Valeant Pharmaceuticals

100 Baggers: Stocks That Return 100-To-1 and How to Find Them
by Christopher W Mayer
Published 21 May 2018

THE 100-BAGGERS OF THE LAST 50 YEARS 47 Total 100-baggers by year-range 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 1–15 years 16–30 years 31–45 years The fastest to 100-baggerdom Company Name Years to 100 Franklin Resources Inc 4.2 Pharmacyclics Inc 5.0 Nexstar Broadcasting Group 5.0 Questcor Pharmaceuticals Inc 5.0 Biogen Idec Inc 5.5 Time Warner Inc 6.0 Valeant Pharmaceuticals Intl 6.5 Dell Inc 7.2 L Brands Inc 7.3 Qualcomm Inc 7.3 Cisco Systems Inc 7.3 Emc Corp/MA 7.7 Henry (Jack) & Associate 8.3 Vector Group Ltd 8.5 Edwards (A G) Inc 8.7 Hasbro Inc 9.5 Monster Beverage Corp 9.5 Southwest Airlines 9.5 Home Depot Inc 9.7 NVR Inc 9.7 46–60 years 48 100-BAGGERS Case Studies Let’s look at some case studies of 100-baggers.

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Colfax is more interesting because it’s smaller (only $6 billion market cap) and younger. It went public back in 2008 at $18 per share. The Rales brothers are basically applying the Danaher formula all over again at Colfax. It was on fire for a while. The stock seems to be on sale now, off 30 percent from its high. • Mike Pearson, Valeant Pharmaceuticals (VRX). This one is controversial. There are some vocal critics who think Valeant’s business model is all sizzle and no steak. They also dispute the accounting and chafe at the share price. On the other hand, I heard Bill Ackman of Pershing Square cogently defend it at a Grant’s Conference.

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ROWE) GROUP 12/31/86 225 18.7 TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS 12/31/86 325 17.0 EMC CORP/MA 12/31/87 468 7.7 FASTENAL CO 12/31/87 382 17.0 HENRY (JACK) & ASSOCIATES 12/31/87 1,099 8.3 SCHWAB (CHARLES) CORP 12/31/87 299 11.0 DELL INC 10/31/88 270 7.2 ROSS STORES INC 10/31/88 395 19.5 ALTERA CORP 12/31/88 129 11.5 CERNER CORP 12/31/88 649 15.0 MAXIM INTEGRATED PRODUCTS 12/31/88 120 11.8 POLARIS INDUSTRIES INC 12/31/88 540 22.5 APPENDIX: THE 100-BAGGERS (1962–2014) 203 Data Date MAGNA INTERNATIONAL INC 10/31/89 Total Return Years to 100 181 22.4 ELECTRONIC ARTS INC 12/31/89 104 14.0 CISCO SYSTEMS INC 10/31/90 353 7.3 AMPHENOL CORP 12/31/91 130 21.3 CANADIAN NATURAL RESOURCES 12/31/91 187 14.5 QUALCOMM INC 12/31/91 160 7.3 TOROMONT INDUSTRIES LTD 12/31/91 105 23.8 VECTOR GROUP LTD 12/31/91 370 8.5 ROPER INDUSTRIES INC/DE 10/31/92 117 21.4 BIOGEN IDEC INC 12/31/92 958 5.5 EXPRESS SCRIPTS HOLDING CO 12/31/92 425 13.5 GILEAD SCIENCES INC 12/31/92 355 18.3 NVR INC 12/31/92 232 9.7 REGENERON PHARMACEUTICALS 12/31/92 137 18.7 STARBUCKS CORP 12/31/92 127 21.3 TIME WARNER INC 12/31/92 488 6.0 CELGENE CORP 12/31/93 477 11.3 MONSTER BEVERAGE CORP 12/31/93 2,523 9.5 SVB FINANCIAL GROUP 12/31/93 174 25.2 VALEANT PHARMACEUTICALS INTL 12/31/94 815 6.5 ALEXION PHARMACEUTICALS INC 10/31/96 123 17.7 BP PRUDHOE BAY ROYALTY TRUST 12/31/96 141 11.7 KEURIG GREEN MOUNTAIN INC 12/31/96 722 10.7 AMAZON.COM INC 12/31/97 201 13.3 BALLY TECHNOLOGIES INC 12/31/98 132 13.3 TRACTOR SUPPLY CO 12/31/98 154 12.2 PRICELINE GROUP INC 12/31/99 145 12.5 ILLUMINA INC 12/31/01 163 11.0 QUESTCOR PHARMACEUTICALS INC 12/31/05 215 5.0 NEXSTAR BROADCASTING GROUP 12/31/06 105 5.0 PHARMACYCLICS INC 12/31/06 168 5.0 

Big Mistakes: The Best Investors and Their Worst Investments
by Michael Batnick
Published 21 May 2018

At the end of 2010, we held 34 stocks in the Fund, which we believe is an all‐time high.”12 But you can't teach an old investor new tricks, and the Sequoia Fund would be back to its concentrated ways in short order. It was in that same report, ironically, that they introduced what would become an extraordinarily large position, Valeant Pharmaceuticals. They first began purchasing shares on April 28, 2010, at $16. Valeant gained 70% that year and it quickly became the fund's second largest holding. Through the first three months of 2011, Valeant gained another 76%, and for the first time in 20 years, Berkshire Hathaway was no longer their largest holding.

