deglobalization

MegaThreats: Ten Dangerous Trends That Imperil Our Future, and How to Survive Them
by Nouriel Roubini
Published 17 Oct 2022

Consumers worldwide will continue to enjoy lower prices while employment in emerging markets lifts millions of global citizens out of poverty. The opposite path, call it deglobalization, favors protectionist policies aimed at bringing lost jobs back home, aka reshoring, and preventing jobs from moving abroad. As appealing as protectionism may sound, when tried before, it toppled the economic ladder for nearly everyone. That is why deglobalization is a megathreat. Deglobalization geared to preserving twentieth-century factory jobs will backfire, crippling essential trade in much larger markets for services, technology, data, information, capital, investment, and labor. Deglobalization will stymie economic growth, disable the means to cope with massive debts, and grease the rails toward epic inflation and stagflation.

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The rise in inequality is only partially due to trade; more powerful forces—to be discussed in Chapter 8—are also at fault. Deglobalization would close the door on the chance to raise living standards worldwide to an acceptable level. Restricting trade would reduce global output, shrinking the number of jobs that displaced workers could fill. The global economic pie would get smaller. A physical representation of global supply chains built over three decades might dazzle observers. They form a robust and intricate web connecting millions of end users to component production facilities across the world where efficiencies are greatest. Deglobalization would disrupt these networks, spurning efficiencies and catering instead to demand for jobs, often where bloated cost structures might impair competition in global markets.

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As any policy maker can attest, however, anything resembling the optimal result is far easier said than done. However well intentioned, deglobalization fights the wrong battle. No one says it more succinctly than my colleague Gordon Hanson: “Encouraging optimism about the reshoring of jobs would only lead to more disappointment, and might further fuel the backlash against free trade and globalization.”23 An excessive backlash to trade and globalization is a megathreat to the high-tech world in which we live. We will be lucky if, after three decades of hyperglobalization, we don’t slip into a radical deglobalization. A slowbalization outcome—while not ideal and still quite costly—looks preferable.

Aftershocks: Pandemic Politics and the End of the Old International Order
by Colin Kahl and Thomas Wright
Published 23 Aug 2021

Walter Scheidel, “The Spanish Flu Didn’t Wreck the Global Economy,” Foreign Affairs, May 28, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-05-28/spanish-flu-didnt-wreck-global-economy.     7.  Richard N. Haass, A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order (New York: Penguin Books, 2018).     8.  Douglas Irwin, “The Pandemic Adds Momentum to the Deglobalisation Trend,” VoxEU, May 5, 2020, https://voxeu.org/article/pandemic-adds-momentum-deglobalisation-trend.     9.  Esteban Ortiz-Ospina and Diana Beltekian, “Trade and Globalization,” Our World in Data, revised October 2018, https://ourworldindata.org/trade-and-globalization.   10.  Steven A. Altman, Pankaj Ghemawat, and Phillip Bastian, DHL Global Connectedness Index 2018: The State of Globalization in a Fragile World (Bonn: Deutsche Post DHL Group, 2019), https://www.dhl.com/content/dam/dhl/global/core/documents/pdf/glo-core-gci-2018-full-study.pdf; Steven A.

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Du Bois, Darkwater: Voices from the Veil (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Howe, 1920), 36.   31.  Graebner and Bennett, The Versailles Treaty and Its Legacy, 68.   32.  Douglas A. Irwin, “The Pandemic Adds Momentum to the Deglobalization Trend,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 23, 2020, https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/pandemic-adds-momentum-deglobalization-trend#_ftnref2.   33.  Barro, Ursua, and Wang, “The Coronavirus and the Great Influenza Epidemic.”   34.  Richard Overy, The Inter-Wars Crisis, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 2017), 54–55.   35.  Overy, The Inter-Wars Crisis, chap. 3.   36.  

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And yet this history is no less important to consider in our current moment, because many of the factors that made the world so volatile, crisis-prone, and dangerous during the interwar period—mounting inequality, widespread civil strife, rising populism and xenophobia, growing economic nationalism and pressures to deglobalize, resurgent authoritarianism, backsliding democracy, escalating great-power rivalry, American retreat, brittle international institutions, and a free world in disarray—were already reemerging in our time during the years immediately before the coronavirus pandemic struck. And, as we detail in Parts II and III of this book, COVID-19 and the shock waves flowing from it have made all these problems worse.

Exponential: How Accelerating Technology Is Leaving Us Behind and What to Do About It
by Azeem Azhar
Published 6 Sep 2021

The economic paradigm that brought about the Exponential Age, globalisation, has fostered technologies that will lead to a return to the local. But our political and economic systems were not designed to cope with the new age of localism. As so often, gaps emerge. Between the economic policies advocated by our political institutions, and the actual workings of an increasingly de-globalised economy. Between the countries that can adapt to the new age of insularity, and those that can’t. And between the creaking nation state, and the newly empowered cities – whose influence has been turbocharged by new technology. The world is not flat. It is very, very spiky.3 The classic rationale for globalisation rests on the work of the economists Adam Smith and David Ricardo, whose theories both make the case for freer trade.

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In one dizzyingly enormous study by the Asian Development Bank, researchers analysed hundreds of thousands of conflicts between 1950 and 2000 and concluded that ‘an increase in bilateral trade interdependence and global trade openness significantly reduces the probability of military conflict between countries’.3 Unsurprisingly, then, the turn against globalisation may well lead to greater conflict between nations. One 2010 estimate by a three-decade veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency suggested that deglobalisation might raise the risk of war for any given country in the subsequent 25 years by more than a factor of six.4 At the same time, conflicts within nations are becoming more commonplace. This dynamic long predates the moment in the 2010s when we tipped into the Exponential Age. Writing in the 1990s, the academic Mary Kaldor coined the term ‘new wars’ to describe conflicts after the fall of the Soviet Union.

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CHAPTER 7: THE NEW WORLD DISORDER 1 Damien McGuinness, ‘How a Cyber Attack Transformed Estonia’, BBC News, 27 April 2017 <https://www.bbc.com/news/39655415> [accessed 26 April 2021]. 2 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy (1848), cited in Jong-Wha Lee and Ju Hyun Pyun, Does Trade Integration Contribute to Peace?, Asian Development Bank Working Paper (January 2009), p. 2. 3 J. W. Lee and J. H. Pyun, Does Trade Integration Contribute to Peace, Asian Development Bank Working Paper (January 2009), p. 18 4 Evan E. Hillebrand, ‘Deglobalization Scenarios: Who Wins? Who Loses?’, Global Economy Journal, vol. 10, issue 2 (2010). 5 Anouk Rigertink, New Wars in Numbers: An Exploration of Various Datasets on Intra-State Violence, MPRA Paper 45264 (University Library of Munich, 2012). 6 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, https://ucdp.uu.se/encyclopedia. 7 Azeem Azhar, ‘AI and the Future of Warfare: My Conversation with General Sir Richard Barrons’, Exponential View, 27 December 2019 <https://www.exponentialview.co/p/-ai-and-the-future-of-warfare> [accessed 18 September 2020]. 8 Anshel Pfeffer, ‘Zeev Raz Explains the Mind-Set of Israeli Pilots’, Jewish Chronicle, 13 September 2012 <https://www.thejc.com/news/world/zeev-raz-explains-the-mind-set-of-israeli-pilots-1.36109> [accessed 9 September 2020]. 9 John T.

The Rise and Fall of the British Nation: A Twentieth-Century History
by David Edgerton
Published 27 Jun 2018

Chatterjee, ‘Business and Politics in the 1930s: Lancashire and the Making of the Indo-British Trade Agreement’, Modern Asian Studies15.3 (1981), pp. 527–73; Muldoon, Empire, Politics; Martin Pugh, ‘Lancashire, Cotton, and Indian Reform: Conservative Controversies in the 1930s’, Twentieth Century British History 15 (2004), pp. 143–51. See also for the politics of jute, Jim Tomlinson, ‘The Deglobalisation of Dundee, c. 1900–2000’, Journal of Scottish Historical Studies 29 (2009), pp. 123–40, and ‘De-globalization and Its Significance: From the Particular to the General’, Contemporary British History 26 (2012), pp. 213–30. 25. This Is the Road: The Conservative and Unionist Party’s Policy, Conservative Party, 1950, available at http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/con50.htm, accessed 12 January 2018. 26.

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The British Welfare State of the 1940s’, Journal of Social Policy 27 (1998), pp. 63–7. —, The Politics of Decline: Understanding Post-War Britain (Abingdon, 2000). —, ‘Marshall Aid and the “Shortage Economy” in Britain in the 1940s’, Contemporary European History 9 (2000), pp. 137–55. —, ‘The Deglobalisation of Dundee, c. 1900–2000’, Journal of Scottish Historical Studies 29 (2009), pp. 123–40. —, ‘De-globalization and Its Significance: From the Particular to the General’, Contemporary British History 26 (2012), pp. 213–30. —, ‘The Empire/Commonwealth in British Economic Thinking and Policy’, in Andrew Thompson (ed.), Britain’s Experience of Empire in the Twentieth Century (Oxford, 2012), pp. 211–50

How Boards Work: And How They Can Work Better in a Chaotic World
by Dambisa Moyo
Published 3 May 2021

The new decade is already characterized by rising economic complexity and geopolitical divisions: escalated US-China tensions, populism and nationalism in Europe, and the continued threat of a global recession. Amid this turmoil, forward-thinking business leaders are developing strategies to mitigate the long-term risks of de-globalization. Naturally, they are concerned about trade protectionism and the revenue a company could lose in potential tariff wars. However, there is another, subtler danger associated with de-globalization: many global corporations are simply not structured in a way that will allow them to compete in a de-globalized world. It is increasingly understood that this new, siloed business environment will directly affect three pillars of global corporations: technology, global recruiting, and the finance function.

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Perhaps these subsidiaries could even list and trade independently on local as well as global exchanges. Ultimately, the way forward will depend on whether a company’s leadership considers de-globalization to be an enduring phenomenon or a passing trend. If business leaders believe a siloed business world is here to stay, then they must give real consideration to upending the prevailing corporate structure. If, however, corporate leaders believe that the push toward a more fragmented world is temporary and will soon pass, then their responsibility is to navigate the de-globalization risks while retaining their global business model. Either way, leaders should be alert to the idea that if they are wrong, the corporations they serve may not survive.

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As we saw in Chapter 4, rising protectionism and de-globalization bring the risk that corporations will have to adapt their organizational structures to reflect a more siloed world, potentially creating separate boards to oversee individual regions—such as Asia or Europe—that would be connected to the global parent company through a federated structure. If this comes to pass, companies must consider whether the board structure, too, should change so that separate, local boards oversee each region. A decentralized structure may limit the board’s ability to govern a global business, but, in such a de-globalized world, the potential gains of a unified board would also be inherently limited.

