–26 files, destruction of 123 Sukarno 139 Sylvester, Stanley 187 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 06/02/18, SPi I n de x393 Syria civil war in 260 covert action in 113, 115–17, 119, 131–2, 137, 258–62 elections in 2 Syria Working Group 137 Taliban 252, 262 Tanganyika, covert action in 147 targeted killing policy 264, 270 see also assassination Tedder, Arthur 32–3 Templer, Gerald 58, 140 Tennant, Peter 220 terrorism and special forces 249 and UK 4–5, 250–66 Thatcher, Margaret 214, 217, 218–21, 222, 224, 225–6, 228–30, 231, 233–5, 236–7, 238, 239, 241–2, 243, 278 Thatcher, Mark 248 Thomas, Hugh 219 Thomson, George 188 Thorneycroft, Peter 159, 166 TIGER infiltration team 51 Tito, Josip 34, 41, 51, 53–4, 136 Transmission X 129 Transport and General Workers’ Union 229 Trend, Burke 113, 163–4, 182, 183–4, 202 Trevaskis, Kennedy 155–6 Trucial Oman Scouts 189 Trucial States 188 Truman, Harry 27, 39, 77, 79, 96 Tudeh Party 22, 23, 99, 104–5 Tugwell, Maurice 198 Tupamaros guerrilla group 186 Turkey 132–3 Turnbull, Andrew 251 Turnbull, Richard 147 Turner, Stansfield 223 UDA (Ulster Defence Association) 211, 212 UDR (Ulster Defence Regiment) 210, 211, 212 Uganda, covert action in 185 UK and Afghanistan 4 and Albania 4, 8 Anglo-American relationship 29 anti-communist activities 28, 31, 59 British understanding of covert action 4–10, 11 cautious approach to covert action 75–7 China policy 36 and Cold War see Cold War Conservative policy 75–7 coordination failures 154–61 counter-subversion 154 covert arms deals 8–9 and Cuba 149–50 decolonization 142–61 deniable interventions 2 discord/nuisance strategy 60–3 and Eastern Europe 3 and EEC membership 200 and election rigging 4, 7 empire and intelligence 142 and Great Game 2 influence after Empire 142–61 instigation of coups 4 and International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 136 and Iron Curtain countries 4 liberation policy 32–56, 57, 85 long-term policy 73–88 and Mau Mau (Kenya) 6 and mercenary activity in Africa 9 Middle East policy/operations 2, 3, 21–2, 30–2, 109–41 military policy 12, 15, 20, 26, 110 military resources in Far East 159 misinformation by 3–4 Northern Ireland see Northern Ireland oil profits, Iran 91 pinprick approach 59–77, 79, 87 post-war covert action 4–12 as proactive 270 regime change in Iran 91–108 responsibilities and resources 58 and rise in nationalism 110–13 in Second World War 2–3 secret wars 4, 161–77 and terrorism 4–5, 6, 250–66 training foreign security services 10 transition to independence 145–9 UK/US cooperation 42–6, 51–6, 74, 77–80, 83, 92, 96–108, 149–54, see also SIS/CIA OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 06/02/18, SPi 394 I n de x UK (cont.)

The Age of Radiance: The Epic Rise and Dramatic Fall of the Atomic Era
by Craig Nelson
Published 25 Mar 2014

Abbasi and his wife escaped more or less unharmed, but one of his colleagues was killed by a similar attack, as was an Iranian particle physicist in January 2010, an electronics specialist in July 2011, and a manager at the Natanz uranium enrichment plant in January 2012. Teheran blamed Tel Aviv and Washington for the assassinations, as well as for the malware viruses known as Flame and Stuxnet, which were discovered in the spring of 2012 infecting Iran’s uranium enrichment computers. Flame is lithe spyware that turns on computer microphones and Skypes the recorded conversations; scans the neighborhood’s Bluetooth gadgets for names and phone numbers; and takes pictures of the computer’s screen every fifteen to sixty seconds. Stuxnet infected Iran’s uranium-enriching centrifuges and sped them up until they committed suicide. A Russian nuclear executive summed up that after the fall of the USSR, “the great powers were stuck with arsenals they could not use, and nuclear weapons became the weapons of the poor. . . .