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., 48 Time horizons, 120 Time Warner, AOL merger, 49 Tim Ferriss Show, The, (podcast), 150 Tim Hortons, spinoff, 89 Tract on Monetary Reform, A, (Keynes), 125–126 Trader (Jones), 119 Trustees Equity Fund, decline, 50 Tsai, Jerry, 65, 68 stocks, trading, 69 ten good games, 71 Tsai Management Research, sale, 70 Tversky, Amos, 81 Twain, Mark (Samuel Clemens), 25, 27, 75 bankruptcy filings, 32 money, losses, 27–32 public opinion, hypersensitivity, 31 Twilio, Sacca investment, 149 Twitter, Sacca investment, 149–150 Uber, Sacca investment, 149 Undervalued issues, selection, 10 Union Pacific, shares (sale), 18 United Copper, cornering, 19 United States housing bubble, 132 University Computing, trading level, 70 US bonds international bonds, spreads, 41 value, decline, 61 U.S. housing bubble, impact, 132 U.S. Steel, shares orders, 17 US stock portfolio, diversification, 109 U.S. stocks, intra‐year decline, 147 Valeant Pharmaceuticals, 113 Ackman targeting, 90 performance, S&P500 comparison, 113 shares, decline, 114 Valuation metrics, 160 Value at risk (VAR), 41–42 Value investing, function, 10 Value investors, problems, 58 Vanguard 500 Index returns, 52 size, 47 Vanguard Group, Inc., 51 VeriSign, Druckenmiller purchase, 104 Vranos, 133 Washington Post stocks, problems, 58 Wayne, Ronald, 148 Webster & Company bankruptcy, 31 problems, 30 Webster, Samuel Charles, 29 Wellington Fund, 48 merger, 49 operation, at‐cost basis, 51 Wellington Management, Bogle firing, 51 Wendy's, stock appreciation, 89 Wesco Financial, purchase, 142 Wheeler, Munger & Company, 141 Whiz Kids Take Over, The, 49 “Who Wants to Be a Millionaire” (Ackman), 90–91 Winning the Loser's Game (Ellis), 99 Woodman, Nick, 150 WordPress, 149 World War I, global monetary system, 122 Wozniak, Steve, 148 Wright Aeronautical, business demonstration, 3 Xerox, trading level, 70 Yahoo!

When the Wolves Bite: Two Billionaires, One Company, and an Epic Wall Street Battle
by Scott Wapner
Published 23 Apr 2018

., 137–138, 144 Sánchez, Loretta, 144 Sard, George, 167–168 Saxon Industries, 120–121 Schaitkin, Keith, 34, 35, 111 Schechter, David, 186 Schiller, Howard, 181 Schnall, Elliot, 116–117, 118 Schuessler, Jack, 36 Schulman, Diane, 12, 20 Schultz, Howard, 40 Sears department store chain, 37 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 1, 10, 63, 64, 88, 91, 96, 112, 121, 125, 128, 139, 149, 150, 170, 205 investigating Ackman, 180 and Madoff, 190 Seyforth, Mark, 43–44 shale gas, 183 shareholder activists, 1–4, 9, 29, 36, 70, 82, 119, 127 impact on corporate culture, 213–214 share prices decreases, 6, 11, 16, 32, 38, 39, 63, 64, 71, 76, 82, 83, 93, 94, 100, 117, 119, 133, 151, 152, 154, 155, 163, 164, 174, 175, 179, 183–184, 187, 188, 193, 206 increases, 2, 3, 32, 36, 68, 70, 71, 84, 85, 88, 96, 97, 113, 129, 133, 134, 139, 140, 148, 150, 161, 165, 168, 169, 171, 180, 182, 183, 184, 187, 188, 195, 197, 211 Kennedy Slide on Wall Street (1962), 117 See also Herbalife: stock prices of; Valeant pharmaceutical company: stock prices of Shaw, Bryan, 133 short selling, 10, 12, 13, 30, 31, 59, 62, 63, 83, 108, 127, 147, 170, 174 of Herbalife shares, 17, 64–65, 66, 68, 72, 73, 75, 76, 109, 147, 148–149, 199, 201–202 and short squeezes, 85, 106, 107, 112, 139, 148, 202, 203, 215 Silverman, Howard, 117 Simplicity Pattern, 121 Singapore, 58 Singer, Paul, 164 Slater, Robert, 120 Slendernow company, 43, 44 Small Business Administration, 62 Société du Louvre, 113 Sohn, Paul, 134–137, 138–139, 143 Sohn special event, 75–81.

