Teledyne

The Outsiders: Eight Unconventional CEOs and Their Radically Rational Blueprint for Success
by William Thorndike
Published 14 Sep 2012

This was highly unconventional behavior at a time when his more accommodating peers were often on the cover of the top business magazines. Teledyne Versus Sarbanes-Oxley Teledyne’s iconoclasm extended to today’s hot-button topic of corporate governance. The company’s board would fail miserably by the current standards of Sarbanes-Oxley legislation. Singleton (like many of the CEOs in this book) was a proponent of small boards. Teledyne’s board consisted of only six directors, including Singleton, half of them insiders. It was an exceptionally talented group, however, and each member had a significant economic interest in the company. In addition to Singleton, Roberts, and Kozmetzky (who retired from Teledyne in 1966 to run the business school at the University of Texas), board members included Claude Shannon, Singleton’s MIT classmate and the father of information theory; Arthur Rock, the legendary venture capitalist; and Fayez Sarofim, the billionaire Houston-based fund manager.

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From this point on, the company never made another material purchase and never issued another share of stock. The effectiveness of this acquisition strategy can be seen in table 2-1. Over its first ten years as a public company, Teledyne’s earnings per share (EPS) grew an astonishing sixty-four-fold, while shares outstanding grew less than fourteen times, resulting in significant value creation for shareholders. TABLE 2-1 Teledyne’s first-decade financial results ($ in millions) Source: This table was provided by Tom Smith, an investor and longtime Teledyne observer. a. Adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends. Singleton came of age at a time when there was great faith in quantitative expertise.

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From 1971 to 1984, Singleton bought back huge chunks of Teledyne’s stock at low P/Es while revenues and net income continued to grow, resulting in an astonishing fortyfold increase in earnings per share. It’s important, however, to recognize that this obsession with repurchases represented an evolution in thinking for Singleton, who, earlier in his career when he was building Teledyne, had been an active and highly effective issuer of stock. Great investors (and capital allocators) must be able to both sell high and buy low; the average price-to-earnings ratio for Teledyne’s stock issuances was over 25; in contrast, the average multiple for his repurchases was under 8.

Quantitative Value: A Practitioner's Guide to Automating Intelligent Investment and Eliminating Behavioral Errors
by Wesley R. Gray and Tobias E. Carlisle
Published 29 Nov 2012

—Warren Buffett, Shareholder Letter, 19841 Henry Singleton is most notable for two achievements: building Teledyne from scratch into one of the most profitable and successful stocks in the United States at the time he stepped down 29 years later, and for his “almost arrogant scorn for most conventional business practices.”2 Warren Buffett has described Singleton as a “managerial superstar,”3 saying that he had “the best operating and capital deployment record in American business.”4 That is high praise indeed, coming from one of the world's greatest capital allocators. Singleton founded Teledyne in 1960 with just $225,000. He continually adapted his capital management strategy to the prevailing climate on Wall Street.

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He continually adapted his capital management strategy to the prevailing climate on Wall Street. In the conglomerate era, he used Teledyne's soaring stock to make cheap acquisitions and raise earnings per share. In the 1970s, when the stock slumped, Singleton bought back Teledyne's undervalued stock hand over fist. Said Singleton in a 1979 Forbes article5: In October 1972 we tendered for 1 million shares and 8.9 million came in. We took them all at $20 and figured that was a fluke and that we couldn't do it again. But instead of going up, our stock went down. So we kept tendering, first at $14 and then doing two bonds-for-stock swaps.

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… I don't believe all the nonsense about market timing. Just buy very good value and when the market is ready that value will be recognized. Investors, heeding Singleton's signal that the stock was cheap, made out like bandits. Teledyne stock, which had sold for less than $14 in 1972, the year of Singleton's first buyback, was by 1987, when adjusted for splits and distributions, worth well over $930 a share (see Figure 9.1).6 The gain in Teledyne stock following the buyback represents a total return of more than 6,500 percent, or a compound yearly return of more than 32 percent. This is not an isolated example. In fact, it's emblematic of stocks that repurchase shares.

The Investment Checklist: The Art of In-Depth Research
by Michael Shearn
Published 8 Nov 2011

Here are a few examples of businesses operated by CEOs who do not follow well-formulated strategic plans but instead improve the business day by day. Henry Singleton, CEO of Teledyne Inc. from the 1960s through the 1980s, believed the best plan was no plan. Under his tenure, Teledyne’s stock compounded at more than 20 percent for more than 20 years. He believed it was better to approach an uncertain world with an open mind. Singleton once remarked at a Teledyne annual meeting, “. . . we’re subject to a tremendous number of outside influences, and the vast majority of them cannot be predicted. So my idea is to stay flexible.

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This allows these CEOs to see the big picture and not get bogged down in the details. One of the best capital allocators in corporate history was Henry Singleton, longtime CEO of Teledyne, who cofounded the business in 1960 and served as CEO until 1986. In John Train’s book The Money Masters, Warren Buffett reported that he believes “Henry Singleton has the best operating and capital-deployment record in American business.” When Teledyne’s stock was trading at extremely high prices in the 1960s, Singleton used the high-priced stock as currency to make acquisitions. Singleton made more than 130 acquisitions of small, high-margin manufacturing and technology businesses that operated in defensible niches managed by strong management.

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“Beating the Odds When You Launch a New Venture.” Harvard Business Review, May 2010. 10. Perkins, Tom. Valley Boy, The Education of Tom Perkins. New York: Penguin Group, 2007. 11. Markels, Alex. “The Sky Really Is Falling.” U.S. News and World Report, November 8, 2004. 12. “The Brain Behind Teledyne: A Great American Capitalist.” New York Observer, April 7 2003; Henry Singleton at a Teledyne annual meeting. 13. Author’s interview with Dave and Sherry Gold in May 2010. 14. Stemberg, Thomas. “Treat People Right and They Will Eat Nails for You, and Other Lessons I Learned Building Staples into a Giant Company.” Inc., January 2007. 15. Bob Graham interview by Michael Shearn and Matt Dreith, April 8, 2011. 16.

Market Wizards: Interviews With Top Traders
by Jack D. Schwager
Published 7 Feb 2012

Anyway, at this same time, I still had the remnants of a big spread position in Teledyne that I was in the process of liquidating. It was a position that would lose in a rising market. One day after I had been trading Boeing for about five weeks, Teledyne started moving up sharply. I was not going to let it get me again. I rushed into the Teledyne pit to take my position off. I was hearing floor brokers come in with orders, and all of a sudden I found myself responding to them. I was adapting the same technique I had learned in Boeing to Teledyne, except instead of scalping for an eighth or a quarter, I was scalping for halves and dollars. What size were you trading at the time? I was doing one lot at a time.

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Besides allowing him to make a comeback from his early poor start, Saliba’s persistence also came into play at other points in his trading career. For example, many others faced with the type of constant ridicule that Saliba was subjected to in the Teledyne pit might have abandoned their strategy. This same Teledyne example also illustrates another important characteristic of the superior trader: the maintenance of rigid risk control, even in difficult circumstances. It must have been very tempting for Saliba to trade a larger position size in the Teledyne pit when he was being derided as “one-lot.” Instead, he maintained his discipline and continued to trade small until his capital had grown sufficiently to allow him to increase his position size.

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I realized that this chipping away approach was what I should be doing, not putting myself at a big risk, trying to collect a ton of dough. At the time I was in Teledyne options, which was a very volatile market. So, I switched to Boeing, which was a very tight, narrow range type of market. I became a spread scalper trying to make a quarter or an eighth of a point on a trade. I stuck strictly to my goal of trying to average $300 a day and it was working. This period taught me to be regimented and disciplined. To this day, I live by the credo of hard work, homework, and discipline. I teach my guys that. Anyway, at this same time, I still had the remnants of a big spread position in Teledyne that I was in the process of liquidating.

The Man Behind the Microchip: Robert Noyce and the Invention of Silicon Valley
by Leslie Berlin
Published 9 Jun 2005

No one noted it at the time, but Davis and Rock were launching the first venture capital fund on the West Coast.75 Rock had become a close friend to Jay Last and so knew of Last’s longstanding dissatisfactions at Fairchild. Rock had also made the acquaintance of Henry Singleton, a PhD engineer who had left his research job at Litton Industries two years before to start a high-tech conglomerate he called Teledyne. Singleton wanted to start a division of Teledyne to develop advanced semiconductor devices for military applications. In other words, he wanted to start an integrated circuits company. Rock, who would become one of the nation’s top corporate matchmakers, had spent the past few months urging Last, who wanted to oversee an operation devoted entirely to integrated circuits, to call Singleton.

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The company for which Beadling now worked, the semiconductor division of Union Carbide, had been started by Jean Hoerni after he left Jay Last and Amelco-Teledyne. In July and August alone, Noyce noted meetings with a dozen current or former Fairchild employees, most of them looking for jobs. Chances are high that meetings with many other Fairchild people went unrecorded. The West Coast semiconductor industry was still so small that it seemed as if nearly everyone in a professional position knew everyone else—often from having worked together at Fairchild. Jay Last’s Amelco-Teledyne rented space from Ed Baldwin’s Rheem, a company later bought by Raytheon, yet another Fairchild spin-off, which years later would hook up with former Fairchild CEO John Carter, who had started his own new company.

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Hoerni, who saw no hope for advancement at Fairchild with the R&D director’s slot now filled by Moore, was also eager to try something new. He and Last drove to southern California—Hoerni hated to fly—and on the last day of 1960, they donned their best suits (“negotiating suits,” they called them) and met with Singleton and his co-founder George Kozmetsky at the Teledyne office in West Los Angeles. The meeting lasted several hours and ended well enough that Last and Hoerni left feeling fairly certain they would go to work for Singleton. Restless with adrenalin, they drove far out into the East Mojave, where they had planned a New Year’s Day climb in the Old Woman Mountains.

The Power Law: Venture Capital and the Making of the New Future
by Sebastian Mallaby
Published 1 Feb 2022

There was no point waiting; they deserved a financial share in the fruits of their research. If Rock had liberated them once, he could easily do so a second time. He advised Last and Hoerni to talk to Teledyne, the firm that would become the second most successful investment in the Davis & Rock portfolio. Time passed and nothing happened. Last and Hoerni seemed too timid to act. So Rock spoke with Teledyne’s boss, Henry Singleton, explaining why his hiking friends would be assets to his enterprise. Then he placed a call to Fairchild midway through the company’s Christmas gift exchange, which featured none other than Jay Last dressed up as Santa Claus.