The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World
by Daniel Yergin
Published 14 May 2011

A multitude of new entry points are provided by the proliferation of wireless devices and possibly by the smart meters that are part of the smart grid and that provide two-way communications between homes and the electrical distribution system.11 A test at a national laboratory in 2007 showed what happened when a hacker infiltrated an electric system. A SCADA system was used to take control of a diesel generator and cause it to malfunction; it shook and shuddered and banged until it eventually blew itself up in a cloud of smoke. The Stuxnet virus that slipped into the Iranian centrifuges in 2010 caused them to spin out of control until they self-destructed. It is not just the power system that is at risk. Obviously, other systems—involving energy production, pipelines, and water—share similar vulnerabilities, as do all the major systems across an economy.

…

In addition to their general impact on the economy, these sanctions have put pressure on Iran by retarding the modernization of Iran’s conventional military forces and by greatly constraining international investment in Iran’s oil and gas industry and Iran’s access to international finance and capital markets. Sabotage is another way, short of military action, of slowing Iran’s progress toward the red line. In 2010 a sophisticated Stuxnet computer virus was introduced into the software programs running the centrifuges, causing them to speed up, perform erratically, and self-destruck. Israel, the United States, or possibly a European country is considered the most likely author. After intense negotiation, Russia and China have supported the United Nations sanctions but not the unilateral sanctions.

…

Bureau of Intelligence and Research of Conoco’s briefing of Major Economies meeting at (2007) State Duma, Russia State Grid Corporation State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) state public utility commissions Statoil Stavins, Robert steamboats steam engine steamers steel Steinway, William Stern, Nicholas Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change Steward, Dan Stewart, Richard stock market, stock bubbles in Chinese IPOs and in Insull Internet 1929 crash of in pension funds Russian Strategic Petroleum Reserve, U.S. (SPR) Straubel, J. B. Strauss, Lewis Strauss-Kahn, Dominique Stuxnet computer virus submarines suburbs Sudan Suess, Hans Suez Canal Suez crisis (1956) suicide bombers sulfur dioxide sulfuric acid Sumatra Sumed Pipeline Summerland Summers, Lawrence Sundsvall meeting (1990) Sunnis in Iraq Sun Oil Suntech Sununu, John Sun Yat-sen supply chain, security of supply shock Supreme Court, U.S.

Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel's Targeted Assassinations
by Ronen Bergman
Published 30 Jan 2018

Matthew Cole, “Israeli Special Forces Assassinated Senior Syrian Official,” First Look, July 15, 2015. “total mutual striptease” Interview with “Oscar,” May 2014. launched a comprehensive campaign of economic measures Interviews with Dagan, June 19, 2013, and “the Prince,” March 2012. computer viruses, one of which became known as Stuxnet Even in the conservative estimate of the German BND, Stuxnet alone delayed the Iranian nuclear project by at least two years. Interview, together with Holger Stark, with “Alfred,” a high-ranking German intelligence official, February 2012. the targeted killing of scientists Interviews with Dagan, May 29, 2013, “Iftach,” March 2017, “Eldy,” September 2014, and “Luka,” November 2016.

…

Covertly, joint sabotage operations also managed to produce a series of breakdowns in Iranian equipment supplied to the nuclear project—computers stopped working, transformers burned out, centrifuges simply didn’t work properly. In the largest and most important joint operation by the Americans and the Israelis against Iran, dubbed “Olympic Games,” computer viruses, one of which became known as Stuxnet, caused severe damage to the nuclear project’s uranium enrichment machinery. The last component of Dagan’s plan—the targeted killing of scientists—was implemented by the Mossad on its own, since Dagan was aware that the United States would not agree to participate. The Mossad compiled a list of fifteen key researchers, mostly members of the “weapons group” that was responsible for developing a detonation device for the weapons, as targets for elimination.

