debt deflation

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description: theory that recessions and depressions are due to the overall level of debt rising in real value because of deflation

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Endless Money: The Moral Hazards of Socialism

by William Baker and Addison Wiggin  · 2 Nov 2009  · 444pp  · 151,136 words

is weighed. The current meltdown has challenged its basic underlying assumptions, and it was predicted by not a single academic close to the Fed. Either debt deflation or inflation might occur, depending upon how monetary authorities interpret these theories and what this implies for their policy actions. While the political will to

also because of its length. While the observations of Higgs are trenchant, if one instead views the period through the simpler explanation of Fisher’s debt deflation theory, the recovery from the Great Depression can be explained by economic actors having repaid debt or had debt extinguished through bankruptcy by 1942, making

of the Great Depression, like a disease, through the gold standard. What this orthodoxy does is downplay the true cause as identified by Irving Fisher, debt deflation theory. It is a bit like celebrating the genius of those who strung power lines instead of acknowledging Thomas Edison for inventing the light bulb

a certain angle, has no longer this tendency to return to equilibrium, but, instead, a tendency to depart further from it.1 Fisher, Irving, THE DEBT DEFLATION THEORY OF GREAT DEPRESSIONS, “Econometrica” (March 1933) his chapter focuses upon the tumultuous unraveling of the financial market that occurred mostly in 2008, and continued

will. In 1933 Irving Fisher correctly diagnosed the cause of financial meltdowns in his book Booms and Depressions, which was followed by an essay, The Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions. In the essay he said: “I have, at present, a strong conviction that these two economic maladies, the debt disease and

, “The Great Depression in Irving Fisher’s Thought,” Universita di Torino (December 2001): 15–16. Chapter 5: Spitting Into the Wind 1. Irving Fisher, “The Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions,” Econometrica (March 1933): 339. Notes 389 2. Ben S. Bernanke, Deflation: Making Sure “It” Doesn’t Happen Here, November 21, 2002

investment in their preferred shares. Although preferred shares are a form of equity, they behave much like unsecured debt. 390 NOTES 15. Irving Fisher, “The Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions,” Econometrica (March 1933): 341. 16. Kris Hollington, “Lost in Space,” Fortean Times, July 2008, http://www. forteantimes.com/features/articles/1302

–290 secular society, 281–285 See also Moral hazard; Self-indulgence Cuneo, Jonathan W., 326–327 “Curveball,” 363 Damn Yankees, 303 Dawes Plan, 62 The Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions (Fisher), 131 Deflation: Making Sure “It” Doesn’t Happen Here (Bernanke), 117 Democracy Alliance, 185 Derivatives, 22. See also Alpha, fake

Crisis Economics: A Crash Course in the Future of Finance

by Nouriel Roubini and Stephen Mihm  · 10 May 2010  · 491pp  · 131,769 words

the day before. It sounds like a blessing, but for debtors it’s a curse. Irving Fisher, a Great Depression economist who coined the term “debt deflation” (see chapter 6) to describe this process, observed that if the price of goods falls faster than debts are reduced, the real value of private

high plateau,” he redeemed himself by subsequently articulating a compelling theory of the connection between financial crises, deflation, and depression, or what he called the “debt-deflation theory of great depressions.” Put simply, Fisher believed that depressions became great because of two factors: too much debt in advance of a crisis, and

of their debts, people fell behind. Fisher called this the “great paradox”—the more people pay, the more their debts weigh them down. This is debt deflation. To understand it better, let’s consider its counterpart, what might be called “debt inflation.” Imagine that you are a firm or a household, and

incurred the debt in the first place. For this simple reason, inflation is the debtor’s friend: it effectively erodes the value of the original debt. Deflation, however, is not the debtor’s friend. Let’s go back to our original example of a ten-year loan at an interest rate of

the first place. Unfortunately, even though each dollar is worth more, you now have fewer of them because your wages have declined. The upshot of debt deflation is that debtors—households, firms, banks, and others—see their borrowing costs rise above and beyond what they originally anticipated. And during a major financial

refuse to lend it, which only exacerbates the liquidity crunch. As credit dries up, more and more people default, feeding the original cycle of deflation, debt deflation, and further defaults. The end result is a depression: a brutal economic collapse in which a nation’s economy can contract by 10 percent or

thought this to be “needless and cruel.” Instead, he counseled that policy makers “reflate” prices up to precrash levels. As he put it, “If the debt-deflation theory of great depressions is essentially correct, the question of controlling the price level assumes a new importance; and those in the drivers’ seats—the

in 1694, and it had created liquidity facilities similar to those devised in the United States. But these moves failed to halt the prospect of debt deflation, and so in March 2009, in a bit of quantitative easing of its own, the Bank of England pledged to buy some £150 billion worth

