debt overhang

back to index

63 results

The Bankers' New Clothes: What's Wrong With Banking and What to Do About It

by Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig  · 15 Feb 2013  · 726pp  · 172,988 words

book is the result. While writing the book, we also did more research with Peter DeMarzo and Paul Pfleiderer, which led to a sequel article, “Debt Overhang and Capital Regulation,” on which the book also draws. Writing a book when one author is located in California and the other in Germany requires

subsidies encourage banks to be more fragile. They reinforce the distortions from the bias that heavy borrowers have toward even more borrowing, the effect of debt overhang discussed in Chapter 3. Excessive borrowing by banks can expose the public to great risks. A bank exposing the public to risks is similar to

8, becomes stronger. Government guarantees and subsidies thus reinforce the effects of bankers’ compensation and the focus on ROE, as well as the effects of debt overhang, all of which encourage borrowing and risk. The prospect of becoming systemically important or too big to fail provides banks with incentives to grow and

funds may well be undesirable for the bank’s shareholders, its other creditors, and society. As discussed in Chapter 3, heavy borrowers are affected by debt overhang, which makes them resist reducing their indebtedness if doing so would make their remaining debt safer at their expense. In fact, heavy borrowers have incentives

concerns with banks’ solvency and with the quality of the supposedly safe and liquid mortgage-related securities that they created and held. The effects of debt overhang and the rat race of borrowing are further strengthened by government guarantees and the subsidies given to bank borrowing that were discussed in Chapter 9

. Bank managers, and possibly shareholders, would resist a requirement that they issue new shares for the same reasons that they resist a ban on payouts—debt overhang and the potential loss of taxpayer subsidies. As noted earlier, however, none of these concerns relates to any cost to society.29 It is legitimate

creditors, whereas shareholders effectively fund them fully on their own. In that sense, borrowing can become addictive. This is part of an important effect called “debt overhang,” which will be introduced in Chapter 3 and will come up in many later discussions in this book. We discuss new stock issuance again in

in Chapter 11. 18. The observation that distressed borrowers may underinvest because of the overhanging debt was made by Myers (1977). When banks suffer from debt overhang, they make fewer loans, as happened in late 2008 (see Ivashina and Scharfstein 2010). There is evidence that homeowners who are underwater do not invest

bankers and banks, which are caused by a combination of flawed compensation structures and governance problems, government guarantees and subsidies, regulations, and distortionary effects of debt overhang. 20. An equity ratio based on market value could be calculated by dividing the market value of the bank’s equity (so-called market capitalization

, any investments they make affect not just their shareholders but also their creditors. This can give rise to a debt overhang effect, which might make shareholders hold back from making investments. The debt overhang effect was introduced in Chapter 3; it is due to the conflicts of interest between borrowers and creditors and creates

dealers acted defensively given their own capital and liquidity problems, raising credit terms to their borrowers.” Credit crunches are actually due to the effect of debt overhang discussed in Chapter 3, which leads distressed lenders to avoid making loans that they would have made had they been less distressed. 55. As discussed

, June 8, 2010. The use of preferred stock instead of equity is also problematic because it constrains banks in many ways and thus adds a debt overhang that can interfere with lending, as discussed in Chapter 3 and earlier in this chapter. 83. The discussion in Chapter 7 about whether equity is

2010/42, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany. Admati, Anat R., Peter M. DeMarzo, Martin F. Hellwig, and Paul Pfleiderer. 2012a. “Debt Overhang and Capital Regulation.” Working paper, Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University; and research paper, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford, CA; Preprint 2012

. 2010. The New Lombard Street. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Meltzer, Allan. 2012. Why Capitalism? New York: Oxford University Press. Melzer, Brian T. 2012. “Mortgage Debt Overhang: Reduced Investment by Homeowners with Negative Equity.” Working paper. Northwestern University, Chicago. Merkley, Jeff, and Carl Levin. 2011. “The Dodd-Frank Act Restrictions on Proprietary

interest: of auditors, 128, 286n40; in bank borrowing, 13; in bankruptcy of businesses, 141; in contingent convertible bonds, 188; of corporate shareholders, 126–27; in debt overhang, 130, 162–63, 173; in fragility of banking system, 149; in regulatory capture, 205; in risk-weighting approach, 184; in solvency problems, 41, 43 Congress