The Complacent Class: The Self-Defeating Quest for the American Dream
by Tyler Cowen
Published 27 Feb 2017

There is also the estimated $20 billion of lost time each year from the proliferation of spam, not necessarily an illegal act but unwelcome nonetheless. Illegal online pornography, often involving minors, is rife.2 It is hard to know how much cyberwarfare is going on, but it was used against Iran, with some success in the form of the Stuxnet virus, and it has become a major issue in U.S.–China relations. China has stolen a great deal of intellectual property from American companies, and who knows what the Americans might have done in return? Companies are investing more and more in their cyberdefenses, and they are reluctant to publicly admit those breaches that do happen, if they are even aware of them.

The End of Big: How the Internet Makes David the New Goliath
by Nicco Mele
Published 14 Apr 2013

Yet we also must acknowledge, as Clarke at least attempted to do, that the balance of power has shifted away from traditional militaries toward small groups of sophisticated, dedicated troublemakers. Recent months have brought the revelation that the United States military, possibly with the Israeli military, has released at least one and perhaps two computer viruses into the world with the intent of crippling Iran’s slow march to nuclear capabilities. The first virus was called Stuxnet, and was targeted at specific kinds of machines that would be in use for uranium enrichment. The second virus is called Flame, and it has not been definitively linked to the United States, although the evidence is strong. These proactive acts of “cyber war,” while significant programming projects, hardly raise the scale of resource-intensive military operations such as designing, building, and maintaining an aircraft carrier.

The Twittering Machine
by Richard Seymour
Published 20 Aug 2019

While the greatest emphasis was placed on coordinated aerial bombardment, racking up tens of thousands of bodies according to the US Military, the Obama administration began to talk cyberwar. This was already in vogue in the administration. It had used cyber-sabotage against North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme. It cooperated with Israeli intelligence in writing code for the Stuxnet worm – a viral attack that shut down Iran’s nuclear power facilities in Natanz. In 2015, State Department counterterrorism official Alberto Fernandez argued that the US, in a break from the ‘marketplace of ideas’ rhetoric, needed its own ‘troll army’ to combat ISIS.48 Later the same year, the US Air Force bombed a ‘command and control’ building discovered by combing ISIS’s social media streams and associated metadata.

Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress
by Steven Pinker
Published 13 Feb 2018

As the size of the team increases, so do the odds of detection, betrayal, infiltrators, blunders, and stings.49 Serious threats to the integrity of a country’s infrastructure are likely to require the resources of a state.50 Software hacking is not enough; the hacker needs detailed knowledge about the physical construction of the systems he hopes to sabotage. When the Iranian nuclear centrifuges were compromised in 2010 by the Stuxnet worm, it required a coordinated effort by two technologically sophisticated nations, the United States and Israel. State-based cyber-sabotage escalates the malevolence from terrorism to a kind of warfare, where the constraints of international relations, such as norms, treaties, sanctions, retaliation, and military deterrence, inhibit aggressive attacks, as they do in conventional “kinetic” warfare.

