The Great Moderation

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Model Thinker: What You Need to Know to Make Data Work for You

by Scott E. Page  · 27 Nov 2018  · 543pp  · 153,550 words

in the United States shows that volatility rose in the 1970s and 1980s and then fell for the next two decades in what some call the Great Moderation.18 Beginning around 2000, volatility again increased. It is possible to explain these volatility patterns by changes in the distribution of firm sizes.19 As

effects with magnitudes that correspond to actual volatility levels. The calibrated fit proves quite close. Firm size distributions correlate nicely with the historical evidence of the Great Moderation. That correlation does not prove that it is changes in firm size distribution (instead of effective government management of the economy or better inventory control

Google, 4, 32, 195, 196, 295 gradient heuristic, 330 Granovetter’s model, 213–220 granularity, model, 222–223 granularity question, 33–35 graphs, spaghetti, 42 the Great Moderation, 78 Grim Trigger, 256–258, 262 Grossman and Stiglitz paradox, 160 group selection, 265–267 cooperation and, 266 growth. See specific models growth rates, 278

Unfinished Business

by Tamim Bayoumi  · 405pp  · 109,114 words

there was a large shock, astute policy responses would be able to contain the resulting economic fallout. Three separately derived beliefs—the efficient markets hypothesis, the great moderation, and benign neglect—intertwined to create the intellectual blind spots that led policymakers to the Panglossian belief that the unsustainable boom of the early 2000s

blinkers were leading to an underestimation of macroeconomic risks, but through a different process. * * * The Great Moderation and Overestimation of Monetary Policy’s Effectiveness If the efficient markets hypothesis was a theory, the “great moderation” was an observation. More precisely, the phrase the great moderation came from the observation that the volatility of US output had fallen markedly after

improvement in economic stability. By contrast, there was no noticeable increase in growth, explaining why this observation is dubbed the “great moderation” rather than (say) “the great acceleration”. It was the inferences from the great moderation that led to policy makers to overestimate their ability to response to macroeconomic shocks. More stable output implied a smoother

uniform regardless of the length of the interval being examined.9 As time went on, however, it became conventional wisdom to attribute the bulk of the great moderation to better monetary policy.10 The timing worked as the rapid reduction of US output volatility occurred soon after Paul Volcker was appointed Chairman of

different countries. Since tighter monetary policy was the driver of lower inflation, this provided strong evidence for a causal link between tighter monetary policy and the great moderation. In response to the observation that there was no change in behavior over the business cycle, proponents of the tighter monetary policy explanation argued that

focused on reducing inflation volatility then this would be offset by an increase in output volatility. The concurrent improvement in growth and inflation variability over the great moderation was ascribed to the fact that earlier monetary policies had been fundamentally flawed. In the 1970s, central banks had made the mistake of ignoring the

improvise when activity remained in the doldrums in the wake of the North Atlantic crisis even after monetary policy rates had been lowered to zero. The great moderation convinced central banks that they could stabilize the economy on their own. As a result, macroeconomics largely devolved into the analysis of conventional monetary policy

by a loss of interest in international policy cooperation. * * * How Benign Neglect Undermined International Policy Cooperation While the efficient markets hypothesis was a theory and the great moderation was an observation, benign neglect illustrated yet another way to get things completely wrong, namely a framework. Benign neglect was not a phrase initially coined

by economists, in contrast to the efficient markets hypothesis and the great moderation. It was first used in a January 1970 memo from Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan to President Richard Nixon when Moynihan was serving as Nixon’s

has come a long way since the early 1980s. Most of these changes have been beneficial—for example, the lower volatility of output seen during the great moderation appears to be continuing after the crisis, suggesting that better monetary policy has indeed provided lasting benefits to the economy. But there is a very

of Lehman Brothers and the premature tightening of fiscal policies in the Euro area. Most worrying of all, many of the implicit beliefs contained in the great moderation, efficient markets hypothesis, and benign neglect remain important components of conventional macroeconomic models and thinking. As discussed in a later chapter, a more radical overhaul

risks. The efficient markets hypothesis eroded belief in the importance of financial regulation which allowed policymakers to sign off on internal risk models; analysis of the great moderation in output volatility led central banks to overestimate the effectiveness of monetary policy; and benign neglect led to a downgrade of international economic policy cooperation

