deindustrialization

Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work
by Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams
Published 1 Oct 2015

Mediation by the market distinguishes these postcolonial subsistence economies from pre-capitalist subsistence economies,104 even though they both function as a desperate means of survival.105 But while primitive accumulation is responsible for the origins of these slums, it is ‘premature deindustrialisation’ that looks set to consolidate their existence. If previous periods of industrialisation at least had the benefit of providing enough factory jobs for the new proletariat, premature deindustrialisation threatens to eliminate this traditional pathway entirely. Technological and economic developments now enable countries to virtually leapfrog the industrialisation phase, which means that developing economies are now deindustrialising at much lower rates of per capita income and with much lower shares of manufacturing employment.106 China is a good example of this, with manufacturing employment in decline,107 labour struggles becoming more confident,108 real wages surging109 and demographic limits leading to a focus on ‘technological upgrading [and] productivity enhancements’ in order to maintain growth.110 The automation of factories is at the leading edge of this deindustrialisation trend, with China already the biggest purchaser of industrial robots, and expected to soon have more industrial robots in operation than either Europe or North America.111 The factory of the world is going robotic.

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Technological and economic developments now enable countries to virtually leapfrog the industrialisation phase, which means that developing economies are now deindustrialising at much lower rates of per capita income and with much lower shares of manufacturing employment.106 China is a good example of this, with manufacturing employment in decline,107 labour struggles becoming more confident,108 real wages surging109 and demographic limits leading to a focus on ‘technological upgrading [and] productivity enhancements’ in order to maintain growth.110 The automation of factories is at the leading edge of this deindustrialisation trend, with China already the biggest purchaser of industrial robots, and expected to soon have more industrial robots in operation than either Europe or North America.111 The factory of the world is going robotic. Deindustrialisation can also be seen in ‘reshoring’, where manufacturing returns to developed economies in jobless, automated forms.112 These deindustrialisation trends are taking hold across the developing economies of Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and most of Asia.113 Even in countries where manufacturing employment has increased in absolute terms, there have been significant decreases in the labour-intensity of the process.114 The result of all of this is not only an incomplete transition to a significant working class, but also the stymying of the expected employment path for the workforce.

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From its origins, the proletariat was riven by divisions – between the waged male worker and the unwaged female labourer, between the ‘free’ worker and the unfree slave, between skilled craftsmen and unskilled labourers, between the core and periphery, and between nation-states.13 The tendency to unify was always a limited phenomenon, and these differences persist today, exacerbated under conditions of a globalised division of labour. Perhaps more fundamentally, if deindustrialisation (the automation of manufacturing) is a necessary stage along the path towards a postcapitalist society, then the industrial working class could never have been the agent of change. Its existence was predicated upon economic conditions that would have to be eliminated in the transition to postcapitalism. If deindustrialisation is required for the transition to postcapitalism, then the industrial working class was inevitably going to lose its power in the process – fragmenting and falling apart, just as we have seen in recent decades.

The Making of a World City: London 1991 to 2021
by Greg Clark
Published 31 Dec 2014

In Chapter 2 I consider the groundwork laid for London by government leaders, corporate chiefs and civic activists in the period before 1991. London was the first major city in Europe to undergo large-scale de-industrialisation, a process which had a seismic impact not only on East London’s character but on the development and orientation of the whole city. The negotiated response to the city’s de-industrialisation and preparation for a different mode of globalisation was marked by political conflict and ideological division. None of the major decisions in this period were made free of tension between central government and local councils, between advocates and critics of the City of London, and between representatives of big business and trade unions.

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Our recent story of London’s emergence as ‘world city’ begins in the 1970s and 1980s when the UK was ravaged by de-industrialisation. In that setting, the UK government’s very active role in support of the first decade of London’s world city agenda is understandable both as a desire to help ensure the competitiveness Lessons from London for other cities 189 of the capital city and as an example of the outward-looking agenda it wanted to inspire in other UK cities where de-industrialisation hit hardest. The UK system of government also has some very distinctive features by international standards.

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In this context, urban regeneration in London gradually came to be identified as a task of re-engineering for economic competitiveness and new job creation. Economic activity had to be re-galvanised in sites where it had declined most, and where social inclusion had deteriorated. This was especially the case in the rapidly de-industrialising waterfront areas in the east and south, which had suffered due to the advent of the global container system that saw cargo move to deep-water ports at Tilbury and Folkestone. Because these vast areas required social and physical infrastructure capable of competing for inward investment, quality of place re-emerged at the heart of London’s planning predicament. 

23 Things They Don't Tell You About Capitalism
by Ha-Joon Chang
Published 1 Jan 2010

One cause of genuine de-industrialization has recently attracted a lot of attention. It is the rise of manufacturing imports from low-cost developing countries, especially China. However dramatic it may look, it is not the main explanation for de-industrialization in the rich countries. China’s exports did not make a real impact until the late 1990s, but the de-industrialization process had already started in the 1970s in most rich countries. Most estimates show that the rise of China as the new workshop of the world can explain only around 20 per cent of de-industrialization in the rich countries that has happened so far.

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It is instead the falling relative prices of the manufactured goods due to faster growth in productivity in the manufacturing sector that is the main driver of the de-industrialization process. Thus, while the citizens of the rich countries may be living in post-industrial societies in terms of their employment, the importance of manufacturing in terms of production in those economies has not been diminished to the extent that we can declare a post-industrial age. Should we worry about de-industrialization? But if de-industrialization is due to the very dynamism of a country’s manufacturing sector, isn’t it a good thing? Not necessarily. The fact that de-industrialization is mainly caused by the comparative dynamism of the manufacturing sector vis-à-vis the service sector does not tell us anything about how well it is doing compared to its counterparts in other countries.

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Rowthorn, ‘Structural change under New Labour’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2007, vol. 31, no. 5. 2 The term is borrowed from the 2008 report by the British government’s Department for BERR (Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform), Globalisation and the Changing UK Economy (2008). 3 B. Alford, ‘De-industrialisation’, ReFRESH, Autumn 1997, p. 6, table 1. 4 B. Rowthorn and K. Coutts, ‘De-industrialisation and the balance of payments in advanced economies’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2004, vol. 28, no. 5. THING 10 1 T. Gylfason, ‘Why Europe works less and grows taller’, Challenge, 2007, January/February. THING 11 1 P. Collier and J.

Automation and the Future of Work
by Aaron Benanav
Published 3 Nov 2020

Note that because this equation is true according to the very definition of labor productivity (O/E), it cannot be used to establish causality. 19 It is worth noting that job loss has been somewhat more severe in France compared to other European countries. 20 José Gabriel Palma, “Four Sources of ‘Deindustrialization’ and a New Concept of the ‘Dutch Disease,’” in José Antonio Ocampo, ed., Beyond Reforms: Structural Dynamics and Macroeconomic Vulnerability, Stanford University Press, 2005, pp. 79–81. See Rowthorn and Ramaswamy, “Deindustrialization,” p. 6, as well as Dani Rodrik, “Premature Deindustrialization,” Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 21, no. 1, 2016, p. 7. 21 Rowthorn and Ramaswamy, “Deindustrialization,” p. 20. See also Robert Rowthorn and Ken Coutts, “De-industrialisation and the balance of payments in advanced economies,” Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 28, no. 5, 2004.

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Although Rowthorn and his associates explained deindustrialization primarily in terms of differences between productivity growth rates in manufacturing and in services, they turned to a theory of evolutionary changes in the composition of demand to explain the existence of a prior period of industrialization, as well as to explain the timing of the turning point at which industrialization gave way to deindustrialization. 22 For example, deindustrialization—as measured by the fall in the manufacturing share of employment—started in Brazil in 1986, when the country’s GDP per capita was $12,100 (measured in 2017 US dollars at purchasing power parity), that is, a little more than half of the GDP per capita of France at the time it began to deindustrialize, in 1973. South Africa, Indonesia, and Egypt had lower income levels at the time when their economies began to deindustrialize. See Sukti Dasgupta and Ajit Singh, “Manufacturing, Services, and Premature Deindustrialization in Developing Countries: A Kaldorian Analysis,” in George Mavrotas and Anthony Shorrocks, eds., Advancing Development: Core Themes in Global Economics, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007; Tregenna, “Characterizing Deindustrialization.” 23 Fiona Treganna describes this process as “pre-industrialization deindustrialization” in “Deindustrialization, Structural Change, and Sustainable Economic Growth,” UNIDO/UNU-MERIT Background Paper 32, 2015. 24 United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Industrial Development Report 2018, 2017, p. 166.

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All rights reserved The moral rights of the author have been asserted 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2 Verso UK: 6 Meard Street, London W1F 0EG US: 20 Jay Street, Suite 1010, Brooklyn, NY 11201 versobooks.com Verso is the imprint of New Left Books ISBN-13: 978-1-83976-129-4 ISBN-13: 978-1-83976-130-0 (UK EBK) ISBN-13: 978-1-83976-131-7 (US EBK) British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress Typeset in Garamond by Hewer Text UK Ltd, Edinburgh Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon CR0 4YY Contents List of Figures and Tables Preface 1. The Automation Discourse 2. Labor’s Global Deindustrialization 3. In the Shadow of Stagnation 4. A Low Demand for Labor 5. Silver Bullets? 6. Necessity and Freedom Postscript: Agents of Change Notes Index Figures Figure 1.1. Labor Share of Income, G7 Economies Figure 1.2. Productivity–Wages Gap, OECD Countries Figure 2.1. French Manufacturing Sector Figure 2.2. Global Waves of Deindustrialization Figure 2.3. Deindustrialization in China, India and Mexico Figure 2.4. World Manufacturing and Agricultural Production Figure 3.1.

A Pelican Introduction Economics: A User's Guide
by Ha-Joon Chang
Published 26 May 2014

During the last two decades, in some rich countries, such as Germany, Italy and France, the fall in the share of manufacturing in GDP has been quite large in current prices (by 20 per cent in Germany, 30 per cent in Italy and 40 per cent in France), but not been so large in constant prices (by less than 10 per cent in all three).11 In several rich countries, the share of manufacturing has actually risen, if calculated in constant prices: in the US and Switzerland, its share has risen by around 5 per cent in the last couple of decades;12 in Finland and Sweden, the share has actually risen by as much as 50 per cent over the last few decades.13 An important exception is the UK, in which the share of manufacturing has fallen dramatically in the last couple of decades, even in constant prices.14 This suggests that the UK’s deindustrialization has largely been the result of the absolute decline of its manufacturing industry due to loss of competitiveness, rather than the relative price effect due to differential productivity growth rates. ‘Premature’ deindustrialization in developing countries In the last three decades, many developing countries have experienced ‘premature’ deindustrialization. That is, the share of manufacturing (and industry in general) in their outputs and employments started falling at a much earlier stage of economic development than had been the case for the rich countries.

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They look to India, which is supposed to have become – through its success in the export of services like software, accountancy and the reading of medical scanning images – ‘the office of the world’ to China’s ‘workshop of the world’ (a title which had originally been conferred on Britain after its Industrial Revolution). Deindustrialization doesn’t mean that we are producing fewer manufactured products While many people, including key policy-makers, have been seduced by it, the discourse of post-industrial society is highly misleading. Most rich countries have indeed become ‘post-industrial’ or ‘deindustrialized’ in terms of employment; a decreasing proportion of the labour force in these countries is working in factories, as opposed to shops and offices. In most, although not all, countries this has been accompanied by a fall in the share of manufacturing in output.

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When this relative price effect is taken into account and the shares of different sectors are recalculated in constant prices (that is, applying the prices of the starting year to the quantities produced in subsequent years), as opposed to current prices (today’s prices), the share of manufacturing has not fallen very much in most rich countries. It has even risen in several countries, as I will show later. Some deindustrialization is due to ‘optical illusions’ The extent of deindustrialization has also been exaggerated due to the ‘optical illusions’ created by the way in which statistics are compiled. A lot of services that used to be provided in-house in manufacturing firms (e.g., catering, security guards, some design and engineering activities) are now outsourced, that is, supplied by independent companies (at home or abroad; in the latter case this is called off-shoring).

The London Problem: What Britain Gets Wrong About Its Capital City
by Jack Brown
Published 14 Jul 2021

Then, on 23 June 2016, the UK voted to leave by a margin of 51.9 per cent to 48.1 per cent. The motivations behind this binary decision on the part of the nation’s voters were complex and numerous. It has been argued that they include opposition to immigration and multiculturalism, globalisation, deindustrialisation, austerity, the ‘establishment’, and an overly centralised British state. Meanwhile, the geographical spread of votes across the UK has been seen as demonstrating a growing urban–rural divide, a north–south divide, big cities versus ‘left-behind’ post-industrial and coastal towns, a growing cultural chasm between a London-based ‘elite’ and the rest of the country, and an area’s proportion of voters with a university-level education.

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Thatcher personally found the stock exchange quite distasteful.29 As prime minister, she also famously abolished the GLC, irritated by its left-wing leader Ken Livingstone, leaving the capital without city-wide government for the first time in the twentieth century. Yet the Thatcher years saw regional inequalities widen substantially, with London and the south-east of England the benefactors. The cause was rapid deindustri-alisation, particularly outside the south-east, alongside the boom of an increasingly internationalised, mainly services-based economy focused in the capital. London’s economy soared away from the rest of the nation once more. The Big Bang corresponded roughly with the point at which the capital’s population began to grow again, following decades of decline.

The Rise and Fall of the British Nation: A Twentieth-Century History
by David Edgerton
Published 27 Jun 2018

See Simon Gunn, ‘Ring Road: Birmingham and the Collapse of the Motor City Ideal in 1970s Britain’, The Historical Journal (2017). CHAPTER 12: NATIONAL CAPITALISM 1. Margaret Thatcher, ‘Speech to Conservative Party Conference’, 10 October 1975, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/102777, accessed 29 August 2017. Thanks to Thomas Kelsey. 2. C. J. F. Brown and T. D. Sheriff, ‘De-industrialisation: A Background Paper’, in F. Blackaby (ed.), De-industrialisation (London, 1979), pp. 239–40. 3. Ibid., p. 241. 4. For examples, see Michael Barratt-Brown, ‘The Controllers II’, Universities and Left Review 6 (spring 1959), available at http://banmarchive.org.uk/collections/ulr/06_38.pdf, accessed 5 February 2018; Sam Aaronovitch, The Ruling Class (London, 1961). 5.

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Brooks, Richard and Solomon Hughes, ‘Public Servants, Public Paydays’ (Revolving Doors Special), Private Eye 1426 (15 September 2016), pp. 19–24. Brown, Callum, The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularisation 1800–2000 (London, 2001). Brown C. J. F. and T. D. Sheriff, ‘De-industrialisation: A Background Paper’, in F. Blackaby (ed.), De-industrialisation (London, 1979), pp. 239–40. Brown, Judith M. and William Roger Louis, The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. 4: The Twentieth Century (Oxford, 1999). Burgess, Keith, The Challenge of Labour (London, 1980). Burn, Duncan (ed.), The Structure of British Industry, 2 vols.

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Huw Beynon and Hilary Wainwright, The Workers’ Report on Vickers: The Vickers Shop Stewards Combine Committee Report on Work, Wages, Rationalisation, Closure and Rank-and-File Organisation in a Multinational Company (London, 1979), p. 140. 4. For a vigorous argument to this effect see John Medhurst, That Option No Longer Exists: Britain, 1974–76 (Winchester, 2014). 5. See ‘A Blueprint for Survival’, The Ecologist 2 (January 1972), and Edward Goldsmith, ‘De-industrialising Society’, The Ecologist 7 (May 1977). 6. The Economist, 2 June 1979. 7. M. Artis, D. Cobham and M. Wickham-Jones, ‘Social Democracy in Hard Times: The Economic Record of the Labour Government 1974–1979’, Twentieth Century British History 3 (1992), pp. 32–58. 8. For reflections see Eric Hobsbawm, ‘The 1970s: Syndicalism without Syndicalists’, New Society (5 April 1979), and Worlds of Labour: Further Studies in the History of Labour (London, 1984). 9.

Inglorious Empire: What the British Did to India
by Shashi Tharoor
Published 1 Feb 2018

As we know, some apologists for British rule argue that the condemnation of Britain for its destruction of Indian industry and economic growth is unjustified. Britain, they claim, did not deindustrialize India; India’s share of world GDP merely went down because India ‘missed the bus’ for industrialization, failing to catch up on the technological innovations that transformed the West. India had a significant world share of GDP when the world was highly agrarian. As the world changed, they argue, other countries overtook India because of scientific and industrial progress that India was unable to make. That is a highly disputable proposition. As I have demonstrated, deindustrialization was a deliberate British policy, not an accident.

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Montgomery Martin, after examining: Dadabhai Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1901. Indian shipbuilding…offers a more complex but equally instructive story: This section relies heavily on Indrajit Ray, 1995, ‘Shipbuilding in Bengal under Colonial Rule: A Case of “De-Industrialisation”, The Journal of Transport History, 16 (1), pp. 776–77. India’s once-thriving shipbuilding industry collapsed: Ibid The total amount of cash in circulation in the Indian economy fell: Wilson, India Conquered, p. 433. Even Miss Prism…could not fail to take note: Oscar Wilde, The Importance of Being Earnest, Act II, London: Leonard Smithers and Company, 1899.

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Qureshi, Ishtiaq Husain, The Struggle for Pakistan, University of Karachi, 1969. Rai, Lala Lajpat, Unhappy India, Calcutta: Banna Publishing Company, 1928. Rangarajan, Mahesh, India’s Wildlife History, New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2001. Ray, Indrajit, ‘Shipbuilding in Bengal under Colonial Rule: A Case of ‘De-Industrialisation’, The Journal of Transport History, 16 (1), 1995. Raychaudhuri, Tapan, Europe Reconsidered: Perceptions of the West in 19th Century Bengal, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. Rees, J. D., The Real India, London: Methuen, 1908. Scott, Paul, The Jewel in the Crown, London: Heinemann, 1966. ———, The Day of the Scorpion, London: Heinemann, 1968. ———, The Towers of Silence, London: Heinemann, 1971. ———, A Division of the Spoils, London: Heinemann, 1975.

How Asia Works
by Joe Studwell
Published 1 Jul 2013

The academic debate over the relative productivity performance of manufacturing versus services revolves around the reasons for the ‘de-industrialisation’ of rich countries. However, many of the theoretical considerations are the same as for developing states. See, for instance, Robert Rowthorn and Ken Coutts, ‘De-industrialisation and the Balance of Payments in Advanced Economies’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 28: 5, 2004, p. 767 and Robert Rowthorn and Ramana Ramaswamy, Deindustrialization – Its Causes and Implications (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 1997). 3. Share of services trade in total international trade from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.

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James Rorty, ‘The Dossier of Wolf Ladejinsky: The Fair Rewards of Distinguished Civil Service’, Commentary, April 1955. Walt Whitman Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960). Robert Rowthorn and Ken Coutts, ‘De-industrialisation and the Balance of Payments in Advanced Economies’, Cambridge Journal of Economics 28, no. 5 (2004). Robert Rowthorn and Ramana Ramaswamy, Deindustrialization – Its Causes and Implications (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1997). Rosanne Rutten (ed.), Brokering a Revolution: Cadres in a Philippine Insurgency (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2008).

Powers and Prospects
by Noam Chomsky
Published 16 Sep 2015

‘Britain itself would have been deindustrialized by the cheapness of Indian calicoes if protectionist policies had not been adopted’, the same work concludes.7 Contemporaries saw matters much in that light. A century after Defoe, liberal historian Horace Wilson observed ruefully that without protection, ‘the mills of Paisley and Manchester would have been stopped in their outset, and could scarcely have been again set in motion, even by the power of steam. They were created by the sacrifice of Indian manufacturers’. It was India, not Britain, that was deindustrialised, including steel, ship-building, and other manufactures.

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One reason for the enormous difference since is that the rulers were able to avoid the market discipline rammed down the throats of their dependencies. ‘There is no doubt’, Bairoch concludes in his detailed refutation of the leading ‘myth of economic science’, ‘that the Third World’s compulsory economic liberalism in the nineteenth century is a major element in explaining the delay in its industrialisation’, in fact, its ‘de-industrialisation’, a story that continues to the present under various guises. Bairoch in fact considerably understates the role of state intervention for the wealthy, because he limits himself in conventional manner to a narrow category of market interferences: protection. But that is only a small part of the story.

The New Snobbery
by David Skelton
Published 28 Jun 2021

Although 90 per cent of workers gained another job, the average wage for these workers was almost £6,000 a year less than it had been at Rover. This is a clear illustration of the fact that all jobs are not created equal. Although many who lost their jobs following deindustrialisation were able to find other work, this new work was often lower paid, with less security and less social esteem than the skilled manufacturing job they had held before. It wasn’t just the post-industrial towns that took the hit from the UK’s rapid deindustrialisation; it was the economy as a whole. One of our major national problems is the fact that our productivity lags behind most major European countries, and low productivity means we are generating less wealth as a country.

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It also meant that many women were locked out of the workforce. But that was an argument for modernisation within manufacturing, rather than modernisation without manufacturing; the assumption underlying this economic shift was wrong. Any argument that deindustrialisation was inevitable is deeply flawed and ignores that sector’s success in other countries. Treating deindustrialisation as an unalterable economic inevitability or a sign of progress and ‘modernisation’ was mindless at best and negligent at worst. Manufacturing decline has left our country poorer, less productive and more economically divided. It has also meant that too many parts of the country have become long forgotten, too many workers stuck in insecure work and too many high-status individuals feeling disdain for and disengagement from their fellow citizens.

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The major challenge is to shift from a country that is renowned for inventing things to one that is also renowned for making things, and in doing so create millions of secure, fulfilling jobs that allow for more dignified work and stronger families and communities. Sadly, stories of manufacturing success are all too often the exceptions that prove the rule of lasting deindustrialisation – and this wasn’t just a 1980s story; the UK has also deindustrialised more than any other major economy since 1990. Many things were lost in the decision made by successive governments to shift the UK from being a major manufacturing nation to one that relies on services. For many years, parts of the libertarian right spread the gospel that the UK had little future in manufacturing and that we should instead make the most of our ‘comparative advantage’ and become a service- and finance-led economy.

Paint Your Town Red
by Matthew Brown
Published 14 Jun 2021

Both these things are becoming increasingly viable alternatives as a response to the problems of deindustrialisation, unemployment, and inequality, which the status quo has failed to solve. Again, these alternatives are developing through community wealth-building strategies as a collaboration between the resources and support of local authorities and the skills, initiatives and enterprise of grassroots groups and individuals. Old Approaches to Deindustrialisation The economic and social impact of the deindustrialisation which affected many parts of Britain from the late 1970s still casts a shadow over much of the country.

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The challenge of “community wealth-building” is for this transformative moment to work for the benefit of local communities rather than global corporations. In Britain, the US and beyond, voices from all parts of the political spectrum agree that we need to find a new way of addressing the major divides in wealth and opportunity between and within regions. Decades of deindustrialisation and austerity have depressed many communities and decisions made by increasingly remote central governments have made people feel that they have little power to influence how things work in their own lives. Part One of this book looks at some of the history and thinking behind the idea of community wealth-building and why it is becoming so important in addressing these problems, as well as considering some of the issues, particularly around democratic engagement, that will also need to be addressed if community wealth-building is to successfully fulfil its potential.

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Low productivity, regional inequalities and a system that doesn’t respond to long-term risks or the need for long-term investment.”1 However refreshingly frank this statement, it will hardly come as news to many of us. The current crisis has been decades in the making and is rooted in the past forty years of economic strategies which have overseen a rolling back of the welfare state, deindustrialisation, attacks on wages and working conditions, and weakening of local civic infrastructure. All of this has been exacerbated by the austerity imposed in response to the financial crisis of 2008. Following the 2008 crisis, the UK’s government entirely failed to attribute its effects to its true cause: the recklessness and dysfunction of a deregulated financial sector.

Net Zero: How We Stop Causing Climate Change
by Dieter Helm
Published 2 Sep 2020

Or rather it did count on the positive side, without any offset for the imported carbon. Closing down energy-intensive production scored as an unambiguous plus, and carbon-intensive imports simply did not count at all. The lesson others learned from all this is that a unilateral policy can actually speed up deindustrialisation. That is not what the US has had in mind, and China could sit back, talk the talk and encourage the Europeans to deindustrialise further, in the knowledge that it would be Chinese companies that would go on benefiting. The UK’s Climate Change Act The UK went further than any other country by putting its unilateralism on a solid legal foundation with the Climate Change Act in 2008.

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What really bothers me, and makes me pick up the pen again to write on climate change, is the widely repeated claim made by the UK’s Committee on Climate Change (CCC) in the foreword to its recent report ‘Net Zero: The UK’s Contribution to Stopping Global Warming’: By reducing emissions produced in the UK to zero, we also end our contribution to rising global temperatures.[2] This is misleading in that the net zero target the CCC advocates is for territorial emissions in the UK, and unless every other country we trade with gets to net zero by 2050 too, or we stop importing carbon-intensive goods, it is simply not true. The net zero carbon production target takes no account of the carbon we import, and which pervades much of our spending. For a deindustrialised economy with only 20 per cent manufacturing, this is particularly pertinent. To give a simple example, if British Steel had closed down (something which was under active consideration at the time the CCC published its report), UK territorial emissions would have gone down, but the subsequent increased imports of steel from, say, China would mean global warming would go up, and by more than it would have had that steel manufacturing remained here.

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To get your head around these astonishing numbers, the UK’s GDP in 1990 was just over $1 trillion, and now it is just over $2.6 trillion. With all this GDP growth comes pollution, and in China’s case pollution on a planetary scale. Every other country in the world pales into insignificance in terms of added environmental pollution since 1990. The Europeans deindustrialised, and the US went sideways. From around 2005, the US had natural gas to substitute for coal, and hence it could both grow and limit its carbon emissions. On a carbon consumption basis, the net effect was relatively benign compared with what was going on elsewhere. China was off the scale in emissions.

The Enigma of Capital: And the Crises of Capitalism
by David Harvey
Published 1 Jan 2010

In many industries that turned out not to be in the United States, and especially not in the traditional centres of production in the north-east and the mid-west, but in the west and the south. The result was the wrenching and relentless reorganisation and relocation of production throughout the world. Deindustrialisation of older production centres occurred everywhere from Pittsburgh’s, Sheffield’s and Essen’s steel industry to Mumbai’s textile industry. This was paralleled by an astonishing spurt in the industrialisation of entirely new spaces in the global economy, particularly those with specific resource or organisational advantages – Taiwan, South Korea, Bangladesh and the special production zones such as Mexico’s maquiladoras (tax-free assembly plants) or the export platforms created in China’s Pearl River delta.

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But this trend is neither smooth nor irreversible. Protectionism can return, barriers can be refortified, civil wars can disrupt flows. Furthermore, revolutions in spatial and temporal relations produce stresses and crises (witness the difficult adjustments forced on many cities by widespread deindustrialisation in the heartlands of capitalist production in the 1980s as production moved to east Asia). The geography this produces will be examined later. Why do capitalists reinvest in expansion rather than consume away their profits in pleasures? This is where ‘the coercive laws of competition’ play a decisive role.

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If the vast amount of fixed capital embedded in the land (look down upon the land next time you fly just to get a sense of how vast this is) is to be realised, then it must be used and paid for by capitalist producers in the here and now. Abandoning all those assets, as happened to many older industrial cities in the huge wave of deindustrialisation of the 1980s, incurs losses (social as well as infrastructural) and can itself be a source of crises that affect not only those that hold the debt on many of these infrastructural investments but also the economy at large. It is here that Marx’s thesis that capitalism inevitably encounters barriers within its own nature (in this case, within the spaces, places and environments it has produced) becomes most visible. ——— The relations between capital and labour as well as those between capital and nature are mediated by the choice of technologies and organisational forms.

Apocalypse Never: Why Environmental Alarmism Hurts Us All
by Michael Shellenberger
Published 28 Jun 2020

“In the U.S., manufacturing employment peaked at twenty million people in 1978,” said Dinh, “and since then, it has shed its low-end industries to focus on higher, more specialized manufacturing. That’s different from Nigeria de-industrializing at 7 or 8 percent (share of manufacturing in GDP) before its manufacturing reached the maturity stage.” Dinh added, “In a lot of developing countries, the de-industrialization is due to poor policy, bad governance, or neglect, not because of some natural peak as the case of the U.S. or Europe.” Dinh dismissed the notion that China’s high productivity made the expansion of manufacturing in African nations irrelevant.

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The Manufacturing Ladder The real risk to forests comes not from the expansion of energy-intensive factories in poor nations, as Greenpeace and Extinction Rebellion claim, but rather from the declining need for them. On one hand, Africa has made real progress during the last half century. Agricultural productivity has risen, but manufacturing was a higher percentage of the economy in the mid-1970s than it is today. “Most countries of Africa are too poor to be experiencing de-industrialisation,” writes Rodrik, “but that is precisely what seems to be taking place.”78 One exception is Ethiopia, which has attracted Calvin Klein, Tommy Hilfiger, and fast-fashion leader H&M,79 both because of its low wages compared to places like China and Indonesia, where they have risen, as well as to its investments in hydroelectric dams, the electricity grid, and roads.80 “Ethiopia has experienced GDP growth of more than 10 percent per annum over the last decade,” notes Rodrik, “due in large part to the increase in public investment, from 5 percent to 19 percent of GDP.”81 Ethiopia had to end and recover from a bloody seventeen-year civil war, which resulted in at least 1.4 million deaths, including one million from famine, before its government could invest in infrastructure.

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Countries with high population density, like Germany, Britain, and Japan, consume less energy per person than population-diffuse places like California, thanks to reduced car usage, but nowhere near the levels of people like Suparti, much less Bernadette. As nations like Indonesia industrialize, they at first require more energy per unit of economic growth, but as they deindustrialize, like the United States, they require less. Globally, the history of human evolution and development is one of converting ever-larger amounts of energy into wealth and power in ways that allow human societies to grow more complex. 6. Energy Density Matters When you interview women who are small farmers about what it’s like to cook with wood you might assume they would complain about the toxic smoke they must breathe.

Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism
by David Harvey
Published 3 Apr 2014

While the bundling of new technologies and organisational forms has always played an important role in facilitating an exit from crises, it has never played a determinate one. The hopeful focus these days is on a ‘knowledge-based’ capitalism (with biomedical and genetic engineering and artificial intelligence at the forefront). But innovation is always a double-edged sword. The 1980s, after all, gave us deindustrialisation through automation such that the likes of General Motors (which employed well-paid unionised labour in the 1960s) have now been supplanted by the likes of Walmart (with its vast non-unionised low-wage labour force) as the largest private employers in the United States. If the current burst of innovation points in any direction at all, it is towards decreasing employment opportunities for labour and the increasing significance of rents extracted from intellectual property rights for capital.

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The questions, then, are: when and why does this tension between fixity and motion and between process and thing become heightened into an absolute contradiction, particularly in the form of the excessive power of the rentier class, so as to produce crises? Plainly, this contradiction can be the locus of local stresses and crises. If commodities no longer flow, then the things that facilitate the flows become useless and have to be abandoned and rental returns collapse. The long and painful history of deindustrialisation has left whole cities, like Detroit, bereft of activity and therefore sinks of lost value even as other cities, like Shenzhen or Dhaka, become hubs of activity that demand massive investments in fixed capital coupled with rental extractions and property market booms if they are to succeed. The history of capital is rife with stories of localised booms and crashes in which the contradiction between fixed and circulating capital, between fixity and motion, is strongly implicated.

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The history of capital is rife with stories of localised booms and crashes in which the contradiction between fixed and circulating capital, between fixity and motion, is strongly implicated. This is the world where capital as a force of creative destruction becomes most visible in the physical landscape we inhabit. The balance between creativity and destruction is often hard to discern, but the costs imposed on whole populations through deindustrialisation, gyrations in property values and land rents, disinvestment and speculative building all emanate from the underlying and perpetual tension between fixity and motion which periodically and in specific geographical locations heightens to the point of an absolute contradiction and, hence, produces a serious crisis.

The Economics of Belonging: A Radical Plan to Win Back the Left Behind and Achieve Prosperity for All
by Martin Sandbu
Published 15 Jun 2020

Low economic growth and damaged public finances after the crisis have led governments to cut spending in ways that have often caused the most pain to those who were already the worst off. This has added people who may have been faring reasonably well until 2008 to the ranks of those bearing the cost of decades of deindustrialisation. In a sentence: incontinent policy before the crisis brought a financial collapse, and timid policy afterwards amplified the suffering it caused. * * * Strike three: the task ahead. In the baseball metaphor, the first strike for many Western governments was their poor handling of deindustrialisation; and for most, the second strike was the run-up to and the aftermath of the global financial crisis. A third economic challenge is now under way, as technology has begun to deliver another shock like the one that afflicted manufacturing.

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But around 1980 this changed on both sides of the Atlantic. Since then, the richer cities have pulled away from a small-town and rural hinterland where incomes have increasingly fallen behind and economic opportunities have become more limited (I discuss this at greater length in chapter 11). Deindustrialisation is again a big part of the reason for this. The big shift from manufacturing to services favours some kinds of places over others.11 The industrial economy is shaped by the scale economies of the factory, which once allowed high-value economic activity to centre on midsize towns. Industrial production that keeps its technological edge still can.

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In particular, the European social market economies did a better job of bringing along those at the bottom than the United States (Figure 4.2)—but both individual and regional inequality grew significantly in Europe as well.15 We should not be surprised, therefore, by growing polarisation and alienation in Western societies, nor at their political consequences. * * * Strike two: A great recession made at home. If Western governments’ policy mistakes had been confined to mismanaging deindustrialisation, populist forces may have remained quiescent after their initial, largely unsuccessful emergence in the 1980s. But the global financial crisis in 2008 and the Great Recession that followed it added to the ranks of the economically disaffected and stoked their support. In many countries, a critical mass of citizens now turned their backs on mainstream Western politics in support of the insurgent antisystem parties—the same that had first emerged in the 1980s in some places, and similar but new ones in others.

The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class
by Guy Standing
Published 27 Feb 2011

(Maltby) 138 Canada 79, 114 capital funds 176–7 Capitalism and Freedom (Friedman) 156 care work 61, 86, 125–6 careers, leisure 129 cash transfers 177 see also conditional cash transfers (CCTs) CCTs (conditional cash transfer schemes) 140 Cerasa, Claudio 149 Channel 4, call centre programme (UK) 16 charities 53 children, care for 125 China 28 and contractualisation 37 criminalisation 88 deliberative democracy 181 education 73 immigrants to Italy 4–5 invasion of privacy 135 migrants 96, 106–9, 109–10 old agers 83 191 192 INDEX China 28 (Continued) Shenzhen 133, 137 and time 115 wages 43 youth 76 see also Chindia China Plus One 28 Chindia 26, 27–9, 83 see also China Chrysler Group LLC 43 circulants 90, 92 Citizens United vs Federal Election Commission (US) 152–3 civil rights 14, 94 class, social 6–8, 66–7 Coase, Ronald 29 Cohen, Daniel 57, 66, 69 collaborative bargaining 168 collective attention deficit syndrome 127 commodification of companies 29–31 of education 67–72 and globalisation 26 labour 161–2 of management 40 of politics 148–53 re- 41–2 conditional cash transfers (CCTs) 140 see also cash transfers conditionality 140, 175 and basic income 172–3 and workfare 143–5, 166–7 connectivity, and youth 127 contract status 35, 36, 37, 44, 51, 61 contractors, independent/ dependent 15–16 contractualisation 37 counselling for stress 126 Crawford, Matthew 70 credit 44 crime 5, 129–30 criminalisation 14, 145, 146 crystallised intelligence 85 cultural rights 14 de Tocqueville, Alexis 145 de-industrialisation 5, 37–8 debt, and youth 73–4 Delfanti, Alessandro 78 deliberative democracy 180–1, 182 denizens 14, 93–102, 105, 113, 117, 157–8 Denmark 150 dependent/independent contractors 15–16 deskilling 17, 33, 40, 124 developing countries 12, 27, 60, 65, 105–9 disabled people 86–7, 89, 170 discrimination age 84–5 disability 81 gender 60, 123 genetic profiling 136–7 and migrants 99, 101–2 disengagement, political 24 distance working 38, 53 dole (UK) 45 Duncan Smith, Iain 143 Durkeim, Emile 20 economic security 157, 171, 173–6 The Economist 17–18, 33, 52, 137 economy, shadow 56–7 education 10, 67–73, 135–6, 159–60 Ehrenreich, Barbara 21, 170–1 elites 7, 22, 24, 40, 50 criminality 152 and democracy 181 ethics 165 Italian 148 and the Tea Party (US) 151 empathy 22–3, 137 employment agencies 33 employment security 10b, 11, 17, 36, 51, 117 Endarkenment 70 Enlightenment 24, 70 enterprise benefits 11, 12 environmental issues 167 environmental refugees 93 Esping-Andersen, G. 41 ethics 23–4, 121–2, 165 ethnic minorities 86 EuroMayDay 1, 2, 3, 167 European Union (EU) 2, 39, 146, 147 and migrants 97, 103, 105 and pensions 80 see also individual countries export processing zones 105–6 Facebook 127, 134, 135 failed occupationality 21 INDEX family 27, 44, 60, 65, 126 fear, used for control 32 fictitious decommodification 41 financial capital 171, 176–7 financial sector jobs 39–40 financial shock 2008-9 see Great Recession Financial Times 44, 55, 121, 155 firing workers 31–2 Fishkin, James 180 Fletcher, Bill 170–1 flexibility 18 labour 23–4, 31–6, 53, 60, 61, 65 labour market 6, 120–1, 170 Ford Motor Company 42, 43 Foucault, Michel 88, 133 Foxconn 28–9, 43, 105, 137 see also Shenzhen France criminalisation 88 de-industrialisation 38 education 69 leisure 129 migrants 95, 97, 101–2, 114 neo-fascism 149 and old agers 85 pensions 79 shadow economy 56 Telecom 11 youth 65–6 fraternity 12, 22, 155 freedom 155, 167–70, 172 freelance see temporary employment freeter unions 9 Friedman, Milton 39, 156 functional flexibility 36–8, 52 furloughs 36, 50 gays 63–4 General Motors (GM) 42, 43, 54 genetic profiling 136 Germany 9 de-industrialisation 38 disengagement with jobs 24 migrants 91, 95, 100–1, 114 pensions 79 shadow economy 56 temporary employment 15, 35 wages 40 and women 62 youth and apprenticeships 72–3 193 Glen Beck’s Common Sense (Beck) 151 Global Transformation 26, 27–31, 91, 115 globalisation 5–7, 27–31, 116, 148 and commodification 26 and criminalisation 87–8 and temporary employment 34 Google Street View 134 Gorz, Andre 7 grants, leisure 180–2 Great Recession 4, 49–51, 63, 176 and education 71 and migrants 102 and old agers 82 and pensions 80 and youth 77–8 Greece 52, 56, 117, 181 grinners/groaners 59, 83–4 Habermas, Jürgen 179 Haidt, J. 23 Hamburg (Germany) 3 happiness 140–1, 162 Hardt, M. 130 Hayek, Friedrich 39 health 51, 70, 120, 126 Hitachi 84 Hobsbawm, Eric 3 hormones 136 hot desking 53 Howker, Ed 65 Human Rights Watch 106 Hungary 149 Hurst, Erik 128 Hyatt Hotels 32 IBM 38, 137 identity 9 digital 134–5 work-based 12, 15–16, 23, 158–9, 163 Ignatieff, Michael 88 illegal migrants 96–8 In Praise of Idleness (Russell) 141, 161 income security 10b, 30, 40, 44 independent/dependent contractors 15–16 India 50, 83, 112, 140 see also Chindia individuality 3, 19, 122 informal status 6–7, 57, 60, 96, 119 inshored/offshored labour 30, 36, 37 194 INDEX International Herald Tribune 21 internet 18, 127, 139, 180, 181 surveillance 134–5, 138 interns 16, 36, 75–6 invasion of privacy 133–5, 167 Ireland 52–3, 77 isolation of workers 38 Italy education 69 neo-fascism 148–9 pensions 79 Prato 4–5 and the public sector 52, 53 shadow economy 56 and temporary employment 34 youth 64 Japan 2, 30 and Chinese migrants 110 commodification of companies 30 and migrants 102, 103 multiple job holding 119–20 neo-fascism 152 pensions 80 salariat 17 subsidies 84 and temporary employment 15, 32–3, 34–5, 41 and youth 66, 74, 76, 77 job security 10b, 11, 36–8 Kellaway, Lucy 83–4 Keynes, John Maynard 161 Kierkegaard, Søren 155 Klein, Naomi 148 knowledge 32, 117, 124–5, 171 labour 13, 115, 161–2 labour brokers 33–4, 49, 110, 111, 167, 168 labour flexibility 23–4, 31–45 labour intensification 119–20 labour market flexibility 6 labour security 10–11, 10b, 31 Laos 112 lay-offs see furloughs Lee Changshik 21 legal knowledge 124–5 legal processing 50 Legal Services Act of 2007 (UK) (Tesco Law) 40 leisure 13, 128–30 see also play lesbians 63–4 Liberal Republic, The 181 Lloyds Banking Group 50–1 localism 181–2 long-term migrants 100–2 loyalty 53, 58, 74–5 McDonald’s 33 McNealy, Scott 69 Malik, Shiv 65 Maltby, Lewis 138 Manafort, Paul 152 management, commodification of 40 Mandelson, Peter, Baron 68 Maroni, Roberto 97 marriage 64–5, 92 Martin, Paul 141 Marx, Karl 161 masculinity, role models for youth 63–5 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 68–9 Mayhew, Les 81 Mead, Lawrence 143 mergers, triangular 30 Mexico 91 Middle East 109 migrants 2, 13–14, 25, 90–3, 145–6 and basic income 172 and conditionality 144 denizens 93–102, 157–8 government organised 109–13 internal 105–9 and queuing systems 103–5 and recession 102–3 Mill, John Stuart 160 Morris, William 160, 161 Morrison, Catriona 127 multinational corporations 28, 92 multitasking 19, 126–7 National Broadband Plan 134 near-sourcing/shoring 36 Negri, A. 130 neo-fascism 25, 147–53, 159, 175, 183 Netherlands 39, 79, 114, 149–50 New Thought Movement 21 New York Times 69, 119 News from Nowhere (Morris) 161 Niemöller, Martin 182 INDEX non-refoulement 93 Nudge (Sunstein/Thaler) 138–9 nudging 138–40, 155–6, 165, 167, 172, 178, 182 numerical flexibility 31–6 Obama, Barack 73, 138–9, 147, 148 Observer, The 20 occupations associations of 169–70 dismantling of 38–40 freedom in 162–4 obsolescence in 124 offshored/inshored labour 30, 36, 37 old agers 59, 79– 86, 89 old-age dependency ratio 80–1 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 27 origins of the precariat 1–5 outsourcing 29, 30, 33, 36, 37, 49 Paine, Thomas 173 panopticon society 132–40, 142–3 Parent Motivators (UK) 139–40 part-time employment 15, 35–6, 51, 61, 82 Pasona 33 paternalism 17, 29, 137, 153, 178, 182 nudging 138–40, 155–6, 165, 167, 172, 178, 182 pensions 42, 51, 52, 76–7, 79–81, 84–6 PepsiCo 137 personal deportment skills 123 Philippines 109 Phoenix, University of 71 Pigou, Arthur 117, 125 play 13, 115, 117, 128, 141 pleasure 141 Polanyi, K. 163, 169 political engagement/disengagement 24, 147 Portugal 52, 56 positive thinking 21, 86 Prato (Italy) 4–5 precariat (definition) 6, 7–13 precariato 9 precariatisation 16–18 precarity traps 48–9, 73–5, 114, 129, 144, 178 pride 22 prisoners 112, 146 privacy, invasion of 133–5, 167 private benefits 11 productivity, and old age 85 proficians 7–8, 15, 164 proletariat 7 protectionism 27, 54 public sector 51–4 qualifications 95 queuing systems 103–5 racism 97–8, 101, 114, 149 Randstad 49 re-commodification 41–2 recession see Great Recession refugees 92, 93, 96 regulation 23, 26, 39–40, 84, 171 Reimagining Socialism (Ehrenreich/ Fletcher) 170–1 remote working 38, 53 rentier economies 27, 176 representation security 10b, 31 retirement 42, 80–3 rights 14, 94, 145, 163, 164–5, 169 see also denizens risk management 178 Robin Hood gang 3 role models for youth 63–5 Roma 97, 149 Rossington, John 100 Rothman, David 88 Russell, Bertrand 141, 161 Russell, Lucie 64 Russia 88, 115 salariat 7, 8, 14, 17, 32 Santelli, Rick 150 Sarkozy, Nicolas 69, 97, 149 Sarrazin, Thilo 101 Schachar, Ayelet 177 Schneider, Friedrich 56 Schwarzenegger, Arnold 71 seasonal migrants 98–100 security, economic 157, 171, 173–6 self-employment 15–16, 66, 82 self-esteem 21 self-exploitation 20, 122–3 self-production 11 self-regulation 23, 39 self-service 125 services 37–8, 63 195 196 INDEX Sex, Drugs and Chocolate: The Science of Pleasure (Martin) 141 sex services 63 sexism, reverse 123 shadow economy 56–7, 91 Shenzhen (China) 133, 137 see also Foxconn Shop Class as Soulcraft (Crawford) 70 short-time compensation schemes 55–6 side-jobs 119–20 skill reproduction security 10b skills 157, 176 development of 30, 31, 40 personal deportment 123 tertiary 121–4 Skirbekk, Vegard 85 Smarsh 138 Smile or Die (Ehrenreich) 21 Smith, Adam 71 snowball theory 78 social class 6–8, 66–7 social factory 38, 118, 132 social income 11–12, 40–5, 51, 66 social insurance 22, 104 social memory 12, 23, 129 social mobility 23, 57–8, 175 social networking sites 137 see also Facebook social rights 14 social worth 21 sousveillance 134, 135 South Africa, and migrants 91, 98 South Korea 15, 55, 61, 75 space, public 171, 179–80 Spain BBVA 50 migrants 94 and migrants 102 pensions 79 and the public sector 53 shadow economy 55–6 temporary employment 35 Speenhamland system 55, 143 staffing agencies 33–4, 49, 110, 111, 167, 168 state benefits 11, 12 status 8, 21, 32–3, 94 status discord 10 status frustration 10, 21, 63, 67, 77, 78, 79, 89, 114, 123, 160 stress 19, 126, 141, 141–3 subsidies 44, 54–6, 83–6, 176 suicide, work-related 11, 29, 58, 105 Summers, Larry 148 Sun Microsystems 69 Sunstein, Cass 138–9 surveillance 132–6, 153, 167 see also sousveillance Suzuki, Kensuke 152 Sweden 68, 110–11, 135, 149 symbols 3 Taking of Rome, The (Cerasa) 149 taxes 26 and citizenship 177 France 85 and subsidies 54–5 Tobin 177 United States (US) 180–1 Tea Party movement 150–1 technology and the brain 18 internet 180, 181 surveillance 132–6 teleworking 38 temporary agencies 33–4, 49, 110, 111, 167, 168 temporary employment 14–15, 49 associations for 170 Japan 9 and numerical flexibility 32–6 and old agers 82 and the public sector 51 and youth 65 tertiarisation 37–8 tertiary skill 121–4 tertiary time 116, 119 tertiary workplace 116 Tesco Law (UK) 40 Thailand, migrants 106 Thaler, Richard 138–9 therapy state 141–3, 153 Thompson, E.P. 115 time 115–16, 163, 171, 178 labour intensification 119–20 tertiary 116, 119 use of 38 work-for-labour 120–1 titles of jobs 17–18 Tobin taxes 177 Tomkins, Richard 70 towns, company 137 INDEX toy-factory incident 108–9 trade unions 1, 2, 5, 10b, 26, 31, 168 and migration 91 public sector 51 and youth 77–8 see also yellow unions training 121–4 triangular mergers 30 triangulation 34 Trumka, Richard 78 trust relationships 8–9, 22 Twitter 127 Ukraine 152 undocumented migrants 96–8 unemployment 145 benefits 45–8, 99, 104 insurance for 175 voluntary 122 youth after recession 77 uniforms, to distinguish employment status 32–3 unions freeter 9 yellow 33 see also trade United Kingdom (UK) 102–3 benefit system 173 Channel 4 call centre programme 16 company loyalty 74–5 conditionality 143–5, 166–7 criminalisation 88 de-industrialisation 38 disabled people 170 and education 67, 70, 71 financial shock (2008-9) 49–51, 71 labour intensification 119 Legal Services Act (2007) (Tesco Law) 40 leisure 129 migrants 91, 95, 99, 103–5, 114, 146 neo-fascism 150 paternalism 139–40 pensions 43, 80 and the public sector 53 public spaces 179 and regulation of occupational bodies 39 shadow economy 56 and social mobility 56–8 and subsidies 55 197 temporary employment 15, 34, 35 as a therapy state 142 women 61–2, 162 workplace discipline 138 youth 64, 76 United States (US) care for children 125 criminalisation 88 education 69, 70–1, 73, 135–6 ethnic minorities 86 financial shock (2008-9) 49–50 migrants 90–1, 93, 94, 97, 103, 114 neo-fascism 150–1, 152–3 old agers 82–3, 85 pensions 42, 52, 80 public sector 52 regulation of occupational bodies 39 social mobility in 57–8 subsidies 55, 56 taxes 180–1 temporary employment 34, 35 volunteer work 163 wages and benefits 42 women 62, 63 youth 75, 77 universalism 155, 157, 162, 180 University of the People 69 University of Phoenix 71 unpaid furloughs 36 unpaid leave 50 uptitling 17–18 utilitarianism 88, 132, 141, 154 value of support 11 Vietnam 28, 111–12 voluntary unemployment 122 volunteer work 86, 163–4 voting 146, 147, 181 Wacquant, L. 132 wages 8, 11 and benefits 41–2 family 60 flexibility 40–5, 66 individualised 60 and migrants 103 and temporary workers 32, 33 Vietnam 28 see also basic income Waiting for Superman (documentary) 69 Wall Street Journal 35, 163 198 INDEX Walmart 33, 107 Wandering Tribe 73 Weber, Max 7 welfare claimants 245 welfare systems 44 Wen Jiabao 105 Whitehead, Alfred North 160 Williams, Rob 62 wiretapping 135 women 60–5 and care work 125–6 CCTs (conditional cash transfer schemes) 140 labour commodification 161 and migration 92 multiple jobholding 119–20 reverse sexism 123 work 115, 117, 160–1 and identity 158–9 and labour 13 right to 145, 163, 164–5 security 10b work-for-labour 120–1, 178 work-for-reproduction 124–7 work–life balance 118 worker cooperatives 168–70 workfare 143–5, 166–7 working class 7, 8 workplace 116, 122, 130, 131 discipline 136–8 tertiary 116 Yanukovich, Victor 152 yellow unions 33 youth 59, 65–7, 89, 156 commodification of education 67–72 connectivity 127 and criminality 129–30 generational tension 76–7 and old agers 85 precarity traps 73–5 prospects for the future 78–9 and role models 63–5 streaming education 72–3 zero-hour contracts 36 

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They saw the world as an increasingly open place, where investment, employment and income would flow to where conditions were most welcoming. They argued that unless European countries, in particular, rolled back the securities that had been built up since the Second World War for the industrial working class and the bureaucratic public sector, and unless the trades unions were ‘tamed’, de-industrialisation (a new concept at the time) would accelerate, unemployment would rise, economic growth would slow down, investment would flow out and poverty would escalate. It was a sobering assessment. They wanted drastic measures, and in politicians like Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan they had the sort of leaders willing to go along with their analysis.

