deglobalization

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description: process of diminishing interdependence and integration between certain units around the world

42 results

Aftershocks: Pandemic Politics and the End of the Old International Order

by Colin Kahl and Thomas Wright  · 23 Aug 2021  · 652pp  · 172,428 words

so volatile, crisis-prone, and dangerous during the interwar period—mounting inequality, widespread civil strife, rising populism and xenophobia, growing economic nationalism and pressures to deglobalize, resurgent authoritarianism, backsliding democracy, escalating great-power rivalry, American retreat, brittle international institutions, and a free world in disarray—were already reemerging in our time

to free trade. Between 1929 and 1932, the value of trade fell by 70 percent worldwide, and (to borrow a contemporary term) the world economy deglobalized. Unemployment skyrocketed to between one-fifth and one-third of the industrial workforce in advanced economies, and rates of poverty and acute food insecurity sharply

War I, the influenza pandemic, monetary policy in the 1920s, new immigration restrictions, the Great Depression, spiraling protectionism, and another world war, the international system deglobalized, producing a trade openness index of 10.1 percent in 1945.8 In the post–World War II era, from the mid-1940s on, the

, and Howe, 1920), 36.   31.  Graebner and Bennett, The Versailles Treaty and Its Legacy, 68.   32.  Douglas A. Irwin, “The Pandemic Adds Momentum to the Deglobalization Trend,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 23, 2020, https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/pandemic-adds-momentum

-deglobalization-trend#_ftnref2.   33.  Barro, Ursua, and Wang, “The Coronavirus and the Great Influenza Epidemic.”   34.  Richard Overy, The Inter-Wars Crisis, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge,

Crisis of the Old Order (New York: Penguin Books, 2018).     8.  Douglas Irwin, “The Pandemic Adds Momentum to the Deglobalisation Trend,” VoxEU, May 5, 2020, https://voxeu.org/article/pandemic-adds-momentum-deglobalisation-trend.     9.  Esteban Ortiz-Ospina and Diana Beltekian, “Trade and Globalization,” Our World in Data, revised October 2018, https

Capitalism and Its Critics: A History: From the Industrial Revolution to AI

by John Cassidy  · 12 May 2025  · 774pp  · 238,244 words

the first quarter of 2023, according to the Bank for International Settlements, banks’ total cross-border claims reached $37 trillion.45 But proponents of the “deglobalization” thesis could also point to figures that supported their case. If you looked at the volume of trade in goods relative to the size of

/policy-sub-issues/fdi/FDI-in-Figures-April-2024.pdf. 48.   Christian Keller and Renate Marold, “Deglobalization: What You Need to Know,” World Economic Forum, January 17, 2023, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/01/deglobalisation-what-you-need-to-know-wef23. 49.   American Compass, The American Rejection of Globalization, January 11

MegaThreats: Ten Dangerous Trends That Imperil Our Future, and How to Survive Them

by Nouriel Roubini  · 17 Oct 2022  · 328pp  · 96,678 words

overlap and reinforce one another. There are links between debt accumulation and debt traps, easy money and financial crises, artificial intelligence (AI) and workplace automation, deglobalization, geopolitical clashes among great powers, inflation and stagflation, currency meltdowns, income inequality and populism, global pandemics and climate change. Each hampers our ability to address

of numerous asset bubbles including the crypto ones, now that the era of cheap money was starting to reverse. The peristent talk and practice of deglobalization and fragmentation of the global economy; the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the risk that this conflict could expand geographically and in unconventional ways; the

the current global political environment, draconian restrictions on migration will strip employers of that option when workers press wage demands. Wage inflation will accelerate. 3. Deglobalization, protectionism, and inward-oriented policies intended to protect workers and firms will punish economies rather than bolster them. By restricting global trade in goods, services

worldwide will continue to enjoy lower prices while employment in emerging markets lifts millions of global citizens out of poverty. The opposite path, call it deglobalization, favors protectionist policies aimed at bringing lost jobs back home, aka reshoring, and preventing jobs from moving abroad. As appealing as protectionism may sound, when

tried before, it toppled the economic ladder for nearly everyone. That is why deglobalization is a megathreat. Deglobalization geared to preserving twentieth-century factory jobs will backfire, crippling essential trade in much larger markets for services, technology, data, information, capital, investment