The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History Since 1900
by David Edgerton
Published 7 Dec 2006

Cotton was processed thousands of miles from where it was grown and was exported from a few industrial centres to the whole world. The hub of the industry was free-trading Britain, and particularly Cottonopolis itself, the city of Manchester. The peak year of the British cotton industry was 1913 when it was not only the largest, but also the most efficient cotton industry in the world.13 In the interwar years, as trade de-globalised and Japan emerged as a major competitor, Manchester’s exports slumped. In 1931, the worst year of the depression, output was half what it had been in 1913. It was not to recover very much, and from the early 1950s a long steady decline continued, though this declining industry remained important.

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The old Anglo plant in Fray Bentos struggled into the 1970s, long enough to be preserved as a museum, the appropriately named Museum of the Industrial Revolution, a place which figures in tourist guides to the Southern Cone. European self-sufficiency in meat, particularly in the British case, and the rise of the Common Market, which de-globalised the trade in meat, put paid to it. In the USA the great meatpackers of Chicago lost markets to new rural, nonunionised, low-skill, single-storey meatpackers, which sent out boxed meat to supermarkets instead of sides of beef to butchers (and of course to the new giant mass producers of beefburgers and the like).

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It is a measure of the importance of technology to the twentieth century, and to our understanding of it, that to rethink the history of technology is necessarily to rethink the history of the world. For example, we should no longer assume that there was ineluctable globalisation thanks to new technology; on the contrary the world went through a process of de-globalisation in which technologies of self-sufficiency and empire had a powerful role. Culture has not lagged behind technology, rather the reverse; the idea that culture has lagged behind technology is itself very old and has existed under many different technological regimes. Technology has not generally been a revolutionary force; it has been responsible for keeping things the same as much as changing them.

The Rise and Fall of Nations: Forces of Change in the Post-Crisis World
by Ruchir Sharma
Published 5 Jun 2016

“EM Macro Daily: China Capital Outflow Risk—The Curious Case of the Missing $300 Billions.” Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, January 13, 2015. Forbes, Kristin. “Financial ‘Deglobalization’?: Capital Flows, Banks, and the Beatles.” Bank of England, 2014. Freund, Caroline. “Current Account Adjustment in Industrialized Countries.” International Finance Discussion Papers, 2000. “Global Macro Jottings: Financial Deglobalization.” VTB Capital, November 20, 2014. Harvey, Oliver, and Robin Winkler. “Dark Matter: The Hidden Capital Flows That Drive G10 Exchange Rates.” Deutsche Bank Markets Research, March 6, 2015).

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With their newfound clout, the rising global middle class would put pressure on dictatorships to loosen censorship, hold genuine elections, and open up new opportunities. Rising wealth would beget political freedom and democracy, which would beget greater prosperity. Then came 2008. The years BC gave way to the years AC. After the Crisis, the expectation of a golden age gave way to a new reality. Hype for globalization yielded to mutterings about “deglobalization.” The big picture is complicated and contradictory, because not all the flows that globalization traditionally describes have slowed or reversed. The flow of information, as measured by Internet traffic, for example, is still surging. The flow of people, as measured by the number of tourists and airline passengers, is rising sharply.

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In Africa, Morocco and Rwanda are carving out export success stories in very rough neighborhoods. Location still matters. Economic growth has long tended to flower along the trade routes that carry manufactured goods; now it is flourishing in service industry capitals as well, and this trend may be gaining momentum in a period of deglobalization. In recent years, as growth in global trade leveled off and global capital flows have fallen sharply, the process of globalization nonetheless has accelerated in two important categories. The number of international travelers and tourists has continued to rise rapidly, and Internet communications have continued to explode, which could open up new opportunities for countries that can exploit these trends.

21 Lessons for the 21st Century
by Yuval Noah Harari
Published 29 Aug 2018

We now have a global ecology, a global economy and a global science – but we are still stuck with only national politics. This mismatch prevents the political system from effectively countering our main problems. To have effective politics, we must either de-globalise the ecology, the economy and the march of science – or we must globalise our politics. Since it is impossible to de-globalise the ecology and the march of science, and since the cost of de-globalising the economy would probably be prohibitive, the only real solution is to globalise politics. This does not mean establishing a global government – a doubtful and unrealistic vision. Rather, to globalise politics means that political dynamics within countries and even cities should give far more weight to global problems and interests.

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From this perspective, current populist resentment of ‘the elites’ is well founded. If we are not careful, the grandchildren of Silicon Valley tycoons and Moscow billionaires might become a superior species to the grandchildren of Appalachian hillbillies and Siberian villagers. In the long run, such a scenario might even de-globalise the world, as the upper caste congregates inside a self-proclaimed ‘civilisation’ and builds walls and moats to separate it from the hordes of ‘barbarians’ outside. In the twentieth century, industrial civilisation depended on the ‘barbarians’ for cheap labour, raw materials and markets. Therefore it conquered and absorbed them.

Seven Crashes: The Economic Crises That Shaped Globalization
by Harold James
Published 15 Jan 2023

Analyzing the long-term trends of average return has led to an influential formulation about the rate of return on capital, pointing to higher and higher levels of accumulation (“producing infinite accumulation”): that became the subject of a famous analysis by Thomas Piketty.21 Piketty’s average rate is consistently higher than marginal rates, especially in eras of decline or stagnation: perhaps because in fact it is largely concerned with returns on land or real estate that might properly be thought of as the rents for scarce locations: the middle of Paris or New York or Silicon Valley or Shanghai.22 The phenomenon was the major driver of inequality in the nineteenth century, and again at the end of the twentieth century: Piketty sees the rise of inequality proceeding at an even faster rate in the twenty-first century.23 His version of r > g may simply be a reflection of a globalization that pushes up land values, especially in globally connected centers (and indeed, his measures of inequality fall during the deglobalization phase of the mid-twentieth century). Thus he insists that even technical progress, which might be thought of as the triumph of human ingenuity or human capital over the cold types of dead capital that constitute his definition (land, buildings, or financial capital), will drive a need for more buildings, agglomerations, patents that will drive up the returns on capital.

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But the shock of the First World War also constituted a restriction of supply: there were food shortages in belligerent European states previously dependent on transatlantic shipping routes that were now restricted by economic warfare, but also a lack of rubber, of nitrates, of non-ferrous metals. That shock too pushed a brief restoration of world trade in the 1920s. In the twentieth century, the Great Depression, which led to a deglobalization push, was primarily a demand shock. People interpreted the catastrophe as poverty in the midst of plenty: there was an oversupply of grain (and other commodities) that drove down prices. The policy answer was demand management. Governments needed to generate more demand and push up prices. The intellectual response was that capitalism and the market had failed.

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Understanding what delivered the shock of the Great Depression consequently has become what Ben Bernanke memorably called the “holy grail” of macroeconomics: but we know from medieval stories that the knights almost never succeed in their quest.3 As Alfred Tennyson put it in “Sir Galahad”: “O just and faithful knight of God! Ride on! the prize is near.” Sir Galahad only glimpses the grail. In a sense the answer to the modern analytical quest is obvious: the Great Depression followed from the massive disruptions (a supply shock) that followed the Great War. It was a continuation of the deglobalization rupture brought by the First World War, made all the more severe by the bungled attempts to revive or reinvent internationalism. Most obviously, the war disrupted European production and agriculture, and led to the spread of manufacture and cultivation elsewhere. In that sense, the military conflict extended the partial globalization of the late nineteenth century, which only fully encompassed flows of capital and people to temperate countries of European settlement but left much of the globe on the margin of development.

The Haves and the Have-Nots: A Brief and Idiosyncratic History of Global Inequality
by Branko Milanovic
Published 15 Dec 2010

This fact is by now generally acknowledged, and alternative theories of economic growth have been proposed to account for it. It is also accepted that since the Industrial Revolution, the average incomes of the countries of the world have diverged (see Vignette 2.1). But what has happened during the period of deglobalization when, if the theory is correct, we should observe an increase in the differences between poor and rich countries? The period of deglobalization, conventionally considered as spanning the years from the end of World War I to the beginning of World War II, is one of the least studied by economists. The problem, from the economists’ point of view, is that it is a political period par excellence.

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Vignette 2.2 - How Unequal Is Today’s World? Vignette 2.3 - How Much of Your Income Is Determined at Birth? Vignette 2.4 - Should the Whole World Be Composed of Gated Communities? Vignette 2.5 - Who Are the Harraga? Vignette 2.6 - The Three Generations of Obamas Vignette 2.7 - Did the World Become More Unequal During Deglobalization? CHAPTER 3 Vignette 3.1 - Where in the Global Income Distribution Are YOU? Vignette 3.2 - Does the World Have a Middle Class? Vignette 3.3 - How Different Are the United States and the European Union? Vignette 3.4 - Why Are Asia and Latin America Mirror Images of Each Other? Vignette 3.5 - Do You Want to Know the Winner Before the Game Begins?

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But she now learned ... the chasm that separated the life chances of an American from those of an Indonesian. She knew which side of the divide she wanted her child to be on. I was an American, she decided, and my true life lay elsewhere [outside of Indonesia].6 Vignette 2.7 Did the World Become More Unequal During Deglobalization? One of the truisms of simple neoclassical economics is that openness to the movement of labor, capital, and goods—that is, globalization—should not only benefit all participating countries but benefit more the poor ones.1 This is based essentially on three assumptions. First, poor countries are “producing” a higher marginal return to each successive addition of capital than the rich countries.

The Economic Weapon
by Nicholas Mulder
Published 15 Mar 2021

“In the present economic and financial state of the world,” Da Mata said, “I think these sanctions may often be not only inoperative against the violator but dangerous, if not punitive, to those applying them.” 13. On theories and recurring motifs of autarky, see Eric Helleiner, “The Return of National Self-Sufficiency? Excavating Autarkic Thought in a De-Globalizing Era,” International Studies Review, 2021, pp. 1–25. 14. Luigi Einaudi, “Autarchia o autarcia?” Rivista di storia economica 2, no. 4 (1937): 369–370. 15. Stefan J. Link, “How Might 21st-Century De-Globalization Unfold? Some Historical Reflections,” New Global Studies 12, no. 3 (2018): 358. 16. Link rightly argues that “thirties-style autarky . . . owed its radical nature to the severity and complexity of the Great Depression” (ibid., p. 362). 17.

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Trade volumes in raw materials and food were less affected and rebounded quickly.14 In other words, the 1930s witnessed a virtually undiminished physical quantity of commodities circulating around the world—not to mention other important benchmarks of globalization, such as migration.15 The notion of a drastic and unqualified interwar “deglobalization” is thus misleading; insofar as it applies, it is to price levels, capital, and monetary indicators rather than to the circulation of people, production, and commodities.16 By the late 1930s world trade had also become much more regionally distributed than in the fin-de-siècle years. In 1913 Europe accounted for nearly 60 percent of global exports.

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By 1937 its share had shrunk by almost a quarter, whereas the Americas, Africa, Asia, and Oceania all gained in global market shares.17 The faith that European elites had placed in the economic weapon during the war reflected the confidence bestowed by the continent’s dominant trade position in the 1910s. A quarter century later, non-European economies had claimed a more active role in the global market. Supposed interwar deglobalization is thus more accurately described as the “de-Europeanization” of a world economy that remained deeply global.18 In general, how the downturn affected overall trade values and volumes was less important to sanctions than how it shaped specific sectors. The depression had mixed effects on interdependence in transport, energy, and minerals.