…

Individual contracts, casualisation and other forms of external flexibility come together in another clumsy term, ‘tertiarisation’. This is more than is conveyed by ‘the tertiary sector’, which implies a shift to services. For decades the world’s production and employment have been shifting to services. The popular term ‘de-industrialisation’ is misleading, since it implies an erosion 38 THE PRECARIAT and loss of capacity, whereas much of the change has been consistent with technological advances and the changing nature of production. Even in Germany, an export powerhouse, the share of manufacturing in output and employment has shrunk to under 20 per cent.

The Cost of Inequality: Why Economic Equality Is Essential for Recovery
by Stewart Lansley
Published 19 Jan 2012

GEC was one of the world’s leading electronics companies and Raleigh’s Nottingham factory was still producing 100,000 bicycles a year. A decade later, large parts of the industrial landscape had been turned into a wasteland. Of course some decline in manufacturing was always inevitable while the process of de-industrialisation and the expansion of the service sector is in many ways a desirable hallmark of economic maturity. 94 Some industries in which Britain once had a comparative advantage such as steel, textiles and coalmining were in historic decline unable to compete with newly industrialising countries with cheaper labour.

…

What is significant is that the falls in the UK and the US have been much steeper. 95 In Mrs Thatcher’s first term alone, as the number of bankruptcies exploded, manufacturing output fell by a third. It is no coincidence that in both these countries finance became an increasingly dominant force as the process of de-industrialisation accelerated. Indeed the fortunes of these two sectors have been moving in opposite directions—as finance has triumphed, manufacturing has slumped. The economic policies pursued by both Mrs Thatcher and Ronald Reagan—from a high exchange rate to financial and labour market de-regulation—were highly favourable to finance.

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They always put the interests of finance and commerce well before those of industry.’ 100 The view that manufacturing was dispensable also chimed with the views of the leading new right economists. As Milton Friedman said in 1980, Britain’s manufacturing should be allowed to fall to bits.101 When Labour came to power in 1997, they took no action to slow the pace of deindustrialisation. After its fall in 1992—one that proved the key to economic recovery —the pound strengthened again and stayed high for the duration of Gordon Brown’s Chancellorship. Even during the relative boom conditions from 1997 to 2007 a further 1.5 million manufacturing jobs were lost in the UK, as fast a rate as in the 1980s.

Extreme Economies: Survival, Failure, Future – Lessons From the World’s Limits
by Richard Davies
Published 4 Sep 2019

Walsh, D. (2016), History, Politics and Vulnerability: Explaining Excess Mortality in Scotland and Glasgow, Glasgow Centre for Population Health, May. ————, Bendel, N., Jones, R., and Hanlon, P. (2010), ‘It’s Not “Just Deprivation”: Why Do Equally Deprived UK Cities Experience Different Health Outcomes?’ Public Health, 124 (9), 487–5. ————, Taulbut, M., and Hanlon, P. (2008), The Aftershock of Deindustrialisation Trends in Mortality in Scotland and Other Parts of Post-industrial Europe, Glasgow Centre for Population Health and NHS Health Scotland, April. Whyte, B., and Ajetunmobi, T. (2012), Still the ‘Sick Man of Europe’?, Glasgow Centre for Population Health, November. Withey, D. (2003), The Glasgow City Improvement Trust: An Analysis of Its Genesis, Impact and Legacy, and an Inventory of Its Buildings, 1866–1910, PhD thesis, University of St Andrews.

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These cities, not Edinburgh, are viewed locally as Glasgow’s peers – all large west-coast cities, they share an industrial history, Irish and religious heritage, and historic football teams. The idea that the three are alike stands up in more rigorous statistical comparisons: data on everything from employment to diet, income deprivation to drugs, suggests the three places – all struck by de-industrialization – are a close match. Yet one statistic stands out: premature deaths are 30 per cent more common in Glasgow than in Liverpool and Manchester. And in-depth studies that take account of economic and social deprivation fail to explain the mystery away: when all is taken into consideration, people still die too young in Glasgow.

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With nothing else by which to remember their previous life, they took a photograph together standing next to it. DEAR GREEN PLACE It is hard to prove that an ambitious housing policy explains the mysterious ‘Glasgow effect’ but the pattern certainly fits. While Manchester and Liverpool, Glasgow’s best comparators, both saw a sharp de-industrialization neither experienced the same degree of mandatory resettlement or house demolition. Once a city where keys were left in doors, recent surveys show that a lower share of those in Glasgow than in Liverpool or Manchester agree that people can be trusted. Once a place where births, weddings and deaths were communal events, today almost 10 per cent of people in Glasgow feel isolated and lonely (the average in England is 4 per cent).

The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics
by David Goodhart
Published 7 Jan 2017

How they must weep on Teeside. The benefit of having employees represented at the highest level in large German companies—something that the May government has been thinking about for Britain too—can also be seen in the more gradual pace of de-industrialisation in the heavy industrial Ruhr region of Germany in the 1980s and 1990s compared with most of Britain’s industrial regions. The pace of de-industrialisation in Britain picked up sharply in the early 1980s as the effect of North Sea oil sent the pound rocketing and Mrs Thatcher’s new free market government removed all capital controls, and in some cases sharply cut financial support to nationalised industries.

…

And uneducated people loved him back: almost 70 per cent of whites without college degrees voted for Trump.25 It is true that a majority of the poorest voters—those earning less than $50,000 a year—divided 52 per cent/42 per cent in favour of the Democrats. But those who switched from Democrat to Republican were almost entirely from middle and lower income groups. Indeed, according to Torsten Bell of the Resolution Foundation, a full 16 per cent of voters earning less than $30,000 switched to Trump. This explains his unexpected success in the de-industrialised Midwestern states like Michigan and Wisconsin, hit hard by the China shock.26 Even more than in Britain, white Americans tell pollsters that they think ‘Things were better in the past’. A YouGov poll in 2016 found nearly 60 per cent agreeing and only 21 per cent disagreeing.27 Those who perceive loss—whether due to age, lack of opportunities, personalities that favour stability, sense of declining status—are much more anti-immigrant and populist.

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Support for the Dutch Labour party, for example, has fallen from nearly 30 per cent to less than 10 per cent in recent years as educated people in big cities and university towns have peeled off to the Greens and a liberal party called D66 (between them they now get the votes of 80 per cent of Dutch students), while working class strongholds in places like Rotterdam have switched to the Geert Wilders Party of Freedom. The Anywhere/Somewhere value divide has been only one part of the story of social democratic decline. Others include the achievement of many historic social democratic goals; de-industrialisation and the shrinking of the traditional, unionised working class; and the more mainstream legitimacy of populist parties. From a high point at the end of the 1970s electoral support for the centre-left across Europe has fallen by around one third and looks likely to fall further—it is hard to see where the sociological or ideological impetus for another Clinton/Blair style revival might come from.

Rethinking Capitalism: Economics and Policy for Sustainable and Inclusive Growth
by Michael Jacobs and Mariana Mazzucato
Published 31 Jul 2016

The major reason is that the production of greenhouse gas emissions—particularly carbon dioxide—is so embedded in capitalism’s historic systems of production and consumption, which have been built on the use of fossil fuels. In total 80 per cent of the world’s energy still comes from oil, gas and coal. In developed economies, as a result both of structural deindustrialisation and recent climaterelated policies, emissions are now declining. But part of this is simply due to the effective transfer of production to the developing world as globalisation has occurred.34 Western economies are not yet reducing their emissions—either those they generate themselves or those embodied in the goods and services they import—at anything like the speed required to control global warming (see Figure 9).

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In this chapter we argue that low investment is at the root of European stagnation, and that a sustained (and sustainable) recovery can only be investment-driven. Investment is necessary to cure insufficient demand and unemployment in the short run, but also to introduce innovative technologies and increase potential output in the long run. Moreover, only higher investment can reverse the disquieting trend of de-industrialisation that can be observed throughout Europe. However, the measures that the European institutions have so far put in place to revive investment—in particular the ‘Growth Compact’ and President Jean-Claude Juncker’s ‘Investment Plan for Europe’—are likely to prove inadequate to deliver the desired outcomes.

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Recovery from the global and European crises was short-lived, as displayed in Figure 1, and there is little sign of a return to robust growth within the next decade. Figure 1: GDP growth (% change on same quarter of previous year) Source: Eurostat Another remarkable and disquieting trend is de-industrialisation, which has accelerated during the crisis. In 2013 alone, the share of industry in GDP fell by 1 percentage point at the EU level—from 15 per cent to 14 per cent. In Germany, Europe’s major industrial champion, in 2014 the share of industry was 25.1 per cent, or 30.7 per cent including construction activities.

World Cities and Nation States
by Greg Clark and Tim Moonen
Published 19 Dec 2016

Supported by the London government of the time, these policies saw London lose more than one million people to the surrounding Greater South East, and fall to its own 100‐year population low of 6.7 million by 1985. Together, the post‐imperial years, the excessive damage and de‐population after World War 2 and then the successive waves of de‐industrialisation hit London very hard. How that de‐industrialisation was both contested and managed, and how London was encouraged to shift rapidly into advanced traded ­services, explains why and how it took a path to world city status in the 1990s and 2000s. Initially, London became the UK’s guinea pig for post‐industrial development in the 1980s.

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As national leaders and governments came to power with new economic solutions and ideas, a wave of liberalisation began in the global economy that saw flows of capital, goods, information and labour accelerate faster than political structures could adjust. Cities that had been in a spiral of decline and de‐population as a result of de‐industrialisation and disinvestment suddenly appeared more flexible than their national governments at taking advantage of the new order; some rapidly became switchboards for key corporate decision‐making and negotiations between national and international representatives in government and business alike. Analysts and commentators searched for new conceptual tools to grasp this change.

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At the opposite end of the spectrum, relative concentrations in Seoul and Tokyo are much lower (1.3–1.5 times) because of their more diversified roles in technology, R&D, chemicals and other sectors which are also traded globally. On the other hand, world cities are at different stages in cycles of industrialisation and de‐industrialisation. Hong Kong, New York, Seoul and London all have a lower share of manufacturing relative to their population size, having made a Cities and nation states: The story so far 25 Table 2.2: World cities’ share of national economic output in financial services and manufacturing Hong Kong London Moscow Mumbai New York Paris São Paulo Seoul Shanghai Singapore Tokyo Toronto % of national share of business/ financial services sector Sector size compared to share of population (average = 1) % of national share of manufacturing sector Sector size compared to share of population (national = 1) 6.3 44.3 38 5.7 11.4 40.4 27.1 67 6.1 100 43.9 27.6 11.99 2.02 4.78 3.4 1.91 2.15 2.76 1.39 3.47 1 1.47 1.65 0.1 15.9 13.8 3.5 3.0 19.1 21.2 31.9 4.5 100 24.2 19.2 0.26 0.73 1.73 2.06 0.50 1.02 2.16 0.66 2.55 1 0.81 1.15 Source: Istrate and Nadeau (2012).

The Rare Metals War
by Guillaume Pitron
Published 15 Feb 2020

Over the same period, the secondary sector’s contribution to France’s GDP slid four points.45 The figures are not much better in Europe and the US, where the industry made up 22 per cent and 18 per cent of GDP respectively in 2018, down 11 per cent and 12 per cent since the turn of the century.46 De-industrialisation in the United States and Europe hammered the post-war social contract, stirring up deep social turmoil and creating a hotbed for a franchise of populist parties. Donald Trump succeeded in reaching the White House because he could count on the voters in the de-industrialised states of the Rust Belt. In these swing states, where votes can tip the result of a national election, the Republican candidate vigorously denounced the anti-competitive practices of the Chinese and offshoring, and emphasised the need to protect the US from the industrial war spearheaded by Beijing.

…

But did we really need to give Beijing that extra leg-up? Our poor assessment of China’s competitive streak, combined with our outright quest for profit, without a doubt precipitated the transfer of labour, work units, and, most importantly, technologies to China. A chronicle of impending de-industrialisation Underlying our apparent blindness are numerous instances of wishful thinking. The West has long held to the illusion of eternal scientific progress — a philosophy that has irrigated several economic sectors since the 1980s. We believed that by abandoning our heavy industries, we could focus our efforts on high-value-adding manufacturing sectors while maintaining healthy profit margins.

…

In these swing states, where votes can tip the result of a national election, the Republican candidate vigorously denounced the anti-competitive practices of the Chinese and offshoring, and emphasised the need to protect the US from the industrial war spearheaded by Beijing. The strategy paid off, and Trump won the popular and Electoral College vote in virtually all these states, wiping out the comfortable popular-vote majority enjoyed by Hillary Clinton at the national level. The West would have felt the pernicious effects of de-industrialisation with or without rare metals. But this economic, social, and political crisis was amplified by China’s monopoly of the resources destined to replace fossil fuels, and by its formidable strategy of absorbing the green industries reliant on rare metals. Moreover, the European model has proven ‘powerless to implement a policy that preserves its economic, technological, and social assets’, writes a Western expert, adding: ‘The survival … of European democracy … may be the last hurdle in the way of the scarcely begun emergence of Chinese industry.’47 When two world views collide Meanwhile, China’s success has allowed it to foster a model of government that values a long game, unlike the short-sighted decisions of the West that have wrecked most of its industrial policies.

The Corruption of Capitalism: Why Rentiers Thrive and Work Does Not Pay
by Guy Standing
Published 13 Jul 2016

The rentier share rose more than sevenfold between 1980 and 2000.27 By then, rental income, as narrowly defined, accounted for over a third of national income, up from about a fifth before the Global Transformation started. The share of income going to profits in non-financial sectors actually fell. Meanwhile, deindustrialisation has been relentless. During the early twentieth century, agriculture shrank to less than 3 per cent of US national income, while manufacturing began its steep decline. In 1950, manufacturing accounted for 28 per cent of GDP. By the time of the crash of 2008, its share was down to 11 per cent.

…

Today, a variant could be called the British Disease, since it is most pronounced in Britain. It arises from the domination of financial capital over the whole economy, stemming from the Big Bang of 1986, when the City of London was deregulated. One outcome has been a persistently strong currency, which has made manufacturing exports uncompetitive and accelerated deindustrialisation. It has also boosted inequality.52 Canada suffered similarly after 2008, when money flowed into its financial sector because it had largely escaped the turbulence of the banking crisis. This pushed up the value of the Canadian dollar, causing the manufacturing sector to lose 20 per cent of its capacity.

…

‘Left’ parties everywhere had abandoned traditional values for a crude utilitarianism in trying to appeal to ‘the middle class’, the ‘aspirational middle’ or, in its later guise, ‘the squeezed middle’. In doing so they were competing with the right, which was much more comfortable in that zone. What has happened on the right is equally fascinating. Its old class base also weakened in the early phase of globalisation and the early stages of rentier capitalism. Deindustrialisation meant a dwindling number of industrialists to fund and mobilise support. Moreover, all across the Western world, middle-income groups seemed to be shrinking as well. In 2004, defining middle income as between 75 per cent and 125 per cent of national median income, only in Scandinavian countries did about half the population fit, whereas in the UK and USA that middle had decreased to about a third.12 It was to shrink almost everywhere after 2008.

The Science of Hate: How Prejudice Becomes Hate and What We Can Do to Stop It
by Matthew Williams
Published 23 Mar 2021

This economic downturn has been combined with a rise in inward migration, generating the conditions for local populations to perceive immigrants as posing realistic and symbolic threats. These perceived threats are exacerbated in areas where there is low employment amongst locals but high, although precarious and temporary, employment amongst migrants. In the UK almost all of the places affected by a combination of deindustrialisation and immigration are north of London. Many have been selected by Conservative governments as asylum seeker dispersal areas and receive a disproportionate share of the load. Almost 60 per cent of asylum seekers are placed in the poorest towns, adding further strain on local resources in times of recession.19 All the places in the UK that saw the largest proportional increase in foreign-born settlement between 2005 and 2015 also saw steady rises in racially and religiously motivated hate crime.

…

The economic downturn and perceived change in culture are only exclusively related to immigration for those who are hypersensitive to threats of this nature. Not all areas of the UK with large increases in foreign-born migration and a significant number of hate crimes share the same industrial past as West Yorkshire. The economic pains of deindustrialisation and the challenges to working-class British identity therefore play less of a part in explaining crimes targeting minority groups in these areas. Compared to West Yorkshire, Essex has a near polar opposite demographic character. It is a Conservative heartland with the UK’s second most prosperous economy (after London).

…

This feeling is intoxicating, as they have been denied it since childhood.12 Seeking out this feeling of power from dominating others is a predominantly male phenomenon because it helps fulfil the requirements of a certain type of masculinity – it made Greg feel more like a man and on top of his image of the social order.13 The traumas suffered by Greg and Stan during childhood are deep-rooted and personal. Trauma that leads to using hate as a container can also be experienced during adulthood. Greg and Stan talked of their adult losses: loss of jobs, loss of respect, loss of a certain way of life – all common to deindustrialising towns and cities. These losses can impact whole communities and can result in multiple types of coping: some collective, like the nostalgic celebration of a mythical bygone era before the immigrants arrived; some individualistic, like a personal preoccupation with racial mixing. These community and individual frustrations can suddenly become intertwined – deeply personal frustrations can combine with political propaganda about the risks of unfettered migration.

Platform Capitalism
by Nick Srnicek
Published 22 Dec 2016

We might turn to the technology sector,3 but, strictly speaking, this sector remains a relatively small part of the economy. In the United States it currently contributes around 6.8 per cent of the value added from private companies and employs about 2.5 per cent of the labour force.4 By comparison, manufacturing in the deindustrialised United States employs four times as many people. In the United Kingdom manufacturing employs nearly three times as many people as the tech sector.5 This is in part because tech companies are notoriously small. Google has around 60,000 direct employees, Facebook has 12,000, while WhatsApp had 55 employees when it was sold to Facebook for $19 billion and Instagram had 13 when it was purchased for $1 billion.

…

In Italian autonomism, this would be a claim about the ‘general intellect’, where collective cooperation and knowledge become a source of value.3 Such an argument also entails that the labour process is increasingly immaterial, oriented towards the use and manipulation of symbols and affects. Likewise, the traditional industrial working class is increasingly replaced by knowledge workers or the ‘cognitariat’. Simultaneously, the generalised deindustrialisation of the high-income economies means that the product of work becomes immaterial: cultural content, knowledge, affects, and services. This includes media content like YouTube and blogs, as well as broader contributions in the form of creating websites, participating in online forums, and producing software.4 A related claim is that material commodities contain an increasing amount of knowledge, which is embodied in them.

Hired: Six Months Undercover in Low-Wage Britain
by James Bloodworth
Published 1 Mar 2018

But even at ‘good’ companies like Admiral there were, for the most part, few trade unions in sight, meaning that there was nothing in place to stop a good company at some point metamorphosing into a bad one. Everything we enjoyed could be whisked away at short notice, like a dummy yanked from the mouth of a helpless child. 15 The crash de-industrialisation of the 1980s left a grim legacy in parts of South Wales. This sense of defeat seeped into your veins in certain towns like the injection of an intravenous drug. This was especially true in Ebbw Vale, the largest town in Blaenau Gwent. The town took its name from the Ebbw River, which ran almost parallel to the town of Cwm, three miles to the south.

…

.: These Poor Hands 23, 149, 190 courier firms 211, 215, 217, 223, 236, 244–7, 250, 256, 257 Cwm, Wales 147, 148, 187, 190, 195, 196, 197 Cwmbran, Wales 143 Daily Express 124–5 Daily Mail 66, 134, 188 Dan (bicycle courier) 248, 249 Dangerfield, George 72 Davies, Idris 148–9 Gwalia Deserta (Wasteland of Wales) 148 ‘The Angry Summer’ 174 debt 62, 69, 146, 151, 153 Deliveroo 215, 217, 223, 250, 256, 257 democratic socialists 192 Department for Work and Pensions 133 Dickens, Charles 29, 205, 210, 249; Hard Times 138–9 Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) 88–90, 109–10, 214 Dorothy (housemate of JB) 203, 204–5 DriveNow 217 Dropit 217 Eastern Europe, migrant workers from 11, 13, 15, 21, 24, 26–7, 30, 32, 33, 34, 45, 57, 61–2, 75, 114–16, 128–9, 154, 203–4, 260–1 see also under individual nation name Ebbw Vale, Wales 147, 149, 154; legacy of de-industrialisation in 187–200 Elborough, Travis 93 emergency housing 96 employment agencies 1, 16, 19, 20, 23, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 56, 65–6, 70, 72, 73, 82, 86, 127, 130, 158, 189, 194 see also under individual agency name Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) 248 employment contracts/classification: Amazon 19–20, 53, 58 care sector 87–8, 107–8, 116 Uber 214–15, 222, 229–35, 243, 245, 250–2, 257 zero-hours see zero-hours contracts employment tribunals 38, 229–30, 243–4 English seaside, debauchery and 92–3 Enterprise Rent-A-Car 214 ESOL (English for Speakers of Other Languages) programmes 115–16 European Economic Community (EEC) 195 European Referendum (2016) 61, 195–6 Evening Standard 208, 241 Express & Star 59–60 Fabian Society 109 Farrar, James 229–31, 232, 233, 234, 236, 238, 240, 241–2, 250, 254, 255–6 Fellows of the Academies of Management 17 Fernie, Sue 182 financial crisis (2008) 1, 2, 45, 125, 195, 209 Flash (former miner) 165–8, 170, 171–2, 174, 175, 176–8, 179, 188, 196 Fleet News 246 Foot, Michael 149 football 56, 58, 92, 94, 97, 98, 126, 135, 169 fruit picking 61 FTSE 123, 262 Gag Mag 122 Gallagher, Patrick 246 Gary (homeless man, Blackpool) 96–104, 105 Gaz (Gag Mag seller, Blackpool) 122 GDP 146 General Election (2015) 109 General Strike (1926) 148, 149, 173 gentrification 219 Geoff (former miner) 189, 190, 191, 193 ‘gig’ economy 2, 208–10, 217–18, 232, 236, 242, 243–4, 248, 249–50, 252, 257 see also Uber Gissing, George: New Grub Street 64 GMB union 36 grammar schools 261 Guardian 5, 235 Hamstead Colliery, Great Barr 169 Hazel (home carer) 110–11, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119 Heller, Joseph: Catch-22 235–6 Hemel Hempstead 54, 70 Henley, William Ernest: ‘England, My England’ vii Hoggart, Richard: The Uses of Literacy 45 home care worker (domiciliary care worker): Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) checks 88–90, 109–10 employment contracts 87–8, 107–8, 116, 118, 120 length of home care visits 108–9, 110 local authority budget cuts and 107–10 MAR (Medication Administration Record) sheets 114, 115 migrant workers as 114–16 negligent 86–7 privatisation of social care and 106–8, 109 recruitment 82–4 ‘shadowing’ process 88, 109–10 societal view of 106 staffing crisis 85–6, 119 suicide rate among 100 typical day/workload 110–14, 118 unions and 88 view job as vocation 86–7 wages/pay 107–8, 117, 118–19, 159 Home Instead 119 homelessness 95–105, 138, 187, 208 hostels 95, 96, 101, 102 housing/accommodation: Amazon workers, Rugeley 20–2, 24–6 Blackpool 80, 124, 137–8 buy-to-let housing market 24 emergency housing 96 homelessness and 95, 96, 101, 102, 137–8 hostels 95, 96, 101, 102 inability to buy 62 landlords and 12, 21, 24, 39, 67, 69, 95–6, 137–8, 164, 204, 206, 258 London 203–8 migrant workers and 20–2, 24–6, 197–8 social housing 62, 206 Swansea 124, 150 housing benefit 96, 137–8, 248 immigration 26–7, 61, 115–16, 128–9, 144, 193, 197–9, 236, 259–61 see also migrant workers indeed.co.uk 83–4 independent contractors 209, 248, 251–2 Independent Workers Union of Great Britain (IWGB) 230, 257 inequality 18, 73, 123, 125, 207–8, 226, 238, 262, 263 inflation 2, 122 job centres 19, 96, 133–6, 139–40, 156, 158 Joe (housemate of JB) 22 John Lewis 23, 83 Joseph Rowntree Foundation 70, 159 June (call centre employee) 181–2, 183, 184 Kalanick, Travis 215, 228, 229, 233, 235 Kelly, Kath 66 Khan, Sadiq 256 Koestler, Arthur: The God that Failed 228 Labour Party 7, 57, 59, 61, 109, 144, 149, 150, 173, 174 Ladbroke Road, Notting Hill, London 219 Lamb, Norman 109 Lancashire Evening Post 104–5 landlords, private 12, 21, 24, 39, 67, 69, 95–6, 137–8, 164, 204, 206, 258 Lea Hall Colliery, Staffordshire 31–2, 54, 55, 56, 57 Lea Hall Miners’ Social Club, Staffordshire 55, 56, 74 Len (step-grandfather of JB) 143–4 Lili (London) 203–4 living wage 1, 85, 160, 246 Lloyd George, David 172 loan sharks 151, 156 local councils 104–5, 164 London 201–57 accommodation/housing in 65, 203–8, 218 gentrification in 219 ‘gig’ economy in 208–57, 263 homelessness in 95 migrant labour in 205–6, 213, 239 wealth divide in 207–8, 238 London Congestion Charge 254 London Courier Emergency Fund (LCEF) 247 London Metropolitan Police 90 London, Jack 205 low-skilled jobs, UK economy creation of 153 Lydia (Amazon employee) 70 Macmillan, Harold 3 manufacturing jobs, disappearance of 59, 139 Marine Colliery, Cwm, Wales 190 Mayhew, Henry 4, 205 McDonald’s 52, 68, 83 Merkel, Angela 196 Metcalf, David 182 middle-class 6, 39, 51, 67, 68, 69, 72–3, 74, 75, 149, 178, 205, 258, 259, 260, 262, 263 migrant labour: Amazon use of 11, 12, 13, 15, 20, 21, 22–7, 30, 32, 33, 34, 44, 45, 46, 51, 53, 57, 61–2, 65, 71–5, 258, 260–1 care home workers 114–16 ‘gig’ economy and 203–6, 213, 239 restaurant workers 154 retail sector and 128–9 Miliband, Ed 109 mining see coal mining Miners’ Federation of Great Britain (MFGB) 173 Miners’ Strike (1984–5) 3, 174–7 minimum wage 1, 7, 55, 62, 84, 107, 108, 118, 135, 155, 159, 173, 189–90, 209, 212, 235, 236, 245, 250, 262 Morecambe, Lancashire 137–8 Morgan family 156–8 Morgan, Huw: How Green Was My Valley 147 Moyer-Lee, Jason 257 National Coal Board (NCB) 54, 170, 171 National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) 108 National Union of Miners (NUM) 174, 176 New York Times 222 NHS (National Health Service) 106, 108, 247 Nirmal (Amazon employee) 45–6, 51 Norbert (Amazon employee) 71–5 nostalgia 3, 60, 93–4, 216 Nottingham 2, 151–2 objectivism 228 oil crisis (1973) 122–3 Oliver, Jamie 154 Orwell, George 56, 169 Palmer, William 29 pay see wages and under individual job title and employer name payday loans 156 PayPal 216 Pimlico Plumbers 251–2 platform capitalism 215 PMP Recruitment 19, 189–90 Poland, migrant workers from 128–9, 130, 135, 197–8 ‘poor, the’ 145 Port Talbot, Wales 166, 176, 190, 196 ‘post-truth’ discourse 199 ‘post-work’ world 165 poverty: Blackpool and 132, 137 class and 4 darkness and 96 diet/weight and 137 ease of slipping into 5 Eastern Europe and 26 monthly salary and 156 as a moral failing 188–9 press treatment of 66–7 time and 67 working poor living in 194 Preston, Lancashire 100, 105, 138–9 private school system 123 progressive thought 262 Public Accounts Committee (PAC) 107 Putin, Vladimir 71 Rand, Ayn 228–9, 235, 236; The Fountainhead 228, 229 recession (2008) 1, 45, 104, 121, 125, 156 ‘regeneration’ 55, 60–1, 146 rent-to-own 157–8 retirement, working in 58–9 Reve, Gerard: The Evenings 160 Robin (Cwm) 196, 197 Rochelle (home care worker) 117–19 Romania, migrant workers from 11, 12, 13, 15, 20, 21, 22–7, 32, 44, 46, 51, 53, 61, 65, 71–5, 203, 206, 258 Ron (former miner) 170, 195 Royal London 59 Royal London pub, Wolverhampton 71 Royal Mail 151 Rugeley, Staffordshire 28–35 Amazon distribution centre in 11–76, 79, 86, 119, 127, 128, 159, 258 decline of coal mining industry in 31–2, 54–6, 57, 169 disappearance of manufacturing jobs from 54–63 high street 28–35 immigration and 30–4, 193–4 Tesco and 58–9, 62–3 Scargill, Arthur 175 scientific management theories 17 Scotland Yard 90 self-employment: ’gig’ economy and 214–15, 222, 229–30, 234, 243–4, 245, 246, 249, 250–1 increase in numbers of workers 2, 209 ‘independent contractors’ and 209, 248, 251–2 Selwyn (former miner) 175, 178, 179, 263–4 Senghenydd, Glamorgan pit explosion (1913) 169–70 Shelter 104 Shirebrook Colliery, Derbyshire 55 Shu, William 250 Silicon Valley, California 210, 232 Sillitoe, Alan: Saturday Night and Sunday Morning 2, 3, 94 Sky Sports News 126 social democracy 3, 263 social housing 62, 206 socialism 7, 56, 131, 144, 148, 149, 173 social mobility 58, 199, 261 South Wales Miners’ Museum, Afan Argoed 166, 196 South Wales Valleys 141–200 accommodation in 150, 197 Amazon in 145–6 beauty of 148 call centre jobs in 153–64, 180–6 coal industry and 143–4, 147–9, 165–79, 180, 188, 189, 190–1, 193, 195, 196 immigration and 197–9 JB’s family history and 143–4 legacy of de-industrialisation in 187–200 nostalgia and 147 radical history of 149–50 see also under individual place name ‘spice’ 95 Sports Direct 55 squatting 96, 99 steel industry 176, 180, 188, 189, 190, 196–7 Steven (housemate of JB) 124, 126, 127–31 Stoke-on-Trent 58–9 suicide 99–100 Sunday Times 175 ‘Best Companies to Work For’ 154 Rich List 125 Swansea, Wales 145–6, 150–2, 154–64, 176, 178, 197, 205 Tata Steel 190 tax 65, 69, 70, 118, 146, 158, 159, 163, 164, 212, 229, 244, 246, 248, 251, 255 Taylor, Frederick W.: The Principles of Scientific Management 17 Tesco 35, 57, 58–9, 62–3 Thatcher, Margaret 122, 123, 146, 174–5, 193, 207, 263–4 Thorn Automation 57 Thorn EMI 59 trade unions: Amazon and 36 B&M and 130, 131 call centres and 160, 181, 184–5, 186 care sector and 88 coal industry decline and 55–6, 173, 174, 263–4 decline of 2, 3, 35 ‘gig’ economy and 230, 257, 261 objectivism and 228 oil crisis (1973) and 122 Thatcher and 123, 174, 193, 263–4 Wales and 144, 149 see also under individual union name Trades Union Congress (TUC) 173 transgender people 40–1 Transline Group 19, 20, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, 65–6, 86 Transport for London (TFL) 211, 212–13, 214, 233, 254, 256 Tredegar Workmen’s Medical Aid Society 247 Trefil, Wales 149 Trump, Donald 7 Uber 207, 211–57 ‘account status’ 221 clocking in at 218 corporation tax and 229 customers 221, 222, 226–7, 237–41, 244, 257 driver costs/expenses 214, 217, 233, 241, 246, 253–5 driver employment classification/contract 214–15, 222, 229–35, 243, 245, 250–2, 257 driver hours 221, 226, 230, 232, 233, 236, 246, 253, 255 driver numbers 211–13, 233–5 driver wages/pay 212, 218, 221, 229–30, 235, 236, 237, 240, 241, 244, 246, 252–5 employment tribunal against (2016) 229–34 flexibility of working for 213–14, 218, 230–3, 248, 250–1 James Farrar and see Farrar, James migrant labour and 213, 236 ‘Onboarding’ class 224–5, 238, 241, 256 opposition to 215–17 philosophy of 228–9, 235, 236 psychological inducements for drivers 222–3 rating system 225–7, 232, 238, 239, 243, 253 rejecting/accepting jobs 221–2, 224–5 ride process 219–21 surge pricing 237, 238, 253 TFL and 211, 212–13, 214, 233, 254, 256 Travis Kalanick and see Kalanick, Travis UberEATS 256 UberPOOL 225, 240–2, 253, 255–6 UberX 212, 225, 240, 241, 255 VAT and 229 vehicle requirements 214 unemployment 2, 32, 36, 62, 121–3, 132, 138, 148, 157, 172, 178, 179, 189–95, 199, 218 Unison 88, 108 Unite 55, 160 United Private Hire Drivers 230, 257 university education 3, 6, 61, 62, 123, 150–1, 152, 153–4 USDAW 130–1 Vettesse, Tony 138 Vicky (care sector supervisor) 86, 87 Wade, Alan 121, 123–4 wages: Amazon 18, 19, 37–9, 42–3, 65–6, 68, 69, 70, 159 call centre 155–6, 158–60, 164, 180 care sector 107–8, 117, 118–19, 159 living wage 1, 85, 160, 246 minimum wage 1, 7, 55, 62, 84, 107, 108, 118, 135, 155, 159, 173, 189–90, 209, 212, 235, 236, 245, 250, 262 Uber 212, 218, 221, 229–30, 235, 236, 237, 240, 241, 244, 246, 252–5 wage stagnation 2 see also under individual employer, job and sector name Wealth and Assets Survey 207–8 wealth inequality 18, 73, 123, 125, 207–8, 238 Wells, H.

…

.: These Poor Hands 23, 149, 190 courier firms 211, 215, 217, 223, 236, 244–7, 250, 256, 257 Cwm, Wales 147, 148, 187, 190, 195, 196, 197 Cwmbran, Wales 143 Daily Express 124–5 Daily Mail 66, 134, 188 Dan (bicycle courier) 248, 249 Dangerfield, George 72 Davies, Idris 148–9 Gwalia Deserta (Wasteland of Wales) 148 ‘The Angry Summer’ 174 debt 62, 69, 146, 151, 153 Deliveroo 215, 217, 223, 250, 256, 257 democratic socialists 192 Department for Work and Pensions 133 Dickens, Charles 29, 205, 210, 249; Hard Times 138–9 Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) 88–90, 109–10, 214 Dorothy (housemate of JB) 203, 204–5 DriveNow 217 Dropit 217 Eastern Europe, migrant workers from 11, 13, 15, 21, 24, 26–7, 30, 32, 33, 34, 45, 57, 61–2, 75, 114–16, 128–9, 154, 203–4, 260–1 see also under individual nation name Ebbw Vale, Wales 147, 149, 154; legacy of de-industrialisation in 187–200 Elborough, Travis 93 emergency housing 96 employment agencies 1, 16, 19, 20, 23, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 56, 65–6, 70, 72, 73, 82, 86, 127, 130, 158, 189, 194 see also under individual agency name Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) 248 employment contracts/classification: Amazon 19–20, 53, 58 care sector 87–8, 107–8, 116 Uber 214–15, 222, 229–35, 243, 245, 250–2, 257 zero-hours see zero-hours contracts employment tribunals 38, 229–30, 243–4 English seaside, debauchery and 92–3 Enterprise Rent-A-Car 214 ESOL (English for Speakers of Other Languages) programmes 115–16 European Economic Community (EEC) 195 European Referendum (2016) 61, 195–6 Evening Standard 208, 241 Express & Star 59–60 Fabian Society 109 Farrar, James 229–31, 232, 233, 234, 236, 238, 240, 241–2, 250, 254, 255–6 Fellows of the Academies of Management 17 Fernie, Sue 182 financial crisis (2008) 1, 2, 45, 125, 195, 209 Flash (former miner) 165–8, 170, 171–2, 174, 175, 176–8, 179, 188, 196 Fleet News 246 Foot, Michael 149 football 56, 58, 92, 94, 97, 98, 126, 135, 169 fruit picking 61 FTSE 123, 262 Gag Mag 122 Gallagher, Patrick 246 Gary (homeless man, Blackpool) 96–104, 105 Gaz (Gag Mag seller, Blackpool) 122 GDP 146 General Election (2015) 109 General Strike (1926) 148, 149, 173 gentrification 219 Geoff (former miner) 189, 190, 191, 193 ‘gig’ economy 2, 208–10, 217–18, 232, 236, 242, 243–4, 248, 249–50, 252, 257 see also Uber Gissing, George: New Grub Street 64 GMB union 36 grammar schools 261 Guardian 5, 235 Hamstead Colliery, Great Barr 169 Hazel (home carer) 110–11, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119 Heller, Joseph: Catch-22 235–6 Hemel Hempstead 54, 70 Henley, William Ernest: ‘England, My England’ vii Hoggart, Richard: The Uses of Literacy 45 home care worker (domiciliary care worker): Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) checks 88–90, 109–10 employment contracts 87–8, 107–8, 116, 118, 120 length of home care visits 108–9, 110 local authority budget cuts and 107–10 MAR (Medication Administration Record) sheets 114, 115 migrant workers as 114–16 negligent 86–7 privatisation of social care and 106–8, 109 recruitment 82–4 ‘shadowing’ process 88, 109–10 societal view of 106 staffing crisis 85–6, 119 suicide rate among 100 typical day/workload 110–14, 118 unions and 88 view job as vocation 86–7 wages/pay 107–8, 117, 118–19, 159 Home Instead 119 homelessness 95–105, 138, 187, 208 hostels 95, 96, 101, 102 housing/accommodation: Amazon workers, Rugeley 20–2, 24–6 Blackpool 80, 124, 137–8 buy-to-let housing market 24 emergency housing 96 homelessness and 95, 96, 101, 102, 137–8 hostels 95, 96, 101, 102 inability to buy 62 landlords and 12, 21, 24, 39, 67, 69, 95–6, 137–8, 164, 204, 206, 258 London 203–8 migrant workers and 20–2, 24–6, 197–8 social housing 62, 206 Swansea 124, 150 housing benefit 96, 137–8, 248 immigration 26–7, 61, 115–16, 128–9, 144, 193, 197–9, 236, 259–61 see also migrant workers indeed.co.uk 83–4 independent contractors 209, 248, 251–2 Independent Workers Union of Great Britain (IWGB) 230, 257 inequality 18, 73, 123, 125, 207–8, 226, 238, 262, 263 inflation 2, 122 job centres 19, 96, 133–6, 139–40, 156, 158 Joe (housemate of JB) 22 John Lewis 23, 83 Joseph Rowntree Foundation 70, 159 June (call centre employee) 181–2, 183, 184 Kalanick, Travis 215, 228, 229, 233, 235 Kelly, Kath 66 Khan, Sadiq 256 Koestler, Arthur: The God that Failed 228 Labour Party 7, 57, 59, 61, 109, 144, 149, 150, 173, 174 Ladbroke Road, Notting Hill, London 219 Lamb, Norman 109 Lancashire Evening Post 104–5 landlords, private 12, 21, 24, 39, 67, 69, 95–6, 137–8, 164, 204, 206, 258 Lea Hall Colliery, Staffordshire 31–2, 54, 55, 56, 57 Lea Hall Miners’ Social Club, Staffordshire 55, 56, 74 Len (step-grandfather of JB) 143–4 Lili (London) 203–4 living wage 1, 85, 160, 246 Lloyd George, David 172 loan sharks 151, 156 local councils 104–5, 164 London 201–57 accommodation/housing in 65, 203–8, 218 gentrification in 219 ‘gig’ economy in 208–57, 263 homelessness in 95 migrant labour in 205–6, 213, 239 wealth divide in 207–8, 238 London Congestion Charge 254 London Courier Emergency Fund (LCEF) 247 London Metropolitan Police 90 London, Jack 205 low-skilled jobs, UK economy creation of 153 Lydia (Amazon employee) 70 Macmillan, Harold 3 manufacturing jobs, disappearance of 59, 139 Marine Colliery, Cwm, Wales 190 Mayhew, Henry 4, 205 McDonald’s 52, 68, 83 Merkel, Angela 196 Metcalf, David 182 middle-class 6, 39, 51, 67, 68, 69, 72–3, 74, 75, 149, 178, 205, 258, 259, 260, 262, 263 migrant labour: Amazon use of 11, 12, 13, 15, 20, 21, 22–7, 30, 32, 33, 34, 44, 45, 46, 51, 53, 57, 61–2, 65, 71–5, 258, 260–1 care home workers 114–16 ‘gig’ economy and 203–6, 213, 239 restaurant workers 154 retail sector and 128–9 Miliband, Ed 109 mining see coal mining Miners’ Federation of Great Britain (MFGB) 173 Miners’ Strike (1984–5) 3, 174–7 minimum wage 1, 7, 55, 62, 84, 107, 108, 118, 135, 155, 159, 173, 189–90, 209, 212, 235, 236, 245, 250, 262 Morecambe, Lancashire 137–8 Morgan family 156–8 Morgan, Huw: How Green Was My Valley 147 Moyer-Lee, Jason 257 National Coal Board (NCB) 54, 170, 171 National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) 108 National Union of Miners (NUM) 174, 176 New York Times 222 NHS (National Health Service) 106, 108, 247 Nirmal (Amazon employee) 45–6, 51 Norbert (Amazon employee) 71–5 nostalgia 3, 60, 93–4, 216 Nottingham 2, 151–2 objectivism 228 oil crisis (1973) 122–3 Oliver, Jamie 154 Orwell, George 56, 169 Palmer, William 29 pay see wages and under individual job title and employer name payday loans 156 PayPal 216 Pimlico Plumbers 251–2 platform capitalism 215 PMP Recruitment 19, 189–90 Poland, migrant workers from 128–9, 130, 135, 197–8 ‘poor, the’ 145 Port Talbot, Wales 166, 176, 190, 196 ‘post-truth’ discourse 199 ‘post-work’ world 165 poverty: Blackpool and 132, 137 class and 4 darkness and 96 diet/weight and 137 ease of slipping into 5 Eastern Europe and 26 monthly salary and 156 as a moral failing 188–9 press treatment of 66–7 time and 67 working poor living in 194 Preston, Lancashire 100, 105, 138–9 private school system 123 progressive thought 262 Public Accounts Committee (PAC) 107 Putin, Vladimir 71 Rand, Ayn 228–9, 235, 236; The Fountainhead 228, 229 recession (2008) 1, 45, 104, 121, 125, 156 ‘regeneration’ 55, 60–1, 146 rent-to-own 157–8 retirement, working in 58–9 Reve, Gerard: The Evenings 160 Robin (Cwm) 196, 197 Rochelle (home care worker) 117–19 Romania, migrant workers from 11, 12, 13, 15, 20, 21, 22–7, 32, 44, 46, 51, 53, 61, 65, 71–5, 203, 206, 258 Ron (former miner) 170, 195 Royal London 59 Royal London pub, Wolverhampton 71 Royal Mail 151 Rugeley, Staffordshire 28–35 Amazon distribution centre in 11–76, 79, 86, 119, 127, 128, 159, 258 decline of coal mining industry in 31–2, 54–6, 57, 169 disappearance of manufacturing jobs from 54–63 high street 28–35 immigration and 30–4, 193–4 Tesco and 58–9, 62–3 Scargill, Arthur 175 scientific management theories 17 Scotland Yard 90 self-employment: ’gig’ economy and 214–15, 222, 229–30, 234, 243–4, 245, 246, 249, 250–1 increase in numbers of workers 2, 209 ‘independent contractors’ and 209, 248, 251–2 Selwyn (former miner) 175, 178, 179, 263–4 Senghenydd, Glamorgan pit explosion (1913) 169–70 Shelter 104 Shirebrook Colliery, Derbyshire 55 Shu, William 250 Silicon Valley, California 210, 232 Sillitoe, Alan: Saturday Night and Sunday Morning 2, 3, 94 Sky Sports News 126 social democracy 3, 263 social housing 62, 206 socialism 7, 56, 131, 144, 148, 149, 173 social mobility 58, 199, 261 South Wales Miners’ Museum, Afan Argoed 166, 196 South Wales Valleys 141–200 accommodation in 150, 197 Amazon in 145–6 beauty of 148 call centre jobs in 153–64, 180–6 coal industry and 143–4, 147–9, 165–79, 180, 188, 189, 190–1, 193, 195, 196 immigration and 197–9 JB’s family history and 143–4 legacy of de-industrialisation in 187–200 nostalgia and 147 radical history of 149–50 see also under individual place name ‘spice’ 95 Sports Direct 55 squatting 96, 99 steel industry 176, 180, 188, 189, 190, 196–7 Steven (housemate of JB) 124, 126, 127–31 Stoke-on-Trent 58–9 suicide 99–100 Sunday Times 175 ‘Best Companies to Work For’ 154 Rich List 125 Swansea, Wales 145–6, 150–2, 154–64, 176, 178, 197, 205 Tata Steel 190 tax 65, 69, 70, 118, 146, 158, 159, 163, 164, 212, 229, 244, 246, 248, 251, 255 Taylor, Frederick W.: The Principles of Scientific Management 17 Tesco 35, 57, 58–9, 62–3 Thatcher, Margaret 122, 123, 146, 174–5, 193, 207, 263–4 Thorn Automation 57 Thorn EMI 59 trade unions: Amazon and 36 B&M and 130, 131 call centres and 160, 181, 184–5, 186 care sector and 88 coal industry decline and 55–6, 173, 174, 263–4 decline of 2, 3, 35 ‘gig’ economy and 230, 257, 261 objectivism and 228 oil crisis (1973) and 122 Thatcher and 123, 174, 193, 263–4 Wales and 144, 149 see also under individual union name Trades Union Congress (TUC) 173 transgender people 40–1 Transline Group 19, 20, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, 65–6, 86 Transport for London (TFL) 211, 212–13, 214, 233, 254, 256 Tredegar Workmen’s Medical Aid Society 247 Trefil, Wales 149 Trump, Donald 7 Uber 207, 211–57 ‘account status’ 221 clocking in at 218 corporation tax and 229 customers 221, 222, 226–7, 237–41, 244, 257 driver costs/expenses 214, 217, 233, 241, 246, 253–5 driver employment classification/contract 214–15, 222, 229–35, 243, 245, 250–2, 257 driver hours 221, 226, 230, 232, 233, 236, 246, 253, 255 driver numbers 211–13, 233–5 driver wages/pay 212, 218, 221, 229–30, 235, 236, 237, 240, 241, 244, 246, 252–5 employment tribunal against (2016) 229–34 flexibility of working for 213–14, 218, 230–3, 248, 250–1 James Farrar and see Farrar, James migrant labour and 213, 236 ‘Onboarding’ class 224–5, 238, 241, 256 opposition to 215–17 philosophy of 228–9, 235, 236 psychological inducements for drivers 222–3 rating system 225–7, 232, 238, 239, 243, 253 rejecting/accepting jobs 221–2, 224–5 ride process 219–21 surge pricing 237, 238, 253 TFL and 211, 212–13, 214, 233, 254, 256 Travis Kalanick and see Kalanick, Travis UberEATS 256 UberPOOL 225, 240–2, 253, 255–6 UberX 212, 225, 240, 241, 255 VAT and 229 vehicle requirements 214 unemployment 2, 32, 36, 62, 121–3, 132, 138, 148, 157, 172, 178, 179, 189–95, 199, 218 Unison 88, 108 Unite 55, 160 United Private Hire Drivers 230, 257 university education 3, 6, 61, 62, 123, 150–1, 152, 153–4 USDAW 130–1 Vettesse, Tony 138 Vicky (care sector supervisor) 86, 87 Wade, Alan 121, 123–4 wages: Amazon 18, 19, 37–9, 42–3, 65–6, 68, 69, 70, 159 call centre 155–6, 158–60, 164, 180 care sector 107–8, 117, 118–19, 159 living wage 1, 85, 160, 246 minimum wage 1, 7, 55, 62, 84, 107, 108, 118, 135, 155, 159, 173, 189–90, 209, 212, 235, 236, 245, 250, 262 Uber 212, 218, 221, 229–30, 235, 236, 237, 240, 241, 244, 246, 252–5 wage stagnation 2 see also under individual employer, job and sector name Wealth and Assets Survey 207–8 wealth inequality 18, 73, 123, 125, 207–8, 238 Wells, H.