, a moderate rate of inflation helps erode the real value of public debt, reducing the burden. At the same time, it resolves the problem of debt deflation, reducing the real value of private liabilities—fixed-rate mortgages, for example—while increasing the nominal value of homes and other assets. This is a

“It” Happen Again? Essays on Instability and Finance (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1982), 59-70, 90-116. 52 Irving Fisher: Irving Fisher, “The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions,” Econometrica 1 (1933): 346. 54 The Austrian School: See Steven Horwitz, “The Austrian Marginalists: Menger, Böhm-Bawerk, and Wieser,” and Peter

,” Bank for International Settlements Working Paper no. 186, November 2005, online at http://www.bis.org/publ/work186.pdf?noframes=1. 139 “debt-deflation theory of great depressions”: Irving Fisher, “The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions,” Econometrica 1 (1933). 140 “The very effort of individuals . . .”: Ibid., 344, 346. 140 “great paradox”: Ibid., 344

the chart at http://www.visualizingeconomics.com /2009/08/02/prices-inflation-and-deflation-great-depression-vs-great-recession /. 142 “Unless some counteracting cause . . .”: Fisher, “Debt-Deflation Theory,” 346, 347. 143 “open market operations”: A useful introduction is M. A. Akhtar, Understanding Open Market Operations (New York: Federal Reserve Bank of New

/index.php?q=node/3079. Ferguson, Niall. The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World. New York: Penguin Press, 2008. Fisher, Irving. “The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions.” Econometrica 1 (1933): 337-57. Fox, Justin. The Myth of the Rational Market: A History of Risk, Reward, and Delusion on

, see rating agencies; specific ratings recovery and restructuring of short-term unsecured bonded U.S., purchase of see also collateralized debt obligations; leverage; loans; mortgages debt-deflation theory of great depressions debt inflation decoupling deficits budget, see budget, deficits current account, see current account deficit fiscal, see fiscal deficits monetizing of deficit

Act (1994) homes, see housing Hong Kong Hoover, Herbert households debt of in emerging Europe in Japan House of Representatives, U.S. housing booms bust debt deflation in leverage in price of risk vs. uncertainty in sales of see also mortgages Housing and Economic Recovery Act (2008) housing bubbles Community Reinvestment Act

The Price of Time: The Real Story of Interest

by Edward Chancellor  · 15 Aug 2022  · 829pp  · 187,394 words

members were paralysed with an unjustified fear that any further action would excite another bout of speculation.68 As a result, the Fed allowed a debt deflation to take hold, which further deepened the crisis. These flawed decisions were compounded by the ‘fetters’ of the Gold Standard, which limited the central bankers

’, not the price stabilization policy, was ultimately responsible for the Great Depression. This Great Depression narrative is shaped by two seminal texts: Irving Fisher’s ‘Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions’ (1933) and A Monetary History of the United States by Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, published thirty years later. Fisher’s

United States would bounce back after the Great Crash turned out to be as misplaced as his earlier views on the stock market. In his debt-deflation paper, Fisher drew on personal experience to describe how debt becomes harder to handle when the price level declines. A vicious cycle opens up as

causes prices to fall further; and, as a result, borrowers end up owing more in real terms (i.e., after inflation) than at the outset. Debt deflation continues to the point of ‘universal bankruptcy’, said Fisher. The Yale economist prescribed ‘scientific medication’ to arrest the dollar disease: ‘Great depressions are curable and

policymakers ease monetary conditions to ward off such a benign decline in the price level, people are incentivized to borrow more. As Irving Fisher observed, debt deflation starts from a position of over-indebtedness – a point which Bernanke in his writings on the subject conspicuously overlooks. Thus, Hayek concluded that attempts to

more likely. Furthermore, the bad deflation that appears during a financial crisis should be viewed as a symptom, rather than a cause of economic malaise. Debt deflation, Hayek concluded, is ‘a secondary phenomenon, a process induced by the maladjustments of industry left over from the boom’.74 While Fisher believed that the