Postcapitalism: A Guide to Our Future
by Paul Mason
Published 29 Jul 2015

So what’s more likely is that at some point one or more countries will quit globalization, via protectionism, debt write-offs and currency manipulation. Or that a de-globalization crisis originating in diplomatic and military conflict spills over into the world economy and produces the same results. The lesson from the OECD’s report is that we need a complete system redesign. The most highly educated generation in the history of the human race, and the best connected, will not accept a future of high inequality and stagnant growth. Instead of a chaotic race to de-globalize the world, and decades of stagnation combined with rising inequality, we need a new economic model.

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In January 2014, John Ashton, a career diplomat and formerly the British government’s special representative on climate change, delivered the blunt truth to the 1 per cent: ‘The market left to itself will not reconfigure the energy system and transform the economy within a generation.’3 According to the International Energy Agency, even if all the announced emissions-reduction plans, all the carbon taxes and all the renewables targets are achieved – that is, if consumers don’t revolt against higher taxes, and the world does not de-globalize – then CO2 emissions will still rise by 20 per cent by 2035. Instead of limiting the warming of the earth to only a two-degree increase, the temperature will rise 3.6 degrees.4 Faced with a clear warning that a 4.5-billion-year-old planet is being destabilized, those in power decided that a 25-year-old economic doctrine held the solution.

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Over time, there is a danger that austerity plus stagnation will shrink the size of the economies from which the debts have to be repaid. Therefore governments have to do something clear and progressive about debts. They could be written off unilaterally – and in countries like Greece, where they are unpayable, that might be required. But the outcome would be de-globalization, as countries and investors holding the worthless debt retaliated, cutting off market access or kicking the defaulting countries out of various currency and trading zones. Some of the quantitative easing money could be used to buy and bury the debts – but even this so-called ‘monetization’ of debt, using the $12 trillion created so far, would not reduce global sovereign debts enough compared to GDP as these stand at $54 trillion and rising, and the global stock of all debts is approaching $300 trillion.

Cogs and Monsters: What Economics Is, and What It Should Be
by Diane Coyle
Published 11 Oct 2021

The findings of RCTs may well conflict with political or cultural beliefs about the right course of action. Perhaps economic efficiency is not the societal goal in all contexts, so other people’s idea of a good outcome might be different from even the most balanced, open-minded economist. In the current conjuncture, in the post-GFC, deglobalisation, mid-pandemic, western economies, economists claiming to be technocrats are very definitely taking political positions. As the prominent UK politician Michael Gove notoriously expressed the populist position in the 2016 Brexit referendum campaign, ‘People have had enough of experts.’ Or at least experts whose conclusions they disagree with.

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The post-pandemic economy will be further weakened, leaving some people facing debt burdens, unemployment, and food banks. The double economic catastrophe in just over a decade is reinforcing questioning of what we mean by economic progress, and the role of economists in achieving it, or not. Meanwhile, further significant challenges loom. One is the process of deglobalisation; mitigating the effects of climate change and biodiversity loss is another. Then there is growing concern about the next economic challenge: a wave of automation sweeping over so-far unaffected sectors of the economy, including professional services such as law and accountancy. Advances in digital technologies, robotics, and AI are coalescing to alter the shape of work, automating routine tasks and requiring jobs for humans to be repackaged as non-routine ones.

Ten Lessons for a Post-Pandemic World
by Fareed Zakaria
Published 5 Oct 2020

Then came the recovery, fueled by historically low interest rates and other active monetary policies, which caused stocks and other financial assets to rise in value, further deepening the divide between capital and labor. Populist politicians who railed against “globalism” were elected in major countries, including the United Kingdom and the United States. People began to speak of “deglobalization.” And then came the pandemic. THE DRIVE FOR INDEPENDENCE Covid-19 and the ensuing national lockdowns caused economic indicators to slump more dramatically than at any time on record. In April 2020, compared to a year earlier, global air traffic fell by 94%, new car registrations in the European Union were down 76%, and the United States had 20 million fewer jobs.

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In 1990, it was $240 billion. Air travel and related tourism in 1998 contributed $1.4 trillion to global GDP, a figure that had almost doubled by 2016. In other words, by almost all measures since the 1990s, globalization has galloped forward and in the last few years it has taken one or two steps back. That’s not deglobalization—that’s a pause. SEVEN DECADES OF GLOBALIZATION The “trade openness index” looks at all exports and imports as a share of the total world economy, expressed on the y-axis as a percentage of GDP. Overall, the global economy remains deeply interconnected. The broadest measure, the “trade openness index,” which looks at all exports and imports as a share of the total world economy, was down to 54% in 2016 from 61% in 2007.

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But look at the chart historically, and since 1945, when trade openness stood at about 10%, you see an almost unbroken upward path of increasing globalization. The fallback since 2008 is real but small, a blip on the long-term trend. The short-term effect of the pandemic and lockdowns, of course, has been to curtail all economic activity, domestic and international. This reversal will probably grow into a phase of real but modest deglobalization. But economic indicators could improve just as rapidly as they have deteriorated, especially once a treatment or vaccine is at hand. The longer-term effects are unclear, but the melodramatic rhetoric against globalization has yet to translate into equally extreme policy. Almost no country has enacted major new tariffs in response to the virus, nor does any have plans to do so.

Trade Wars Are Class Wars: How Rising Inequality Distorts the Global Economy and Threatens International Peace
by Matthew C. Klein
Published 18 May 2020

Gabriel Wildau and Yizhen Jia, “China’s Subway Building Binge Is Back on Track,” Financial Times, December 18, 2018. 19. China, State Administration of Foreign Exchange, “The Time Series of the Balance of Payments of China”; National Bureau of Statistics of China, “Annual Data”; Brad W. Setser, “President Xi, Still the Deglobalizer in Chief . . .,” CFR (blog), June 25, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/blog/president-xi-still-deglobalizer-chief. 20. Mark Wu, “The ‘China, Inc.’ Challenge to Global Trade Governance,” Harvard International Law Journal 57, no. 2 (Spring 2016): 261–324; Curtis J. Milhaupt and Wenton Zheng, “Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese Firm,” Georgetown Law Journal 103 (2015): 668; “The Communist Party’s Influence Is Expanding—in China and Beyond,” Bloomberg, March 11, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-11/it-s-all-xi-all-the-time-in-china-as-party-influence-expands; Matthew C.

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Compounding the immediate impact of the collapse in business activity and cross-border finance was the wave of protectionism unleashed by the United States with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930. Punitive American taxes on imports from the rest of the world prompted global retaliation, breaking whatever had been left of an international economic system and unleashing competitive currency devaluations, rising tariffs, and deglobalization. Fittingly, the United States, which had been reliant on foreign customers to absorb its excess production since the end of the nineteenth century and was at that time running one of the largest trade surpluses in world history, was among the biggest victims of the protectionism it had helped encourage as it lost access to many of its export markets.

The Power Surge: Energy, Opportunity, and the Battle for America's Future
by Michael Levi
Published 28 Apr 2013

Yet natural gas, for the time being, is lowering emissions because it’s displacing coal. Rising U.S. oil production, meanwhile, will be offset substantially by lower oil production elsewhere, and it remains relatively small in the context of global emissions. T he big wild cards facing the future of U.S. energy—peak oil, major war, deglobalization, a stalled economic recovery, and surprisingly high climate sensitivity—all have something in common: they largely reinforce the benefits of the changes currently sweeping the American energy scene. There are modest exceptions, like somewhat greater climate risks from new oil production if climate sensitivity turns out to be surprisingly large, and bigger economic risks from some new environmental rules meant to foster efficiency and alternatives if economic growth continues to falter.

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See renewable energy; solar energy; wind energy Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM) summit, 148 climate change Arctic ice and, 84, 86, 91 biofuels and, 111, 138–139 cap-and-trade and, 97, 101, 155, 171, 206 carbon dioxide emissions and, 85, 87, 89–100, 102–103, 136, 139 carbon tax and, 101, 155, 202 clean energy standard (CES) and, 101, 155, 202 coal and, 97–101, 170, 182, 194 Copenhagen climate summit and, 104–106 deforestation and, 85, 91, 105, 140 geoengineering and, 193–194 globalization and, 188 international treaties and, 104–107, 204 introduction to the science of, 84–88 methane and, 102 mountain pine beetles and, 83–84, 87–88 natural gas and, 97–103, 107, 155, 177, 200, 204, 208 nuclear energy and, 97–99, 101, 173, 175 oil and, 80, 83, 85–86, 88–90, 93–97, 101, 107–108, 110, 136–137, 182, 194, 196, 200 renewable energy and, 170, 178, 194, 196–197 social cost of carbon, 89–90 Clinton (Pennsylvania), 161–162 Clinton, Bill, 15, 116 coal carbon capture and sequestration and, 100, 158, 172 China and, 96 climate change and, 97–101, 170, 182, 194 land use and, 22, 175–176 power plants and, 3, 17, 88, 98–100, 103, 107, 141, 153, 158, 160–161, 168, 170, 196 Coal Question, The (Jevons), 137 cobalt, 133 Colbert, Stephen, 48 Cold War, 10, 16, 64, 169, 185 Colorado climate change in, 83–85, 87–88 mountain pine beetles in, 83–84, 87–88 252 • INDEX Colorado (Cont.) natural gas production in, 102–104 tight oil in, 51, 56, 61, 80, 93–94 Columbus (Ohio), antifracking protest in, 3–4, 22, 92 compressed natural gas (CNG), 37–39 Congo, 133 Copenhagen climate summit, 104–106 Dawe, Justin, 170–172 Day, Roger, 62 Dearing, Becky, 26 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, 52, 56–58 defense spending, innovation and, 169, 201 deglobalization, 189–190, 194 Delaware, 56 Department of Defense, 169, 200–201 Department of Energy, 15, 115, 146 Detroit automakers, 5, 18, 109–110, 113–116, 118–119, 122–123, 129–130, 136 Deutch, John, 24 Diaoyu Islands, 132 Dix, Bill, 20–22, 25, 46, 48 Dukakis, Michael, 14 E.ON, 32 Eagle Ford shale (Texas), 55 Earth Summit (1993), 15 earthquakes, natural gas production and, 44–45, 47 economic development natural gas and, 27–29, 47, 49, 192 oil and, 74–75, 127, 192 renewable energy and, 147, 162–163, 166, 191–192 Economides, Michael, 41 Edelstein, Paul, 129–130 EGL Oil Shale company, 51, 62 el-Badri, Abdallah Salem, 69 electric cars, 5, 114, 116, 118–119, 132, 135, 141–142, 200 electricity.