Reaching for Utopia: Making Sense of an Age of Upheaval
by Jason Cowley
Published 15 Nov 2018

The mood among the electorate in Scotland reminds him of the final weeks of campaigning in the 2011 Scottish election, when, having been trailing in the polls, the SNP won a landslide in a proportional voting system that was designed to prevent such an outcome, setting us on the road to where we are today, with the British people so divided and the United Kingdom fracturing. ‘That night,’ Salmond says of 2011, ‘I was just watching things fall one by one. It’s happening again.’ The decline of Labour in Scotland is deep and has been a long time in the making, the result of institutional complacency, failures of leadership and profound structural changes – deindustrialisation, the decline of the trade unions and of cross-border class solidarity, globalisation, the London effect, and so on – and also the Iraq War. Yet it has been accelerated by the 2014 referendum campaign and the perception among many Scots that, as Salmond puts it, ‘Labour was hand-in-hand, hand-in-glove, shoulder-to-shoulder with the Conservative Party.’

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The Chancellor, ever alert to an opportunity, could not resist making an anti-Labour gibe (‘We are supporting industry in the north-east and not putting all our bets on the City of London as under the last Labour government’) as he extolled the virtues of the ‘Northern Powerhouse’ and reaffirmed his commitment to reviving British manufacturing, which has fallen to ten per cent of GDP (part of the blame for which lies with the deindustrialisation policies of the Thatcher government). Earlier, before assembled dignitaries and senior Japanese executives from Hitachi, Osborne had introduced the Prime Minister affectionately as ‘my boss’. Later, as we sat at a table drinking tea, Osborne attempted to explain why he and Cameron had worked together so successfully for so long.

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‘We can’t make a politics for straight, white men,’ said one of the panellists, a blonde-haired woman from the Karl Renner Institute, the political academy of the Austrian Social Democratic Party. Corbyn nodded vigorously. The Labour leader – his image projected on a large screen behind him – said that politics had been shaken up across the world and that corporate America had ‘bought up industrial America, deindustrialised it and sold it off’. He and his fellow socialists had to be ‘agents of change’. Injustice had been ‘brought about by free market economics’, he said, and: ‘We should stand up to unfettered capitalism . . . We cannot be protectors of the status quo.’ His speech was a hymn to socialist internationalism.

Wasteland: The Dirty Truth About What We Throw Away, Where It Goes, and Why It Matters
by Oliver Franklin-Wallis
Published 21 Jun 2023

More recent estimates that reflect modern recycling practices and data collection show the gap is smaller (although not by much) and depends heavily on how industrialised a country is. Canada, a country with extensive mining and forestry sectors, produces just 35.5 million tonnes of household waste per year, but 1.12 billion tonnes of industrial waste.27 (In pure coincidence, this fits almost precisely with the 97–3 estimate.)28 In the UK, a relatively deindustrialised nation, ‘commercial and industrial’ wastes amounted to 43.9 million tonnes in 2018, plus a further 57.5 million tonnes of ‘non-hazardous construction and demolition wastes’. Household wastes, by contrast, totalled just 26.4 million tonnes – that is, just 11.8 per cent of the total.29 This is the reality about waste, that must be reckoned with: for all our focus on household recycling rates, for all the effort we spend washing out yogurt pots and collecting bottles, the vast majority of waste happens upstream, before our products ever get to us.

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However, as of 2019, much of this budget remained unspent. 19 Black, ‘What It Takes To Clean The Ganges’. 20 Lorraine Boissoneault, ‘The Cuyahoga River Caught Fire at Least a Dozen Times, but No One Cared Until 1969’, Smithsonian Magazine, 19/06/2019: https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/cuyahoga-river-caught-fire-least-dozen-times-no-one-cared-until-1969-180972444/ 21 David Stradling and Richard Stradling, ‘Perceptions of the Burning River: Deindustrialization and Cleveland’s Cuyahoga River’, Environmental History, Vol. 13 (2008): http://www.jstor.org/stable/25473265 22 Wes Siler, ‘51 Years Later, the Cuyahoga River Burns Again’, Outside, 28/08/2020: https://www.outsideonline.com/outdoor-adventure/environment/cuyahoga-river-fire-2020-1969 23 Michael C.

Rethinking the Economics of Land and Housing
by Josh Ryan-Collins , Toby Lloyd and Laurie Macfarlane
Published 28 Feb 2017

Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014) argue that increased network externalities and brand effects resulting from advances in computer processing, artificial intelligence and networked communication will see the ‘winner takes all’ phenomenon become more prominent over time. Deindustrialisation and the rise of the service sector Across many advanced economies the process of deindustrialisation and the rise of the services sector have resulted in significant changes to the shape of the labour market. Between 1979 and 2009 the percentage of the UK workforce in manufacturing experienced a 60% decline, and this was matched with a rapid increase in the service industry and high-end technological occupations (Shaheen et al., 2011).

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Addison Act (1919), 78 adverse selection, 127 affordable housing: capital grants, 34; housing investment bank proposal, 209–10; need for public investment, 222–3; planning permission conditionalities, 33, 93–6, 216; public corporations’ investment levels, 220–1; see also social housing age, and net property wealth, 181–2, 181 agricultural land, 9, 61, 68, 69, 122–3 agricultural tariffs, 43 agriculture: common agricultural policy, 33, 122–3; increase in productivity, 68 Alliance and Leicester, 139 Aquinas, Thomas, 16 Arkwright, Richard, 71 armed forces, demobilisation, 78, 79 Association of Residential Letting Agents (ARLA), 134 Assured Shorthold Tenancy, 89 Australia: house price to income ratio, 112, 114; land value taxes, 204–5; mortgage market structure, 156 Bank of England, 210 banks/banking: alternatives to bank debt financing, 211–12; business relationship banking, 208–9; credit and money creation, 115, 206–7; housing investment bank proposal, 209–10; incentives for non-property lending, 206–8; income from mortgage interest, 61; international regulation, 135; land as lending collateral, 7, 55, 127–8; land-related credit creation, 8, 114–19, 190–1, 222; lending by industry sector, 118–19, 118; lending relative to GDP, 117–18, 117; leverage, 184; macroprudential policy, 206; minimum deposit requirements (corset controls), 132, 155; money supply, 115; regulating property-related credit, 154–5; securitisation, 135–42, 156–7, 156; structural reform recommendations, 208–9; wholesale money markets, 131, 139 Basel Accord (Basel I), 135 basements, 57, 57n16 Bath, 71 Belgium, mortgage market structure, 156 Bradford and Bingley, 139 Bretton Woods system, 83 Brighton, 71 building societies: demutualisation, 134–5, 136; effect of mortgage funding deregulation, 132–3; emergence, 72, 128; favourable tax regime, 132; history, 129; interest rate cartel, 130, 132; mergers and acquisitions, 136; mortgage funding arrangements, 131; stability, 129–30, 132, 158 Building Societies Act (1986), 133 buy-to-let (BTL): increase, 7, 184; mortgages, 122, 134; overseas investors, 100, 160; tax relief, 62, 86, 160 Cadbury, George, 71 Canada, mortgage market structure, 156 capital: conflated with land, 48–52, 62; definition, 37–8; differences between land and capital, 51–7; differences between wealth and capital, 170–1; factor in production, 37–8 capital gains tax: for buy-to-let landlords, 62; definition, 85–6; exemption for primary residencies, 85–6, 104, 202 capital goods depreciation, 52–3 capital investment, 56 Capital Markets Union (CMU), 141 capitalism: Golden Age, 83; land as private property, 36; Primitive Accumulation concept, 18 Cerberus Capital Management, 136, 137 cholera, 70, 73 Churchill, Winston, 76–7, 189 Clark, John Bates, 48–51, 57–9 classical economics, 17, 38, 45, 48, 70 co-ownership housing, 72, 86 coal industry, 69 collateral: commercial real estate, 148; land as, 7, 20–1, 127–8, 160; see also home equity withdrawal collectivisation, 43 commercial real estate (CRE), 148–50; bank lending, 118–19, 118, 130, 148; credit bubbles and crises, 111, 148–9; data sets, 63; effect of UK vote to leave EU, 150; foreign investment, 149; investment returns, 148, 149–50; and Japanese crisis, 151–3; rating lists, 202; time-limited leases, 214 common agricultural policy, 33, 122–3 communications technology, 9 Community Land Trusts, 72, 198–9, 214, 221 commuting, 27 Competition, Credit and Control Act (1971), 130 compulsory purchase: ‘hope value’ court judgments, 88; housing construction, 80–1; infrastructure projects, 31, 73, 196–7, 222 conservation areas, 32 construction industry see housing construction industry consumption: affected by house deposit saving, 145; and asset-based wealth, 123–4; consumption-to-income ratio trends, 143–4, 144; equity release and consumer demand, 145–7, 146; and house prices, 147; and inequality, 185–7 cooperative housing, 72, 215 Corn Laws, 43, 69–70 corporate income tax, 168–9 council tax, 104, 201, 202 credit conditions index, 143–4, 144 credit controls, 132 credit liberalisation, 144 Crown Estate, 19, 31 Darrow, Charles, 47 de Soto, Hernando, 21 debt, public sector debt, 219–21 debt-to-income ratio, 115–16, 116, 139, 159, 186 defaults, mortgage lending, 141 deindustrialisation, 168 Denmark: land value taxes, 204; size of new-builds, 97 developing economies, and private property, 21–2 development charge, 82 digital economy, 9 Eastern Europe, serfdom, 23–4 Eccles, Marriner, 186–7 economic growth: dependence on land values, 190–1; and homeownership, 21–2 economic modelling, 50–1, 155, 218 economic rent: Crown Estate, 31; determined by collective rather than individual investment, 40; financial sector, 44, 184; infrastructure projects, 194–5, 196–7; and land, 39–44, 56–7; and land taxes, 34–5, 45–8, 76–7, 199, 222; and landownership, 10–13, 25; oil sector, 44; urban areas, 41–2, 73–4 economic theory: landownership, 16–18; marginal productivity theory, 49–50, 51, 56, 57–9, 165–7; shortcomings, 64–5, 191–2, 217; teaching reform proposals, 218 Edinburgh New Town, 66, 71, 80 eminent domain theory, 16 Enlightenment, 16 equity release see home equity withdrawal European Investment Bank, 210 European Union: Capital Markets Union (CMU), 141; common agricultural policy, 33, 122–3; full-recourse mortgage loans, 141–2; government debt, 220; UK decision to leave, 150, 160 Eurostat, 64, 219 factory workers, accommodation, 71 feudal system, 18, 19, 32 financial crisis (2007-8): causes, 153–4, 159–60, 186–7; effect on mortgages, 100; and house and land prices, 101, 140; Northern Rock, 136–7; payment defaults, 123; UK banking collapse, 139–40 financial instability, 152–3, 154–5, 185–7 Financial Policy Committee, 155, 206 financial sector: economic rent, 44, 184; profitability, 184; reform proposals, 205–12; see also banks/banking financialisation, 120; declining wage share in national income, 169; land, 14, 110–12; land and property, 160 First World War, 77 Fisher, Irving, 152 Florida, credit-driven bubbles, 111 foreign exchange controls, 132 France: feudal system, 32; Livrét A accounts, 210; mortgage market structure, 156; private tenancy, 32; residential property wealth, 9, 10 French Physiocrats, 38 Friedman, Milton, 87 Garden City movement, 72, 75–6 GDP: and bank lending by sector, 118–19, 118; and declining wage share, 169; and domestic mortgage lending, 118, 156–8, 156; and home equity withdrawal, 146; and household debt, 151; and outstanding credit loans, 117; and property wealth, 9–10, 10 George, Henry, 12, 25, 34, 45, 58, 60–1, 76, 87, 199; Progress and Poverty, 40–1, 46–7 Germany: business relationship banking, 208–9; credit controls, 207; economic success and low homeownership, 215; house price to income ratio, 112, 114; mortgage market structure and homeownership, 156, 157–8; private tenancy, 32 Gini coefficient, 163, 177, 178 globalisation, 167–8, 169 Great Depression, 186–7 Great Moderation, 154, 191 Grotius, Hugo, 16 Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS), 139 health problems, and inequality, 185 help-to-buy schemes, 122 Henry VIII, King, 20 high-rise buildings, 57 Hill, Octavia, 71 home equity withdrawal: contribution to consumer demand, 145–7, 146; and financial crisis, 187; and living standards, 180; and mortgage market structure, 156–7, 156; to finance consumer goods, 127, 133 homeownership: benefits, 101; difficulties in saving for, rent trap, 106; downward trend, 83, 103, 178; as financial asset, 63; housing costs, 179; increased unemployment and reduced labour mobility, 27–8, 215; interwar growth, 78; investment opportunity, 92; low-supply equilibrium, 102; and mortgage market structure, 156–8, 156; mutual co-ownership, 86; political and electoral dominance, 24–5, 92; Right to Buy policy, 89, 90–1, 103; rise in 1970s/80s, 86; second homes, 160; trends, 106–7, 107 Hong Kong, Mass Transit Railway, 195 house building see housing construction industry house prices: boom and bust, 88, 99; and consumer demand, 147; and credit availability, 116–18; financial crisis collapse, 140; and growing inequality, 177–8; house price-credit feedback cycle, 119–24; increase with buy-to-let mortgages, 134; low-supply equilibrium, 102; negative equity, 123, 133–4; price-to-income ratios, 99, 100, 112–14, 114, 139, 183, 183; and real disposable income, 115–16, 116; replacement cost vs market price, 6; rise due to insufficient supply, 63; volatility, 8, 8, 112–14, 114; volatility reduced by land taxes, 200 Housing Act (1924), 78 Housing Act (1980), 89 Housing Act (1988), 89 housing associations, 72, 82, 83, 93 housing benefit, 34, 96, 106 housing construction industry: barriers to entry, 97; building clubs, 72; compulsory land purchase, 80–1; concentration, 96–7; costs, 8, 95; development charge, 82; effect of financial crisis, 101; land banks (with planning permission), 96–7, 101; peak, 82; poor design quality, 97; private house building, 78; size trends, 97; speculative house building, 93, 94–5, 96; trends, 82–5, 82, 83 housing costs: by tenure type, 179; and inequality, 179–80 housing demand, 63, 114 Housing, Town Planning, &c.

Snakes and Ladders: The Great British Social Mobility Myth
by Selina Todd
Published 11 Feb 2021

And workers like Wendy Pettifor suggested that understanding inequality was just as important a skill for a lawyer as being able to talk to a judge. Andrew Dewdney and Ian Beesley decided not to try to break into what Andrew called ‘the elite spaces’ of universities and galleries.88 In the 1970s, Ian became a freelance photographer focusing on poverty and deindustrialisation ‘which were not exactly popular topics for photographers, but because there was at least talk about these things, in politics and in the press, you could find an audience and a bit of funding’.89 Andrew Dewdney became a community artist. By the mid-seventies, the concrete estates and precincts planned so optimistically in the 1940s and 50s were the site of social problems as unemployment rose and problems with the housing – no play space for children, for example – caused discontent.

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Most of them wanted what Neelam, a young British Bangladeshi woman, called ‘high, fast jobs’: professional or managerial posts. This was the only way that they could acquire the ‘prestige’ and wealth they wanted.10 These ambitions were not confined to the poorest children, nor to those in the areas worst hit by deindustrialisation. Both generations grew up in an unequal world that rewarded only the few at the top. Tessa Parr was born in 1972 in London. Her parents were from working-class families in the East End, but both got clerical jobs, enabling them to buy their first home in Kent in the early 1980s. But when the recession hit ten years later, Tessa’s father lost his job and had to claim unemployment benefit – a ‘humiliating’ experience.

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Access was never as wide as it could have been, and only a tiny minority of working-class people had ever forged careers in these fields. But the success of some sportspeople, notably footballers, and of those working-class men who got into the media and the arts in the late 1950s and 60s, showed that, given the chance, many people were capable of excelling in these fields. And in the 1980s and 90s, recession and deindustrialisation encouraged people to look at other ways of realising their dreams. Generations of young men had dreamed of becoming professional footballers, and now this ambition was more attractive than ever. The creation of the Premier League in 1993, lucrative television contracts, and the floating of several football clubs on the stock market turned some top-flight footballers into millionaires and international celebrities.

This Is Not Normal: The Collapse of Liberal Britain
by William Davies
Published 28 Sep 2020

The entrepreneurial investment that neoliberals always believe is just around the corner never materialised. New Labour’s solution was to spread wealth in their direction using fiscal policy: public sector back-office jobs were strategically relocated to South Wales and the North East to alleviate deindustrialisation, while tax credits made low-productivity service work more socially viable. This effectively created a shadow welfare state that was never publicly spoken of, co-existing with a political culture that heaped scorn on dependency. The infamous comment, sometimes attributed to Peter Mandelson, that the Labour heartlands could be depended on to vote Labour no matter what ‘because they’ve got nowhere else to go’, spoke of a dominant attitude.

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It was encapsulated by Norman Tebbit in his conference speech in 1981, often misquoted: ‘I grew up in the 1930s with an unemployed father. He didn’t riot. He got on his bike and looked for work, and he kept looking till he found it.’ That would imply that economic hardship should produce a more mobile population, and perhaps further abandonment of deindustrialised regions. A more interventionist version of such thinking appeared with the development of ‘workfare’ programmes by the Clinton and Blair governments of the 1990s, which sought to repurpose the welfare state as a means of boosting claimants’ ‘employability’ as well as their efforts to find work.

Rule Britannia: Brexit and the End of Empire
by Danny Dorling and Sally Tomlinson
Published 15 Jan 2019

However Brexit is resolved, whatever is done now, Britain’s status in the world and in Europe will inevitably be much reduced, even if the UK somehow stays in the European Union. It will be difficult for the English, fed on so much past imperial propaganda, to accept a reduced place in the world after Brexit. The Scots, who suffered deindustrialisation first in the mid-1970s, have had longer to get used to the new global realities. Brexit partly came about because some were finding it very hard before the vote to accept Britain’s current status as not special compared to other countries. They were hoping to put the ‘Great’ back into Great Britain.

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It was a pity that over the years so many companies were later sold by shareholders (the employees and customers got no say) to foreign competitors and hedge funds, who took advantage of globalisation and often moved them abroad for cheaper labour costs, or closed the company down and stripped out the assets, leaving the workers with nothing. The proportion of GDP coming from manufacturing compared to services fell quickly as a result of 1980s deindustrialisation. In 1970, manufacturing accounted for 33 per cent of the economy (including sectors like mining, quarrying, steel making, gas/electricity and water, plus all the parts that went into cars) while services accounted for 55 per cent. As Figure 5.2 above illustrated, by 2014 manufacturing accounted for only 10 per cent of GDP, while services were up to nearly 80 per cent.44 And as Figure 5.3 below shows, half of British manufacturing now is cars, food, metals (often a euphemism for arms) and medicinal drugs.

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O. 1 London inequality in 1, 2 abstentions in EU referendum 1, 2, 3, 4 multiculturalism in 1 fall in immigration to 1, 2 wealthy immigrants in 1 housing in 1, 2, 3 consequences of EU referendum 1 gentrification in 1 Lucas, Caroline 1, 2 Lumley, Joanna 1 Luyendijk, Joris 1, 2 Lynch, Patrick 1 McCarthy, Joseph 1 MacDonald, Ramsay 1 McDonnell, John 1 Mackinder, Halford 1 McLoughlin, Patrick 1 McVey, Esther 1, 2 Maier, Juergen 1 Major, John 1 Malthus, Thomas 1 Manchester City 1 Manchester Guardian 1 Manning, Ralph 1 manufacturing industry 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Manzoor, Sarfraz 1 Markle, Meghan 1, 2 Marquand, David 1 Martin, Kingsley 1 Massie, Alex 1 May, Philip 1 May, Theresa support from DUP 1 changed position on Brexit 1 portrait removal 1 belief in selective education 1, 2 use of nuclear weapons 1 and US steel tariffs 1 suggests transition period 1 Florence speech 1 speeches to Conservative Party conference 1 and fourth industrial revolution 1 position on immigration 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and Windrush scandal 1 becomes Prime Minister 1 and 2017 general election 1 Davos speech 1 invokes Article 1 2 Mercer, Johnny 1 Merkel, Angela 1 Meynell, Francis 1 MI5 1, 2 MI6 1 Miliband, Ed 1 Mill, James 1 Miller, Edgar 1 Miller, Gina 1 Minford, Patrick 1, 2 Modood, Tariq 1, 2 Moore, Suzanne 1 Mosley, Oswald 1, 2 Mundell, David 1 Murdoch, Rupert 1 Muslim Council of Britain 1, 2 Myerson, George 1 National Front 1, 2 National Health Service 1, 2 National Organization of Deported Migrants (NODM) 1 National Service 1 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (2002) 1 New Statesman 1 New World-Wide Geographies, The (Stembridge) 1 New York Times 1, 2, 3 New Zealand 1 Northern Ireland negotiations over border 1 abstentions in EU referendum 1 and customs union ‘backstop’ 1 Oakeshott, Isabel 1 obesity as factor in referendum 1, 2 and inequality 1, 2 Observer, The 1, 2 Odey, Crispin 1 Office for National Statistics 1 On the Origin of Species (Darwin) 1, 2, 3 Opium Wars 1 Ormosi, Peter 1, 2, 3 Orwell, George 1, 2, 3, 4 Osborne, George 1 Oswald, Andrew J. 1 Oxford University 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Paisley Jr, Ian 1 Panama Papers 1 Paradise Papers 1, 2 Parris, Matthew 1 Patel, Priti 1 patriotism 1, 2, 3 Patten, Chris 1, 2, 3 Pearl, Raymond 1, 2 Pearson, Karl 1, 2, 3 Peston, Robert 1 Philby, Kim 1 Philip, Prince 1, 2, 3 Philipps, Rhodri 1 Piers Gaveston dining society 1 Piris, Jean-Claude 1 Pitt, William 1 Policy Exchange 1 Polish Resettlement Act (1947) 1 pollution 1 Porter, Bernard 1 Portes, Jonathan 1 poverty lack of empathy for 1 and nutrition 1 under austerity 1, 2 Powell, Enoch and Darwinism 1 encouraged immigration 1 ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech 1 views on European Union 1, 2, 3 Proto, Eugenio 1 Pursglove, Tom 1 Putin, Vladimir 1 Raab, Dominic 1, 2, 3 race/racism in 1970s 1 and British Empire 1 and immigration 1 of Cecil Rhodes 1 and inequality 1 and sense of ‘fairness’ 1 and Brexit 1 Rae, Alasdair 1 Ramsay, Adam 1, 2, 3 Rand, Ayn 1 Ransome, Arthur 1 Redoano, Michela 1 Rees-Mogg, Jacob at Oxford University 1 on transition period 1 in European Research Group 1 and Paradise Papers 1 wealth of 1 and divisions in Conservative Party 1 Reeves, Rachel 1 referendum on EEC membership (1975) 1, 2, 3, 4 referendum on EU membership (2016) abstentions in 1, 2, 3 age as factor in 1, 2, 3 geography as factor in 1, 2 class as factor in 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 political repercussions of 1 sense of own finances as factor in 1 educational levels as factor in 1 obesity as factor in 1, 2 immigration as factor in 1, 2 gender as factor in 1 impact on immigration 1 Leave campaigns 1, 2, 3 consequences of 1 Referendum Party 1 Rhodes, Cecil 1, 2, 3 Rhodes scholarship 1, 2, 3 Ricardo, David 1, 2 Rimington, Stella 1 Robinson, Joan Violet 1 Rolet, Xavier 1 Rothschild, Nathaniel 1 Royal College of Paediatricians and Child Health 1 royal family 1 Rudd, Amber 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ‘Rule Britannia’ (Arne) 1, 2 Rwanda 1 Sachs, Jeffrey 1 Sadler, Michael 1 Sahlberg, Pasi 1 Sánchez, Óscar Arias 1 Sankara, Thomas 1 Saudi Arabia 1, 2 Sayer, Duncan 1 Schama, Simon 1 Scotland rejects Brexit legislation 1 independence referendum (2014) 1 abstentions in EU referendum 1 result of EU referendum in 1 in creation of Britain 1 deindustrialisation in 1 Scottish National Party (SNP) 1 Sedwill, Mark 1 selective education 1 Sheppard, Dick 1 Shilliam, Robbie 1 Shinwell, Emmanuel 1 Siddiqui, Nadia 1 Sidera, Sandro 1 slavery 1, 2 Small Island (Levy) 1 Smith, Adam 1, 2 Smith, Julian 1 Social Mobility Commission 1 Sorensen, Reg 1 Sovereign Individual, The (Rees-Mogg) 1 Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) 1 Spectator, The 1 Stander, Julian 1, 2 Starmer, Keir 1 steel industry 1, 2 Stembridge, J.

The Journey of Humanity: The Origins of Wealth and Inequality
by Oded Galor
Published 22 Mar 2022

School enrolment at the age of ten increased from 40 per cent in 1870 to nearly 100 per cent in 1902.[18] In the 1870s, the overall fertility rate in the UK started to drop, and in the subsequent fifty years, it declined from about five children per woman to nearly 2.5. Over this same period, the economy transitioned into a state of sustained growth in income per capita at a rate of nearly 2 per cent per year. Figure 16. The Impact of Globalisation: Industrialisation and Deindustrialisation across the Globe In contrast, India experienced a decline in its per capita level of industrialisation. The entrenchment of the agricultural sector in India, for which education was not essential, contributed to the persistence of widespread illiteracy well into the twentieth century.

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A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A Abbasid Caliphate (750–1258), 176, 184 abortion, 87–8 Aeneid (Virgil), 59 aeroplanes, 111 Africa agriculture in, 21, 179–80, 188–9 colonialism in, 157, 158, 187 diversity in, 220–32 emigration from, 127 fertility rates in, 112 Homo sapiens emergence in, 5, 18–20, 30, 119, 120, 124, 218–32, 221, 222, 237 income per capita in, 106 industrialisation in, 241 institutions in, 157, 187 livestock in, 179–80 living standards in, 7 malaria in, 180 marriage in, 87 Neolithic Revolution in, 202, 203, 204, 207 poverty in, 113 slave trade in, 173–4, 187 trade in, 136 trust in, 173–4 tsetse flies, 180 African Americans, 130–31, 155, 156, 215–17 Afrobarometer 173–4 Age of Enlightenment (c.1637–1800), 27, 58, 66, 170–71, 182, 212 agriculture climate and, 13, 15, 20, 21, 25, 155, 181, 186–7, 193–5, 203–4 comparative advantage in, 181, 211–12, 237 cooperation and, 168–9 diseases and, 8, 180 education and, 77, 81–3, 109, 140 future orientation and, 187–90, 213 gender roles and, 191–2 Green Revolution, 111, 117 hydraulic hypothesis, 184 innovations in, 61, 64, 181 institutions and, 208–10 irrigation, 22, 23, 120, 141–2, 160, 168, 184, 190 labour productivity, 131–2 livestock, 179–80, 203 Neolithic Revolution, see Neolithic Revolution soil and, 8, 21, 30, 141, 155, 186, 187, 191, 198, 204, 209, 236 Akkadian Empire (c.2334–2154 BCE), 23 algebra, 69 altitude, 51 American Civil War (1861–5), 62 Amsterdam, Netherlands, 40 Anatolia, 23, 40, 206 Angola, 154 antibiotics, 111 Aquinas, Thomas, 163 Arabian Nights, 59 Arctic region, 195 Argentina, 77, 154 Arkwright, Richard, 59, 72 Arrow, Kenneth, 172 art, 20, 22, 58, 62, 120, 216 Asia agriculture in, 188, 192 East–West orientation, 203 fertility rates in, 112 income per capita in, 106 industrialisation in, 241 living standards in, 7 marriage in, 87 Neolithic Revolution in, 202, 203 trade in, 136 see also Middle East Assyrian Empire (2500–609 BCE), 40 Athens, 40 Atlantic triangular trade, 136 Australia, 49, 106, 153, 154, 157 Austronesians, 206–7 automobiles, 61, 97, 101, 107, 111 Aztec civilisation, 154, 205 B Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, 19 Babylonian Empire (1895–539 BCE), 40 Bandy, Robert, 217 Banfield, Edward, 172 Bantu people, 207 Battle of the Books, The (Swift), 169 Belgium, 37, 64, 65, 72, 75, 138 Bell, Alexander Graham, 104 Berry, Charles ‘Chuck’, 216 Bessemer, Henry, 60 bicycles, 61 bifurcation theory, 46 Bill of Rights (1689), 148 biodiversity, 9, 29, 33, 202, 210, 236 Black Death (1346–53), 34–5, 36, 149–50, 159, 212 Blake, William, 57 Boas, Franz, 168 Bolivia, 131, 154, 229 Boserup, Ester, 191 brain, 14–17 Brazil, 103, 154, 216 Brexit (2016–20), 110 Brown, Moses, 72 Brown University, 1, 72, 239 Buddhism, 63 Byzantine Empire (395–1453), 48 C Caesar, Julius, 184 caloric yields, 189 Calvinism, 164 Cameroon, 207 Canada, 77, 108, 138, 154 canals, 61 Card, Addie, 78 cargo cults, 233–4 Caribbean, 113, 154, 155, 157, 186 Carthage, 23 Cartwright, Edmund, 59 Çatalhöyük, 23, 40 Catholicism, 148, 163, 217 Central America, see under Meso-America central heating, 101 centralised civilisations, 182–7 cephalopods, 14 de Cervantes, Miguel, 59 Chaplin, Charles, 105 Charlemagne, Emperor of the Romans, 184 Charles II, King of England and Scotland, 148 chemistry, 61, 69 Chicago, Illinois, 60 childbirth, 2, 41, 83 children education of, 8, 52–5, 62–83, 88–91, 94–8, 122, 129, 175 labour of, 57, 67, 78–83, 89, 93, 99, 122 mortality of, 2, 29, 41, 57, 89, 98, 121, 127, 128, 180 quantity–quality trade-off, 52–5, 88–91 Chile, 77, 146, 154 China agricultural productivity, 131 Black Death in (c. 1331–54), 34 centralised authority in, 182, 183, 184–6 coal mining in, 181 collectivism in, 190 dictatorship in, 146 diversity and, 226–9 education in, 64, 91 fertility rates in, 91 geography of, 182 growth in, 115 gunpowder, development of, 47, 61 income per capita in, 210 industrial regions, 108 naval exploration, 213 Neolithic Revolution in, 3, 21, 23, 122, 206, 210 New World crops in, 37–9 one-child policy (1979–2015), 112 Opium War, First (1839–42), 61 poverty in, 113, 114 printing, development of, 48 technological development in, 121, 176, 184 writing development of, 24 cholera, 205 Christianity, 63 Catholicism, 148, 163, 217 Protestantism, 63, 90, 163–4, 175, 184, 217 wealth, views on, 163 civil law systems, 154 civil liberties, 127 civilisations, dawn of, 22–5, 208–10, 236 class conflict, 73, 74, 78 climate, 13, 15, 20, 21, 25, 155, 181, 186–7, 193–5, 203–4 climate change, 116–18, 123, 241 coal mining, 59, 60, 71, 181 Cobbett, William, 86 Collapse (Diamond), 33 Colombia, 154 colonialism, 135–7, 140, 147, 152–9, 168, 175, 205, 235 Columbia, 103 Columbian Exchange, 35–9, 94–6, 195 Columbus, Christopher, 35, 47, 182–3 Comenius, John Amos, 65 common law systems, 154 Communist Manifesto, The (Marx and Engels), 62, 73 comparative advantage, 71, 137, 140, 141, 211–12 competition, 182–6, 198 concrete, 61 de Condorcet, Nicolas, 27 Confucianism, 63 consumption vs investment strategy, 188–90, 213 contraception, 85–6, 118 convergent evolution, 14–15 cooking, 15, 17 cooperation, 8, 168–9, 175, 236 Copernicus, Nicolaus, 44 Corinth, 40 Cortés, Hernán, 205 Covid-19 pandemic, 115, 130, 240 Crime and Punishment (Dostoevsky), 59 critical junctures, 212 Crompton, Samuel, 59 Cuba, 216 Cuitláhuac, Emperor of Tenochtitlan, 205 cultural traits, 51–5, 141, 161, 163–77, 187–98, 213 collectivism, 190–91 cooperation, 8, 168–9, 175, 236 entrepreneurship, 52, 72, 165, 182, 184, 193, 197 future orientation, 52, 141, 165, 169–71, 175, 187–90, 197–8, 213, 238 gender equality, see gender equality geography and, 181, 187–90, 208–10, 236 growth and, 169–71 human capital investment, 52–5, 80, 88–91, 94–8, 122, 165, 175 immigration and, 174 individualism, 165, 176, 190–91, 197 institutions and, 182 language and, 195–8 loss aversion, 192–5 prosperity and, 174–7 Protestant ethic, 164–5, 175, 184 racism and, 168 social hierarchies, 197 survival advantage of, 168 technology and, 52–5, 121, 169–70, 176, 231 transmission of, 171 trust, 8, 165, 172–4, 175, 236 Cyprus, 40 D Dante, 59 Darby, Abraham, 60 Darwin, Charles, 27, 50 decline of generations, 169 deindustrialisation, 107–10, 139, 140 democracy, 78, 151–2, 155, 160, 172–3 social capital and, 172–3 demographic dividend, 117 demographic transition, 6, 85–100, 106, 112–18, 175, 176, 198, 240 human capital and, 88–91, 112, 175, 211 Denmark, 104 Detroit, Michigan, 107–8, 217 Diamond, Jared, 21, 29, 32–3, 202, 203 Dickens, Charles, 57 dictatorships, 146 see also extractive institutions diet, 2, 25, 28, 30, 33, 95, 101, 107 diphtheria, 102 diseases, 2, 8, 40, 94, 102, 204–5, 236 agriculture and, 8, 180 Black Death (1346–53), 34–5, 36, 149–50, 159, 212 colonialism and, 156–7 germ theory, 102 immunity to, 51, 205 malaria, 156, 180, 205 sleeping sickness, 180 Spanish flu pandemic (1918–20), 106, 240 vaccinations, 102 diversity, 6, 9, 19, 142, 160, 215–32, 227–8, 237 innovation and, 9, 215–16, 226–30 measurement of, 223–4 origins of, 219–22 prosperity and, 217–18, 222, 224–32 Divine Comedy (Dante), 59 division of labour, 22, 191–2, 196–7, 204 Domino, Fats, 216 Don Quixote (Cervantes), 59 Dostoevsky, Fyodor, 59 double-entry bookkeeping, 65 E East Germany (1949–90), 144 Easter Island, 32, 207 economic ice age, 39–41 Edison, Thomas, 60, 104 Education Act (UK, 1902), 76 education, 8, 52–5, 62–83, 88–98, 99, 118, 129, 238 agriculture and, 77, 81–3, 109, 140 child labour and, 57, 67, 78–83, 122 fertility rates and, 89–98, 99, 113, 122 human capital, see human capital industrialisation and, 64, 67–83, 89, 99, 109, 140 inequality and, 127, 140 investment in, 52–5, 80, 88–91, 94–8, 122, 165 land ownership and, 77, 155 technology and, 62–83, 99, 109, 110, 111–12 trade and, 137 universal public, 73–9 women and, 91, 92, 112 Egypt, 3, 20, 23, 24, 40, 63, 87, 88, 121, 207 Einstein, Albert, 44 electricity, 61, 101, 129, 130, 144 elevators, 61 Elizabeth I, Queen of England, 147 Engels, Friedrich, 27, 62, 73 England, 3, 35, 37, 91, 147 Enlightenment (c.1637–1800), 27, 58, 66, 170–71, 182, 212 entrepreneurship, 52, 72, 165, 182, 184, 197 environmental degradation, 116–18, 241 Epic of Gilgamesh, 59 Ethiopia, 131, 229 Euphrates River, 20, 23, 206, 236 Europe income per capita, 106 industrialisation, see industrialisation institutions see institutions living standards in, 7, 41 Neolithic agriculture in, 35–7, 94–6, 188, 190, 192 Black Death (1346–53), 34–5, 36, 149–50, 159, 212 colonialism, 135–7, 140, 147, 152–9, 168, 175 competition in, 182–3, 184 East–West orientation, 203 economic growth in, 115 education in, 64–7 Enlightenment (c.1637–1800), 27, 58, 66, 170–71, 182, 212 fertility rates in, 85–6, 122 future orientation in, 190, 213 gender equality in, 92 geography of, 184–5 immigration to, 127, 192 Revolution in, 202, 203 New World crops in, 35–7, 94–6, 190 Protestant ethic in, 164–5, 175, 184 technological development in, 58, 61–2, 97, 212 trade in, 135–7 European Marriage Pattern, 86 European Miracle, 182, 213 European Social Survey, 189, 194 European Union (EU), 110 extinctions, 32, 88, 116, 167, 193, 203 extractive vs inclusive institutions, 145–61, 172, 186–7, 198, 209, 236 eye, evolution of, 14, 51 eyeglasses, 64 F Factory Acts (UK), 80 famines, 29, 40, 102, 193 Irish Famine (1845–9), 37, 96 Faust (Goethe), 59 feedback loops, 17, 48 feminism, 97 Ferdinand II, King of Aragon, 183 Fertile Crescent, 20, 21, 23, 33, 40, 48, 122, 202–4, 206, 210, 214, 226 fertility rates, 6, 85–98, 87, 112, 113, 117–18, 122, 123, 232 trade and, 137–8 feudalism, 62, 73, 147, 149–50, 159, 172 film, 105 financial crisis (2008), 115 Finland, 40 Florence, Italy, 34 food surpluses, 4, 28–41, 85, 94, 95 Ford, Henry, 107 France Black Death in, 34 colonialism, 153, 154 education in, 64, 67, 68, 70–71, 72, 75, 147 fertility rates in, 90 geography of, 185 guilds in, 150 industrialisation in, 109, 110, 138 late blight in, 37 life expectancy in, 40 living standards in, 147 Napoleonic Wars (1803–15), 62, 146, 153 Protestantism in, 164 trade in, 137 Fresnes-sur-Escaut, France, 70 future orientation, 52, 141, 165, 168–71, 175, 187–90, 197–8, 213, 236, 238 G Ganges River, 236 Gates, William ‘Bill’, 118 gender equality, 8, 91–4, 99, 106, 118, 122, 236 geography and, 191–2 language and, 196–7 wage gap, 91–4, 99, 122 general relativity, theory of, 44 General Social Survey, 194 Genoa, Republic of (c. 1000–1797), 183 geography, 179–99, 236 competition and, 182–6 future orientation and, 187–90, 197–8, 213 gender equality and, 191–2 individualism in, 190–91 institutions and, 181, 182, 186–7, 207, 208–10 language and, 195–8 loss aversion and, 192–5 Neolithic Revolution and, 203–4, 208–10, 212–14 geometry, 69 germ theory, 102 Germany, 64, 67, 75, 93, 110, 112, 137, 138, 164, 197 glass, 61 global warming, 116–18, 123 globalisation, 115, 137, 235 Godwin, William, 27 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 59 Goldin, Claudia, 111 grass analogy, 140–42 Great Depression (1929–39), 106, 115, 240 Great Fire of London (1666), 150 Great Migration (1916–70), 215 Great Pyramid, Giza, 24 Greece, 3, 18, 23, 40, 48, 58, 63, 88, 121, 160, 170, 213 Green Revolution, 111, 117 Greenland, 33, 49 guilds, 150 gunpowder, 47, 61 Guns, Germs and Steel (Diamond), 21 Gutenberg, Johannes, 48–9, 64, 104 H Habsburg Empire (1282–1918), 173 Hamburg, Germany, 34 Hamlet (Shakespeare), 59 hands, evolution of, 17 Hargreaves, James, 59 Hawaii, 48 head starts, 29, 34, 48, 146, 181, 185, 201–2, 204, 206, 210–12, 236–7 agricultural comparative advantage and, 181, 211–12, 237 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 9 Henry IV, King of France, 147 Henry VII King of England, 183 hierarchical societies, 98, 172, 197, 207, 208–10 high-yield crops, 111, 190, 213 Hill, Rowland, 104 Hine, Lewis, 78 Hobbes, Thomas, 2 Hofstede, Geert, 188 Holy Roman Empire (800–1806), 165, 172, 173 Homo erectus, 18 Homo technologicus, 119 Hong Kong, 154 hookworm, 90 hot-air balloons, 61 Huayna Capac, Incan Emperor, 205 Hugo, Victor, 59, 62 human capital, 6, 52–5, 66–73, 88–91, 93, 103, 111–12, 232 child labour and, 80, 81, 83, 122 colonialism and, 158 demographic transition and, 88–91, 112, 175, 232 dictatorships and, 146 industrialisation and, 66–73, 74, 76, 80, 81, 83, 109, 110, 140, 211 investment in, 52–5, 80, 88–91, 94–8, 122, 165, 175 resource curse and, 181 technology and, 62–83, 99, 109, 110, 111–12 human rights, 127 humanism, 170 Hume, David, 182 hunter-gatherer societies, 6, 17, 18, 20, 21–2, 30, 33–4, 203, 206, 207 hydraulic hypothesis, 184 I Ice Age, 18, 19 immigration, see migration Inca civilisation, 154, 205 inclusive vs extractive institutions, 145–61, 172, 186–7, 198, 209, 236 income effect, 89, 93 income per capita, 4, 8, 31, 102, 106, 109, 117, 122, 130, 131–5 diversity and, 229 future orientation and, 198 inequality, 131–5, 132, 134, 210 institutions and, 155, 160 trade and, 137 India, 23, 111, 112, 113, 131, 138, 154, 210 individualism, 165, 176, 190–91, 197 Indonesia, 154, 207 Industrial Revolution (1760–1840), see industrialisation industrialisation, 6, 45–7, 55, 57–62, 85, 86, 109, 121, 124, 139, 181, 198–9, 240 agriculture and, 181, 202 decline of, 107–10, 139, 140 education and, 64, 66–83, 89, 99, 109, 110, 140, 211 environment and, 116, 123, 241 institutions and, 147–51 skilled labour and, 67, 71, 137 trade and, 136, 138 inequality, 7, 9–10, 44, 74, 106 climate and, 155, 203–4 colonialism and, 135, 137, 140, 152–9, 235 cultural traits and, 163–77 diversity and, 215–32 education and, 127, 140 geography and, 179–99, 203–4 institutions and, 147–61, 172 legal systems and, 154–5 Neolithic Revolution and, 201–14, 236–7 trade and, 135–40 infant mortality, 2, 29, 41, 57, 89, 98, 121, 127, 128, 180 influenza, 205 innovation, 6, 58, 59, 111 age of growth, 111 climate change and, 118, 123 competition and, 184, 186, 198 cooking and, 17 diversity and, 9, 215–16, 226–30 education and, 53, 91, 99 food surpluses and, 4 industrialisation and, 58, 61–2, 65, 83 institutions and, 144, 161 literacy and, 72 Malthusian epoch, 4, 47, 48 Neolithic Revolution, 23, 120, 204 population size and, 47, 48, 120, 204 institutions, 147–61, 172, 175, 182–7, 198, 204, 213 climate and, 155–6 colonialism and, 152—9, 175 competition and, 182–6 democracy, 151–2, 172 geography and, 181, 182, 186–7, 198, 207, 208–10 technology and, 147–51, 176, 231 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 234 International Organization for Standardization, 111 Internet, 101, 111, 130 Inuit, 49, 195—6 invertebrates, 14 investment vs consumption strategy, 188–90, 213 Ireland, 36–7, 91, 94–6, 175 iron ore, 60 irrigation, 22, 23, 120, 141–2, 160, 168, 184, 190 Isabella I, Queen of Castile, 183 Islam, 63 Israel, 2, 13, 18, 201 Italy, 112, 127, 137, 147, 160, 171–3, 185 J Jacquard, Joseph-Marie, 150 James II and VII, King of England and Scotland, 148, 159 Japan, 62, 77, 112, 146, 210, 213, 226, 233 Jericho, 3, 22–3, 24 Jerusalem, 1–2 Jewish people; Judaism, 63, 88–9, 166–7, 169 João II, King of Portugal, 182–3 Joshua ben Gamla, 166 Judaean Revolt (66–70 CE), 166 Judah ha-Nasi, 166 K Kahneman, Daniel, 192 Kant, Immanuel, 170 Karataş, 40 Kay, John, 59 Kenya, 131 kettle analogy, 43, 46, 100 Keynes, John Maynard, 115 Khirokitia, 40 Khoisan, 207 Kitson, James, 75 Korea, 77, 91, 143, 144, 146, 151, 159, 171, 177, 185, 212, 226, 231 L labour productivity, 131 lactase persistence, 24–5 land ownership of, 77, 155 strategies of use, 188–90 see also agriculture landlocked countries, 181 language, 195–8, 221–2 Latin America, see Central America; South America law of diminishing marginal productivity, 133 Lee, William, 147 legal systems, 154–5 Leo X, Pope, 163 Lerna, 40 life expectancy, 2, 41, 57, 89, 99, 102–3, 103, 114, 121, 127, 128, 130 light bulbs, 60 linguistic niche hypothesis, 196 literacy, 2, 63–8, 66, 70–71, 72, 88, 92, 95, 107, 112 Judaism and, 166, 167 Ottoman Empire and, 184 Protestant Reformation and, 90, 164, 165, 167 literature, 58, 59, 62, 216 livestock, 179–80 living standards, 1–10, 28, 94, 99, 101–7, 114, 121–4, 127–31, 240 diversity and, 217–18, 222, 224–32 hunter-gatherer societies, 30, 33 Malthusian thesis and, 3–5, 6, 28–41, 240 London, England, 34, 150 long-term orientation, see future orientation loss aversion, 192–5 lost paradise myth, 34 Lumière brothers, 105 Luther, Martin, 90, 163 Luxembourg, 160 M Madagascar, 207 Madrid, Spain, 40 Mahabharata, 59 maize, 21, 35, 37–9, 190, 203 malaria, 156, 180, 205 Malthus, Thomas, 3–5, 27–30, 50 Malthusian epoch, 3–5, 6, 27–41, 45–7, 83, 85, 99–100, 102, 112, 151, 156, 232 cultural traits and, 52, 54, 89, 94, 95, 97, 98, 188, 193 economic ice age, 39–41 geography and, 181, 188, 193 population composition, 50, 54 population swings, 6, 33–9 poverty trap, 5, 25, 45, 121, 235, 240 Mamluk Sultanate (1250–1517), 48 manufacturing, 107–10 Marconi, Guglielmo, 104 marriage, 86–7, 87 Marx, Karl, 9, 27, 62, 73, 74, 78 Mary II, King of England and Scotland, 148 Massachusetts, United States, 81 Mayan civilisation, 3, 33, 46, 121, 154 McCloskey, Deirdre, 57–8 McLean, Malcolm, 111 measles, 205 mechanical drawing, 69 Mediterranean Sea, 13, 19, 20, 127, 213 Meiji Restoration (1868), 62, 146, 213 Memphis, Egypt, 23 Meso-America colonialism in, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 186–7, 205–6 diversity in, 220–21 emigration from, 127 fertility rates in, 112 income per capita in, 106 industrialisation in, 241 institutions in, 156, 157, 158, 160, 186–7, 236 land ownership in, 77, 155 living conditions in, 7 Malthusian crises in, 33 Neolithic Revolution in, 21, 202, 203, 204, 205–6 population density in, 154, 156 poverty in, 113 trade in, 136 writing, development of, 24 Mesolithic period, 40 Mesopotamia, 23, 24, 40, 59 see also Fertile Crescent Methodism, 164 Mexico, 103, 108, 111, 154, 205 microscopes, 64 middle class, 62, 152 Middle East agriculture in, 20, 21, 23, 192, 202–4, 206, 210, 214 emigration from, 127 hunter-gatherer societies in, 33 life expectancy in, 40 marriage in, 87 Neolithic Revolution in, 20, 21, 23, 40, 48, 122, 192, 202–4, 206, 210, 214 migration, 127, 174, 217, 218 Mill, John Stuart, 27 mining, 59, 60, 61, 70, 71 Misérables, Les (Hugo), 59 mita system, 152–3 Mitochondrial Eve, 18 Modernisation Hypothesis, 152 Mokyr, Joel, 170 Mongol Empire (1206–1368), 34 Morse, Samuel, 60 mosquitoes, 180 moths, 51 Mount Carmel, Israel, 13, 18 multicultural societies, 218 Murasaki Shikibu, 59 music, 58, 215–16 N nanotechnology, 119 Naples, Italy, 40 Napoleon, Emperor of the French, 184 Napoleonic Wars (1803–15), 62, 146, 153 Native Americans, 33, 155 Natufian culture (13,000–9500 BCE), 20 Nea Nikomedeia, 40 Neanderthals, 13 Neolithic Revolution, 6, 9, 20–25, 29–41, 46, 48, 51, 120, 122, 199, 201–14, 210, 236–7 diseases and, 204–5 geography and, 199, 203–4 head start and, 29, 34, 48, 202, 204, 206, 210–12, 236–7 technology and, 29–30, 48, 120, 201–2, 204, 206, 207, 209–12 Netherlands, 37, 40, 64, 65, 75, 147, 148, 164, 213 New Guinea, 21, 207 New World crops, 35–9, 94–6, 195 New York City, 23, 60, 61, 217 New Zealand, 106, 153, 154, 157, 207 Newcomen, Thomas, 59 Nigeria, 207 Nile River, 18, 20, 23, 206, 207, 236 North America, 7, 41, 58, 62, 98 colonialism in, 37, 153, 154, 155, 157, 158 economic growth in, 115 fertility rates in, 85 industrialisation, 60, 72, 107, 241 institutions in, 153, 154, 155, 157, 158, 160, 175 land ownership in, 77, 155 Malthusian crises in, 33 Neolithic Revolution in, 202, 203, 204 technological development in, 58, 61–2 North Korea, 143, 144, 146, 151, 159, 171, 177, 212, 231 North, Douglass, 145 Norway, 104 nuclear energy, 44, 111 numeracy, 63, 67, 88 nurturing strategy, 53 O obesity, 171, 198 Oceania, 7, 32, 87, 105, 202, 203, 207 Ohalo II site, Israel, 201 oil crisis (1973), 115 Opium War, First (1839–42), 61 opportunity cost, 89, 93 Ottoman Empire (1299–1922), 1–2, 64, 173, 182, 183–4 Out of Africa hypothesis, 5, 18–20, 30, 119, 120, 124, 218–32, 221, 222, 237 outsourcing, 115 Owen, Robert, 75 P Pakistan, 111 Palmer, Robert, 215 paper, 61 Paraguay, 103 Paris, France, 34, 40, 150 Pasteur, Louis, 102 Paul the Apostle, 163 Pawtucket, Rhode Island, 72 pendulum clocks, 64 per capita income, see income per capita Perry, Matthew, 62 Persia, 48, 63, 121, 213 Peru, 152–3, 205 Pharisees, 166 phase transition, 43–6, 50, 83, 98, 99–100, 122, 151 Philippines, 207 phonographs, 104 Pickford, Mary, 105 Pitcairn Islands, 33 Pizarro, Francisco, 205 Plato, 9 Pleistocene period, 19 ploughing, 191–2 pneumonia, 205 politeness distinctions, 197 political extremism, 106 political fragmentation, 182–7, 207 pollution, 116–18 Polynesia, 32, 48 population, 46–55, 47 composition of, 50–55 demographic transition, 6, 85–100, 106, 112–18, 175 diseases and, 204–5 diversity of, 9, 142, 160, 177, 214, 215–32, 237 institutions and, 208 labour and, 34–5 Malthusian thesis, 3–5, 6, 28–41, 46, 50, 156 technology and, 5, 29–30, 31, 47–55, 89, 120–24, 156, 179, 181, 202, 211 unified growth theory, 46–55 Portugal, 38, 153, 154, 182–3 positive feedback loops, 17, 48 postal services, 104 potatoes, 36–7, 94–6 poverty, 113–14, 114 poverty trap, 5, 25, 45, 121, 235, 240 Presley, Elvis, 216 printing, 48–9, 64–5, 104, 183–4, 213 production lines, 61 property rights, 92, 144–6, 148, 154, 155, 167, 197, 198, 204, 234 Protestantism, 217 cultural traits, 164–5, 175, 184 Reformation (1517–1648), 63, 90, 163–4, 184 proximate vs ultimate factors, 9, 140–42, 198 Prussia (1525–1918), 68–9, 72, 90, 146, 153, 165 Puritans, 175 Putnam, Robert, 172 Pygmies, 207 Q Qing Empire (1636–1912), 61 Quakers, 175 quantity–quality trade-off, 52–5, 88–91 quantum mechanics, 44 quasi-natural historical experiments, 38–9, 70, 90 Quebec, 54 R racism, 106, 168, 198, 215, 216, 217 radio, 101, 104–5, 111 Rational Optimist, The (Ridley), 216 Red Sea, 19 Reformation (1517–1648), 63, 90, 163 refrigerators, 101 Renaissance (c. 1400–1600), 64, 170 resource curse, 181 Ricardo, David, 27, 144 rice, 190 Ridley, Matt, 216 Roberts, Richard, 80 rock ’n’ roll music, 215–16 Rockefeller Sanitary Commission, 90 Rome, ancient, 1–2, 40, 46, 63, 88, 121, 166, 170, 212 Rome, city of, 23 Roosevelt, Franklin, 217 Royal African Company, 148 rule of law, 144, 186, 204 running water, 101 Russian Empire (1721–1917), 73, 77 Russian Revolution (1917), 73 Rust Belt, 108, 110 S Sadducees, 166 Sahara Desert, 21, 179, 204, 214, 236 Sámi, 195–6 Scandinavia, 185, 211 science, 20, 22, 58, 69, 75, 120, 216 Scotland, 175 Scramble for Africa (1884–1914), 158 Sea of Galilee, 201 serial founder effect, 219–22 Seven Years War (1756–63), 154 sewerage, 101 Shakespeare, William, 59 Shimon ben Shetach, 166 Siberia, 236 silk, 81 Silk Road, 34 Sinai Peninsula, 18 Singapore, 146, 154 skin pigmentation, 51 skyscrapers, 60, 61 Slater, Samuel, 72 slavery, 8, 106, 136, 148–9, 154, 155, 168, 198, 236 sleeping sickness, 180 smallpox, 96, 102, 205 Smith, Adam, 144 smoking, 198 social capital, 172–3, 175 social cohesion, 9, 160, 167, 175, 186, 197, 218, 226, 229–31, 234, 237 social hierarchies, 98, 172, 197, 207, 208–10 soil, 8, 21, 30, 141, 155, 186, 187, 191, 198, 204, 209, 236 Solow, Robert, 132–3 Song Empire (960–1279), 176, 184 South America agricultural productivity in, 131 colonialism in, 154, 156, 157, 158, 186–7, 205 diversity in, 220–21 emigration from, 127 fertility rates in, 112 geography of, 186–7 income per capita in, 106 industrialisation in, 241 institutions in, 154, 156, 157, 158, 160, 186–7 land ownership in, 77, 155 living standards in, 7 Neolithic Revolution in, 202, 203, 204, 205–6 population density in, 154, 156 poverty in, 113 trade in, 136 South East Asia, 19, 20, 21, 131, 180, 184, 202 South Korea, 77, 91, 144, 146, 151, 159, 171, 177, 210, 212, 231 Soviet Union (1922–91), 59 Spaichi, Hans, 150 Spain, 40, 148–9, 152–3, 154, 183, 185, 205 Spanish flu pandemic (1918–20), 106, 240 Sputnik 1 launch (1957), 59 squirrels, 1, 239 Sri Lanka, 103 state formation, 208–10 steam engines, 59, 60, 70–71, 97 steam locomotives, 60, 97 steel, 60, 61 Stockholm, Sweden, 97–8 subsistence, 1, 4–5, 20, 32, 33, 36–7, 39, 94–6 substitution effect, 89, 93 Sumer (c. 4500–1900 BCE), 23, 24, 59 Sweden, 40, 93, 97–8, 104, 137, 138, 160 Swift, Jonathan, 169 Switzerland, 72, 104, 138, 160, 164, 185 T Taiwan, 77, 146, 206 Tale of Genji, The (Shikibu), 59 Tanna, Vanuatu, 233–4, 237–8 Tasmania, 49 taxation, 175, 208, 209, 211, 234 technology, 3, 20, 22, 24, 25, 111–12, 120–24, 147, 240 accelerations, 58–62 agricultural comparative advantage and, 181, 211–12, 237 competition and, 182–6 cultural traits and, 52–5, 121, 169–70, 176, 231 diversity and, 215–16, 226–30 education and, 62–83, 99, 109, 110, 111–12 hands, evolution of, 17 head starts, 29, 34, 48, 146, 181, 185, 201–2, 204, 206, 210–12, 236–7 institutions and, 147–51, 176, 231 living standards and, 104 Neolithic Revolution and, 29–30, 48, 120, 201–2, 204, 206, 207, 209–12 population and, 5, 29–30, 31, 47–55, 89, 120–24, 156, 179, 181, 202, 211 regressions in, 49 Tel Aswad, Syria, 201 Tel Jericho, West Bank, 201 telegraph, 60, 104 telephones, 104 telescopes, 64 television, 101, 111 textiles, 72, 79, 80, 93, 138, 147 Theory of Everything, 44 theory of general relativity, 44 thrifty gene hypothesis, 171 Tigris River, 20, 23, 206, 236 Titanic, 105 toilets, 101 Tonga, 48 trade, 135–40, 144, 185, 235 fertility rates and, 137–8 geography and, 181, 185 Transcaucasia, 21 Trump, Donald, 109–10 trust, 8, 165, 172–4, 175, 236 tsetse flies, 180 Turkey, 23, 40, 210 Tversky, Amos, 192 typhus, 37 U Uganda, 131 ultimate vs proximate factors, 9, 140–42, 198 unified growth theory, 44–55 United Kingdom Brexit (2016–20), 110 child labour in, 80–81 colonialism, 61, 138, 147, 153–5 education in, 67–8, 71–2, 75–6, 78, 91, 96–7 fertility rates in, 91, 83, 97 gender wage gap in, 93 geography of, 185 income per capita in, 210 industrial decline in, 108, 110 industrialisation in, 59, 67–8, 71–2, 75, 96–7, 138, 147, 148, 181 institutions in, 147–51, 154–5, 159 literacy in, 65 Neolithic Revolution in, 210 Opium War, First (1839–42), 61 postal service in, 104 Protestantism in, 164 trade in, 136–7 United Nations, 13 United States African Americans, 130–31, 155, 156, 215–17 agricultural productivity, 131 Apollo program (1961–72), 59 child labour in, 78, 81–3 Civil War (1861–5), 62 education in, 75, 77, 90 fertility rates in, 85, 92, 93 future orientation, 190 gender wage gap in, 93 Great Migration (1916–70), 215 hookworm in, 90 immigration to, 127, 192, 217 income per capita in, 106 industrial decline in, 107–8, 109–10 industrialisation in, 60–61, 67, 69, 71, 72, 138 infant mortality in, 130–31 institutions in, 155, 157, 175 land ownership in, 77 life expectancy in, 130 living standards in, 101, 103, 105, 106, 130 Pacific War (1941–5), 233 Ur, 23 urbanisation, 149, 153, 167, 211–12, 237 Uruguay, 77 Uruk, 23 V vaccinations, 102 Vanuatu, 48, 233–4, 237–8 Venice, Republic of (697–1797), 183 vertebrates, 14 Vietnam, 146 Vikings, 47 Virgil, 59 vitamin D, 51 Voltaire, 154 W wages, 39, 40 Black Death and, 34–5, 36, 149 fertility rates and, 89, 93 women, 91–4, 99, 122 Wallace, Alfred Russel, 27 War of the Worlds, The (Wells), 105 war, 39, 102, 123, 149, 154 washing machines, 101 Washington Consensus, 234 Watt, James, 59 Weber, Max, 164 welfare state, 74 Wells, Herbert George, 105 Wesley, John, 164 wheat, 21, 23, 28, 34, 36, 40, 94, 111, 133, 136, 190, 201, 202, 203 whooping cough, 102 Why Nations Fail (Acemoglu and Robinson), 145–6 William III and II, King of England and Scotland, 148, 159 Wittfogel, Karl, 184 Wizard of Oz, The (1939 film), 105 women childbirth, 2, 41, 83 education of, 91, 92, 112 gender wage gap, 91–4, 99, 122 woodwork, 61 World Bank, 112, 113, 234 World Values Survey, 189, 192, 194 World War I (1914–18), 105, 106, 136, 240 World War II (1939–45), 106, 115, 233, 240 writing, 24, 59 Y Yangtze River, 122, 185, 236 yellow fever, 156 Z Zealots, 166 A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z About the Author Oded Galor is Herbert H.

