by Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig · 15 Feb 2013 · 726pp · 172,988 words
book is the result. While writing the book, we also did more research with Peter DeMarzo and Paul Pfleiderer, which led to a sequel article, “Debt Overhang and Capital Regulation,” on which the book also draws. Writing a book when one author is located in California and the other in Germany requires
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subsidies encourage banks to be more fragile. They reinforce the distortions from the bias that heavy borrowers have toward even more borrowing, the effect of debt overhang discussed in Chapter 3. Excessive borrowing by banks can expose the public to great risks. A bank exposing the public to risks is similar to
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8, becomes stronger. Government guarantees and subsidies thus reinforce the effects of bankers’ compensation and the focus on ROE, as well as the effects of debt overhang, all of which encourage borrowing and risk. The prospect of becoming systemically important or too big to fail provides banks with incentives to grow and
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funds may well be undesirable for the bank’s shareholders, its other creditors, and society. As discussed in Chapter 3, heavy borrowers are affected by debt overhang, which makes them resist reducing their indebtedness if doing so would make their remaining debt safer at their expense. In fact, heavy borrowers have incentives
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concerns with banks’ solvency and with the quality of the supposedly safe and liquid mortgage-related securities that they created and held. The effects of debt overhang and the rat race of borrowing are further strengthened by government guarantees and the subsidies given to bank borrowing that were discussed in Chapter 9
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. Bank managers, and possibly shareholders, would resist a requirement that they issue new shares for the same reasons that they resist a ban on payouts—debt overhang and the potential loss of taxpayer subsidies. As noted earlier, however, none of these concerns relates to any cost to society.29 It is legitimate
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creditors, whereas shareholders effectively fund them fully on their own. In that sense, borrowing can become addictive. This is part of an important effect called “debt overhang,” which will be introduced in Chapter 3 and will come up in many later discussions in this book. We discuss new stock issuance again in
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in Chapter 11. 18. The observation that distressed borrowers may underinvest because of the overhanging debt was made by Myers (1977). When banks suffer from debt overhang, they make fewer loans, as happened in late 2008 (see Ivashina and Scharfstein 2010). There is evidence that homeowners who are underwater do not invest
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bankers and banks, which are caused by a combination of flawed compensation structures and governance problems, government guarantees and subsidies, regulations, and distortionary effects of debt overhang. 20. An equity ratio based on market value could be calculated by dividing the market value of the bank’s equity (so-called market capitalization
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, any investments they make affect not just their shareholders but also their creditors. This can give rise to a debt overhang effect, which might make shareholders hold back from making investments. The debt overhang effect was introduced in Chapter 3; it is due to the conflicts of interest between borrowers and creditors and creates
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dealers acted defensively given their own capital and liquidity problems, raising credit terms to their borrowers.” Credit crunches are actually due to the effect of debt overhang discussed in Chapter 3, which leads distressed lenders to avoid making loans that they would have made had they been less distressed. 55. As discussed
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, June 8, 2010. The use of preferred stock instead of equity is also problematic because it constrains banks in many ways and thus adds a debt overhang that can interfere with lending, as discussed in Chapter 3 and earlier in this chapter. 83. The discussion in Chapter 7 about whether equity is
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2010/42, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany. Admati, Anat R., Peter M. DeMarzo, Martin F. Hellwig, and Paul Pfleiderer. 2012a. “Debt Overhang and Capital Regulation.” Working paper, Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University; and research paper, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford, CA; Preprint 2012
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. 2010. The New Lombard Street. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Meltzer, Allan. 2012. Why Capitalism? New York: Oxford University Press. Melzer, Brian T. 2012. “Mortgage Debt Overhang: Reduced Investment by Homeowners with Negative Equity.” Working paper. Northwestern University, Chicago. Merkley, Jeff, and Carl Levin. 2011. “The Dodd-Frank Act Restrictions on Proprietary