(eds), International Monetary Cooperation: Lessons from the Plaza Accord after Thirty Years, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington DC, 2016. Bernanke (2004): Ben S. Bernanke, “The Great Moderation”, speech given at the meetings of the Eastern Economic Association, Washington DC, February 20, 2004. Bernanke (2005): Ben S. Bernanke, “The Global Saving Glut and

Expected Returns: An Investor's Guide to Harvesting Market Rewards

by Antti Ilmanen  · 4 Apr 2011  · 1,088pp  · 228,743 words

the definition but there is no (academic or practitioner) consensus on how to do this. All 20th-century recessions could qualify but the period of the Great Moderation was characterized by the absence of severe economic downturns and, instead, an abundance of periodic financial crises. The last two rows highlight episodes where major

’ risk attitudes become more conservative in down-markets. The next section shows that estimates of the equity premium have edged lower since the 1990s. During the Great Moderation years, it was popular to argue that lower macro-volatility and investor learning about equities’ long-run return advantage could justify a sustained fall in

be the best estimate of future earnings growth. How long a sample? Table 8.4 shows that very long windows point to lower estimates, while the Great Moderation period boosted this number. Here are some other ideas:• Payout rates appear to have some ability to predict future growth, but the empirical relation is

problem and irrational expectations may have contributed. The benign sample period was doubly biased. Prolonged good times and (by and large) abundant global liquidity during the Great Moderation meant that rare bad events became even rarer. This benign outcome in turn resulted in excessive optimism about sustainable carry returns and excessive complacency about

1979, the Fed finally ended and reversed the decades-long uptrend in inflation—at the cost of deep recessions in 1980–1982. The decades of the Great Moderation followed, although inflation scares (1984, 1987, 1990, 1994) did still occur until the Fed’s anti-inflation credibility was firmly established. Since the late 1990s

. Central bank credibility is essential to contain second-round effects and to keep any shocks transitory. Well-anchored inflation expectations had a benign influence during the Great Moderation: empirical studies show that inflation has become less sensitive to the output gap, and to exchange rate and energy price developments. The gravitational pull of

1980s), the latter by disinflation. The volatility of both real activity and inflation series fell dramatically between the two periods (this change is sometimes called the Great Moderation). • Debt growth outpaced economic growth in all sectors, and at a faster rate in the second 20 years than in the first; but the sharp

. More regulation will certainly follow. Stretched public finances also make higher taxes inevitable down the road. Markets are giving way to the state. Disinflation and the Great Moderation I discuss inflation developments in greater detail in Chapter 17. Here I just remind readers of the mountain shape in postwar U.S. inflation data

the malign developments before that may be attributed to soaring inflation and nominal interest rates. Disinflation since 1980 coincided with a decline in macroeconomic volatility (the Great Moderation) and, to a much lesser extent, in financial market volatility (see Figure 27.2). Here, too, a reversal seems to be taking place, as macro

The Long Good Buy: Analysing Cycles in Markets

by Peter Oppenheimer  · 3 May 2020  · 333pp  · 76,990 words

. The 1990s. This cycle was very strong. The economic backdrop was one of solid growth but with low inflation and interest rates, frequently described as the ‘Great Moderation’. The combined effect of globalisation, partly in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening up of China, was also crucial

. When this bubble eventually burst, it brought to an end the secular uptrend that had started in 1982. 2009 Onwards: The Start of QE and the ‘Great Moderation’ Chapter 9 examines some of the specific conditions that have followed the financial crisis in more detail, but this bull market has also been particularly

the late 1990s. But there has been a renewed fall since the financial crisis. Although the 1990s is often referred to as the period of the ‘Great Moderation’ because of its stable growth and low inflation, it came to an end largely as a result of the technology bubble in equity markets at

Samuelson Friedman: The Battle Over the Free Market

by Nicholas Wapshott  · 2 Aug 2021  · 453pp  · 122,586 words

assumption held by Bernanke and others that the bad old days of bank runs and serial bankruptcies had been replaced by the sunlit certainty of the Great Moderation. The events of 2008 undermined the logic of the rational-expectations school who argued that those who operate the markets know enough to avoid catastrophe