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BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 52 Last, interview by the author, Sept. 20, 2017. BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 53 Berlin, Man Behind the Microchip, 123. BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 54 Rock, interview by the author, Nov. 8, 2017. BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 55 George A Roberts, Distant Force: A Memoir of the Teledyne Corporation and the Man Who Created It (Teledyne Corporation, 2007), 14. A slight variant on this account is given by Berlin, Man Behind the Microchip, 123. BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 56 “Companies | The Silicon Engine | Computer History Museum,” website, accessed Sept. 13, 2017, www.computerhistory.org/siliconengine/companies.

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(“The best thing about going to Russia was leaving it,” Rock recalled later.)[45] In 1969, when Xerox made a bid for SDS, Palevsky recognized Rock’s superior grasp of the financial details and asked him to negotiate. The result was the corporate sale of the decade, with Xerox paying just under $1 billion.[46] On June 30, 1968, Davis and Rock wound up their partnership. Thanks overwhelmingly to SDS, but also to a defense contractor called Teledyne, their initial fund of $3.4 million was now worth almost $77 million, an extraordinary return of 22.6x; it was a performance that easily eclipsed Warren Buffett in this period, as well as that of the inventor of the “hedged fund,” Alfred Winslow Jones. Adding together their share of the fund’s appreciation plus the gain on their personal $100,000 stakes, each partner walked off with almost $10 million—or $74 million in today’s money.

Fortune's Formula: The Untold Story of the Scientific Betting System That Beat the Casinos and Wall Street
by William Poundstone
Published 18 Sep 2006

For a while, Singleton lived in Greenwich Village near Bell Labs. Then he moved west to work in the booming defense industry. In 1960 Singleton and George Kozmetsky founded Teledyne, a defense contractor selling digital navigation systems to a still-analog Pentagon. Shannon bought a couple thousand shares at the initial price of $1 a share. It became one of the red-hot stocks of the 1960s. By 1967 it hit $24. As the company’s shares skyrocketed, Singleton used the inflated market value to buy other companies. He bought about 130. Teledyne came to own insurance companies, offshore oil wells, and the manufacturer of Water Pik teeth cleaners. In 1962 an MIT group founded Codex Corporation to provide coding technology to the military.

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When they were thinking of investing in Kentucky Fried Chicken, they bought the chicken and served it to friends to gauge their reactions. “If we try it and don’t like it,” Shannon said, “we simply won’t consider an investment in the firm.” Shannon became a board member of Teledyne. He was not just a distinguished name in the annual report but was actively scouting potential acquisitions for CEO Henry Singleton. For instance, in 1978 Shannon investigated Perception Technology Corporation on behalf of Teledyne. Perception Technology was founded by an MIT physicist, Huseyin Yilmaz, whose training was largely in general relativity. During the visit with Shannon, Yilmaz spoke enthusiastically about physics, asserting that there was a “gap in Einstein’s equation” which Yilmaz had filled with an extra term.

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He did not say how or if he accounted for stocks he no longer owned. That can make a big difference in the return of an actively managed portfolio. However, the Shannons apparently never put too much money into a new stock, and they sold rarely after the mid-1960s. Practically all of the profit came from the Teledyne/Motorola/Hewlett-Packard triumvirate. Shannon had bought Teledyne for 88 cents a share, adjusted for stock splits. Twenty-five years later, each share was worth about $300, a 25 percent annual return. Codex had cost Shannon 50 cents a share; by 1986 each share had become a share of Motorola worth $40, translating into a 20 percent return rate.

Concentrated Investing
by Allen C. Benello
Published 7 Dec 2016

When Hewlett‐Packard acquired it in 1962, Shannon received stock as part of the merger, and was struck by the size of the gain.13 He also invested in Teledyne, Inc., a new venture started by Henry Singleton, a close friend and alumnus from MIT’s graduate school. Shannon bought in 1960 at the $1 initial public offer price.14 By 1967, the stock traded for $24. None other than Warren Buffett would later describe Singleton as a “managerial superstar,”15 with “the best operating and capital deployment record in American business.”16 Shannon would go on to sit on the board of Teledyne, and would conduct technical and business diligence on potential acquisitions at Singleton’s behest.

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Shannon simply remained 82 Concentrated Investing Table 3.1â•… Shannon’s Portfolio Returns and Statistics Company Shares Purchase Price 1981 Price Value Return Baxter International 30 $42.75 $50.00 $1,500.00 17% Crown Cork & Seal 50 $8.00 $31.75 $1,587.50 297% 348 $0.13 $82.00 $28,536.00 62,977% 70 $26.50 $22.00 $1,540.00 –17% 1 $30.00 $39.00 $39.00 30% 120 $1.63 $28.88 $3,465.00 1,672% Hewlett‐Packard International Flavors and Fragrances John H. Harland Masco M.I.L.I Motorola Schlumberger Teledyne Total 40 $32.00 $28.13 $1,125.00 –12% 1,086 $1.13 $65.00 $70,590.00 5,652% 22 $44.00 $108.75 $2,329.50 147% 2,428 $1.00 $194.38 $471,942.50 19,338% $582,717.50 invested in each as they grew. This allowed Motorola to compound his initial investment 57 times. Teledyne, his largest investment, grew an incredible 194 times. Hewlett‐Packard, his second-largest holding, multiplied his capital an astonishing 630 times from his average purchase price.

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This figure excludes the value of another stock Shannon held, Datamarine International, which Shannon told Hershberg was the worst-performing stock in the portfolio.28 Purchased in 1971, it had averaged only 13 percent per year since.29 There are two striking aspects of Shannon’s portfolio observable in the 1981 snapshot. The first is the extreme concentration. Fully 81 percent of the portfolio was dedicated to his biggest position, Teledyne. His secondlargest holding, Motorola, made up another 12 percent of the portfolio, and Hewlett‐Packard, the third-largest holding, accounted for a further 5 percent. The other seven positions made up just 2 percent of his holdings. The reason for the extreme concentration is the second striking feature of Shannon’s portfolio: He didn’t trim positions.

One Up on Wall Street
by Peter Lynch
Published 11 May 2012

They never pay a dividend, and they never make unprofitable acquisitions, but by shrinking shares they’ve gotten the maximum impact from the earnings. If this keeps up, someday there will be a thousand shares of Crown, Cork, and Seal—worth $10 million apiece. At Teledyne, chairman Henry E. Singleton periodically offers to buy in the stock at a much higher price than is bid on the stock exchange. When Teledyne was selling for $5, he might have paid $7, and when the stock was at $10, then he was paying $14, and so on. All along he’s given shareholders a chance to get out at a fancy premium. This practical demonstration of Teledyne’s belief in itself is more convincing than the adjectives in the annual report. The common alternatives to buying back shares are (1) raising the dividend, (2) developing new products, (3) starting new operations, and (4) making acquisitions.

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The point is that fortunes change, there’s no assurance that major companies won’t become minor, and there’s no such thing as a can’t-miss blue chip. Buy the right stocks at the wrong price at the wrong time and you’ll suffer great losses. Look what happened in the 1972–74 market break, when conservative issues such as Bristol-Myers fell from $9 to $4, Teledyne from $11 to $3, and McDonald’s from $15 to $4. These aren’t exactly fly-by-night companies. Buy the wrong stocks at the right time and you’ll suffer more of the same. During certain periods it seems to take forever for the theoretical 9.8 percent annual gain from stocks to show up in practice. The Dow Jones industrials reached an all-time high of 995.15 in 1966 and bounced along below that point until 1972.

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., 71 switch funds, 281 synergy, 156–57 Taco Bell, 36, 89, 90, 163, 181, 190, 243, 284 history of, 118 Tagamet, 97–98, 100, 141, 187, 266, 271 takeovers, 135, 240 see also acquisitions Tambrands, 35–36, 37, 95 Tampa Electric, 128 Tampax, 35–36 Tandon, 160, 191 Tandy, 134 taxes: breaks of, 213, 214 deductions of, 78, 285 dividends and, 19 exemptions of, 78–79 loss carryforward of, 126, 213, 257 profit margin and, 220–21 savings and, 285 shelters of, 279 Teamsters union, 66 tear sheets, 136 Telecommunications, 126–27 Teleco Oilfield Services, 212 Teledyne, 72, 134, 134n, 145, 246 telephone companies, 135–36, 205, 213 Televideo, 42, 158, 191 Temple Inland, 134 Templeton, John, 55 tenbaggers, definition of, 32–33 10-year financial summaries, 196–97 Texaco, 205 Texas Air, 129, 224–26 Texas Instruments, 128, 230–31 textile industry, 188–89 Theragenics, 24 Thom McAn, 155 Three Mile Island, 75, 123–24, 206, 255 Tiffany, 155 Time, 131 Time, Inc., 134, 231 Times Mirror, 141, 155 Tisches, 155 Tobias, Andrew, 239 Tom Brown, 151–52 Tonka, 134n Toys “R” Us, 33, 42, 56, 124, 133, 153, 159, 192, 247, 268 growth of, 248 trade deficit, U.S., 284 trade restrictions, 64 Transamerica, 134 Transunion, 134 Treasury bills, 70 Treasury bonds, U.S., 68 T.

100 Baggers: Stocks That Return 100-To-1 and How to Find Them
by Christopher W Mayer
Published 21 May 2018

This allowed them to cut “through the clutter of peer and press chatter to zero in on the core economic characteristics of their business.” He provides many examples of all these traits. And you see the result: some jaw-dropping track records. Take Henry Singleton of Teledyne. (This is one of my favorite case studies in all of business history.) Teledyne was a conglomerate—nothing too special. But look at how Singleton used his tool kit. He avoided paying dividends. He ignored reported earnings, focusing on cash flow. He had Teledyne buy back 90 percent of its stock over time. If you had put $1 with Singleton in 1963, you’d have had $180 when he retired in 1990. He beat the market by a factor of 12.

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And it serves as a handbook for exactly the kind of thing I spend so much time looking for: truly great owner-operators. Finally, but just as importantly, the quest for the next 100-bagger logically begins with a study of the wizards who have already done it. 94 100-BAGGERS Thorndike profiles eight CEOs. Four of their stocks became 100baggers under their watch. These CEOs include Henry Singleton at Teledyne (180-bagger), Tom Murphy at Capital Cities (204-bagger) and John Malone at TCI (900-bagger). Oh, and Warren Buffett. There are also four who don’t quite make the cut of being a 100-bagger, such as Katharine Graham at the Washington Post (89-bagger) and Bill Stiritz at Ralston Purina (52-bagger).