, and labor. Deglobalization will stymie economic growth, disable the means to cope with massive debts, and grease the rails toward epic inflation and stagflation. Globalization stalwarts have hard

its allies on one side and China and its allies—Russia, Iran, North Korea—are mounting, the risk of trade and financial sanctions that exacerbate deglobalization is increasing. North Korea and Iran were already widely sanctioned by the United States and the West, leading them to trade only with informal allies

space to create their own high-tech cloud. Actions of this kind threaten vital elements of global trade in technology. This looks to me like deglobalization on steroids. Globalization is also under assault where wage compensation and labor standards fall short. Expecting poor countries to match the wages or regulations of

in emerging markets. The US Congress has introduced similar proposals. Collectively, all these protections hobble globalization. The result is low-balization, slow-balization, and, eventually, deglobalization. The motivations behind these protections are understandable, stemming in part from rage against the widening wealth gap between owners of capital and the vast majority

by policy makers in civilized societies, for self-preservation if not for nobler reasons. But before we succumb to impulses that elevate the cause of deglobalization, prudent attention should weigh its economic, political, and social consequences. Tariffs sound painless, but they actually cause disproportionate injury to consumers with low incomes. Raising

get poorer. The rise in inequality is only partially due to trade; more powerful forces—to be discussed in Chapter 8—are also at fault. Deglobalization would close the door on the chance to raise living standards worldwide to an acceptable level. Restricting trade would reduce global output, shrinking the number

dazzle observers. They form a robust and intricate web connecting millions of end users to component production facilities across the world where efficiencies are greatest. Deglobalization would disrupt these networks, spurning efficiencies and catering instead to demand for jobs, often where bloated cost structures might impair competition in global markets. Geopolitics

the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Geopolitically driven balkanization of the global economy is ahead of us and a further nail in the coffin of globalization. Deglobalization unleashes other dangerous currents. When most people think about trade, they are likely to picture giant containers carried on ocean freighters. Focusing on trade in

pushes policy toward balkanization, what price will we pay for trade restraints on intangibles? When we go beyond the realm of goods, the urge to deglobalize makes everything curiouser and curiouser, as Alice in Wonderland might say. Case in point: technology. We worry about TikTok collecting data about our teenagers and

support those left behind. As any policy maker can attest, however, anything resembling the optimal result is far easier said than done. However well intentioned, deglobalization fights the wrong battle. No one says it more succinctly than my colleague Gordon Hanson: “Encouraging optimism about the reshoring of jobs would only lead

the high-tech world in which we live. We will be lucky if, after three decades of hyperglobalization, we don’t slip into a radical deglobalization. A slowbalization outcome—while not ideal and still quite costly—looks preferable. In a slowbalized world, the US and China would operate competing trading and

, if not hopeless. Think global climate change, pandemics, cyberwarfare, global financial crises, conflict between the United States and China and Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Deglobalization, global financial crises, mass migration, and ethical uses of artificial intelligence sound very different to authorities in rich and poor countries, or even among leading

globalization. The fundamental aspect of populist economic policy is economic nationalism and autarkic tendencies. The rise of political and economic populism exacerbates the risk of deglobalization, protectionism, fragmentation of the global economy, balkanization of global supply chains, restrictions to migration, controls of movement of capital, technology, and data, and severe friction

get? If two oil shocks bore significant blame for stagflation in the seventies, imagine the consequences when multiple megathreats converge. Massive explicit and implicit debt, deglobalization and protectionism, balkanization of global supply chains, aging of populations in advanced and emerging markets, restrictions on labor migration, the US-China cold war and