…

Wodehouse and, 446 spirituality, 433–5 sports Moneyball, 381 politics similar to, 359, 360, 366, 381, 383 Springsteen, Bruce, 284 Sri Lanka, 160, 203, 278 Stalin, Joseph, 78, 161, 203, 313, 445, 447 Starmans, Christina, 101–2 Star Trek, 427 Stein’s Law, 61, 241, 283, 327 Davies’s Corollary, 61, 327 Stenger, Victor, 423 Stephan, Maria, 405 Stephens-Davidowitz, Seth, 217–18, 339–40, 471n13, 482n44 Stern, Charlotta, 373 Stevenson, Betsey, 269, 270 stoves, cooking, 117, 144, 183, 251, 252 Strauss, Leo, 491n118 Stuxnet worm, 304 Subbiah, Ilavenil, xix subjectivity hard problem of consciousness and, 425, 426–8, 488n43 reason and, 351–2, 390 Sudan, 72, 73, 89, 160, 161, 162 suicide, 277–80 age, cohort, and period analyses, 278, 279 cohorts and, 279–80, 476n74 decreasing rates of, 277–80, 279, 476n74 as “self-murder,” 278 sex differences in, 278, 279 Sweden’s high rate of, as urban myth, 264, 280 See also mental health and illness Sullivan, James X., 116 Sultan, Wafa, 443 Summers, Lawrence, 67, 328, 461n8, 462nn62,65, 480n9, 490n106 Supreme Court, U.S., 212–13, 214–15, 374 sustainability, 127–9, 141 Sutherland, Rory, 135 Sweden child mortality and, 55, 56 depression and, 282 emancipative values in, 225–7, 226, 227 fallacious pessimism and, 53 famine in, 68 happiness ranking of, 475n30 maternal mortality in, 57, 58 nuclear power and, 148 per capita income of, 86 populism and, 341 secularization and, 436, 437, 489n68 social spending in, 108 suicide rate in, 263–4, 280 traffic death rates in, 178 Swift, Jonathan, 74–5, 162 Switzerland, 271, 278–9, 279, 475n30, 489n68 Syed, Muhammad, 443 sympathy (benevolence, compassion), 11 cosmopolitanism and, 221 humanism and, 415 and infectious disease improvement, 67 the meaning of life and, 3–4 pessimism and expanding circle of, 49 for the poor, 107 and psychopathology, awareness of, 282 standard-of-living improvements and, 34 syphilis, 306, 401 Syria civil war in, 49, 159, 160, 335 happiness ranking of, 475n30 terrorist deaths in, 193 Szilard, Leo, 308 Taiwan, 85, 85, 200 Taliban, 67, 240 Tan, Amy, 284 Taoism, 23, 204 taxes carbon tax, 139, 145–6, 149 economic freedom compatible with, 365, 483nn39,42 libertarians and, 364–5 poverty mitigated by, 107, 115–16 Trump and, 335 Taylor, Paul, 340 Taylor, Theodore, 308 technology advance of, and paradox of value, 82, 117, 332–3 and climate change, 143–5, 150, 153–4 and creation of wealth, 83, 94–5 delay in productivity growth due to, 330 dematerialization and, 135, 136, 332 democratization of platforms for, 332 demonetization and, 332–3 digital, Flynn effect and mastery of, 244 donated as foreign aid, 95 doomsday prophecies and, 293–4 for environmental protection, 124, 128–30, 132–6, 134–6 future advances in, 330–32 knowledge growth as exponentiated by, 233 mobile phones/smartphones, 94–5, 257, 331 nuclear power, 148–50 productivity dependent on, 328 science applied to, 82–3 Second Machine Age, 330–32 social embeddedness of, 302 technophilanthropists, 332 Trump and, 335 See also artificial intelligence (AI); consumer products; existential threats; Internet; safety; social media teenagers depression and, 476n74 drug use declining among, 184–5, 229 transgressive Web searches by, 218 Tegmark, Max, 308, 425 Teilhard de Chardin, Pierre, 418 teleological systems, 21–2 telephone, 94–5, 257, 331 Terminator (films), 296 terrorism and terrorists, 191–8 Availability and Negativity biases, 42, 195, 302, 307, 404 bioterrorism, 300–302, 305, 306–7 civil wars as primary locations of, 193 cyber-sabotage, 300–302, 304–6, 335 historical trends, 193–5 media responses to curtail, 197–8 motives of killers, 196 nation-states’ reactions to, 197–8 nuclear terrorism, 197, 310–311, 313–14 number of potential competent, 302–5 objective assessment of threat, 195–7 panic as risk of, 191, 195, 197 right-wing American terrorism, 194, 196, 469n10 safety of society as enhancing threat of, 197, 198 success, lack of, 196–7, 198, 303–4, 404 See also hate crimes; rampage shootings; September 11, 2001, attacks —DEATHS FROM double-counted as war deaths, 193 number of, 192–5, 192, 194–5, 194, 469n10 vs. other causes, 191–2, 192, 193 Tetlock, Philip, 367–71, 373, 378–9, 404 Texas, capital punishment in, 211 Thackeray, William Makepeace, 284 Thailand, 259, 336, 419, 457n8 Thatcher, Margaret, 110, 315 theism and theistic morality, 419, 420–22, 428–30 Argument from Design, 18, 421, 423 and consciousness, hard problem of, 423, 425–8, 488n43 deism vs., 8, 18, 22, 422 and existence of God, arguments against, 421–2 fundamental physical constants and, 423–5 God of the Gaps argument, 423–8 refutation of theistic morality, 428–30 wars motivated by, 10, 429–30 See also deism and deists; God; secularization theoconservatism, 448–9 theocracy, 201, 206, 430 theodicy, 39, 423 Thermodynamics, Laws of, 15–16 See also Entropy, Law of thick tails.