, there would be no problem in taking them even lower in future. INFLATION TARGETING The financial crisis revived the threat of deflation – the kind of debt-deflation identified by Irving Fisher that occurs after credit booms when people, having taken on too much debt, seek to pay it off. After 2008, fear

figure.91 As Chu commented: ‘if losses don’t manifest on financial institution balance sheets, they will do so via slowing growth and deflation.’92 Debt deflation, as Irving Fisher pointed out, occurs after too much debt has accumulated. At the same time, excess industrial capacity was putting downward pressure on producer

(from 2010), 173–4, 255–6; corporate zombies in, 277, 281, 285, 289; corruption in, 270, 274, 275, 287–8, 287*; currency devaluation (2015), 227; debt-deflation in, 280–81; Deng’s reform era, 265, 266, 267; and digital currencies concept, 294; economic stimulus plan (2008/9), 270, 271–81, 282, 289

; cancellation/jubilees/clean slates, 9, 300; dangers of cheap credit, 32, 44; debt bondage, 5, 9, 18; ‘debt supercycle’, 135; ‘debt trap’, 43, 135, 280; debt-deflation, 98–9, 100, 119, 280–81; debt–service ratio, 135; ‘evergreening’ of bad debts, 136, 145–6, 280; late payment penalties, 10, 14, 25; Lord

Crash, 98–9, 100, 101, 105, 108; Austrian economists’ view of, 100, 101, 105, 113, 133–4; crisis of 2008 revives fears of, 119, 122; debt-deflation, 98–9, 100, 119, 280–81; in early-1920s Britain, 85–6; and Fed’s post-2008 policies, 236–8; ‘forgotten depression’ (1921), 84, 86

, 246 Finley, Sir Moses, Economy and Society in Ancient Greece (1981), 18* fire-fighting services, 154–5 First World War, 84, 85 Fisher, Irving: and debt-deflation, 98–9, 100, 119, 280; first to refer to ‘real’ interest rate, 88–9, 219*; founds Stable Money League (1921), 87, 96; and Gesell’s

The New Depression: The Breakdown of the Paper Money Economy

by Richard Duncan  · 2 Apr 2012  · 248pp  · 57,419 words

of Government Finances The Government’s Options American Solar Conclusion Notes Chapter 10: Fire and Ice, Inflation and Deflation Fire Ice Fisher’s Theory of Debt-Deflation Winners and Losers Ice Storm Fire Storm Wealth Preservation through Diversification Other Observations Concerning Asset Prices in the Age of Paper Money Protectionism and Inflation

additional debt strongly suggests that this paradigm has reached and exceeded its capacity to generate growth through further credit expansion. If credit contracts significantly and debt deflation takes hold, this economic system will break down in a scenario resembling the 1930s, a decade that began in economic disaster and ended in geopolitical

buy assets denominated in their own currencies. Their purpose was to boost the domestic liquidity of each of their respective countries in order to prevent debt deflation at home. Meanwhile, China’s central bank created the equivalent of $1.7 trillion between the end of 2007 and mid-2011, using the money

growth. The final assumption is that private sector debt will remain unchanged in both years. Two percent economic growth should be enough to prevent a debt deflation downward spiral; however, it is unlikely to be enough to cause the private sector to significantly increase its level of borrowing. Therefore, it is assumed

-faire method this time would be even more extreme. The nation’s gold stock is worth approximately $431 billion (at $1,650 per ounce). The debt deflation that would be necessary to return the credit supply to that level would destroy the world as we know it. Rothbard and von Mises were

. Observing that phenomenon firsthand, Irving Fisher explained it in a famous 21-page article published in Econometrica in October 1933. The article was titled “The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions.” The crisis the world faces today is very much like the one that crushed the global economy in 1930. Both were

caused by extraordinarily large fiat-money-denominated credit bubbles. Fisher’s article clearly describes the debt-deflation dynamics that now threaten to drive the global economy into a New Great Depression. This important article will therefore be considered at some length because

there is no clearer explanation of the manner in which our economy would collapse should government intervention cease. Fisher’s Theory of Debt-Deflation Fisher believed that overindebtedness and deflation were the two dominant factors in the great booms and depressions. He wrote as explanations of the so-called