Arguing With Zombies: Economics, Politics, and the Fight for a Better Future

by Paul Krugman  · 28 Jan 2020  · 446pp  · 117,660 words

address to the American Economic Association. In 2004, Ben Bernanke, a former Princeton professor who is now the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, celebrated the Great Moderation in economic performance over the previous two decades, which he attributed in part to improved economic policymaking. Last year, everything came apart. Few economists saw

the field of macroeconomics. There hadn’t been any real convergence of views between the saltwater and freshwater factions. But these were the years of the Great Moderation—an extended period during which inflation was subdued and recessions were relatively mild. Saltwater economists believed that the Federal Reserve had everything under control. Freshwater

; meanwhile, everything else can be conducted on free-market principles. And this worked for a while—roughly speaking from 1985 to 2007, the era of the Great Moderation. It worked in part because the political insulation of central banks also gave them more than a bit of intellectual insulation, too. If we’re

Age of Greed: The Triumph of Finance and the Decline of America, 1970 to the Present

by Jeff Madrick  · 11 Jun 2012  · 840pp  · 202,245 words

hailed the resulting low inflation that began in the 1990s as the beginning of a new stable age of ideal growth—which became known as the Great Moderation. Much the opposite is more likely. The anti-inflationary policies were adhered to too firmly, and contributed significantly to slower rates of growth, higher levels

2 and 4 percent,” wrote the IMF chief economist and former MIT professor Olivier Blanchard, who once fully expressed his faith in the benefits of the Great Moderation. “So I think people could get used to 4 percent and the distortions would be small.” In 1980, the Friedmans published a simple version of

of the Great Stagflation Revisited,” Center for Economic Studies Working Paper, No. 176, Princeton, November 2008, p. 49. 60 MANY ECONOMISTS HAILED: Ben S. Bernanke, “The Great Moderation,” Speech, February 2004, http://www.bis.org/review/r040301f.pdf. 61 THERE HAD BEEN DISSENTERS: George A. Akerlof, William T. Dickens, and George L. Perry

Broken Markets: A User's Guide to the Post-Finance Economy

by Kevin Mellyn  · 18 Jun 2012  · 183pp  · 17,571 words

as it is, “How did this house of cards stay up so long”? The short answer is cheap money over a long period of time. The Great Moderation The term Great Moderation was coined to describe the 25 years between 1983 and 2008 when inflation remained in check, the value of financial assets

, times were good with the exception of a few short recessions and a few special cases like Japan. It would be wrong, however, to attribute the Great Moderation to the inherent virtues of a financedriven global economy where the market rewarded good investments and punished bad ones. For example, the taming of inflation

, occupied the chairmanship of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for 17 of the 25 years of the Great Moderation. Where the central bank and US Treasury policy was decisive during the Great Moderation was in protecting the financial economy from its own mistakes and excesses. On one level, this made sense, because

investment-banking operations increasingly came to believe that the authorities would step in to prevent any reckoning for financial bets gone wrong. In this sense, the Great Moderation was at least as much a product of governments as it was of markets, something that pains the heart of free-market fundamentalists. The problem

is that in a free market, everyone is free to fail. Indeed, something that Joseph Schumpeter called “creative destruction” is essential to economic progress.The Great Moderation was largely a one-way bet for market participants. Financial crises of one sort or another, which affected companies ranging from Japanese and Swedish banks

is allowed and even panics have their uses. They purge excess from the system and foster prudence. Individuals and institutions learn from their losses. During the Great Moderation, individuals and institutions learned that the market was back-stopped by the state, their profits were theirs to keep, and their losses would be picked

the financial market meltdown revolves around the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the market freefall that ensued. What made the event so shocking was that the Great Moderation had taught the global financial economy that a large market player with huge obligations to and from other key players would somehow be saved. Certainly

relentless growth in profits, which effectively forced corporations to minimize high-cost, full-time employment in high-wage countries. Second, the buoyant capital markets of the Great Moderation, ever hungry for the next big thing, brought a remarkable number of startup companies to market (Microsoft, Google,Apple, Starbucks, etc.).The ability of a