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., 2–3 subprime housing bust, 11 Sullivan, Brian, 77 Sullivan and Cromwell, 74–75, 145 Swartz, Mike, 58 Swisher, Kara, 95 Sykes, Glen, 185–186 Synergy Oil & Gas, 92 takeovers, 4, 92, 113, 119, 121, 122, 123, 126, 127 Tappan, Richard, 119, 120 Target, 37, 38–39, 70, 90, 176 Tartol, John, 82 Tattinger family, 113 tender offers, 106, 108, 118 Tepper, David, 164 Tessel, Patrick & Company, 117 Test-Aankoop Belgian nonprofit, 19 Texaco, 126 Texas Air Corporation, 124 Third Point LLC, 88, 89, 91, 93, 94, 130 major positions of, 96 13D Monitor, 2 13G disclosure form, 88, 91 Thompson, Scott, 94–95 Tilson, Whitney, 25, 166, 176 Time Warner, 127–128 Tim Horton’s doughnut chain, 36 Tishman-Speyer, 29 Titans of Takeover, The (Slater), 120 Trans World Airlines (TWA), 123–125 Trek Alliance, 14 Trinity Industries, 104, 108 Trump, Donald J., 192–193 Tupperware, 44 Turing Pharmaceuticals, 172 Turner, Mary Ann, 146 Twitter, 158, 172 Tylenol tampering case, 6 Ubben, Jeffrey, 176 Ullman, Mike, 39, 40 USA Today, 162, 178 US Attorney’s Office, 167, 180 US District Court for the Southern District of New York, 14 Valeant pharmaceutical company, 168–176, 178 Ackman selling entire stake of, 210 stock prices of, 165, 169, 171, 172, 174, 175, 179, 181, 182, 193, 210 ValueAct investment firm, 176 Value Investing Conference, 64 Vanity Fair, 91 Vemma distributor, 181 Venezuela, 163 Villaraigosa, Antonio, 148 Wall Street Journal, 26, 94, 96, 100, 166, 175, 206 Walsh, Des, 18, 57, 58, 59–60, 61, 96, 97, 98, 164, 178, 192, 207 Walt Disney International, 49, 50–51 Walton, William L., 63 Wang, Henry, 196 Watergate scandal, 119 Wells Fargo, 27 Wendy’s International, 36, 37 Wexler & Wexler, 145 “What’s All the Buzz About?”

The Revolution That Wasn't: GameStop, Reddit, and the Fleecing of Small Investors
by Spencer Jakab
Published 1 Feb 2022

But a brash outsider was convinced he could make a fortune by proving them wrong and used the internet to broadcast his thesis to anyone who would listen. He was patient and eventually proven right, forcing the hedge fund manager into a crushing loss. This isn’t the story of Gabe Plotkin versus Keith Gill—it was Bill Ackman and Andrew Left who duked it out in public over Valeant Pharmaceuticals four years earlier. A professional short seller, Left had identified what he correctly believed were improperly inflated sales at the Canadian company, once a hedge fund darling, made through a related mail-order pharmacy. In March 2017, Ackman finally threw in the towel, by which time Valeant had lost more than 90 percent of its value.

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., 197 Trust Index, 143 Twitter, 11, 19, 24, 37, 39, 57, 88, 135, 152–54, 157–58, 161–63, 166, 172, 177, 187, 202 Gill’s Forrest Gump post on, 212 Musk’s use of, x, 60, 82, 83, 124, 144, 152–54, 161, 170 SEC and, 167–68 two-day period to settle trades, 204 U Uber, 105 unemployment, 71, 151 Ursus, 85 utilitarian products, 51 V Valeant Pharmaceuticals, 116–17, 120, 125 Van Bavel, Jay, 20, 36 VandaTrack, 139 VanEck, 158–59 Vanguard Group, 8, 32, 254, 257, 259 venture capitalists, 24 Vergara, Salvador, 172–73 Verlaine, Julia-Ambra, 171 Versailles, 9 Virtu Financial, 49, 55, 178, 202, 207, 218 Vision Fund, 105 Volcker Rule, 42 Volkswagen, 77–78, 81 Vrabeck, Kathy, 114, 223 W WallStreetBets, ix–x, xii, xiv, 2, 4, 8, 11, 14, 15, 16, 19, 22–23, 36, 38–40, 43–47, 55, 57, 67, 69, 75–77, 88, 92–95, 97–99, 107, 111, 113, 115, 120, 122, 127–32, 135, 138, 145, 147–49, 152, 157, 159–61, 170–72, 181–82, 188, 190, 192, 193, 205, 213, 216–17, 220–22, 227, 229–31, 238, 243, 255, 259 AMC and, 225–26 “apes together strong” and, 135–36 bots on, 163–66 BTFD on, 69 DeepFuckingValue on, see Gill, Keith as hedge fund, 139 Jeffamazon on, 107–9 Kronos_415 on, 103, 107 Left and, 121–23, 126, 129, 130, 133, 136, 238 membership demographics of, 57 MoonYachts on, 97–98 number of members of, xi, 46, 136–38, 190, 199, 213, 229 Player896 on, 93, 109 proof of trade on, 47 racial slurs on, 190 Robinhood and, 22–23 Senior_Hedgehog on, 72, 73, 76, 79, 92 sharing of losses on, 144 Stonksflyingup on, 95, 109 taken off-line, 190 WeLikeTheStock and, 126, 242 see also GameStop, GameStop short squeeze Wall Street Journal, ix, 30, 50, 52, 61, 84, 118, 128–29, 132, 136, 152, 171, 179, 180, 210, 211, 223, 250, 253 Wall Street Week, 156 Walmart, 26 Wanda, Dalian, 225 Wang Jianlin, 225 warrants, 101 Washington Post, The, 161 Waters, Maxine, 3, 13, 64–65, 76 Wealthfront, 27, 257 wealthiest Americans, 234 wealth inequality, xi, 14, 71–72, 160, 182 Webull, 178, 200 Weissmann, Jordan, 175–76 WeLikeTheStock, 126, 242 West, Jack, 172 Western Digital, 46 WeWork, 105 When Genius Failed (Lowenstein), 260 Where Are the Customers’ Yachts?