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See also energy security; national security Arab-Israeli War (1973), 7, 76 Cold War, 10, 16, 64, 169, 185 globalization and, 35, 186–190, 194, 204–205 Gulf War (1991), 13–14, 76, 112 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 7, 13, 66–69, 90, 95–96 sea lanes and, 78, 183–184, 205 South China Sea confl ict, 132–134 Germany, 156, 173, 183 global warming. See climate change globalization Asian tiger economies and, 187 China and, 187–188 climate change regulation and, 188 254 • INDEX globalization (Cont.) deglobalization, 189–190, 194 energy trade and, 35, 188–190, 204–205 Great Depression and, 187 multinational corporations and, 187–188 trade agreements and, 186–187 United States and, 186 Gore, Al, 96–97, 146 Grant County (Kansas), 24 Grape, Steven, 54 Great Depression, 187, 190 Great Illusion, The (Angell), 183 Great Recession climate change initiatives and, 206 Congressional Budget Office projections and, 190–191 natural gas production and, 23, 25–26, 28 oil consumption and, 110 oil prices and, 16 renewable energy and, 145–146, 191 unemployment and, 190–191 Gulf of Mexico Deepwater Horizon oil spill, 52, 56–58 oil production in, 3, 56–57, 180 Gulf War (1991), 13–14, 76, 112 Halliburton, 4, 24 Hamilton, Jim, 70 Hammond, Allen, 9 Hanergy, 167 Hansen, James, 82, 92 Hart, Gary, 10 Herrington, John S., 14 Honda GX, 38 Horizon Wind, 170 horizontal drilling, 23–24, 47, 52, 54 Hot, Flat, and Crowded (Friedman), 163 House, Kurt Zenz, 170–172 Howarth, Robert, 101–104 Hubbert, M.

People, Power, and Profits: Progressive Capitalism for an Age of Discontent
by Joseph E. Stiglitz
Published 22 Apr 2019

Jobs were certainly destroyed in the process of globalization, but they will be destroyed again in the process of the reckless deglobalization proposed by Trump. The world has created efficient global supply chains, and wise nations take advantage of them. For America to walk away from these supply chains will make our firms less competitive. Most importantly, there are large costs of adjustment. Adjusting to globalization was hard, and we—and especially our workers—paid a high price. But we will pay another high price as we try to adjust to deglobalization.32 Global Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century While protectionism won’t help the US, or even those who have suffered from deindustrialization, it can have profoundly negative effects on America’s trading partners and the global economy.

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Federal Election Commission, 166, 169–70, 172 class warfare, 6 climate change and attacks on truth, 20 and intergenerational justice, 204–5 markets’ failure to address, xxiii money’s effects on debate, 20 Clinton, Bill, and administration, xiii, 4, 5, 168, 238, 242 Clinton, Hillary, 4, 6 coal companies, 20 Cold War, end of, 28; See also Communism, collapse of collective action, 138–56 balancing with individualism, 139 circumstances requiring, 140–42 government failures, 148–52 increasing need for government action, 152–55 in preamble to Constitution, 138–39 regulation as, 143–48 collective judgments, 262–63n20 college, income inequality and, 200 Comcast, 147 Communications Decency Act, 320n32 Communism, collapse of, 3, 28 comparative advantage, 82–84 competition market concentration, 55–56 market failures, 23 in marketplace of ideas, 75–76 market power, 57–60 power vs., 22 competitive equilibrium model, 47, 280n1 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, 306n25 compulsion, power of, 155 confirmatory bias, 225 conflicts of interest, 70, 72, 124 Congress antitrust laws, 51, 68 and Great Recession, 39, 215 and lobbyists, See lobbyists and money in politics, 171–72 and Obamacare, 213 and regulatory process, 145–46 Supreme Court nominations, 166 and USTR, 100 conservatism, embracing change vs., 226–28 Constitution of the United States collective action reference in preamble, 138–39 economic changes since writing of, 227 “General Welfare” in Preamble, 242 individual liberties vs. collective interest in, 229 and minority rights, 6 as product of reasoning and argumentation, 229 three-fifths clause, 161 consumer demand, See demand consumer surplus, 64 cooperatives, 245 Copenhagen Agreement, 207 copyright extensions, 74 Copyright Term Extension Act (1998), 74 corporate taxes, 108, 206, 269n44 corporate tax rates, globalization and, 84–85 corporate welfare, 107 corporations and labor force participation, 182 and money in politics, 172–73 as people, 169–70 rights as endowed by the State, 172 corruption, 50 cost-benefit analysis, 146, 204–5 Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), xii credit, 102, 145, 186, 220 credit cards, 59–60, 70, 105 credit default swaps, 106 credit unions, 245 culture, economic behavior and, 30 customer targeting, 125–26 cybersecurity, 127–28 cybertheft, 308n35 Daraprim, 296n72 data exclusivity, 288n40 data ownership, 129–30 Deaton, Angus, 41–42 debt, 220; See also credit DeepMind, 315n1 defense contractors, 173 deficits, See budget deficits deglobalization, 92 deindustrialization early days of, xix effect on average citizens, 4, 21 facilitating transition to postindustrial world, 186–88 failure to manage, xxvi in Gary, Indiana, xi globalization and, 4, 79, 87 place-based policies and, 188 deliberation, 228–29 demand automation and, 120 and job creation, 268n41 Keynesian economics and, xv market power’s effect on, 63 demand for labor, technological suppression of, 122 democracy, 159–78 agenda for reducing power of money in politics, 171–74 curbing the influence of wealth on, 176–78 fragility of norms and institutions, 230–36 inequality as threat to, 27–28 maintaining system of checks and balances, 163–67 need for a new movement, 174–76 new technologies’ threat to, 131–35 and power of money, 167–70 as shared value, 228 suppression by minority, xx Trump’s disdain for, xvii voting reforms, 161–63 democratic institutions, fragility of, 230–36 Democratic Party gerrymandering’s effect on, 159 and Great Recession, 152 need for reinvention of, 175 popular support for, 6 renewal of, 242 and voter disenfranchisement, 162 demographics, xx, 181 “deplorables,” 4 deregulation, 25, 105, 143–44, 152, 239; See also supply-side economics derivatives, 80, 88, 106–7, 144 Detroit, Michigan, 188 Dickens, Charles, 12 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 320–21n32 disadvantage, intergenerational transmission of, 199–201 disclosure laws, 171 discourse, governance and, 11 discrimination, 201–4; See also gender discrimination; racial discrimination by banks, 115 and economics texts, 23 forms of, 202 under GI Bill, 210 and inequality, 40–41, 198–99 and labor force participation, 183 means of addressing, 203–4 and myths about affirmative action, 225 reducing to improve economy, 201–4 diseases of despair, 42–43 disenfranchisement, 27, 161–62 disintermediation, 109 Disney, 65, 74 dispute resolution, 56–57, 309n40 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 70, 102, 107 driverless cars, 118 drug overdoses, 42 Durbin Amendment, 70 East Asia, 149 economic justice historical perspectives, 241–42 intergenerational justice, 204–5 racial justice and, 176, 203–4 tax system and, 205–8 economics, assumptions about individuals in, 29–30, 223 economic segregation, 200 economies of scale, 72 economies of scope, 347–48n15 economy and collective action, 153–54 decent jobs with good working conditions, 192–97 deterioration since early 1980s, 32–46 failure’s effect on individuals and society, 29–31 failure since late 1980s, 3–5 government involvement in, 141–42, 150–55 intergenerational transmission of advantage/disadvantage, 199–201 reducing discrimination in, 201–4 restoring fairness to tax system, 205–8 restoring growth and productivity, 181–86 restoring justice across generations, 204–5 restoring opportunity and social justice, 197–201 social protection, 188–91 “sugar high” from Trump’s tax cut, 236–38 transition to postindustrial world, 186–88 education equalizing opportunity of, xxv–xxvi, 219–20 improving access to, 203 returns on government investment in, 232 taxation and, 25 undermining of institutions, 233–34 Eggers, Dave, 128 Eisenhower, Dwight, and administration, 210 elderly, labor force growth and, 181–82 election of 1992, 4 election of 2000, 165–66 election of 2012, 159, 178 election of 2016, xix, 132, 178 elections, campaign spending in, 171–73 elite control of economy by, 5–6 and distrust in government, 151 and 2008 financial crisis, 5 promises of growth from market liberalization, 21–22 rules written by, 230 employers, market power over workers, 64–67 employment, See full employment; jobs; labor force participation End of History, The (Fukuyama), 3 Enlightenment, the, 10–12 attack on ideals of, 14–22 and standard of living, 264n24 environment carbon tax, 194, 206–7 and collective action, 153 economic growth and, 176 economists’ failure to address, 34 markets’ failure to protect, 24 and true economic health, 34 environmental justice, economic justice and, 176 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 267n38 epistemology, 10, 234 equality as basis for well-running economy, xxiv–xxv economic agenda for, xxvii as shared value, 228 Equifax, 130 equity value, rents as portion of, 54 ethnic discrimination, 201–4 Europe data regulation, 128–29 globalization, 81 infrastructure investment, 195–96 privacy protections, 135 trade agreements favoring, 80 unity against Trump, 235 European Investment Bank, 195–96 evergreening, 60 excess profits, as rent, 54 exchange rate, 89, 307n28, 307n32 exploitation in current economy, 26 in economics texts, 23 financial sector and, 113 market power and, 47–78 reducing, 197 as source of wealth, 144–45 wealth creation vs., 34 and wealth redistribution, 50 exports, See globalization; trade wars Facebook anticompetitive practices, 70 and Big Data, 123, 124, 127–28 competition for ad revenue, 56 and conflicts of interest, 124 market power in relaxed antitrust environment, 62 as natural monopoly, 134 and preemptive mergers, 60, 73 reducing market power of, 124 regulation of advertising on, 132 fact-checking, 132, 177 “Fading American Dream, The” (Opportunity Insights report), 44–45 “fake news,” 167 family leave, 197 Farhi, Emmanuel, 62 farmers, Great Depression and, 120 fascism, 15–16, 18, 235 Federal Communication Commission (FCC), 147 Federal Reserve Board, 70, 112 Federal Reserve System, 121, 214–15 Federal Trade Commission, 69 fees bank profits from, 105, 110 credit card, 60, 70, 105 for mergers and acquisitions, 108 mortgages and, 107, 218 “originate-to-distribute” banking model, 110 private retirement accounts and, 215 fiduciary standard, 314n21, 347n10 finance (financial sector); See also banks and American crisis, 101–16 contagion of maladies to rest of economy, 112 disintermediation, 109 dysfunctional economy created by, 105–9 gambling by, 106–8 and government guarantees, 110–11 history of dysfunctionality, 109–12 as microcosm of larger economy, 113 mortgage reform opposed by, 216–18 private vs. social interests, 111–12 and public option, 215–16 shortsightedness of, 104–5 stopping societal harm created by, 103–5 and trade agreements, 80 financial crisis (2008), 101; See also Great Recession bank bailout, See bank bailout [2008] China and, 95 deregulation and, 25, 143–44 as failure of capitalism, 3 government response to, 5 housing and, 216 as man-made failure, 153–54 market liberalization and, 4 and moral turpitude of bankers, 7 regulation in response to, 101–2 as symptomatic of larger economic failures, 32–33 and unsustainable growth, 35 financial liberalization, See market liberalization First National Bank, 101 “fiscal paradises,” 85–86 fiscal policy, 121, 194–96 fiscal responsibility, 237 food industry, 182 forced retirement, 181–82 Ford Motor Company, 120 Fox News, 18, 133, 167, 177 fractional reserve banking, 110–11 fraud, 103, 105, 216, 217 freedom, regulation and, 144 free-rider problem, 67, 155–56, 225–26 Friedman, Milton, 68, 314–15n22 FUD (fear, uncertainty, and doubt), 58 Fukuyama, Francis, 3, 259n1 full employment, 83, 193–94, 196–97 Galbraith, John K., 67 gambling, by banks, 106–7, 207 Garland, Merrick, 166–67 Gates, Bill, 5, 117 GDP elites and, 22 as false measure of prosperity, 33, 227 financial sector’s increasing portion of, 109 Geithner, Tim, 102 gender discrimination, 41, 200–204 gene patents, 74–75 general welfare, 242–47 generic medicines, 60, 89 genetically modified food (GMO), 88 genetics, 126–27 George, Henry, 206 Germany, 132, 152 gerrymandering, 6, 159, 162 GI Bill, 210 Gilded Age, 12, 246 Glass-Steagall Act, 315n25, 341n39 globalization, 79–100 budget deficits and trade imbalances, 90 collective action to address, 154–55 effect on average citizens, 4, 21 in era of AI, 135 failure to manage, xxvi false premises about, 97–98 and global cooperation in 21st century, 92–97 and intellectual property, 88–89 and internet legal frameworks, 135 and low-skilled workers, 21, 82, 86, 267n39 and market power, 61 pain of, 82–87 and protectionism, 89–92 and 21st-century trade agreements, 87–89 and tax revenue, 84–86 technology vs., 86–87 and trade wars, 93–94 value systems and, 94–97 GMO (genetically modified food), 88 Goebbels, Joseph, 266n35 Goldman Sachs, 104 Google AlphaGo, 315n1 antipoaching conspiracy, 65 and Big Data, 123, 127, 128 conflicts of interest, 124 European restrictions on data use, 129 gaming of tax laws by, 85 market power, 56, 58, 62, 128 and preemptive mergers, 60 Gordon, Robert, 118–19 Gore, Al, 6 government, 138–56 assumption of mortgage risk, 107 Chicago School’s view of, 68–69 debate over role of, 150–52 and educational system, 220 failure of, 148–52 in finance, 115–16 and fractional reserve banking, 111 and Great Depression, 120 hiring of workers by, 196–97 increasing need for, 152–55 interventions during economic downturns, 23, 120 lack of trust in, 151 lending guarantees, 110–11 managing technological change, 122–23 and need for collective action, 140–42 and political reform, xxvi pre-distribution/redistribution by, xxv in progressive agenda, 243–44 public–private partnerships, 142 regulation and rules, 143–48 restoring growth and social justice, 179–208 social protection by, 231 government bonds, 215 Great Britain, wealth from colonialism, 9 Great Depression, xiii, xxii, 13, 23, 120 “great moderation,” 32 Great Recession, xxvi; See also financial crisis (2008) deregulation and, 25 diseases of despair, 42 elites and, 151 employment recovery after, 193 inadequate fiscal stimulus after, 121 as market failure, 23 pace of recovery from, 39–40 productivity growth after, 37 and retirement incomes, 214–15 weak social safety net and, 190 Greenspan, Alan, 112 Gross Fixed Capital Formation, 271n4 gross investment, 271n4 growth after 2008 financial crisis, 103 in China, 95 decline since 1980, 35–37 economic agenda for, xxvii failure of financial sector to support, 115 and inequality, 19 international living standard comparisons, 35–37 knowledge and, 183–86 labor force, 181–82 market power as inimical to, 62–64 in post-1970s US economy, 32 restoring, 181–86 taxation and, 25 guaranteed jobs, 196–97 Harvard University, 16 Hastert Rule, 333n31 health inequality in, 41–43 and labor force participation, 182 health care and American exceptionalism, 211–12 improving access to services, 203 public option, 210–11 in UK and Europe, 13 universal access to, 212–13 hedonic pricing, 347n13 higher education, 219–20; See also universities Hispanic Americans, 41 hi-tech companies, 54, 56, 60, 73 Hitler, Adolf, 152, 266n35 Hobbes, Thomas, 12 home ownership, 216–18 hours worked per week, US ranking among developed economies, 36–37 House of Representatives, 6, 159 housing, as barrier to finding new jobs, 186 housing bubble, 21 housing finance, 216–18 human capital index (World Bank), 36 Human Development Index, 36 Human Genome Project, 126 hurricanes, 207 IA (intelligence-assisting) innovations, 119 identity, capitalism’s effect on, xxvi ideology, science replaced by, 20 immigrants/immigration, 16, 181, 185 imports, See globalization; trade wars incarceration, 161, 163, 193, 201, 202 incentive payments for teachers, 201 voting reform and, 162–63 income; See also wages average US pretax income (1974-2014), 33t universal basic income, 190–91 income inequality, 37, 177, 200, 206 income of capital, 53 India, guaranteed jobs in, 196–97 individualism, 139, 225–26 individual mandate, 212, 213 industrial policies, 187 industrial revolution, 9, 12, 264–65n24 inequality; See also income inequality; wealth inequality benefits of reducing, xxiv–xxv and current politics, 246 in early years after WWII, xix economists’ failure to address, 33 education system as perpetuator of, 219 and election of 2016, xix–xxi and excess profits, 49 and financial system design, 198 growth of, xii–xiii, 37–45 in health, 41–43 in opportunity, 44–45 in race, ethnicity, and gender, 40–41 and 2017 tax bill, 236–37 technology’s effect on, 122–23 in 19th and early 20th century, 12–13 20th-century attempts to address, 13–14 tolerance of, 19 infrastructure European Investment Bank and, 195–96 fiscal policy and, 195 government employment and, 196–97 public–private partnerships, 142 returns on investment in, 195, 232 taxation and, 25 and 2017 tax bill, 183 inheritance tax, 20 inherited wealth, 43, 278n38 innovation intellectual property rights and, 74–75 market power and, 57–60, 63–64 net neutrality and, 148 regulation and, 134 slowing pace of, 118–19 and unemployment, 120, 121 innovation economy, 153–54 insecurity, social protection to address, 188–91 Instagram, 70, 73, 124 institutions fragility of, 230–36 in progressive agenda, 245 undermining of, 231–33 insurance companies, 125 Intel, 65 intellectual property rights (IPR) China and, 95–96 globalization and, 88–89, 99 and stifling of innovation, 74–75 and technological change, 122 in trade agreements, 80, 89 intelligence-assisting (IA) innovations, 119 interest rates, 83, 110, 215 intergenerational justice, 204–5 intergenerational transmission of advantage/disadvantage, xxv–xxvi, 199–201, 219 intermediation, 105, 106 Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 217 International Monetary Fund, xix internet, 58, 147 Internet Explorer, 58 inversions, 302n10 investment buybacks vs., 109 corporate tax cuts and, 269n44 and intergenerational justice, 204 long-term, 106 weakening by monopoly power, 63 “invisible hand,” 76 iPhone, 139 IPR, See intellectual property rights Ireland, 108 IRS (Internal Revenue Service), 217 Italy, 133 IT sector, 54; See also hi-tech companies Jackson, Andrew, 101, 241 Janus v.