. What went terribly wrong with finance is that it became too complacent, too complicated, and too concentrated at the same time over the course of the Great Moderation. New, quantitative approaches to managing and pricing risk, elegant computer simulations, and highly liquid global markets to distribute risk promised to move finance out of

more dangerous than an outright fraudster. Second, banking needs to be kept simple, and if it gets complicated, it goes wrong. The banking practices of the Great Moderation violated both rules. The complacency is easy to understand given the willingness of governments to prevent banks from suffering more losses despite frequent financial crises

institutions and industry. Deep down in the reptilian brains of the surviving high rollers of the financial bubble was a belief that the world of the Great Moderation was somehow normal and that things would return to normal as soon as the recovery from recession kicked into gear.A fundamental rethink of the

a future disaster for the world economy. A second key lesson is that banks must be free to fail—something that the crony capitalism of the Great Moderation inhibited until the institutions really became too big and interconnected to fail, turning finance into a one-way bet for the bankers. Dodd-Frank punts

plastic surgery that turned subprime loans into Triple A securities, and all were to some degree conflicted. What is often forgotten, however, is that throughout the Great Moderation, institutional investors from mutual funds to college endowments were clamoring for high-yielding debt to buy. It should also be remembered this was all possible

on about getting tough with China routinely vote for spending that depends on Chinese purchases of US Treasury debt. The super-low interest rates of the Great Moderation sowed the seeds of the asset-price bubbles that led up to the financial market meltdown of 2008 were in part a reflection of too

credit scores were being developed into objective predictive tools to measure the risk of default, the United States was enjoying what I’ve been calling the Great Moderation. Between 1982 and 2008 there had been a steady rise in asset prices, especially for homes, and job creation was robust enough to keep unemployment

simple, comprehensible, no-surprise tariffs for their services from which customers can explicitly pick and choose or buy as a package. Prudence The maestro of the Great Moderation, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan, has fallen from his pedestal but remains admirably true to his faith in market capitalism. His greatest error of

Capitalism 4.0: The Birth of a New Economy in the Aftermath of Crisis

by Anatole Kaletsky  · 22 Jun 2010  · 484pp  · 136,735 words

CHAPTER THREE - The Four Ages of Capitalism Part II - The Arrow and the Ring CHAPTER FOUR - Annus Mirabilis CHAPTER FIVE - The Four Megatrends CHAPTER SIX - The Great Moderation The Platform Company: A New Business Model The Reinvention of Demand Management CHAPTER SEVEN - The Financial Revolution Megatrends in Housing and Finance CHAPTER EIGHT - The

-83, early monetarism and confrontations with unions Capitalism 3.1: from 1984-92, Volcker and Greenspan, Thatcher-Reagan booms Capitalism 3.2: from 1992-2000, the Great Moderation Capitalism 3.3: from 2001-08, market fundamentalism under Greenspan and George W. Bush This thirty-year epoch started with Thatcherism in 1979 and ended

capacity. This transfer of industrial activity made the world economy more prosperous but also more stable, for the reasons described in the next chapter. Three, the Great Moderation—a period of unprecedented stability in inflation, unemployment, and economic cycles—created twenty years of almost continuous growth throughout the world economy that lasted right

creating the period of remarkable economic stability that came to be known as the Great Moderation and then snapping back with a vengeance in the crisis of 2007-09. CHAPTER SIX The Great Moderation Practice moderation in all things, including moderation.1 —Gaius Petronius THE GREAT MODERATION was the title chosen by Ben Bernanke for a speech he delivered

megatrends described in the preceding chapter, it is worth considering a less familiar change that was brought about by globalization and whose supporting role in the Great Moderation has been underplayed. Had this structural change been fully appreciated by policymakers around the world and by academic economists, some of the predictions about the

of the most important reasons for the steady reduction in economic volatility that Bernanke mentioned but never explained in the introduction of his speech on the Great Moderation. Platform companies have generally outsourced the parts of the production process that involve the greatest volatility: heavy capital spending, physical inventories of materials and finished

of employment and output in the two decades before the 2007-09 crisis, we can now return to Ben Bernanke’s most important claim about the Great Moderation: that the main reason for economic stability from the mid-1980s onward was the skilful management of monetary policy by the Fed and other central