A Mind at Play: How Claude Shannon Invented the Information Age
by Jimmy Soni and Rob Goodman
Published 17 Jul 2017

A college friend of Shannon, Henry Singleton, put Shannon on the board of the company he created, Teledyne, which grew to become a multibillion-dollar conglomerate. As Shannon retold the story, he made the investment simply because “I had a good opinion of him.” If there can be said to have been an old boys’ club of Silicon Valley in its initial days, then Claude Shannon was a card-carrying member—and he benefited from all the privileges therein. The club benefited from Shannon as well, in his roles as network node and informal consultant. For instance, when Teledyne received an acquisition offer from a speech recognition company, Shannon advised Singleton to turn it down.

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From his own experience at the Labs, he doubted that speech recognition would bear fruit anytime soon: the technology was in its early stages, and during his time at the Labs, he’d seen much time and energy fruitlessly sunk into it. The years of counsel paid off, for Singleton and for Shannon himself: his investment in Teledyne achieved an annual compound return of 27 percent over twenty-five years. * * * The stock market was, in some ways, the strangest of Shannon’s late-life enthusiasms. One of the recurrent tropes of recollections from family and friends is Shannon’s seeming indifference to money. By one telling, Shannon moved his life savings out of his checking account only when Betty insisted that he do so.

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Beyond the research, there was another factor, one that Shannon was secure enough to readily acknowledge as key to his success. Asked if he was lucky in life, Shannon answered, “Far beyond any reasonable expectations.” By his own admission, Shannon had been fortunate in his timing, and privileged in knowing certain company founders and securing early investments. The bulk of his wealth was concentrated in Teledyne, Motorola, and HP stock; after getting in on the ground floor, the smartest thing Shannon did was hold on. His daughter, Peggy, summed it up with a statement that could just as well have come from her father: her parents “used common sense and connections and had good luck.” If Shannon’s work in the field of finance can be said to have left anything of lasting note, it’s the memorable one-liners, many of which are among the best-known stories about him.

Stock Market Wizards: Interviews With America's Top Stock Traders
by Jack D. Schwager
Published 1 Jan 2001

In April 1978, I made my first option trade: I bought two Teledyne calls at $9 apiece for a total premium of $1,800. I sold the options two days later for $13, earning a total profit of $800 on my $1,800 investment. I said to myself, "Boy, this is a lot easier than shoveling manure and milking cows." For my next option trade, I bought Teledyne calls again, and again I made money. I thought I was going to be a millionaire in no time flat. I was doing so well that I thought, "Why trade with only a small part of my capital; I might as well use all of it." I kept trading Teledyne options. Finally, I put on an option position that went down.

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Geert, 256n Russell 2000, 30, 33, 35 Russia, 18,64,231-32 INDEX 300 misconceptions about, 27, 185-86 as random, 8, 228-29, 238, 274 trends in, 17-19, 29, 50-51, 52, 75-76, 77,92-93, 107, 115-16, 131-32, 151-52, 164, 165,257, 270,281-82,308-9 stock market crash (1987), 47-48, 56, 108, 135, 237, 320-21 Slock Market Logic (Fosback), 156-57 stock market wizards, see traders stocks: "blessed," 15-17, 318 breakouts of, 183 capitalization of, see capitalization certificates for, 69-70 cyclical, 81 discounts on, 140-41, 157,213,250-52,253, 315 dividends from, 13, 133, 140^41 fundamentals of, 15, 18, 62, 70, 79, 87, 92, 147, 152, 155, 161, 162-63, 165, 166, 180-82, 268-69,274, 281, 3 1 1 , 320 over-the-counter, 77, 140, 235 preferred, 243 takeovers, 103, 105 taxes, 35, 109, 133, 134-35, 200 T-bill rate, 1 34 Tektronix, 37, 42, 45-46 Teledyne, 10! "ten-bagger," i61 Thailand, 18 Thermolase, 46-47 ThcSlreet.com, 218 Thorpe, Ed, 266 3Com, 22 lick indicators, 107-1 1, 114, 312, 322 Time, 277 timc-and-sales log, 80 lips, stock, 6, 13-14, 20, 25, 72, 173, 176, 312 Tokyo Stock Exchange, 223 traders: athletes compared with, 285, 288, 289-90, 291, 297, 310 author's previous works on, 30, 77, I 70, 189, 197, 214-15,233 black, 127-28, 136-38 competitive edge of, 61-62, 144-45, 172, 177,203, 217-18, 225-26, 255-56, 301-2 conviction of, 27, 37-38, 48-49, 51, 52, 55, 57, 120-21, 126, 152, 167, 171, 174, 288-97, 302-3 decision-making by, 6, 13-14, 20. 21-22, 23, 25, 72,78, 173, 1 7 6 , 3 1 2 , 3 1 8 determination of, 28, 29, 31, 54, 125. 174-75, 186-87, 194, 203-4, 205, 208, 283-84,299, 303^1 discipline of, 72, 166, 167-68, 177, 186, 187, 202, 205, 208, 209, 292, 298 experience of, 28, 1 19-22. 195, 254-55, 300, 304, 308,314,317-18 fees of, 35, 55.275 flexibility of, 188,299-300 independence of, 22-23, 26-27, 57-58, 60-61, 93, 119-21,254-55,301,316, 326 instincts of, 5, 16, 27, 28, 71-72, 186, 188, 278-79, 286-87 lessons from, 298-326 novice, 67, 72,93-94. 183-86, 204, 218-19, 286-87, 308 patience of, 167-68, 176, 309-10 personality of, 29, 281, 285, 288-97, 298-99, 312-13, 314 style of, 183-84,2)8-20,281-83, 286-87 in teams, 282-83 whole-picture perspective o f , xiii-xiv women, 77, 88-89 see also specific trailers trading: as art vs. science, 61, 7i—72 "bond ratio," 110-11 capitalization for, 10, 114-19, 120. 142, 146, 147, 205, 207, 222, 303 "catapult," 110 charts for, 158, 181-83, 264-74 complexity of, 3 1 5 — 1 6 contests for, 97, 111, 118, 170 currency, 5, 9, 202-3 equity, 6, 144-45,257 fixed-income, 271 goals For, 296,297, 310 high-probability. 110, 116. 177. 1 7 8 , 2 1 6 - 1 7 . 2 1 9 , 255-56,307,316 leveraged, 47-48, 69-70, I 17, 174, 204, 222, 314-15 losses capped in, 179-80, 184, 187, 188 paper, 175 positions in, see positions, trading post-trade analysis of, 97, 109-10, 179-80, 185, 187-88, 218, 219, 300-301,314 research for, see research restrictions on, 21-22, 27-28, 8 1 , 118-22, 152-53, 166, 179-80 systems of, 169, 171-82, 189-206, 264-74 timing in, xiii, 85, 157-58, 162-63, 171, 185, 196, 217, 220, 231, 232, 239, 257, 284-85, 305, 308 unethical, 79-80, 84, 234-35 as vocation, 119-21,316 Trading in the "Lane (Kiev), 288-89 Trading Places, 277 Trading to Win (Kiev), 288 transaction costs, 134-35, 255 turbo indexing, 34 TV set-type adjustments, 233-34 INDEX Ultrafem, 69 U.S.

The Theory That Would Not Die: How Bayes' Rule Cracked the Enigma Code, Hunted Down Russian Submarines, and Emerged Triumphant From Two Centuries of Controversy
by Sharon Bertsch McGrayne
Published 16 May 2011

Consequently, it was the air force that sponsored a review in 1983 of NASA’s estimates of the probability of a shuttle failure. The contractor, Teledyne Energy Systems, employed a Bayesian analysis using the prior experience of 32 confirmed failures during 1,902 rocket motor launches. Using “subjective probabilities and operating experience,” Teledyne estimated the probability of a rocket booster failure at 1 in 35; NASA’s estimate at the time was 1 in 100,000. Teledyne, however, insisted that “the prudent approach is to rely on conservative failure estimates based on prior experience and probabilistic analysis.”3 On January 28, 1986, during the shuttle’s twenty-fifth launch, the Challenger exploded, killing all seven crew members aboard.

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See also belief intuition submarines: for location, 193, 194 location of, x, 3, 182, 196–203, 206–8 silencing, 141. See also U-boats Suez Canal, 203–4 Sulzberger, Arthur, 154 supernova 1987A, 238 Swinburne, Richard, 177 Swirles, Bertha, 54 Tanner, Martin A., 220–21 Tanur, Judith, 174 Taylor, Barbara L., 230 Teledyne Energy Systems, 215 telephone systems, x, 40–42 Teller, Augusta, 223 Teller, Edward, 165, 223 terminology, xi, 8, 129–30 terrorism, 241–42, 247 thinking, 248–51. See also learning Three Mile Island, 180–81 Thrun, Sebastian, 240 Thule accident, 194 Tierney, Luke, 224 translation, 245–47 Travis, Robert F., 122 tree-flipping, 149 Tribe, Laurence H., 136 Truman, Harry, 154 Tukey, John W., 77, 159, 163–75, 176, 177, 233 Tunny-Lorenz codes, 73–74, 75, 84 Turchin, Valentin Fedorovich, 219 Turing, Alan M.: biographical details on, 64–65 computers and, 80–82, 84–85, 99 empirical Bayes and, 134 Enigma code and, x, 3, 65–72, 74, 75–76 forensic science and, 235 genetic science and, 239 JN-25 code and, 82 after Second World War, 83–86, 99 Tunny-Lorenz codes and, 74, 75 Tutte, William T., 74 Tversky, Amos, 236 Twinn, Peter, 66, 70, 71 U-boats: battles with, 61, 69, 74–75, 77, 80, 141 Enigma code and, 61–62, 65–66, 69–70, 71, 77, 80, 84 location of, 77–80 Ulam, Stanislaw, 165 uncertainty: Bayes’ rule and, generally, xi, 8 beliefs and, 52 brains and, 248–50 business and, 142, 145–46, 150 computers and, 234 epidemiology and, 116–17 frequentism and, 55–57, 142 gender and, 26 location and, 201, 206–8 military and, 119 nuclear energy and, 180 operations research and, 79 probability and, 19, 26, 52, 55–57, 242 submarines and, 201, 206–8 telephone systems and, 40–42 unified approach, 170 Unwin, Stephen D., 235 updating: Bayes and, 8, 11 Bayesian networks and, 228 CIA and, 136 Dreyfus and, 39 elections and, 171 insurance and, 92, 95 Laplace and, 33 navy and, 80, 192, 195, 201–2 Netflix and, 244 RAND and 124 Wall Street and, 237 U.S.