Digital Empires: The Global Battle to Regulate Technology
by Anu Bradford
Published 25 Sep 2023

Such decoupling occurs if tech companies conclude that they are no longer able to operate across the conflicting regulatory regimes and, consequently, must choose one over the other. This prospect of a broader decoupling is challenging the notion of a global internet and fragmenting the deeply connected digital economy. It is also undermining the remaining efforts at global cooperation and contributing to the existing forces that are driving deglobalization—thereby also aggravating the horizontal battles that are discussed in the following chapters. While it is unclear how far such decoupling will ultimately proceed given the costs associated with such a development, the decoupling of the tech economy remains one of the key challenges facing the global digital order in the coming years.

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Tech companies are thus caught between two sets of irreconcilable legal obligations, forced to do what they always try to avoid doing: choosing sides. This inability by companies to resolve the regulatory conflicts will have significant consequences, setting in motion the decoupling of the digital economy and thus contributing to the existing trend toward “deglobalization” as a defining force shaping international economic and political relations. Following sanctions on Huawei and other Chinese hardware companies, Chinese social media companies—including the popular video-sharing app TikTok—have now also become a target of US government restrictions.110 This may not be surprising given that TikTok is the first large Chinese tech company that has managed to break into the US (and global) markets, challenging its US rivals and thus embodying China’s ascendant technological power.

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Despite both countries’ tentative commitments and incentives to cooperate in this new experiment in financial regulation, the countries already disagree on the role that Chinese regulators should play in the PCAOB’s inspection process.214 This suggests that, despite the costs involved, further decoupling of the US and Chinese financial markets remains possible, even probable. Under the most extreme scenario, such escalation could lead to a complete decoupling of the global stock market. Such a scenario—which may be unlikely, even if no longer impossible to imagine—would open a whole new era both in US–China relations and in deglobalization more generally, fragmenting the global economy in ways that were once unthinkable. Will the Intersecting Vertical Battles Lead to Technological Decoupling? The conflicts discussed in this chapter reveal the complex reality of today’s digital economy where global tech companies are caught between different regulatory models, confronting hard choices or, even worse, irreconcilable demands from different governments.

A Brief History of Neoliberalism
by David Harvey
Published 2 Jan 1995

Silver, Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1999); see also the Afterword to the paperback edition of Harvey , The New Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 19. Cited in Harvey, Condition of Postmodernity, 168–70. 20. S. Amin, ‘Social Movements at the Periphery’, in Wignaraja (ed.), New Social Movements in the South, 76–100. 21. W. Bello, Deglobalization: Ideas for a New World Economy (London: Zed Books, 2002); Bello, Bullard, and Malhotra (eds.), Global Finance; S. George , Another World is Possible IF… (London: Verso, 2003); W. Fisher and T. Ponniah (eds.), Another World is Possible: Popular Alternatives to Globalization at the World Social Forum (London: Zed Books, 2003); P.