The Myth of Capitalism: Monopolies and the Death of Competition
by Jonathan Tepper
Published 20 Nov 2018

The pills were always affordable for a good reason: they were not expensive to produce. Merck, which had originally owned Cuprimine and Syprine, had kept the prices low. But in 2006, they sold the drugs to a small company called Aton, which began raising the prices. Then, in 2010, Aton sold the drugs to Valeant Pharmaceuticals. That is when prices soared. Valeant raised the list price to around $300,000 for a year's supply in the United States, or $25,000 a month. There was no generic version of either drug, due to a backlog of drug approvals at the FDA.2 Most patients cannot afford the drugs, and they will die like Jeff Dirlam if they do not get the drugs.

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S3 (August 2014): S67–S100. https://doi.org/10.1086/675862. Chapter 8: Regulation and Chemotherapy 1. http://www.jeffslegacy.com/book.html and http://www.wilsonsdisease.org/for-patients-families/stories. 2. https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/06/the-valeant-meltdown-and-wall-streets-major-drug-problem. 3. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Valeant_Pharmaceuticals. 4. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/31/business/how-valeant-cashed-in-twice-on-higher-drug-prices.html. 5. http://fortune.com/2016/10/17/valeant-new-drug-price-hikes/. 6. https://www.consumeraffairs.com/news/valeant-increases-price-on-lead-poisoning-drug-by-2700-but-american-kids-dont-need-it-anyway-110416.html. 7. https://www.streetinsider.com/Corporate+News/Imprimis+Pharma+(IMMY)+Announces+Lower-Cost+Option+to+Valeants+(VRX)+Lead+Poisoning+Treatment/12136830.html. 8. https://www.forbes.com/sites/emilywillingham/2016/10/16/cost-for-valeants-lead-poisoning-treatment-increased-7250-in-six-years/#22903eef26a8. 9. https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/imprimis-pharmaceuticals-announces-availability-of-lower-cost-option-for-the-treatment-of-lead-poisoning-300345605.html. 10.

Beyond Diversification: What Every Investor Needs to Know About Asset Allocation
by Sebastien Page
Published 4 Nov 2020

First, on September 21, Hillary Clinton tweeted that she would unveil a plan to curtail “price gouging” by pharmaceutical companies.7 (The day before, the New York Times had published an article on how Turing Pharmaceuticals had just increased the price of a lifesaving drug from $13.50 to $750.00.8 The media nicknamed Martin Shkreli, Turing’s young and brash CEO, the “pharma bro.”) Second, on September 28, Democrats in the US House of Representatives asked to subpoena Valeant Pharmaceuticals for documents on drug price increases.9 XLV volume on that day reached an all-time high. Both events threatened to put pressure on pharmaceuticals-sector revenues, but not necessarily those of other healthcare stocks. Although some companies were directly in the line of fire, it’s hard to imagine how regulation aimed at human drug pricing would affect companies that make animal medicines and vaccines, such as Zoetis, or medical equipment, such as Baxter International.10 Yet all XLV constituents—without exception—sold off over these seven trading days.

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Rowe Price, 191 Asset Allocation Committee, xii capital markets assumptions approach at, 37–38 and global equity markets forecasts, 13–14 portfolios/products managed by, 248 scenario analysis at, 157–158, 163 and tactical asset allocation, 57–58 Target Date Fund series of, 250 Taborsky, Mark, 174 Tactical asset allocation (TAA), 45–59 best valuation signal for, 52–56 forecast horizons for, 111 (See also Longer-term risk forecasting) global, 182 and macro dashboards, 67 in practice, 46–52 and relative valuation between stocks and bonds, 56–59 Tail dependence, 126 Tail risk: combining volatility and, 206–207 and managed volatility, 99, 101 in optimization problem, 206 Tail-risk estimation: fat tails, 147–157 scenario analysis, 157–167 Tail-risk hedging, 135 Tail-risk-aware analytics, 135–136 Tails: and correlation asymmetries, 123 and correlations, 124–126, 134 and kurtosis, 118 and skewness, 118 (See also Fat tails) Taleb, Nassim Nicholas, 8–9, 148, 150, 153 Target allocation portfolios, 253–261 conservative income, 253–255 diversified global portfolio, 257–259 diversified income, 255–257 Target allocation portfolios (continued): growth portfolio, 261–261 specialized portfolios, 261–262 Target volatility portfolios, 261–263 Target-date funds (TDFs), 186, 187, 190–195, 248 Target-date portfolios, 248–253 Technology Select Sector SPDR ETF, 242 Thompson, Toby, 94 Three-factor model, 22 Three-sigma days, 94–95 Thurston, David, 218–219 Time horizon(s): and bond returns, 16 and building block valuation model, 33 in CAPM, 14 and CAPM forecasts, 21 for cash return, 19 and correlation forecasting, 140–143 counterweight effect at, 41–42 differing between momentum and value investing, 180 for fixed income asset classes, 39–40 macro factors for short term tactical investments, 63–66 with managed volatility, 107 and momentum, 71–73, 75–76 and persistence of risk measures, 113–117 in tactical asset allocation, 57 and volatility, 113–114 within-horizon and end-of-horizon risk, 168–170 Time series analyses, 159 Time series forecasts, 31 Tracking error, 210 Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS), 186–188 Treynor, Jack, 6 Turing Pharmaceuticals, 238 Turkington, David, 156, 211, 225 “215 Years of Global Multi-Asset Momentum: 1800–2014” (Geczy and Samonov), 71 Tzitzouris, Jim, 186, 187, 189–192, 233 Unstable portfolios, 207–210 Uppal, Raman, 211 US Treasuries: impact of QE on, 17 as safe-haven class, 161 stock correlations with, 132 volatility persistence for, 114 US Treasury bills, 11–12, 19 US Treasury bonds, 11 Utility, 192, 198 Utility function: approximating, 203–207 inflection points in, 201–203 Utility maximization, 199–203 Utility theory, 199 Valeant Pharmaceuticals, 238 Valuation, 25–42, 267 and bond future returns, 39–42 building block model for, 28–39 and CAPM model, 12 and equity risk premium, 14 fundamental analysis, 37–39 in market risk premium determination, 21 and momentum, 61, 70–82 relative, between stocks and bonds, 27–28 shorter-term (see Shorter-term valuation signals) of stocks, P/E ratio vs.