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interest: of auditors, 128, 286n40; in bank borrowing, 13; in bankruptcy of businesses, 141; in contingent convertible bonds, 188; of corporate shareholders, 126–27; in debt overhang, 130, 162–63, 173; in fragility of banking system, 149; in regulatory capture, 205; in risk-weighting approach, 184; in solvency problems, 41, 43 Congress
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.S., 322n32 debt contracts, restrictions (covenants) in, 41, 141–42 debt-equity funding mix. See funding mix debt guarantees. See guarantees debtors’ prison, 36, 244n6 debt overhang, 33, 42–43, 241n16, 246n18; effect on lending, 81, 232n18, 246n19, 267n19, 279n26; excessive borrowing encouraged by, 43–45, 130, 162–63, 165, 173, 175
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, 120, 122 Diamond, Douglas W., 249nn11–12, 249n14, 250n19, 301n56 DIDMCA. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act dilution, 28, 175, 306n29. See also debt overhang Dimon, Jamie: on allowing bank failures, 77–78; on Basel III, 194; on blame for financial crisis of 2007-2009, 1, 229nn2–3; as board
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, 326n58; on risk-weighted assets, 312n63 disciplining effect, of short-term debt of banks, 164, 301n56, 317n83 distortions in markets, 197–98. See also bailouts; debt overhang; externalities; guarantees; risk taking, excessive, in financial distress; subsidies distress, financial, 41–43; in banks, importance of preventing, 81, 171–72; in banks, strategies for
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preventing, 218–24; in businesses, costs of, 140–42; caution or recklessness in response to, 33, 41–43; covenants and, 141; debt overhang in, 42–43; hidden insolvency and, 54–55, 171; inefficiencies in, 246n18; investment decisions during, 41–43, 246n18. See also bankruptcy dividends: benefits of ban
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, 95; career concerns and, 127, 228, 319n9; in compensation, 116, 122–27, 283n21, 284n24, 284n27; and corporate governance, 277n13; in creditworthiness assessments, 56, 58; in debt overhang, 130, 162–63; in evaluation of insolvency, 41; gambling for resurrection, 33, 54–55; induced by guarantees, 130, 139, 142–45, 198; for lending versus
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, 71 “other people’s money,” 215–17, 333n36. See also corporate governance output, during financial crisis of 2007-2009, 5, 146, 233n19, 237n42 overhang. See debt overhang Palepu, Krishna G., 266n8 Pandit, Vikram, 232n18, 274n60 panics, 51–53; in liquidity narrative of financial crisis of 2007–2009, 211; over mortgage-related securities
by Mohamed A. El-Erian · 26 Jan 2016 · 318pp · 77,223 words
escaping a liquidity trap and the challenging aspects of balance sheet recessions to a change in productivity trends, lack of infrastructure investment, the effects of debt overhangs, demography, and “the race against the machines.” These are all factors that, first, hold actual growth below the potential of the economy, and second, act
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, addressing simultaneously 1) lagging structural reforms to revamp growth engines; 2) the mismatch in aggregate demand between the ability and willingness to spend; 3) persistent debt overhangs that undermine existing and new productive capacity; and 4) Europe’s incomplete regional integration project, as well as other multilateral bottlenecks. I believe that if
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, geopolitical, political, and social factors. Long-term unemployment makes it harder for individuals, and society as a whole, to overcome debt burdens—thus the persistent debt overhangs in parts of Europe and the increasing worries about student loans in the United States, among other things. Together with growing inequality (see the next
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detail to the critical four sets of necessary measures we introduced before—pro-growth structural reforms, better composition and level of aggregate demand, lifting of debt overhangs, and progress in completing Europe’s regional integration project. We will turn to these after a brief specification of the analytical approach. CHAPTER 20 THE
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secretariat for the group rather than experience the inevitable interruption in continuity associated with annual handoffs among countries in both chairmanship and secretariat. 3. REMOVING DEBT OVERHANGS The Third Policy Component involves intelligently dealing with residual pockets of excessive and persistent indebtedness that sap productive energies and discourage new investments. We need
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! As such, new investment simply avoids being part of what can often be a productive rehabilitation process. On paper, there are four ways to overcome debt overhangs. The best is through high economic growth, which allows debtors—be they countries, companies, or households—to service and pay off existing debt while also
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, as illustrated by the (albeit extreme) case of Greece, situations of excessive indebtedness can slowly slip into a vicious cycle in which inadequate growth aggravates debt overhangs, while at the same time the expanding overhangs themselves undermine growth further. To make things worse, the liquidity and solvency challenges become deeply intertwined and