Reset
by Ronald J. Deibert
Published 14 Aug 2020

Cyber Westphalia and beyond: Extraterritoriality and mutual entanglement in cyberspace. In D. Bigo, E. F. Isin, & E. Ruppert (Eds.), Data politics: Worlds, subjects, rights. Routledge. Offensive action … takes place just below the threshold of armed conflict: But not always. For exceptions and discussion, see Zetter, K. (2014). Countdown to zero day: Stuxnet and the launch of the world’s first digital weapon. Broadway Books; Greenberg, A. (2019). Sandworm: A new era of cyberwar and the hunt for the Kremlin’s most dangerous hackers. Doubleday; For a contrary view, see Rid, T. (2013). Cyber war will not take place. Oxford University Press USA. Spreading false information is as old as humanity itself: See Posetti, J., & Matthews, A. (2018, July 23).

The Future of Fusion Energy
by Jason Parisi and Justin Ball
Published 18 Dec 2018

It really is incredible how hostile to life this isotope is. 15A sphere is the right shape to use because it minimizes the surface area for a given volume. Hence, the number of neutrons leaving the material is minimized. 16Formally, this is know as Graham’s Law, which observes that 17For enrichment, centrifuges typically rotate roughly 500 times per second. The Stuxnet computer virus, which famously destroyed a significant fraction of Iran’s centrifuges in 2010, subtly altered this rotational speed. 18This occurs through a process known as “beta minus" decay. It takes a neutron and turns it into a proton and an electron. Also, note the awesome sequence of elements: Uranium, Neptunium, and Plutonium.

What to Think About Machines That Think: Today's Leading Thinkers on the Age of Machine Intelligence
by John Brockman
Published 5 Oct 2015

That will stop runaway uses that could harm. Even so, we should realize that AIs, like many inventions, are in an arms race. Computer viruses were the first example, ever since I invented the first one in 1969. They race against virus detectors—but they’re mere pests, not lethal. Smart sabotage algorithms (say, future versions of Stuxnet) already float through the netsphere and are far worse. These could quietly infiltrate many routine operations of governments and companies. Most would come from bad actors. But with genetic-programming and autonomous-agent software already out there, they could mutate and evolve by chance in Darwinian evolutionary fashion—especially where no one’s looking.

The Wires of War: Technology and the Global Struggle for Power
by Jacob Helberg
Published 11 Oct 2021

A congressional oversight committee described the hack as “the most significant digital violation of national security faced to date.”158 A Twenty-First-Century Watergate It would hardly be the last. Even as Russia and China asserted themselves more online, lesser autocrats were getting in on the action. In 2010, a sophisticated worm known as Stuxnet destroyed 1,000 Iranian centrifuges, setting back Iran’s nuclear ambitions. The malware attack was widely attributed to the United States and Israel. In response, Iran’s mullahs began ramping up their cyber operations. During the summer of 2012, an Iranian cyberattack on the Saudi Aramco oil company melted down 35,000 hard drives and forced the company to buy 50,000 new computers—driving up the global price for hard drives for half a year.159 A few months later, Iran launched Operation Ababil, a series of distracting though not destructive attacks against Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, and other financial institutions.160 The next year, casino billionaire and conservative mega-donor Sheldon Adelson publicly suggested that America should nuke a patch of Iranian desert as a warning over its nuclear program.