Why Wall Street Matters
by William D. Cohan
Published 27 Feb 2017

It remains an incredibly important innovation, despite the hubris (and illegality) that Milken engaged in, and a source of huge annual profits for Wall Street. In 2015 alone—thanks to Milken—nearly $372 billion was raised globally for companies with less-than-stellar credit ratings. The market—both new and existing issues—now totals some $2.2 trillion, tripling since 2005. In 2015, Valeant Pharmaceuticals raised $8.5 billion in the junk-bond market; Frontier Communications raised $6.6 billion; First Data raised $6.6 billion in two separate financings; Dollar Tree Inc. raised $3.25 billion; and Fiat Chrysler raised $3 billion. The money was used to build new factories, to buy new equipment, to create new products, and to hire more people and pay them decent wages.

Black Edge: Inside Information, Dirty Money, and the Quest to Bring Down the Most Wanted Man on Wall Street
by Sheelah Kolhatkar
Published 7 Feb 2017

“SAC places extreme pressure on its traders”: Biovail Corporation v. SAC Capital Management, et al. the SEC launched its own investigation: Stunningly, the Biovail suit against SAC was dismissed in 2009 by a judge in New Jersey. In February 2010, SAC sued Biovail, which had been taken over by Valeant Pharmaceuticals, accusing it of vexatious litigation. Valeant and SAC settled the case in November 2010, with Valeant agreeing to pay $10 million to SAC to compensate it for legal expenses. On March 24, 2008, the SEC sued Melnyk and Biovail, accusing the company of engaging in accounting fraud. The company paid $10 million to settle the charges and another $128 million to settle a class-action lawsuit filed by its shareholders.

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People could only speculate: Just three days after Raj’s arrest, The Wall Street Journal posted an article on its website that publicly identified C. B. Lee and Ali Far, for the first time, as government cooperators. It was hugely damaging to the investigation. Susan Pulliam, “How Associates Helped Build Case,” The Wall Street Journal, October 20, 2009. Biovail’s lawsuit against SAC had been dismissed: Valeant Pharmaceuticals eventually bought Biovail, and in 2010 settled claims brought by SAC Capital for vexatious litigation by agreeing to pay SAC $10 million. Shira Ovide, “SAC Capital, Biovail Finally Bury the Hatchet,” The Wall Street Journal, November 4, 2010. SEC had charged the company with fraud: Judith Burns, “SEC Charges Biovail Officers with Fraud,” The Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2008.

The Joys of Compounding: The Passionate Pursuit of Lifelong Learning, Revised and Updated
by Gautam Baid
Published 1 Jun 2020

Most businesses fail to appreciate this delicate trade-off between high short-term profitability and the longevity accorded to the business through disciplined pricing and offering great customer value. The few businesses that do understand this trade-off always display “pain today, gain tomorrow” thinking in their daily decisions. Let’s look at two contrasting examples. On one hand, we have Valeant Pharmaceuticals, which buys lifesaving drugs for rare diseases from innovative companies but then resorts to predatory pricing. The financial metrics might appear attractive, but a parasitic relationship of extracting value from customers (rather than adding value to them) usually ends up destroying shareholder value at some point in the future.