The Joys of Compounding: The Passionate Pursuit of Lifelong Learning, Revised and Updated
by Gautam Baid
Published 1 Jun 2020

Peter Lynch, One Up on Wall Street: How to Use What You Already Know to Make Money in the Market (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000). 27. Updating Our Beliefs in Light of New Evidence 1. Michael Rothschild, Bionomics: Economy as Business Ecosystem (Beard Books, 1990). 2. Carter Johnson, “Dr. Henry Singleton and Teledyne,” ValueWalk, April 27, 2018, https://www.valuewalk.com/2018/04/dr-henry-singleton-and-teledyne. 3. Whitney Tilson, “Notes from the 2004 Wesco Annual Meeting,” Whitney Tilson’s Value Investing Website, May 5, 2004, https://www.tilsonfunds.com/wscmtg04notes.doc. 4. Scott Fearon and Jesse Powell, Dead Companies Walking: How a Hedge Fund Manager Finds Opportunity in Unexpected Places (New York: St.

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Investment Masters Class. http://mastersinvest.com/investinginstinctquotes. Jobs, Steve. “ ‘You’ve Got to Find What You Love,’ Jobs Says.” Stanford News, June 14, 2005. https://news.stanford.edu/2005/06/14/jobs-061505. Johnson, Carter. “Dr. Henry Singleton and Teledyne.” ValueWalk, April 27, 2018. https://www.valuewalk.com/2018/04/dr-henry-singleton-and-teledyne. Jordon, Steve. “Investors Earn Handsome Paychecks by Handling Buffett’s Business.” Omaha World-Herald, April 28, 2013. https://www.omaha.com/money/investors-earn-handsome-paychecks-by-handling-buffett-s-business/article_bb1fc40f-e6f9-549d-be2f-be1ef4c0da03.html.

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—Phil Fisher When businesses treat equity capital as gold, even those with limited internal compounding growth opportunities can create significant shareholder value through disciplined capital allocation. If excess free cash flow cannot be reinvested, then look for sound capital allocation that might result in dividends or value-accretive buybacks and acquisitions. Henry Singleton of Teledyne Technologies was an exemplary capital allocator. He would issue shares to acquire cheaper companies when his company’s stock was trading at expensive P/E multiples of 40× to 50×, and when his stock P/E was in single digits, he would repurchase stock. It is smart capital allocation to raise equity at a low dilution when the shares are trading at steep valuations.

Stealth
by Peter Westwick
Published 22 Nov 2019

The weight included a payload of cameras, infrared sensors, or laser target designators.5 Engineers soon discovered a surprising side benefit: the Mini-RPV’s relatively small size, together with its plastic material and judicious shaping, made it much less visible to radar. DARPA commissioned a couple of “observable-optimized” Mini-RPV models—one a rounded delta wing with twin canted-in tails from Teledyne Ryan, the other from McDonnell Douglas with a V-tail—and found they could achieve radar cross sections orders of magnitude below those of conventional tactical military aircraft, in the .005-.01 square meter range, or as low as half a square foot, about as big across as the book you’re reading. The F-15, by comparison, had a cross section of about 25 square meters—roughly 5,000 times greater than the lowest value obtained by the Mini-RPV.

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The sources conflict on which Lockheed engineer got wind of the Stealth contest: some say it was Warren Gilmour (Alan Brown; Rich and Janos); others (Overholser; Aronstein and Piccirillo) say Ed Martin; others (Weinberger and O’Neil, both apparently following Chuck Myers interviews) say Rus Daniell. Weinberger, Imagineers of War, 248–49; O’Neil, “What to Buy,” 64. 17 McDonnell Douglas had designed a low-radar-cross-section aircraft with a curving planform and curved leading and trailing edges. When the design looked like it would fail, Perko encouraged them to team with Teledyne Ryan, which like McDonnell Douglas had earlier built some of the stealthy RPVs. Aronstein and Piccirillo, Have Blue and the F-117A, 26. 18 “Ken Perko,” in Griffin, Pioneers of Stealth, 264–66; Aronstein and Piccirillo, Have Blue and the F-117A, 28–29. chapter four: lockheed: tin shed in a hurricane 1 For the history of Lockheed, see Walter J.

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., and Perry embracing, 145 Cashen joining competition of, 67 contest in, 28, 211n.16 design and production integrated in, 192–193 Disney’s connection to, 18–19 engine builders for, 152 engineers in, 16 innovation spurred by, 192 misconceptions about, 61–62 Northrop influenced by, 187–188 as nuclear weapons alternative, xv, 196 Overholser entering, 46 RCS reduced in, 11 resistance faced by, xii Sea Shadow ship in, 184 secrecy of, 115–116 Soviet Union and, 113–114 teamwork in, 198 term coined for, 25 U.S. investment in, 193–194 Stegner, Wallace, 15–16 Stewart, James, 27 stock exchange, 157 stored-program principle, 70 strategic bombing, 2 Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars), 120–121, 193 strike aircraft, low-altitude, 127 subcontractors, for B-2 bomber, 173–174 submarine-launched missiles, 144 supersonic cruise, 184–185 surface-to-air missiles, 5 Symington, Stuart, 57 Tacit Blue Air Force canceling, 141–142 at Area 51, 139 as B-2 stepping stone, 160 BSAX design contract for, 136 curves of, 137, 159–160 DARPA contract for, 133 design and production of, 139 first flight of, 141 in flight, 128f fly-by-wire system of, 140 flying wing concept and, xiv head-on view of, 132f Kinnu reviving program for, 153–154 low-frequency threat to, 138 low-probability-of-intercept radar testing, 125–126 LRRD seminars and, 123 Northrop advantages from, 159–160 production problems of, 137 RAM for, 138 side view of, 129f test pilots of, 140–141 Tall King system, 5, 9–10, 138 teamwork, 198 technology, xiv, 7, 198 conventional, 120–121 military, xi, 23 Teledyne Ryan, 25, 211n.17 Tesla, Nikola, 2–3 test flight of B-2 bomber, 178 brake problems in, 96 of Have Blue, 93–98, 95f of Johnson, 91–92 landing gear problems in, 96 of Morgenfeld, 107 test pilots, 83–84 dangers facing, 93 design engineers and, 91 Dyson as, 97–98 in flight simulators, 86–87 Park as, 95–97 of Tacit Blue, 140–141 Testor Corporation, 109 Theremin, Léon, 111–112 thermonuclear war, 9 Thomas, Richard, 140–141 titanium, 90, 171–172 Tizard, Henry, 2–3 Tizard Committee, 2–3 Tomorrowland, 18–20 Tonopah Test Range, 109 toothpick design, 166, 167f Top Gun (movie), 83–84 Top Secret programs, 139, 168 Trident missile, 174 Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM), 184 Truman, Harry, 58 TSSAM.

Investment: A History
by Norton Reamer and Jesse Downing
Published 19 Feb 2016

In the view of many management theorists, management control of this sort offers distinct advantages over the more minute-to-minute frenetic activity of dominating, control-oriented CEOs.9 Henry Singleton, the CEO of Teledyne from the 1960s to the 1980s, was a wonderful example of this management style. While there were earlier CEOs who focused more on resource allocation than on the more traditional management skills such as execution of management technique and implementation of day-to-day management plans, Singleton seemed to be the most striking contemporary departure from this dominant model. Among other things, Singleton was devoted to shrinking Teledyne’s number of outstanding shares, often in lieu of potential acquisitions and substantial investments in plant and equipment.

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Although the modern concept of the CEO as an executor of management technique, objective setting, and implementation has continued to be dominant, another management model has gained traction The Investment Challenge 7 in recent years. The success of CEOs who place emphasis on effective allocation of capital and people has led to a reappraisal of the hierarchy of management skills.8 Noteworthy examples of these CEOs include Warren Buffett (Berkshire Hathaway), Henry Singleton (Teledyne), and Thomas Murphy (Capital Cities), all of whom have demonstrated the significant impact of CEOs as allocators of capital and human resources. Often this focus on capital allocation is paired with an executive style that emphasizes meaningful decentralization in the management hierarchy. Decentralization provides substantial autonomy to carefully vetted division managers or subsidiary CEOs.

The Idea Factory: Bell Labs and the Great Age of American Innovation
by Jon Gertner
Published 15 Mar 2012

Baker insisted it was an honorable thing to do “should the man who came up with information theory” suffer any kind of financial hardship.)25 Shannon had become wealthy, too, through friends in the technology industry. He owned significant shares in Hewlett-Packard, where his friend Barney Oliver ran the research labs, and was deeply invested in Teledyne, a conglomerate started by another friend, Henry Singleton. Shannon sat on Teledyne’s board of directors. The stock market was therefore just another puzzle, albeit one with a pleasant proof of success. He was convinced that the stock market was less efficient than some economists believed, and that a smart investor who took advantage of mispriced stocks could do quite well.26 Len Kleinrock, Shannon’s former student, recalls that one day at MIT, Shannon mentioned that he was making a mathematical model of the stock market.