Nine Crises: Fifty Years of Covering the British Economy From Devaluation to Brexit
by William Keegan
Published 24 Jan 2019

That overconfidence led later that year to the Plaza Agreement, when the G7 leading finance ministers (not forgetting their central bankers) embarked on a collective policy to halt the rise in the dollar, and indeed to lower it to a level that was not threatening to cripple US exports and cause deindustrialisation. The dive in the pound led to an hilarious episode featuring Bernard Ingham, the hard-nosed and bluff Yorkshireman who was Mrs Thatcher’s chief press officer, and a Friday briefing of the weekend press. The Observer’s political editor was my friend and colleague Adam Raphael. He returned to our offices, then opposite Battersea Park, with the news that, as far as the loyal Ingham was concerned, his political mistress believed in market forces, and if the pound fell to $1 or below, so be it.

…

The next stage in his attempts to win over a reluctant Prime Minister came in February 1987. This was the month when the G7 decided that enough was enough in the exchange markets. The Plaza Agreement of September 1985 had achieved its purpose: the dollar had fallen to a more sensible level, and concerns that an overvalued US currency would cause massive deindustrialisation in the US economy had dissipated. There had been enough adjustment. What was now needed in the currency markets was a period of stability. The meeting at which G7 finance ministers and central bank governors agreed on a policy of concerted intervention to steady the markets took place at the Louvre in Paris, and the resulting agreement became known as the Louvre Accord.

The Refusal of Work: The Theory and Practice of Resistance to Work
by David Frayne
Published 15 Nov 2015

Given the fact that Marienthal’s local identity was so closely tied with industry, the closure of its factory meant nothing less than the destruction of a way of life, and there is certainly no reason to doubt the credibility of these findings. Indeed, the case of Marienthal invites comparison with my home region of South Wales, which continues to suffer the miserable effects of deindustrialisation following Thatcher’s closure of its coal mines in the 1980s. Such cases are proof of the power of unemployment to dismantle communities and destroy familiar ways of life. Translated into English in the 1970s, the Marienthal study was a commendable and empathic portrayal of an unemployed community.

…

Index * * * A achievement, social, measured through work, 15 Adam, a former computer programmer, 120, 127–8, 138–41, 170, 180 Adorno, Theodor, 69–72, 75, 76–7, 162; ‘Free Time’, 69 advertising, 85–8, 171; spending of industry, 88 affluence, ideals of, 181 agoraphobia, 152, 153 Alan, a former office administrator, 157–8 alienating tendencies, use of term, 62 alienation, 9, 48, 50, 61, 62, 63, 90, 93, 126, 146, 178, 200, 230; in Marx, 46, 47; normalisation of, 52; use of term, 51 alternatives: experimenting in, 223; utopian, 145 altruism, 113 Amazon, working conditions at, 51 anger management techniques, 53 Anne, a photographer, 127, 170; co-founder of Idlers’ Alliance, 207–8 anti-consumerist ethics, 163 anxiety, 13, 148, 151, 152, 164, 200; about education, 79; in face of consumer choices, 168 apricots, cultivation of, 79 Arendt, Hannah, 24, 39 Aristotle, concept of good life, 4 art of living, 4 Ashton, John, 229 ATOS company, 104; scandal regarding, 152 autonomous activities, 20 autonomous self-development, 36; right of, 35 autonomously organised production, 112 autonomy, 10, 29, 64, 91, 113, 141, 142, 150, 198, 205, 210–37; in work, limits to, 61–6; moral, 155; of workers, 69 B bakeries, production process in, 51–2 Basic Income, 225; as personal entitlement, 226; universal and unconditional, 225 Bauman, Zygmunt, 73, 159–60, 169–70 Beck, Ulrich, 73 being, mode of being, 79–80, 166 ‘being yourself’’ in work, 59–60 Bell, Daniel, 26 Ben, husband of Cheryl, 178, 179 benefit fraud, claimed costs of, 101 benefits, conditionalities of, 104 Berardi, Franco, 54–5, 81 Berger, Peter, 125, 128, 130, 144; with Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, 125 Beveridge, William, 28 Billig, Michael, 231 binary dichotomies in society, 99 biomedical labels: adoption of, 151–2; resistance to, 152, 153 black working class, rebellion of, 115 Black, Bob, The Abolition of Work, 206 Black, Carol, 108 Blauner, Robert, 48, 62 body, starts shouting, 149 see also broken body books: from libraries, 206; on subject of work, 206–7; reading of, 175, 195 boredom at work, 12, 140 Bowring, Finn, 116, 171 Braverman, Harry, 48 breakpoints, 125, 128, 129, 141, 142, 154, 216; causes of, 129; relating to personal health issues, 148 Brennan, Teresa, 148 Bridge, Angela, 189–90 broken body, 147–54 Brown, Philip, 42 Bruce, a former care home worker, 137, 146, 148–51, 200, 202, 203, 204 ‘bullshit jobs’, 40 bureaucracy at work, 132; intensification of, 133 Burroughs, William, 206 C ‘Californian ideology’, 59; boundaries of, 60 call centres, labour practices in, 50–1 calmer life, living of, 151 Calvin, John, 25 Cameron, David, 99 Cannon, David, 154–5, 233 capitalism, 24, 37, 44, 48, 64, 65–6, 147; as production of needs, 85; development of, 25–6, 29, 39–40; fixated on work and consumption, 3, 4; industrial, 30; insecurity in, 73; potential reduction of working time in, 32–3; resistance to, 188; spirit of, 25–6 career, concept of, 127 Casey, Catherine, 16–17, 56–7, 58, 212 casual labour, 28 Cederström, Carl, and Peter Fleming, Dead Man Working, 55 Chaplin, Charlie, in Modern Times, 49 character assessment of workers, 56 cheese, buying of, 169 Cheryl, an interviewee, 120, 165–7, 176–7, 178 child-friendly policies, 116 childcare, 155, 206, 211 children, a factor in decision-making, 161 chirpiness, required in job, 136 Christmas, celebration of, 145, 186 cinema attendance, moral panic regarding, 96 Citizens Advice Bureau, 153 city spaces, privatisation and commercialisation of, 222 claimants, viewed as wasters, 99 claiming benefits, viewed as game, 135 Clive, an interviewee 201 clubbing together to get something done, 22 cognitive labour, 54–5 Cohen, Stanley, 126, 127, 129, 210 Cole, Matthew, 106, 205 collaborative forms of work, 64 Collinson, David, 213 colonisation of life: by economic demands, 9, 93; by work-related demands, 67–94 commodification, 92 commodity-intensive lifestyle, questioning of, 164 commons, abolition of, 186 commuting, costs of, 178 company people, creation of, 56 computerisation, of bakery, 51–2 computers, 50, 61, 72, 139–40, 172, 175, 177; gaming, 177 conditions of work, 226, 233 ‘constantly on call’, 72 consumer motivation, theories of, 88–91 consumer satisfaction, 85 consumer society, 26–7 consumerism, 40, 83–4, 91, 162–3, 169, 214, 228, 231; costs of, 160; depends on exploitation, 167; ethically conscious, 87; motivation for, 85, 178 consumers: needs of, exaggerated, 92; persuasion of, 86 consuming less, 172, 187 consumption: de-spiritualisation of, 176; gospel of, 82–94; growth of, 94; ostentatious, 186; replaces self-production, 92; therapeutic, 180 convenience, need for, 178–9 convenience commodities, consumption of, 91 conversation, love of, 137–8, 141 conviviality, as valued good, 116 cooking of meals, 145; pleasures of, 176–7, 187 coping strategies at work, 11 Coupland, Douglas, Generation X, 114 Cremin, Colin, 58, 76 customer complaints procedures, 54 CVs, preparation of, 75 cynicism, 12, 212–13 D Dalla Costa, Mariarosa, 115 dead end, experience of, 141 death, witnessing of, 130 debt, of students, 81 decentralisation of work, 32 deindustrialisation, 107 ‘delusions’ of workers regarding work, 21, 22 democracy, 215; engagement in, 222; in the workplace, 13 denaturalisation of work, 17, 216 Department of Trade and Industry (UK), work–life balance study, 218 dependency, alleged culture of, 100 depression, 148, 152 de-reification, 128, 144 desires, consumerist, pursuit of, 170 deskilling of work, 42, 48 diet, simplicity of, 136 dignity, 137, 193 disabilities see people with disabilities disability allowances, 152, 153 discipline at work, 28 discreditable, 200–1 dis-ease, feeling of, 130 disengagement from work, 47–52 dis-identification, 213 dissatisfaction, organised creation of, 85 distribution of income, 14 Dittmar, Helga, 88 division of labour, 28, 29, 48, 133, 146; gendered, 229–30 ‘doing nothing of value’, 141, 190, 233 domestic work, 19 see also outsourcing of domestic work downshifter, use of term, 120 downshifter study in USA, 165 Dubi, Steve, 46 Duncan Smith, Ian, 102 E eating together: pleasure of, 143, 144, 147; whittled away, 176 economic growth, 34, 37 education, 78; aims of, 80; anxiety context of, 79; as certification for work, 69; as socialisation, 15; broad, value of, 79; investment in, 42 eight-hour day, 71 Eleanor, an interviewee, 120, 124, 129, 144, 161–2, 167–8, 182, 183, 207 Emma, an interviewee, 196–7, 198–9, 202–3 emotional conduct, management of, 62 emotional investment, in office work, 136 emotional labour, 52–3, 57, 137 emotions, management of, 53–4 employability, 6, 9, 15, 16, 81, 82; discipline demanded by, 77–8; pressure of, 73–82 employee appraisals, 54 employers, 76–7 Employment Support Allowance (ESA), 148, 153 employment, paid see paid employment encirclement by the market, 92 ‘end of work’, argument, 33, 35, 36, 82 Engels, Friedrich, 74 entitlement, alleged culture of, 100, 103, 232 environmental awareness, 168 escapes, 129; construction of, 12 escapism, 10, 27, 210–37 ethical reflection, need for, 217 ethically dubious work, 135 see also worthwhile ethic eudaemonia, 4 Euro May Day movement, 115 exclusion, social, 161 extra hours, working of, 57 F Facebook, 88 factories, closure of, 106–8 family, work as, 56–7 family life: importance of, 230; prioritising of, 218 feminism, 22; interest in shorter working hours, 229; second-wave, 114–15 Fevre, Ralph, 106 Ffion, an interviewee, 145, 167, 170, 177, 181 Fisher, Mark, 214, 229 five-day week, 97 Fleming, Peter, 59–61, 64, 212–13 Fletcher, Harrell, 189 flight attendants, working conditions of, 53 ‘flow state’ condition, 12 Ford, Henry, 95 Ford assembly line, 48 foreign encounters, power of, 144 four-day week, recommended for public health reasons, 229 Fourier, Charles, 30–1 France, 35-hour week legislation in, 223–4 Frankfurt School, 2, 35 Franklin, Benjamin, 28 free choice of work, 31 free-time, 29, 33, 39, 40, 69–72, 123, 155, 157, 221, 228; as continuation of work, 72; as valued good, 116; authentic, 82; ‘excessive’, 83; experience of, 162; fragmentation of, 71, 73; increase of, 38; preservation of, 24; reabsorption of, 84; scarcity of, 41, 173, 175 freedom from work, 38 freelance work, 155 friendliness, simulation of, 54 Fromm, Erich, 79, 80, 166 Fryer, D., 109 full-time working, 90, 110–11, 141; resistance to, 28, 29 fun, culture of, in work, 59–60, 62, 213, 232 G Galbraith, J.

Uncomfortably Off: Why the Top 10% of Earners Should Care About Inequality
by Marcos González Hernando and Gerry Mitchell
Published 23 May 2023

The only exception was blue-collar, low-skilled jobs in private-sector services (for example, retail and catering).17 Meanwhile, growth in full-time, permanent employment was almost completely concentrated in the first income quintile (top 20%), while the proportion of part-time, temporary jobs is increasing across the economies of Europe. Conceivably, the only way for this process of deindustrialisation not to generate insurmountable societal pressures is if the numbers of professional, well-paid service jobs continue to increase and are captured by the children of blue-collar workers. But how likely is that, considering what we know about social mobility trends? And if the children of blue-collar workers do seek to become professionals and managers, won’t that generate further incentives to police access to elite occupations for those already ‘in’ them?

…

A abortion, top 10% attitudes towards 6, 16 academics/academia 5, 9–10, 54 knowledge production and enabling of the wealthy 132–3 acceleration, of the pace of life 128–9 accountancy firms 67, 68, 108, 109, 126 accumulation 135–6 Advani, A. 179, 180 affluence 22, 144, 162, 180 see also top 1%; top 10%; wealth age profile of the top 10% 8 agency 49 Alamillo-Martinez, Laura 73 Amazon 180 Ambler, L. 132–3 anti-elitism 12, 46, 96 anxiety 72, 130, 150 and status 135, 165 see also mental health ‘anywheres’ 96 ascriptive identities 153 attitudes to cultural issues 42, 84 to economic issues 6, 8, 11, 16, 18–19, 42, 42, 77, 92–3, 161–4 to political issues 8, 16–17, 42, 76–99 to social issues 6, 8, 16, 18–19, 42, 65–71, 77, 92, 92–3, 161–3, 164–6 austerity policies 10, 11, 13, 16, 76, 78–9, 105, 115–16, 169–70 automation 79, 158, 160 B Bangladeshi ethnicity, in the top 10% 30 Bank of England 78, 105, 164, 175 ‘bank of mum and dad’ 29, 111 Barber, Rob 1, 2, 4, 181 Barclay family 121 BBC 11 Beck, U. 64 Bell, Torsten 2, 6 Berman, Y. 34 Berry, C. 82 Bezos, Jeff 144 Biden, Joe 142 Big Four accountancy firms 67, 68 see also accountancy firms Bill of Rights 121 Bitcoin 143 Black African/British/Caribbean ethnicity, in the top 10% 30 Black Lives Matter 113 Black Report 1977 115 Blair, Tony 9, 84, 185 Blakeley, Grace 139, 176 Bolsonaro, Jair 96, 98 ‘boundary work’ of elites 45 Bourdieu, Pierre 40 Brahmins 38, 41–2, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 50, 51, 59, 61, 68, 73, 74–5, 84, 96, 167, 185 ‘brain drain’ 124 see also mobility Brexit 11, 16, 76, 80, 86–7, 97, 101–2, 125 Brown, Gordon 175 Bullough, Oliver 113–14 bunkers 130, 131, 144, 187 Burgon, Richard 1, 3, 6 business support schemes, COVID-19 pandemic 15, 104, 126–7, 140, 151 C Cambridge University 28–9, 119 Cameron, David 84 capital, income from 33–4 capital flight 124 capital tax, global 180 car ownership 153 carbon emissions 54, 114–15, 135, 143, 145, 171, 172, 178 see also climate change 236 Index care see social care Centre for Economic Performance 163 Chancel, L. 176–7 charitable donations 70–1 charitable sector 132 child poverty 170 see also poverty children of the top 10% 27, 35–6, 100–1, 109, 111–12, 183–4, 186 ‘bank of mum and dad’ 29, 111 childcare costs 135–6 downward social mobility 31–2, 162 social reproduction 135–7 US 57 Chinese ethnicity, in the top 10% 30 class 39–40 cultural signifiers of 39, 40–1 ‘death of ’ 39 and education 40–1, 46, 51, 58–9 inherited nature of 148 middle class 33, 39, 40, 133, 136, 148 and social mobility 57–8 terminology of 38–9 upper class 38–9, 133 upper-middle class 4, 16, 27, 31–2, 38–54, 39 (see also top 10%) working class 24, 39, 57, 101–2, 148 climate change 54, 100, 101, 114–15, 125, 135, 141, 171–2 carbon emissions 54, 114–15, 135, 143, 145, 171, 172, 178 need for collective action on 122–3 net zero 174, 176–7 coalition government (Conservative/ Liberal Democrat) 78 collective denial 139–42 common sense 11, 19, 74, 89, 90, 108, 126, 130, 147 community gender and community involvement 70 top 10%’s lack of awareness of/ involvement in 45–6, 49–50, 127–31, 131, 150–1, 154–7, 164–6 ‘compensatory consumption’ 129, 134 Conservative Party/Conservatives 3, 16, 53, 76–7, 84, 85, 88, 97, 99, 120, 179 leadership election, 2022 39 taxation policy 3, 53 traditional supporters 44 consumption 152–4, 169, 171, 178 ‘compensatory consumption’ 129, 134 environmental impact of 135 luxury consumption, and climate change 114–15 Corbyn, Jeremy 11, 16, 80, 84, 85, 87, 96, 97 corporate governance 174 corporate responsibility 70–1 corporate sector 46, 51, 59, 64, 65–6, 67–8, 71, 88–9, 108, 128, 153 corporation tax 105–6, 113, 180 cost of living crisis 14, 52, 76, 101, 104, 106, 127, 177–8 council tax 110, 180 COVID-19 pandemic 13, 15, 72–3, 103–4, 116, 126, 134, 142, 144, 151 furlough and business support schemes 15, 104, 126–7, 128, 140, 151 political impact of 87–8 Coyle, Diane 145 crises cost of living crisis 14, 52, 76, 101, 104, 106, 127, 177–8 of democracy 119–21 global financial crisis, 2008 31, 77–9, 126, 140 cryptocurrencies 143–4 cultural attitudes of the top 10% 42, 84 cultural capital 40, 41, 46, 51 cuts, in public services 78–9, 105, 117, 170 D deindustrialisation 28 democracy crisis of 119–21 erosion of 76, 81–2 demographic profile of the top 10% 8 depression 130, 150 see also mental health ‘deserving’, the 23, 57, 74 see also ‘undeserving’, the disability and social mobility 58 welfare benefits 78, 79, 175 Disability Rights UK 175 diversity and inclusion targets 57 domestic work see unpaid work Dorling, Danny 35, 146–7, 156, 183 downward orientation 35, 46, 47 downward social mobility 14, 36, 73, 136, 152, 162, 182 237 Uncomfortably Off children of the top 10% 31–2, 162 income and status insecurity 51–2 Dubai 133 Durose, Oly 39–40 E Earth4All 177 economy economic attitudes of the top 10% 6, 8, 11, 16, 18–19, 42, 42, 77, 92–3, 161–4 economic common sense 89, 90 GDP, as indicator of success 176 Economy 2030 Enquiry 109 EDF 106 Edmiston, Daniel 49 education and class 40–1, 46, 51, 58–9 inequalities 17, 100–1, 117–19, 136 Ofsted ratings and league tables 137 and political attitudes 41, 42 and social capital 60 and social mobility 58–60, 147–8 state education 36, 60, 119, 136, 137, 148, 170 see also higher education; private education Ehrenreich, Barbara 152 Elections Bill 2021 120 Electoral Calculus 173 Electoral Commission 120 electoral system reform 172–3 Eliasoph, Nina 81 elites 39, 44–5, 77 anti-elitism 12, 96 employment 151 blue-collar 28 good jobs 55–61 hard work 48, 50, 61–73, 162 impact on society of 65–71 inequalities 17, 100, 107–9 low-wage work 62, 127 precarity 61, 107–9 presenteeism 64 public sector 109 and purpose 66–7, 71, 75, 162 and self-respect 55–6 and status 55–7, 68, 74 structural labour market change 27–8, 158 top 10% 6, 16, 24, 25, 26–8, 55–75 total British employed 2 white-collar 28 work-life balance 18, 171 workplace reform 71–2 see also unpaid work energy costs 101, 104, 105–7, 175 energy industry privatisation of 177–8 windfall taxes 177 environmental issues 54, 161 carbon emissions 54, 114–15, 135, 143, 145, 171, 172, 178 net zero 174, 176–7 equality of opportunity 57, 153 equality of outcome 57 ESS (European Social Survey) 89, 92 ethnicity see race and ethnic origin Eton College 26, 119 EU-SILC (European Union Statistics on Living Conditions) 24, 28, 29–30, 32, 33 Eurofound 27–8, 36–7 European Convention on Human Rights 121 European Social Survey (ESS) 89, 92 European Union Statistics on Living Conditions (EU-SILC) 24, 28, 29–30, 32, 33 experts, anti-elitist attitudes towards 12 Extinction Rebellion 84 ‘extraction capitalism’ 112 F Farage, Nigel 96 ‘fear of falling’ 152, 182 see also downward social mobility feminism 56 financial sector 51–2, 88–9 food food banks 93, 175 ‘right to’ 178 foreign policy, top 10% attitudes towards 6, 42 formal work see employment ‘fortification mentality’ 134–5 Frank, Robert H. 48 Friedman, Sam 27, 29, 31, 40, 57 furlough scheme, COVID-19 pandemic 15, 104, 128, 140, 151 G Gallup Poll, US 22, 26 Gates, Bill 144 GDP, as indicator of success 176 gender gender profile of the top 10% 8, 29–30 inclusivity 152–3 social mobility 57–8 general election, 2019 1, 76, 97, 120, 173 Generation Z 17, 100, 118 gentrification 133–4 238 Index Germany 159, 169 Gethin, Stephen 121 Ghosh, J. 132–3 Giddens, A. 64 Gilens, Martin 42–3 gilets jaunes (yellow vest) movement, France 115 global financial crisis, 2008 31, 77–9, 126, 140 global warming see climate change globalisation 39 offshoring 79, 109, 158 Good Friday Agreement 121 good jobs 55–61 see also employment Goodhart, David 96–7 Gove, Michael 84 government debt 140 government employees, as members of the top 10% 5 government spending 169–70 see also public services; welfare state Graeber, David 46, 66, 75, 129, 157 Great British Class Survey 2013 39 Green, Duncan 184 Green New Deal 176 Green Party 87, 120, 178 Guinan, J. 82 H House of Commons Committee for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 107 household debt 152 housing 52 and climate change 114 house prices 33 housing costs 110, 111 inequalities 17, 100, 107–9, 133–4 insulation grants 176 mortgages 33, 52, 106, 110 and state education 137 see also home ownership; homelessness human rights 121 Human Rights Act 1998 121 I Haldane, Andy 164 hard work 48, 50, 61–73, 162 HC-One 107 healthcare 144, 168 inequalities 112–14, 138, 139 NHS 91, 94, 116, 137, 138, 170 private healthcare 116, 137, 140, 159, 167–8, 182 Hecht, Katharina 62 higher education 30–1, 58, 136, 147–8, 183 elite 17, 26, 28–9, 73, 74, 100 and employment 57, 61 inequalities 17, 100, 117–19 mental health issues 73 post-1992 28 and social capital 118 student debt 37 US 57, 74 Hills, John 168 HMRC, income survey 5–6 hoarding 135–6, 144 home ownership 33, 52, 110, 111 see also housing homelessness 93 see also housing immigration, top 10% attitudes towards 6, 16, 42, 43 income distribution 133, 168 misconceptions around 1–4 Palma ratio 22–3 UK breakdown, 2019/20 7 income from capital 33–4 income tax 178–9, 181 Indian ethnicity, in the top 10% 30 inequalities 53, 77–8, 92–3, 100–23, 129–30, 153–4, 165–6, 183 and the COVID-19 pandemic 127 and education 17, 100–1, 117–19, 136 and employment 17, 100, 107–9 global 177 growth of 14, 32–3 healthcare 112–14, 138, 139 higher education 17, 100, 117–19 housing 17, 100, 107–9, 133–4 intergenerational 14, 17, 100, 109, 111–12, 117–18 labour market 60–1 and politics 87 private sector responsibility 69–71 and the top 10% 8, 17, 101–23 and the ‘undeserving’ 148–50 inflation 101, 105 Inflation Reduction Act 2022, US 169 informal work 56–7 inheritance, and housing inequality 111 Institute for Fiscal Studies 26, 105 Institute for Government 104 insulation 125–7, 130, 144 interdependence 175–6 Intergenerational Commission 118 intergenerational inequalities 14, 17, 100, 109, 111–12, 117–18 International Labour Organization 56 interview panels 40 239 Uncomfortably Off IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) 114 Ireland 5, 13, 33, 155 isolation 127–31, 131, 144, 150–1 Ivy League universities, US 57 J jobs see employment Johnson, Boris 11, 26, 76, 84, 87, 97, 119, 121 Johnson, Paul 105 Jones, Owen 133, 148 K Kawachi, I. 116–17 key workers 127, 144, 150, 165 Khan, Shamus 152–3 King’s Fund 138 Kwarteng, Kwasi 3, 105 L labour market 60–1, 79–80 Labour Party/ Labour 1, 2, 44, 76, 80, 82–3, 84, 85, 89, 120, 122, 180, 194 New Labour 9, 78, 85 Lamont, Michèle 44–5 land values 110 Lansley, Stewart 112, 114, 151 Laurison, Daniel 27, 29, 31, 40, 57 Lawson, Neal 154 Le Pen, Marine 96, 98 left, the and Brahmins 41 social attitudes of the top 10% 16, 4 2 LGBTQ+ people, top 10% attitudes towards 43 Liberal Democrat Party 76, 84, 85, 86, 102, 120 liberalism small-l liberalism 96, 98, 182 life expectancy 79, 115, 138 Lindner, Christian 169 living standards 23–4 see also cost of living crisis local government 81–3, 117 local politics 81, 82–3 low-wage work 62, 127 luck 48, 59, 61 luxury consumption, and climate change 114–15 Lynch, Mick 178 M Major, John 60 Make Votes Matter 84 management consultants 47, 59, 70, 86, 90, 108, 126, 130, 147 Mandler, Peter 148 manners elite 45 market failures 105–7, 141 marketisation 137–9 Markovits, D. 20 Marmot reports, 2010 and 2020 115–16, 117 Mason, Paul 142 May, Theresa 84, 87 Mazzucato, Mariana 173–4 mean-tested benefits 77, 93–4, 159 media control of 120 as members of the top 10% 5, 26 Members of Parliament (MPs) 5, 76 men community involvement 70 see also gender mental health anxiety 72, 130, 135, 150, 165 depression 130, 150 higher education 73 unequal societies 130 working hours reduction 171 Merchants 38, 41–2, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 53, 61, 65, 68, 69, 72, 73, 88–9, 96, 98, 160, 162, 174 meritocracy 6, 11, 18, 19, 20, 39, 47, 58, 65, 68, 74, 100, 109, 111, 118, 146–9, 165, 170, 181, 184–5, 186 middle class 33, 39, 40, 133, 136, 148 Mijs, Jonathan 118, 155–6, 156–7 Milanovic, Branco 14, 34 Millennials 17, 100, 117, 118 minority rights, top 10% attitudes towards 6, 43 mobility 17–18, 124–5, 144, 148, 167 money, cultural taboos around 3 money elite 45 monopolies 140 and energy market failure 106–7 morals elite 45 mortgages 33, 52, 106, 110 MPs (Members of Parliament) 5, 76 multinational companies, taxation of 180 Murdoch, Rupert 120 N NatCen Social Research 24, 39 National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers 178 240 Index Nationality and Borders Bill 2021 120 neoliberalism 142 net zero 174, 176–7 networking 63 see also social capital New Labour see Labour Party/Labour NFTs (non-fungible tokens) 143–4 NHS 91, 94, 116, 137, 138, 170 Nietzsche, F. 46 Nixon, B. 82 Northern Ireland 121 O Obama, Barack 96 occupation see employment Occupy movement 181 OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) data 23, 31 Office for National Statistics (ONS) 24, 29 offshoring 79, 109, 158 Olson, Dan 144 online shopping, and the COVID-19 pandemic 134 online working see working from home ONS (Office for National Statistics) 24, 29 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) data 23, 31 overwork 69, 75 see also working hours Oxford Brookes University 29 Oxford University 28–9, 119 P Pakistani ethnicity, in the top 10% 30 Palma ratio 22–3 Parra, Nicanor 32 Parsons, Tony 3 participation, political 80–5, 172–3 ‘partygate’ scandal 76 Paugam, Serge 49–50 pensions, state 138 performance management 72 Personal Independence Payment 79 PFIs (private finance initiatives) 139 Piketty, Thomas 5, 14, 31, 38, 41, 42, 113, 180 Polanski, Jack 178 polarisation, political 14, 85–6, 98, 102, 172 Policing Bill 2021 120 politicians, as members of the top 10% 5, 26 politics 76–99, 181 centre ground 85–8 contemporary context 77–80 party membership 82–3, 84 political change 184–5 political participation 80–5, 172–3 political polarisation 14, 85–6, 98, 102, 172 political reform 172–3 and trust 76, 82 populism 11, 14, 16, 76, 77, 98, 102 positionality of authors 8–11 poverty 59, 78, 93, 151, 174, 175 child poverty 170 and education 118 and the ‘undeserving’ 148–50 precarity, of employment 61, 107–9 presenteeism 64 private education 54, 118–19, 136, 137, 147–8, 159, 162, 167, 170, 182 school fees 26, 33, 35, 36, 37 and social capital 60, 118 see also education private finance initiatives (PFIs) 139 private healthcare 116, 137, 140, 159, 167–8, 182 see also healthcare private sector 19–20 corporate sector 46, 51, 59, 64, 65–6, 67–8, 71, 88–9, 108, 128, 153 financial sector 51–2, 88–9 insecurity in 109 involvement in public services 139, 170 raising expectations of 171 privatisation excess profits of privatised companies 101 of utility companies 177–8 professionals anti-elitist attitudes towards 12, 46, 96 professionals and managers 24, 25, 26–8, 39, 55 see also top 10% property tax 180–1 protest, right of 120 Protestant work ethic 50 public sector employment 109 public services 159, 173 cuts in 78–9, 105, 117, 170 destigmatisation of 170 and marketisation 137–8 private sector involvement in 139, 170 and the top 10% 8, 19, 56, 77, 91–2, 138–9, 140, 144, 159, 163, 166–8, 183 universal 56, 77, 93–5, 144, 159 241 Uncomfortably Off Putnam, Robert 81, 129, 157, 158 Q Question Time, BBC 1, 2, 181 R race and ethnic origin and inclusivity 152–3 and social mobility 58 of the top 10% 8, 30 Raworth, Kate 135 redistribution 139, 161, 163, 182 top 10% attitudes towards 6, 42, 42, 43, 77 Reed, Howard 151 Reich, Robert 141 relocation see mobility renewable energy 141 see also climate change; energy costs Resolution Foundation 2, 34, 112, 163 rich, the see top 1%; top 10% richness 47 right, the 16 and Brexit 102 centre right 89, 97 and control of the media 121 far right 15, 97–8 and Merchants 41 political attitudes of the top 10% 16, 42 rights and responsibilities 158–60 Rivera, Lauren 57, 119 Rosa, Hartmut 129 Rothermere, Lord 120 Russell Group universities 57 Russia-Ukraine war 76, 104, 105–6 S Saez, E. 31 Salvini, Matteo 98 same-sex marriage, top 10% attitudes towards 6, 16, 42 Sandbu, Martin 179 Sandel, Michael 142, 150–1 Sanders, Bernie 96 Savage, Mike 183 savings levels of the top 10% 36 school fees, private education 26, 33, 35, 36, 37 Schor, Juliet 171 Scotland, devolved government 121 Scottish Greens 121 Scottish National Party 121 self-respect, and employment 55–6 Sherman, Rachel 35, 45–6 Shrubsole, Guy 110 ‘sink’ schools 137 Sinn Féin 121 small-l liberalism 96, 98, 182 ‘smart’ working 64 social capital decline in 157–8 and private education 60, 118 social care 117 low pay of care workers 103 market failure in 107 Social Democratic Party of Germany, Programme for the Future 159 social media ‘echo chambers’ 128 social mobility 19, 28, 36, 57–9 downward 14, 36, 73, 136, 152, 162, 182 children of the top 10% 31–2, 162 income and status insecurity 51–2 and education 58–60 meritocracy 6 and networking 63 structural barriers to 62 upward 18, 36, 50, 64, 136 Social Mobility Commission 60 social reproduction 135–7 social security top 10% attitudes towards 77 see also welfare benefits; welfare state society, attitudes to impact of work on 65–71, 74–5 sociological imagination 13, 49, 128, 160 solidarity 94, 127, 142, 157, 158, 159, 170 ‘somewheres’ 96 Soper, Kate 74 Spain 5, 73, 149, 155, 169 stamp duty 110–11 Starmer, Keir 87 state, the 161 raising expectations of 173–6 top 10% attitudes towards 91–5, 92 state education 36, 60, 119, 136, 137, 148, 170 status and employment 55–7, 68, 74 status anxiety and insecurity 14, 51–2, 135, 165 Stevenson, Gary 15 stigma, and unemployment 56 Streib, Jessi 31–2 structure 49 student debt 37 suburbia 40 Summers, A. 179, 180 Sutton Trust 29 Sweden 5, 23, 155 242 Index T tactical voting 172–3 taxation 97, 161, 163, 164, 178–81, 182 corporation tax 105–6, 113, 180 council tax 110, 180 income tax 2, 105–6, 178–9, 181, 185 property tax 180–1 stamp duty 110–11 tax avoidance/evasion 178, 181 tax cuts 169 tax fraud 181 top 10% attitudes towards 8, 42, 43, 77, 88–91, 92 Truss government tax cuts 105–6 wealth tax 179 windfall taxes, energy industry 177 technology and acceleration of the pace of life 129 automation 79, 158, 160 Thatcher, Margaret 105, 180 third sector, as members of the top 10% 5 Thomas, Mark 120 top 1% 2, 4, 13, 14, 15, 32, 41, 52, 64, 65, 93, 126, 128, 162 and employment 58–9 enabling of 131–4 inequality in 155 top 10% 4–7, 8, 11–13, 18, 33 accumulation and hoarding 135–6, 144 and austerity policies 1, 11, 13, 16 barriers to sense of belonging 18, 146–60 collective denial 139–42 contradictory isolation of 53–4 cost of living pressures 14, 15 and the COVID-19 pandemic 13, 15, 18, 127 furlough and business support schemes 15, 104, 126–7, 128, 151 cultural attitudes 42, 84 demographic profile 8 economic attitudes 6, 8, 11, 16, 18–19, 42, 42, 77, 92–3, 161–4 education 28–9, 30–1 employment 6, 16, 24, 25, 26–8, 55–75 enabling the wealthy 131–4 future prospects for 34–7, 95–9, 98, 182-7 gender profile 8, 29–30 HMRC income data 5–6 income and status insecurity 14, 51–2 inequalities 8, 17, 101–23 insulation 125–7, 130, 144 internal diversity of 32 isolation/lack of awareness of others’ lives 45–6, 49–50, 127–31, 131, 150–1, 154–7, 164–6 location 8, 29 and marketisation 137–9 and meritocracy 6, 11, 18, 19, 20, 39, 47, 58, 65, 68, 74, 100, 109, 111, 118, 146–9, 165, 170, 181, 184–5, 186 mobility 17–18, 124–5, 144, 148 overview and profile of 13–15, 21–37, 154–5 perceptions of income distribution 38, 47–51 political attitudes 8, 16–17, 42, 76–99 political participation 80–5 political influence of 5, 11, 76 and public services 8, 19, 56, 77, 91–2, 138–9, 140, 144, 159, 163, 166–8, 183 qualitative analysis of 15–16, 38–54 race and ethnic origin 8, 30 response to social and economic pressures 17–18, 124–45 rights and responsibilities 158–60 and the role of the state 91–5, 92 savings levels 36 social attitudes 6, 8, 16, 18–19, 42, 65–71, 77, 92, 92–3, 161–3, 164–6 social reproduction 135–7 uncertainty and insecurity of 68–9 Törmälehto, Veli-Matti 36–7 Toynbee, P. 89 trade unions 165, 172 membership 72, 157, 158, 163 Trump, Donald 11, 47, 96, 97, 98 Truss, Liz 105, 141, 186 Trussell Trust 175 trust 130–1 and politics 76, 82 Trust for London 23–4 U UBI (Universal Basic Income) 160 UK devolved government 121 Palma ratio 23 UKIP 87 Ukraine-Russia war 76, 104, 105–6 ‘undeserving,’ the 23, 148–50, 163 see also ‘deserving’, the 243 Uncomfortably Off unemployment 56 welfare benefits 138 Universal Basic Income (UBI) 160 universal welfare benefits 93, 168 see also welfare benefits universal public services 56, 77, 93–5, 144, 159 see also public services universities/university education 30–1, 58, 136, 147–8, 183 elite 17, 26, 28–9, 73, 74, 100 and employment 57, 61 inequalities 17, 100, 117–19 mental health issues 73 post-1992 28 and social capital 118 student debt 37 US 57, 74 Unlock Democracy 83 unpaid work 56, 150, 175–6 upper class 38–9, 133 upper-middle class 4, 16, 27, 31–2, 38–54, 39 see also top 10% upward orientation 35, 45–6, 47, 50, 51 upward social mobility 18, 36, 50, 64, 136 US and the COVID-19 pandemic 141 downward social mobility 31–2 elitism in higher education 150–1 employment and social class 57 inequalities and social segregation 156–7 Inflation Reduction Act 2022 169 middle class 33 universities/university education 57, 74 utility companies, privatisation of 177–8 V volunteering 69, 70–1 W Walker, D. 89 water industry, privatisation of 178 wealth distribution of 142 enabling of the wealthy 131–4 historical accumulation of 113 inequalities 112–14 unequal distribution of 14 wealth tax 179 Weber, Max 50 welfare benefits 138, 159–60, 167–8 cuts in 78, 79, 169 increasing of in line with inflation, 2022 175 mean-tested 77, 93–4, 159 universal 93, 168 welfare state 167, 174 anti-welfare attitudes 42, 42–3 top 10% attitudes towards 42, 93–4 and the ‘undeserving’ 149–50 see also public services well-off, the social attitudes and perceptions of 21–2 see also top 1%; top 10% White ethnicity, in the top 10% 30 Whitmarsh, Lorraine 114 Whyte, William 55–6 Williams, Zoe 134, 178 women anti-exclusion policies 43 community involvement 70 gender pay gap 30 life expectancy, decrease in 115 and online working 64 top 10% 8, 29–30 trade union membership 72 unpaid work 56, 150, 175–6 working class, and employment 57 see also gender Woodward, A. 116–17 work hard work 55, 61–73 see also employment work-life balance 18, 171 working class 24, 39, 148 and Brexit 101–2 and employment 57 working from home 27, 64, 104, 126, 128, 165 working hours 64 reduction in 171 World Bank 47 World Inequality Database 13, 32, 54 Wren-Lewis, Simon 78–9, 90 Y yellow vest (gilets jaunes) movement, France 115 Young, Michael 184–5 Younge, Gary 181 Z Zahawi, Nadim 107 244 

The Corona Crash: How the Pandemic Will Change Capitalism
by Grace Blakeley
Published 14 Oct 2020

Thatcher portrayed her fight against the unions as part of a strategy to ‘modernise’ the UK economy by weaning it off dirty, unsafe industries like coal and steel and refocusing economic activity on finance and professional services. Ultimately, the expansion of the finance sector created a self-reinforcing cycle that led to a long-term trend of deindustrialisation in the UK’s regions. Capital flows into UK finance and North Sea oil drove up the value of sterling, making it even harder for the UK’s manufacturers to compete internationally.26 In 1970, financial and insurance activities made up 5 per cent of total gross value added, compared with 27 per cent for the manufacturing sector; by 2007, manufacturing and finance both made up about 10 per cent of the UK economy.27 Most of these manufacturing jobs did not disappear – they were exported to the rest of the world.