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Arrighi, G., and Silver, B., Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1999). Bales, K., Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). Bartholomew, A., and Breakspear, J., ‘Human Rights as Swords of Empire’, Socialist Register (London: Merlin Press, 2003), 124–45. Bello, W., Deglobalization: Ideas for a New World Economy (London: Zed Books, 2002). ——Bullard, N., and Malhotra, K. (eds.), Global Finance: New Thinking on Regulating Speculative Markets (London: Zed Books, 2000). Benn, T., The Benn Diaries, 1940–1990, ed. R. Winstone (London: Arrow, 1996). Blyth, M., Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

The Light That Failed: A Reckoning
by Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes
Published 31 Oct 2019

They embody his defensive reaction to the threat to Russia posed by global economic interdependency and digital interoperability as well as the seemingly unstoppable diffusion of Western social and cultural norms. In this sense, Kremlin policy reflects a general trend that can be observed in the self-insulating, barricade-erecting and de-globalizing behaviour of other global actors in the wake of global financial crises as they have unfolded since the 1980s. Superficially, it’s true, Putin’s actions resemble nineteenth-century Russian imperial politics. But they are much better understood as part of a worldwide 21st-century resistance to unfettered, open-for-business but under-governed globalization.

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Why do they agree that the United States, rather than benefiting handsomely, has suffered miserably from the central role it has played in global trade, international organizations and the Atlantic Alliance? And why have so many Americans rallied to a President who describes the dividing of the West against itself and the de-globalization of the American economy as America’s revenge for decades of national humiliation? Trump has retained a non-negligible level of support among many of his fellow citizens even after attacking America’s closest allies and publicly embracing leaders who routinely denounce America in the shrillest terms.

The End of Indexing: Six Structural Mega-Trends That Threaten Passive Investing
by Niels Jensen
Published 25 Mar 2018

One way this could be achieved will be revealed in chapter 10; however, before you object to spending public money on non-productivity-enhancing initiatives like helicopter money, think about the trillions of dollars that companies from all over the world have stashed away in offshore tax havens. Taxing that money at a reasonable rate could easily finance such a policy, and pushing out the D-curve would benefit the corporate sector anyway. What else could we do? Some will argue that de-globalisation could also do the trick, but I won’t even go there. Such a move would be a very unfortunate step back into the dark ages and would totally disregard the contribution that rising international trade has made to economic growth over the past few decades. In the public sector, as already mentioned, it is all about increasing spending.

Pandora's Box: How Guts, Guile, and Greed Upended TV
by Peter Biskind
Published 6 Nov 2023

Save for Netflix, the dilemma, especially for young sprouts like Comcast-NBCU’s Peacock, is that they have to reach profitability before their own pay TV linear cable channels, which are still throwing off profits that the infant streamers needed to grow, are chewed up and spat out. They resemble the ouroboros, a serpent eating on its own tail, but instead of a symbol of infinity, it is a symbol of nullity. Another factor is deglobalization, meaning instability in big markets like India, Russia, and China—although after four years, China lifted its ban on Marvel, allowing Black Panther 2 and Ant-Man 3 to play in its theaters. Streaming, however, is a business that goes from gold to dross and back in the flick of an eye, and the clouds parted in the summer of that year, thanks to shows like Wednesday, Dahmer, Bridgerton, Squid Game, Glass Onion, The Gray Man, Stranger Things 4, Red Notice, and The Diplomat.

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See also Gilligan, Vince Bridgerton, 212 Brillstein-Grey, 14, 29, 31, 32 broadcast networks, 3, 44, 46, 214, 292, 298–299, 307–311 Broccoli, Barbara, 239 Bronchtein, Henry, 163 Brooke, Sian, 287 Brown, Jasmin Savoy, 160 bubble shows, 292 Buena Vista Music Group, 256 Buffett, Warren, 242 Burgess, Mitch, 34, 39–40, 48, 51, 68–69, 71, 180 Burns, Ed, 45, 308 Bushnell, Candace, 22–23 Cablevision company, 122–123 Callender, Colin, 79 Calvo, Dana, 226 candor, culture of, 198, 300 Cannavale, Bobby, 171 Capital News, 53 Carell, Steve, 227 Carnivale, 78 Carpool Karaoke, 222 Carr, David, 79 Carradine, Robert, 257 Carroll, Ed, 123, 135 Carter, Bill, 79 Cattrall, Kim, 22–23 CBS, 246, 307–308, 310 Cha Cha Real Smooth, 231 Chabon, Michael, 90 Chapek, Bob, 264, 273–275 Chapman, Anna, 116–117 Chase, David ambivalence toward women, 73 as anti-network, 73 background, 28, 30 Burgess on, 71 cast/crew afraid of, 48 Coulter on, 28–29, 50 on creative fatigue, 70–71 depression and, 31 directing Not Fade Away, 74 on Gandolfini, 44, 47–48 Green and, 51, 72–73 on “huggable moments” in writing, 31 on loose ends, 194 as network averse, 298 Reilly on, 31 reputation, 28 as The Rockford Files writer, 204 Winter on, 49 Wright and, 26–27 writing credits, 127 on writing The Sopranos, 29–32, 41, 69–70 Chase, Denise, 30–31 Chernin, Peter, 101 Chewing Gum, 284 Chiklis, Michael, 102, 103, 104, 106–107 churn, 303 Cinematch, 137 Citadel universe, 237–238 Clarke, Emilia, 183 Close, Glenn, 106, 109 closed shows, 42 Coates, Ta-Nahisi, 94 CODA, 230–231 Coel, Michaela, 283–286 Cohen, Joe, 116 Cohen, Rich, 171 Cohen, Sam, 7 Collette, Toni, 149 Collier, Charlie, 123, 135, 141 Columbia Pictures Television, 14–15 Comcast, 219, 244, 246, 288 comfort viewing, 230–231, 238, 297, 311 Coogler, Ryan, 263 Cook, Tim, 219, 222, 223–224, 228 Corden, James, 222 Costner, Kevin, 161 Coulter, Allen on Boardwalk Empire, 171–172 on Chase, 28–29, 50 on Gandolfini, 43, 44 as House of Cards director, 181 Mann and, 163–164 Milch and, 69, 165 on Spacey, 181–182 Strauss and, 36 valuing autonomy, 63 on Vinyl, 186 Cox, Brian, 58, 62, 64, 66, 164, 277, 278–281, 296 Cox, Laverne, 201 Craig, Daniel, 239 Cranston, Brian, 134–135, 136, 227 Critical Mouse Theory, 249–250 The Crown, 241, 300 Cruise, Tom, 296 Cue, Eddy, 219, 222 Culkin, Kieran, 279–280 culture of candor, 198, 300 Cuse, Carlton, 102, 107 Dahmer—Monster: The Jeffrey Dahmer Story, 212–213 Damages, 109–110, 116 Damon, Matt, 240 Danes, Claire, 154 Darabont, Frank, 157–158 Davidson, Adam, 63–64 Davis, Kristin, 22–23 DC Extended Universe, 270 De La Hoya, Oscar, 75 De Luca, Mike, 239–240, 269 Deadwood, 53–57, 62, 64–65 Dear Edward, 223 deglobalization, 294 DeLaria, Lea, 201–202 Dern, Laura, 207 DeSantis, Ron, 273, 274 Desmond, Norma, 296 The Devil You Know, 167 Dexter, 115, 150 Dibble, Mel, 108 Dickinson, 227, 229 Diller, Barry, 249 Dinklage, Peter, 168 Dino Daycare, 301 Discovery Channel, 266–267 Disney. See Walt Disney Company Disney, Abigail, 259, 264 Disney Channel, 243 Disney Press, 256 Disney+.

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See also Hastings, Reed; Randolph, Marc ad-supported tier introduced for, 304 allowing niche shows, 258 Amblin and, 300 Bezos praising, 241 business model, 139 Coel and, 284–285 content library, 139 cost-plus front-end deals, 213 creative excellence as new watchword, 301 culture of, 196–199, 258–259 data algorithms, 211 deglobalization, effects of, 294 destroying the relationship side of business, 215 Disney deal with, 139 Disney producers defecting to, 257–258 diversity, dedication to, 199 downturn, 292–294 Epix deal with, 138–139 exhibition strategy, 211, 302–303 financing, 59 HBO’s plan to purchase, 92–93 heavy price for success, 211–212 hitting 200-million-subscriber mark, 214 international expansion, 140 “Keeper Test,” 198–199 lacking a brand, 200 looming death spiral, 302 Marvel movies on, 243 Mattel and, 214 merchandising programs, 214 monster-of-the-month anthology series, 213 normalizing bingeing, 193–195 offering non-linear streaming experience, 194 original content budget, 212 pop-up storefront, 215 producers experiencing chaos, 301 programming.

Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization
by Branko Milanovic
Published 10 Apr 2016

Not only was centrally planned socialism eliminated as a competitor only recently, but nowhere in the world do we now find unfree labor playing an important economic role, as it did until some 150 years ago. Such is the hegemony of capitalism as a worldwide system that even those who are unhappy with it and with rising inequality, whether locally, nationally, or globally, have no realistic alternatives to propose. “Deglobalization” with a return to the “local” is impossible because it would do away with the division of labor, a key factor of economic growth. Surely, those who argue for localism do not wish to propose a major drop in living standards or a Khmer Rouge solution to inequality. Forms of state capitalism, as in Russia and China, do exist, but this is capitalism nevertheless: the private profit motive and private companies are dominant.

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See also imperialism; individual colonial powers Commercial Revolution, 65, 69 communism: end of, 3, 6, 123; Piketty on, 94; capital and, 99; mistaken predictions and, 157, 159; Chinese, 179, 180; globalization and, 214 consumption: data sources, 12–13, 16; discrepancies in data and, 16; rich countries and, 39, 197; labor demand and, 64; “mal-distribution of consuming power” and, 96; middle class and, 195, 197; climate change and, 233; as metric, 244n21; Marx on, 251n39. See also scalable jobs convergence. See economic convergence; income convergence, global cosmopolitanism, 141 currencies, 14–15, 236, 239, 244n24, 263n9, 263n11 decolonization, 100 deglobalization, 192 democracy, 7, 164, 189–90, 193–194, 199–203, 210, 255n18. See also global governance Democratic Republic of Congo, 173 demographic forces, 248n23. See also age and aging; marriages; migration; populations, global and national de Soto, Hernando, 221 dictatorships, 99 discoveries, 69 distribution.

Green Swans: The Coming Boom in Regenerative Capitalism
by John Elkington
Published 6 Apr 2020

Globally, seven in ten (70%) agreed that their economy is rigged in favor of the rich and powerful (little change at up one point from 2016), with a majority saying this in every single country except for Sweden (50%).5 Most of us avert our eyes, close our minds. We assume that the natural order will reassert itself, somehow—just as we assume that populism, trade wars, and deglobalization will sort themselves out, somehow. But eleventh hour escapes seem increasingly unlikely. Instead, we seem to be forcing ourselves into the biggest civilizational migration in history, where we have no option but to shift our economies and our businesses technologically, geographically, politically, and culturally.

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A South African colleague said that had happened in South Africa after the apartheid regime was toppled. Provocative, certainly, and another illustration of the seismic shocks now rattling the windows in palaces, ministries, and headquarter offices. When it comes to naming today’s Horsemen of the Apocalypse in this moment of populism, bellicosity, trade wars, and possible deglobalization, we are spoiled for choice. But, perhaps self-interestedly, I argued in that table discussion that what we really need is radically improved intergenerational working. And for that to work and succeed over time, we must all reinvent ourselves, not “just” our organizations, economies, and educational systems.