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taxing creditors and subsidizing debtors through artificially low and repressed interest rates, the financial repression regime that central banks have been imposing can help alleviate debt overhangs. But it takes a long time—a very long time—for such a strategy to make a decisive breakthrough. In the meantime, it risks significant
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collateral damage and unintended consequences that, among other things, distort growth engines, as we have discussed earlier. A third way to deal with debt overhangs is through unilateral default. This has been tried many times, including by Russia in 1998 and Argentina in 2001. But this approach does not by
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management over time. All of this leads to the fourth way—that involving orderly debt and debt service reduction (DDSR). DDSR is needed to overcome debt overhangs in situations where sufficient growth is not forthcoming, default would be too disruptive, and financial repression is not enough. Fortunately, history provides a guide on
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debt reduction, fearing both the precedent and the popular reaction at home. As such, Greece continued to struggle under the stifling weight of a large debt overhang. Human costs cascaded. And the problems became even more deeply and stubbornly entrenched, making the solution harder and more expensive. Looking at the Eurozone situation
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policy-making entities remain on the sidelines. Central banks can do a little bit more when it comes to the problems of inadequate demand and debt overhangs—though, again, we need to understand that because they are just one part of the required policy response, their efforts come with unintended consequences, including
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on what needs to be done, particularly when it comes to the four policy priorities we have discussed (related to structural reforms, inadequate aggregate demand, debt overhangs, and incomplete regional and international architecture). Yet the probability of converting this consensus into action is quite remote. Decisive policy breakthroughs in advanced economies are
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is a significant amount of real consensus among economists on the four-legged policy response detailed earlier—invigorating structural reforms, rebalancing aggregate demand, lifting crippling debt overhangs, and modernizing regional and global architectures. The longer the world waits for such comprehensive responses, the more the ten distinct but reinforcing forces discussed earlier
by Martin Wolf · 24 Nov 2015 · 524pp · 143,993 words
fall sharply, they remained significant (see Figures 6 and 7). For countries caught in a deflationary trap, these spreads might yet prove unmanageable. Moreover, the debt overhangs, high interest rates, banking-sector weakness and broken mechanisms for transmission of monetary policy, which are characteristic of all financial crises, inevitably led to deep
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it is the latter, the Eurozone crisis is exported. A clash must also arise, within this low-inflation Eurozone, between improving competitiveness and managing the debt overhang. This is because a rapid restoration in competitiveness of countries like Italy or Spain requires falling wages and prices. But falling wages and prices also
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we know, telling the truth. There is, however, one reason why high leverage might be attractive to shareholders, even in the absence of government guarantees: debt overhangs. In their important book on the perils of high bank leverage, professors Anat Admati of Stanford University and Martin Hellwig of the Max Planck Institute
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), needs the capacity to bear large losses, particularly if failure is likely to cause a global economic meltdown. Much higher equity would protect creditors, remove debt overhangs and eliminate the shareholders’ incentive to go for broke. It would also make government promises not to save creditors more credible, since the failure of
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is costly. But the reasons for this are never made entirely clear (if we leave aside fiscal and other subsidies). Furthermore, with higher leverage, the ‘debt overhang’ problem continues: shareholders would have less interest in running a bank prudently because much of the benefit of their doing so would accrue to creditors
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]. It could take many more years to finish an orderly deleveraging in the UK and Spain.’29 In brief, what is needed to handle the debt overhang is a strategy for demand expansion, low interest rates, reconstruction of the financial system, and restructuring and reduction of non-financial debts. Of the big
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2010, and so rely on monetary policy. As argued in Chapter Eight, this policy has created significant dangers. It might not work well, given the debt overhang. If it worked, it might begin another unsustainable credit-cum-asset-price boom. Yet, for some reason, policymakers regarded this reliance on monetary policy as