Deal policies, which he referred to as artificial respiration: The depression out of which we are now (I trust) emerging is an example of a debt-deflation depression of the most serious sort. The debts of 1929 were the greatest known, both nominally and really, up to that time. Had no “artificial

of inflation. There should be no doubt that the natural tendency for the economy—following a 40-year credit boom—is to collapse into a debt-deflation depression. Policy makers understand that. They have read Fisher’s article. That is why they are determined to prevent that outcome from recurring. Try as

, the cure could prove to be just as deadly as the disease. Therefore, over the years ahead, the U.S. economy could suffer either severe debt-deflation or severe inflation. Either scenario would inflict enormous damage on the economy and, therefore, on society. However, the impact that deflation would have on asset

and would benefit from mild deflation. That sector is a net creditor to the amount of $6.1 trillion. Ice Storm Of course in severe debt-deflation almost everyone would lose because the financial system would collapse as a result of massive bankruptcies and defaults. Therefore, even the creditors would suffer as

tend to perform badly when inflation at the CPI level exceeds 4 percent, in a weak economic environment, and, particularly, during a severe period of debt deflation. 3. Bonds benefit from disinflation or mild deflation and suffer when there is inflation. In the third quarter of 2011, the yield on ten-year

by more than 30 percent on average since the crisis began and they could fall further, even significantly further in the case of a severe debt-deflation scenario. Even then, if well located, rental properties would continue to generate rental income. In a worse-case scenario, rents would fall significantly from current

, but the debt owed would remain the same, which would effectively reduce the burden of the debt. The risk, however, is that in a severe debt-deflation, rents would fall so much that the rental income would be insufficient to service the mortgage. A prudent loan-to-value ratio mitigates that danger

the crisis began in 2008. It is uncertain how much longer those measures can be sustained. Should they cease altogether, there would be a horrible debt-deflation similar—in cause and consequence—to that which occurred during the Great Depression. Government attempts to prevent that outcome, or political developments that drive policy

have an extraordinary influence on both. Notes 1. From The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 338. 2. Irving Fisher, “The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions,” Econometrica (October 1933). Conclusion This is the third book I have written on the crisis in the global economy. The Dollar

transformation of U.S. economy by U.S. domestic causes “Crowding in” “Crowding out” Currencies, trade balances and Current account balances. See Balance of payments “Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions, The” (Fisher) Deflation. See Inflation and deflation Deindustrialization Demand deposits, commercial bank funding and Democratic Party Derivatives: consequences of regulating U

France (White) Financial sector: debt and lack of liquidity reserve requirements and credit expansion Fiscal stimulus, needed with additional quantitative easing Fisher, Irving theory of debt-deflation Fixed-interest-rate debt, in diversified portfolio Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States Food prices: deflation and excluded from CPI quantitative easing and

’s effects on Human Action (von Mises) Hyperinflation Inflation and deflation credit and inflation derivative regulation and effects on asset classes Fisher’s theory of debt-deflation inflation in 2011 inflation likely in 2012 inflation likely without additional quantitative easing and fiscal stimulus New Great Depression scenarios and protectionism and wealth preservation

on Production incomes, in Mitchell’s theory of business cycles Profits: credit expansion’s effect on in Mitchell’s theory of business cycles Property rights, debt-deflation and Protectionism: inflation and New Great Depression scenarios and Purchasing Power of Money: Its Determination and Relation to Credit, Interest and Crises, The (Fisher) Quantitative

The Rise and Fall of Nations: Forces of Change in the Post-Crisis World

by Ruchir Sharma  · 5 Jun 2016  · 566pp  · 163,322 words

, and Seb Barker, “Long-Term Asset Return Study: Bonds: The Final Bubble Frontier?,” Deutsche Bank Markets Research Report, September 10, 2014. 7 Irving Fisher, “The Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depression,” St. Louis Federal Reserve, n.d. 8 David Hackett Fischer, The Great Wave: Price Revolutions and the Rhythm of History (New