.S., 322n32 debt contracts, restrictions (covenants) in, 41, 141–42 debt-equity funding mix. See funding mix debt guarantees. See guarantees debtors’ prison, 36, 244n6 debt overhang, 33, 42–43, 241n16, 246n18; effect on lending, 81, 232n18, 246n19, 267n19, 279n26; excessive borrowing encouraged by, 43–45, 130, 162–63, 165, 173, 175

, 120, 122 Diamond, Douglas W., 249nn11–12, 249n14, 250n19, 301n56 DIDMCA. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act dilution, 28, 175, 306n29. See also debt overhang Dimon, Jamie: on allowing bank failures, 77–78; on Basel III, 194; on blame for financial crisis of 2007-2009, 1, 229nn2–3; as board

, 326n58; on risk-weighted assets, 312n63 disciplining effect, of short-term debt of banks, 164, 301n56, 317n83 distortions in markets, 197–98. See also bailouts; debt overhang; externalities; guarantees; risk taking, excessive, in financial distress; subsidies distress, financial, 41–43; in banks, importance of preventing, 81, 171–72; in banks, strategies for

preventing, 218–24; in businesses, costs of, 140–42; caution or recklessness in response to, 33, 41–43; covenants and, 141; debt overhang in, 42–43; hidden insolvency and, 54–55, 171; inefficiencies in, 246n18; investment decisions during, 41–43, 246n18. See also bankruptcy dividends: benefits of ban

, 95; career concerns and, 127, 228, 319n9; in compensation, 116, 122–27, 283n21, 284n24, 284n27; and corporate governance, 277n13; in creditworthiness assessments, 56, 58; in debt overhang, 130, 162–63; in evaluation of insolvency, 41; gambling for resurrection, 33, 54–55; induced by guarantees, 130, 139, 142–45, 198; for lending versus

, 71 “other people’s money,” 215–17, 333n36. See also corporate governance output, during financial crisis of 2007-2009, 5, 146, 233n19, 237n42 overhang. See debt overhang Palepu, Krishna G., 266n8 Pandit, Vikram, 232n18, 274n60 panics, 51–53; in liquidity narrative of financial crisis of 2007–2009, 211; over mortgage-related securities

The Only Game in Town: Central Banks, Instability, and Avoiding the Next Collapse

by Mohamed A. El-Erian  · 26 Jan 2016  · 318pp  · 77,223 words

escaping a liquidity trap and the challenging aspects of balance sheet recessions to a change in productivity trends, lack of infrastructure investment, the effects of debt overhangs, demography, and “the race against the machines.” These are all factors that, first, hold actual growth below the potential of the economy, and second, act

, addressing simultaneously 1) lagging structural reforms to revamp growth engines; 2) the mismatch in aggregate demand between the ability and willingness to spend; 3) persistent debt overhangs that undermine existing and new productive capacity; and 4) Europe’s incomplete regional integration project, as well as other multilateral bottlenecks. I believe that if

, geopolitical, political, and social factors. Long-term unemployment makes it harder for individuals, and society as a whole, to overcome debt burdens—thus the persistent debt overhangs in parts of Europe and the increasing worries about student loans in the United States, among other things. Together with growing inequality (see the next

detail to the critical four sets of necessary measures we introduced before—pro-growth structural reforms, better composition and level of aggregate demand, lifting of debt overhangs, and progress in completing Europe’s regional integration project. We will turn to these after a brief specification of the analytical approach. CHAPTER 20 THE

secretariat for the group rather than experience the inevitable interruption in continuity associated with annual handoffs among countries in both chairmanship and secretariat. 3. REMOVING DEBT OVERHANGS The Third Policy Component involves intelligently dealing with residual pockets of excessive and persistent indebtedness that sap productive energies and discourage new investments. We need