failed Communist economy that can barely feed its people and is doomed to collapse at some point. A rejuvenated Western system would counteract calls for deglobalization and protectionism. Sluggish growth and inequality spur populism, and populism stirs economic nationalism. Strong, inclusive, and sustainable growth keeps both trends in check. Greater global

century ago? In the first four decades of the twentieth century, we faced World War I, then the deadly Spanish flu of 1918–19, then deglobalization and bouts of hyperinflation, and then the Great Depression. That brought massive trade wars, financial and debt crises, and deflation; then the rise of populist

good. Inequality will worsen. COVID-19 exposed how likely recurrent deadly pandemics are and how competing priorities thwart coordinated responses within and across national borders. Deglobalization won’t occur overnight, but I see nothing to break its momentum. Likewise, inequality and widespread feelings of displacement and alienation make populism easier to

Seven Crashes: The Economic Crises That Shaped Globalization

by Harold James  · 15 Jan 2023  · 469pp  · 137,880 words

be a reflection of a globalization that pushes up land values, especially in globally connected centers (and indeed, his measures of inequality fall during the deglobalization phase of the mid-twentieth century). Thus he insists that even technical progress, which might be thought of as the triumph of human ingenuity or

metals. That shock too pushed a brief restoration of world trade in the 1920s. In the twentieth century, the Great Depression, which led to a deglobalization push, was primarily a demand shock. People interpreted the catastrophe as poverty in the midst of plenty: there was an oversupply of grain (and other

quest is obvious: the Great Depression followed from the massive disruptions (a supply shock) that followed the Great War. It was a continuation of the deglobalization rupture brought by the First World War, made all the more severe by the bungled attempts to revive or reinvent internationalism. Most obviously, the war

the Daily Mail a celebration under the headline “President Roosevelt Is Magnificently Right.”66 Keynes and Roosevelt were the makers of a new age of deglobalized politics. The Magician: Keynes Keynes grew up in the sunny, optimistic, intellectually confident atmosphere of Edwardian Cambridge. He was the son of a don, John

the extraordinary rate achieved between 1920 and 1970.130 There are three explanations for the interlocking U-curves: technical change, war, and the logic of deglobalization. In the first place, the extraordinary American development of the mid-century was driven by dramatic technical change (see Figure 4.2). Overall innovations transformed

economic miracle that rescued the American economy from the threat of secular stagnation of the late 1930s.134 And finally, there was a logic of deglobalization that brought real improvements for workers who were now protected by new restrictions on international mobility. The lack of competition for jobs from recent immigrants

pyramid and contributed to the remarkable “great compression” of income distribution during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. Robert Gordon concludes that it was the extensive deglobalization that laid the groundwork for an American Great Leap Forward (the terminology used by Alex Field in a satirical dig at communist China’s growth

the exceptional rates of productivity growth of the interwar era fell off. The last two effects, world war and the one-off income gains from deglobalization, could not be repeated over and over again. The effects of the mid-twentieth-century innovations on geography and distance, however, seemed to hold out

, politics, and interconnectedness: or, in other words, genius, government, and globalization. And of course, the way in which these elements mixed together generated controversy. Some deglobalizers liked to make the connection between Covid and globalization very explicit: thus President Trump’s trade adviser, Peter Navarro, called globalization the “original sin” that

imitating the United States. But that set-up is not a usual rule, and it followed from the peculiar circumstances of the world’s interwar deglobalization. Crises push more, and more technically transformed, globalization not simply because of a need for commodities or goods that are complex and produced a long

), Das Ende des Kapitalismus (Jena: E. Diederichs, 1931), 247. 2. Joshua Derman, “Prophet of a Partitioned World: Ferdinand Fried, ‘Great Spaces,’ and the Dialectics of Deglobalization, 1929–1950,” Modern Intellectual History 2020: 1–25. 3. Ben S. Bernanke, Essays on the Great Depression (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 5. 4. J