The Butterfly Defect: How Globalization Creates Systemic Risks, and What to Do About It
by Ian Goldin and Mike Mariathasan
Published 15 Mar 2014

Goldin and Mariathasan demonstrate that systemic risk issues are now endemic everywhere—in supply chains, pandemics, infrastructure, ecology and climate change, economics, and politics. Unless we are better able to address these concerns, they will lead to greater protectionism, xenophobia, nationalism, and, inevitably, deglobalization, rising conflict, and slower growth. The Butterfly Defect shows that mitigating uncertainty and systemic risk in an interconnected world is an essential task for our future.”—Provided by publisher. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-691-15470-1 (hardback) 1. Risk management. 2.

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Politicians, business people, and civil society have done a bad job in explaining the wide-ranging benefits of international connections and why these connections imply more, not less, joined-up global action. But we face not only a political backlash. We face the real threats posed by systemic risks. Financial crises, pandemics, and cyber and other threats could overwhelm the ties that bind us. Deglobalization and slowing global growth would be the consequences. These would be disasters for the global economy, particularly for poor people, who are always the most vulnerable. Everyone stands to gain through better management of systemic risk. Poor people suffer most when there are shocks. They also have the most to gain through greater connection.

The Price of Time: The Real Story of Interest
by Edward Chancellor
Published 15 Aug 2022

Arnott, Rob, Bernstein, William J. and Wu, Lillian, ‘The Myth of Dynastic Wealth: The Rich Get Poorer’, Cato Journal, 35 (3), October 2015. Arnott, Rob, Cornell, Bradford and Shepherd, Shane, ‘Yes. It’s a Bubble. So What?’ Research Affiliates, April 2018. Arslan, Yavuz, Contreras, Juan, Patel, Nikhil and Shu, Chang, ‘Globalisation and Deglobalisation in Emerging Market Economies: Facts and Trends’, BIS Working Paper, December 2018. Ashton, T. S., Economic Fluctuations in England 1700–1800 (Oxford, 1959). Atkeson, Andrew and Kehoe, Patrick J., ‘Deflation and Depression: Is There an Empirical Link?’ NBER Working Paper, January 2004. Bagehot, Walter, ‘Art.

…

As Valentina Bruno and colleagues write: ‘Long supply chains entail substantial financing needs, which increase in a non-linear way with the length of the supply chain.’ This paper cites Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk who first suggested that when interest rates decline companies would use more time and capital – or, as he put it, more ‘roundabout’ production methods. 38. Yavuz Arslan et al., ‘Globalisation and Deglobalisation in Emerging Market Economies: Facts and Trends’, BIS Working Paper, December 2018, p. 21. 39. John. M. Keynes, ‘National Self-sufficiency’, Yale Review, 22 (4), June 1933: 755–69. 40. Ben Bernanke, The Courage to Act: A Memoir of a Crisis and Its Aftermath (New York, 2017), p. 493. 41.

The Fair Trade Scandal: Marketing Poverty to Benefit the Rich
by Ndongo Sylla
Published 21 Jan 2014

The economist and historian Jeffrey Williamson, as well as many of his colleagues, distinguish a first ‘wave’ of globalisation, which they place between 1870 and 1913 and refer to as the ‘age of mass migration’. In contrast, the second ‘wave’ of globalisation would have started in the 1950s and continues to the present. From their point of view, the intervening period (1913–45) would be one of de-globalisation. See for example Williamson (1996). 28. According to Rodrik (2007b: 8), with a 3 per cent increase in their share of the labour force of rich countries, immigrants from the South would enjoy net gains of $265 billion per year. This is considerably higher than gain estimates as part of the Doha round of negotiations ($30 billion according to Rodrik). 29.

Global Governance and Financial Crises
by Meghnad Desai and Yahia Said
Published 12 Nov 2003

The half-century preceding 1914 had witnessed a globalised world with free movement of capital and labour and Gold Standard which meant that except for Great Britain, no other country had monetary sovereignty. Over the period, the cycles in 1864–1914 became more interlinked across the developed countries of the globe and there was a rough regularity about their frequency. In the 1919–39 period the world deglobalised. The free movement of labour came to a stop and the movements of capital became difficult across national barriers. Great Britain lost its hegemony of the world economy and the USA was not yet ready to take it up. The cycles became irregular and uncorrelated. There was an upswing and inflation in the immediate postwar period but by 1922/23 the deflationary phase began in major European economies.

The Wires of War: Technology and the Global Struggle for Power
by Jacob Helberg
Published 11 Oct 2021

Reconstituting the productive capacity of allied democracies before China achieves its own self-reliance should be a high national security priority. Deglobalize China’s Eye of Sauron By Establishing a Global Network Strategy Huawei’s 5G dominance poses perhaps the greatest threat to the integrity of a free, open, safe, and sovereign Western techno-bloc. From eastern Europe to Southeast Asia, the United States has been fighting a desperate rearguard action to persuade other countries not to install Huawei infrastructure. But what are we offering in exchange? To win the Gray War, the United States should adopt a global strategy to deglobalize China’s Eye of Sauron, making a concerted effort to compete with Huawei by establishing a Western 5G alternative.

The Great Demographic Reversal: Ageing Societies, Waning Inequality, and an Inflation Revival
by Charles Goodhart and Manoj Pradhan
Published 8 Aug 2020

In China’s case, that might eventually mean tapping into the considerable savings of its SOEs that have been the mainstay of China’s national savings over the last few decades. In both cases, China has the resources to protect its future, but the impact it had on the global economy will no longer be the same as in the past. As we move deeper into de-globalisation, the temptation will be to think of the world as a collection of local entities, a temptation that would lead one to erroneous conclusions. Slowing globalization remains entirely consistent with the global transmission of shocks, particularly when the underlying change is as uniform across the major economies of the world as ageing.

The Shifts and the Shocks: What We've Learned--And Have Still to Learn--From the Financial Crisis
by Martin Wolf
Published 24 Nov 2015

This is because financial markets are more integrated and the autonomy of national policy is more limited than elsewhere.10 In practice, the outcome in Europe is likely to be some mixture of the two. The same is also true for the world as a whole, where tension arises between a desire to agree at least a minimum level of common regulatory standards and a parallel desire to preserve domestic regulatory autonomy.11 Such pressure for ‘de-globalization’ may not be limited to finance. The combination of slow growth with widening inequality, higher unemployment, financial instability, so-called ‘currency wars’ and fiscal defaults may yet undermine the political legitimacy of globalization in many other respects. Inevitably, the legacy of the crises includes large-scale institutional changes in many areas of policy, at national, regional and global levels.

…

Taylor, ‘The Great Leveraging’, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 18290, August 2012, www.nber.org. 10. Adair Turner, ‘Financial Risk and Regulation: Do we Need More Europe or Less?’, 27 April 2012, Financial Services Authority, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2012/0427-at.shtml. 11. Another example of ‘de-globalization’ is the proposed ring-fencing of domestic retail banking from global investment banking proposed by the UK’s Independent Commission on Banking, of which I was a member. This was set up by the incoming coalition government under the chairmanship of Sir John Vickers. See Independent Commission on Banking, Final Report: Recommendations, September 2011, London, http://bankingcommission.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/ICB-Final-Report.pdf, ch. 3.

Connectography: Mapping the Future of Global Civilization
by Parag Khanna
Published 18 Apr 2016

Then came the collapse of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha round of negotiations in 2006, when it was argued that without an agreement on a single overarching global framework of rules, global trade would unwind, retrench, or contract. And most recently with the financial crisis of 2007–8, exports slumped, international lending diminished, and the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism came under attack, all cited as evidence of “de-globalization.” A fourth front of “end of globalization” hyperbole is now under way as American interest rates rise, Chinese growth slows, and cheap energy and advanced manufacturing technologies together enable the near-shoring and automation of production. But I argue that globalization is entering a new golden age.

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.*1 Furthermore, the more jobs and wealth American companies create abroad, the more foreigners buy American goods: U.S. exports to emerging markets doubled from 1990 to 2012. Cutting off American investment (and thus profits) overseas will therefore lead to reduced investment at home too. Remember tug-of-war: Be careful when untangling the rope. Even what looks like de-globalization is actually still globalization. Apple is a perfect example of these complex realities. The Berkeley economist Enrico Moretti estimates that Apple is substantially responsible for sixty thousand jobs in Silicon Valley, only twelve thousand of which are employees in its Cupertino headquarters.

The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics
by David Goodhart
Published 7 Jan 2017

This reflected the political settlement of the Thatcher-Reagan era in which the right won the economic argument and the liberal-left won the cultural argument. There are exceptions to this rule, of course: the left did not win the cultural argument so clearly in the US, hence the long ‘culture wars’. And the right may now be partly losing the economic argument as markets are more constrained and the world experiences a limited deglobalisation. This ‘double liberalism’ is the reason for that familiar refrain ‘they are all the same, what’s the point in voting?’ And almost everywhere that convergence left a ‘missing majority’, or at least a substantial minority, of lower income, less well-educated people who remain significantly less liberal than the graduate Anywhere class but still prefer moderately social democratic economic and tax-spend policies and better protection from globalisation.

The Globalization of Inequality
by François Bourguignon
Published 1 Aug 2012

For example, if we believe that the increase in national inequalities is due above all to the globalization of trade, it would be tempting Policies for a Fairer Globalization 147 to try to remedy it by taking protectionist measures. Several figures in France and elsewhere in the world have come out in favor of this policy. Some have even advocated a policy of “de-­globalization.”1 The problem is that even if such a policy did lead to a reduction in inequalities in some countries—which, as we will see later on, is itself doubtful—it would also be a hindrance to the development of other countries and would ultimately slow down the reduction of poverty in the world. This is exactly the kind of trade-­off that a community that cares about global well-­ being must avoid.

Boom and Bust: A Global History of Financial Bubbles
by William Quinn and John D. Turner
Published 5 Aug 2020

The liberalisation of incorporation law, the development of stock markets and the growing middle classes joining the ranks of speculators over the next century increased the likelihood of bubbles, by ensuring that all three sides of the triangle were present. Similarly, after the Wall Street Crash, the regulation of financial markets, the stringent regulation of banks and the deglobalisation of capital both restricted marketability and limited the potential fuel for bubbles. However, the globalisation of capital and deregulation of banking since the 1970s has led to an unprecedented extension of credit and increase in debt. In addition, the deregulation of financial markets has made trading much cheaper and easier, greatly increasing the marketability of financial assets.

The End of Growth
by Jeff Rubin
Published 2 Sep 2013

I can’t say I was surprised when the bank’s lawyers sent down word four months later that permission would be denied. Economists at big banks do publish books, but most often the subject matter is along the lines of how your retirement savings can outperform the stock market. Mine was about how triple-digit oil prices were going to reverse globalization. CIBC doesn’t sell oil, and it sure doesn’t sell de-globalization. Looking back, I realize that McCaughey was only doing his job, which was to protect the bank’s interests. But I didn’t write the book so that it wouldn’t get read. I’d been preaching its themes to whoever would listen at CIBC for years. It was time to take the message to a broader audience.