! As such, new investment simply avoids being part of what can often be a productive rehabilitation process. On paper, there are four ways to overcome debt overhangs. The best is through high economic growth, which allows debtors—be they countries, companies, or households—to service and pay off existing debt while also

, as illustrated by the (albeit extreme) case of Greece, situations of excessive indebtedness can slowly slip into a vicious cycle in which inadequate growth aggravates debt overhangs, while at the same time the expanding overhangs themselves undermine growth further. To make things worse, the liquidity and solvency challenges become deeply intertwined and

taxing creditors and subsidizing debtors through artificially low and repressed interest rates, the financial repression regime that central banks have been imposing can help alleviate debt overhangs. But it takes a long time—a very long time—for such a strategy to make a decisive breakthrough. In the meantime, it risks significant

collateral damage and unintended consequences that, among other things, distort growth engines, as we have discussed earlier. A third way to deal with debt overhangs is through unilateral default. This has been tried many times, including by Russia in 1998 and Argentina in 2001. But this approach does not by

management over time. All of this leads to the fourth way—that involving orderly debt and debt service reduction (DDSR). DDSR is needed to overcome debt overhangs in situations where sufficient growth is not forthcoming, default would be too disruptive, and financial repression is not enough. Fortunately, history provides a guide on

debt reduction, fearing both the precedent and the popular reaction at home. As such, Greece continued to struggle under the stifling weight of a large debt overhang. Human costs cascaded. And the problems became even more deeply and stubbornly entrenched, making the solution harder and more expensive. Looking at the Eurozone situation

policy-making entities remain on the sidelines. Central banks can do a little bit more when it comes to the problems of inadequate demand and debt overhangs—though, again, we need to understand that because they are just one part of the required policy response, their efforts come with unintended consequences, including

on what needs to be done, particularly when it comes to the four policy priorities we have discussed (related to structural reforms, inadequate aggregate demand, debt overhangs, and incomplete regional and international architecture). Yet the probability of converting this consensus into action is quite remote. Decisive policy breakthroughs in advanced economies are

is a significant amount of real consensus among economists on the four-legged policy response detailed earlier—invigorating structural reforms, rebalancing aggregate demand, lifting crippling debt overhangs, and modernizing regional and global architectures. The longer the world waits for such comprehensive responses, the more the ten distinct but reinforcing forces discussed earlier

The Shifts and the Shocks: What We've Learned--And Have Still to Learn--From the Financial Crisis

by Martin Wolf  · 24 Nov 2015  · 524pp  · 143,993 words

fall sharply, they remained significant (see Figures 6 and 7). For countries caught in a deflationary trap, these spreads might yet prove unmanageable. Moreover, the debt overhangs, high interest rates, banking-sector weakness and broken mechanisms for transmission of monetary policy, which are characteristic of all financial crises, inevitably led to deep

it is the latter, the Eurozone crisis is exported. A clash must also arise, within this low-inflation Eurozone, between improving competitiveness and managing the debt overhang. This is because a rapid restoration in competitiveness of countries like Italy or Spain requires falling wages and prices. But falling wages and prices also

we know, telling the truth. There is, however, one reason why high leverage might be attractive to shareholders, even in the absence of government guarantees: debt overhangs. In their important book on the perils of high bank leverage, professors Anat Admati of Stanford University and Martin Hellwig of the Max Planck Institute

), needs the capacity to bear large losses, particularly if failure is likely to cause a global economic meltdown. Much higher equity would protect creditors, remove debt overhangs and eliminate the shareholders’ incentive to go for broke. It would also make government promises not to save creditors more credible, since the failure of

is costly. But the reasons for this are never made entirely clear (if we leave aside fiscal and other subsidies). Furthermore, with higher leverage, the ‘debt overhang’ problem continues: shareholders would have less interest in running a bank prudently because much of the benefit of their doing so would accrue to creditors

]. It could take many more years to finish an orderly deleveraging in the UK and Spain.’29 In brief, what is needed to handle the debt overhang is a strategy for demand expansion, low interest rates, reconstruction of the financial system, and restructuring and reduction of non-financial debts. Of the big