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the mundane into something far more important. The economic troubles of crisis-hit economies are evident: huge recessions, extraordinarily high unemployment, mass emigration and heavy debt overhangs. The constitutional disorder that has resulted remains insufficiently emphasized. Within the Eurozone, power is now concentrated in the hands of the governments of the creditor
by Kariappa Bheemaiah · 26 Feb 2017 · 492pp · 118,882 words
when the supply of credit is cut, as it occurs in the wake of bust or a crisis. What this leads to is a debt overhang effect. A debt overhang is a debt burden that is so large that a household or entity cannot take on additional debt to finance future projects, even if
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to it, are one of the reasons recovery has been slow following the crisis (Jorda et al., 2016). While crises can cause great harm, the debt overhang created by excessive debt issuance can have more long-lasting effects . As house prices fall, those households and companies which are highly leveraged attempt to
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. Hence, the demand side of credit availability becomes the more pressing issue (Koo, 2014), for even if credit is supplied at a low price, the debt overhang effect reduces the demand for credit. When companies cut investment and households reduce spending, government deficits increase as tax revenues fall and social expenditures for
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dancers move in gracious circles in a Viennese waltz, the interconnection of financial markets with a sovereign’s economy further metastasizes the effect of the debt overhang and causes it to spread into other sectors of the economy and across other economies. The figures show this effect: Between 2007 and 2014, global
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the figure shows a general upward trend with regards to public debt growth, the same report goes on to show that evolution of debt and debt overhang is getting increasingly divergent and picking up pace. Moreover, in a few developed countries such as France, Sweden, and Belgium, private sector debt has actually
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rendered to the importance of credit for economic growth. But, as seen in the previous chapter, the issuance of increased amounts of debt leads to debt overhang and the shifting of the debt burden from private to public sectors. In addition, sustainable, continuous growth in a consumerist society requires the constant purchase
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, and excessive debt levels at the sovereign level. In light of technological unemployment and the fact that private debt ultimately becomes pubic debt and creates debt overhang effects, what needs to be considered is the role of the state in money creation and if it is a better idea to only let
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not used for economic growth, but is instead invested in housing/real estate. As a result, it does not proportionally increase demand, and leads to debt-overhang and recession. The main objective of policy makers should thus be to create a less credit-concentrated economy. Without such measures, capitalism is a ticking
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Disaster Defines Our Times, and What We Can Do About It . London: Allen Lane - Penguin Random House. Doug Campbell, F. O. (2010). Overextended, Underinvested: The Debt Overhang Problem. Cleveland: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. Economic Costs . (2015, April). Retrieved from Costs of War: http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/economic European Banking
by Mihir Desai · 22 May 2017 · 239pp · 69,496 words
may ask yourself if you can take on additional commitments to pursue those dreams. That problem is known by the ominous name of “debt overhang.” The idea of debt overhang is that you can prevent yourself from doing things you should do because of the shadow of a preexisting commitment. Think of a homeowner
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owner have the right incentives. The shadow of that preexisting commitment prevents the owner from doing the things he needs to do. This idea of debt overhang, in part, is why the housing crisis was so scary—with nearly one in five owners underwater in 2009, we might have seen many more
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is better off for taking that loss. Unfortunately, lenders often are unwilling to take those losses. There exists no more gut-wrenching a portrait of debt overhang—and the shadow of preexisting commitments—in our personal lives than Kazuo Ishiguro’s portrait of Mr. Stevens in The Remains of the Day. Mr
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—as we’ll see in the next chapter, it can lead to bankruptcy where the commitments you’ve made become untenable. But the danger of debt overhang is much more general. Negotiating our existing commitments to allow us to take on new ones is the critical life skill that finance highlights
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. Debt overhang is the manifestation of not being able to renegotiate those commitments to take on new opportunities—and the resulting loss for everyone involved. And Mr.