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., 63–64 Science, 331 Scientific American, 127, 137, 138, 200, 258, 321 Seattle, Century 21 Exposition in, 228–29 Seitz, Fred, 54–55, 245, 309 semiconductors, 83–86, 87, 90, 92–95, 97, 99, 101, 102, 151, 163, 169, 251–52, 276 Moore’s law and, 308 chips, 252–53, 308 Shannon, Betty, 133, 137, 138–39, 145, 146, 147, 318, 321, 322–23 Shannon, Claude Elwood, 2–3, 115–35, 136–48, 150, 184, 185, 226, 232, 234, 242, 243, 247, 250–51, 267, 292, 317–23, 341, 342, 350, 357 Alzheimer’s of, 322, 323 Baker and, 244 bust of, 340 in California, 146–47 chess program of, 136, 137–38, 143, 322 computing and, 117–18, 136–44 cryptography and, 124–25, 131, 141, 147 death of, 322 information theory of, 125, 128–30, 135, 136, 141, 142, 149, 151, 185–86, 202, 281, 318–19 juggling of, 145, 147, 148, 319–21, 323 Kyoto Prize awarded to, 322 labs named after, 335 letters to, 141, 147–48 master’s thesis of, 118, 123 as MIT professor, 145–47, 317–18, 319 as part-time employee at Bell Labs, 148 Pierce and, 196–97, 201, 225, 318, 323–24 radio interview with, 136–37 resignation from Bell Labs, 146, 147 stock market and, 319 Theseus Mouse project of, 138–40, 141, 323 ultimate machine of, 142–43 unfinished and unpublished papers of, 146, 323 unicycles of, 145 Shewhart, Walter, 49–50 Shive, John, 103 Shockley, Emma, 313 Shockley, William, 2, 38, 40, 41, 43, 44, 52–58, 59–60, 63, 68, 69, 71–74, 79, 81, 88, 89, 92, 95, 96, 108, 133, 134, 136, 149, 151, 163, 185, 186, 242, 266, 267, 285, 307–15, 317, 342, 347, 357, 358 amplifier work of, 57–58 at ASWORG, 71–72 Baker and, 313–14 at Caltech, 53–54, 192 as consultant at Bell Labs, 311–13 death of, 315 early life of, 53–54, 100–101 Electrons and Holes in Semiconductors, 112 Elmendorf and, 312 “field effect” theory of, 90–91, 92, 101 Fisk and, 234, 313 Kelly and, 56 at MIT, 54–55, 56, 88 Morton and, 311–13 Murray Hill complex and, 75, 76 Nobel Prize awarded to, 2, 181–82, 244 Pierce and, 194–95, 197, 225 racial theories of, 2, 309–15 resignation from Bell Labs, 180–82, 307 solid-state work of, 43, 79, 83, 86–90, 92, 102, 103, 112 transistor work of, 99–105, 107, 110, 111, 115–16, 134, 135, 166–67, 168, 316 Shockley Semiconductor, 180–81, 225, 244–45, 251, 290, 308–9, 310, 314, 346 Shurkin, Joel, 72, 315 silicon, 83–86, 87, 93–95, 166–72, 252 diffused, 169–70, 171, 254 solar battery, 4, 170–72, 206, 208 Silicon Valley, 181, 308, 346–48 Singleton, Henry, 319 Skaade, Helvar, 54 Slepian, David, 132, 141, 143, 148, 357 Smith, Walter Bedell, 141 solar battery, 4, 170–72, 206, 208 solid circuits, 253 solid-state physics, 43, 79, 80, 81, 86–91, 92, 102, 103, 105, 112, 134, 150–51 Sommerfeld, Arnold, 42 sonar, 65 Soviet Union, 246–47 Sputnik satellite of, 208 Sparks, Morgan, 110 Sputnik, 208 Stanford University, 181 steam engine time, 289 Stibbitz, George, 123 stimulated emission, 206–7, 254 submarines, 71, 80, 88 Sullivan, Mark, 174 Summit University, 347 surface states, 92–93 switching, 52, 97, 117, 118, 123, 136, 155, 232, 250, 252, 339 electronic, 229, 231–34, 235, 260, 261, 290–91 Szilard, Leo, 60 Tanenbaum, Morris, 166–70, 181, 251, 253–54, 299, 300, 302, 351–52 TASI (Time Assignment Speech Interpolation), 183–84 TAT-1, 175–80 Teal, Gordon, 86–87, 109–10, 168 Telecommunications Act, 328–29 Teledyne, 319 telegraph, 126, 224, 260 telephones, 17–19, 126, 134, 155, 260, 263 carbon granules in, 12, 20 diaphragms in, 82 long-distance calling, 20–24, 33–34, 37, 47, 173–74, 175–80, 229 mobile, 3, 131, 227, 233–34, 279–83, 284, 286–97, 335 outdoor equipment for, 50 patent for, 17–18, 98 PCM and, 126–27, 129 problems with, 47–48 sheathing on cables for, 242 touch-tone buttons on, 229, 233 transatlantic service, 37, 175–80, 183–84, 203, 205, 211 Teletype, 49 television, 220, 283 Telstar, 220, 221–24, 225, 226, 228, 229, 340 Temin, Peter, 269 Terman, Frederick, 181, 347 Tesla, Nikola, 12 Texas Instruments, 251, 252 Theseus, 138–40, 141, 323 Theurer, Henry, 84, 85 THROBAC, 142 Time, 140, 165, 308, 333 Tomkins, Calvin, 196 Tordella, Louis, 249 Townes, Charles, 39–40, 41, 43, 60–61, 206–7, 254 laser work of, 254–55, 257 stimulated emission work of, 206–7 transatlantic phone cable, 37, 175–80, 183–84, 203, 205, 211 transistors, 3, 4, 98–114, 115–16, 127–28, 134, 135, 140, 150–51, 155, 163–72, 179, 180, 183, 185–86, 197, 207, 229, 244, 245, 250–53, 281, 308, 315–16, 341, 343, 349, 359 junction, 102–4, 107, 110, 111, 134 licensing of technology for, 112 Moore’s law and, 308 naming of, 98, 197 Nobel Prize for work on, 181–82, 244 patents for, 97–100, 107, 111 point-contact, 102–4, 107–8, 110, 112 quality of, 253 tyranny of numbers and, 252 unveiling of, 104–5, 127 traveling wave tube (TWT), 198–201, 202, 205–6, 207–8, 210 Truman, Harry, 157, 158, 160, 245 Tukey, John, 129, 151, 246 2001: A Space Odyssey, 197 tyranny of numbers, 252 underwater cables, 37, 81–82 University of California, 159 University of Chicago, 14 Unix, 261, 346 uranium, 51, 59–60, 68 vacuum tubes, 23, 33–36, 37, 52, 57, 67, 80, 82, 93, 97–99, 105, 107–8, 110, 113, 164, 176, 183, 194, 195, 250, 349 traveling wave, 198–201, 202, 205–6, 207–8, 210 Vail, Theodore, 18–20, 24, 27, 30, 45, 272, 275 transcontinental phone service and, 21, 22 Van Vleck, John, 42 venture economy, 347–48 Von Mehren, Robert, 304, 306 Walbridge, Mabel, 168 Walker, Larry, 70 Wall Street Journal, 337 Waters, Ernie, 193 Watson, Thomas A., 23–24 Watson, Thomas J.

The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons for Corporate America
by Warren E. Buffett and Lawrence A. Cunningham
Published 2 Jan 1997

However, very few enterprises possess both characteristics, and competition to buy those that do has now become fierce to the point of being self-defeating. The second category involves the managerial superstars-men who can recognize that rare prince who is disguised as a toad, and who have managerial abilities that enable them to peel away the disguise. We salute such managers as Ben Heineman at Northwest Industries, Henry Singleton at Teledyne, Erwin Zaban at National Service Industries, and especially Tom Murphy at Capital Cities Communications (a real managerial "twofer", whose acquisition efforts have been properly focused in Category 1 and whose operating talents also make him a leader of Category 2). From both direct and vicarious experience, we recognize the difficulty and rarity of these executives' achievements.

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Piedmont. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 RJR Nabisco 70,71,100, 102,142 Rockwood & Co. 67 Salomon Inc 71, 103, 105, 110, 114, 115, 117, 118, 134-136, 154 Scott & Fetzer Company (Scott Fetzer) 59-60, 181-87, 193 Sears... .. . .. . .. . 91 See's Candies. . . . . . .. 58, 76, 79, 90, 141, 173-175,179,179,186 Southwest Airlines 112 Sunbeam........................ 9 Standard Brands 142 Teledyne 139 Texaco.......................... 129 U.S. Postal Service.. .. . .. . .. . 51 USAir. 110-115, 154 113 Virgin Atlantic Airways. . . . . . . . . . . Wachovia Corp. . . ... ... .. . ... ... . 146 The Washington Post Company. . . . 6, 63, 76, 79, 83, 84, 88, 200, 202 Waumbec Mills 45 Wells Fargo & Company. . . . . . . . .. 6, 32, 97-99, 179 Wesco Financial Corporation .... 97,102, 150, 151, 166 Wrigley......................... 77 215 INDEX OF NAMES Allen, Woody. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 46, 100 Benchley, Robert 93 Berra, Yogi 71, 140 68 Boesky, Ivan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Kill Chain: The Rise of the High-Tech Assassins
by Andrew Cockburn
Published 10 Mar 2015

Come the Vietnam War, they were adapted for reconnaissance, though without much success, being easy targets for enemy gunners. Foster, however, cherished the notion that they could soon begin replacing manned attack planes in various roles, and so money poured into a variety of drone programs under development by corporations such as Boeing, Vought, and Teledyne Ryan. None of them worked very well. Most were canceled after a suitable interval, including those assigned to the electronic fence. Yet the desire for aircraft that could be controlled from some remote location was already deeply ingrained at high levels, perhaps because their missions could be more easily kept secret.

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See also specific operations; regions; task forces; and units Special Operations Command (SOCOM) Special Operations Division (DEA) Sprey, Pierre SR-71 reconnaissance plane Star Wars State Department stealth technology Stevens, John Paul stigmergy Stimson, Henry Stingray Strategic Air Command Suez crisis suicide bombers Sukarno Sullivan, Leonard Sunni Muslims superdrones surveillance systems Swan, Fred Syria Takhar Province Takur Ghar battle Taliban TALOS targeted killing. See assassination; high-value targets; kingpin strategy Tarnak Farms compound Task Force 11 Task Force 180 Task Force 373 Task Force Alpha Task Force ODIN Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) Teledyne Ryan corporation Templer, Gerald Tenet, George terrorists watch lists Terrorist Threat Integration Center (T-TIC) Texas Instruments Thailand Thanh Hoa Bridge Thornley, Ronald Thuraya satellite phone torture total situational awareness Trafficante, Santo “Transforming Defense” (Krepinevich and Armitage) Trans-Yemen pipeline Triga research reactor Triggerfish Trohan, Walter Trujillo, Rafael Truman, Harry S.

Palo Alto: A History of California, Capitalism, and the World
by Malcolm Harris
Published 14 Feb 2023

Hayden Stone secured the financing, a cinch for Rock.27 One of the first things it bought was rights to the name Teledyne, which is what the founders re-christened the larger organization. Another purchase was Amelco, a tax write-off of a SoCal manufacturing plant. In January of 1961, Rock convinced four of Shockley’s eight defectors (Hoerni, Roberts, Kleiner, and Last) to reinvent Amelco under Teledyne as a specialty circuit provider for the military. Within a year of founding, Teledyne had its initial public offering, making everyone rich, and they diligently reinvested in the local electronics industry.

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Money flowed back the other way later that year when Rock spun himself off of Hayden Stone, moving to California to start his own venture capital fund with Tommy Davis, a vice president of the Kern County Land Company whose search for more exciting investments had led him to Fred Terman and the Stanford electronics community. Why should Rock work for Hayden Stone when he already made enough people rich to round up money himself? Among the initial investors in the firm, called Davis and Rock, were a Teledyne cofounder and all four ex-Fairchild Amelco founders. The company’s VC fund knitted leading techno-capitalists together into a financing layer that could lie between Silicon Valley and East Coast capital, making sure inventors and their friends got rich first and reinvested in the community. It was the financial complement to what Fred Terman worked to establish with the industrial park.