2010, and so rely on monetary policy. As argued in Chapter Eight, this policy has created significant dangers. It might not work well, given the debt overhang. If it worked, it might begin another unsustainable credit-cum-asset-price boom. Yet, for some reason, policymakers regarded this reliance on monetary policy as

the mundane into something far more important. The economic troubles of crisis-hit economies are evident: huge recessions, extraordinarily high unemployment, mass emigration and heavy debt overhangs. The constitutional disorder that has resulted remains insufficiently emphasized. Within the Eurozone, power is now concentrated in the hands of the governments of the creditor

The Blockchain Alternative: Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy and Economic Theory

by Kariappa Bheemaiah  · 26 Feb 2017  · 492pp  · 118,882 words

when the supply of credit is cut, as it occurs in the wake of bust or a crisis. What this leads to is a debt overhang effect. A debt overhang is a debt burden that is so large that a household or entity cannot take on additional debt to finance future projects, even if

to it, are one of the reasons recovery has been slow following the crisis (Jorda et al., 2016). While crises can cause great harm, the debt overhang created by excessive debt issuance can have more long-lasting effects . As house prices fall, those households and companies which are highly leveraged attempt to

. Hence, the demand side of credit availability becomes the more pressing issue (Koo, 2014), for even if credit is supplied at a low price, the debt overhang effect reduces the demand for credit. When companies cut investment and households reduce spending, government deficits increase as tax revenues fall and social expenditures for

dancers move in gracious circles in a Viennese waltz, the interconnection of financial markets with a sovereign’s economy further metastasizes the effect of the debt overhang and causes it to spread into other sectors of the economy and across other economies. The figures show this effect: Between 2007 and 2014, global

the figure shows a general upward trend with regards to public debt growth, the same report goes on to show that evolution of debt and debt overhang is getting increasingly divergent and picking up pace. Moreover, in a few developed countries such as France, Sweden, and Belgium, private sector debt has actually

rendered to the importance of credit for economic growth. But, as seen in the previous chapter, the issuance of increased amounts of debt leads to debt overhang and the shifting of the debt burden from private to public sectors. In addition, sustainable, continuous growth in a consumerist society requires the constant purchase

, and excessive debt levels at the sovereign level. In light of technological unemployment and the fact that private debt ultimately becomes pubic debt and creates debt overhang effects, what needs to be considered is the role of the state in money creation and if it is a better idea to only let

not used for economic growth, but is instead invested in housing/real estate. As a result, it does not proportionally increase demand, and leads to debt-overhang and recession. The main objective of policy makers should thus be to create a less credit-concentrated economy. Without such measures, capitalism is a ticking

Disaster Defines Our Times, and What We Can Do About It . London: Allen Lane - Penguin Random House. Doug Campbell, F. O. (2010). Overextended, Underinvested: The Debt Overhang Problem. Cleveland: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. Economic Costs . (2015, April). Retrieved from Costs of War: http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/economic European Banking

The Wisdom of Finance: Discovering Humanity in the World of Risk and Return

by Mihir Desai  · 22 May 2017  · 239pp  · 69,496 words

may ask yourself if you can take on additional commitments to pursue those dreams. That problem is known by the ominous name of “debt overhang.” The idea of debt overhang is that you can prevent yourself from doing things you should do because of the shadow of a preexisting commitment. Think of a homeowner

owner have the right incentives. The shadow of that preexisting commitment prevents the owner from doing the things he needs to do. This idea of debt overhang, in part, is why the housing crisis was so scary—with nearly one in five owners underwater in 2009, we might have seen many more

is better off for taking that loss. Unfortunately, lenders often are unwilling to take those losses. There exists no more gut-wrenching a portrait of debt overhang—and the shadow of preexisting commitments—in our personal lives than Kazuo Ishiguro’s portrait of Mr. Stevens in The Remains of the Day. Mr

—as we’ll see in the next chapter, it can lead to bankruptcy where the commitments you’ve made become untenable. But the danger of debt overhang is much more general. Negotiating our existing commitments to allow us to take on new ones is the critical life skill that finance highlights

. Debt overhang is the manifestation of not being able to renegotiate those commitments to take on new opportunities—and the resulting loss for everyone involved. And Mr.