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.), 93 Thiel, Peter, 319 thinking: calculation and, 309–313; Darwin on, 296; fine-tuning, 305–306; first principles, 19–21; flexibility of, 300; Franklin on, 297; golden rule of, 296; Griffin on, 29–30; happiness and, 352; about market conditions, 232–240; mental models and, 29–30; Munger on, 158–159; opportunity costs and, 305–306; positive, 351–356; second-level, 306; time management and, 11–13 Thinking, Fast and Slow (Kahneman), 292 Thorndike, William, 227 Thorp, Ed, 249, 259 three-bucket framework, 28 thumb-sucking, Munger on, 300 Tide, 222 time: Buffett on, 216; nonrenewability of, 11–12; stocks and, 185; wealth and, 78–79 timelessness, of wisdom, 16 time management, 6; learning and, 11–13; reading and, 11–13; thinking and, 11–13 Toffler, Alvin, 284 Tolle, Eckhart, 351 Tolstoy, Leo, 12 Torrent Pharmaceuticals, 197–198 total debt, 131 total real returns, 274 trade-offs, 40–41 Treasury bonds, 255 Treasury rate, 58 Truman, Harry, 281 trust: building, 49; earning, 49–50; Munger on, 49; Welch on, 49 truths, absolute, 55–56 turnarounds, Buffett on, 294 Tversky, Amos, 141, 344 twaddle tendency, 335 Twain, Mark, 16, 39, 187, 264, 346 Twitter, market conditions and, 236 Tzu, Lao, 285 Uber, 225, 286 uncertainty: certainty and, 54–55; Feynman on, 55; risk and, 240, 314 underspending, 79 understanding, 31 Undervalued Corporation, 217 unforced errors, 219 United States (US): equity markets in, 280; GDP of, 278; spinoffs in, 204 United Technologies, 39–40 Upanishads, 33 US. See United States Usmanov, Alisher, 190 Valeant Pharmaceuticals, 98–99 valuation: of bonds, 319–320; clusters, 260; conventional, 163; earnings and, 312; public market and, 313; sum of parts, 311; traditional, 173; trailing, 310 Valuation (Koller, Goedhard, & Wessels), 101 value creation, Koller on, 221 value investing, 163–164 Value Investing and Behavioral Finance (Parikh), 189 ValuePickr, 324 value traps, 169–170 Vardhman Special Steels, 196 variant perception, 248 via negativa, 21 vicarious learning, 10–11, 23, 46; Munger on, 349 victimhood, Munger on, 354 Vinati Organics, 118 Vishny, Robert, 348 visualization exercises, 190–191 visual thinking, 23 vitamin and mineral supplements, 357–358 Vivekananda (Swami), 33, 66 volatility, 105; abrupt, 263; clusters, 260; downside, 276; of mind, 230; Munger on, 106–107; tolerance for, 276 Voltaire, 53 voluntary praise, 309 Wall Street: egotism on, 55; Federal Reserve and, 276; on spinoffs, 204–205 Walmart, 91 Walt Disney Company, 53 Walton, Sam, 304 wasteful expenses, 365 Way, Gerard, 39 Way to Wealth, The (Franklin), 79, 81 wealth: Buffett on, 258–259, 363; building, 79; compounding of, 362–367; creation of, 299; Housel on, 109; Lynch on, 79; measurement of, 78–79; of Munger, 81–82; sustaining, 54–56; time and, 78–79 Wealth in Families (Collier), 64 Weatherford, David, 38, 375–376 Welch, Jack, on trust, 49 Wells, Frank, 53 Wells Fargo, Buffett on, 318 Wesco Financial, 82, 92, 151 Wessels, David, 101 West, Mae, 250 Western Insurance Securities Company, 60 what you see is all there is (WYSIATI), 305 White Sox, 47 Wilde, Oscar, 336 William of Ockham, 70 Williams, Ted, 56–57 Wilson, Joe, 150 Winning on Wall Street (Zweig, M.), 297 wisdom: Fisher on, 333; Munger on, 19, 51, 128; timelessness of, 16; worldly, 26–29 Wisdom of Crowds, The (Surowiecki), 241 Wisdom of Finance, The (Desai), 291 Wooden, John, 66, 362 working capital, 166 Working Together (Eisner & Cohen), 4–5 World Health Organization, 357 worldly wisdom, 26–29 writing: happiness and, 143–144; self-awareness and, 143–144 WYSIATI.

The Price of Time: The Real Story of Interest
by Edward Chancellor
Published 15 Aug 2022

Over the following couple of years net debt increased by more than half and per-share earnings nearly doubled.24 Kraft Heinz was one of a number of so-called ‘platform companies’, similar to the trusts of the robber baron era, which used debt to finance anti-competitive mergers. Other notable platform companies included the beer giant Anheuser-Busch InBev (also controlled by the Brazilian 3G), cereal-maker Post Holdings, together with a number of healthcare companies. No platform company soared higher than Valeant Pharmaceuticals. The brainchild of Michael Pearson, a former McKinsey consultant, Valeant acquired more than twenty medical and drug businesses, including contact lens-maker Bausch & Lomb. The Canadian-listed company boosted its profits by slashing costs and pushing through large price hikes on its portfolio of patented drugs.25 Acquisitions were funded with debt.