The Four Pillars of Investing: Lessons for Building a Winning Portfolio
by William J. Bernstein
Published 26 Apr 2002

Prices ballooned even further, allowing the conglomerate to purchase even more companies. The banal nature of the industries under their wings was dressed up with impressive jargon: a zinc mine became a “space minerals division,” shipbuilding became “marine systems,” and meatpacking became “nutritional services.” At its height, the four biggest conglomerates—A-T-O, Litton, Teledyne, and Textron—sold for 25 to 56 times earnings. Pretty heady stuff for what were essentially collections of smokestack companies. Finally, in 1968, the music stopped when Litton announced an earnings disappointment, and the whole house of cards collapsed, with the Four Horsemen falling over 60% each.

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Rowe Price mutual funds, 29, 205, 216 “Taxable Ted,” asset allocation example, 265–266, 267 Taxes bonds, 260-262 capital gains, 581, 99, 103-104, 263, 282, 285, 291, 292 efficiency and asset mix, 246, 263–264 impact on investment, 4, indexed vs. of top 10% mutual funds, 81 municipal bonds, 260–261, 262 performance and indexing, 98–99 Technical progress and diffusion, 132–134 Teledyne, 149–150 Telocity, 152 Templeton, John, 152, 283 Terra Networks, 152 Texas Instruments, 150, 151 Texas Instruments TI BA-35 calculator, 230, 237 Textron, 149–150 Thaler, Dick, 162, 165–166, 173, 174 Theory of investing (Pillar 1), 1–126 about, x–xi, 295–296 equality of capital cost and capital returns, 7 Fisher’s discounted dividend model (DDM), 43–51 Gordon Equation, 53–62 importance of study, 6 The Theory of Interest (Fisher), 43, 223 The Theory of Investment Value (Williams), 43n1 TIAA-CREF, 214, 216 Times of London, 144 Timing the market, 87–88, 108, 220 rebalancing, 290–291 TIPS (Treasury Inflation Protected Security), 19, 70–71, 110, 235 Tomlin, Lily, 219 Total market funds, 246, 247 Total market mix as basic in asset mix, 244–246 Trail fee, variable annuity, 205 Transactional skill, index funds, 246 Transferral of funds considerations, 281–282 dollar cost averaging (DCA), 282–283 value averaging, 283–285 Treasury bills and bonds annuity perspective on, 10 buying directly, 260, 262–263 Gordon Equation predictions, 72 as government securities, 259–260 historical perspective, 20–23, 28-29 inflation-adjusted, 19 vs. junk bonds, 69-70 as risk-free investment, 70 yield, 257, 259 Treasury Inflation Protected Security (TIPS), 19, 70–71, 110, 235 Trinity withdrawal rate strategy study, 231–235 Tronics bubble, 149–150 The Trouble with Prosperity (Grant), 224 Truman, Harry, 185 Tsai, Gerald, 83–84 Tumulty, Joseph, 147 Turnover in brokerage accounts, 198–199, 200 Tversky, Amos, 166 Two-coin toss test, diversification and rebalancing, 287–288 Undaunted Courage (Ambrose), 131 United States, railroad bubble in, 145 Unpopular Funds Strategy, Morningstar Inc., 209 U.S.

The Innovators: How a Group of Inventors, Hackers, Geniuses and Geeks Created the Digital Revolution
by Walter Isaacson
Published 6 Oct 2014

Engineers began defecting, thus seeding the valley with what became known as Fairchildren: companies that sprouted from spores emanating from Fairchild. The most notable came in 1961, when Jean Hoerni and three of the other eight defectors from Shockley left Fairchild to join a startup, funded by Arthur Rock, that became Teledyne. Others followed, and by 1968 Noyce himself was ready to leave. He had been passed over for the top corporate job at Fairchild, which ticked him off, but he also realized that he did not really want it. Fairchild, the corporation as a whole and even the semiconductor division in Palo Alto, had become too big and bureaucratic.

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They went into business together as Davis and Rock, raised $5 million from Rock’s East Coast investors (as well as some of the Fairchild founders), and started funding new companies in return for a chunk of the equity. Stanford’s provost Fred Terman, still seeking to build his university’s ties to the growing tech boom, encouraged his engineering professors to spend time advising Rock, who took a night course in electronics at the university. Two of his first bets were on Teledyne and Scientific Data Systems, which both paid off handsomely. By the time Noyce called him about finding an exit strategy from Fairchild in 1968, Rock’s partnership with Davis had amiably dissolved (their investments had shot up thirtyfold in seven years) and he was on his own. “If I wanted to start a company,” Noyce asked, “could you find me the money?”

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., ref1 Snow White, ref1 Snyder, Betty, ref1, ref2, ref3 ENIAC’s glitch fixed by, ref1 and public display of ENIAC, ref1 social networking, ref1, ref2 software, ref1 open-source, ref1, ref2 Software Publishing Industry, ref1n Sokol, Dan, ref1 solid circuit, ref1 solid-state physics, ref1, ref2, ref3 Solomon, Les, ref1, ref2 Somerville, Mary, ref1, ref2 sonic waves, ref1 Source, ref1, ref2, ref3 source code, ref1 Soviet Union, ref1, ref2 space program, ref1 Spacewar, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8, ref9 speech-recognition technologies, ref1 Spence, Frances Bilas, see Bilas, Frances Spencer, Herbert, ref1 Sperry Rand, ref1, ref2, ref3n, ref4 Sputnik, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 SRI, ref1 Srinivasan, Srinija, ref1 Stallman, Richard, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6 Stanford Artificial Intelligence Lab (SAIL), ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4 Stanford Industrial Park, ref1 Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, ref1 Stanford Research Institute, ref1, ref2, ref3 Stanford Research Park, ref1 steam engine, ref1 stepped reckoner, ref1 Stevenson, Adlai, ref1 Stibitz, George, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8, ref9, ref10 store-and-forward switching, ref1 Strachey, Oliver, ref1 Strategic Air Command, ref1, ref2 subroutines, ref1, ref2 in ENIAC, ref1 of video games, ref1 Suess, Randy, ref1 “Summit Ridge Drive,” ref1 Sun Microsystem, ref1, ref2 surface states, ref1 Sutherland, Ivan, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5 Swarthmore University, ref1 Swimming Across (Grove), ref1 Switchboards, ref1 “Symbolic Analysis of Relay and Switching Circuits, A,” ref1 symbolic logic, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7 Symbolics, ref1 Syzygy, ref1 Tanenbaum, Andrew, ref1 Taylor, Bob, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8, ref9, ref10 ARPA funding raised by, ref1 Internet designed as decentralized by, ref1 Kleinrocker criticized by, ref1 on nuclear weapons myth of Internet origin, ref1 On Distributed Communications read by, ref1 online communities and, ref1 PARC leadership style of, ref1 personality of, ref1, ref2 recruited to PARC, ref1 Robert’s hiring suggested by, ref1 TCP/IP protocols, ref1, ref2 Teal, Gordon, ref1 teamwork, innovation and, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8, ref9 Tech Model Railroad Club, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7, ref8 technotribalism, ref1 Teitelbaum, Ruth Lichterman, see Lichterman, Ruth Tektronix, ref1 Teledyne, ref1, ref2 telephones, ref1, ref2 television, ref1 Teller, Edward, ref1, ref2, ref3 Tennis for Two, ref1 Terman, Fred, ref1n, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5 Terman, Lewis, ref1 Terrell, Paul, ref1 Tesla, Nikola, ref1, ref2 Texas Instruments, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7 military microchips by, ref1 textiles, ref1 Thacker, Chuck, ref1, ref2, ref3 “That’s All Right,” ref1 Third Wave, The (Toffler), ref1 Thompson, Clive, ref1 Time, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6, ref7 Time Inc., ref1, ref2 Times (London), ref1 time-sharing, ref1, ref2, ref3, ref4, ref5, ref6 Time Warner, ref1 Tocqueville, Alexis de, ref1, ref2 Toffler, Alvin, ref1 Tolkien, J.

The Last Man on the Moon: Astronaut Eugene Cernan and America's Race in Space
by Eugene Cernan and Donald A. Davis
Published 1 Jan 1998

To avoid any communication mixups with two spacecraft flying at the same time, NASA gave in and let the crews name their ships, and this team called ’em like they saw ’em. The Apollo 9 command module was named Gumdrop and the spindly lunar module was called Spider. The week before our Tracy turned six years old in March, Barbara joined me at the Cape to watch the launch, but when it was postponed, we were invited by Frank Jameson, a friend and the president of Teledyne-Ryan, to fly down for a few days at his place on St. Lucia, in the Caribbean. Since it would be my last chance at some relaxation and some time alone with my family, we accepted. Even heading to the sunny island, the talk was about our Apollo 10 mission, scheduled to fly in only two months. I fell into conversation with Dick Iverson, the Ryan vice president in charge of designing the radar that would look for the lunar landing site.

…

He drank vodka like a normal person could drink lemonade, and during long evenings of toasting everything in sight, Georgi just got jollier and bearier with every drink and mangled my name, Eugene, into a nonword that was more comfortable on his Russian tongue. “Ou-zheen! One more!” he would call while I was sliding cross-eyed beneath the table. “Come, Ou-zheen, just one more!” During a party at the swank, cliffside La Jolla mansion of Frank Jameson, the president of Teledyne-Ryan, Georgi put on an apron to help me cook up a mess of barbeque while a Mexican mariachi band honked in the background and his wife, Lidiya, walked into a glass door. Many toasts were drunk to future friendships. “Ou-zheen! One more!” He gamely tried on Mickey Mouse ears at Disneyland and straddled a steer at the Cow Palace in San Francisco.

Predator: The Secret Origins of the Drone Revolution
by Richard Whittle
Published 15 Sep 2014

For technical, legal, and cultural reasons, the next logical step was a giant one. Since the Kettering Bug, World War I’s never-used “aerial torpedo,” the U.S. military had tried putting explosives or bombs or missiles on drones several times, but the results were never satisfactory. The closest brush with success came in the 1970s, when the Air Force and Teledyne Ryan put the TV-guided Maverick missile and later a TV-guided glide bomb on some Firebee target drones like the ones Big Safari modified to fly unmanned reconnaissance missions in Vietnam. By firing a Maverick from a modified Firebee on December 14, 1971, at Edwards Air Force Base in California, the Air Force’s 6514th Test Squadron claimed a place in aviation history—the first launch of an air-to-ground missile from a remotely piloted aircraft.