Cape Town After Apartheid: Crime and Governance in the Divided City
by Tony Roshan Samara
Published 12 Jun 2011

For a discussion of the rise of urban neoliberalism in the United States, see Alice O’Conner, “The Privatized City: The Manhattan Institute, the Urban Crisis, and the Conservative Counterrevolution in New York,” Journal of Urban History 34, no. 2 (January 2008): 333–53; Jamie Peck, “Liberating the City: Between New York and New Orleans, Urban Geography 27, no. 8 (2006): 681–713. 23.╯Walden Bello, Deglobalization: Ideas for a New World Economy (London: Zed Books, 2005). 24.╯Bryn Hughes, “The ‘Fundamental’ Threat of (Neo)Liberal Democracy: An Unlikely Source of Legitimation for Political Violence, Dialogue 3, no. 2 (2005): 43–85. http://www.polsis.uq.edu.au/dialogue/3-2-4.pdf (accessed November 11, 2010); Leys, Market Driven Politics: Neoliberal Democracy and the Public Interest; Robert W.

Future Files: A Brief History of the Next 50 Years
by Richard Watson
Published 1 Jan 2008

Obvious implications will include a focus on green and community issues and various promises of free time and family-friendly policies. Of course, this trend could go out of the window the moment there’s a flu pandemic, major war or economic downturn. Global or national? Another wildcard is globalization, or perhaps more accurately de-globalization. While most people assume that globalization is here to stay, I’d argue that this is far from certain. Globalization will probably last for at least another decade or two but there are a number of worrying signs. First, the rise of China and India could result in economic protectionism in regions like the US and Europe, putting a few speed-bumps in the road to further globalization.

Why We Can't Afford the Rich
by Andrew Sayer
Published 6 Nov 2014

We are told by politicians that globalisation is the future – ever-increasing integration of different economies, more imports and exports, more travel, both freight and passenger. The total distance travelled by all the parts in a computer or car may be equivalent to the distance from the earth to the moon. The politicians are wrong: de-globalisation is necessary for a sustainable future. Unless and until we can devise low-carbon forms of travel, which means, in effect, an alternative to petroleum-based fuel, there will have to be much less of it, and much more local production. And in more localised economies we are much less likely to harm the environment because any damage and waste are less likely to be out of sight and mind.

The Verdict: Did Labour Change Britain?
by Polly Toynbee and David Walker
Published 6 Oct 2011

In the three months to October 2009, for example, an extra 23,000 NHS jobs pushed up employment opportunities, in many cases for women. Another academic study, looking at Dundee – the jam and jute city once famously dependent on international trade – remarked that with four out of ten jobs in the public sector, the city had been ‘de-globalized’, making its regional economy both less open and more stable. Labour’s trick was to detach living standards from incomes. During stable, low-inflationary growth, people readily took on more debt while running down their savings. When nearly seven out of ten households owned their own homes, property inflation created a widespread sense of being better off, with added ease of borrowing.

How Will Capitalism End?
by Wolfgang Streeck
Published 8 Nov 2016

If there is nothing in supranational ‘Europe’ that could provide for the sort of social cohesion and solidarity and governability that would be required, of the kind that was over two centuries more or less successfully established in European nation states – if all there is at supranational level are the Junckers and Draghis and their fellow financial functionaries – then the general answer is that rather than, like latter-day Don Quixotes, trying to extend the scale of democracy to that of capitalist markets, to do what you can to reduce the scale of the latter to fit the former. Bringing capitalism back into the ambit of democratic government, and thereby saving the latter from extinction, means de-globalizing capitalism; it is as simple and as difficult as that. There is no denying that this would be a huge agenda, and in certain respects, perhaps, also a costly one, with no guarantee of success. But it would at least be a goal worth fighting for. Restoring embedded democracy means re-embedding capitalism.

Head, Hand, Heart: Why Intelligence Is Over-Rewarded, Manual Workers Matter, and Caregivers Deserve More Respect
by David Goodhart
Published 7 Sep 2020

There are several ways in which the crisis will enable, in the language of this book, Hand (manual work) and Heart (care work) to claim back some of the prestige and reward they have lost to Head (cognitive work) in recent decades. At the most macro level a new version of globalization is now possible, summed up in one of the wittier slogans of the crisis: workers of the world unite, you have nothing to lose but your supply chains. Full-scale deglobalization is highly undesirable and is not going to happen; we have learned the lessons of 1930s protectionism. But some restraints on what economist Dani Rodrik has called “hyper-globalization”—the globalization that has favored large corporations, financial markets, and mobile skilled professionals—can be put in place.

The World in 2050: Four Forces Shaping Civilization's Northern Future
by Laurence C. Smith
Published 22 Sep 2010

Global trade is fueled by cheap energy, and container ships and long-haul cargo trucks cannot readily be electrified like passenger cars as described in Chapter 3. And as environmental damages, too, are increasingly priced into production costs in manufacturing countries like China, the apparent profit margin of a global versus local trade network will narrow. A deglobalized world with extremely high energy prices might be an oddly familiar one, with local farmers feeding compact walking cities, a return to domestic manufacturing, and airplane travel afforded only by rich elites. One could even imagine a reversal of the urbanization trend as farming returns to being a labor-intensive industry, no longer propped by cheap hydrocarbon for fuel, fertilizers, and pesticides.

The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World
by Niall Ferguson
Published 13 Nov 2007

It was a story repeated all over the world, from Shanghai to Santiago, from Moscow to Mexico City. By the end of the 1930s, most states in the world, including those that retained political freedoms, had imposed restrictions on trade, migration and investment as a matter of course. Some achieved near-total economic self-sufficiency (autarky), the ideal of a de-globalized society. Consciously or unconsciously, all governments applied in peacetime the economic restrictions that had first been imposed between 1914 and 1918. The origins of the First World War became clearly visible - as soon as it had broken out. Only then did the Bolshevik leader Lenin see that war was an inevitable consequence of imperialist rivalries.

A Game as Old as Empire: The Secret World of Economic Hit Men and the Web of Global Corruption
by Steven Hiatt; John Perkins
Published 1 Jan 2006

New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2004. Balanyá, Belén, Brid Brennan, Olivier Hoedeman, Satoko Kishimoto and Philipp Terhorst. Reclaiming Public Water: Achievements, Struggles and Visions from Around the World, 2nd edn. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute and Corporate Europe Observatory, March 2005. Bello, Walden. Deglobalization: Ideas for a New World Economy. London: Zed, 2004. Black, Maggie. The No-Nonsense Guide to International Development. London: Verso/New Internationalist, 2004. Brecher, Jeremy, and Tim Costello. Global Village or Global Pillage: Economic Reconstruction from the Bottom Up. Boston: South End, 1998.

The Levelling: What’s Next After Globalization
by Michael O’sullivan
Published 28 May 2019

Flows within China are dynamic and are perhaps more managed than before, but flows of foreigners into China are miniscule by comparison to other countries, and China has only recently established an agency (the State Immigration Administration created at the 2018 Party Congress) to cultivate inward flows. So as China has become a major pole, it has become less globalized and arguably is contributing to the trend toward deglobalization. On a broader scale, without picking on individual countries, we can measure the extent to which the world is becoming multipolar by examining aggregate trends in trade, GDP, foreign direct investment, government budget size, and population. All of these are much less concentrated, or more dispersed, than they used to be, and increasingly they are collecting around several poles.

Capitalism 4.0: The Birth of a New Economy in the Aftermath of Crisis
by Anatole Kaletsky
Published 22 Jun 2010

From this point of view, the sooner the world economy can be rebalanced, eliminating excessive trade surpluses and deficits worldwide, the smaller the risk of dangerous inflationary pressures. Unfortunately, as discussed previously in this chapter, the prospects of such a global rebalancing occurring quickly and smoothly do not seem bright. Protectionism and deglobalization therefore could create the conditions for stagflation to return. Big Government From the mid-1960s until the late 1970s, the world experienced a large upsurge of government spending and employment. This was clearly one of the major causes of stagflation. Whatever one’s political outlook about the virtues or vices of public spending, there can be no denying that government-administered activities are generally insensitive to competition.

The Future of Money: How the Digital Revolution Is Transforming Currencies and Finance
by Eswar S. Prasad
Published 27 Sep 2021

Cross-country Concerns In the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, multinational commercial banks stopped expanding their international footprints as they had been aggressively doing for a few years before that. Instead, they beat a retreat to their home bases, setting off a wave of deglobalization, as such banks had until then been the key drivers of cross-border financial flows. New financial technologies could now make it easier for both bank and nonbank financial institutions to once again expand the geographic scope of their operations across national borders. After all, an online bank with no physical branches can exist and operate anywhere, unconstrained by borders.

After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire Since 1405
by John Darwin
Published 5 Feb 2008

Politics and geopolitics were a vital part of the equation. The outbreak of wars and their unpredictable course could shatter one equilibrium and impose another. Thus the great expansion of trade in the late nineteenth century and the kinds of globalization it helped to promote came to a shuddering halt with the First World War. After 1929, ‘deglobalization’ set in with catastrophic results. Europe’s original breakthrough to a position of primacy in its global relations is much better seen as the unexpected result of a revolution in Eurasia than as the outcome of a steady advance in Columbus’s footsteps. The appropriate imagery is not of rivers or tides, but of earthquakes and floods.

Expected Returns: An Investor's Guide to Harvesting Market Rewards
by Antti Ilmanen
Published 4 Apr 2011

Source: Haver Analytics. 27.3 THE NEXT 20 YEARS The shadow of the crisis Many of the trends listed above contributed to the 2007–2008 financial crisis; and their reversals are, in part, consequences of the crisis. In this spirit, PIMCO’s Bill Gross and Mohamed El-Erian characterize the post-crisis years as the “new normal” environment of slower economic growth and greater government involvement, in which de-leveraging, de-globalization, and re-regulation are key features. Like many others, I expected the crisis to have a long-lasting impact on this generation’s risk appetite—echoing that of the conservative “depression babies”—but the sharp risky asset rally in 2009 and early 2010 suggests that the lessons were not very memorable.

The Stack: On Software and Sovereignty
by Benjamin H. Bratton
Published 19 Feb 2016

For their part, Schmidt and Cohen also warn against “Internet balkanization” whereby authoritarian state actors (China, Russia, Iran, federations of Sunni states, Texas, and so on) build virtual borders around their citizens, keeping them trapped in a closed bubble of sanctioned concepts, and sheltered from the enlightening waters of the global Internet provided by open platforms, such as Google. Under this deglobalization, the cosmopolitan potential of the Google Cloud model would be subverted and inverted by local “traditional states” jealous of their citizens’ wandering attention. They explain the dynamic of Cloud versus state in the gentlest possible terms for a Western audience. The negative scenarios drawn include alternative DNS (Domain Name System) addressing systems allowing any state bloc to contain its own map of the online world, separate from others, and in principle to wipe other locations off their particular map.