Exponential: How Accelerating Technology Is Leaving Us Behind and What to Do About It

by Azeem Azhar  · 6 Sep 2021  · 447pp  · 111,991 words

against globalisation may well lead to greater conflict between nations. One 2010 estimate by a three-decade veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency suggested that deglobalisation might raise the risk of war for any given country in the subsequent 25 years by more than a factor of six.4 At the

. W. Lee and J. H. Pyun, Does Trade Integration Contribute to Peace, Asian Development Bank Working Paper (January 2009), p. 18 4 Evan E. Hillebrand, ‘Deglobalization Scenarios: Who Wins? Who Loses?’, Global Economy Journal, vol. 10, issue 2 (2010). 5 Anouk Rigertink, New Wars in Numbers: An Exploration of Various Datasets

Shocks, Crises, and False Alarms: How to Assess True Macroeconomic Risk

by Philipp Carlsson-Szlezak and Paul Swartz  · 8 Jul 2024  · 259pp  · 89,637 words

, it is fair to expect trade architecture to adjust again, along with economic knock-on effects. In the popular telling, globalization is giving way to deglobalization, offshoring to reshoring. The benefits that were gained are supposedly to be lost. But trade is a perfect example of treacherous extrapolation and the simplification

trade is not as bad as you might think. The Curious Claim of Retreating Trade Over the past decade or so, a powerful narrative of deglobalization has emerged.1 Pointing to trends in world trade data, the narrative argues that global trade is in retreat. Yet a closer examination shows that

share of trade in world GDP. In other words, falling trade intensity is significantly driven by lower commodity prices—which would be weak evidence of deglobalization. The deglobalization thesis alleges less trade integration, not merely swings in commodity prices. Figure 19.1C puts the thesis to the test, stripping out mining and

commodity prices doubled in the next year and the share of trade in world GDP surged, should a reglobalization narrative replace the fashionable one about deglobalization? No. There are additional reasons to be skeptical of a narrative of retreating global trade. Trade was never strictly global—but always significantly regional. The

. Think in terms of global capacity.  The steady stream of announcements about new production capacity in high-cost, developed economies is too easily equated with deglobalization and inflationary cost. Ask if new capacity replaces or adds to existing capacity and realize that incremental changes to the geographic mix of capacity moves

rests on four insights. Underestimated resilience. So far, the popular case that trade is in decline looks like an overstatement. Despite a decade of supposed deglobalization, trade volumes are still growing, the decline in trade intensity (that is, trade as a share of world GDP) is modest, and—correcting for falling

-making, 27–30 declinism narratives, 56–57, 67, 196, 203 defeatism in growth narratives, 55–66 magical growth models and, 67 deficits. See national debt deglobalization, 220–223, 250 deleveraging, 176–178, 177f democracy-markets-liberty trifecta, 198–199, 201–202 demographics, 59–60, 60f, 175 depreciation, capital growth and, 62

Trade Wars Are Class Wars: How Rising Inequality Distorts the Global Economy and Threatens International Peace

by Matthew C. Klein  · 18 May 2020  · 339pp  · 95,270 words

rest of the world prompted global retaliation, breaking whatever had been left of an international economic system and unleashing competitive currency devaluations, rising tariffs, and deglobalization. Fittingly, the United States, which had been reliant on foreign customers to absorb its excess production since the end of the nineteenth century and was

Payments of China”; National Bureau of Statistics of China, “Annual Data”; Brad W. Setser, “President Xi, Still the Deglobalizer in Chief . . .,” CFR (blog), June 25, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/blog/president-xi-still-deglobalizer-chief. 20. Mark Wu, “The ‘China, Inc.’ Challenge to Global Trade Governance,” Harvard International Law Journal 57