…

See also African embassy terrorist bombings Sullivan, Kevin Sulzberger, Arthur Hays Summer Project (Afghan Eyes) bin Laden sighting and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (Mons, Belgium) surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) Suter, Richard “Moody” Swanson, Scott Swenson, Don synthetic aperture radar Syria “Taco Bell” tests Tajikistan Takur Ghar peak Taliban Tanjug news agency Tanzania. See African embassy terrorist bombings Tarnak Farms Taszár air base Technion—Israel Institute of Technology Teledyne Ryan Tenet, George Texron Thanh Hoa Bridge Thatcher, Margaret 32nd Expeditionary Air Intelligence Squadron Thomas, Joseph G. 348th Bombardment Squadron 391st Fighter Squadron Thunderbirds Tier programs I (low-altitude UAV) II (medium-altitude UAV) III (high-altitude UAV) tiltrotor designs Times-Picayune (New Orleans) Title 10, U.S. code Tomahawk missiles Top Gun (film) Townes Commission Transportable Medium Earth Terminal (TMET) Trimble Navigation Trimble Navigation GPS receiver Trippe, Charles W.

All the Money in the World
by Peter W. Bernstein
Published 17 Dec 2008

Fayez Sarofim (2006 net worth: $1.5 billion): Also Egyptian-born, Sarofim has a bachelor’s degree from University of California–Berkeley and an MBA from Harvard. He borrowed $100,000 in 1958 from his wealthy father to launch his own investment firm and later made a killing by buying stock in such start-up companies as Intel and Teledyne. Nicknamed the Sphinx, Sarofim and his Houston-based firm now manage some $40 billion in assets, mostly from Texas oil money. Jerry Yang (2006 net worth: $2.2 billion): Yang, who left Taiwan at age ten with his widowed mother and younger brother, originally knew only one word of English: shoe.

…

These men bankrolled new companies like Eastern Airlines and Minute Maid. But the term VC didn’t exist48 until it was invented by Wall Street investment banker Arthur Rock. His instincts for picking creative people who could turn brilliant ideas into businesses led to an extraordinary string of hits, such as Scientific Data Systems, Teledyne, Intel, and Apple Computer. Rock, now an octogenarian49 (2005 net worth: $1 billion), says Intel, the semiconductor manufacturer, was the only company he was 100 percent sure would make it. Gordon Moore and Robert Noyce, also members of the Forbes 400, had founded an earlier company, Fairchild Semiconductor, which was the birthplace of the integrated circuit, with venture capital Rock arranged while he was employed by a Wall Street firm.

Extreme Money: Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk
by Satyajit Das
Published 14 Oct 2011

GE had a bewildering range of businesses—consumer products, turbines, jet engines, medical technology, media, and a finance business. Combinations of unrelated businesses had been fashionable in the go-go 1960s. The “nifty fifty”—stocks like Ling-Temco-Vought (LTV), ITT Corporation, Litton Industries, Textron, Teledyne, and Gulf and Western Industries were the darlings of investors. Low interest rates and an equity market that rose and fell with metronomic regularity allowed the conglomerates to buy companies at temporarily deflated values, anticipating the leveraged acquisitions of the 1980s and 2000s. Investors saw conglomerates as an unstoppable new power and pushed up stock prices, allowing them to borrow more to buy more companies.

…

See also mortgages shorting (2005/2006), 256 subsidies, 334, 348 Suma Oriental, 82 Sumitomo, 227 Summers, Lawrence, 116, 129, 214, 300, 304, 315 Sunday Times, 364 super jumbo loans, 182 Super Return annual industry conference, 162 super senior tranches, 175 supply of assets, 267 survivorship bias, 243 suspension of deep-water drilling, 362 Suze Orman Show, The, 93 Suze Orman’s Financial Freedom, 93 swaps correlation, 255 credit default swaps (CDS), 232, 237 dispersion, 255 Fiat, 222-223 first-to-default (FtD), 220-221 gamma, 255 total return swap (TRS), 209 Swensen, David, 124 Swift, Jonathon, 130 Sydney Airport, 159 synchronous lateral excitation, 273 synthetic securitization, 173, 176 systematic risk, 118 T TAC (target amortization class) bonds, 178 TAF (term auction facility), 340 tail risk, 246 Tainter, Joseph, 349 takeovers (risk arb), 242 Taleb, Nicholas Nassim, 126, 246 Talking Heads, The, 46 taming risk, 120-122 Tang dynasty, 351 tansu savings, 39 Tao Jones Averages, The, 96 TARDIS (Time And Relative Dimension(s) In Space) trades, 217-218 target redemption forwards, 217 Tavakoli, Janet, 177 taxes avoidance, 48-49 cuts, 348 Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC), 82-83 favorable regimes, 41 leveraged buyouts (LBOs), 138 VAT (value added tax), 262 tchotchkes, 162 Teenage Cancer Trust, 262 Teledyn, 60 television, financial news, 91-99 Templars, 32 temporary suspension of deep-water drilling, 362 Terra Firma Capital Partners, 154, 157, 162, 165 terrorism, 44 Texas Instruments (TI), 122 Texas International, 146 Texas Pacific Group, 154 Textron, 60 Thain, John, 291, 319, 330 Thaler, Richard, 126 Thatcher, Margaret, 66, 81, 158 the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA or Ginnie Mae), 179 theoretical profits, 231 theories, bubbles, 277-278 Theory of the Leisure Class, The, 41 This American Life, 185 Thompson, Todd, 93 Thoreau, Henry David, 359 Thornton, John, 76 Thorp, Edward, 121 thought leaders, 90 thundering herd, the, 66 TICKETs (tradable interest bearing convertible to equity trust securities), 160 Tierney, John, 98 Tiger Fund, 243 Time, 45, 129 Time Warner, 58 Tobias, Seth, 322 TOBs (tender option bonds), 222 toggle loans, 154 toilets, Japanese, 38 Tokyo as a financial center, 78 tools, six sigma, 60 Torii, Mayumi, 43 Toscanini, Arturo, 157 total return swap (TRS), 209 Tourre, Fabrice, 199 toxic currency structures, 218-219 toxic waste, 172 Toynbee, Arnold, 354 Toys R Us, 155 TPG, 156 trade protectionism, 334, 349 trading, 23-24 alleys, 92 banks, 73 proprietary, 352 securities, 66 stabilization of global trade, 349 traditional banking models, 68 tranches, 169 AAA, 203 equity, 192 innovation of, 178 super senior, 175 synthetic CDOs, 174 Z, 170, 178 transfers risk, central banks, 281-282 systems, money, 22 Transformers, 278 Travelers, merger of with Citicorp, 75 Treynor, Jack, 117 trickle-down economics, 42-43 Triffin dilemma, 31 Triffin, Robert, 31 Trollope, Anthony, 173 Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), 340 troy ounce bars, 25.

The Big Score
by Michael S. Malone
Published 20 Jul 2021

Noyce, now in charge of Fairchild Semi, found himself without any incentive to keep talented people from running off and trying to make their own fortunes. First to go, angered by what they saw as increasingly shabby treatment by the parent company, were three of the original Eight—Hoerni, Roberts, and Kleiner—to found Amelco. It was bought by Teledyne Semiconductor in 1972. Kleiner went on to become a venture capitalist. Hoerni left Amelco just two years after its founding—as would be his habit—to become the most prolific (if not the most successful) entrepreneur the industry has seen, creating at least a dozen new companies. Also that year, four other Fairchild employees quit to found Signetics, with the help of Corning Glass.

…

., 317 STRETCH (Model 7030) computer, 343 Sunnyvale, 29, 422–5 Sunnyvale Historical Society, 23–25 Sweet, Bill, 264–65 Sylvania Electric, 63, 85, 288, 290, 311 Synapse, 317 Synertek, Inc., 187, 189, 275–76 Systems, 241–42, 287–93 Systems Control Inc., 268 T Taito Ltd., 389 Tandem, 291, 310, 315–18, 407 Tape recorders, 88 Taylor, A. Hoyt, 224 Telecommunications, 242 Teledyne Semiconductor, 119 Telephone, wireless, 37–38 Televideo Corp., 354–55 Tellegen, D.D.H., 144–45, 146 Terman, Frederick, 37, 43–47, 50, 53–54, 71–72, 78, 80, 81, 84 Texas Instruments (TI), 115, 125, 134 calculators, 67–68 Hogan and, 148, 150 integrated circuits and, 117, 118 microprocessors and, 169–70 Thievery.

Deep Value
by Tobias E. Carlisle
Published 19 Aug 2014

By 1966, Litton had sales of $1 billion, and sold more than 5,000 products, including such high-technology exotica as oil drilling rigs, submarines, credit cards, trading stamps, and, of course, mechanical tabulating machines.14 The torrid pace of acquisitions since Thornton had taken over in 1954 had burned out a number of the top executives. Those that left were called LIDOs—Litton Industries Drop Outs—and Litton became known as a “school for conglomerateurs.”15 One notable LIDO was Henry Singleton, who, along with another Litton alumnus, left to form Teledyne. Buffett has described Singleton as a “managerial superstar,”16 with “the best operating and capital deployment record in American business.”17 The LIDOs and others aped Litton, but none had Thornton’s zeal for publicity and deft touch in investor relations. Even after it extended well beyond the high-technology businesses upon which much of its allure rested and started buying more run-of-the-mill companies, Thornton managed to maintain Litton’s air of glamour and growth.

Alpha Girls: The Women Upstarts Who Took on Silicon Valley's Male Culture and Made the Deals of a Lifetime
by Julian Guthrie
Published 15 Nov 2019

But she knew intuitively that this was the right place for her: Silicon Valley was the embodiment of breathtakingly bold ideas and inventions, a region awash in unparalleled ingenuity, originality, tenacity, optimism, and opportunity. It had given rise to more new companies and industries than anywhere else in the world, including such technology giants as Hewlett-Packard, Fairchild Semiconductor, Intel, Teledyne, ROLM, Amgen, Genentech, Advanced Micro Devices, Tandem, Atari, Oracle, Apple, Dell, Electronic Arts, Compaq, FedEx, Netscape, LSI, Yahoo!, Amazon, Cisco, PayPal, eBay, Google, Salesforce, LinkedIn, Tesla, Facebook, YouTube, Uber, Skype, Twitter, and Airbnb. But Mary Jane and the other Alpha Girls would need steel in their spines to stay the course, and they would pay a steep emotional price along the way.