, was a return to the tremendous economic and financial volatility of the pre-Keynesian period. The crucial point elided in Bernanke’s monetarist explanation of the Great Moderation—and in almost all official accounts of economic policy—was that central banks and governments quietly restored active demand management from the mid-1980s onward

of the unexpected triumph of pure fiat money after the breakdown of Bretton Woods. The result was the spectacular success of macroeconomic stabilization described as the Great Moderation—at least until the crisis of 2007. Had governments truly followed the narrowly antiinflationary policies described by Bernanke (and still embodied in the official targets

, though not the practice, of most central banks other than the Fed), the Great Moderation would probably never have happened. A much more likely outcome would have been something akin to the twenty years of stagnation in Japan. The return

deformation. What matters in the present discussion is how the central bankers have actually behaved since the start of the Great Moderation. If we focus on actions, rather than rhetoric, it is clear that the Great Moderation began when policymakers, first in America and then in other countries, returned to the traditional Keynesian objectives of minimizing

opportunities and challenges implied by pure paper money—accounted for the extraordinary economic stability of the subsequent twenty years. Ben Bernanke, in his speech about the Great Moderation in 2004, still felt obliged to pay lip service to the official doctrine that maintaining low inflation had been the key to the Fed’s

the circus tent. With this observation, it is time to consider the last and most controversial of the four megatrends: the financial revolution that triggered the Great Moderation’s spectacular demise. CHAPTER SEVEN The Financial Revolution Neither a borrower nor a lender be; For loan oft loses both itself and friend, And borrowing

fundamentally justified and irreversible. It was, in fact, a rational response to transformative economic trends of the kind described in the last two chapters. During the Great Moderation, workers and companies were becoming less vulnerable to the risks of the economic cycle—to bankruptcy and unemployment at the extreme. The recognition that cyclical

. Chapter 5 showed that the world economy has been driven since the early 1990s by four powerful long-term trends: the rise of Asia, globalization, the Great Moderation created by the reinvention of Keynesian demand management, and a revolution in finance. The last of these trends has been broken by the crisis, at

characterized by long-term stagnation and mass unemployment, the opposite may be true. It could be that the new normal will mean a continuation of the Great Moderation which, after all, had been running for less than twenty years before the crisis, accompanied by an accelerating process of globalization. Meanwhile, the cyclical aberration

in market fundamentalist ideology are best explained by the New Keynesian-Marxist approach. Specifically, the story can be summarized as follows. Prolonged stability caused by the Great Moderation suppressed financial risk, as explained by Minsky, and thereby transformed expectations, creating the herd behavior and reflexive changes in reality described by Soros. At the

’s Paradox is considered a classic example of a self-referential statement that contradicts its own premise and is therefore logically meaningless. 2 Ben Bernanke, “The Great Moderation,” remarks at the meetings of the Eastern Economic Association, Federal Reserve Board, Washington, DC, February 20, 2004. 3 Olivier Blanchard and John Simon, “The Long

Reserve Board. Washington, DC, November 21, 2002. ——. “Friedman’s Monetary Framework, Some Lessons.” Journal of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (October 2003): 207-214. ——. “The Great Moderation.” Remarks at the meetings of the Eastern Economic Association. Federal Reserve Board. Washington, DC, February 20, 2004. ——. Statement before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing

CHAPTER THREE - The Four Ages of Capitalism Part II - The Arrow and the Ring CHAPTER FOUR - Annus Mirabilis CHAPTER FIVE - The Four Megatrends CHAPTER SIX - The Great Moderation The Platform Company: A New Business Model The Reinvention of Demand Management CHAPTER SEVEN - The Financial Revolution Megatrends in Housing and Finance CHAPTER EIGHT - The

Money Free and Unfree

by George A. Selgin  · 14 Jun 2017  · 454pp  · 134,482 words

significant part in the post-1984 decline in output volatility (as well as in both the average rate and the volatility of inflation) known as the “Great Moderation.” Consequently, that episode seems especially likely to reflect a genuine if belated improvement in the conduct of monetary policy. We next turn to research concerning

this possibility. THE “GREAT MODERATION” The beginning of PaulVolcker’s second term as Fed chairman coincided with a dramatic decline in the volatility of real output that lasted through the

than improved monetary policy. A study by James Stock and Mark Watson (2002: 200; see also 2005) attributes between 75 percent and 90 percent of the Great Moderation in U.S. output volatility to “good luck in the form of smaller economic disturbances” rather than improved monetary policy. Subsequent research has likewise tended

to downplay the contribution of improved monetary policy, either by lending support to the “good luck” hypothesis or by attributing the Great Moderation to financial innovations, an enhanced “buffer stock” role for manufacturing inventories, an increase in the importance of the service sector relative to that of manufacturing

finds that improved monetary policy, consisting of an increased emphasis on inflation targeting in setting the federal funds target, did play an important part in the Great Moderation. Most authorities do attribute the substantial decline in both the mean rate of inflation and in inflation volatility since the early 1980s to improved monetary