. “Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have.” Journal of Financial Economics 13, no. 2 (1984): 187–221. For debt overhang, in particular, see Ishiguro, Kazuo. The Remains of the Day. New York: Knopf, 1989; Myers, Stewart. “Determinants of Corporate Borrowing.” Journal of Financial Economics 5

, 30 Crews, Frederick, 94 Crossroads of Should and Must, The (Luna), 90–92 Curry, Stephen, 51 D Davies, Owen, 25 Dead Poets Society (film), 17 debt overhang, 132–35 “Defence of Usury” (Bentham), 121 de la Vega, Joseph. See Vega, Joseph de la DeLillo, Don, 165 diminishing marginal utility of wealth, 166

a Deal (TV show), 16 leverage, 8 benefits and drawbacks, 123–26, 135 Bentham and Smith conflict on, 121–22 “bonus” of leverage, 137–38 debt overhang, 132–35 definition, 123–24 leveraged buyout, 127 risk and return, 125–27 static trade-off theory, 126 leverage, personal and artistic, 127–30 commitment

device, 131, 137–40 connection to debt overhang, 132–35 degree of leverage, 130–32 effective use, 138–39 failure and rebirth, 149–50 life-cycle hypothesis, 135–36 role of reputation, 139

Finance and the Good Society

by Robert J. Shiller  · 1 Jan 2012  · 288pp  · 16,556 words

become leveraged, so that any otherwise small problem becomes magni ed by the debt. If debt becomes too large relative to resources, there is a “debt overhang,” which inhibits any form of positive action. People, and rms and governments as well, feel pinned down by their debt. Few of the individuals presented

was paying attention to the problem, and, given the social basis for human attention, it was natural that most people would simply not think about debt overhang. These are powerful psychological motivations not to x the fundamental problem, and as of this writing European banks still have zero capital requirements against eurodenominated

of all debts were magni ed. This change bene ted creditors at the expense of debtors, but the net e ect was negative. The augmented debt overhang led to cutbacks in expenditure that persisted as long as did the overhang problem. Recently economic theorist John Geanakoplos has expanded on Fisher’s theory

has not been signi cant de ation during the severe nancial crisis that began in 2007, the crisis is indeed well thought of as a debt overhang problem.6 When people’s debts exceed their assets, many problems are created for the economy: Geanakoplos lists nine troubling “externalities” caused by the

debt overhang. These include troubles in the construction industry, setbacks for small business, rising inequality, loss of productivity, and damage to collateral.7 Thus there is a

that might occur, and a feeling of safety in numbers as millions of people increase their indebtedness. After the boom, during a time of severe debt overhang, there is still a tendency to regard the government as the ultimate savior, and to circle in a holding pattern, hoping for help. The holding

pattern itself generates economic distress. The debt overhang problem is remarkably refractory. People, corporations, and governments who have accepted higher leverage in boom times may be unable to rid themselves of its adverse

effects for years to come. Evidence for the persistence of a debt overhang problem can be seen in the events that typically follow a change of government in a country. When there is such a change, one might

rigid mindsets and traditions but change the fundamental ways in which we do things. Lasting solutions to the problems of the leverage cycle and the debt overhang have to balance the bene ts of freely available credit against the cyclical and systemic problems that debt can create. Designing these solutions will be

contracts, 148; microfinance, 44; odious, 157–58; perceptions of, 148; personal, 151–52, 153; risks, 151, 153, 154–55; salubrious, 158. See also bonds; mortgages debt overhang, 153, 156 democratization: of finance, 43–44, 47, 144, 150, 209–11, 214, 235, 239; of financial capitalism, xiii–xiv, xvii, 5–6, 8–9