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. “Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have.” Journal of Financial Economics 13, no. 2 (1984): 187–221. For debt overhang, in particular, see Ishiguro, Kazuo. The Remains of the Day. New York: Knopf, 1989; Myers, Stewart. “Determinants of Corporate Borrowing.” Journal of Financial Economics 5
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, 30 Crews, Frederick, 94 Crossroads of Should and Must, The (Luna), 90–92 Curry, Stephen, 51 D Davies, Owen, 25 Dead Poets Society (film), 17 debt overhang, 132–35 “Defence of Usury” (Bentham), 121 de la Vega, Joseph. See Vega, Joseph de la DeLillo, Don, 165 diminishing marginal utility of wealth, 166
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a Deal (TV show), 16 leverage, 8 benefits and drawbacks, 123–26, 135 Bentham and Smith conflict on, 121–22 “bonus” of leverage, 137–38 debt overhang, 132–35 definition, 123–24 leveraged buyout, 127 risk and return, 125–27 static trade-off theory, 126 leverage, personal and artistic, 127–30 commitment
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device, 131, 137–40 connection to debt overhang, 132–35 degree of leverage, 130–32 effective use, 138–39 failure and rebirth, 149–50 life-cycle hypothesis, 135–36 role of reputation, 139
by Robert J. Shiller · 1 Jan 2012 · 288pp · 16,556 words
become leveraged, so that any otherwise small problem becomes magni ed by the debt. If debt becomes too large relative to resources, there is a “debt overhang,” which inhibits any form of positive action. People, and rms and governments as well, feel pinned down by their debt. Few of the individuals presented
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was paying attention to the problem, and, given the social basis for human attention, it was natural that most people would simply not think about debt overhang. These are powerful psychological motivations not to x the fundamental problem, and as of this writing European banks still have zero capital requirements against eurodenominated
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of all debts were magni ed. This change bene ted creditors at the expense of debtors, but the net e ect was negative. The augmented debt overhang led to cutbacks in expenditure that persisted as long as did the overhang problem. Recently economic theorist John Geanakoplos has expanded on Fisher’s theory
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has not been signi cant de ation during the severe nancial crisis that began in 2007, the crisis is indeed well thought of as a debt overhang problem.6 When people’s debts exceed their assets, many problems are created for the economy: Geanakoplos lists nine troubling “externalities” caused by the
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debt overhang. These include troubles in the construction industry, setbacks for small business, rising inequality, loss of productivity, and damage to collateral.7 Thus there is a
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that might occur, and a feeling of safety in numbers as millions of people increase their indebtedness. After the boom, during a time of severe debt overhang, there is still a tendency to regard the government as the ultimate savior, and to circle in a holding pattern, hoping for help. The holding
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pattern itself generates economic distress. The debt overhang problem is remarkably refractory. People, corporations, and governments who have accepted higher leverage in boom times may be unable to rid themselves of its adverse
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effects for years to come. Evidence for the persistence of a debt overhang problem can be seen in the events that typically follow a change of government in a country. When there is such a change, one might
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rigid mindsets and traditions but change the fundamental ways in which we do things. Lasting solutions to the problems of the leverage cycle and the debt overhang have to balance the bene ts of freely available credit against the cyclical and systemic problems that debt can create. Designing these solutions will be
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contracts, 148; microfinance, 44; odious, 157–58; perceptions of, 148; personal, 151–52, 153; risks, 151, 153, 154–55; salubrious, 158. See also bonds; mortgages debt overhang, 153, 156 democratization: of finance, 43–44, 47, 144, 150, 209–11, 214, 235, 239; of financial capitalism, xiii–xiv, xvii, 5–6, 8–9
by Christopher Leonard · 11 Jan 2022 · 416pp · 124,469 words
more than 5 percent to just under 4 percent by early 1992, hoping to give the economy some sweet, palliative medicine that might counteract the debt overhang. But it quickly became clear that a lot more medicine was going to be necessary. Throughout 1992, the Fed cut rates steadily, meeting after meeting