, January 23, 2015. Fischer, David Hackett. The Great Wave: Price Revolutions and the Rhythm of History. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. Fisher, Irving. “The Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depression.” St. Louis Federal Reserve, n.d. Gavae, Charles. “Back to MV=PQ.” GK Research, January 9, 2014. Hatiuz, Jan. “Revisiting the

EuroTragedy: A Drama in Nine Acts

by Ashoka Mody  · 7 May 2018

7.8. Euro-area inflation rate continues dropping while US inflation rate stabilizes in mid-​2013. 316 7.9. Italy begins to slide into a debt-​deflation cycle. 318 8.1. The great divergence in euro-area incomes and employment. 340 x   l i s t of figures 8.2. Italy seen

October 15, it did not recognize that the euro area’s rolling crisis had crossed into Greece. And it certainly did not foresee that a debt-​deflation dynamic, propelled by the ideology of monetary and fiscal austerity, would carry the crisis to Italy. after the bust, the denial 231 Chapt er 6

fell below the optimistic forecasts, and the government’s debt-​to-​GDP ratio rose faster than had been forecast. The risk now was that a debt-​deflation cycle—​a continued decline in inflation, feeding into higher debt burdens—​could take hold in large parts of the euro area. On November 7, 2013

2007 110 September 2011 09 11 13 15 2010 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Figure 7.9. Italy begins to slide into a debt-​deflation cycle. Note: Dashed lines refer to projections at the time. Sources: Left panel: OECD, Real House Price Index (2010 = 100). Right panel: International Monetary Fund

Europe As in Greece, prolonged economic stress was having a profound impact on Italian politics. By mid-​2011, the Italian economy was edging into a debt-​ deflation cycle. House prices were falling, the government’s debt burden was rising faster than forecast, and banks were facing ever-​increasing stress. Italian Prime Minister

, 41, 423, 449, 480 Dahl, Robert, 191, 425 Dallas Fed, 222 Debré, Michel, 35, 50 deflation Draghi and, 303 FOMC concerns about, 291–292 Greek debt-​deflation dynamic, 231 IMF and, 283–284, 302 Italy and, 18, 318–319, 318f Japan and, 344 looming price deflation, 315–321 negative consequences, 353–354

–333 college education data, 347f comparison with 1990s Japan, 18–19 corruption in, 12, 386–387 crisis legacy, 338–342 debt burden/​crisis, 308–310 debt-​deflation cycle, 18, 318–319, 318f deflation prevention, 356 ECB and, 299, 300 economic/​financial crisis, 296, 315, 385–390 economic miracle in, 116 Euro’s

Expected Returns: An Investor's Guide to Harvesting Market Rewards

by Antti Ilmanen  · 4 Apr 2011  · 1,088pp  · 228,743 words

—but even they may be less than fully effective if a deflationary recession raises market concerns about sovereign creditworthiness. Unfortunately, the current environment resembles classic debt deflation (which is preceded by excessive debt accumulation and characterized by de-leveraging) more than it does the benign deflation experience of the late 19th century

its independence. Even if the unmooring of inflation expectations to the upside is scary, the impact of global deflation, if it occurs, is even worse. Debt deflation and hyperinflation are the worst destroyers of wealth. Most policymakers now fear the former more than the latter, which makes inflation (though not hyperinflation) the

The Invisible Hands: Top Hedge Fund Traders on Bubbles, Crashes, and Real Money

by Steven Drobny  · 18 Mar 2010  · 537pp  · 144,318 words

not eased fast enough or far enough. The Great Macro Experiment, therefore, is an attempt to use aggressive reflationary policies to overcome the effects of debt deflation after the equity bubble burst. We still seem to be in the midst of the Great Macro Experiment, although it is the next phase. It

30 years will prove more challenging, especially when viewed through the prism of the last three decades. Today we are faced with the prospect of debt deflation, which we last experienced globally after the crash of 1929. My argument is that it took 30 to 40 years for society to correct for

upon a long period of unwinding financial excesses. Stock market returns could be terrible for the foreseeable future. If you believe people like Niall Ferguson, debt deflation eliminates all of the gains from the preceding boom, it purges everything. By 1974, we had eliminated all of the real gains from the American

and everything is highly correlated, is a world that cannot be correctly navigated by the old model. If I am right and this is a debt deflation, it will take 30 years to work through the system, and you do not want to be paying an active management fee for passive execution

think they get it. I think the death of leverage and its effect on the velocity of money gushing through the economy has initiated a debt deflation that continues to see a contraction in bank loans even in 2009. The same “upside down” logic prevailed in 1979 when Volcker became chairman of

in the way that the Volcker Fed did in the 1970s? The Fed understands the gravity of the present situation and is fearful of a debt deflation. However, if I were to be super critical, I would contend that they are tackling a Minsky moment (see box) through the lens of Milton