Why We Can't Afford the Rich
by Andrew Sayer
Published 6 Nov 2014

Is it right that some get so much/little, and pay so much/little tax? Should students pay for their university courses? Should you get interest on your savings? Should there be more/less/no child benefit? More money for carers, or none? Who should pick up the bill when a company goes bankrupt, and who should pay for clearing up a derelict site left by deindustrialisation? Who should pay for pollution? These and other such questions are about moral economy. I believe we need to think much more about them – about whether our familiar economic arrangements are fair and justifiable, instead of taking them simply as immutable facts of life – or equally bad, as matters of mere subjective ‘preferences’, or ‘values’, beyond the scope of reason.30 Individuals may sometimes give more than they get, or get more than they give, for justifiable reasons, as in the case of parent–child relations, but sometimes they do so for no good reason other than power.

…

Surveys of public opinion show that the majority judge those below them much more harshly than those above them,23 and although in recent years rich bankers in particular have come in for more criticism, hostility towards them is still less than towards those at the bottom. Neoliberal governments and media work hard to keep it that way, so resentment is directed downwards. Here the problem is not merely individual but structural – a consequence of job shortages. These are normal in capitalism – more in recessions than in booms, and more in areas of deindustrialisation, like Liverpool or Detroit. To the extent that such areas have any jobs at all, they tend to be low paid and unskilled. Right-wing politicians love to point to individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds who, through heroic struggle, find a job and then get ahead, and they castigate others for not doing the same.

…

Inflation reduced the real rate of interest, favouring debtors; debt payments become less onerous if the currency you have to pay them in is losing value fast. For a while, with a still-strong labour movement, many workers could continue to win wage rises to keep up with inflation but, as unemployment rose in the old industrialised countries, the post-war balance of power between capital and organised labour crumbled as deindustrialisation hit union membership. At the end of the decade, leaders like Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan seized the moment to attack the unions and weaken employment legislation. In effect they declared class war on organised labour, which was blamed for the high inflation. In both the US and the UK, the governments raised interest rates, making their currencies strong and hence making business difficult for export industry, as it drove up the prices of exports relative to those of goods from other countries.

The Ecotechnic Future: Envisioning a Post-Peak World
by John Michael Greer
Published 30 Sep 2009

Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A Hundred Energy Slaves The Deindustrial Want Ads The Twilight of Automation Trailing-Edge Technologies 141 Contents 9. Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 The Innovation Fallacy The Paradox of Production Jevons’ Alternative Master Conservers 10. Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 Lifeboat Ecovillages Cities in the Deindustrial Future The Ecology of Social Change 11. Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 A Failure of Mimesis The Twilight of Culture Cultural Conservers Religion and the Survival of Culture 12.

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What counts as a criminal enterprise today will likely become a growth industry in the deindustrial future. Nor are raw materials the only legacies of the industrial age the salvage societies of the future will use. A good deal depends on how much technical knowledge survives the cycles of crisis before the age of salvage begins. Communities that keep electrical generators in working order, for example, can use salvaged equipment that runs on electricity. Internal combustion engines may still be viable on a small scale if they can be fueled with ethanol or biodiesel. In a deindustrializing world, access to such technologies will be a potent source of economic, political and military power, and this guarantees that they will be used.

…

All these factors need to be kept in mind by families and communities as they face up to the challenge of getting ready for the transition into the deindustrial age. On a family level, retrofitting or new construction can respond to the need to reinvent the Home household economy, and those who take the time to learn the skills of a household economy will likely find that the investment pays rich dividends in the years to come. On a community level, modest changes in zoning regulations and city ordinances — ​for example, rules encouraging home businesses, farmer’s and craft markets and the like — ​could contribute mightily to the birth of a domestic economy better suited to the approaching deindustrial age. One way or another, the household economy will be needed, because the changes the future will impose on the economy of paid employment and market exchanges may well leave few of today’s economic patterns intact. 139 Work M 8 uch of the work that goes into keeping individuals, families, and communities alive will thus have to be done in the household economy.

The Next Shift: The Fall of Industry and the Rise of Health Care in Rust Belt America
by Gabriel Winant
Published 23 Mar 2021

These phenomena of course may occur separately. But there exists a distinctive historical process that produced all of them together: deindustrialization. The social formations left behind by manufacturing were—at the level of the population—disproportionately aged, sick, unemployed, impoverished, and yet relatively well insured. This generalization does not mean that each individual in a Rust Belt town was elderly, ailing, broke, and well insured, nor that the only way these phenomena occur is through deindustrialization. Nor, of course, does health trouble happen only by economic mechanisms or only to working-class people.

…

The institutions of social policy constructed between the 1930s and the 1960s worked to shunt the social crisis of deindustrialization into the health care system. At the bottom of the labor market, waged care work proliferated, responding to the process of industrial decline. In historical perspective, the process appears in close parallel to the rise of mass incarceration. Like the expansion of the prison system in the final decades of the twentieth century, the rise of the health care industry offered an economic fix to the social crisis brought about by deindustrialization, channeling public expenditure and state power into the management of surplus population, generating employment, profits, and social stability.40 In this light, the relationship between the midcentury “egalitarian” period and our own time looks quite different.

…

This later widespread instability, when deindustrialization manifested socially as a problem of populations of disposable and dependent people, allows us to look back and see how the New Deal state was always engaged in a project of securing, maintaining, reproducing, and ordering the life of the population. This project became evident when its basis eroded.42 Health care as a site of employment expanded in the United States in ways roughly parallel to what happened in other wealthy capitalist democracies. Yet, in other wealthy societies undergoing deindustrialization, while health care employment grew, health care provision did not depart markedly from other aspects of welfare states; health care provision grew as welfare states did.

The Origins of the Urban Crisis
by Sugrue, Thomas J.

For a snapshot of industrial problems in other cities in the 1950s, see Irving Bernstein, Promises Kept: John F. Kennedy’s New Frontier (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 160–67. The history of deindustrialization after World War II has yet to be written. But glimpses of the overall pattern in other cities can be found in: “Deindustrialization: A Panel Discussion,” Pennsylvania History 58 (1991): 181–211; John T. Cumbler, A Social History of Economic Decline: Business, Politics, and Work in Trenton (New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press, 1989); Irwin Marcus, “The Deindustrialization of Homestead: A Case Study, 1959–1984,” Pennsylvania History 52 (1985) 162–82; Gary Gerstle, Working-Class Americanism: A History of Labor in a Textile City, 1920–1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 320–28; Ronald Schatz, The Electrical Workers: A History of Labor at General Electric and Westinghouse (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 232–36.

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A spate of recent historical scholarship on the industrial transformation of twentieth-century America (a subfield that has taken off in recent years) bears out my argument about the crucial role that capital flight and the introduction of labor-saving technologies played in the devastation of urban America well before the 1970s. The process of deindustrialization began as early as the 1920s in cities dominated by the textile industry, intensified in the post-World War II years, and took a new form in the wake of the economic crises of the 1970s. Cities dominated by a single industry—like Detroit, Pittsburgh, and Gary—reeled when their key industries began to close plants and relocate to other regions. But the process of deindustrialization was equally damaging in cities like Philadelphia, Oakland, and Chicago, which had diverse economic bases.

…

Ruth Milkman, Farewell to the Factory: Auto Workers in the Late Twentieth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Jefferson Cowie, Capital Moves: RCAs Seventy-Year Quest for Cheap Labor (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999); Jefferson Cowie and Joseph Heathcott, eds., Beyond the Ruins: The Meanings of Deindustrialization (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003); Guian McKee, “Urban Deindustrialization and Local Public Policy: Industrial Renewal in Philadelphia, 1953–1976,” Journal of Policy History 16 (2004): 66–98; Joseph Heathcott and Maire Agnes Murphy, “Corridors of Flight, Zones of Renewal: Industry, Planning, and Policy in the Making of Metropolitan St.

Once the American Dream: Inner-Ring Suburbs of the Metropolitan United States
by Bernadette Hanlon
Published 18 Dec 2009

This shift has led to the loss of relatively high-paying union jobs in manufacturing in the cities and older suburbs, greatly impacting the local economies of these deindustrialized communities (Bluestone and Harrison 1989). These impacts have been well documented for central cities, and a number of studies note the effects on inner-ring suburbs. For instance, in a study of the change in Chicago’s suburbs, Morton Winsberg (1989) finds that heavy declines in household income were most striking in deindustrialized suburbs. Similarly, Scott Bollens (1988) finds that, particularly in the older, northeastern metropolitan areas of the United States, the more troubled suburbs tended to be manufacturing oriented, and Bernadette Hanlon and Thomas Vicino (2007), in their study of Baltimore’s inner suburbs, find a predominance of decline among older, industrial suburbs on the southwestern border of the city.

…

In the traditional manufacturing regions of the United States, older working-class suburbs have witnessed the effects of runaway industry and, in the case of metropolitan areas, such as Los Angeles, the abandonment by such industries as aerospace and defense, which have had tremendous impacts on these areas (Davis 2005). Deindustrialization follows the trail of industry, and, just as inner-city plants were often the first to close, now it is the turn of inner-ring suburban plants. A force shaping the inner-ring suburbs is the loss of blue-collar jobs in the wake of deindustrialization. Metropolitan Fragmentation The U.S. metropolis is highly politically fragmented. It is composed of central cities surrounded by separate suburban municipalities, each with its own local government services and structures and each making its own land-use planning decisions.

…

Unemployment rates were 6 percent for white males and more than 16 percent for African American males by 2000. As with many working-class inner-ring suburbs, Dundalk has experienced the effects of deindustrialization. With the loss of its industrial base, this suburb has experienced income declines and poverty increases. The median family income in 1969 was $48,464 (in 1999 dollars), which declined to $46,035 in 1999. The poverty rate doubled from 5 percent to 10 percent between 1969 and 1999. Another offshoot of deindustrialization is environmental degradation. Dundalk and other inner-ring suburbs are scattered with old industrial sites, some vacant, derelict brownfields.

Capitalism: Money, Morals and Markets
by John Plender
Published 27 Jul 2015

Many also feel instinctively that a nation’s strength can be measured by the amount of swarf on its boots – swarf being the metal chippings found on factory floors. And because this view is so widespread, the decline of manufacturing in countries such as the US and UK is generally perceived to be disturbing, especially when there is high unemployment in ‘rustbowl’ industries that are conspicuous victims of globalisation and de-industrialisation. According to this school of thought, advanced countries cannot live by services alone, not least because services have less export potential than manufactures. So a shrinking manufacturing base must be equated with national decline, as must the growing financialisation of the economy. No surprise, then, that the decline in manufacturing employment in the UK, from 31 per cent of the workforce in 1975 to 25 per cent in 1983 to 8 per cent today, causes much angst, as does the almost-as-severe percentage fall in the US, where manufacturing employment is down to 9 per cent.

…

You cannot go on watching with indifference the disappearance of your principal industries, and always hoping that you will be able to replace them by secondary and inferior industries.59 Chamberlain was echoing those who, in the debate on luxury in the eighteenth century, feared that the increasing production of goods designed to meet the whims and fancies of fashionable women would cause society to become decadent and effeminate. He in turn was echoed decades later by Lord Weinstock, chief executive of Britain’s General Electric Company, before the House of Lords committee on overseas trade in 1985, when Margaret Thatcher’s government presided over a painful period of de-industrialisation: What will the service industries be servicing when there is no hardware, when no wealth is actually being produced? We will be servicing, presumably, the production of wealth by others. We will supply the Changing of the Guard, we will supply the Beefeaters around the Tower of London. We will become a curiosity.

The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization
by Richard Baldwin
Published 14 Nov 2016

Understanding the First Unbundling’s Stylized Facts Chapter 2 identified five top-line facts that marked globalization’s first unbundling: The North industrialized while the South deindustrialized Trade boomed Growth took off worldwide but sooner and faster in the North than in the South The Great Divergence happened Urbanization accelerated, especially in the North. All these stylize facts can be easily understood as implications of globalization’s first unbundling. The explanation starts with the first two facts since they are tightly linked. Northern Industrialization, Southern Deindustrialization, and Trade In a deservedly famous paper on “Globalization and the Inequality of Nations,” Paul Krugman and Tony Venables explain the first two facts with the new economic geography (NEG) framework.

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Index A7/global South/developing nations: agreements and, 240; BITs and, 103, 104, 104f; communication and, 124; comparative advantage and, 149, 217–218; deindustrialization and, 55–57; exports and, 151; global GDP, share of, 1820-1990, 48f; ICT revolution and, 8; income, U.S. vs., 59; industrialization and, 59, 60f, 61, 62t, 213–218; know-how and, 140–141; market fragmentation and, 184–185; New Globalization policies and, 98–105, 217–218; Old Globalization (first unbundling) and, 78; policies and, 279; premature deindustrialization and, 134; sectors sequencing and, 268–269; summary, 18–19, 25–26; tariffs and, 72f, 100–105, 100f; trade with developed nations, 161.

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Phase Four: Globalizing factories (1990 to present) The revolution in information and communication technology (ICT) was to the second unbundling what the steam revolution was to the first. By relaxing the constraints that had underpinned the vast imbalances in the global distribution of knowledge, the ICT revolution unleashed a historic transformation that might be called the Great Convergence. The North deindustrialized while some nations in the South industrialized. The world experienced a shockingly large shift in world GDP shares that has made a big step toward reversing the Great Divergence. The rest of Part I considers the four globalization phases in more detail. Chapter 1 covers the first two phases, leaving Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 to cover the third and fourth phases, respectively.

The Globalization of Inequality
by François Bourguignon
Published 1 Aug 2012

See also emerging economies development aid, 148–53, 157 development gap, 34–35, 83 Di Bao program, 166 discrimination: ghettos and, 66– 67; immigrants and, 64, 66, 127; labor and, 64–66, 69, 132, 142, 180–81; non-­material inequalites and, 64–66, 69; racial, 65; women and, 64–65, 103 disinflation, 95, 102, 110 distribution, 10n1, 186; capital-­ labor split and, 55–58, 60; efficiency and, 142–45; evolution of inequality and, 41, 42t, 44t, 45, 46t, 48–59, 64, 71–72; fairer globalization and, 148, 153, 156–73, 175, 178; geographical disequilibria and, 83; Gini coefficient and, 18 (see also Gini coefficient); global, 18–19, 25, 29, 39, 41, 46t, 121, 124–38, 141– 45, 156; growth and, 49–50, 188; international, 17–18, 30, 148; median of, 31; OECD countries and, 10–11, 12n3; policy and, 26, 72, 135, 188; range of, 16; real earnings loss and, 78; redistribution and, 4, 7, 37 (see also redistribution); rise in inequality and, 74, 77–79, 82, 85, 90–92, 94–96, 99, 103–4, 106–7, 112, 114–15; Southern perspective on, 82–85; standard of living and, 16, 18 (see also standard of living); taxes and, 37, 92–94 (see also taxes); Theil coefficient and, 18–19, 37–38, 194 distribution (cont.) 52; transfers and, 4, 14, 48, 105, 110, 130, 135–36, 142, 148, 153, 158–67, 170, 175, 181, 183, 187; wage, 3, 78–79, 107 Divided We Stand report, 52 Doha negotiations, 154 drugs, 66, 133 Dubai, 127 Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), 156 education, 34, 187; college, 132; evolution of inequality and, 61, 65–68; fairer globalization and, 149, 152, 167–73, 180–81; globalization and, 132, 140, 143; labor and, 168, 180; Millennium Development Goals and, 149– 50; national inequality and, 167–73; poverty and, 24; preschool, 169–70; redistribution and, 149, 152, 167–73; rise in inequality and, 111; taxes and, 167–73; tuition and, 170 efficiency: data transfer technology and, 78; deregulation and, 94, 96, 105, 108; economic, 1, 4, 6, 111, 116, 119, 129–33, 135, 140–45, 158, 164, 167, 171, 181; emerging economies and, 78; equality and, 116, 129–31; fairness and, 8, 129– 31; globalization and, 1, 4, 6, 8, 36, 78, 94, 96, 105, 108, 111, 116, 118–19, 129–35, 140–45, 157–58, 164, 167, 170–71, 175, 180–81, 188; human capital and, 175; import substitution and, 34, 180; inefficiency and, 105, 129–30, 132–33, 135, 140, 170–71, 180, 188; labor Index and, 175; loss of, 142, 164; opportunity and, 142–45; Pareto, 130n5; privatization and, 94, 96, 105, 108; redistribution and, 142–45; rents and, 180; social tensions and, 188; spontaneous redistribution and, 133; taxes and, 170; technology and, 78; weak institutions and, 36; wealth of nations and, 1 elitism, 182; fairer globalization and, 151, 165; globalization and, 127n4, 136, 138; rise in inequality and, 4, 6–7 emerging economies: Africa and, 122–23 (see also Africa); competition and, 178, 187–88; conditional cash transfers and, 165– 66; credit cards and, 165; domestic markets and, 120, 125; efficient data transfer and, 78; evolution of inequality and, 57; fairer globalization and, 147, 154, 158, 165–66, 177–78, 182; global inequality and, 40, 77– 80, 82, 109, 113, 115, 188–89; globalization and, 117, 119–22, 125–27; institutions and, 109– 12; Kuznets curve and, 113; labor and, 77; natural resources and, 127; profits and, 117; rise in inequality and, 109–12; structural adjustment and, 109– 12; taxes and, 165; trends in, 57; Washington consensus and, 109–10, 153 entrepreneurs, 83, 92, 96, 131–32, 135, 143, 170–71, 188 equality: efficiency and, 116, 129– 31; policy for, 184–89; relative gap and, 18, 28, 30, 31–32, 36 Ethiopia, 21–22, 46t, 155 Index195 European Union (EU), 24, 156, 174, 177 Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative, 155 evolution of inequality: Africa and, 46t, 54–55; Brazil and, 46t, 55, 59, 70; capital and, 55–58, 60, 73; China and, 47, 53, 57–60; consumption and, 42t, 44t; convergence and, 65, 69; credit and, 61; crises and, 48, 50, 54, 57, 73–74; developed countries and, 47, 52–53, 56, 59–64, 66; developing countries and, 47, 53–55, 57, 63, 68; distribution and, 41, 42t, 44t, 45, 46t, 48–59, 64, 71– 72; education and, 61, 65–68; elitism and, 4, 6–7, 46t; emerging economies and, 57; exceptions and, 52–53; France and, 46t, 51f, 52–53, 55, 58, 59n8, 62–63, 66, 70–71; ghettos and, 66–67; Gini coefficient and, 39, 42t, 44t, 48, 50, 51f, 53, 58–59; Great Depression and, 48; growth and, 33, 49–50, 54; India and, 54, 57, 59–60; institutions and, 55, 69; investment and, 56; labor and, 55–58, 60; markets and, 48–50, 53–54, 64, 69; national income inequality and, 48–52; non-­monetary inequalities and, 49, 60–70; normalization and, 41, 43–44; opportunity and, 61–62, 68, 70–71; perceptions of inequality and, 69–73; policy and, 55, 72; primary income and, 48–50, 58; production and, 57; productivity and, 63; profit and, 56; reform and, 54, 72; rise in inequality in, 48–52, 73, 77–80, 91–95, 97–98, 102–8; risk and, 63, 66; standard of living and, 41, 43– 45, 46t, 53–55, 58, 60–62, 67, 69, 73; surveys and, 42t, 43–45, 56, 68n17, 69–71; taxes and, 12–14, 37, 48, 50, 56n5; Theil coefficient and, 42; United Kingdom and, 46t, 50, 51f, 59, 67, 68n17; United States and, 2, 4–6, 9, 11, 21, 33, 46t, 47–50, 51f, 58, 59n9, 66–70, 73; wealth and, 58–60 executives, 73, 88–89, 97, 174 expenditure per capita, 13, 15, 42t, 44t exports: deindustrialization and, 76, 82; fairer globalization and, 147, 154–55, 176, 178; globalization and, 124, 128; rise in inequality and, 76, 82–84 fairer globalization: Africa and, 147, 151, 154–56, 179, 183; African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) and, 155; Bolsa Familia and, 166; Brazil and, 150, 154, 166–68, 173; capital and, 158–62, 167, 171, 175, 182; China and, 150, 154, 165–66, 172, 178; competition and, 155, 169, 173, 176–79, 182; consumers and, 177–78; consumption and, 159, 177; convergence and, 146–47, 157; correcting national inequalities and, 158–80; credit and, 164–65, 172, 180; crises and, 163, 176; deregulation and, 173; developed countries and, 150, 154–57, 160, 162, 164, 168–72, 176, 178–79, 181; developing countries and, 154, 166; development aid and, 196 fairer globalization (cont.) 148–53, 157; Di Bao program and, 166; distribution and, 148, 153, 156–73, 175, 178; Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and, 156; education and, 149, 152, 167–73; 180–81; elitism and, 151, 165; emerging economies and, 147, 154, 158, 165–66, 177–78, 182; Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative and, 155; exports and, 147, 154–55, 176, 178; France and, 147, 159–61, 164, 169, 175, 177; Gini coefficient and, 156, 166; goods and services sector and, 180; growth and, 147–52, 155, 162, 167–68, 171, 177, 180, 183; health issues and, 152, 166; imports and, 154, 177–78, 180; India and, 150, 154, 165– 66, 172; inheritance and, 170– 73; institutions and, 151, 168, 174–75; international trade and, 176–77; investment and, 150, 155, 157, 160, 170, 174, 179; liberalization and, 156, 179; markets and, 147–48, 154–58, 168, 173–75, 178–81; Millennium Development Goals and, 149–50; national inequality and, 147, 158; opportunity and, 155, 167, 170, 172; policy and, 147–53, 157, 167–73, 175, 177, 179–83; poverty and, 147–52, 164, 166, 175; prices and, 147– 48, 176, 178, 182; primary income and, 158, 163n10, 167, 173; production and, 155–57, 167, 176, 178–79; productivity and, 155, 177–78; profit and, 173, 176; Progresa program and, Index 166; protectionism and, 7, 147, 154, 157, 176–79; redistribution and, 148, 153, 156–73, 175, 178; reform and, 151, 161, 163, 168–69; regulation and, 152, 173–76, 181–82; risk and, 148, 154, 156, 159, 164, 171, 174–75, 178; standard of living and, 146–48, 154, 156–58, 160, 165, 168–69; surveys and, 169; taxes and, 148, 158–73, 175, 181–83; technology and, 156, 173; TRIPS and, 156; United Kingdom and, 163, 169; United States and, 155, 159–61, 163– 64, 169, 174–75, 182; wealth and, 162, 164, 167, 170–73 Fitoussi, Jean-­Paul, 14 France: evolution of inequality and, 46t, 51f, 52–53, 55, 58, 59n8, 62–63, 66, 70–71; fairer globalization and, 147, 159–61, 164, 169, 175, 177; Gini coefficient of, 20; global inequality and, 2, 9, 11, 20–21; offshoring and, 81; rise in inequality and, 80, 88, 92–93, 95, 97, 99, 103; soccer and, 87; wage deductions and, 159 G7 countries, 56 G20 countries, 182 Garcia-­Panalosa, Cecilia, 107 Gates, Bill, 5–6, 70, 150 Germany, 2, 21, 46t, 50, 51f, 80, 88, 92 Ghana, 46t, 54 ghettos, 66–67 Giertz, Seth, 160–61 Gini coefficient: Brazil and, 22; Current Population Survey and, 21; evolution of inequality and, Index197 39, 42t, 44t, 48, 50, 51f, 53, 58– 59; fairer globalization and, 156, 166; France and, 20; historical perspective on, 27–28; meaning of, 18–19; purchasing power parity and, 28; rise in inequality and, 110; United States and, 21; wealth inequality and, 58–60 Glass-­Steagall Act, 174n15 global distribution, 18–19, 25, 29, 39, 41, 46t, 121, 156 global inequality: Africa and, 16, 21, 23, 30–31, 34, 36; between countries, 2–3, 5, 7, 9, 16–19, 23, 33, 36, 38–39, 42–45, 47, 53, 58, 68, 90–91, 107, 117–19, 123, 128, 153; Brazil and, 21– 23; crises and, 20, 38–41; cross-­ country heterogeneity and, 13; definition of, 3–4, 9–10, 25–26, 30–32, 39; developed countries and, 10–11, 21, 34–39; developing countries and, 10–11, 13, 21, 32, 34–39; effects of, 38–40; emerging economies and, 40, 77–80, 82, 109, 113, 115, 188– 89; at the end of the 2000s, 20– 25; evolution of inequality and, 41 (see also evolution of inequality); expenditure per capita and, 13, 15, 42t, 44t; France and, 2, 9, 11, 20–21; globalization and, 117–18, 121–23, 128; great gap and, 33–36; historic turning point for, 25–32; Human Development Report and, 25; institutions and, 36; measuring, 10– 20; Millennium Development Goals and, 149–50, 185; normalization and, 13, 15, 22–23, 26, 29; OECD Database on Household Income Distribution and Poverty and, 11–12; policy and, 185–89; Povcal database and, 10, 12, 42t, 43, 44t; prices and, 27–28, 74, 80, 84, 91–92, 94, 97, 110; profit and, 13; reduction of, 2, 185–86; relative gap and, 18, 28, 30–32, 36; rise of, 2–4, 7; risk and, 20; standard of living and, 10–26, 29, 31–33, 36, 39; surveys on, 10, 12–15, 20n10, 21–22, 29, 42t, 43–45; technology and, 3–4, 34–35; trend reversal in, 37–38; within countries, 2, 5–7, 9, 16, 30, 33, 35–45, 47, 113–14, 118, 124– 29, 184–85, 189 globalization: Africa and, 122–23, 126–27; Asian dragons and, 34, 82; Brazil and, 127, 133; capital and, 117, 125–26, 132, 137; China and, 120–22, 128; competition and, 117–18, 130, 186 (see also competition); as complex historical phenomenon, 1–2; consumption and, 137–39; convergence and, 120–22, 125; credit and, 131–32, 137–40; crises and, 119–22, 125, 135–39, 142; debate over, 1; deindustrialization in developed countries and, 75–82; democratic societies and, 135–36; deregulation and, 95–99; developed countries and, 117, 119, 121, 127n4, 128, 133, 143; developing countries and, 121, 127n4, 128, 132, 143; education and, 132, 140, 143; efficiency and, 1, 4, 6, 8, 36, 78, 94, 96, 105, 108, 111, 116, 118–19, 129–35, 140–45, 157–58, 164, 167, 170–71, 175, 180–81, 188; elitism and, 127n4, 136, 138; 198 globalization (cont.) emerging economies and, 117, 119–22, 125–27; exports and, 124, 128; fairer, 146–83 (see also fairer globalization); future of inequality between countries and, 119–22; global inequality and, 117–18, 121–23, 128; goods and services sector and, 127, 130; growth and, 118–29, 134–39; health issues and, 140– 41, 144; Heckscher-­Ohlin model and, 76; imports and, 119, 124; inequality within countries and, 124–29; inheritance and, 144–45; institutions and, 124; as instrument for modernization, 1; international trade and, 3, 75–76, 78–79, 83, 112, 114, 176–77; investment and, 119, 130, 134–35, 143; laissez-­faire approach and, 118, 129; markets and, 118, 120–21, 124–37, 140, 143–44; as moral threat, 1; national inequality and, 119; negative consequences of inequality and, 131–42; opportunity and, 133–34, 139, 142–44; as panacea, 1; policy and, 118–19, 124, 126, 128–31, 139, 143–44; poverty and, 117, 123, 126–27, 134, 144; prices and, 118, 122, 126, 136–38; primary income and, 135, 143–44; production and, 119, 124, 126, 129, 131, 133, 137; productivity and, 120, 125, 127, 144; profit and, 117; redistribution and, 121, 124–38, 141–45; reform and, 124, 126–27, 138; regulation and, 136; rise in inequality and, 117–18; risk and, 127–28, Index 137–39, 144; shocks and, 38, 55, 91–92, 175; Southern perspective on, 82–85; standard of living and, 120–23, 126, 138, 143; surveys and, 127n4, 141n15; taxes and, 74, 89n10, 91–94, 104, 114–15, 129–30, 135–36, 142–45; technology and, 86–91, 118–20, 125; trends and, 118; United States and, 135–39; wealth and, 74, 95, 98, 125, 127, 129, 131–32, 139, 143–45 Great Depression, 48 Greece, 46t, 135 gross domestic product (GDP) measurement: Current Population Survey and, 21; evolution of inequality and, 41–45, 56–57; fairer globalization and, 123, 127, 165–66, 176; global inequality and, 13–15, 20–21, 23, 26, 27f, 29–30, 39; normalization and, 29, 41, 43–45; rise in inequality and, 94; Sen-­Stiglitz-­ Fitoussi report and, 14 Gross National Income (GNI), 148–49 Growing Unequal report, 52 growth, 4; African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) and, 155; constraints and, 35; consumption and, 13–15, 42t, 44t, 80, 137–39, 159, 177; convergence and, 16; determinants of, 34; distribution and, 49–50, 188; emerging economies and, 125 (see also emerging economies); evolution of inequality and, 33, 49–50, 54; fairer globalization and, 147–52, 155, 162, 167–68, 171, 177, 180, 183; GDP mea- Index199 surement of, 30, 39 (see also gross domestic product (GDP) measurement); globalization and, 118–29, 134–39; great gap in, 33–36; import substitution and, 34, 180; inflation and, 50, 95, 102, 110; negative, 31; political reversals and, 36; poverty and, 28–29; production and, 3, 34–35, 57, 74, 76–81, 84–86, 119, 124, 126, 129, 131, 133, 137, 155–57, 167, 176, 178–79; rate of, 15, 29–35, 79, 125, 185; recession and, 6, 31, 99, 120; relative gap and, 18, 20, 30–32, 36; rise in inequality and, 75, 79, 82, 84, 109–12; trends in, 40, 121 health issues, 24, 187; fairer globalization and, 152, 166; globalization and, 140–41, 144; public healthcare and, 37, 111, 140 Heckscher-­Ohlin model, 76 Hong Kong, 34, 82, 174 housing, 12, 61, 137 human capital, 74, 167, 175 Human Development Report, 25 Ibrahimovich, Zlata, 87 IKEA, 172 immigrants, 64, 66, 127 imports: fairer globalization and, 154, 177–78, 180; globalization and, 119, 124; import substitution and, 34, 180; rise in inequality and, 80 income: average, 9, 18, 21, 29–30, 43, 72; bonuses and, 87, 174; convergence and, 16; currency conversion and, 11; definition of, 45; deindustrialization and, 75–82; developed/developing countries and, 5, 36; disposable, 20, 22, 24, 48, 50, 51f, 74, 91, 163; distribution of, 3 (see also distribution); executives and, 73, 88–89, 97, 174; family, 10; financial operators and, 87–88, 90–91; gap in, 3, 5–6, 27f, 33– 36, 42t, 44t, 149; GDP measurement and, 13–15, 20–21, 23, 26, 27f, 29–30, 39, 41–45, 56–57, 94, 123, 127, 165–66, 176; high, 50, 52, 56, 85–93, 97–99, 140, 143, 158–62, 164, 189; household, 10–12, 43, 45, 50, 58, 105, 107, 137, 163, 177; inequality in, 2, 4, 41, 48–50, 56–64, 68, 70, 72–73, 83, 98, 102–3, 107–8, 114, 125, 132– 34, 137, 140–41, 143–44, 163; inflation and, 50, 95, 102, 110; international scale for, 17–18, 23, 30; lawyers and, 89–90; mean, 17, 20n10, 27f, 42t, 44t; median, 6, 49, 71, 102–3, 106; minimum wage and, 52–53, 100, 102–8, 175, 177; national, 7, 16–19, 30, 43, 48–52, 60, 73, 84n6, 125, 149, 153, 172; OECD Database on Household Income Distribution and Poverty and, 11; opportunity and, 5; payroll and, 53, 93, 100, 104, 107, 175; pension systems and, 167; per capita, 20, 25, 29–30, 42t, 45, 48, 55–56, 120; portfolios and, 88; poverty and, 1, 11, 15n6, 19–20, 22–25, 28–29, 32, 44t, 109, 117, 123, 126–27, 134, 144, 147–52, 164, 166, 175; primary, 48–50, 58, 135, 143–44, 158, 163n10, 167, 173; 200 income (cont.) purchasing power and, 11, 13, 19–24, 27f, 28, 50, 80, 144, 158, 178; real earnings loss and, 78; relative gap and, 18, 28, 30, 31– 32, 36; superstars and, 85–87, 89–90; taxes and, 37, 89n10, 92–93, 145, 159, 161–65, 170 (see also taxes); technology and, 34, 180; virtual, 12; wage inequality and, 51–53, 79, 101–3, 106, 108; wage ladder effects and, 78–79; wealth inequality and, 58–60; women and, 64– 65, 103 India: evolution of inequality and, 54, 57, 59–60; fairer globalization and, 150, 154, 165– 66, 172; household consumption and, 15; international trade and, 75; Kuznets hypothesis and, 113; rise in inequality and, 2, 15–16, 19, 30, 34, 46t, 75, 83, 90, 112–13; taxes and, 165 Indonesia, 30, 46t, 54, 111, 127 industrialization: deindustrialization and, 1, 75–82, 102, 120, 188; labor and, 1, 26, 29, 33, 35, 54, 82, 84, 102, 113, 120, 127, 179, 188 Industrial Revolution, 26, 29, 33, 35 inequality: between countries, 2–3, 5, 7, 9, 16–19, 23, 33, 36, 38– 39, 42–45, 47, 53, 58, 68, 90– 91, 107, 117–19, 123, 128, 153; efficiency and, 1, 4, 6, 8, 36, 78, 94, 96, 105, 108, 111, 116, 118– 19, 129–35, 140–45, 157–58, 164, 167, 170–71, 175, 180–81, 188; Gini coefficient and, 18 (see Index also Gini coefficient); income, 2, 4, 41, 48–50, 56–64, 68, 70, 72–73, 83, 98, 102–3, 107–8, 114, 125, 132–34, 137, 140–41, 143–44, 163; international, 17; inverted U curve and, 54, 113; measurement of, 18; negative consequences of, 131–42; non-­ monetary, 49, 60–70; perceptions of, 69–73; social tensions and, 188; standard of living and, 18 (see also standard of living); Theil coefficient and, 18–19, 37–38, 42; wealth, 58–60; within countries, 2, 5–7, 9, 16, 30, 33, 37–45, 47, 113–14, 118, 124–29, 184–85, 189 infant mortality, 150 inflation, 50, 95, 102, 110 inheritance: fairer globalization and, 170–73; globalization and, 144–45; rise in inequality and, 93 institutions: deregulation and, 91– 112 (see also deregulation); disinflation and, 95, 102, 110; emerging economies and, 109– 12; evolution of inequality and, 55, 69; fairer globalization and, 151, 168, 174–75; global inequality and, 36; globalization and, 124; markets and, 91–92; privatization and, 94–109; reform and, 91–112; rise in inequality and, 91–112, 114; structural adjustment and, 109– 12; taxes and, 92–94; “too big to fail” concept and, 174–75; Washington consensus and, 109–10, 153 International Development Association, 149 Index201 international income scale, 17–18, 23, 30 International Labor Organization, 51 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 54, 57, 84, 90, 109–10 international trade: capital mobility and, 74; China and, 75; de­ industrialization and, 75–76, 78–79; effect of new players, 75–76; Heckscher-­Ohlin model and, 76; India and, 75; offshoring and, 81–82; rise in inequality and, 75–76, 78–79, 83, 112, 114; Soviet Union and, 75; theory of, 76; wage ladder effects and, 78–79 inverted U curve, 54, 113 investment: direct, 76, 79; evolution of inequality and, 56; fairer globalization and, 150, 155, 157, 160, 170, 174, 179; foreign, 83, 85, 112, 155, 157, 160, 179; globalization and, 119, 130, 134– 35, 143; production and, 119; public services and, 143; re-­ investment and, 56; rise in inequality and, 76, 79, 82–83, 85, 92, 97–98, 112; taxes and, 92 Ivory Coast, 54 Japan, 34, 46t, 51f, 103 job training, 34, 181, 187 Kenya, 46t, 54 kidnapping, 133 Kuznets, Simon, 113, 126 labor: agriculture and, 12, 82, 84, 122–23, 127–28, 132, 155; artists and, 86–87; bonuses and, 87, 174; capital and, 3–4, 55– 58, 60, 158, 161n7, 185; capital mobility and, 3; cheap, 77, 117; costs of, 81, 100, 104–5, 117, 176, 187; decline in share of national income and, 73; deindustrialization and, 75–82; demand for, 168; deregulation and, 99– 109; discrimination and, 64–66, 69, 132, 142, 180–81; distribution of income and, 175 (see also distribution); education and, 168, 180; efficiency and, 96–97, 175; emerging economies and, 77; entrepreneurs and, 83, 92, 96, 131–32, 135, 143, 170–71, 188; evolution of inequality and, 55–58, 60; excess, 81, 83; executives and, 73, 88–89, 97, 174; goods and services sector and, 13, 73, 80, 85, 91, 102, 127, 130, 180; growth and, 154, 179; immigrant, 64, 66, 127; increased mobility and, 90–91; industrialization and, 1, 26, 29, 33, 35, 54, 80, 82, 84, 102, 113, 120, 127, 179, 188; inflation and, 50, 95, 102, 110; International Labor Organization and, 51; job training and, 34, 181, 187; manufacturing and, 57, 80–82, 84, 123, 154–55, 157; median wage and, 49, 71, 102– 3, 106; minimum wage and, 52– 53, 100, 102–8, 175, 177; mobility of, 185; offshoring and, 81–82; payroll and, 53, 93, 100, 104, 107, 175; pension systems and, 167; portfolios and, 88; poverty and, 1, 11, 15n6, 19– 20, 22–25, 28–29, 32, 44t, 109, 117, 123, 126–27, 134, 144, 147–52, 164, 166, 175; 202 labor (cont.) privatization and, 99–109; productivity and, 63, 79, 81–82, 89, 100, 102, 104, 114, 120, 125, 127, 144, 155, 177–78; protectionism and, 7, 147, 154, 157, 176–79; real earnings loss and, 78; reserve, 84; security and, 133; skilled, 76–78, 82–83, 86, 90, 114, 117, 126, 176; standard of living and, 69 (see also standard of living); superstars and, 85, 87, 89–90; supply of, 130– 31, 164; taxes and, 159–60, 171; technology and, 85–91 (see also technology); unemployment and, 37, 39, 53, 62–63, 66, 69, 77, 94, 100–108, 164, 175–76; unions and, 100–106, 108, 156, 179; unskilled, 3, 76–77, 79, 83, 105, 117, 154; wage inequality and, 51–53, 79, 101–3, 106, 108; wage ladder effects and, 78–79; women and, 64–65, 103, 114; writers and, 86–87 Lady Gaga, 5–6 laissez-­faire approach, 118, 129 Latin America, 9, 34, 36, 54–55, 58, 109–11, 155, 165–66, 168, 180 lawyers, 89–90 liberalization: capital and, 96; customs, 156; deregulation and, 96–99, 108–9, 112 (see also deregulation); fairer globalization and, 156, 179; mobility of capital and, 115; policy effects of, 97–99; Reagan administration and, 91; recession and, 6, 31, 99, 120; rise in inequality and, 76, 91, 93, 96–99, 108–9, 112, 115; tax rates and, 93 Luxembourg, 16, 19 Index Madonna, 71 Malaysia, 127 manufacturing: deindustrialization and, 75–82, 84, 123; emerging economies and, 57, 84; fairer globalization and, 154–55, 157; France and, 81; offshoring and, 81–82; United Kingdom and, 80; United States and, 80 markets: competition and, 76–77, 79–82, 84, 86, 94–98, 102, 104, 115–18, 130, 155, 169, 173, 176–79, 182, 186–88; credit, 131; deindustrialization and, 1, 75–82, 102, 120, 188; deregulation and, 91–92, 99–109 (see also deregulation); development gap and, 34–35, 83; Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and, 156; effect of new players, 75–76; emerging economies and, 120 (see also emerging economies); entrepreneurs and, 83, 92, 96, 131–32, 135, 143, 170–71, 188; evolution of inequality and, 48–50, 53–54, 64, 69; exports and, 76, 82–84, 124, 128, 147, 154–55, 176, 178; fairer globalization and, 147–48, 154–58, 168, 173–75, 178–81; GDP measurement and, 13–15, 20–21, 23, 26, 27f, 29–30, 39, 41–45, 56–57, 94, 123, 127, 165–66, 176; globalization and, 35, 118, 120–21, 124–37, 140, 143–44; Heckscher-­Ohlin model and, 76; housing, 12, 61, 137; imports and, 1, 34, 80, 119, 124, 154, 177–78, 180; institutions and, 91–112; international trade and, 3, 75–76, 78–79, 83, 112, 114, 176–77; labor and, Index203 144 (see also labor); liberalization and, 112 (see also liberalization); monopolies and, 94, 111, 127, 136; offshoring and, 81– 82; protectionism and, 7, 147, 154, 157, 176–79; purchasing power and, 11, 13, 19–24, 27f, 28, 50, 80, 144, 158, 178; reform and, 54 (see also reform); regulation and, 74 (see also regulation); rise in inequality and, 74, 76– 79, 83, 86, 90–112, 114; shocks and, 38, 55, 91–92, 175; single market and, 76; South-­South exchange and, 35; TRIPS and, 156 median wage, 49, 71, 102–3, 106 Mexico, 46t, 57, 59, 109–10, 133, 166, 172 middle class, 51, 71, 93, 109, 133– 34, 136, 140 Milanovic, Branko, 4–5, 17n8, 29n16 Millennium Development Goals, 149–50, 185 minerals, 84, 127 minimum wage, 52–53, 100, 102– 8, 175, 177 monopolies, 94, 111, 127, 136 Morocco, 173 Morrisson, Christian, 28 movies, 87 Murtin, Fabrice, 28 national inequality, 2–4; correcting, 158–80; education and, 167–73; fairer globalization and, 147, 158; Gini coefficient and, 27 (see also Gini coefficient); globalization and, 119; market regulation and, 173–75; protectionism and, 147, 157, 176–79; redistribution and, 158–73, 175, 178; rise in, 6, 48– 52, 115, 204; taxes and, 158–73, 175, 181–83 natural resources, 84–85, 92, 122, 126–28, 127, 151 Netherlands, 46t, 50, 66, 70, 102 Nigeria, 9, 46t, 54, 127, 151 non-­monetary inequalities: access and, 61, 67–68; capability and, 61; differences in environment and, 66–68; discrimination and, 64–66, 69; employment precariousness and, 63–64; evolution of inequality and, 49, 60–70; intergenerational mobility and, 68; opportunities and, 49, 60– 70; social justice and, 60, 70; unemployment and, 62–63 normalization: evolution of inequality and, 41, 43–44; GDP measurement and, 29, 41, 43– 45; global inequality and, 13, 15, 22–23, 26, 29 Occupy Wall Street movement, 6, 135 OECD countries, 27t; evolution of inequality and, 42t, 43, 44t, 50– 52, 64, 65n13; fairer globalization and, 149, 159, 162, 164– 65; Gini coefficient and, 51; income distribution and, 51; relaxation of regulation and, 99; restrictive, 64; rise in inequality and, 50–51, 94, 99, 102, 106n18, 107; social programs and, 94; standard of living and, 11–12, 43, 50–52, 64, 94, 99, 102, 107, 120, 149, 159, 162, 164–65; U-­shaped curve on income and, 50 OECD Database on Household 204 Income Distribution and Poverty, 11–12 offshoring, 81–82 oil, 92, 127 opportunity, 5; African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) and, 155; as capability, 61; efficiency and, 142–45; evolution of inequality and, 61–62, 68, 70–71; fairer globalization and, 155, 167, 170, 172; globalization and, 133–34, 139, 142–44; redistribution and, 142–45; rise in inequality and, 102 Pakistan, 46t, 111 Pareto efficiency, 130n5 Pavarotti, Luciano, 86–87 payroll, 53, 93, 100, 104, 107, 175 Pearson Commission, 149 pension systems, 167 Perotti, Roberto, 134 Philippines, 46t, 111 Pickett, Kate, 140 Piketty, Thomas, 4, 48, 59n8, 60, 89n10, 125, 160n4 PISA survey, 169–70 policy, 4; adjustment, 109, 153; Cold War and, 149, 153; convergence and, 147–48; development aid and, 148–53; distributive, 26, 72, 135, 188; educational, 149, 152, 167–73; evolution of inequality and, 55, 72; fairer globalization and, 147–53, 157–58, 167–73, 175–83; Glass-­Steagall Act and, 174n15; global inequality and, 185–89; globalization and, 118–19, 124, 126, 128–31, 139, 143–44; globalizing equality and, 184–89; import substi- Index tution and, 34; Millennium Development Goals and, 149– 50, 185; poverty reduction and, 147–48; protectionist, 7, 99– 100, 107–8, 147, 154, 157, 176–79; reform and, 74 (see also reform); rise in inequality and, 34, 74–75, 85, 94, 97, 99– 100, 104, 106–11, 114–16; social, 7; standard of living and, 147–48 population growth, 28–29, 110, 183 portfolios, 88 Povcal database, 10, 12, 42t, 43, 44t poverty, 1, 44t, 109; Collier on, 23; convergence and, 147–48; criminal activity and, 133–34; definition of, 24; development aid and, 147–52; fairer globalization and, 147–52, 164, 166, 175; ghettos and, 66–67; global inequality and, 11, 15n6, 19–20, 22–25, 28–29, 32; globalization and, 117, 123, 126–27, 134, 144; growth and, 28–29; measurement of, 23–24; Millennium Development Goals and, 149– 50, 185; OECD Database on Household Income Distribution and Poverty and, 11–12; reduction policies for, 147–48; traps of, 144, 150, 164 prices: commodity, 84, 182; exports and, 178; factor, 74, 126; fairer globalization and, 147–48, 176, 178, 182; global inequality and, 27–28, 74, 80, 84, 91–92, 94, 97, 110; globalization and, 118, 122, 126, 136–38; imports and, 80; international compari- Index205 sons of, 11; lower, 94, 137; oil, 92; rise in inequality and, 74, 80, 84, 91–92, 94, 97, 110; rising, 110, 122, 178; shocks and, 38, 55, 91–92, 175; statistics on, 11, 27; subsidies and, 109–10, 175 primary income: evolution of inequality and, 48–50, 58; fairer globalization and, 158, 163n10, 167, 173; globalization and, 135, 143–44 privatization: deregulation and, 94–112; efficiency and, 94, 96, 105, 108; globalization of finance and, 95–99; institutions and, 94–109; labor market and, 99–109; reform and, 94–109; telecommunications and, 111 production: deindustrialization and, 75–82; evolution of inequality and, 57; fairer globalization and, 155–57, 167, 176, 178–79; globalization and, 119, 124, 126, 129, 131, 133, 137; growth and, 3, 34–35, 57, 74, 76–81, 84–86, 119, 124, 126, 129, 131, 133, 137, 155–57, 167, 176, 178–79; material investment and, 119; North vs.