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., 201 tax structures, 164; offshore tax havens, 210 Taylor, John, 116–17, 129, 252 Tencent, 283 Tencin, Claudine Alexandrine Guérin, Madame de, 51 Terborgh, George, 125–6, 127 Tesla, 176–7 Theranos, 149 Thiel, Peter, 263 Third Avenue (investment company), 227–8 Thornton, Daniel, 192 Thornton, Henry, 41–2, 66*, 70, 75 Thornton, Henry Sykes, 66* Tiberius, Roman Emperor, 12 time, concept of, xviii; and act of saving, 188–90; canonical ‘hours’, 21; and Lewis Carroll, 309; in era of ultra-low interest rates, 59, 177; Franklin on, xviii, 22, 28; and Hayek, 32; interest as ‘time value of money’, xxiv, xxv–xxvi, 10, 14–15, 16, 20, 22, 26–7, 28–32; Lord King’s ‘paradox of policy’, 194, 230*; the Marshmallow Test, 29, 189; and medieval scholars, 19–20; Renaissance writings on, 21; secularization of, 21–2; speculators’ misunderstanding of, 59; and thought in ancient world, 20–21; time as individual’s possession, 20, 21, 25; ‘time in production’, xxiv, 14–15, 16, 22, 95, 95†, 141; ‘time preference’ theory, xxiv*, 28–32, 42, 95, 188–9; Thomas Wilson’s ideas, 26–7, 28, 30 Time-Warner, 167 Tooke, Thomas, 69 Toporowski, Jan, 167 Torrens, Robert, 66 Toys ‘R’ Us, 169 trade and commerce: in ancient world, 6, 7–8, 12, 14, 15; Atlantic trade, 59; business partnerships (commenda, societas), 26; commercial classes/interests, 35, 36–7, 38–40, 41, 43, 44, 66–7; commercial importance of time, xviii, 15–16, 21, 22; emergence of modern trade cycle, 62–4; expansion of in Middle Ages, 19, 21–3, 25–6; international trade, 6, 15, 23, 24, 59, 252–3, 261–2; and Italian Renaissance, 21; in medieval Italy, 21–3; mercantile/shipping loans, 6, 12, 14, 22–3, 26, 219 TransAmerica Life Insurance, 199* Trichet, Jean-Claude, 239 Trollope, Anthony, The Way We Live Now, 73 Truman, Harry, 84 The Truman Show (Peter Weir film, 1998), 185–7 Trump, Donald, 185, 261, 262, 291–2, 299, 304, 310 trusts/monopolies: in early twentieth century Europe, 159; Lenin on, 159–60; merger ‘tsunami’ after 2008 crisis, 160–63, 161*, 168–70, 182–3, 237, 298; ‘platform companies’, 161; Adam Smith on, 162, 298; in US robber baron era, 156, 157–9, 203 tulip mania (1630s), 68 Tunisia, 255 Turgot, Anne-Robert Jacques, 15, 28–9, 30, 218 Turkey, xxiii, 252, 258–60, 263 Turkmenistan, 262 Turner, Adair, 292 TXU (energy company), 162 Uber, 149, 150 ‘unicorn’ start-up companies, 148–50, 153, 155, 173, 176–7 Union Pacific Railroad, 157, 158 United States: as bubble economy, 184–7; credit expansion of 1920s, 87–91, 92–4, 96–8, 112, 203; Democrats’ Green New Deal policy, 302; economic expansion (1929–41), 143; economy in Bretton Woods era, 291, 302; financial crisis (1873), 157; foreign securities/loans in 1920s, 91; inflation in 1970s, 108–9; Knickerbocker Panic (1907), 83–4; large-scale immigration into, 78; loan of farm animals in, 4; long-term interest rates (1945–2021), 134; loss of manufacturing jobs to China, 261*, 261; low economic vitality in post-crisis decade, 124, 150–53, 191; monetary policy in 1900s, 83–4, 83*; post-Second World War recovery, 126; public debt today, 291–2, 291*; recessions of early 1980s, 109–10, 151; reversal of global capital flows (late-1920s), 93; robber baron era, 156–9, 203; shift from manufacturing towards services, 167–8, 182; and zombification, 146, 152–3, 155 see also Federal Reserve, US United States Steel Corporation, 157–8 Universities Superannuation Scheme, UK, 196 Useless Ethereum Token, 178 usury: attacked from left and right, 17; attitudes to in ancient world, 17–18, 19, 20–21, 219; in Britain, 24, 26–7, 34, 40, 42, 65‡, 65; Church law forbids, 18–19, 23–4; definitions in Elizabethan era, 26–7; etymology of word, 5; Galiani on, 218–19, 220, 221; and Jews, 18; Marx on, 16, 200–201; medieval Church acknowledges risk, 25–6; Old Testament restrictions on, 17; Proudhon-Bastiat debate on, xvii–xix, xxi, xxii, xxv, 9; in Renaissance world, 22–3; scholastic attack on, 18–20, 23–4, 25 Valeant Pharmaceuticals, 161, 168–9 Vancouver, 175 Veblen, Thorstein, Theory of Business Enterprise (1904), 158, 159, 166 Velde, François, 58*, 59 Venice, 22, 23 Vinci, Leonardo da, Salvator Mundi, 208–9 VIX index, 228–9, 254 La Voix du Peuple, xvii–xix volatility, 153, 228–30, 233, 234, 254, 304, 305 Volcker, Paul, 108–9, 121, 145, 184, 240 Voltaire, 57 Wainwright, Oliver, 209 Waldman, Steve, 206 Waldorf Astoria, New York, 285–6 Wall Street Crash (October 1929): Fed’s response to, 98, 100, 101, 108; Fisher and Keynes fail to foresee, 94–5; Hayek’s interpretation of, 101, 105; low real rates in 1920s USA, 87–91, 89, 92–4, 96–8, 203; low/stable inflation at time of, 134; monetarist view of, 98–9, 101, 105, 108; predictions/warnings of, 93–5, 96, 101, 105, 308; reversal of international capital flows (late-1920s), 93, 93*, 261 WallStreetBets, 307, 309 Walpole, Horace, 62–3 Warburg, Paul, 94 Warsh, Kevin, 228 wealth: ‘Buddenbrooks effect’, 216; conspicuous consumption by mega-rich, 54–5, 208–10, 212; definitions of, 179–82, 216; elite displays as signs of inequality, 209–10, 212; virtual wealth bubbles, 179, 180, 181–2, 185, 193–5, 206, 215, 216–17, 217†, 229–30, 237; wealth illusion, 193–5, 198 Welch, Jack, 170, 171 Wells, H.