The Lords of Easy Money: How the Federal Reserve Broke the American Economy

by Christopher Leonard  · 11 Jan 2022  · 416pp  · 124,469 words

more than 5 percent to just under 4 percent by early 1992, hoping to give the economy some sweet, palliative medicine that might counteract the debt overhang. But it quickly became clear that a lot more medicine was going to be necessary. Throughout 1992, the Fed cut rates steadily, meeting after meeting

remained high, almost four years after the crash of 2008. This long period of anemic growth was entirely expected and predictable because of the big debt overhang that remained from the housing bubble, but Bernanke felt pressure to act and to keep the Federal Reserve at the center of efforts to boost

plan. The foreign threat came from Europe. The domestic threat came from Congress. In Europe, the financial crisis of 2008 had never really ended. The debt overhang in Europe was simply astounding. Just three European banks had taken on so much debt before 2008 that their balance sheets amounted to 17 percent

, U.S., 8, 24, 27–28, 50, 88, 133, 170, 238, 259, 304 cycles and patterns in, 72–74, 95, 238 depressions in, see depressions debt overhang and, 73–75, 102, 126 Fed as central driver of policy making for, 15, 75, 114–16, 120–21 GDP in, 302 Greenspan’s perceived

European Spring: Why Our Economies and Politics Are in a Mess - and How to Put Them Right

by Philippe Legrain  · 22 Apr 2014  · 497pp  · 150,205 words

. But some of the debts are owed to other financial players, such as hedge funds, and investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies. This debt overhang is another big impediment to growth. Many households in countries that have suffered a housing bust – such as Spain, Ireland and the Netherlands – have mortgages

boom – and hence a speedy recovery – was predicated wouldn’t happen in a depressed and hidebound economy with a broken banking system and a huge debt overhang. The programme devised by the Troika – the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF, who together were put in charge of Greece’s destiny – forecast

Greek debt were known after the first EU bank stress tests in 2009 and could have been publicised. Far from sparking panic, then, tackling the debt overhang could have reduced uncertainty and therefore stabilised markets.144 Eurozone policymakers’ handling of Greece was so inept that they spread panic rather than quelling it

an insolvent Greece – loans that will ultimately have to be written off. As we shall see, Greece’s debts have soared since 2010, because the debt overhang and the massive austerity have crippled the economy. But they are now mostly owed to the EU and the IMF. In effect, Greece’s creditors

so had a choice. Even so, it was ludicrous to suggest that restructuring Greece’s debts would do more damage to the economy than the debt overhang, the crippling fears of a Greek default and euro exit, and the resulting investment slump. Bini Smaghi also argued that respect for debts contracts was

of loans into bonds that banks can sell to investors – could be stepped up. Ultimately, though, banks’ balance sheets need to be cleaned up, the debt overhang tackled and growth rekindled. Until its banking problems are dealt with through a common, comprehensive and conclusive approach, the eurozone is likely to remain sickly

this unjust imposition.338 The biggest worry is that prolonged stagnation could tip even Italy into insolvency. Policy shift Fixing the banks and clearing the debt overhang would do wonders for crisis-stricken economies’ prospects. So too would longer-term reforms to make all European economies more dynamic and adaptable, as Chapters

finances quickly is not to counterproductively pursue austerity at the same time as the private sector, but rather to fix the banks, clear the private debt overhang and boost productive investment. While the eurozone’s new fiscal straightjacket (see Chapter 6) greatly limits governments’ room for manoeuvre, they could still shift their

how much worse the bust would have been.) So when dotcoms crashed, investors suffered a loss of wealth, but were not left with a massive debt overhang. Banks were largely unscathed and so could continue lending to the rest of the economy. While growth slowed, the US did not even suffer two

The Production of Money: How to Break the Power of Banks

by Ann Pettifor  · 27 Mar 2017  · 182pp  · 53,802 words

, and in a vast overhang of private debt. This is especially so under conditions of ‘austerity’. Monetary reformers are right to argue that such private debt overhangs are wrong; socially, politically, morally and economically wrong. Which is why high real rates of interest, even when central bank rates are low, should be

End This Depression Now!