How the World Ran Out of Everything

by Peter S. Goodman  · 11 Jun 2024  · 528pp  · 127,605 words

-Carbon Technologies,” Science 377, no. 1266 (2022). 24. the globe to replenish: See, for example, Pinelopi K. Goldberg and Tristan Reed, “Is the Global Economy Deglobalizing? And If So, Why? And What Is Next?” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 31115, April 2023. 25. two chip plants in Ohio

Taiwanese Chip Giant Builds a Hedge Against China,” New York Times, December 7, 2022, B1. 28. four to five times: Kevin Xu, “The Cost of Deglobalization,” Noema, February 23, 2023. 29. half again as much: Yang Jie, “TSMC’s Arizona Chip Plant, Awaiting Biden Visit, Faces Birthing Pains,” Wall Street Journal

, “Container Shipping’s ‘Big Unwind’: Spot Rates Near Pre-COVID Levels,” FreightWaves, December 27, 2022. 16. process of deglobalization: See, for example, Pinelopi K. Goldberg and Tristan Reed, “Is the Global Economy Deglobalizing? And If So, Why? And What Is Next?” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, March 29, 2023, https://www.brookings

.edu/articles/is-the-global-economy-deglobalizing-and-if-so-why-and-what-is-next/. 17. new configuration taking shape: For two excellent treatments of this development, see Rana Foroohar, Homecoming: The

The Haves and the Have-Nots: A Brief and Idiosyncratic History of Global Inequality

by Branko Milanovic  · 15 Dec 2010  · 251pp  · 69,245 words

? Vignette 2.5 - Who Are the Harraga? Vignette 2.6 - The Three Generations of Obamas Vignette 2.7 - Did the World Become More Unequal During Deglobalization? CHAPTER 3 Vignette 3.1 - Where in the Global Income Distribution Are YOU? Vignette 3.2 - Does the World Have a Middle Class? Vignette 3

was an American, she decided, and my true life lay elsewhere [outside of Indonesia].6 Vignette 2.7 Did the World Become More Unequal During Deglobalization? One of the truisms of simple neoclassical economics is that openness to the movement of labor, capital, and goods—that is, globalization—should not only

Industrial Revolution, the average incomes of the countries of the world have diverged (see Vignette 2.1). But what has happened during the period of deglobalization when, if the theory is correct, we should observe an increase in the differences between poor and rich countries? The period of

deglobalization, conventionally considered as spanning the years from the end of World War I to the beginning of World War II, is one of the least

United States as the richest country in the world and China still being on the bottom). We can conclude that all the many commotions and deglobalization that the world witnessed between 1913 and 1938 left the inequality among nations unchanged. As we saw above, this is not what we would expect

(in political philosophy) Crassus, Marcus Croesus, Greek King Cuba Cultural Revolution (China) Czech Republic Czechoslovakia Dalton, Hugh Darcy, Mr. Das Kapital (Marx) De Silva, Lula Deglobalization See also Globalization Democracy Democratic Party, Democrats Deng Xiaoping Denmark Developed countries household surveys and interpersonal inequality and technology and Discrimination Disney Productions Djilas, Milovan

The Rise and Fall of Nations: Forces of Change in the Post-Crisis World

by Ruchir Sharma  · 5 Jun 2016  · 566pp  · 163,322 words

the years AC. After the Crisis, the expectation of a golden age gave way to a new reality. Hype for globalization yielded to mutterings about “deglobalization.” The big picture is complicated and contradictory, because not all the flows that globalization traditionally describes have slowed or reversed. The flow of information, as

that carry manufactured goods; now it is flourishing in service industry capitals as well, and this trend may be gaining momentum in a period of deglobalization. In recent years, as growth in global trade leveled off and global capital flows have fallen sharply, the process of globalization nonetheless has accelerated in

ending but for the next transformation, because that is the normal cycle. The next turn may now be visible in the way the process of deglobalization is unfolding. Though global trade has slowed, and global capital flows have retreated, the flow of travelers, tourists, and Internet communications has continued to explode

that averaged more than 5 percent of GDP for the previous five years, and it faced a flashing red warning on the currency rule. Does Deglobalization Change the Rule? Indeed, that warning sign may have been even more urgent than this narrative has suggested so far. There is an important caveat

at home. In expert circles, this broad shift in attitudes is feeding a widening debate over the extent to which globalization has given way to “deglobalization.” The impact of slowing global trade might not have been big if other global money flows were not in retreat, but they are. Because a