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remained high, almost four years after the crash of 2008. This long period of anemic growth was entirely expected and predictable because of the big debt overhang that remained from the housing bubble, but Bernanke felt pressure to act and to keep the Federal Reserve at the center of efforts to boost
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plan. The foreign threat came from Europe. The domestic threat came from Congress. In Europe, the financial crisis of 2008 had never really ended. The debt overhang in Europe was simply astounding. Just three European banks had taken on so much debt before 2008 that their balance sheets amounted to 17 percent
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, U.S., 8, 24, 27–28, 50, 88, 133, 170, 238, 259, 304 cycles and patterns in, 72–74, 95, 238 depressions in, see depressions debt overhang and, 73–75, 102, 126 Fed as central driver of policy making for, 15, 75, 114–16, 120–21 GDP in, 302 Greenspan’s perceived
by Philippe Legrain · 22 Apr 2014 · 497pp · 150,205 words
. But some of the debts are owed to other financial players, such as hedge funds, and investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies. This debt overhang is another big impediment to growth. Many households in countries that have suffered a housing bust – such as Spain, Ireland and the Netherlands – have mortgages
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boom – and hence a speedy recovery – was predicated wouldn’t happen in a depressed and hidebound economy with a broken banking system and a huge debt overhang. The programme devised by the Troika – the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF, who together were put in charge of Greece’s destiny – forecast
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Greek debt were known after the first EU bank stress tests in 2009 and could have been publicised. Far from sparking panic, then, tackling the debt overhang could have reduced uncertainty and therefore stabilised markets.144 Eurozone policymakers’ handling of Greece was so inept that they spread panic rather than quelling it
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an insolvent Greece – loans that will ultimately have to be written off. As we shall see, Greece’s debts have soared since 2010, because the debt overhang and the massive austerity have crippled the economy. But they are now mostly owed to the EU and the IMF. In effect, Greece’s creditors
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so had a choice. Even so, it was ludicrous to suggest that restructuring Greece’s debts would do more damage to the economy than the debt overhang, the crippling fears of a Greek default and euro exit, and the resulting investment slump. Bini Smaghi also argued that respect for debts contracts was
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of loans into bonds that banks can sell to investors – could be stepped up. Ultimately, though, banks’ balance sheets need to be cleaned up, the debt overhang tackled and growth rekindled. Until its banking problems are dealt with through a common, comprehensive and conclusive approach, the eurozone is likely to remain sickly
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this unjust imposition.338 The biggest worry is that prolonged stagnation could tip even Italy into insolvency. Policy shift Fixing the banks and clearing the debt overhang would do wonders for crisis-stricken economies’ prospects. So too would longer-term reforms to make all European economies more dynamic and adaptable, as Chapters
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finances quickly is not to counterproductively pursue austerity at the same time as the private sector, but rather to fix the banks, clear the private debt overhang and boost productive investment. While the eurozone’s new fiscal straightjacket (see Chapter 6) greatly limits governments’ room for manoeuvre, they could still shift their
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how much worse the bust would have been.) So when dotcoms crashed, investors suffered a loss of wealth, but were not left with a massive debt overhang. Banks were largely unscathed and so could continue lending to the rest of the economy. While growth slowed, the US did not even suffer two
by Ann Pettifor · 27 Mar 2017 · 182pp · 53,802 words
, and in a vast overhang of private debt. This is especially so under conditions of ‘austerity’. Monetary reformers are right to argue that such private debt overhangs are wrong; socially, politically, morally and economically wrong. Which is why high real rates of interest, even when central bank rates are low, should be
by Paul Krugman · 30 Apr 2012 · 267pp · 71,123 words
that much more room to cut when crisis struck. Yet that isn’t the only reason higher inflation would be helpful. There’s also the debt overhang—the excessive private debt that set the stage for the Minsky moment and the slump that followed. Deflation, said Fisher, can depress the economy by
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