by Paul Krugman  · 30 Apr 2012  · 267pp  · 71,123 words

that much more room to cut when crisis struck. Yet that isn’t the only reason higher inflation would be helpful. There’s also the debt overhang—the excessive private debt that set the stage for the Minsky moment and the slump that followed. Deflation, said Fisher, can depress the economy by

The Scandal of Money

by George Gilder  · 23 Feb 2016  · 209pp  · 53,236 words

Broken Markets: A User's Guide to the Post-Finance Economy

by Kevin Mellyn  · 18 Jun 2012  · 183pp  · 17,571 words

The Euro and the Battle of Ideas

by Markus K. Brunnermeier, Harold James and Jean-Pierre Landau  · 3 Aug 2016  · 586pp  · 160,321 words

The Alchemists: Three Central Bankers and a World on Fire

by Neil Irwin  · 4 Apr 2013  · 597pp  · 172,130 words

Hedgehogging

by Barton Biggs  · 3 Jan 2005

India's Long Road

by Vijay Joshi  · 21 Feb 2017

The Age of Stagnation: Why Perpetual Growth Is Unattainable and the Global Economy Is in Peril

by Satyajit Das  · 9 Feb 2016  · 327pp  · 90,542 words

Currency Wars: The Making of the Next Gobal Crisis

by James Rickards  · 10 Nov 2011  · 381pp  · 101,559 words

Making Globalization Work

by Joseph E. Stiglitz  · 16 Sep 2006

House of Debt: How They (And You) Caused the Great Recession, and How We Can Prevent It From Happening Again

by Atif Mian and Amir Sufi  · 11 May 2014  · 249pp  · 66,383 words

What Went Wrong: How the 1% Hijacked the American Middle Class . . . And What Other Countries Got Right

by George R. Tyler  · 15 Jul 2013  · 772pp  · 203,182 words

EuroTragedy: A Drama in Nine Acts

by Ashoka Mody  · 7 May 2018

The Economics of Belonging: A Radical Plan to Win Back the Left Behind and Achieve Prosperity for All

by Martin Sandbu  · 15 Jun 2020  · 322pp  · 84,580 words

The End of Growth: Adapting to Our New Economic Reality

by Richard Heinberg  · 1 Jun 2011  · 372pp  · 107,587 words

The Irrational Economist: Making Decisions in a Dangerous World

by Erwann Michel-Kerjan and Paul Slovic  · 5 Jan 2010  · 411pp  · 108,119 words

The Decadent Society: How We Became the Victims of Our Own Success

by Ross Douthat  · 25 Feb 2020  · 324pp  · 80,217 words

Postcapitalism: A Guide to Our Future

by Paul Mason  · 29 Jul 2015  · 378pp  · 110,518 words

A Game as Old as Empire: The Secret World of Economic Hit Men and the Web of Global Corruption

by Steven Hiatt; John Perkins  · 1 Jan 2006  · 497pp  · 123,718 words

The Great Demographic Reversal: Ageing Societies, Waning Inequality, and an Inflation Revival

by Charles Goodhart and Manoj Pradhan  · 8 Aug 2020  · 438pp  · 84,256 words

The Corruption of Capitalism: Why Rentiers Thrive and Work Does Not Pay

by Guy Standing  · 13 Jul 2016  · 443pp  · 98,113 words

Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State

by Paul Tucker  · 21 Apr 2018  · 920pp  · 233,102 words

Prosperity Without Growth: Foundations for the Economy of Tomorrow

by Tim Jackson  · 8 Dec 2016  · 573pp  · 115,489 words

Why Government Is the Problem

by Milton Friedman  · 1 Feb 1993  · 25pp  · 7,179 words

Fixed: Why Personal Finance is Broken and How to Make it Work for Everyone

by John Y. Campbell and Tarun Ramadorai  · 25 Jul 2025

Who Stole the American Dream?