, indicating that banks not only stopped lending but started liquidating loans to bring money home, writes Forbes. Those flows have yet to recover, and this “deglobalization of banking” will make it increasingly difficult for the United States and Britain to borrow money to support their taste for imported goods. It will

have been increasingly citing as a threshold level. The Return of Thrift Even before the optimism of the globalization era gave way to concern about deglobalization, the general consensus among economists was that most nations had gained from opening up to trade, whereas opening up to global capital flows produced mixed

account deficit has been growing at an average rate of 5 percent of GDP for five years running. But in a world increasingly marked by “deglobalization,” the threshold level for a manageable current account deficit could be moving lower, possibly to 3 percent. Even if the current account deficit is below

era is defined by slower economic growth in every region of the world. The world economy has been disrupted by the forces of depopulation, the deglobalization of trade and money flows, and the looming need to cut back debt burdens, or “deleverage.” These trends should not, however, make for undue pessimism

trade share of GDP has risen from 19 percent to 24 percent. In the near term, however, the benefits will be limited by the creeping deglobalization of trade: In the second half of 2015, worldwide, the growth rate of trade turned negative for the first time since the global financial crisis

—Russia ranks poorly among emerging countries, with a rapidly aging population that has been running up private debts at home. On the third big concern—deglobalization—Russia has become one of the greatest obstacles to world trade. Between 2008 and late 2015, Russia imposed nearly five hundred trade protection measures, second

by an almost equally unbridled pessimism about almost every country on the planet. While growth is likely to be lower across the world as depopulation, deglobalization, and deleveraging accelerate, some nations will continue to rise even in this slow-growth world. In the developed world, the list of nations with relatively

, Anatole. “Wrong, INET?” The Economist, November 22, 2010. Kennedy, Robert. “Is a ‘Human Population Bomb” Ticking.” Al Jazeera, June 12, 2012. Kurlantzick, Joshua. “The Great Deglobalizing.” Boston Globe, February 1, 2015. Lagon, Mark P. and Arch Puddington. “Democracy Takes a Global Hit.” Wall Street Journal, January 27, 2016. Lu, Ming, Zhao

Macro Daily: China Capital Outflow Risk—The Curious Case of the Missing $300 Billions.” Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, January 13, 2015. Forbes, Kristin. “Financial ‘Deglobalization’?: Capital Flows, Banks, and the Beatles.” Bank of England, 2014. Freund, Caroline. “Current Account Adjustment in Industrialized Countries.” International Finance Discussion Papers, 2000. “Global Macro

Jottings: Financial Deglobalization.” VTB Capital, November 20, 2014. Harvey, Oliver, and Robin Winkler. “Dark Matter: The Hidden Capital Flows That Drive G10 Exchange Rates.” Deutsche Bank Markets Research

, 264–67, 287, 291–94 contagion, 273–74, 285 crises in, 269–70, 271–73, 284–87, 291 and debt, 65–66, 291, 296 and deglobalization, 274–77, 296 devaluing, 290–96, 381 floating, 288–89 and inflation, 264–65, 292 local, 279, 296 market-determined, 295–96 measuring the value

, 93–94, 150 and state banks, 151–52, 276 as systemic crisis, 23 unexpectedness of, 5, 11, 337–38 globalization: and asset prices, 257–58 deglobalization, 274–77, 296, 394, 399 trends in, 1, 8, 199, 211, 295 and wages, 101 gold standard, end of, 252 Goldstone, Jack, 92 “golf course

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