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Others feel it has caused the majority of humanity to sink into poverty in order to benefit a privileged elite. Criticism has been heaped upon it. Globalization is said to be the cause of economic crises, the destruction of the environment, the excessive importance of finance and the financial sector, deindustrialization, the standardization of culture, and many other ills of contemporary society, including an explosive rise in inequality. My goal is to shed some light on this debate by focusing on one of the above points in particular, one that has arguably drawn the most attention: inequality. Globalization is a complex historical phenomenon that has existed, in some 2 Introduction form or another, since the beginning of human society, but which we can track with more precision over recent centuries.1 No one denies that it exists, and there is little doubt that it will continue.

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To the extent that globalization enables better integration primarily of the developing world into the global economy, one might expect that its potential distributive effects have been different in developed and developing economies. As this also applies to the nature of policy reforms and the circumstances in which they have been undertaken, care will be taken throughout the chapter to distinguish the two sets of countries. The Effects of Globalization and Deindustrialization on Developed Countries The 1980s and early 1990s witnessed a radical change in the world economy. Whole swaths of the world were opened up to international trade, most importantly China in the 1980s and the Soviet bloc and India at the turn of the 1990s. Simple economic reasoning suggests that the opening up of these giants to international trade was equiv- 76 Chapter 3 alent to the entrance of around a billion workers, for the most part unskilled, into international competition, with the simultaneous effect of creating a relative scarcity of other factors of production, particularly capital, skilled labor, and raw materials.

What Would the Great Economists Do?: How Twelve Brilliant Minds Would Solve Today's Biggest Problems
by Linda Yueh
Published 4 Jun 2018

At its peak, financial services alone made up some 8 per cent of UK national output, which is not that much smaller than all of Britain’s manufacturing combined. This is the essence of deindustrialization, where industry has given way to a dominant services sector in the same way that agriculture was overtaken by manufacturing during Adam Smith’s time. * * * The question is, can the US, and perhaps the UK, reverse deindustrialization? It’s a refrain heard frequently since the crisis. ‘Made in America’ and ‘Made in Britain’ are among the phrases uttered by governments and businesses after the worst recession in a century. But, reversing the process of deindustrialization is challenging in a globalized world economy. Emerging economies like China can produce more cheaply while information and communications technology (ICT) has lowered the costs of logistics, so globalization makes it harder for rich nations to compete with lower-cost producers.

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Is it possible to rebalance the economy in countries where the services sector makes up more than three-quarters of national output, as it does in Britain and the US? The answer holds lessons for other economies that may follow those two nations as they embark on the typical economic path of industrialization followed by deindustrialization. Industrialization, deindustrialization and reindustrialization Great Britain became the first industrialized nation in the late eightteenth and nineteenth centuries, followed by Germany and the United States. The period, which became known as the Industrial Revolution, saw the economy transformed from an agrarian society into one characterized by factories owned and run by merchants who traded their wares both at home and overseas.

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Emerging economies like China can produce more cheaply while information and communications technology (ICT) has lowered the costs of logistics, so globalization makes it harder for rich nations to compete with lower-cost producers. In fact, Harvard economist Dani Rodrik even points to ‘premature deindustrialization’ in some developing countries which are moving from agriculture directly to services due to the forces of globalization, which holds potentially worrying consequences for countries that have yet to gain a firm foothold in the middle-income stratum. We are in unknown territory. The impetus for deindustrialization is greater in Britain and America than in other nations. After suffering their worst financial crisis in a century, they are anxious for change.

Straight Talk on Trade: Ideas for a Sane World Economy
by Dani Rodrik
Published 8 Oct 2017

The only countries that seem to have escaped the curse of premature industrialization are a relatively small group of Asian countries and manufactures exporters. The advanced countries themselves have experienced significant employment deindustrialization. But manufactures output at constant prices has held its own comparatively well in the advanced world, something that is typically overlooked since so much of the discussion on deindustrialization focuses on nominal rather than real values. The reasons behind these trends have to do both with technology and trade. Rapid global technological progress in manufacturing has reduced the prices of manufactured goods relative to services, discouraging newcomers in developing countries from entry.

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But once manufacturing operations become robotized and require high skills, the supply-side constraints begin to bite. Effectively, developing countries lose their comparative advantage vis-à-vis the rich countries. We see the consequences in the premature deindustrialization of the developing world today. In a world of premature deindustrialization, achieving economy-wide productivity growth becomes that much harder for low-income countries. As we saw in an earlier chapter, it is not clear whether there are effective substitutes for industrialization. The economist Tyler Cowen has suggested that developing countries may benefit from the trickle down of innovation from the advanced economies: they can consume a stream of new products at cheap prices.16 This is a model of what Cowen calls “cellphones instead of automobile factories.”

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The natural tendency for countries without long and deep liberal traditions is to slide into authoritarianism. This has negative consequences not just for political development but economic development as well. The growth challenge compounds the democracy challenge. One of the most important economic phenomena of our time is a process I have called “premature deindustrialization.”10 Partly because of automation in manufacturing and partly because of globalization, low-income countries are running out of industrialization opportunities much sooner than their earlier counterparts in East Asia did. This would not be a tragedy if manufacturing was not traditionally a powerful growth engine, for reasons I discuss below.

The Globotics Upheaval: Globalisation, Robotics and the Future of Work
by Richard Baldwin
Published 10 Jan 2019

ICT created better substitutes for people whose jobs involved manual tasks and better tools for people whose jobs involved mental tasks. The result was a “skills twist.” The technology created jobs for people who worked with their heads but destroyed jobs for those who worked with their hands. The resulting deindustrialization devastated communities and created enormous social and economic difficulties for blue-collar workers—especially in nations that failed to help their citizens make the transition (like the US and UK). The Globotics Transformation has been launched by a third technological impulse—digital technology.

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The new ICT impulse produced a new economic transformation, as I point out at length in my 2016 book, The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization.3 The societal changes weren’t anywhere near as epic as those of the Great Transformation, but they still shook things up in a big way. Industrialization—which had been the codeword for progress for a couple of centuries—turned into deindustrialization. The results were dramatic. NEW TECHNOLOGY PRODUCES A NEW ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION The impact of the ICT impulse was first felt though the automation of industrial jobs. Computer-controlled machines rapidly displaced workers, especially in the auto industry, and especially those involved in welding, painting, and specific pick-and-place tasks.

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It allowed manufacturing firms in advanced economies to exploit the vast international wage differences between, for example, the United States, Germany, and Japan on one hand, and nearby developing nations like Mexico, Poland, and China on the other hand. The result was a quite sudden and massive deindustrialization of the advanced economies. In 1970, the advanced industrial economies known as the G7 (United States, Japan, Germany, Britain, France, Italy, and Canada) produced over 70 percent of the world’s manufactured goods. That declined gently during the 1970s and 1980s, but from 1990 it plummeted.

Brexit, No Exit: Why in the End Britain Won't Leave Europe
by Denis MacShane
Published 14 Jul 2017

George Osborne’s stewardship of the economy, with its relentless focus on austerity cuts while protecting the already-rich, helped fuel the anger against him and David Cameron that many believe was part of the reason for the anti-London establishment Brexit vote. Following the financial crash, the take-home pay of the average British employee fell by 10 per cent between 2007 and 2015 – the longest continuous fall in income since the Great Depression of the 1930s. It was the areas worst hit by the great de-industrialisation of the 1980s and 1990s that saw the biggest increase in poverty and where the Brexit vote was the strongest. Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey Where wealth accumulates, and men decay wrote Oliver Goldsmith in ‘The Deserted Village’ 250 years ago. Britain’s greatest historian of postwar Europe, Tony Judt, used part of those lines for the title of his great deathbed essay – Ill Fares the Land – attacking the meretricious Britain that came into being this century as the gap between have and have-not Britain grew ever wider.

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In France in 2016, militant trade unions all but destroyed the French socialist government with a series of militant, sometimes violent strikes and protests in opposition to minor labour market reforms that had been accepted by trade unions across the Rhine or further north decades before. In Italy, Spain, France or Portugal trade unions were off-shoots of political parties or the Catholic Church and obeyed the line of the communist party leaders or cardinals. Trade union membership slumped as deindustrialisation in the 1980s and 1990s eliminated the majority of jobs in the metal industries, where archetypal working-class trade union organisation was strongest. Women and immigrant workers were more difficult to organise and had different priorities from the classic twentieth-century white male proletariat.

People, Power, and Profits: Progressive Capitalism for an Age of Discontent
by Joseph E. Stiglitz
Published 22 Apr 2019

One couldn’t help but see the effects, both on my schoolmates and on the façade of the city. The city traced the history of industrialization and deindustrialization in America, having been founded in 1906 as the site of the largest integrated steel mill in the world, and named after the founding chairman of US Steel, Elbert H. Gary. It was a company town through and through. When I went back for my fifty-fifth high school reunion in 2015, before Trump had become the fixture in the landscape that he is today, the tensions were palpable, and for good reason. The city had followed the country’s trajectory toward deindustrialization. The population was only half of what it was when I was growing up.

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Even if economic policies successfully avoided another Great Depression, it is not a surprise that there have been political consequences of this unbalanced rescue.2 Hillary Clinton’s referring to those in the deindustrialized parts of the country supporting her opponent as the “deplorables” may have been a fatal political error (saying that was itself deplorable): to them, her words reflected the cavalier attitude of the elites. A series of books, including J. D. Vance’s Hillbilly Elegy: A Memoir of a Family and Culture in Crisis3 and Arlie Hochschild’s Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right4 documented the feelings of those who had experienced deindustrialization and the many others who shared their discontent, showing how distant they were from the country’s elites.5 One of Bill Clinton’s 1992 campaign slogans was, “It’s the economy, stupid.”

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We signed bad trade deals that led to the loss of American industrial jobs.1 This criticism of globalization has found enormous resonance, especially in the parts of the country that experienced deindustrialization. By contrast, globalization’s advocates claim that all of this is sheer nonsense. America has benefited from globalization. Protectionist policies put at risk all that has been gained through trade. In the end, they say, protectionism will not help even those who’ve lost their jobs due to globalization or seen their wages collapse. They, the US, and the entire world will be worse off. Globalization’s advocates shift the blame for deindustrialization and the American malaise elsewhere: the real source of job loss and low wages for unskilled workers has been improved technology, and globalization is getting a bum rap.

Democracy and Prosperity: Reinventing Capitalism Through a Turbulent Century
by Torben Iversen and David Soskice
Published 5 Feb 2019

As we set out in more detail in chapter 3, a major underlying cause of the challenge to the postwar consensus over the welfare state was the decline of Fordist mass production since the 1970s, and the concomitant shift toward knowledge-intensive production. These changes have severed previously strong complementarities in production between skilled and semiskilled workers. Deindustrialization contributed to this process by gradually segregating many low- and intermediary-skilled workers into insecure, often part-time or temporary, service jobs (Wren 2013). The combined effect of new technology and deindustrialization has been a divergence in employment security and income between core and peripheral workers (Kalleberg 2003), with the college-educated in much more secure positions. A key question for our entire understanding of the role of democratic politics in redistribution is the extent to which governments have stepped in to compensate and assist workers who have been adversely affected by deindustrialization and technological change.25 In past work, we have argued that in multiparty PR systems where each class is represented by its own party, there is an incentive for the middle-income party to ally with the low-income party because the size of the pie to be divided rises with the wealth of those excluded from the coalition.

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We might add that the general results presented in table 1 are confirmed if we use a nationally specific shock variable in a non-linear setup. The shock variable in this analysis is deindustrialization, defined as the annual drop in industrial employment as a share of the working age population, incorporated into a nonlinear model. The results are reported in Iversen and Soskice (2014). This analysis also shows that our common shock variable, as defined above, is fairly highly correlated with the deindustrialization variable, measured as annual means (.64). TABLE A3.1. Regression results for the effect of shocks on government policies Total social spending Spending on unemployment Spending on ALMP Shock 0.78*** (0.12) 0.68*** (0.12) 0.51*** (0.12) PR with weak CD * shock 0.74*** (0.26) 1.24*** (0.32) 1.53*** (0.27) PR with strong CD * shock 0.12 (0.16) 0.24 (0.24) 0.25 (0.27) Unexpected growth –0.15*** (0.01) –0.24*** (0.03) –0.44 (0.19) Share population under 15 0.52*** (0.17) — — Share population over 65 0.30 (0.17) 0.43*** (0.02) — Automatic disbursements 0.69*** (0.11) N 493 483 397 Adj.

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Such pressures and temptations arise naturally as part of Vernon’s (1966) product life-cycle as production becomes more routinized and can be performed by robots or low-skilled workers abroad. But we think it is far more remarkable that governments in ACDs routinely shun such temptations. At the height of deindustrialization in the 1980s governments across ACDs engaged in policies that accelerated the decline of sunset industries by cutting back subsidies, privatizing unproductive public enterprises, and removing barriers to competition from low-wage countries while betting on new high value-added industries moving in to take advantage of an abundance of high-skilled labor (and the associated institutional supports).

Grand Transitions: How the Modern World Was Made
by Vaclav Smil
Published 2 Mar 2021

A new, and unexpected, reverse phenomenon was first noted in the United States during the early 21st century: after generations of steady decline, mid-life mortality among white non-university educated population stopped falling and it began to rise (Case and Deaton 2020). Will these “deaths of despair” (largely attributable to suicide, drug overdose, and alcohol-induced liver disease) remain an American oddity or will they affect future life expectancy in other de-industrializing countries? Demographers and physiologists have been divided about further prospects for longer life expectancies. Aging is an irreversible process following an exponential decline that begins already in the third decade of life and from which we still see no effective escape (Marck et al. 2017).

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Most importantly, in China’s case, benefits of falling relative energy intensities were overwhelmed by rapid growth of total economic product (nearly 11-fold between 1990 and 2015), a trend that led to boosting total primary energy supply 4.4-fold during the same period: obviously there has been no decoupling of the two processes! In contrast, absolute energy consumption rates in the United States and France were, respectively, only about 15% and 10% higher, reflecting already very high levels of per capita use (and, as already noted, stagnation and even decline of per capita supply) as well as the recent trend of deindustrialization, as energy-intensive activities have been offshored, largely to Asia. In any case, decline of energy intensities has been a worldwide phenomenon but, given the different structures of national economies, there is no universal minimal rate to which these falling rates might be trending. Not surprisingly, calculating energy intensity for the global energy use is even more problematic.

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US data on the distribution of employment by major sector have been available since 1850, when the primary sector dominated but the labor force was equally split between the secondary and tertiary sectors, and the latest available division shows the primary sector at just 2% (rather than at 10%), the secondary sector at less than 13%, and the tertiary one as just over 80% (Urquhart 1984; BLS 2018). This finding means that the retreat of the US primary sector as well as later deindustrialization proceeded much further than Fourastié posited, and that the tertiary sector is even more dominant than indicated by his projections. The Chinese trajectory demonstrates an even more significant departure from a generic model. Republican China remained overwhelmingly agrarian (the primary sector declining from 83% to 79% of all employment between 1915 and 1933) and in 1952, three years after the Communist took power, the respective shares of the three sectors had shares of 75%, 10%, and 15% (Wu 2016).

Public Places, Urban Spaces: The Dimensions of Urban Design
by Matthew Carmona , Tim Heath , Steve Tiesdell and Taner Oc
Published 15 Feb 2010

The image captures a sense of the disinvestment and abandonment in central Detroit. For Fishman (2008: xv), Detroit encapsulates the fate that, as late as the end of the twentieth century, had been predicted for all American cities: ‘… a downtown marginalised and semi-abandoned; once bustling factory zones turned into depopulated, deindustrialised and racially segregated “inner-cities”; suburbs in the “first-ring” just beyond the central city caught in a rolling wave of abandonment about to engulf them and – at the edges – the feverish, fragmented, low-density growth we know as sprawl.’ While the established centres were being eroded, on the urban periphery new concentrations of business, shopping and entertainment were being developed.

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Whilst downtowns may maintain their dominance of some high level service functions, back offices, corporate plazas, research and development and university campuses, malls, airports and logistics zones, and retail, leisure and residential spaces spread further and further around the metropolitan core.’ Box 2.4 The Los Angeles School The value of the Los Angeles School lies in its early recognition of emergent processes shaping urban landscapes, economies and cultures. Soja (1995, 1996) identified six processes of restructuring:(i) A combined process of deindustrialisation and re-industrialisation, resulting in the rise of new flexible forms of economic organisation and production, representing a shift ‘… from the tight organisation of mass production and mass consumption around large industrial complexes to more flexible production systems, [which are] vertically disintegrated but geographically clustered in “new industrial spaces”.’

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Everyday Urbanism is an urbanism of unconventional real estate development; of innovative modes of development funding; of experimentation, innovation and creativity; of small, micro projects; and of the ‘soft’, more fluid and spontaneous city of people and activities. As such, it has resonance with other movements and initiatives, such as the Slow Cities movement (www.cittaslow.blog.com) and the various initiatives flourishing in the deindustrialised cities of the US rust belt and in central and eastern Europe, such as the ‘shrinking cities’ movement (see Oswalt 2006; www.skrinkingcities.com) and ‘Pop-Up City’ (Rugare & Schwarz 2008; Schwarz & Rugare 2009), with temporary uses for sites (Oswalt et al 2007). Because so much of Everyday Urbanism is concerned with explanation of the urban condition rather than changing it through action, Walters (2007: 158) concludes its real challenge lies in moving beyond rhetoric to actual urban design intervention.

Planet of Slums
by Mike Davis
Published 1 Mar 2006

Eighty percent of Marx's industrial proletariat now lives in China or somewhere outside of Western Europe and the United States.38 In most of the developing world, however, city growth lacks the powerful manufacturing export engines of China, Korea, and Taiwan, as well as China's vast inflow of foreign capital (currently equal to half | of total foreign investment in the entire developing world). Since the ! mid-1980s, the great industrial cities of the South — Bombay, Johannesburg, Buenos Aires, Belo Horizonte, and Sao Paulo — have all j suffered massive plant closures and tendential deindustrialization. ' Elsewhere, urbanization has been more radically decoupled from industrialization, even from development per se and, in sub-Saharan Africa, from that supposed sine qua non of urbanization, rising agricultural productivity. The size of a city's economy, as a result, often bears surprisingly little relationship to its population size, and vice versa.

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Cities — in spite of their stagnant or negative economic growth, and without necessary investment in new infrastructure, educational facilities or public-health systems — have simply harvested this world agrarian crisis. Rather than the classical stereotype of the labor-intensive countryside and the capital-intensive industrial metropolis, the Third World now contains many examples of capital-intensive countrysides and labor-intensive | deindustrialized cities. "Overurbanization," in other words, is driven by [ the reproduction of poverty, not by the supply of jobs. This is one of | the unexpected tracks down which a neoliberal world order is shunting 1 the future.48 From Karl Marx to Max Weber, classical social theory believed that the great cities of the future would follow in the industrializing footsteps of Manchester, Berlin, and Chicago — and indeed Los Angeles, Sao Paulo, Pusan, and today, Ciudad Juarez, Bangalore, and Guangzhou have roughly approximated this canonical trajectory.

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Most cities of the South, however, more closely resemble Victorian Dublin, which, as historian Emmet Larkin has stressed, was unique amongst "all the slumdoms produced in the western world in the nineteenth century ... [because] its slums were not a product of the industrial revolution. Dublin, in fact, suffered more from the problems of de-industrialization than industrialization between 1800 and 1850."49 Likewise, Kinshasa, Luanda, Khartoum, Dar-es-Salaam, Guayaquil, and Lima continue to grow prodigiously despite ruined importsubstitution industries, shrunken public sectors, and downwardly mobile middle classes. The global forces "pushing" people from the countryside — mechanization of agriculture in Java and India, food imports in Mexico, Haiti, and Kenya, civil war and drought throughout Africa, and everywhere the consolidation of small holdings into 48 See Josef Gugler, "Overurbanization Reconsidered," in Gugler, Cities in the Developing World, pp. 114—23. 49 Foreword to Jacinta Prunty, Dublin Slums, 1800-1925: A Study in Urban Geography, Dublin 1998, p. ix.

Peak Everything: Waking Up to the Century of Declines
by Richard Heinberg and James Howard (frw) Kunstler
Published 1 Sep 2007

Nevertheless, the fact that we have reached the end of the era of cheap oil and gas demands that we re-examine the potential costs and benefits of our current trajectory and its alternatives. I believe we must and can de-industrialize agriculture. The general outline of what I mean by de-industrialization is simple enough: a radical reduction of fossil fuel inputs to agriculture, accompanied by an increase in labor inputs and a reduction of transport, with production being devoted primarily to local consumption. Once again, fossil fuel depletion almost ensures that this will happen. But at the same time, it is fairly obvious that if we don’t plan for de-industrialization, the result could be catastrophic. It’s worth taking a moment to think about how events might unfold if the process occurs without intelligent management, driven simply by oil and gas depletion.

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Table of Contents Praise Title Page Join the Conversation Acknowledgements Foreword Preface Introduction ON TECHNOLOGY, AGRICULTURE, AND THE ARTS Chapter 1 - Tools with a Life of Their Own Classy Tools It’s the Energy, Silly Peak Oil and the Limits of Technology Staring at Techno-Collapse Chapter 2 - Fifty Million Farmers Intensifying Food Production The 21 Century: De-Industrialization Examples and Strategies The Key: More Farmers! If We Do This Well Chapter 3 - (post-) Hydrocarbon Aesthetics Designing for the Tragic Interlude of Cheap Abundance Hydrocarbon Style: Big, Fast, and Ugly Oh, To Be Hip Again Manifesto for a Post-Carbon Aesthetic ON NATURE’S LIMITS AND THE HUMAN CONDITION Chapter 4 - Five Axioms of Sustainability History and Background Five Axioms Evaluation Chapter 5 - Parrots and Peoples Chapter 6 - Population, Resources, and Human Idealism THE END OF ONE ERA, THE BEGINNING OF ANOTHER Chapter 7 - The Psychology of Peak Oil and Climate Change Explaining Our Incomprehension Acceptance and Beyond: Peak Oil Grief Collective PTSD A Model for Explanation and Treatment: Addiction and Dependency Proactive Application: Social Marketing Chapter 8 - Bridging Peak Oil and Climate Change Activism Differing Perspectives Differing Recommendations Supply Side, Demand Side Common Ground Chapter 9 - Boomers’ Last Chance?

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Fortunately, during the past century or two we have also developed the disciplines of archaeology and ecology, which teach us how and why those ancient societies failed, and how the diversity of the web of life sustains us. In principle, if we avail ourselves of this knowledge, we need not mindlessly repeat yet again the time-worn tale of catastrophic civilizational collapse. The 21st Century: De-Industrialization How might we avoid such a fate? Surely the dilemmas we have outlined above are understood by the managers of the current industrial food system. They must have some solutions in mind. Indeed they do, and, perhaps predictably, those solutions involve a further intensification of the food production process.

How to Kill a City: The Real Story of Gentrification
by Peter Moskowitz
Published 7 Mar 2017

The Great Depression put big development plans on hold, but New York remained committed to deindustrializing and refilling itself with high-cost real estate. Deindustrialization impacted nearly every city in the United States, but New York was an exception in that it planned its industrial decline. That explains why whereas industrialization peaked in 1956 in the rest of the United States, New York’s industry—mainly small manufacturing and garments—peaked ten years earlier. It also explains why New York was one of the only cities in the United States where land values increased as deindustrialization occurred. The planners had made way for a new kind of city, one focused on real estate, not industrial jobs, long before others caught on.

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The planners had made way for a new kind of city, one focused on real estate, not industrial jobs, long before others caught on. Through the 1930s and ’40s, New York’s government continued to put pressure on the city to deindustrialize, while politicians simultaneously presented the city’s industrial job loss as an inevitable consequence of cheaper labor in the South and globalization. That was a myth: during the decline of industrialization in the United States, New York actually had the cheapest labor force of any major city besides San Antonio, Texas. The deindustrialization of New York was kicked into overdrive when an RPA-backed group called the Citizens Committee for Modern Zoning formed in the late 1950s to pressure the city to rezone.

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If you look at the inner-ring suburbs of New York, you can see why: by the 1960s, in places near commuter trains or within a reasonable driving distance of the city, nearly all of the land was developed and housing prices were high, making it hard for developers to buy on the cheap and sell at a markup. Sure, they could buy land even farther from the city and attempt to develop it, but commuters are only willing to travel so far, and New York’s suburban commute times were already pushing the hour mark. The city, on the other hand, was a bargain, thanks to white flight and deindustrialization. In 1979, geographer Neil Smith came up with what has become possibly the most influential academic theory on gentrification: the rent gap. Smith posited that the more disinvested a space becomes, the more profitable it is to gentrify. The idea behind his theory is a basic tenet of free-market economics: capital will go where the rate of potential return (i.e., the potential to make profit) is greatest.

The Great Economists: How Their Ideas Can Help Us Today
by Linda Yueh
Published 15 Mar 2018

At its peak, financial services alone made up some 8 per cent of UK national output, which is not that much smaller than all of Britain’s manufacturing combined. This is the essence of deindustrialization, where industry has given way to a dominant services sector in the same way that agriculture was overtaken by manufacturing during Adam Smith’s time. The question is, can the US, and perhaps the UK, reverse deindustrialization? It’s a refrain heard frequently since the crisis. ‘Made in America’ and ‘Made in Britain’ are among the phrases uttered by governments and businesses after the worst recession in a century. But, reversing the process of deindustrialization is challenging in a globalized world economy. Emerging economies like China can produce more cheaply while information and communications technology (ICT) has lowered the costs of logistics, so globalization makes it harder for rich nations to compete with lower-cost producers.

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Is it possible to rebalance the economy in countries where the services sector makes up more than three-quarters of national output, as it does in Britain and the US? The answer holds lessons for other economies that may follow those two nations as they embark on the typical economic path of industrialization followed by deindustrialization. Industrialization, deindustrialization and reindustrialization Great Britain became the first industrialized nation in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, followed by Germany and the United States. The period, which became known as the Industrial Revolution, saw the economy transformed from an agrarian society into one characterized by factories owned and run by merchants who traded their wares both at home and overseas.

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Emerging economies like China can produce more cheaply while information and communications technology (ICT) has lowered the costs of logistics, so globalization makes it harder for rich nations to compete with lower-cost producers. In fact, Harvard economist Dani Rodrik even points to ‘premature deindustrialization’ in some developing countries which are moving from agriculture directly to services due to the forces of globalization, which holds potentially worrying consequences for countries that have yet to gain a firm foothold in the middle-income stratum. We are in unknown territory. The impetus for deindustrialization is greater in Britain and America than in other nations. After suffering their worst financial crisis in a century, they are anxious for change.

Inside the Robot Kingdom: Japan, Mechatronics and the Coming Robotopia
by Frederik L. Schodt
Published 31 Mar 1988

Even free-trade advocate Ronald Reagan seemed to acknowledge this when, in 1983, without obvious economic or military reasons, he authorized whopping tariffs to protect the Harley-Davidson company and its 1,400 employees. Third, deindustrialization of the United States in particular has frightening implications both for the world economy and for Japan. Japanese labor unions have occasionally worried that their nation's robotization has aggravated unemployment overseas, but industrialists worry about deindustrialization, too. Hajime Karatsu in his 1985 article "Is U.S. Industry Going Down the Tubes?" wrote that "if present trends continue, U.S. industry will soon be in danger of complete collapse.

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As Wiener imagined for India, roboticist Hiroyuki Yoshikawa, professor at the University of Tokyo's Mechanical Engineering Department, thinks one reason China is so interested in robotics, and especially in the training of software engineers for industry, is that a software engineer can be trained in three years, while it takes at least ten to train a skilled lathe operator.18 * * * * * * * * * * * * In the advanced, richer nations, robots have increasingly become a means of countering "deindustrialization," or what the Japanese call the "hollowing" of industry—the transformation of manufacturing concerns into marketing specialists who no longer make what they sell. According to Joseph Engelberger, Japan's success with robots is the real driving force behind their application in United States and European industry today.

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First, nations with strong manufacturing industries have historically dominated other areas as well. Process and product technology have become much more closely linked today, so that to remain technologically advanced an industry requires a mastery of manufacturing technology equal to or greater than its mastery of design technology. For the US., deindustrialization exposes a deep-rooted national schizophrenia—a political and military establishment fixated on the Soviet Union and committed to a defense policy that requires a maximum of industrial self-sufficiency, and an economic establishment increasingly dependent on Japanese and Asian manufacturing and technology.

What Went Wrong: How the 1% Hijacked the American Middle Class . . . And What Other Countries Got Right
by George R. Tyler
Published 15 Jul 2013

Yet these prominent US free traders did what good economists do when confronted with convincing new data: they changed their minds in the face of surging Chinese goods, mercantilist policies such as the persistent undervaluation of the Chinese currency, the yuan, expansive offshoring, and wage erosion. It wasn’t just the impact of trade, which directly accounts for maybe 15 percent of American wage declines, or the magnitude of offshoring. Instead, it was the combined impact of offshoring, deindustrialization, Us versus Them and all the rest, plus technology change, which intensified the impact of trade on wages and deindustrialization. Alan Blinder, for example, concluded that even good jobs in “safe” domestic service sectors (health care, education, and finance) are jeopardized by global integration and the threat of offshoring. He determined that the number of sectors at risk is two to three times larger than the number of manufacturing jobs subject to offshoring—and that the danger is growing.19 Krugman’s conversion occurred in 2007; global integration was exacerbating income disparities and “fears that low-wage competition is driving down US wages have a real basis in both theory and fact,” he concluded.20 And Summers grew concerned with multinationals behaving like “stateless elites whose allegiance is to global economic success and their own prosperity rather than the interest of the nation where they are headquartered….

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The stakes for Americans are much graver than considerations of equity. As we see next, the dismal investment and productivity performances that are hallmarks of the Reagan decline have also caused a notable deindustrialization of the American economy. It is simply impossible to conjure a bright economic future for America when the number of high-value jobs is not rising and firms are being out-invested by the margins just noted by international competitors. CHAPTER 23 DEINDUSTRIALIZING AMERICA MARKS THE REAGAN DECLINE “The progression of an economy such as America’s from agriculture to manufacturing to services is a natural change.”1 RONALD REAGAN “A strong manufacturing sector is not a requisite for a prosperous economy.”2 New York Stock Exchange, 1984 “The US de-emphasized technology.

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Returning High-Productivity Jobs to America Reagan era officials viewed deindustrialization as inevitable, akin to aging. Many others believed it, too, including a Washington Post editorial board in 2012, which pooh-poohed hopes of matching the German success in rebuilding an industrial base: “It’s unrealistic to imagine a return to the relatively high levels of manufacturing employment and wages that the United States enjoyed in the 1950s.”29 US families cannot rekindle the American Dream by taking in each other’s wash. Moreover, the inevitability of deindustrialization is belied by history and rejected by a number of economists and US business leaders, such as retired Intel CEO Paul Otellini and Andrew Liveris of Dow.30 They have not only Japanese and German history on their side but American history as well, one replete with the successful deployment of policies that have stimulated domestic enterprises and facilitated the creative destruction process.

Chavs: The Demonization of the Working Class
by Owen Jones
Published 14 Jul 2011

The researchers' conclusion was that 'the UK's very high incapacity claimant numbers are an issue of jobs and of health: Glasgow is a particularly striking example of how the de-industrialization of Britain has left continuing-but disguised-mass unemployment inits wake. The city houses more incapacity benefit claimants than any other local authority. The number of people claiming some form of disability benefits peaked in 1995 at one in five of the working population, or almost three times the UK level. A group of Glasgow University and Glasgow City Council experts looked at how the number of recipients increased during the 1980s, and concluded: 'The main reason for the huge growth in sickness benefit claims was the city's rapid de-industrialization.' The number of manufacturing jobs in 1991 had collapsed to just a third of the 1971 figure.

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For the first time since the World War II,the next generation will be worse off than the generation before it. of course, we all have agency: we don't all respond to the same situation in the same way. But it only takes a small proportion of young people who have nothing much to lose to bring chaos to the streets. It is also impossible to ignore the fact that men featured so prominently among the rioters. Nine out of ten apprehended rioters were men. Britain's rapid de-industrialization and the disappearance of so many skilled middle-income jobs were particularly disruptive--given that such work often excluded women-to the lives of working-class men. Over a generation ago, a young working-class man could leave school at the age of sixteen and have a decent prospect of getting an apprenticeship, training that might open a gateway to a skilled, respected job that could give life some structure.

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The town centre is studded with shops like Argos, Curry's, Carphone Warehouse and Gregg's bakery. There's a real community spirit in the air. People are warm towards one another-as they were towards me, a stranger asking them intrusive questions. Communities like Ashington were devastated by the whirlwind of de-industrialization unleashed by Thatcherism, but people do their best to adjust and get on with their lives, even in the toughest of circumstances. Father Ian Jackson has been the local Catholic priest in Ashington since 2002. 'It's a very warm, caring kind of community. People really look out for each other,' he told me.

"They Take Our Jobs!": And 20 Other Myths About Immigration
by Aviva Chomsky
Published 23 Apr 2018

Even the census itself acknowledges that racial categories “are sociopolitical constructs and should not be interpreted as being scientific or anthropological in nature.”8 The U.S. economy has changed drastically between the two periods of immigration. In the 1890s, the United States was industrializing rapidly, and most new immigrants went to work in the mines, mills, and factories of the new industrial economy. In the 1960s, the country was undergoing deindustrialization, and the mines, mills, and factories were closing, creating a “rust belt” in the very regions that had previously been a magnet for immigrants. The deindustrialized economy still created a demand for immigrant workers, but in the service industry: “cleaning—all kinds of cleaning,” as one immigrant worker, who ran his own small house-cleaning business, described it to me.

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Walter Rodney’s How Europe Underdeveloped Africa critiques the term and the theory behind it. Other economists offered “industrialized” and “non-industrialized,” and later added “newly industrialized” or NICS (newly industrialized countries, referring usually to Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong). But the deindustrialization of the first world, and the very different nature of the industrialization now going on in the third, makes these terms problematic. Despite the radical changes in the global economic and social order since the 1950s, the concepts of First World and Third World still offer considerable power for understanding the roots and nature of global inequality.

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European countries were experiencing the same phenomenon. Industrialization had been accompanied, everywhere that it occurred in the late nineteenth century, by colonial expansion—military, political, and economic. (Sometimes this expansion took the form of direct colonial rule; sometimes it consisted of informal means of control.) Deindustrialization, in the late twentieth century, was accompanied by immigration from former colonies. These different events were part of an interconnected historical process, and to understand the differences between the two waves of immigration, we need to understand the entire historical process. These issues of race and the global economy were also interrelated.

The Next Factory of the World: How Chinese Investment Is Reshaping Africa
by Irene Yuan Sun
Published 16 Oct 2017

Salihu Maiwada and Ellisha Renne, “The Kaduna Textile Industry,” Textile History 44, no. 2 (2013): 171–196. 4. Sola Akinrinade and Olukoya Ogen, “Globalization and De-Industrialization: South-South Neo-Liberalism and the Collapse of the Nigerian Textile Industry,” The Global South 2, no. 2 (2008): 159–170. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Maiwada and Renne, “The Kaduna Textile Industry.” 8. Ibid. 9. Akinrinade and Ogen, “Globalization and De-Industrialization.” 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. Onyeiwu, “The Modern Textile Industry in Nigeria.” 14. L. N. Chete, J. O. Adeoti, F. M. Adeyinka, and O. Ogundele, “Industrial Development and Growth in Nigeria: Lessons and Challenges,” Brookings Africa Growth Initiative Working Paper No. 8., The Brookings Institution, 2016. 15.

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Stephen Gordon, “A Little Context on the Decline of Manufacturing Employment in Canada,” Maclean’s, February 12, 2013, http://www.macleans.ca/economy/business/some-context-for-the-decline-in-canadian-manufacturing-employment/, based on data from the St. Louis Federal Reserve FRED database. 35. Dani Rodrik, “On Premature Deindustrialization,” Dani Rodrik’s weblog, October 11, 2013, http://rodrik.typepad.com/dani_rodriks_weblog/2013/10/on-premature-deindustrialization.html. 36. Robert Lawrence, interview by author, Cambridge, MA, October 7, 2015. 37. Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962). 38. Erich Weede, “Economic Freedom and the Advantages of Backwardness,” (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, January 31, 2007), http://www.cato.org/publications/economic-development-bulletin/economic-freedom-advantages-backwardness. 39.

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When the Tungs and other eager Chinese industrialists showed up in the 1960s, Africa seemed poised for take-off, with government policies emphasizing industrial sectors, a small but promising industrial base left behind by European colonizers, and a general sense of optimism from being newly independent. But the following years brought devastating shocks: a macroeconomic crisis, worsening government corruption and ineptitude, and increasingly fierce global competition. In Nigeria, two of the four big Chinese family-run industrial firms collapsed. As a whole, Nigeria—and the rest of Africa—deindustrialized. But the lessons of history run both ways at once. Even in the face of headwinds, there is often a way to do business. The remaining two family-run firms not only survived, but thrived. Macroeconomic conditions have been better in the past fifteen years than in previous decades across many parts of Africa, and that has attracted hundreds of new Chinese manufacturing investments.

Empire of Cotton: A Global History
by Sven Beckert
Published 2 Dec 2014

Because for many decades cotton was the most important European industry, it was the source of huge profits that eventually fed into other segments of the European economy. Cotton also was the cradle of industrialization in virtually every other part of the world—the United States and Egypt, Mexico and Brazil, Japan and China. At the same time, Europe’s domination of the world’s cotton industry resulted in a wave of deindustrialization throughout much of the rest of the world, enabling a new and different kind of integration into the global economy. Yet even as the construction of industrial capitalism, beginning in the United Kingdom in the 1780s and then spreading to continental Europe and the United States in the early decades of the nineteenth century, gave enormous power to the states that embraced it and to capitalists within them, it planted the seeds of further transformation in the empire of cotton.

…

The empire of cotton, and with it the modern world, is only understood by connecting, rather than separating, the many places and people who shaped and were in turn shaped by that empire.11 I am centrally concerned with the unity of the diverse. Cotton, the nineteenth century’s chief global commodity, brought seeming opposites together, turning them almost by alchemy into wealth: slavery and free labor, states and markets, colonialism and free trade, industrialization and deindustrialization. The cotton empire depended on plantation and factory, slavery and wage labor, colonizers and colonized, railroads and steamships—in short, on a global network of land, labor, transport, manufacture, and sale. The Liverpool Cotton Exchange had an enormous impact on Mississippi cotton planters, the Alsatian spinning mills were tightly linked to those of Lancashire, and the future of handloom weavers in New Hampshire or Dhaka depended on such diverse factors as the construction of a railroad between Manchester and Liverpool, investment decisions of Boston merchants, and tariff policies made in Washington and London.

…

Mexico had had a long-established and thriving nonmechanized textile industry but that industry had come under pressure from cheaply manufactured yarn and cloth imports from Britain and the United States. The newly independent Mexican state tried to address this problem by raising tariffs, or even prohibiting the import of cotton textiles and yarn. Independence meant that Mexico escaped the massive wave of deindustrialization sweeping other parts of the world. The first mechanized cotton mill in Mexico that would last (unlike the Aurora Yucateca) opened in 1835 in Puebla, founded and managed by Esteban de Antuñano, and indeed it was Antuñano himself who most forcefully demanded that the country protect itself from cotton imports.

The New Class War: Saving Democracy From the Metropolitan Elite
by Michael Lind
Published 20 Feb 2020

For the last two generations, in different decades, and in different Western countries, the occasions of populist protest have been different—the white backlash against the civil rights revolution of the 1960s, the traditionalist backlash against the sexual and censorship revolution of the 1970s, populist resistance to the Japanese import shocks of the 1980s, and then, more recently, mass immigration, globalization, deindustrialization, and the Great Recession. All of these different issues resulted in similar alignments of large portions of the non-college-educated working class against managerial and professional elites. Long before Brexit and Trump, their lack of voice and influence made alienated native working-class voters—mostly but not exclusively white—a destabilizing force in politics.

…

Compared to more direct prolabor measures like minimum wages, collective bargaining and limits on global labor arbitrage, pulverizing the most productive firms in the economy is a very roundabout and inefficient way to try to raise wages, like burning down a barn to roast a pig in the famous fable by Charles Lamb.12 Like redistributionism, antimonopolism cannot work at the national level in today’s system of liberalized trade and globalized production. If the Justice Department used antitrust to break up large suppliers in the US, firms that coordinate global supply chains could simply shift those links in production to foreign countries with more lenient competition policies. The result could be accelerated by American deindustrialization, with further massive shifts in employment from the traded sector to the low-wage, low-productivity domestic service sector. In some cases, foreign state-backed national champions might win US domestic market share from American firms that had been broken up by the federal government. Just as a UBI cannot work without stringent and strictly enforced limits on immigration, so a neo-Brandeisian antimonopoly policy cannot work except in a much more protectionist and autarkic US economy, which could only be created by measures that cosmopolitan, open-borders progressives, like their newfound libertarian allies in matters of trade and immigration, would be sure to denounce as xenophobic, racist, and nativist

…

* * * — THE AMERICAN WRITER Daniel McCarthy has aptly called approaches like the ones I have criticized in this chapter “palliative liberalism.”14 However popular these miracle cures may be among the managerial elite and the overclass intelligentsia, as remedies for working-class distress in the deindustrialized heartlands of the Western world the panaceas of redistributionism, education, and antimonopolism are like prescriptions of aspirin for cancer. They may ameliorate the symptoms, but they do not cure the disease—the imbalance of power, within Western nation-states, between the overclass and the working class as a whole, including many exploited immigrant workers who labor for the affluent in the metropolitan hubs.

Hard Times: The Divisive Toll of the Economic Slump
by Tom Clark and Anthony Heath
Published 23 Jun 2014

Summary results and fieldwork details at: http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cu­mulus_uploads/document/u7f0cyctl1/YGCam-Archi­ve-results-040413-All-Countries.pdf 35. Borie-Holtz et al., No End in Sight, pp. 3–7. 36. Comparative data for the wider American workforce are drawn from another survey, conducted by the Heldrich Center in November 2009. See ibid., Table 2. 37. Valerie Walkerdine and Luis Jimenez, Gender, Work and Community after De-Industrialisation: A psychosocial approach to affect, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2012, pp. 137–8. 38. The satisfaction scores of the continually employed group was essentially unchanged over these years – rounding to 5.3 in both years. This updated analysis was kindly provided by James Laurence and Chaeyoon Lim. 39.

…

Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman. ‘Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases source’, Science, NS 185:4157 (1974), pp. 1124–31, available at: www.socsci.uci.edu/∼bskyrms/bio/readings/tversky_k_heuristics_biases.pdf Walkerdine, Valerie and Luis Jimenez. Gender, Work and Community after De-Industrialisation: A psychosocial approach to affect, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2012. Whittaker, Matthew. On Borrowed Time? Dealing with household debt in an era of stagnant incomes, Resolution Foundation, London, 2012. Wilcox, W. Bradford (ed.). The State of Our Unions, 2009, National Marriage Project, University of Virginia and the Institute for American Values, Charlottesville, VA, 2009.

Exponential: How Accelerating Technology Is Leaving Us Behind and What to Do About It
by Azeem Azhar
Published 6 Sep 2021

While globalisation remains a potent force in the world economy, it is also increasingly unfashionable. This is a story that most readers will be familiar with. Much has been written about how globalisation lost its appeal. These accounts usually point towards growing income inequality, concerns about immigration, and deindustrialisation in developed nations – all driving a turn against the supposed benefits of a flat world. Less well-scrutinised, however, is the way exponential technologies both create the rationale for more borders and provide the tools to build them. We often assume that the more high-tech a society becomes, the more global and borderless it will be.