by Hedrick Smith  · 10 Sep 2012  · 598pp  · 172,137 words

Endless Money: The Moral Hazards of Socialism

by William Baker and Addison Wiggin  · 2 Nov 2009  · 444pp  · 151,136 words

Sacred Economics: Money, Gift, and Society in the Age of Transition

by Charles Eisenstein  · 11 Jul 2011  · 448pp  · 142,946 words

The Death of Money: The Coming Collapse of the International Monetary System

by James Rickards  · 7 Apr 2014  · 466pp  · 127,728 words

Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World

by Adam Tooze  · 31 Jul 2018  · 1,066pp  · 273,703 words

The Levelling: What’s Next After Globalization

by Michael O’sullivan  · 28 May 2019  · 756pp  · 120,818 words

GDP: A Brief but Affectionate History

by Diane Coyle  · 23 Feb 2014  · 159pp  · 45,073 words

Mine!: How the Hidden Rules of Ownership Control Our Lives

by Michael A. Heller and James Salzman  · 2 Mar 2021  · 332pp  · 100,245 words

The Measure of Progress: Counting What Really Matters

by Diane Coyle  · 15 Apr 2025  · 321pp  · 112,477 words

Boom: Bubbles and the End of Stagnation

by Byrne Hobart and Tobias Huber  · 29 Oct 2024  · 292pp  · 106,826 words

SUPERHUBS: How the Financial Elite and Their Networks Rule Our World

by Sandra Navidi  · 24 Jan 2017  · 831pp  · 98,409 words

China's Future

by David Shambaugh  · 11 Mar 2016  · 261pp  · 57,595 words

Britain's Europe: A Thousand Years of Conflict and Cooperation

by Brendan Simms  · 27 Apr 2016  · 380pp  · 116,919 words

Chokepoint Capitalism

by Rebecca Giblin and Cory Doctorow  · 26 Sep 2022  · 396pp  · 113,613 words

Our Dollar, Your Problem: An Insider’s View of Seven Turbulent Decades of Global Finance, and the Road Ahead

by Kenneth Rogoff  · 27 Feb 2025  · 330pp  · 127,791 words

The End of Indexing: Six Structural Mega-Trends That Threaten Passive Investing

by Niels Jensen  · 25 Mar 2018  · 205pp  · 55,435 words

Stolen: How to Save the World From Financialisation

by Grace Blakeley  · 9 Sep 2019  · 263pp  · 80,594 words

Stakeholder Capitalism: A Global Economy That Works for Progress, People and Planet

by Klaus Schwab and Peter Vanham  · 27 Jan 2021  · 460pp  · 107,454 words

The Enigma of Capital: And the Crises of Capitalism

by David Harvey  · 1 Jan 2010  · 369pp  · 94,588 words

Breakout Nations: In Pursuit of the Next Economic Miracles

by Ruchir Sharma  · 8 Apr 2012  · 411pp  · 114,717 words

The Rise and Fall of Nations: Forces of Change in the Post-Crisis World

by Ruchir Sharma  · 5 Jun 2016  · 566pp  · 163,322 words

Fed Up: An Insider's Take on Why the Federal Reserve Is Bad for America

by Danielle Dimartino Booth  · 14 Feb 2017  · 479pp  · 113,510 words

Rethinking Capitalism: Economics and Policy for Sustainable and Inclusive Growth

by Michael Jacobs and Mariana Mazzucato  · 31 Jul 2016  · 370pp  · 102,823 words

The Billionaire Raj: A Journey Through India's New Gilded Age

by James Crabtree  · 2 Jul 2018  · 442pp  · 130,526 words

The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism

by Edward E. Baptist  · 24 Oct 2016

Principles of Corporate Finance

by Richard A. Brealey, Stewart C. Myers and Franklin Allen  · 15 Feb 2014

Stakeholder Capitalism: A Global Economy That Works for Progress, People and Planet

by Klaus Schwab  · 7 Jan 2021  · 460pp  · 107,454 words

The Corona Crash: How the Pandemic Will Change Capitalism

by Grace Blakeley  · 14 Oct 2020  · 82pp  · 24,150 words

Seven Crashes: The Economic Crises That Shaped Globalization

by Harold James  · 15 Jan 2023  · 469pp  · 137,880 words