The Crux
by Richard Rumelt
Published 27 Apr 2022

At that moment the firm’s total value was about $10 billion.3 Subsequent events showed that Tim Berner’s “strategy” for the company was conglomerate growth—the acquisition of unrelated businesses. Within a year, Curtiss-Wright began buying the stock of Cenco, a semiconglomerate making pollution-control equipment and medical equipment as well as operating nursing homes. Two years later, Ted Berner launched a proxy battle for control of Kennecott (copper). Then conglomerate Teledyne began buying shares of Curtiss-Wright. The company’s total value sank to $2.9 billion over three years. Over the next twenty years, Curtiss-Wright gradually returned to its original center of supplying sophisticated parts and assemblies to commercial aircraft and defense companies. Today, in 2021, Curtiss-Wright is a medium-size diversified provider of flow and motion-control products for the aerospace, nuclear, and oil and gas industries and of metal-treatment services for aerospace, automotive, and industrial markets.

The Design and Engineering of Curiosity: How the Mars Rover Performs Its Job
by Emily Lakdawalla
Published 5 Mar 2018

They chose the MMRTG because of concern over the reliability of the Stirling generator’s moving parts. Also, the relatively inefficient design of the MMRTG would benefit Mars surface operations: the waste heat could be collected and put to use to maintain the temperature of the rover against the extreme swings of the Martian environment. On June 30, 2003, Boeing Rocketdyne Propulsion and Teledyne Energy Systems announced their partnership with the Department of Energy to develop the new MMRTG, specifically naming MSL as the first mission that would use the new technology. “An MMRTG-powered rover will be able to land and go anywhere on the surface of Mars, from the polar caps to deep, dark canyons, and will safely provide full power during night and day under all types of environmental conditions,” Boeing stated in a press release.

This Machine Kills Secrets: Julian Assange, the Cypherpunks, and Their Fight to Empower Whistleblowers
by Andy Greenberg
Published 12 Sep 2012

Of those that did give me a description of their ideas, deciphering anything unique about their approaches involved wading into bland white-paper-speak filled with phrases like a “solution [that] automatically adjusts weights assigned to user and/or peer group behavior models based on the life cycle of the user” and “a risk-based analysis [of] an abstraction matrix along with a decision model that conforms to a government-, department-, or office – information policy.” Perhaps the most candid response came from a firm called Teledyne that had already bowed out of the program. Mark Anderson, a director of information sciences at the company, complained that without access to past investigations, companies like his had little hope of guessing at a workable way of combing through data for culprits. And he pointed out that the request for proposals seemed to focus on online activities, but ignored the Luddite end of the leaking spectrum.

A Random Walk Down Wall Street: The Time-Tested Strategy for Successful Investing (Eleventh Edition)
by Burton G. Malkiel
Published 5 Jan 2015

., 110–11, 118–19 gurus, 151–54 implications for investors of, 158 limitations of, 116–17, 135–36, 154–58, 160 random-walk theory and, 137–41, 154–57 rationale for, 115–16 types of systems of, 141–51 see also chartists; stock charts Technical Analysis of Stock Trends (Magee), 113, 144 telecom companies, 90, 95 Teledyne, Inc., 64 Telegraph, 173 television, Internet bubble and, 92 term4sale.com, 296 term bonds, 317 Texas Instruments, 57 Thaler, Richard, 247–48 theGlobe.com, 86 Theory of Investment Value, The (Williams), 31 Thorp, Edward O., 156n 3Com, 83 Time, 97 timing penalty, 242–43, 254, 255 Total Bond Market index funds, 386 total capitalization, 261, 271, 265 Total Stock Market Portfolio, 261, 386, 387, 391, 410 Total World index funds, 391 trading, limiting of, 395–98 tranches, 99 Treasury, U.S., 316, 319, 344–45, 352, 353 Treasury bills, 152, 293, 298, 299 rate of return on, 194–96, 351 treasurydirect.gov, 300 Treasury inflation-protection securities (TIPS), 306, 308, 316, 319–20, 386 trends, 113–15, 144–45 perpetuation of, 115 Tri-Continental Corporation, 54 “tronics” boom, see new issues, of 1959–62 T.

King of Capital: The Remarkable Rise, Fall, and Rise Again of Steve Schwarzman and Blackstone
by David Carey
Published 7 Feb 2012

Ling’s counterpart at ITT Corporation, Harold Geneen, made what had been the International Telephone & Telegraph Company into a vehicle for acquisitions, snatching up everything from the Sheraton hotel chain to the bakery that made Wonder Bread; the Hartford insurance companies; Avis Rent-a-Car; and sprinkler, cigar, and racetrack businesses. At RCA Corporation, once just a radio and TV maker and the owner of the NBC broadcasting networks, CEO Robert Sarnoff added the Hertz rental car system; Banquet frozen foods; and Random House, the book publisher. Each of the great conglomerates—Litton Industries, Textron, Teledyne, and Gulf and Western Industries—had its own eclectic mix, but the modus operandi was the same: Buy, buy, buy. Size and diversity became grail-like goals. Unlike companies that grow big by acquiring competitors or suppliers to achieve economies of scale, the rationale for conglomerates was diversification.

Future Shock
by Alvin Toffler
Published 1 Jun 1984

Transient teams, whose members come together to solve a specific problem and then separate, are particularly characteristic of science and help account for the kinetic quality of the scientific community. Its members are constantly on the move, organizationally, if not geographically. George Kozmetsky, co-founder of Teledyne, Incorporated, and now dean of the school of business at the University of Texas, distinguishes between "routine" and "non-routine" organizations. The latter grapple most frequently with one-of-a-kind problems. He cites statistics to show that the non-routine sector, in which he brackets government and many of the advanced technology companies, is growing so fast that it will employ 65 percent of the total United States work force by the year 2001.

Data Science for Business: What You Need to Know About Data Mining and Data-Analytic Thinking
by Foster Provost and Tom Fawcett
Published 30 Jun 2013

” — Claudia Perlich Chief Scientist of M6D (Media6Degrees) and Advertising Research Foundation Innovation Award Grand Winner (2013) “A foundational piece in the fast developing world of Data Science. A must read for anyone interested in the Big Data revolution." —Justin Gapper Business Unit Analytics Manager at Teledyne Scientific and Imaging “The authors, both renowned experts in data science before it had a name, have taken a complex topic and made it accessible to all levels, but mostly helpful to the budding data scientist. As far as I know, this is the first book of its kind—with a focus on data science concepts as applied to practical business problems.

Trend Following: How Great Traders Make Millions in Up or Down Markets
by Michael W. Covel
Published 19 Mar 2007

Another example reveals a chart (see Chart 9.2) of the hot tech stocks of 1968. 239 Chapter 9 • Holy Grails SIMEX NIKKEI 225 NEAREST FUTURES—Monthly Chart 50000 45000 40000 35000 30000 25000 20000 15000 10000 5000 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 CHART 9.1: Weekly Chart Nikkei 225 1985–2003 0 Source: Barchart.com CHART 9.2: 1968 Tech Stocks Company 1968 High 1970 Low % drop P/E at High Fairchild Camera 102.00 18.00 –82 443 Teledyne 72.00 13.00 –82 42 Control Data 163.00 28.00 –83 54 Mohawk Data 111.00 18.00 –84 285 Electronic Data 162.00 24.00 –85 352 Optical Scanning 146.00 16.00 –89 200 Itek 172.00 17.00 –90 71 University Computing 186.00 13.00 –93 118 Who cares what year it is? Bubbles and busts come and go and they all look the same.

After Apollo?: Richard Nixon and the American Space Program
by John M. Logsdon
Published 5 Mar 2015

NASA Gets a New Administrator As George Low had led NASA through the process of developing the agency’s FY1972 budget request, at the White House Peter Flanigan continued his search for a person to take on the administrator’s job on a permanent basis. By late 1970 two promising candidates had been identified—Frank Jameson, president of Teledyne-Ryan Aeronautical Corporation in San Diego, California and James Fletcher, president of the University of Utah in Salt Lake City, Utah. Neither had been on the White House radar screen a few months earlier. The White House ran background checks on the two. Director of personnel Fred Malek reported the results to Flanigan on January 6, 1971, noting that there had been “no attempt to contact the candidates” and “no attempt to determine their political philosophy.”

Troublemakers: Silicon Valley's Coming of Age
by Leslie Berlin
Published 7 Nov 2017

Crisp, the managing partner of an early investor, Venrock (the Rockefeller family’s venture capital firm that was also a first-round investor in Intel), says that all Venrock knew about Apple “was that they were honest, and Markkula recommended them.”76 In the fall of 1977, Apple sold 150,000 shares at $3 each, most of them to people Markkula knew from the semiconductor industry and wanted on the board. Arthur Rock, the venture capitalist behind Fairchild, Intel, Teledyne, and Scientific Data Systems, had been impressed by Markkula at Intel board meetings. Rock invested in Apple and advised the company informally for three years before joining the board.77 The venture capitalist Don Valentine, who had rejected Jobs’s original request for money, now invested and joined the board.

Buffett
by Roger Lowenstein
Published 24 Jul 2013

Feeling the pressure of having to support two households, he complained to Charles Heider, an Omaha broker, “Everything I got is tied up in Berkshire. I’d like a few nickels outside.” In the late seventies, he bought a few stocks for his own account. He was a bit more of a swinger with his personal money. For instance, in the case of Teledyne, Buffett invested in options—a strategy with a higher chance of either failing or making a killing.26 According to one associate, he also bought copper futures—an outright speculation. “It was almost frightening, how easy it was,” a Berkshire employee said. “He analyzed what he was looking for.

Unreal Estate: Money, Ambition, and the Lust for Land in Los Angeles
by Michael Gross
Published 1 Nov 2011

The group of California conservatives who brought Reagan to power included Frawley; Bloomingdale; Henry Salvatori; Taft Schreiber, an MCA executive; Holmes Tuttle, a car dealer and realtor; Tom Jones, the chairman of the defense contractor Northrup; Henry Singleton, a former OSS (Office of Strategic Services) man and engineer who cofounded Teledyne, the conglomerate that made everything from unmanned aircraft to Waterpik shower heads;14 Earle Jorgensen, who turned a scrap steel distributorship into a giant industrial concern; drugstore owner Justin Dart; corporate lawyer William French Smith; and A. C. “Cy” Rubel, the president and chairman of Union Oil.

Without Remorse
by Tom Clancy
Published 2 Jan 1993

His crew station allowed him to turn and look out a small porthole to inspect his bird visually, which he did even though there was no real reason to do so. The sergeant loved the things as a child will love a particularly entertaining toy. He'd worked with the drone program for ten years, and this particular one he had flown sixty-one times. That was a record for the area. Cody-193 had a distinguished ancestry. Its manufacturers, Teledyne-Ryan of San Diego, California, had built Charles Lindbergh's Spirit of St Louis, but the company had never quite managed to cash in on that bit of aviation history. Struggling from one small contract to another, it had finally achieved financial stability by making targets. Fighter aircraft had to practice shooting at something.