Chinese said this is wrong, they all listened. Wouldn’t it be ironic if we find out later that there is only one chance against debt deflation and they all missed it? We are spending all of our time looking for inflation because the Fed will be slow in raising interest rates

while the roof is caving in. The private sector’s desire to unburden itself of debt is so great that debt deflation seems much more likely. And if it rolls over with everyone loaded up on risk again, playing commodities and inflation expectations, bonds could go parabolic

methods Bear market Bear Stearns bailout government bond leverage change perspective (Bernanke) Beauty contest, concept Benchmark Beneficiaries, payments (impact) Bernanke, Ben actions Bear Stearns perspective debt deflation perspective success/error Beta alpha, contrast correlation portfolio Beta-plus domination Big Oil Black box applications, naivete Black swan Bolton, Anthony Bond option positions, leverage

Inflated: How Money and Debt Built the American Dream

by R. Christopher Whalen  · 7 Dec 2010  · 488pp  · 144,145 words

War II. Indeed, the temptation to use a moderate and unexpected inflation tax to wipe out the real value of public debt and avoid the debt deflation of the private sector is powerful, and history may repeat itself—even if the short-term maturity of U.S. liabilities, the risk of a

Seven Crashes: The Economic Crises That Shaped Globalization

by Harold James  · 15 Jan 2023  · 469pp  · 137,880 words

forced borrowers to liquidate stock and other assets, and drove prices down further. This is the process identified at the time by Irving Fisher as debt-deflation, one that was later built into a model of transmission mechanism as the credit channel by Ben Bernanke. International Rescues? Could there have been a

logic that had been influentially analyzed by Irving Fisher, a major figure in the development of the quantity theory of money, who termed the process debt-deflation.99 Bernanke built the insight into a formal model. In the 1990s it was hard to find examples of the insidious damage caused by deflation

1989): 14 –31; Ben Bernanke and Mark Gertler, “Financial Fragility and Economic Performance,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 105 (February 1990): 87–114. 99. Irving Fisher, “Debt Deflation,” Economica 1, no.4 (1933): 337–357. 100. Ben Bernanke, “Japanese Monetary Policy: A Case of Self-Induced Paralysis,” in Japan’s Financial Crisis and

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Extreme Money: Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk

by Satyajit Das  · 14 Oct 2011  · 741pp  · 179,454 words

How Markets Fail: The Logic of Economic Calamities

by John Cassidy  · 10 Nov 2009  · 545pp  · 137,789 words

Why We Can't Afford the Rich

by Andrew Sayer  · 6 Nov 2014  · 504pp  · 143,303 words

Stolen: How to Save the World From Financialisation

by Grace Blakeley  · 9 Sep 2019  · 263pp  · 80,594 words

Them And Us: Politics, Greed And Inequality - Why We Need A Fair Society

by Will Hutton  · 30 Sep 2010  · 543pp  · 147,357 words

Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste: How Neoliberalism Survived the Financial Meltdown

by Philip Mirowski  · 24 Jun 2013  · 662pp  · 180,546 words

The Corona Crash: How the Pandemic Will Change Capitalism

by Grace Blakeley  · 14 Oct 2020  · 82pp  · 24,150 words

Capital Ideas: The Improbable Origins of Modern Wall Street

by Peter L. Bernstein  · 19 Jun 2005  · 425pp  · 122,223 words

Money Changes Everything: How Finance Made Civilization Possible

by William N. Goetzmann  · 11 Apr 2016  · 695pp  · 194,693 words

Rethinking the Economics of Land and Housing

by Josh Ryan-Collins, Toby Lloyd and Laurie Macfarlane  · 28 Feb 2017  · 346pp  · 90,371 words

Value of Everything: An Antidote to Chaos The

by Mariana Mazzucato  · 25 Apr 2018  · 457pp  · 125,329 words