…

Abu Dhabi, UAE, 250 Acemoglu, Daron, 139 Acorn Computers, 16, 21 Ada Lovelace Institute, 8 additive manufacturing, 43–4, 46, 48, 88, 166, 169, 175–9 Adidas, 176 advertising, 94, 112–13, 116, 117, 227–8 AdWords, 227 aeroponics, 171 Afghanistan, 38, 205 Africa, 177–8, 182–3 Aftenposten, 216 Age of Spiritual Machines, The (Kurzweil), 77 agglomeration, 181 Air Jordan sneakers, 102 Airbnb, 102, 188 aircraft, 49–50 Alexandria, Egypt, 180 AlexNet, 33 Algeciras, HMM 61 Alibaba, 48, 102, 108, 111, 122 Alipay, 111 Allen, Robert, 80 Alphabet, 65, 113–14, 131, 163 aluminium, 170 Amazon, 65, 67–8, 94, 104, 108, 112, 122, 135–6 Alexa, 25, 117 automation, 135–6, 137, 139, 154 collective bargaining and, 163 Covid-19 pandemic (2020–21), 135–6 drone sales, 206 Ecobee and, 117 Go stores, 136 Kiva Systems acquisition (2012), 136 management, 154 Mechanical Turk, 142–3, 144, 145 monopoly, 115, 117, 122 Prime, 136, 154 R&D, 67–8, 113 Ami Pro, 99 Amiga, 16 Anarkali, Lahore, 102 anchoring bias, 74 Android, 85, 94, 117, 120 Angola, 186 Ant Brain, 111 Ant Financial, 111–12 antitrust laws, 114, 119–20 Apache HTTP Server, 242 Appelbaum, Binyamin, 63 Apple, 47, 62, 65, 85, 94, 104, 108, 112, 122 App Store, 105, 112, 115 chip production, 113 Covid-19 pandemic (2019–21), 222–3 data collection, 228 iOS, 85 iPhone, 47, 62, 85, 94, 105 media subscription, 112 watches, 112 APT33 hacker group, 198 Aral, Sinan, 238 Aramco, 108, 198 Armenia, 206–7 Arthur, William Brian, 110, 123 artificial intelligence, 4, 8, 31–4, 54, 88, 113, 249 academic brain drain, 118 automation, 125–42 data and, 31–2, 142 data network effect, 106–7 drone technology and, 208, 214 education and, 88 employment and, 126–7 healthcare and, 88, 103 job interviews and, 153 regulation of, 187, 188 arXiv, 59 Asana, 151 Asian Development Bank, 193 Aslam, Yaseen, 148 Assembly Bill 5 (California, 2019), 148 asymmetric conflict, 206 AT&T, 76, 100 Atari, 16 attack surfaces, 192–3, 196, 209, 210 Aurora, 141 Australia, 102, 197 automation, 125–42 autonomous weapons, 208, 214 Azerbaijan, 173, 206–7 Ballmer, Steve, 85 Bangladesh, 175 banking, 122, 237 Barcelona, Catalonia, 188 Barlow, John Perry, 184 Barrons, Richard, 195, 211 Bartlett, Albert, 73 batteries, 40, 51, 53–4, 250, 251 Battle of the Overpass (1937), 162 Bayraktar TB2 drone, 206 Bee Gees, 72 Bekar, Clifford, 45 Bell Labs, 18 Bell Telephone Company, 100 Benioff, Marc, 108–9 Bentham, Jeremy, 152 Berlin Wall, fall of (1989), 4 Bermuda, 119 Berners-Lee, Timothy, 55, 100, 160, 239 Bessen, James, 46 Bezos, Jeffrey, 135–6 BGI, 41 Biden, Joseph, 225 Bing, 107 biological weapons, 207, 213 biology, 10, 39, 40–42, 44, 46 genome sequencing, 40–41, 90, 229, 234, 245–7, 250, 252 synthetic biology, 42, 46, 69, 174, 245, 250 biopolymers, 42 bits, 18 Black Death (1346–53), 12 BlackBerry, 120 Blair, Tony, 81 Bletchley Park, Buckinghamshire, 22 blitzscaling, 110 Blockbuster, 138 BMW, 177 Boeing, 51, 236 Bol.com, 103 Bollywood, 181 Boole, George, 18 Bork, Robert, 114–15, 117, 119 Bosworth, Andrew, 233 Boyer, Pascal, 75 Boyle, James, 234 BP, 92, 158 brain, 77 Braudel, Fernand, 75 Brave, 242 Brazil, 202 Bremmer, Ian, 187 Bretton Woods Conference (1944), 87 Brexit (2016–20), 6, 168 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 87, 129, 191 Brookings Institution, 130 BT, 123 Bulgaria, 145 Bundy, Willard Legrand, 149 Busan, South Korea, 56 business, 82, 92–124 diminishing returns to scale, 93, 108 economic dynamism and, 117 economies of scale, 50, 92 growth, 110–13 increasing returns to scale, 108–10 intangible economy, 104–7, 118, 156, 175, 180 linear value chains, 101 market share, 93–6, 111 monopolies, 10, 71, 94, 95, 114–24 network effect, 96–101 platform model, 101–3, 219 re-localisation, 11, 166–79, 187, 252, 255 state-sized companies, 11, 67 superstar companies, 10, 94–6 supply chains, 61–2, 166–7, 169, 175, 187, 252, 255 taxation of, 96, 118–19 Butler, Nick, 179 ByteDance, 28 C40 initiative, 189 Cambridge University, 127, 188 cancer, 57–8, 127 Capitol building storming (2021), 225 car industry, 93 carbon emissions, 35, 90, 251 Carlaw, Kenneth, 45 Carnegie, Andrew, 112 Carnegie Mellon University, 131 Catholic Church, 83, 88 censorship, 216–17, 224–6, 236 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 194 Cerebras, 34 cervical smears, 57–8 chemical weapons, 207, 213 Chen, Brian, 228 chewing gum, 78 Chicago Pile-1 reactor, 64 Chile, 170 China automation in, 127, 137 brainwave reading in, 152 Covid-19 pandemic (2019–21), 245 drone technology in, 207 Great Firewall, 186, 201 Greater Bay Area, 182 horizontal expansion in, 111–12 manufacturing in, 176 misinformation campaigns, 203 raw materials, demand for, 178 Singles’ Day, 48 social credit systems, 230 superstar companies in, 95 US, relations with, 166 chips, 19–22, 28–9, 48–9, 52, 113, 251 Christchurch massacre (2019), 236 Christensen, Clayton, 24 CIPD, 153 cities, 11, 75, 169, 179–84, 188, 255 Clegg, Nick, 225–6, 235 climate change, 90, 169, 187, 189, 251, 252 cloud computing, 85, 112 Cloudflare, 200 cluster bombs, 213 CNN, 185, 190 coal, 40, 65, 172 Coase, Ronald, 92 Coca-Cola, 93 code is law, 220–22, 235 cold fusion, 113–14 Cold War (1947–91), 194, 212, 213 collective bargaining, 147, 149, 154, 156, 162–5 Colombia, 145 colonialism, 167 Columbus, Christopher, 4 combination, 53–7 Comical Ali, 201 commons, 234–5, 241–3, 256 companies, see business comparative advantage, 170 complex systems, 2 compounding, 22–3, 28 CompuServe, 100 computing, 4, 10, 15–36, 44, 46, 249 artificial intelligence, 4, 8, 31–4, 54, 88 cloud computing, 85, 112 internet, 47–8, 55, 65, 84 Law of Accelerating Returns, 30–31, 33, 35 machining, 43 Moore’s Law, see Moore’s Law quantum computing, 35 transistors, 18–22, 28–9, 48–9, 52 conflict, 87, 189, 190–215 attack surfaces, 192–3, 196, 209, 210 cyberattacks, 11, 114, 140, 181, 187, 190–200, 209–14, 256 de-escalation, 212–13 drone technology, 11, 192, 204–9, 214, 256 institutional change and, 87 misinformation, 11, 191, 192, 200–204, 209, 212, 217, 225 new wars, 194 non-proliferation, 213–14 re-localisation and, 189, 193, 194, 209 consent of the networked, 223 Costco, 67 Coursera, 58 Covid-19 pandemic (2019–21), 12–13, 59, 78–9, 131, 245–9 automation and, 127, 135, 136 cities and, 183 contact-tracing apps, 222–3 gig economy and, 146 lockdowns, 12, 152, 176, 183, 246 manufacturing and, 176 misinformation and, 202–4, 247–8 preprint servers and, 60 recession (2020–21), 178 remote working and, 146, 151, 153 supply chains and, 169, 246 vaccines, 12, 202, 211, 245–7 workplace cultures and, 151, 152 cranks, 54 credit ratings, 162, 229 critical thinking skills, 212 Croatia, 145 Crocker, David, 55 crowdsourcing, 143–4 Cuba, 203 Cuban missile crisis (1962), 99, 212 cultural lag, 85 cyberattacks, 11, 114, 140, 181, 187, 190–200, 209–14, 256 CyberPeace Institute, 214 Daniel, Simon, 173–4 Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 183 Darktrace, 197 data, 8, 11, 71, 217–19, 226–31, 235, 237–42, 256 AI and, 8, 32, 33, 58, 106 compensation for, 239 commons, 242 cyberattacks and, 196 doppelgängers, 219, 226, 228, 239 interoperability and, 237–9 network effects, 106–7, 111 protection laws, 186, 226 rights, 240 Daugherty, Paul, 141 DDT (dichlorodiphenyltrichloroe thane), 253 death benefits, 151 Dediu, Horace, 24, 30 deep learning, 32–4, 54, 58, 127 deforestation, 251 dehumanisation, 71, 154, 158 deindustrialisation, 168 Deliveroo, 154, 163 Delphi, 100 dematerialised techniques, 166, 175 Denmark, 58, 160, 199–200, 257 Deutsche Bank, 130 Diamandis, Peter, 5 Dickens, Charles, 80 digital cameras, 83–4 Digital Geneva Convention, 211 Digital Markets Act (EU, 2020), 122 digital minilateralism, 188 Digital Nations group, 188 Digital Services Act (EU, 2020), 123 diminishing returns, 93, 108 disinformation, see misinformation DoorDash, 147, 148, 248 dot-com bubble (1995–2000), 8, 108, 150 Double Irish tax loophole, 119 DoubleClick, 117 drone technology, 11, 192, 204–9, 214, 256 Dubai, UAE, 43 Duke University, 234 dystopia, 208, 230, 253 Eagan, Nicole, 197 eBay, 98, 121 Ecobee, 120 economies of scale, 50, 92 Economist, The, 8, 65, 119, 183, 239 economists, 63 Edelman, 3 education artificial intelligence and, 88 media literacy, 211–12 Egypt, 145, 186 Elance, 144 electric cars, 51, 69, 75, 173–4, 177, 250 electricity, 26, 45, 46, 54, 157, 249–50 see also energy Electronic Frontier Foundation, 184 email, 6, 55 embodied institutions, 82 employment, 10, 71, 125–65 automation, 125–42 collective bargaining, 147, 149, 154, 156, 162–5 dehumanisation and, 71, 154, 158 flexicurity, 160–61, 257 gig economy, 10, 71, 142–9, 153, 162, 164, 239, 252, 255 income inequality, 155–8, 161, 168 lump of labour fallacy, 139 management, 149–54, 158–9 protections, 85–6, 147–9 reskilling, 159–60 universal basic income (UBI), 160, 189 Enclosure, 234–5, 241 energy, 11, 37–8, 39–40, 44, 46, 172–4, 250 cold fusion, 113–14 fossil fuels, 40, 159, 172, 250 gravitational potential, 53 solar power, 37–8, 53, 65, 77, 82, 90, 171, 172, 173, 249, 250, 251 storage, 40, 53, 114, 173–4, 250, 251 wind power, 39–40, 52 Energy Vault, 53–4, 173 Engels, Friedrich, 81 Engels’ pause, 80, 81 environmental movement, 73 Epic Games, 116 estate agents, 100 Estonia, 188, 190–91, 200, 211 Etzion Airbase, Sinai Peninsula, 195 European Commission, 116, 122, 123 European Space Agency, 56 European Union, 6, 82, 147, 186, 226 Excel, 99 exogeny, 2 exponential gap, 9, 10, 67–91, 70, 89, 253 cyber security and, 193 institutions and, 9, 10, 79–88, 90 mathematical understanding and, 71–5 predictions and, 75–9 price declines and, 68–9 superstar companies and, 10, 94–124 exponential growth bias, 73 Exponential View, 8–9 externalities, 97 extremism, 232–4 ExxonMobil, 65, 92 Facebook, 27, 28, 65, 94, 104, 108, 122, 216–17, 218, 219, 221–2, 223 advertising business, 94, 228 censorship on, 216–17, 224–6, 236 collective bargaining and, 164 data collection on, 228, 239–40 extremism and, 233–4 Instagram acquisition (2012), 117, 120 integrity teams, 234 interoperability, 237–8 Kenosha unrest shooting (2020), 224 misinformation on, 201, 225 network effect and, 98, 223 Oculus acquisition (2014), 117 pay at, 156–7 Phan photo controversy (2016), 216–17, 224, 225 platform model, 101 polarisation and, 233 relationship status on, 221–2 Rohingya ethnic cleansing (2018), 224, 225 US presidential election (2016), 217 WhatsApp acquisition (2014), 117 facial recognition, 152, 208 Factory Act (UK, 1833), 81 Fairchild Semiconductor, 19, 21 fake news, 201–4 family dinners, 86 farming, 170–72, 251 Farrar, James, 148 fax machines, 97 Federal Aviation Administration (US), 236 feedback loops, 3, 13 fertilizers, 35, 90 5G, 203 Financial Conduct Authority, 122 Financial Times, 183 Finland, 160, 211–12 Fitbit, 158 Fiverr, 144 flashing of headlights, 83 flexicurity, 160, 257 flints, 42 flywheels, 54 Ford, 54, 92, 162 Ford, Gerald, 114 Ford, Henry, 54, 162 Ford, Martin, 125 Fortnite, 116 fossil fuels, 40, 159, 172 France, 100, 138, 139, 147, 163 free-market economics, 63–4 freelance work, 10, 71, 142–9 Frey, Carl, 129, 134, 141 Friedman, Milton, 63–4, 241 Friedman, Thomas, 167 FriendFeed, 238 Friendster, 26 Fudan University, 245 fund management, 132 Galilei, Galileo, 83 gaming, 86 Gates, Bill, 17, 25, 84 gender, 6 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 87 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 226 General Electric, 52 General Motors, 92, 125, 130 general purpose technologies, 10, 45–8 generative adversarial networks (GANs), 58 Geneva Conventions, 193, 199, 209 Genghis Khan, 44 GEnie, 100 genome sequencing, 40–41, 90, 229, 234, 245–7, 250, 252 Germany, 75, 134, 147 Giddens, Anthony, 82 gig economy, 10, 71, 142–9, 153, 162, 164, 239, 252, 255 Gilbreth, Lillian, 150 Ginsparg, Paul, 59 GitHub, 58, 60 GlaxoSmithKline, 229–30 global financial crisis (2007–9), 168 Global Hawk drones, 206 global positioning systems (GPS), 197 globalisation, 11, 62, 64, 156, 166, 167–71, 177, 179, 187, 193 internet and, 185 conflict and, 189, 193, 194 Glocer, Thomas, 56 Go (game), 132 GOAT, 102 Gojek, 103 Golden Triangle, 170 Goldman Sachs, 151 Goodfellow, Ian, 58 Google, 5, 35, 36, 94, 98, 104, 108, 115, 122 advertising business, 94, 112–13, 116, 117, 227 Android, 85, 94, 117, 120 chip production, 113 Covid-19 pandemic (2019–21), 222–3 data network effect, 106–7 death benefits, 151 Double Irish tax loophole, 119 Maps, 113 quantum computing, 35 R&D, 114, 118 vertical integration, 112–13, 116 X, 114 YouTube acquisition (2006), 112, 117 Gopher, 59, 100 GPT-3, 33 Graeber, David, 133–4 Grand Bazaar, Istanbul, 102 Graphcore, 34, 35 graphics chips, 34 Grateful Dead, The, 184 gravitational potential energy, 53 gravity bombs, 195 Greater Bay Area, China, 182 Greenberg, Andy, 199 Gross, Bill, 53 Grove, Andrew, 17 GRU (Glavnoje Razvedyvatel’noje Upravlenije), 199 Guangzhou, Guangdong, 182 Guardian, 8, 125, 154, 226, 227 Guiyang, Guizhou, 166 H1N1 virus, 75 Habermas, Jürgen, 218 Hard Times (Dickens), 80 Hardin, Garrett, 241 Harop drones, 207–8 Harpy drones, 207–8 Harvard University, 150, 218, 220, 221, 253 healthcare artificial intelligence and, 57–8, 88, 103 data and, 230, 239, 250–51 wearable devices and, 158, 251 Helsinki, Finland, 160 Herlev Hospital, Denmark, 58 Hinton, Geoffrey, 32, 126–7 HIPA Act (US, 1996), 230 Hitachi, 152 Hobbes, Thomas, 210 Hoffman, Josh, 174 Hoffman, Reid, 110, 111 Holmes, Edward, 245 homophily, 231–4 Hong Kong, 182 horizontal expansion, 111–12, 218 Houston Islam protests (2016), 203 Houthis, 206 Howe, Jeff, 143 Hsinchu, Taiwan, 181 Hughes, Chris, 217 Hull, Charles, 43 Human + Machine (Daugherty), 141 human brain, 77 human genome, 40–41, 90, 229, 234, 250 human resources, 150 Hussein, Saddam, 195 Hyaline, 174 hydroponics, 171 hyperinflation, 75 IBM, 17, 21, 47, 98 IDC, 219 Ideal-X, 61 Ikea, 144 Illumina, 41 Ilves, Toomas Hendrik, 190 ImageNet, 32 immigration, 139, 168, 183–4 Impossible Foods, 69 Improv, 99 income inequality, 155–8, 161, 168 India, 103, 145, 181, 186, 224, 253, 254 Indonesia, 103 Industrial Revolution (1760–1840), 79–81, 157, 235 informational networks, 59–60 ING, 178 innovation, 14, 117 Innovator’s Dilemma, The (Christensen), 24 Instagram, 84, 117, 120, 121, 237 institutions, 9, 10, 79–88, 90–91 path dependence, 86–7 punctuated equilibrium, 87–8 intangible economy, 104–7, 118, 156, 175, 180 integrated circuits, 19 Intel, 16–17, 19, 163 intellectual property law, 82 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (1987), 237 International Alliance of App-Based Transport Workers, 164 International Court of Justice, 224 International Criminal Court, 208 International Energy Agency, 77, 82 International Labour Organization, 131 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 87, 167, 187 international organisations, 82 International Organization for Standardization, 55, 61 International Rescue Committee, 184 International Telecommunication Union, 55 internet, 7, 47–8, 55, 65, 72, 75, 84–5, 88, 115, 184–6 code is law, 220–22, 235 data and, 11, 32, 71 informational networks, 59–60 localisation, 185–6 lockdowns and, 12 network effect, 100–101 online shopping, 48, 61, 62, 75, 94, 102, 135 platform model and, 102 public sphere and, 223 standardisation, 55 Wi-Fi, 151 interoperability, 55, 120–22, 237–9, 241, 243, 256–7 iPhone, 47, 62, 85, 94, 115, 175 Iran, 186, 196, 198, 203, 206 Iraq, 195–6, 201, 209 Ireland, 57–8, 119 Islamic State, 194, 233 Israel, 37, 188, 195–6, 198, 206, 207–8 Istanbul, Turkey, 102 Jacobs, Jane, 182 Japan, 37, 152, 171, 174 Jasanoff, Sheila, 253 JD.com, 137 Jena, Rajesh, 127 Jio, 103 job interviews, 153, 156 John Paul II, Pope, 83 Johnson, Boris, 79 Jumia, 103 just in time supply chains, 61–2 Kahneman, Daniel, 74 KakaoTalk, 27 Kaldor, Mary, 194 Kapor, Mitchell, 99 Karunaratne, Sid, 140–41, 151 Kenosha unrest shooting (2020), 224 Keynes, John Maynard, 126, 158 Khan, Lina, 119 Khartoum, Sudan, 183 Kim Jong-un, 198 King’s College London, 179 Kiva Systems, 136 Kobo360, 145 Kodak, 83–4, 88 Kranzberg, Melvin, 254 Krizhevsky, Alex, 32–3, 34 Kubursi, Atif, 178 Kurdistan Workers’ Party, 206 Kurzweil, Ray, 29–31, 33, 35, 77 Lagos, Nigeria, 182 Lahore, Pakistan, 102 landmines, 213 Law of Accelerating Returns, 30–31, 33, 35 Laws of Motion, 20 learning by doing, 48, 53 Leggatt, George, 148 Lemonade, 56 Lessig, Larry, 220–21 Leviathan (Hobbes), 210 Li Fei-Fei, 32 life expectancy, 25, 26 light bulbs, 44, 157 Lime, 27 Limits to Growth, The (Meadows et al.), 73 linear value chains, 101 LinkedIn, 26, 110, 121, 237, 238 Linkos Group, 197 Linux OS, 242 Lipsey, Richard, 45 lithium-ion batteries, 40, 51 lithium, 170 localism, 11, 166–90, 252, 255 log files, 227 logarithmic scales, 20 logic gates, 18 logistic curve, 25, 30, 51, 52, 69–70 London, England, 180, 181, 183 London Underground, 133–4 looms, 157 Lordstown Strike (1972), 125 Lotus Development Corporation, 99 Luddites, 125, 253 Lufa Farms, 171–2 Luminate, 240 lump of labour fallacy, 139 Lusaka, Zambia, 15 Lyft, 146, 148 machine learning, 31–4, 54, 58, 88, 127, 129, 143 MacKinnon, Rebecca, 223 Maersk, 197, 199, 211 malaria, 253 Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 shootdown (2014), 199 Malta, 114 Malthus, Thomas, 72–3 malware, 197 Man with the Golden Gun, The (1974 film), 37 manufacturing, 10, 39, 42–4, 46, 166–7, 175–9 additive, 43–4, 46, 48, 88, 166, 169, 175–9 automation and, 130 re-localisation, 175–9 subtractive, 42–3 market saturation, 25–8, 51, 52 market share, 93–6, 111 Marshall, Alfred, 97 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 18, 147, 202, 238 Mastercard, 98 May, Theresa, 183 Mayors for a Guaranteed Income, 189 McCarthy, John, 31 McKinsey, 76, 94 McMaster University, 178 measles, 246 Mechanical Turk, 142–3, 144, 145 media literacy, 211–12 meningitis, 246 Mexico, 202 microorganisms, 42, 46, 69 Microsoft, 16–17, 65, 84–5, 88, 98–9, 100, 105, 108, 122, 221 Bing, 107 cloud computing, 85 data collection, 228 Excel, 99 internet and, 84–5, 100 network effect and, 99 Office software, 98–9, 110, 152 Windows, 85, 98–9 Workplace Productivity scores, 152 Mill, John Stuart, 193 miniaturisation, 34–5 minimum wage, 147, 161 misinformation, 11, 191, 192, 200–204, 209, 212, 217, 225, 247–8 mobile phones, 76, 121 see also smartphones; telecom companies Moderna, 245, 247 Moixa, 174 Mondelez, 197, 211 Mongol Empire (1206–1368), 44 monopolies, 10, 71, 94, 95, 114–24, 218, 255 Monopoly (board game), 82 Montreal, Quebec, 171 mood detection systems, 152 Moore, Gordon, 19, 48 Moore’s Law, 19–22, 26, 28–9, 31, 34, 63, 64, 74 artificial intelligence and, 32, 33–4 Kodak and, 83 price and, 41–2, 51, 68–9 as social fact, 29, 49 superstar companies and, 95 time, relationship with, 48–9 Moravec, Hans, 131 Moravec’s paradox, 131–2 Motorola, 76 Mount Mercy College, Cork, 57 Mozilla Firefox, 242 Mumbai, India, 181 mumps, 246 muskets, 54–5 MySpace, 26–7 Nadella, Satya, 85 Nagorno-Karabakh War (2020), 206–7 napalm, 216 NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration), 56 Natanz nuclear site, Iran, 196 National Health Service (NHS), 87 nationalism, 168, 186 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 191, 213 Netflix, 104, 107, 109, 136, 137, 138, 139, 151, 248 Netherlands, 103 Netscape Communicator, 6 networks, 58–62 network effects, 96–101, 106, 110, 121, 223 neural networks, 32–4 neutral, technology as, 5, 220–21, 254 new wars, 194 New York City, New York, 180, 183 New York Times, 3, 125, 190, 228 New Zealand, 188, 236 Newton, Isaac, 20 Nigeria, 103, 145, 182, 254 Niinistö, Sauli, 212 Nike, 102 nitrogen fertilizers, 35 Nixon, Richard, 25, 114 Nobel Prize, 64, 74, 241 Nokia, 120 non-state actors, 194, 213 North Korea, 198 North Macedonia, 200–201 Norway, 173, 216 NotPetya malware, 197, 199–200, 211, 213 Novell, 98 Noyce, Robert, 19 NSO Group, 214 nuclear weapons, 193, 195–6, 212, 237 Nuremberg Trials (1945–6), 208 O’Reilly, Tim, 107 O’Sullivan, Laura, 57–8, 60 Obama, Barack, 205, 214, 225 Ocado, 137 Ocasio-Cortez, Alexandria, 239 Oculus, 117 oDesk, 144 Ofcom, 8 Ofoto, 84 Ogburn, William, 85 oil industry, 172, 250 Houthi drone attacks (2019), 206 OAPEC crisis (1973–4), 37, 258 Shamoon attack (2012), 198 Standard Oil breakup (1911), 93–4 Olduvai, Tanzania, 42 online shopping, 48, 61, 62, 75, 94, 102, 135 open-source software, 242 Openreach, 123 Operation Opera (1981), 195–6, 209 opium, 38 Orange, 121 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 119, 167 Osborne Computer Corporation, 16 Osborne, Michael, 129 Osirak nuclear reactor, Iraq, 195–6, 209 Ostrom, Elinor, 241 Oxford University, 129, 134, 203, 226 pace of change, 3 pagers, 87 Pakistan, 145, 205 palladium, 170 PalmPilot, 173 panopticon, 152 Paris, France, 181, 183 path dependence, 86 PayPal, 98, 110 PC clones, 17 PeerIndex, 8, 201, 237 Pegasus, 214 PeoplePerHour, 144 PepsiCo, 93 Perez, Carlota, 46–7 pernicious polarization, 232 perpetual motion, 95, 106, 107, 182 Petersen, Michael Bang, 75 Phan Thi Kim Phuc, 216–17, 224, 225 pharmaceutical industry, 6, 93, 250 phase transitions, 4 Philippines, 186, 203 Phillips Exeter Academy, 150 phishing scams, 211 Phoenix, Arizona, 134 photolithography, 19 Pigou, Arthur Cecil, 97 Piketty, Thomas, 160 Ping An Good Doctor, 103, 250 Pix Moving, 166, 169, 175 PKK (Partîya Karkerên Kurdistanê), 206 Planet Labs, 69 platforms, 101–3, 219 PlayStation, 86 plough, 157 Polanyi, Michael, 133 polarisation, 231–4 polio, 246 population, 72–3 Portify, 162 Postel, Jon, 55 Postings, Robert, 233 Predator drones, 205, 206 preprints, 59–60 price gouging, 93 price of technology, 22, 68–9 computing, 68–9, 191, 249 cyber-weapons, 191–2 drones, 192 genome sequencing, 41–2, 252 renewable energy, 39–40, 250 printing press, 45 public sphere, 218, 221, 223 Pulitzer Prize, 216 punctuated equilibrium, 87–8 al-Qaeda, 205, 210–11 Qatar, 198 quantum computing, 35 quantum physics, 29 quarantines, 12, 152, 176, 183, 246 R&D (research and development), 67–8, 113, 118 racial bias, 231 racism, 225, 231, 234 radicalisation pathways, 233 radiologists, 126 Raford, Noah, 43 Raz, Ze’ev, 195, 209 RB, 197 re-localisation, 11, 166–90, 253, 255 conflict and, 189, 193, 194, 209 Reagan, Ronald, 64, 163 religion, 6, 82, 83 resilience, 257 reskilling, 159–60 responsibility gap, 209 Restrepo, Pascual, 139 Reuters, 8, 56, 132 revolutions, 87 Ricardo, David, 169–70, 177 rights, 240–41 Rise of the Robots, The (Ford), 125 Rittenhouse, Kyle, 224 Roche, 67 Rockefeller, John, 93 Rohingyas, 224 Rome, ancient, 180 Rose, Carol, 243 Rotterdam, Netherlands, 56 Rule of Law, 82 running shoes, 102, 175–6 Russell, Stuart, 31, 118 Russian Federation, 122 disinformation campaigns, 203 Estonia cyberattacks (2007), 190–91, 200 Finland, relations with, 212 Nagorno-Karabakh War (2020), 206 nuclear weapons, 237 Ukraine cyberattacks (2017), 197, 199–200 US election interference (2016), 217 Yandex, 122 S-curve, 25, 30, 51, 52, 69–70 al-Sahhaf, Muhammad Saeed, 201 Salesforce, 108–9 Saliba, Samer, 184 salt, 114 Samsung, 93, 228 San Francisco, California, 181 Sandel, Michael, 218 Sanders, Bernard, 163 Sandworm, 197, 199–200, 211 Santander, 95 Sasson, Steve, 83 satellites, 56–7, 69 Saturday Night Fever (1977 soundtrack), 72 Saudi Arabia, 108, 178, 198, 203, 206 Schmidt, Eric, 5 Schwarz Gruppe, 67 Second Machine Age, The (Brynjolfsson and McAfee), 129 self-driving vehicles, 78, 134–5, 141 semiconductors, 18–22, 28–9, 48–9, 52, 113, 251 September 11 attacks (2001), 205, 210–11 Shamoon virus, 198 Shanghai, China, 56 Shannon, Claude, 18 Sharp, 16 Shenzhen, Guangdong, 182 shipping containers, 61–2, 63 shopping, 48, 61, 62, 75, 94, 102, 135 Siemens, 196 silicon chips, see chips Silicon Valley, 5, 7, 15, 24, 65, 110, 129, 223 Sinai Peninsula, 195 Sinclair ZX81, 15, 17, 21, 36 Singapore, 56 Singles’ Day, 48 Singularity University, 5 SixDegrees, 26 Skydio R1 drone, 208 smartphones, 22, 26, 46, 47–8, 65, 86, 88, 105, 111, 222 Smith, Adam, 169–70 sneakers, 102, 175–6 Snow, Charles Percy, 7 social credit systems, 230 social media, 26–8 censorship on, 216–17, 224–6, 236 collective bargaining and, 164 data collection on, 228 interoperability, 121, 237–8 market saturation, 25–8 misinformation on, 192, 201–4, 217, 247–8 network effect, 98, 223 polarisation and, 231–4 software as a service, 109 solar power, 37–8, 53, 65, 77, 82, 90, 171, 172, 173, 249, 250, 251 SolarWinds, 200 Solberg, Erna, 216 South Africa, 170 South Korea, 188, 198, 202 Southey, Robert, 80 sovereignty, 185, 199, 214 Soviet Union (1922–91), 185, 190, 194, 212 Spain, 170, 188 Spanish flu pandemic (1918–20), 75 Speedfactory, Ansbach, 176 Spire, 69 Spotify, 69 Sputnik 1 orbit (1957), 64, 83 stagflation, 63 Standard and Poor, 104 Standard Oil, 93–4 standardisation, 54–7, 61, 62 Stanford University, 32, 58 Star Wars franchise, 99 state-sized companies, 11, 67 see also superstar companies states, 82 stirrups, 44 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 208 Stockton, California, 160 strategic snowflakes, 211 stress tests, 237 Stuxnet, 196, 214 Sudan, 183 superstar companies, 10, 11, 67, 94–124, 218–26, 252, 255 blitzscaling, 110 collective bargaining and, 163 horizontal expansion, 111–12, 218 increasing returns to scale, 108–10 innovation and, 117–18 intangible economy, 104–7, 118, 156 interoperability and, 120–22, 237–9 monopolies, 114–24, 218 network effect, 96–101, 121 platform model, 101–3, 219 taxation of, 118–19 vertical expansion, 112–13 workplace cultures, 151 supply chains, 61–2, 166–7, 169, 175, 187, 252 surveillance, 152–3, 158 Surviving AI (Chace), 129 Sutskever, Ilya, 32 synthetic biology, 42, 46, 69, 174, 245, 250 Syria, 186 Taiwan, 181, 212 Talkspace, 144 Tallinn, Estonia, 190 Tang, Audrey, 212 Tanzania, 42, 183 TaskRabbit, 144 Tasmania, Australia, 197 taxation, 10, 63, 96, 118–19 gig economy and, 146 superstar companies and, 118–19 Taylor, Frederick Winslow, 150, 152, 153, 154 Tel Aviv, Israel, 181 telecom companies, 122–3 Tencent, 65, 104, 108, 122 territorial sovereignty, 185, 199, 214 Tesco, 67, 93 Tesla, 69, 78, 113 Thailand, 176, 203 Thatcher, Margaret, 64, 163 Thelen, Kathleen, 87 Thiel, Peter, 110–11 3D printing, see additive manufacturing TikTok, 28, 69, 159–60, 219 Tisné, Martin, 240 Tomahawk missiles, 207 Toyota, 95 trade networks, 61–2, 166–7, 169, 175 trade unions, see collective bargaining Trading Places (1983 film), 132 Tragedy of the Commons, The (Hardin), 241 transistors, 18–22, 28–9, 48–9, 52, 113, 251 transparency, 236 Treaty of Westphalia (1648), 199 TRS-80, 16 Trump, Donald, 79, 119, 166, 201, 225, 237 Tufekci, Zeynep, 233 Turing, Alan, 18, 22 Turkey, 102, 176, 186, 198, 202, 206, 231 Tversky, Amos, 74 23andMe, 229–30 Twilio, 151 Twitch, 225 Twitter, 65, 201, 202, 219, 223, 225, 237 two cultures, 7, 8 Uber, 69, 94, 102, 103, 106, 142, 144, 145 Assembly Bill 5 (California, 2019), 148 engineering jobs, 156 London ban (2019), 183, 188 London protest (2016), 153 pay at, 147, 156 satisfaction levels at, 146 Uber BV v Aslam (2021), 148 UiPath, 130 Ukraine, 197, 199 Unilever, 153 Union of Concerned Scientists, 56 unions, see collective bargaining United Arab Emirates, 43, 198, 250 United Autoworkers Union, 162 United Kingdom BBC, 87 Biobank, 242 Brexit (2016–20), 6, 168 collective bargaining in, 163 Covid-19 epidemic (2020–21), 79, 203 DDT in, 253 digital minilateralism, 188 drone technology in, 207 flashing of headlights in, 83 Golden Triangle, 170 Google and, 116 Industrial Revolution (1760–1840), 79–81 Luddite rebellion (1811–16), 125, 253 misinformation in, 203, 204 National Cyber Force, 200 NHS, 87 self-employment in, 148 telecom companies in, 123 Thatcher government (1979–90), 64, 163 United Nations, 87, 88, 188 United States antitrust law in, 114 automation in, 127 Battle of the Overpass (1937), 162 Capitol building storming (2021), 225 China, relations with, 166 Cold War (1947–91), 194, 212, 213 collective bargaining in, 163 Covid-19 epidemic (2020–21), 79, 202–4 Cyber Command, 200, 210 DDT in, 253 drone technology in, 205, 214 economists in, 63 HIPA Act (1996), 230 Kenosha unrest shooting (2020), 224 Lordstown Strike (1972), 125 manufacturing in, 130 misinformation in, 202–4 mobile phones in, 76 nuclear weapons, 237 Obama administration (2009–17), 205, 214 polarisation in, 232 presidential election (2016), 199, 201, 217 presidential election (2020), 202–3 Reagan administration (1981–9), 64, 163 self-employment in, 148 September 11 attacks (2001), 205, 210–11 shipping containers in, 61 shopping in, 48 solar energy research, 37 Standard Oil breakup (1911), 93–4 taxation in, 63, 119 Trump administration (2017–21), 79, 119, 166, 168, 201, 225, 237 Vietnam War (1955–75), 216 War on Terror (2001–), 205 universal basic income (UBI), 160, 189 universal service obligation, 122 University of Cambridge, 127, 188 University of Chicago, 63 University of Colorado, 73 University of Delaware, 55 University of Oxford, 129, 134, 203, 226 University of Southern California, 55 unwritten rules, 82 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 194 UpWork, 145–6 USB (Universal Serial Bus), 51 Ut, Nick, 216 utility providers, 122–3 vaccines, 12, 202, 211, 245–7 Vail, Theodore, 100 value-free, technology as, 5, 220–21, 254 Veles, North Macedonia, 200–201 Véliz, Carissa, 226 Venezuela, 75 venture capitalists, 117 vertical expansion, 112–13, 116 vertical farms, 171–2, 251 video games, 86 Vietnam, 61, 175, 216 Virological, 245 Visa, 98 VisiCalc, 99 Vodafone, 121 Vogels, Werner, 68 Wag!

The New Urban Crisis: How Our Cities Are Increasing Inequality, Deepening Segregation, and Failing the Middle Class?and What We Can Do About It
by Richard Florida
Published 9 May 2016

Punk, new wave, and rap were electrifying the area’s music venues and clubs—the first tender shoots of what would later become a full-blown urban revival. But it was in Pittsburgh, where I taught for almost twenty years at Carnegie Mellon University (CMU), that I began to sort out the main factors acting on America’s cities. Pittsburgh had been devastated by deindustrialization, losing hundreds of thousands of people and considerable numbers of high-paying factory jobs. Thanks to its world-class universities, medical centers, and corporate research and development units, as well as its major philanthropies, the city was able to stave off the worst. Its leaders were working hard to change its trajectory, and as a professor of economic development I was involved in the thick of it.

…

As I pored over the data, I could see that only a limited number of cities and metro areas, maybe a couple of dozen, were really making it in the knowledge economy; many more were failing to keep pace or falling further behind. Many Rustbelt cities are still grappling with the devastating combination of suburban flight, urban decay, and deindustrialization. Sunbelt cities continue to attract people to their more affordable, sprawling suburban developments, but few are building robust, sustainable economies that are powered by knowledge and innovation. Tens of millions of Americans remain locked in persistent poverty. And virtually all our cities suffer from growing economic divides.

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I delved deep into the many challenges that face the rapidly growing cities of the world’s emerging economies, where urbanization is failing to spur the same kind of economic growth and rising living standards that it did for the advanced nations.3 The New Urban Crisis is different from the older urban crisis of the 1960s and 1970s. That previous crisis was defined by the economic abandonment of cities and their loss of economic function. Shaped by deindustrialization and white flight, its hallmark was a hollowing out of the city center, a phenomenon that urban theorists and policymakers labeled the hole-in-the-donut. As cities lost their core industries, they became sites of growing and persistent poverty: their housing decayed; crime and violence increased; and social problems, including drug abuse, teen pregnancy, and infant mortality, escalated.

The Wealth of Humans: Work, Power, and Status in the Twenty-First Century
by Ryan Avent
Published 20 Sep 2016

Over time, the bug affected more industries in more corners of the rich world: in America, for instance, manufacturing employment peaked as a share of total employment in the early 1940s and declined at a remarkably steady rate thereafter; but there have been particularly nasty spells of employment loss along the way – in the early 1980s, for instance (when Reagan and Thatcher earned the ire of many blue-collar workers) and then in the 2000s. Remarkably, manufacturing now accounts for less than 10 per cent of American employment. In the emerging world, deindustrialization is occurring at ever earlier stages of development: an ailment that economist Dani Rodrik has labelled ‘premature deindustrialization’.12 When manufacturing’s share of total value added in the South Korean economy peaked in 1988, real income per person in South Korea was about $10,000, or just less than half the American level at the time. When that same peak was reached in Indonesia in 2002, its real income per person was roughly $6,000, or about 15 per cent of the American level.

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That knowledge would not be especially valuable at other publications, nor would it do the designer much good to try to rely on the corresponding social capital from her old employer at her new job. So, as social capital loomed larger within rich economies, it became clear that firms were not the only context in which social capital took on new salience. Its rise also boosted the fortunes of big cities with lots of skilled workers. By the end of the 1970s, deindustrialization and suburbanization had many of the rich world’s great industrial cities on the ropes. Populations were crashing. In 1975, New York City very nearly went bankrupt. Popular cinema was filled with dystopian visions of the urban future, in which street punks ruled the streets of gutted cities.

…

The digital revolution, which helped to establish the supply-chain revolution in the first place, continues to shape trade patterns and the ways in which trade enables development. This time, new technology seems to be making life harder for the emerging world. Supply-chain-powered development represented an accelerated – if somewhat superficial – form of industrialization. It seems to have also, as a side effect, accelerated deindustrialization. Readers in rich economies will be well aware of the phenomenon – the loss of manufacturing work to other locations – that hollowed out once-great cities like Detroit. Britain, the first industrializer, was the first to face this particular ill, quite early in the twentieth century. Over time, the bug affected more industries in more corners of the rich world: in America, for instance, manufacturing employment peaked as a share of total employment in the early 1940s and declined at a remarkably steady rate thereafter; but there have been particularly nasty spells of employment loss along the way – in the early 1980s, for instance (when Reagan and Thatcher earned the ire of many blue-collar workers) and then in the 2000s.

Two Nations, Indivisible: A History of Inequality in America: A History of Inequality in America
by Jamie Bronstein
Published 29 Oct 2016

The first reason is permanence. Deindustrialization has removed good manufacturing jobs from the economy, leaving low-wage service jobs that notoriously pay poverty-level wages. Although repairing the nation’s aging infrastructure might provide widespread employment at good wages, it has not been a priority, even in Great-Recession-linked stimulus packages.50 Trade unions, which, despite their flaws (including sclerotic leadership and deep-seated racism and Cold War ideology) once provided a measure of job protection, pensions, and other benefits for their members, ebbed with deindustrialization and the rise of low-paid, insecure labor.51 Trade globalization, it traditionally has been thought, lifts all boats, because even if well-paid manufacturing jobs are exported overseas, the price of goods and services becomes cheaper.

…

The Great Depression may also have substantially eroded the wealth of the top 1 percent of the population, from about 36.6 percent of the national wealth in 1929 to around 25 percent in 1950.20 No matter what the cause of the Great Compression of the postwar years, inequality began increasing again in the 1980s, under pressure from both economic trends (deindustrialization and globalization) and government decision making (tax cuts for the wealthy and cuts to social and educational spending) and has now reached levels at or above those in the 1920s.21 In addition to showing that inequality has been a constant feature in American history, this book will also argue that inequality is not necessary for, and in fact undermines, national prosperity.

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Such critical turning-points include the end of the Civil War, when the government failed to consider stakeholding for freed African Americans; during World War II, when a proposal was on the table to make the nation responsible for the full employment of its citizens; during the Nixon administration, when a basic income guarantee came close to passage; and during the Reagan administration, when neoliberal promises distracted working people from deindustrialization and globalization. This book is divided into eight chronological chapters. Chapter 1 covers the period from the American Revolution to the late 1820s. It argues that like the classical civilizations that the Founders so much admired, a virtuous American republic was predicated on the theory that all and only white men were equal citizens, but that this did not mean they were entitled to equal standing or even equal political participation.

There Is Nothing for You Here: Finding Opportunity in the Twenty-First Century
by Fiona Hill
Published 4 Oct 2021

In the 1970s and 1980s, when I was growing up in Bishop Auckland, we faced the consequences of multigenerational poverty engendered by the rise and fall of the British coal industry and the fallout from the “modernization” of the British manufacturing sector. Over a thirty-year period, as the result of government fiat, industrial manufacturing in the United Kingdom shrank by more than two thirds. This amounted to the largest deindustrialization of any advanced Western country. The deliberate destruction of the UK’s heavy industry in the 1980s cast a shadow over British politics for the next four decades. In the 1990s and early 2000s, I spent years traveling on extended research trips to Russia. I became a long-standing fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., in its foreign policy program.

…

The lessons from all these programs were that individual, group, grassroots, philanthropic, and private-sector actions were just as critical in putting communities on a new path as any top-down government intervention or large-scale transfer of funds. Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, it was clear to many of the economists I worked with that the United States faced its own reconstruction challenge. Thanks to rapid deindustrialization, poor-quality education, and other indices of poverty and inequality, parts of the United States were in the same need of regeneration and redevelopment as low- and middle-income countries in the former Eastern bloc. Like Russia, the United States is a vast continent-sized power. Individual states are the size of most European countries.

…

With the few exceptions of the occasional family from Pakistan or Sri Lanka, some shopkeepers and restaurant owners, and doctors and nurses in local hospitals, most of the region’s residents were from one of the British indigenous groups. Their English, Irish, Scottish, Welsh, or Traveller ancestors had settled down when the mines and factories were expanding. There was not much to attract new immigrants up north to deindustrializing small towns with no opportunity. Race riots and racial discrimination were something we watched from afar on TV or read about in the papers. It was working-class protests and riots over lost jobs and livelihoods that roiled the region. We were in our own bubble of disadvantage. When I got to St.

Rendezvous With Oblivion: Reports From a Sinking Society
by Thomas Frank
Published 18 Jun 2018

And while each of these fads came and went, here is what also happened: utilities were privatized to disastrous effect, the real estate bubble grew and burst, the banks got ever bigger, state governments declared war on public workers, and the economy went off a cliff. It is time to acknowledge the truth: that our leaders have nothing to say, really, about any of this. They have nothing to suggest, really, to Cairo, Illinois, or St. Joseph, Missouri. They have no comment to make, really, about the depopulation of the countryside or the deindustrialization of the Midwest. They have nothing to offer, really, but the same suggestions as before, gussied up with a new set of clichés. They have no idea what to do for places or people that aren’t already successful or that have no prospect of ever becoming cool. And so the dull bureaucrat lusts passionately for the lifestyle of the creative artist, but beneath it all is the harsh fact that foundations have been selling the vibrant, under one label or another, for decades; all they’ve done this time is repackage it as a sort of prosperity gospel for Ivy League art students.

…

Either he is one or (as the comedian John Oliver puts it) he is pretending to be one, which amounts to the same thing. And there is no denying the jolt of energy he has given the racist right. But there is another side to the Trump phenomenon. A map of his support may coordinate with racist Google searches, but it coordinates even better with deindustrialization and despair, with the zones of economic misery that thirty years of Washington’s free-market consensus have brought the rest of America. It is worth noting that in his stump speeches, Trump often makes a point of assailing that Indiana air-conditioning company from the video. What this suggests is that he’s telling a tale as much about economic outrage as it is of racism on the march.

…

Put the question slightly differently: Will the Washington Post or the New York Times take the sad fate of Democratic centrism as a signal to bring a whole new vision to their op-ed pages? Will the think tanks and pressure groups of Washington finally be told by their donors: we’re shifting your grant money to people who care about deindustrialization? Of course not. Liberalism today is an expression of an enlightened professional class, and their core economic interests simply do not align with those of working people. If coming up with a solution to what ails liberalism means heeding the voices of people who aren’t part of the existing nonprofit/journalistic in-group, then there will be no solution.

A United Ireland: Why Unification Is Inevitable and How It Will Come About
by Kevin Meagher
Published 15 Nov 2016

Over the last two decades, however, there have seen massive structural changes that have served to level the playing field between Protestants and Catholics, not least the Good Friday Agreement process and the disbandment of the RUC, but also the massive changes to the economy, notably the deindustrialisation of the economy and, with it, increases in urban poverty and decay. Northern Ireland will appear to be hanging on by its fingertips – still the least economically dynamic or socially liberal part of the United Kingdom. People in Britain, a few staunch Unionists aside, will feel little affinity with the place.

The New Depression: The Breakdown of the Paper Money Economy
by Richard Duncan
Published 2 Apr 2012

Finally, as for the U.S. economy, it is no longer viable the way it is currently structured. The country is deindustrializing because wage rates in the U.S. manufacturing sector are 30 to 40 times higher than the prevailing global wage rate for factory workers, which is $5 per day. Consequently, the nature of the economy has changed. An economic paradigm built on debt expansion, asset price bubbles, and the service industry replaced the previous paradigm that was centered on the production of tangible goods. In 2008, however, that new paradigm exhausted its potential to support asset prices or the demand for services, leaving the country deindustrialized and without the kind of capital structure capable of generating profits, savings, and new investments.

…

Finally, it failed to act when many of its trading partners blatantly manipulated the value of their currencies in a way that prevented the trade imbalances from correcting. When the U.S. credit bubble began in earnest in the 1980s, other countries expanded their industrial capacity to satisfy the United States’ rapidly expanding debt-financed demand. The United States began to deindustrialize and wage rates stagnated, but that did not matter so long as U.S. stock prices and home prices kept inflating, because American households were able to borrow more and to consume more. The United States was able to import more each year, and that demand absorbed the rest of the world’s rapidly increasing industrial supply.

…

In 2008, however, that new paradigm exhausted its potential to support asset prices or the demand for services, leaving the country deindustrialized and without the kind of capital structure capable of generating profits, savings, and new investments. That left the United States ripe for a brutal economic contraction. The crisis has caused the process of deindustrialization to accelerate. More than two million manufacturing jobs (or 15 percent of the total) have been lost since the end of 2007. Nearly a third of all U.S. manufacturing jobs have disappeared over the last ten years. The U.S. current account deficit corrected from $800 billion in 2006 to $377 billion in 2009, but it has widened sharply again since then, reaching $471 billion in 2010. The currency manipulation that perpetuates the U.S. trade disadvantage has intensified since the crisis began as reflected in the $3 trillion (40 percent) increase in total foreign exchange reserves since the end of 2008.

Magical Urbanism: Latinos Reinvent the US City
by Mike Davis
Published 27 Aug 2001

'Almost overnight, taquerias, money transfer outlets and immigration consultants have malls in filled strip and east of the strip. new immigrant neighborhoods to One roadside swap meet catering to immigrant Latinos in the adjacent city of North Las Vegas mated 20,000 customers each weekend." sists the north now Some of draws an esti- this influx con- of families relocating from the deindustrialized neighborhoods of East Oakland and the dead copper towns of southern Arizona; but mostly it is spillover from the immigrant barrios of Los Angeles County. Extrapolations from current school-age demographics indicate that Latinos will become the majority in the city of Las Vegas within a decade.

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"In an- moved into particular neighbor- "^^^ many Latino immigrants are able to deploy "social capital" to reduce their subsistence costs and thereby subsidize their own superexploitation. This goes part of MAGICAL URBANISM 94 the way toward explaining how it has been possible for Latino urban populations to grow so rapidly during periods when most US big cities have been undergoing massive deindustrialization. Immigration foes, Avilez, Daniel tire of course, contend that the likes of Laureano Eduardo and Benvenito Hernandez have stolen en- crops of jobs from native-born workers. Indeed, one former Los Angeles Times editorialist used the pages of the Atlantic Monthly to blame the 1992 Rodney King riots on the displacement of Black labor by recent immigration from Mexico.

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Eco- nomic restructuring simultaneously the lowest-paid and most pulls these immigrants into easily exploitable jobs and removes the mobility structures that unskilled newcomers previously used to get ahead. ... Mexicans and Central Americans seem to have herded into niches [including gardening, food preparation, housecleaning and garment manufacture] that constitute mobility traps." Another report suggests that deindustrialization and early 1990s rendered ethnic resources useful than previously to Mexican social newcomers their part, is McCarthy and Vernez argue networks less to Los Angeles. These trends apply to the California economy jobs in the as a whole. For that "the pool of low-skill shrinking, belying the widespread belief that California's past 20 to 30 years of 'economic restructuring' expanded the number of jobs for less-educated workers."

The Coming of Neo-Feudalism: A Warning to the Global Middle Class
by Joel Kotkin
Published 11 May 2020

Noble, Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation (New York: Knopf, 1984), 249; Robert Gordon, The Rise and Fall of American Growth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 499; Economic Policy Institute, “The growing trade deficit with China has led to a loss of 3.4 million U.S. jobs between 2001 and 2017,” October 23, 2018, https://www.epi.org/press/the-growing-trade-deficit-with-china-has-led-to-a-loss-of-3-4-million-u-s-jobs-between-2001-and-2017/. 35 David Goodhart, The Road to Somewhere: The New Tribes Shaping British Politics (London: Penguin, 2017), 151. 36 Sherry Linkon and John Russo, “Economic Nationalism and the Half-Life of Deindustrialization,” Working-Class Perspectives, October 30, 2017, https://workingclassstudies.wordpress.com/2017/10/30/economic-nationalism-and-the-half-life-of-deindustrialization/. 37 Alan B. Krueger, “The Rise and Consequences of Inequality,” Council of Economic Advisors, January 12, 2012, https://milescorak.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/speech-2012_01_12_inal_web-1.pdf. 38 Fatih Guvenen et al., “Lifetime Incomes in the United States Over Six Decades,” National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2017, https://www.nber.org/papers/w23371.pdf. 39 Phillip Inman, “Social mobility in richest countries ‘has stalled since 1990,’” Guardian, June 15, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/jun/15/social-mobility-in-richest-countries-has-stalled-since-1990s; Miles Corak, “Inequality from Generation to Generation: The United States in Comparison,” in The Economics of Inequality, Poverty, and Discrimination in the 21st Century, ed.

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Gangs proliferate in the decayed and rat-infested environment, and murder rates are among the highest for a large city in the high-income world.3 Chicago’s crime is heavily concentrated in the poorer districts, as is typical of big cities: according to one study, 5 percent of the nation’s streets account for half of the urban crime.4 In the late nineteenth century, the muckraking journalist Frank Norris described Chicago as “the heart of the nation.”5 Today it is becoming essentially two different cities: one-third is what the local analyst Pete Saunders calls “global Chicago,” which is something of a Midwestern San Francisco, while the other two-thirds is more like Saunders’s hometown of Detroit as it is today, much of it a depopulated ruin or a dangerous netherworld of crime.6 Globalization and rapid deindustrialization together have led to the attrition of relatively well-paying jobs tied to the steel industry, meat processing, and manufacturing of agricultural equipment. Over a period of fifteen years, the number of manufacturing jobs in Chicago was cut in half, and it now stands at the lowest level in modern history.7 Meanwhile, the middle class has been decimated.