The Golden Passport: Harvard Business School, the Limits of Capitalism, and the Moral Failure of the MBA Elite
by Duff McDonald
Published 24 Apr 2017

When betting against the nutritional supplement maker Herbalife, Ackman referred to it as a “moral obligation” and has otherwise insisted that his investments are guided by a strict moral code.29 And, incidentally, defended through schoolyard taunts. When Berkshire Hathaway vice chairman Charlie Munger questioned the morality of one of Ackman’s holdings, Valeant Pharmaceuticals, in late 2015 after it had been accused of jacking up the prices of drugs to unaffordable levels, Ackman fired back that the soda made by Coca-Cola, a longtime Berkshire holding, was bad for children. Ackman’s view of his role in the stock market is pure HBS. “He sees himself as one of the good guys,” Katrina Brooker wrote for Bloomberg, before allowing him to say so himself: “We are the white knight always on behalf of the owners of the business.”

…

Defense Department: MBAs at, 272; McNamara reorganizes, 272–73 U.S. economy: average income (1949), 144; capital investment, 343; consumption-based, 185, 193; corporate layoffs (1990s) and, 492; crisis of 1907, 23; decline, American managers and, 342–52; distressed (1893–97), 23; early 1970s, 386; effect of shareholder value ideology, 372–73; federal regulation and, 102, 103, 108, 122, 131–32, 133, 200, 244, 347, 357, 358, 367, 385, 386–87, 430, 504–5, 513; financial crisis of 2007–10, 2, 372, 381, 425, 471, 476, 477, 525; 545–53; GDP, 144, 171, 193; government role in, 5, 7; Great Depression, 59, 62, 79, 95, 96, 101, 107–10, 112, 132, 144, 167, 201, 434; growth (1939–44), 182; HBS graduates and, 198; HBS influence on, 8, 9, 545–53; hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts and, 362, 367, 369, 370–71, 380, 430, 463; income inequality and, 56, 165–66, 463, 539, 544; Keynesian ideas and, 386; loss of industry in, 343–44; manufacturing (1949), 144; New Economy, 490–91, 492, 514–15; peacetime federal budget, 193; personal debt, 193; postwar economic boom and, 167–74, 349; R&D spending drop, 347; railroads and, 251; recession of 2001, 381; redistribution of wealth in, 462; regulatory and legal reforms (1903–14), 56; rise of “neoliberalism,” 385; “trans-national capitalist class” and, 8; Wall Street distortion and, 10, 466, 575 Useem, Jerry, 572 Useem, Michael, 189 U.S. Treasury, 73, 74 U.S. War Department, 135–39 Uyterhoeven, Hugo, 153 Valeant Pharmaceuticals, 480, 481, 482 “Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and The Corporate Objective Function” (Jensen), 373–74 Vanderblue, Homer, 73 Vanity Fair, 188, 519 Van Maanen, John, 80, 309–10, 392–95 Van Slyke, John, 328 Veblen, Thorstein, 95 Venrock, 320, 322 venture capital, 61, 120–21, 125, 127–28, 328; Doriot and ARD, 124–28; Harvard MBAs and, 320–22, 329–30, 332; unicorns, 320, 327.

Bad Blood: Secrets and Lies in a Silicon Valley Startup
by John Carreyrou
Published 20 May 2018

When Richard Fuisz opened the door, a process server tried to hand him a stack of legal papers. “I’m here to serve a lawsuit on Fuisz Technologies,” the man said. Fuisz told him he couldn’t accept service because the company, though it bore his name, was no longer his. He had sold it more than a decade earlier. It was now part of Canadian drugmaker Valeant Pharmaceuticals, he explained. The man placed a call and repeated what Fuisz had said. The response, conveyed by someone shouting on the other end of the line, was that he was at the right address and to just serve the papers. But Fuisz continued to refuse to take them. Losing his patience, the process server threw them at his feet and left.

In Pursuit of the Perfect Portfolio: The Stories, Voices, and Key Insights of the Pioneers Who Shaped the Way We Invest
by Andrew W. Lo and Stephen R. Foerster
Published 16 Aug 2021

See Tony Boyd, “Warren Buffett Still Says Derivatives Are ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction,’” Financial Review, June 17, 2015, http://www.afr.com/markets/derivatives/warren-buffett-still-says-derivatives-are-weapons-of-mass-destruction-20150617-ghpw0a. 73. Interview with authors. 74. Interview with authors. 75. Between July 2015 and April 2017, Valeant Pharmaceuticals’s stock (now called Bausch Health Companies Inc.) lost over 95 percent of its value. 76. Interview with authors. 77. Interview with authors. 78. Interview with authors. 79. Quotations in this section are taken from interviews with authors. Scholes credits Ashwin Alankar as co-originating the ideas that are part of his beliefs in the Perfect Portfolio.