We Are Anonymous: Inside the Hacker World of LulzSec, Anonymous, and the Global Cyber Insurgency
by Parmy Olson
Published 5 Jun 2012

The question appeared have been dictated by Isikoff. The feature later showed Isikoff and Brown strolling side by side down a busy road and talking, Brown gesticulating, Isikoff’s khaki-colored slacks flapping in the breeze as he listened intently. Then it was back to the apartment, and Brown once more sprawled in his chair. “I mean we got Stuxnet off of this,” he said, flicking his hand, referring to an attached file among Barr’s e-mails that was in fact a defanged version of the infamous computer virus that was best known for attacking Iranian nuclear infrastructure in the early 2000s. “It shouldn’t have been available by this federal contractor to get ripped off by a sixteen-year-old girl and her friends.”

The Best Business Writing 2013
by Dean Starkman
Published 1 Jan 2013

• • • Toffler worship and futuristic kitsch aside, what does Hybrid Reality actually argue? There are several disjointed arguments. First, that technology—“technology with a big ‘T,’” as they call it—is supplanting economics and geopolitics as the leading driver of international relations. This means, among other things, that Washington deploys tools such as Flame and Stuxnet simply because it has the better technology—not because of a strategic and military analysis. It is a silly argument, but wrapped in tech-talk it sounds almost plausible. For the Khannas, technology is an autonomous force with its own logic that does not bend under the wicked pressure of politics or capitalism or tribalism; all that we humans can do is find a way to harness its logic for our own purposes.

To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism
by Evgeny Morozov
Published 15 Nov 2013

Thus, he notes that “with minor differences, the evolution of the technium—the organism of ideas—mimics the evolution of genetic organisms.” Technology is nature, and nature is technology; resistance is futile—who would want to challenge nature? With this simple insight, Kelly develops a whole theory that can explain literally every development—from malware like Stuxnet to Google glasses—by claiming that this is just what technology wants. All we have to do is to develop the right listening tools—and the rest will follow. Hence, notes Kelly, “only by listening to technology’s story, divining its tendencies and biases, and tracing its current direction can we hope to solve our personal puzzles.”

Building Secure and Reliable Systems: Best Practices for Designing, Implementing, and Maintaining Systems
by Heather Adkins , Betsy Beyer , Paul Blankinship , Ana Oprea , Piotr Lewandowski and Adam Stubblefield
Published 29 Mar 2020

2 Alternatively, imagine that a government wants to prevent another country from building or obtaining a weapon. Could they remotely and stealthily disrupt their progress? This scenario supposedly happened in Iran in the late 2000s, when attackers illicitly introduced a modularized piece of software onto the control systems of centrifuges used to enrich uranium. Dubbed Stuxnet by researchers, this operation reportedly intended to destroy the centrifuges and halt Iran’s nuclear program. Policing domestic activity Governments may also break into systems to police domestic activity. In a recent example, NSO Group, a cybersecurity contractor, sold software to various governments that allowed private surveillance of communications between people without their knowledge (through the remote monitoring of mobile phone calls).

The Silk Roads: A New History of the World
by Peter Frankopan
Published 26 Aug 2015

If necessary, he added, the US would ‘do what it would have to do’.79 ‘As I have made clear time and again during the course of my presidency,’ President Obama stressed, ‘I will not hesitate to use force when it is necessary to defend the United States and its interests.’80 Despite issuing threats designed to bring Iran to the negotiating table, the US appears to have been taking action behind the scenes to achieve what it wants anyway. While there were several potential sources for the Stuxnet virus that attacked the centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear facility in Iran and then other reactors across the country, multiple indicators suggest that the highly sophisticated and aggressive cyber strategies targeting the nuclear programme could be traced back to the United States – and directly to the White House.81 Cyber-terrorism is acceptable, it seems, as long as it is in the hands of western intelligence agencies.