, making inflation more difficult for households, firms, and the central bank, to predict. As Chappell and McGregor (2004: 249–50) observe, to the extent that the Great Moderation conforms with the predictions of the theory of time inconsistency, that moderation supplies no grounds for complacency about the Fed: Policy-makers may have greater

instability were premature. According to Todd Clark (2009: 7), statistics gathered since the outbreak of the subprime crisis reveal “a partial or complete reversal of the Great Moderation in many sections of the U.S. economy.” Clark himself, in what amounts to the flip side of the Stock-Watson view, characterizes the reversal

output since the end of World War II compared to before World War I. Although a genuine improvement did occur during the subperiod known as the Great Moderation, that improvement, besides having been temporary, appears to have been due mainly to factors other than improved monetary policy. Finally, the Fed cannot be credited

Timothy Cogley and Thomas Sargent (2002) as well as several other researchers reported a decline in the persistence of inflation coinciding with the beginning of the Great Moderation, Frederic Pivetta and Ricardo Reis (2007: 1354), using a more flexible, nonlinear Bayesian model of inflation dynamics and several different measures of persistence, find “no

Kahn (2008), Nir Jaimovich and Henry Siu (2009), Zheng Liu et al. (2009), Jesús Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2010), and Alessio Moro (2010). Besides attributing the Great Moderation to a “fantastic concatenation of [positive output] shocks” rather than to improved policy, the last of these studies reaches the more startling conclusions that “there

, Washington (November 1). ——— (2002b) “On Milton Friedman’s Ninetieth Birthday.” Remarks at the Conference to Honor Milton Friedman, University of Chicago, Ill. (November 8). ——— (2004) “The Great Moderation.” Speech at the Eastern Economic Association Meetings, Washington (February 20). ——— (2006) “The Benefits of Price Stability.” Lecture at the Center for Economic Policy Studies, Princeton

No. 15-05 (April). Washington: U.S. Department of the Treasury. Canarella, G.; Fang, W. S.; Miller, S. M.; and Pollard, S. K. (2010) “Is the Great Moderation Ending? U.K. and U.S. Evidence.” Modern Economy 1 (1): 17–42. Cargill, T. F., and O’Driscoll, G. P. Jr. (2013) “Federal Reserve

of Economics 115 (1): 147–80. Clark, L. E. (1935) Central Banking Under the Federal Reserve System. New York: Macmillan. Clark, T. E. (2009) “Is the Great Moderation Over?” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review 94 (4): 5–39. Cline, W. R., and Gagnon, J. E. (2013) “Lehman Died, Bagehot Lives

. (2009) “Harvests and Business Cycles in Nineteenth-Century America.” Quarterly Journal of Economics (November): 1675–727. Davis, S. J., and Kahn, J. A. (2008) “Interpreting the Great Moderation: Changes in the Volatility of Economic Activity at the Macro and Micro Levels.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 22 (4): 155–80. Day, S. A. (2013

): 709–38. ——— (1994) “Government Size and Macroeconomic Stability.” European Economic Review 38 (1): 117–32. Gali, J., and Gambetti, L. (2009) “On the Sources of the Great Moderation.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 1 (1): 26–57. Gallarotti, G. M. (1995) The Anatomy of an International Monetary Regime: The Classical Gold Standard, 1880–1914

, Part 3: How the U.S. Money Market Really Works.” Asia Times (October 27). Liu, Z.; Waggoner, D. F.; and Zha, T. (2009) “Sources of the Great Moderation: Shocks, Friction, or Monetary Policy?” Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Paper 2009–3 (February). Livingston, J. (1986) Origins of the Federal Reserve System. Ithaca

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