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Today, around 40 percent of black 20-to-24-year-olds in Chicago are out of work and out of school, compared with 7 percent of their white counterparts.9 William Lee, a Chicago Tribune reporter who grew up in the South Shore neighborhood, says that the large-scale exodus has left those remaining on the South Side “feeling like life after the rapture, with relatives, good friends and classmates vanishing and their communities shattering.”10 The forces of globalization and deindustrialization have likewise transformed many big cities around the world from centers of opportunity to places that are starkly divided between rich and poor.11 Today the world’s great cities—Paris, London, Tokyo, New York, San Francisco—are attractive to those who already have wealth or the most impressive academic credentials, but less promising to the middle and working classes.

A Brief History of Neoliberalism
by David Harvey
Published 2 Jan 1995

The deregulation of everything from airlines and telecommunications to finance opened up new zones of untrammelled market freedoms for powerful corporate interests. Tax breaks on investment effectively subsidized the movement of capital away from the unionized north-east and midwest and into the non-union and weakly regulated south and west. Finance capital increasingly looked abroad for higher rates of return. Deindustrialization at home and moves to take production abroad became much more common. The market, depicted ideologically as the way to foster competition and innovation, became a vehicle for the consolidation of monopoly power. Corporate taxes were reduced dramatically, and the top personal tax rate was reduced from 70 to 28 per cent in what was billed as ‘the largest tax cut in history’ (Figure 1.7).

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But business should ‘assiduously cultivate’ the state and when necessary use it ‘aggressively and with determination’.6 But exactly how was state power to be deployed to reshape common-sense understandings? One line of response to the double crisis of capital accumulation and class power arose in the trenches of the urban struggles of the 1970s. The New York City fiscal crisis was an iconic case. Capitalist restructuring and deindustrialization had for several years been eroding the economic base of the city, and rapid suburbanization had left much of the central city impoverished. The result was explosive social unrest on the part of marginalized populations during the 1960s, defining what came to be known as ‘the urban crisis’ (similar problems emerged in many US cities).

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Transfer of industrial activity from the unionized north-east and midwest to the non-unionized and ‘right-to-work’ states of the south, if not beyond to Mexico and South-East Asia, became standard practice (subsidized by favourable taxation for new investment and aided by the shift in emphasis from production to finance as the centrepiece of capitalist class power). Deindustrialization of formerly unionized core industrial regions (the so-called ‘rust belt’) dis-empowered labour. Corporations could threaten plant closures, and risk—and usually win—strikes when necessary (for example in the coal industry). But here too it was not merely the use of the big stick that mattered, for there were a number of carrots that could be offered to labourers as individuals to break with collective action.

Listen, Liberal: Or, What Ever Happened to the Party of the People?
by Thomas Frank
Published 15 Mar 2016

In its quest for prosperity, the Party of the People declared itself wholeheartedly in favor of a social theory that forthrightly exalted the rich—the all-powerful creative class. For many cities and states, this was the economic strategy; this was what our leaders came up with to revive the urban wastelands and restore the de-industrialized zones. The Democratic idea was no longer to confront privilege but to flatter privilege, to sing the praises of our tasteful new master class. True, this was all done with an eye toward rebuilding the crumbling cities where the rest of us lived and worked, but the consequences of all this “creative class” bootlicking will take a long time to wear off.

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What he means is that economic justice only comes about through economic growth, and therefore the primary duty of anyone who wants to tackle inequality is “to create a nurturing environment where business leaders and entrepreneurs want to locate and expand.”6 SHINING CITY ON A HILL The real spiritual homeland of the liberal class is Boston, Massachusetts. As the seat of American higher learning, it seems unsurprising that it should anchor one of the most Democratic of states, a place where elected Republicans are highly unusual. When other cities and states, made desperate by the advance of deindustrialization, set up fake bohemias and implore their universities to generate profitable ideas, Boston is the place they are trying to emulate, the city where it all works, smoothly and successfully. This is the city that virtually invented the blue-state economic model, in which prosperity arises from higher education and the knowledge-based industries that surround it.

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A clinic in the hulk of one abandoned mill has a sign on the window reading, simply, “Cancer & Blood.” The effect of all this is to remind you with every prospect that this is a place and a way of life from which the politicians have withdrawn their blessing. Like so many other American scenes, this one is the product of decades of deindustrialization, engineered by Republicans and rationalized by Democrats. Fifty miles away, Boston is a roaring success, but the doctrine of prosperity that you see on every corner in Boston also serves to explain away the failure you see on every corner in Fall River. This is a place where affluence never returns—not because affluence for Fall River is impossible or unimaginable, but because our country’s leaders have blandly accepted a social order that constantly bids down the wages of people like these while bidding up the rewards for innovators, creatives, and professionals.

The Capitalist Manifesto
by Johan Norberg
Published 14 Jun 2023

But if this is a sign of societal decay, one must ask why that process has been the same in all other industrialized countries, even those that are export powerhouses with chronic trade surpluses. Japan and Germany began to ‘deindustrialize’ in this sense in the 1970s; Singapore did so in the 1980s and South Korea in the 1990s. There is a simple way to disprove the notion that these jobs would have remained if China had not taken them with low wages and massive industrial subsidies: China is also being deindustrialized.1 The proportion of Chinese workers with factory jobs peaked in 2013 and since then the country has lost some five million jobs in manufacturing a year.

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So if even the country that has taken all our manufacturing jobs loses manufacturing jobs, where have all those jobs gone? That would be sub-Saharan Africa, the only continent where the share of manufacturing jobs is currently increasing. We must abandon the old notion that deindustrialization is a sign of weakness. In fact, it is a sign of strength, provided it occurs at the right stage. It is a phase all countries go through as they get richer. And in a real sense, of course, this is not about deindustrialization; on the contrary, the conveyor belts roll faster than ever. Since 1980, industrial production in the United States has more than doubled, it’s just that we do not need as many workers to sustain that production.2 If you zoom in on the American manufacturing world during the first ten years of the millennium, you see that it lost 5.6 million jobs.

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Never before have poor countries grown so fast and never before have so many people been lifted out of poverty. When I argue for free markets nowadays, I am often rebuked by right-wing nationalists in the West who fear that it will make poor countries richer but rich countries poorer. There is a widespread feeling that the economies of Western Europe and North America have been deindustrialized due to cheap imports from China, especially during the first years of the twenty-first century. That we produce nothing any more, and the old decent, well-paid manufacturing jobs – such as the 1950s car industry in Detroit – have disappeared and, at best, we can aspire to low-paid jobs at an Amazon warehouse.

Vertical: The City From Satellites to Bunkers
by Stephen Graham
Published 8 Nov 2016

Louis, Missouri on July 15, 1972 at 3:32 pm (or thereabouts) when the infamous Pruitt-Igoe scheme, or rather several of its slab blocks, were given the final coup de grâce by dynamite.’25 Built in the 1950s, the Pruitt-Igoe project became in the 1960s and 1970s a symbol of the racialised decay of inner urban cores and white flight as the middle classes rushed to the suburbs. Redlining, deindustrialisation and the growing emergence of racialised ghettos in Pruitt-Igoe and similar projects allowed mainstream media to demonise such places and their inhabitants. Pruitt-Igoe thus emerged as a symbol of urban decay, collapse and hopelessness. Its spectacular erasure was widely used as shorthand for a period in the US where ‘those who lived in cities no longer cared for them, and those who lived elsewhere feared and detested them.’26 The fact that communal housing was widely deemed to chime with socialist thinking didn’t help.

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We should also address the often shoddy and cheapskate design of the resulting tower blocks, the failure to deliver promised infrastructure, services or jobs, poor communication between architects and housing offices and the power of demonising stigma. Above all, we must recognise the systematic deindustrialisation of and disinvestment in many of the surrounding local economies imagined to sustain the towers and the severe problems of mass unemployment that followed. Perhaps more important, though, is the need to stress that many examples of high-rise social housing throughout Europe and North America – including modernist high-rise housing – have been extremely successful.33 In hundreds of cases, socially oriented and publicly built and managed vertical housing remains tremendously popular.

The Lonely Century: How Isolation Imperils Our Future
by Noreena Hertz
Published 13 May 2020

Whether it’s Trump’s rallying cry that ‘The forgotten men and women of the USA are forgotten no more!’ or Marine Le Pen’s oath to serve ‘a forgotten France, a France abandoned by the self-appointed elite’, such carefully chosen messaging may well be enticing.38 And the reality was that many had been forgotten for decades as neoliberal capitalism and deindustrialisation was then followed by the 2008 financial crisis and a subsequent recession, coupled with policies of austerity. These collectively took an asymmetric economic toll, with lower-skilled men amongst those who felt they were suffering most – the target market for right-wing populists.39 Loneliness and the loss of status and esteem Many populist leaders understand something else too: that loneliness is not just about feeling forgotten or socially isolated or feeling bereft of voice, it’s also a feeling of loss.

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The bigger issue is that they are jobs that are deemed to be of diminished social status and standing, jobs that one may not feel as proud to find oneself doing. Even before the coronavirus pandemic sent unemployment soaring, such ‘low-status jobs’ were all that were on offer for increasing numbers of people, especially in former manufacturing hubs and deindustrialised regions. The low unemployment figures occluded this, thereby hiding the discontent and disaffection that lurked beneath the statistics. Indeed it is a sense of diminished status, more even perhaps than earnings per se, that sociologists Noam Gidron and Peter A. Hall believe underlies why so many white working-class men in particular – men like Gary, Rusty, Terry or Eric – have turned to right-wing populists in recent years.

The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness
by Michelle Alexander
Published 24 Nov 2011

The budget of the National Institute on Drug Abuse, for example, was reduced from $274 million to $57 million from 1981 to 1984, and antidrug funds allocated to the Department of Education were cut from $14 million to $3 million.74 Determined to ensure that the “new Republican majority” would continue to support the extraordinary expansion of the federal government’s law enforcement activities and that Congress would continue to fund it, the Reagan administration launched a media offensive to justify the War on Drugs.75 Central to the media campaign was an effort to sensationalize the emergence of crack cocaine in inner-city neighborhoods—communities devastated by deindustrialization and skyrocketing unemployment. The media frenzy the campaign inspired simply could not have come at a worse time for African Americans. In the early 1980s, just as the drug war was kicking off, inner-city communities were suffering from economic collapse. The blue-collar factory jobs that had been plentiful in urban areas in the 1950s and 1960s had suddenly disappeared.76 Prior to 1970, inner-city workers with relatively little formal education could find industrial employment close to home.

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To make matters worse, dramatic technological changes revolutionized the workplace—changes that eliminated many of the jobs that less skilled workers once relied upon for their survival. Highly educated workers benefited from the pace of technological change and the increased use of computer-based technologies, but blue-collar workers often found themselves displaced in the sudden transition from an industrial to a service economy. The impact of globalization and deindustrialization was felt most strongly in black inner-city communities. As described by William Julius Wilson, in his book When Work Disappears, the overwhelming majority of African Americans in the 1970s lacked college educations and had attended racially segregated, underfunded schools lacking basic resources.

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Adding to their troubles is the “spatial mismatch” between their residence and employment opportunities.25 Willingness to hire ex-offenders is greatest in construction or manufacturing—industries that require little customer contact—and weakest in retail trade and other service sector businesses.26 Manufacturing jobs, however, have all but disappeared from the urban core during the past thirty years. Not long ago, young, unskilled men could find decent, well-paying jobs at large factories in most major Northern cities. Today, due to globalization and deindustrialization, that is no longer the case. Jobs can be found in the suburbs—mostly service sector jobs—but employment for unskilled men with criminal convictions, while difficult to find anywhere, is especially hard to find close to home. An ex-offender whose driver’s license has been suspended or who does not have access to a car, often faces nearly insurmountable barriers to finding employment.

Sleeping Giant: How the New Working Class Will Transform America
by Tamara Draut
Published 4 Apr 2016

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 opened up opportunities for black men to work in the reigning industrial sector of the time, but predominantly in the hardest, lowest-paid jobs—the very jobs that were most susceptible to being replaced by machines.43 As a result, black men experienced more than their fair share of dislocation as a result of deindustrialization. Thanks to a generation of discriminatory housing policies, black Americans were also more likely to be living in the central core of urban America. So when major steel factories on the outskirts of major cities—Los Angeles, New York, Detroit, Cleveland—shut down, the communities closest to these economic hubs faced severe economic isolation and collapse.

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Instead of having access to private doctors and world-class care at Kaiser Permanente, she and her brothers now had to go to the public county hospital. Her dad was never able to rebound to his previous salary, instead relying on a series of low-paying jobs at auto-repair franchises like Midas. Cullors describes the connection between deindustrialization and mass incarceration as happening “fast, fast, fast.” Her neighborhood, Van Nuys, was poor in the 1990s, and right next door to the affluent community of Sherman Oaks, which made Van Nuys susceptible to gentrification and its black residents undesirable. “The neighborhood became super-surveilled and super-policed.

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As Michelle Alexander observes in her stunning and critically acclaimed book The New Jim Crow, “Conservatives found they could finally justify an all-out war on an ‘enemy’ that had been racially defined years before.”47 By the time Reagan took office, two things were crystal-clear about the ideology of the Republican Party: 1) it would use race to divide the working class to win elections; and 2) it would use race to fuel antigovernment sentiment to shrink the role of government. So just when urban America was reeling from the economic upheaval of deindustrialization and black working-class men and women found themselves either jobless or underemployed, the narrative about what was happening in these neighborhoods depicted black people as morally and culturally defective, mired in a web of self-destruction that included drugs, out-of-wedlock births, and crime.

Hubris: Why Economists Failed to Predict the Crisis and How to Avoid the Next One
by Meghnad Desai
Published 15 Feb 2015

(i), (ii) Rothschilds (i) Roubini, Nouriel (i) Royal Charter, grants of monopoly (i) rules of competition (i) Russia (i), (ii) Russian revolution (i), (ii) saltwater economists (i), (ii) Samuelson, Paul (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) “Analytical Aspects of an Anti–Inflation Policy” (with Robert Solow) (i) Say, Jean-Baptiste (i) Say’s Law (i), (ii) scarcity value (i) Scholes, Myron (i), (ii), (iii) Schumpeter, Joseph (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) The Theory of Economic Development (i) Schwartz, Anna, A Monetary History of the United States (with Milton Friedman) (i) Scottish Enlightenment (i) Second International (i) secular stagnation (i) securitization of mortgages (i) seigniorage privilege (i) self-interest (i) self-organizing society (i) self-sufficiency (i) service sector (i), (ii) servomechanism (i) shadow banking structure (i) shares (i) Sherman Act (i) Shiller, Robert (i), (ii) shocks (i), (ii), (iii) contagion (i) debt crises (i) political (i) see also oil shock short cycles (i) short-run rate of interest (i) Silesian weavers (i) single global currency (i) skills, types needed (i), (ii) slack (i) slavery, abolition of (i) Slutsky, Eugen (i), (ii), (iii) Smith, Adam (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) the founding of the political economy (i) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (i), (ii) The Theory of Moral Sentiments (i), (ii) social science, founding (i) Socialist International (i) society regulation (i) self-organizing (i) Solow, Robert (i), (ii), (iii) “Analytical Aspects of an Anti–Inflation Policy” (with Paul Samuelson) (i) sovereign debt crises (i), (ii) Soviet Union, break up (i), (ii) speculation (i) speculative motive (i), (ii) stag-deflation (i) stagflation (i), (ii), (iii) Stalin, Joseph (i) static vision (i) statistics (i) development of (i) historical research (i) usefulness (i) sterling, as reserve currency (i) stochastic calculus (i) stock market crash, London (i) stock markets bull run (i) competition (i) computer technology (i) stock prices, randomness (i) Stockholm School (i) Stop-Go cycle (i) policy (i) Summers, Larry (i) surplus value (i) sustainable recovery, sources of (i) Sutcliffe, Robert (i), (ii) sweetwater economists (i), (ii) Sweezy, Paul (i) System of Natural Liberty (i) T bills (i), (ii), (iii) tatonnement (i) tax cut, US (i) technical progress, role of (i) technological innovations author’s experiences (i) displacement effect (i), (ii) and manufacturing location (i) see also computer technology technological shocks (i) telecommunications (i) Thailand, Crisis, 1997 (i) Thatcher, Margaret (i) theories, need for validation (i) theory of economic behavior of the household (i) Thornton, Henry (i) time, role of (i) time series data (i) Tinbergen, Jan (i) Tobin, James (i) Tobin tax (i) total money supply, and prices (i) total output, heterogeneity (i) trade doctrine see under Ricardo trade-off, unemployment and inflation (i) trade surpluses, banking (i) trade unions effect on money wage (i) as harmful (i) power (i) rise of (i) strengthening (i) weakening (i) transactions motive (i) transmission mechanism (i) Troubled Assets Recovery Program (TARP) (i) true costs of production (i) Truman, Harry (i) trusts (i) Tugan-Baranowsky, Michael (i) Turkey (i) Turner, Adair, Lord (i) Two Treatises on Government (Locke) (i) uncertainty (i) underemployment equilibrium (i), (ii), (iii) undersaving (i), (ii) unearned income (i) unemployment aggregate level (i) cycles (i) effect of wages (i) explaining (i) and inflation (i) involuntary (i) and money wage (i) natural rate (i) see also Keynesian models unifying principle (i) unique static equilibrium, and moving data (i) unit labor costs (i) United Kingdom budget deficit elimination (i) deindustrialization (i) economic trajectory (i) Great Depression (i) monetarism (i) recovery strategy (i) see also Britain United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) (i) United States budget deficit (i) deindustrialization (i) econometric modeling (i) economic trajectory (i) economic weakness, post WWI (i) fiscal boost (i) Gold Standard (i) Great Depression (i) interest rates (i) Keynesianism (i) post-World War I power (i) post-World War II (i) Progressive Movement (i) prosperity (i) recovery strategy (i) seigniorage privilege (i) tax cut (i) trade deficit (i) welfare state expansion (i) westward expansion (i) withdrawal of currency (i) see also America unorthodoxy (i) urbanization (i) US House of Representatives, Greenspan’s testimony (i) usury defining (i) laws (i) prohibition (i), (ii) utopianism (i), (ii) valuation of assets, theory of (i) of capital (i) value vs.price (i) as price (i) relative (i), (ii) value added (i) value of goods, determination (i) variable costs (i) variables (i) Vietnam War (i) visions of economy (i) vocabulary, economic (i), (ii), (iii) volition (i) wage agreements, voluntary (i) demands, post-World War I (i) downward trend (i) effect on unemployment (i) rates, and unemployment (i) restraint (i) rises (i) share: declining (i); developed and developing economies (i); rise in (i), (ii) wage/profit distinction (i) units (i), (ii) see also money wages; real wages Walras, Antoine Auguste (i) Walras, Léon (i), (ii) Walrasian model (i) wars, financing (i) wealth distribution (i) inequality of (i) indicators (i) Smith’s theory (i) weaving, mechanization (i) welfare economics (i) welfare state, levels of support (i) White, Harry (i) Wicksell, Knut (i), (ii) basis of Hayek’s theory (i) later development of ideas (i) Wicksellian boom, developing countries (i) Wicksellian cycle, combined with Kondratieff cycle (i) William III (i) women, in workforce (i) workers dependence on capitalists (i) living standards (i) migration (i) productive/unproductive (i) workforce, recruitment of women (i) World Trade Organization (WTO) (i), (ii) World War I (i) World War II, outbreak (i) yields (i) Zombie firms (i)

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This was also the year in which the UK experienced its highest ever rate of inflation – 25 percent. Academic economists did not take much notice, though Glyn was a Fellow at Oxford and Sutcliffe was teaching at Kingston Polytechnic then. They also predicted the consequences of the profit squeeze. Capital began migrating out to Asia during the 1970s and the UK began deindustrializing. This was to have a long-lasting effect on the structure of the UK economy. Similar trends were noticed in the US in the Northeast region at the same time. These economies began to become more service based and the income distribution became more unequal as the previously employed manual workers in manufacturing now became unemployed and unemployable, or had to take lower paid service jobs.

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These cycles can in principle be as long as 20 or 30 years depending on the parameters of the equations. Figure 6 The Goodwin cycle This insight is profoundly un-Keynesian as well as un-neoclassical. But it is informative. However, even this way of looking at the world was not fully global, as Marx would have wished. Stagflation resulted in the deindustrialization of the developed economies and the industrialization of what were hitherto developing economies. They were soon to be called the newly industrialized economies. Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore were called the Asian Tigers. They were followed by Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and finally in the 1980s, China.

The Sum of Small Things: A Theory of the Aspirational Class
by Elizabeth Currid-Halkett
Published 14 May 2017

Workers’ ties to their organizations triumphed over their own ideas and ambitions, and yet, to Mills’s point, this loyalty was rewarded and it paved a path for ongoing mobility. The classic film The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit (1956) and more recently the TV series Mad Men, were popular mainstream depictions of how this relationship played out. The collapse of the manufacturing economy changed the currency of social and economic mobility quite considerably. Deindustrialization of Western economies (particularly within the United States and Great Britain) is largely explained by three key forces: oversaturation of the market (there are only so many dishwashers a household can buy), technology and automation (machines are low-cost and faster than people when it comes to factory lines), and globalization (labor costs are cheaper elsewhere and technologies in transport along with computers make it possible to outsource production to Southeast Asia or South America).34 As a result, those well-paying factory jobs that defined the good life in the United States disappeared quickly.

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These jobs were well-paid but relatively unskilled, thus many members of America’s middle class achieved prosperity, material comfort, and economic and social security without birthright, and, antithetical to the current formula for upward mobility, without a college degree. The hemorrhaging of these factory jobs to developing countries and the closing up of factory shops meant that this stable middle class had lost its means for survival. Deindustrialization brought erosion to major urban centers (where many factories were located) and joblessness throughout huge swaths of the country.36 In manufacturing’s place came the rise of the service economy, a truly bifurcated economic structure. Globalization manifested itself in the outsourcing of cheap labor for manufacturing but also through the emergence of elite “global cities,” to use Saskia Sassen’s term.

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Cities became untenable by the mid-twentieth century (with the rise of public health problems, overcrowding, and pollution). Thus, unsurprisingly, when the federal government offered low-interest, amortized loans for suburban home ownership, those who could, fled urban centers.4 The subsequent urban deindustrialization, commencing in the 1960s and continuing through the 1980s, left cities with no middle class and no jobs. Those who study cities—economists, sociologists, urban planners—thought the demise would continue, that the city as we knew it would never recover. Indeed, they were partially right. Cities are no longer centers of manufacturing, and factories, which had gone to South America and Asia, did not reopen.

The Gig Economy: A Critical Introduction
by Jamie Woodcock and Mark Graham
Published 17 Jan 2020

Next, industrial workers successfully organize and precarious conditions are overcome through the collective power of workers. However, because contemporary worker power is premised on the ‘standard employment relationship’ brought about by industrialization, all that workers have collectively achieved is threatened by waves of de-industrialization. Although there are examples of the process developing like this, in many parts of the world the experience of industrialization was very different. For example, Bent (2017: 12) argues that large-scale industries were established in both Egypt and India under British imperial rule. This industrialization was deeply shaped by the exploitative relationships of the British Empire.

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The changes in production identified by Ricardo Antunes (2012: 37) have had a significant impact on work: extensive deregulation of labour-rights, eliminated on a daily basis in all corners of the world that have industrial production and services; increase in the fragmentation of the working class, precarisation and subcontracting of the human force that labours; and destruction of class-unionism and its transformation into docile unionism, based on partnership. The failure of the trade union movement to fully adapt to deindustrialization has also greatly reduced the collective power of workers relative to capital. In these contexts, trade unions ‘face considerable obstacles to extending their presence in private services, not least from hostile employers’ (Williams and Adam-Smith, 2009). In many contexts, as workers’ power is reduced, and the deregulated environment allows for new kinds of employment relationships.

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Whenever we use a digital service, product or even an algorithm that was trained using digital labour, there is almost no way to know whether an exhausted worker is behind it; whether they get laid off if they become sick or get pregnant; whether they are spending twenty hours a week just searching for work; how precarious their source of income is; or whether they are being paid an unfairly low wage. In the Global North, this kind of work is growing within a context of deindustrialization, becoming an option for people who may have seen alternative kinds of jobs disappearing. As Alana Semuels (2018) has uncovered in interviews with microworkers in the US, this kind of work is increasing. One of her interviewees, Erica, explained that she started working for Amazon Mechanical Turk after struggling to find work in her ‘economically struggling town’.

The Global Minotaur
by Yanis Varoufakis and Paul Mason
Published 4 Jul 2015

In the meantime, American households saw their debt share of national income rise from 66 per cent in 1997 to 100 per cent ten years later. Put together, aggregate US debt in 2008 exceeded 350 per cent of GDP, when in 1980 it had stood at an already inflated 160 per cent. As for Britain, the City of London (the financial sector in which British society had put most of its eggs, following the rapid deindustrialization of the early 1980s) sported a collective debt almost two and a half times Britain’s GDP, while, in addition, British families owed a sum greater than one annual GDP. So, if an accumulation of inordinate debt infused more risk than the world could bear, how come no one saw the crash coming?

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Both countries had been rendered dependable (thanks to the overwhelming presence of the US military); both featured solid industrial bases; and both offered a highly skilled workforce and a people that would jump at the opportunity of rising, phoenix-like, from the ashes. Moreover, they both offered considerable geostrategic benefits vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, there was a good deal of resistance to this idea to be overcome – resistance grounded in the urge to punish Germany and Japan by forcing them to deindustrialize and return to an almost pastoral state from which they would never again be able to launch an industrial-scale war. Indeed, Harry White, the US representative at Bretton Woods, had advocated the effective removal of Germany’s industry, forcing German living standards down to those of the country’s less-developed neighbours.

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Cheap Chinese labour and China’s market access to the West (courtesy of World Trade Organization membership) allows Chinese manufacturers to undercut their Mexican and other Latin American competitors in the manufacture of low-value-added sectors, such as shoes, toys and textiles. This two-pronged effect is causing Latin America to deindustrialize and return to the status of a primary goods producer. These developments have a global reach. For if Brazil and Argentina turn their eyes toward Asia, as they have already started doing, they may abandon their long-term struggle to break into the food markets of the United States and Europe, from which they have been barred by severe protectionist measures in favour of American, German and French farmers.

Palaces for the People: How Social Infrastructure Can Help Fight Inequality, Polarization, and the Decline of Civic Life
by Eric Klinenberg
Published 10 Sep 2018

By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the social world that the steel mills had created was already breaking down. Massive deindustrialization hit American and European cities and continued through the last decades of the twentieth century. As factories shuttered, so too did the union halls, taverns, restaurants, and civic organizations that glued different groups together. Unmoored, unemployed, and unable to find new opportunities, people moved away. Between 1970 and 1990, nearly six hundred thousand people left Chicago, and most of them came from industrial areas like the one my great-grandfather settled in a century ago. Sociologists have thoroughly documented how deindustrialization devastated neighborhoods, making cities and suburbs throughout the United States even more segregated by race and class.

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Sociologists have thoroughly documented how deindustrialization devastated neighborhoods, making cities and suburbs throughout the United States even more segregated by race and class. But we are only now coming to terms with how much damage deindustrialization and the decline of blue-collar communities did to the body politic, how fractured and distrustful we have become. The presidential campaign and election of 2016 was hardly the first sign of America’s social and political polarization, and deindustrialization is by no means its only cause. Until recently, though, leading public opinion scholars showed that pundits and policy elites were more polarized than voters. America, claimed the Stanford political scientist Morris Fiorina in 2005, was “closely divided,” not “deeply divided.”

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naturally occurring opioids: Tristen Inagaki, Lara Ray, Michael Irwin, Baldwin Way, and Naomi Eisenberger, “Opioids and Social Bonding: Naltrexone Reduces Feelings of Social Connection,” Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 11, no. 5 (2016): 728–35. “cause there ain’t shit else to do”: Katherine McLean, “ ‘There’s Nothing Here’ Deindustrialization as Risk Environment for Overdose,” International Journal of Drug Policy 29 (2016): 19–26. comparatively fragile communities: Michael Zoorob and Jason Salemi, “Bowling Alone, Dying Together: The Role of Social Capital in Mitigating the Drug Overdose Epidemic in the United States,” Drug and Alcohol Dependence 173 (2017): 1–9.

Vanishing New York
by Jeremiah Moss
Published 19 May 2017

“Our task,” Cubberley concluded, “is to break up these groups or settlements, to assimilate or amalgamate these people as a part of our American race, and to implant in their children, so far as can be done, the Anglo-Saxon conception of righteousness.” One way to take back a city is to undermine the black and brown populations and turn working-class “temporary Negroes” into middle-class whites. To accomplish that dual task, it would require the playing of a long game with many steps. DEINDUSTRIALIZATION AND DIVISION In the first decade of the 1900s, nearly half of New York’s workforce worked in manufacturing, and through progressive politics, the city had become, in the words of labor leader Samuel Gompers, “the cradle of the American labor movement.” As the working class rose, so did the counterculture, and the two continued to coexist, despite their differences.

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At the same time, not-quite-white ethnics moved to embrace whiteness for its privileges, what David Roediger, building on the work of W. E. B. Du Bois, has called “the wages of whiteness.” It was a bonus, essentially, the racial bribe in modern times. Too often, when people talk about the deindustrialization of New York, they talk about it like it happened naturally, a trend of the times, nothing more than market forces. Journalist Robert Fitch offered an alternative explanation in his 1996 book, The Assassination of New York. Poring over the 1929 Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs, Fitch discovered something startling.

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In Harlem, African Americans invented new ways of moving to new rhythms, jitterbugging at the Savoy and shifting swing into bebop at Minton’s, all while fighting to work and live with equality. On 42nd Street, you could score drugs and sex, see a freak show, and buy a dirty book. A million songs came out of Tin Pan Alley. A million books were printed by the great publishers. Battleships boomed out of Brooklyn’s berths. Despite the Elites’ efforts to deindustrialize the city, the working class remained central to urban life. The fight for New York’s soul was not over yet. By 1960, nearly 2 million white New Yorkers had left town, many of them working-class, a Democratic group long credited as progressive, the salt of New York’s agitated earth. That was about to change as the powder keg packed by redlining and urban renewal finally detonated.

Big Data and the Welfare State: How the Information Revolution Threatens Social Solidarity
by Torben Iversen and Philipp Rehm
Published 18 May 2022

The main contribution of our book is to show how information is a long-term driver of welfare state development, inequality, and policy preferences – conditioned by institutions, partisanship, and past social protection – on par with other forces of change that existing literature has focused on, such as the rise and fall of unions, deindustrialization, skill-biased technological change, and globalization. Broadly speaking, we see the rise of a centralized and solidaristic welfare state as the solution to the problems of incomplete information and market failure (including the failure of MASs), combined with a democratic state that has the power to force good risks into a national pool with bad risks.

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Yet, while those who are big net contributors will oppose the system, their opposition will be moderated by uncertainty about where they are in the risk distribution. The more the uncertainty, the broader the support for a public system. This helps explain the broad cross-class support for the welfare state in the wake of industrialization and the huge shocks of the Great Depression and WWII. Deindustrialization, which started in the 1970s, was an extra boost because many people were worried about losing their jobs and private benefits (Iversen and Cusack 2000). Yet, eventually, the dust settled, and it is becoming increasingly apparent who is at risk of losing their job and who is not, even as health risks continue to be difficult to pin down, especially for insurers.

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Yet, while those who are big net contributors will oppose the system, their opposition will be moderated by uncertainty about where they are in the risk distribution. The more the uncertainty, the broader the support for a public system. This helps explain the broad cross-class support for the welfare state in the wake of industrialization and the huge shocks of the Great Depression and WWII. Deindustrialization, which started in the 1970s, was an extra boost because many people were worried about losing their jobs and private benefits (Iversen and Cusack 2000). Yet, eventually, the dust settled, and it is becoming increasingly apparent who is at risk of losing their job and who is not, even as health risks continue to be difficult to pin down, especially for insurers.

Behemoth: A History of the Factory and the Making of the Modern World
by Joshua B. Freeman
Published 27 Feb 2018

Hareven and Randolph Lanenbach, Amoskeag: Life and Work in an American Factory City (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 10–11; Gray Fitzsimons, “Cambria Iron Company,” Historic American Engineering Record, National Park Service, Department of the Interior, Washington, D.C., 1989; William Serrin, Homestead: The Glory and Tragedy of an American Steel Town (New York: Random House, 1992). 2.Lindsay-Jean Hard, “The Rouge: Yesterday, Today & Tomorrow,” Urban and Regional Planning Economic Development Handbook, University of Michigan, Taubman College of Architecture and Urban Planning, Dec. 4, 2005, http://www.umich.edu/~econdev/riverrouge/; Perry Stern, “Best Selling Vehicles in America—September Edition,” Sept. 2, 2016, http://www.msn.com/en-us/autos/autos-passenger/best-selling-vehicles-in-america-%E2%80%94-september-edition/ss-AAiquE5#image=21. 3.Laurence Gross, The Course of Industrial Decline: The Boott Cotton Mills of Lowell, Mass., 1835–1955 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 44–45, 102–03, 229, 238–40. 4.Jefferson Cowie and Joseph Heathcott, “The Meanings of Deindustrialization,” in Cowie and Heathcott, eds., Beyond the Ruins: The Meanings of Deindustrialization (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 4. There is a large literature on deindustrialization. In addition to this volume, see the cluster of articles on “Crumbling Cultures: Deindustrialization, Class, and Memory,” ed. Tim Strangleman, James Rhodes, and Sherry Linkon, in International Labor and Working-Class History 84 (Oct. 2013). 5.Paul Wiseman, “Why Robots, Not Trade, Are Behind So Many Factory Job Losses,” AP: The Big Story, Nov. 2, 2016, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/265cd8fb02fb44a69cf0eaa2063e11d9/mexico-taking-us-factory-jobs-blame-robots-instead; Mandy Zuo, “Rise of the Robots: 60,000 Workers Culled from Just One Factory as China’s Struggling Electronics Hub Turns to Artificial Intelligence,” South China Morning Post, May 22, 2016, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/1949918/rise-robots-60000-workers-culled-just-one-factory-chinas.

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In the late 1960s and early 1970s, there was a brief flurry of political and cultural interest in the discontent of industrial workers—the so-called “blue-collar blues”—but an economic downturn quickly put an end to that. The next time factory workers captured public attention, they did so as a result of deindustrialization and the massive social crisis it brought to the “rust belt.” Between 1978 and 1982, employment in the automobile industry fell by a third, with more than three dozen factories shuttered in the Detroit area alone. During those same years, the steel industry shed more than 150,000 jobs. Bethlehem cut ten thousand jobs at Sparrows Point and phased out operations in Lackawanna, New York, and Johnstown, Pennsylvania.

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But if resilient and durable as a totality, industrial giantism in any given place has proven unsustainable. Specific communities have experienced the giant factory not as a continuity of progress but as an arc of disruptive innovation, growth, decline, and abandonment. As historians Jefferson Cowie and Joseph Heathcott wrote in a book about American deindustrialization, “the industrial culture forged in the furnace of fixed capital investment was itself a temporary condition. What millions of working men and women might have experienced as solid, dependable, decently waged work really only lasted for a brief moment.”4 Especially in areas dominated by a single industry, when the cycle of factory giantism moved on, prolonged devastation resulted, even as somewhere else on the globe giant factories were creating new possibilities and wealth.

The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times
by Giovanni Arrighi
Published 15 Mar 2010

And when at the end of the fourteenth century the Flemish industry finally collapsed, many did just that (Miskimin 1969: 93-9). The success of this carrotand-stick strategy can be gauged from the trends depicted in Figure 2.2, which shows the expansion of the English cloth industry during the Hundred Years War and the parallel “forcible” deindustrialization of one of the three main centers of Flemish cloth production, Ypres. Commenting on these trends, Harry Miskimin has underscored the “negative-sum game” that underlay them. Edward III had been triumphantly successful in destroying the Flemish industry and in transferring part of it to England, but the Flemish depression must moderate the claims permitted to the English success.

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(Miskimin 1969: 95-6) The conclusion that the expansion of cloth production in England consisted of nothing more than a transplant of an industry, and that the transplant was associated with an overall decline in economic prosperity, becomes even more inescapable once we bring into the picture the “spontaneous” deindustrialization of Florence, which preceded that of Ypres and was even more massive. According to Giovanni Villani, in 1338 there were 200 or more workshops in Florence producing between 70,000 and 80,000 pieces of cloth for a total value of more than 1,200,000 gold florins. Thirty years earlier, there had been about 300 producing over 100,000 pieces of cloth, although these cloths were coarser and about half as valuable (Lopez and Raymond 1955: 71-4; Luzzatto 1961: 106).

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Even closer is the resemblance between the Edwardian era and what is known as the “periwig period” of Dutch history — a period that broadly corresponds to the phase of financial expansion of the Dutch cycle of accumulation, particularly to the closing two or three decades of the expansion. As in Florence 400 years earlier and in Britain 125 years later, the financial expansion of the latter half of the eighteenth century was associated in Holland with widespread processes of “deindustrialization” (most clearly reflected in shipbuilding) and with a contraction in workingclass incomes. “The merchant-bankers and the wealthy rentiers might never have ‘had it so good,’ ” notes Charles Boxer (1965: 293-4), but as an eyewitness reported at the end of the period, “ ‘the well-being of that class of people who lead a working life [was] steadily declining.’ ” And as in Renaissance Florence or in Edwardian Britain, or for that matter in Reaganite America, the capitalists-turned-rentiers of periwig Holland THE “ENDLESS” ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL 179 were only concerned with the very short run.

Age of the City: Why Our Future Will Be Won or Lost Together
by Ian Goldin and Tom Lee-Devlin
Published 21 Jun 2023

Why then have we witnessed such a dramatic divergence over the past four decades? The answer lies in the interplay between three structural shifts in the economy: deindustrialization, superstar dynamics and declining mobility. Together these shifts make sense of why place has reasserted itself as a major factor in determining the opportunities one receives in life, and what must be done in order to create a more level playing field. Deindustrialization In the US, the share of workers in manufacturing jobs has fallen from around 25 per cent in the 1950s to around 10 per cent today,19 an experience echoed in Britain, France and other rich countries.

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Index abortion here abstract mathematics here Achaemenid Empire here Adani, Gautam here agglomeration effects here agriculture here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here and carbon emissions here and disease here, here productivity here, here vertical farming here Ahmedabad here air-conditioning here, here airports here, here, here, here Albuquerque here Alexandria here Allen, Paul here Allen, Thomas here Altrincham here Amazon here, here, here Amazon rainforest here Amsterdam here Anatolia here Anderson, Benedict here Anheuser-Busch here antibiotics here, here, here Antonine Plague here Anyang here apartment conversions here, here Apple here, here, here Aristotle here Arizona State University here Arlington here Assyrian merchants here Athens, Ancient here, here, here, here, here, here Atlanta here, here Austin here, here, here automation here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here axial precession here Baghdad, House of Wisdom here Baltimore here, here Bangalore here, 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incomes here remote working here social housing here Brixton riots here broadcasting here Bronze Age here, here, here, here bronze, and shift to iron here Brooks, David here Brynjolfsson, Eric here Burgess, Ernest here bushmeat here, here Byzantine Empire, fall of here Cairncross, Frances here Cairo here calendar, invention of here Cambridge, Massachusetts here Cambridge University here canals here, here, here ‘cancel culture’ here Cape Town here Catholic Church here C40 Cities partnership here Chadwick, Edwin here Chang’an (Xi’an) here, here, here, here Charles, Prince of Wales here charter cities here Chengdu here Chiba here Chicago here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here childbirth, average age at here childcare here, here, here, here, here China here ancient here, here, here, here call-centre workers here cereal production here civil strife here and Covid-19 pandemic here Cultural Revolution here definition of cities here economic liberalization here entry into WTO here Household Responsibility System here hukou system here One Child Policy here Open Coastal Cities here per capita emissions here rapid ageing here Special Economic Zones here technology here urbanization here China Towns here Chinese Communist Party here cholera here, here, here, here Chongqing here cities, definition of here Citigroup here city networks here civil wars here Cleveland here, here, here, here climate change here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here coastal cities here, here, here, here commuting here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here Concentric Zone Model here Confucius here conspiracy theories here Constantinople here, here containerization here, here Copenhagen here, here Corinth here Cornwall here corruption here Coventry here, here covid-19 see pandemics crime rates here ‘cyberbalkanization’ here cycling here, here, here, here Damascus here Dark Ages here, here data science here de Soto, Hernando here deforestation here, here, here, here Delhi here Dell here Delphic oracle here democracy here, here, here Democratic Republic of Congo here, here, here, here, here, here Deng Xiaoping here dengue fever here Denmark here, here Detroit here, here, here, here, here, here, here Dhaka here, here, here, here, here Dharavi here Diana, Princess of Wales here diasporas here, here Dickens, Charles here district heating systems here Dresden here drought here, here, here, here, here, here, here Drucker, Peter here dual-income households here, here Dubai here, here, here Dunbar, Kevin here Düsseldorf here East Antarctic ice sheet here East China Sea here, here Easterly, William here Eastern Mediterranean here, here, here Ebola here Edinburgh here education here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here higher education here, here, here, here; see also universities Japanese school system here Egypt here, here Ancient here, here, here, here Ehrenhalt, Alan here electric vehicles (EVs) here Engels, Friedrich here Enlightenment here Epic of Gilgamesh here Erfurt here Ethiopia here, here Euripides here European Enlightenment here exchange rates here Facebook here, here, here fake news here famine here, here fertility rates here, here, here ‘15-minute city’ principle here Fischer, Claude here Fleming, Alexander here flooding here, here, here, here, here, here, here Florida, Richard here, here food shortages here Ford, Henry here, here foreign aid here fossil fuels here, here France here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here Frankfurt here Franklin, Benjamin here Friedman, Thomas here, here Fryer, Roland here Fukuoka here, here Gaetani, Ruben here Galileo Galilei here Ganges River here Garden Cities here Garden of Eden here Gates, Bill here, here gay community here General Electric here General Motors here genetic engineering here gentrification here, here, here, here, here George, Andy here Germany here, here, here, here, here, here Gingrich, Newt here 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Howard, Ebenezer here Hudson River here Hugo, Victor here Hume, David here Hurricane Katrina here hybrid working, see remote and hybrid working ice melting here, here import substitution industrialization here InBev here India here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here fertility rates here Indonesia here, here Indus River here Indus Valley here, here, here inequality here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here infant and child mortality here, here, here, here influenza here, here, here ‘information cocoons’ here Instagram here internet here, here, here, here, here, here invention here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here irrigation here, here, here, here Italy here Jacobs, Jane here, here, here Jakarta here, here James, Sheila here Japan here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here post-war development here schooling system here Jenner, Edward here Jesus Christ here Jobs, Steve here jobs apprenticeships here ‘lousy’ and ‘lovely’ here tradeable and non-tradeable here Justinian Plague here Kashmir here Kenya here Kinshasa here, here Kish here knowledge workers here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here Koch, Robert here Kolkata here Korean War here Krugman, Paul here Kushim Tablet here Lagash here Lagos here, here, here, here, here, here, here Lahore here land titling programmes here Las Vegas here Latin language here Lee Kuan Yew here, here Leeds here, here Leicester here Leipzig here, here, here, here Letchworth here life expectancy here, here, here, here, here, here Liverpool here, here Ljubljana here London here, here, here, here, here, here, here bike lanes here Canary Wharf here, here Chelsea here, here, here China Town here cholera outbreaks here City of London here, here coffeehouses here and Covid-19 pandemic here financial services here gentrification here, here, here Great Stink here, here heatwaves here, here house prices here, here hybrid working here, here immigration here, here incomes here, here mayoralty here migration into inner London here population growth here, here, here poverty here, here public transport here, here, here slum housing here social housing here suburbanization here Los Angeles here, here, here, here Louisville here Luoyang here Luther, Martin here Luton Airport here Luxembourg here, here Lyon here McDonald’s here McDonnell Douglas here McLuhan, Marshall here Madagascar here malaria here, here, here, here Malaysia here Mali here malls, reinvention of here Manchester here, here, here, here, here, here, here Manila here Manning, Alan here Markle, Meghan here marriage here Marshall, Alfred here Marshall, Tim here Marx, Karl here Maya here, here measles here, here, here Meetup here mega regions here Mekong River here Memphis, Egypt here, here Mesoamerica here, here Mesopotamia here, here, here metallurgy here metaverse here methane here, here Mexico here Miami here, here, here microbiology here Microsoft here, here, here middle class, rise of here migration policy here millennial generation here Milwaukee here, here Minoan civilization here Mistry, Rohinton here MIT here MMR vaccine here ‘modernization’ theory here Mohenjo-Daro here, here Moretti, Enrico here, here mortality rates here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here motor car, invention of here Moynihan, Daniel here Mumbai here, here Mumford, Lewis here, here, here, here Munich here, here Mycenaean civilization here Nagoya here, here Nairobi here Nashville here National Landing, Arlington here Natural History Museum here natural resource exports here Nestlé here Netherlands here network effects here New Economics Foundation here New Orleans here, here New York here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here carbon emissions here and Covid-19 pandemic here gentrification here, here housing here, here, here incomes here, here Manhattan here, here, here, here, here population growth here, here and rising sea levels here slum housing here suburbanization here, here subway here waste and recycling here New York Central Railroad here New York World Fair here Newcastle here Nextdoor here Niger here Nigeria here, here, here, here Nilles, Jack here, here Nipah virus here Norway here, here Nottingham here Novgorod here ocean and air circulation here office rental and sales prices here Ohlin, Bertil here Oldenburg, Ray here online deliveries here OpenTable here Osaka here, here Oslo here Ottoman Empire here Oxford, population of here Oxford University here Pacific Belt Zone here Padua here Pakistan here, here, here pandemics here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here and zoonotic diseases here paramyxovirus here Paris here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here Paris Conference (2015) here Park Chung-hee, General here parks here Pasteur, Louis here Pearl River Delta here, here Peñalosa, Enrique here per capita income here Philadelphia here Philippines here, here Phoenix here, here Pixar here plague here, here, here, here Plato here plough, invention of here pollution here, here, here, here air pollution here, here, here, here population growth here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here PORTL here potter’s wheel, invention of here printing press here, here productivity here, here, here, here, here agricultural here, here Protestantism, rise of here public transport here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here Putnam, Robert here, here quarantine here railways here, here, here, here, here high-speed rail here, here, here Ralston Purina here Reagan, Ronald here recycling here, here religion here remote and hybrid working here, here, here, here Renaissance Florence here, here, here renewable energy here, here Republic of Letters here République des Hyper Voisins here ‘resource curse’ here Rheingold, Howard here Ricardo, David here Rio de 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50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 29 Earlsfort Terrace, Dublin 2, Ireland BLOOMSBURY, BLOOMSBURY CONTINUUM and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc This electronic edition first published in Great Britain 2023 Copyright © Ian Goldin and Tom Lee-Devlin 2023 Ian Goldin and Tom Lee-Devlin have asserted their right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Authors of this work All rights reserved.

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Index abortion here abstract mathematics here Achaemenid Empire here Adani, Gautam here agglomeration effects here agriculture here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here and carbon emissions here and disease here, here productivity here, here vertical farming here Ahmedabad here air-conditioning here, here airports here, here, here, here Albuquerque here Alexandria here Allen, Paul here Allen, Thomas here Altrincham here Amazon here, here, here Amazon rainforest here Amsterdam here Anatolia here Anderson, Benedict here Anheuser-Busch here antibiotics here, here, here Antonine Plague here Anyang here apartment conversions here, here Apple here, here, here Aristotle here Arizona State University here Arlington here Assyrian merchants here Athens, Ancient here, here, here, here, here, here Atlanta here, here Austin here, here, here automation here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here axial precession here Baghdad, House of Wisdom here Baltimore here, here Bangalore here, here Bangkok here Bangladesh here, here, here, here Barlow, John Perry here Bauhaus here Beijing here, here Belmar redevelopment here Berkes, Enrico here Berlin here, here, here Berlin Wall, fall of here Bezos, Jeff here biological weapons here ‘biophilia’ here biospheres here bird flu here Birmingham here, here Black Death here, here, here Blake, William here Bloom, Nick here BMW here ‘bobo’ (bourgeois bohemian) here, here, here Boccaccio, Giovanni here Boeing here, here, here Bogota here Bologna here Bonfire of the Vanities here Borneo here Boston here, here, here Boston University here, here Brand, Stewart here Brazil here, here Brexit here, here, here Bristol here Britain broadcasting here deindustrialization here education here enclosure movement here foreign aid here high-speed rail here, here house prices here immigration here industrialization here, here infant mortality here ‘levelling up’ here life expectancy here mayoralties here per capita emissions here per capita incomes here remote working here social housing here Brixton riots here broadcasting here Bronze Age here, here, here, here bronze, and shift to iron here Brooks, David here Brynjolfsson, Eric here Burgess, Ernest here bushmeat here, here Byzantine Empire, fall of here Cairncross, Frances here Cairo here calendar, invention of here Cambridge, Massachusetts here Cambridge University here canals here, here, here ‘cancel culture’ here Cape Town here Catholic Church here C40 Cities partnership here Chadwick, Edwin here Chang’an (Xi’an) here, here, here, here Charles, Prince of Wales here charter cities here Chengdu here Chiba here Chicago here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here childbirth, average age at here childcare here, here, here, here, here China here ancient here, here, here, here call-centre workers here cereal production here civil strife here and Covid-19 pandemic here Cultural Revolution here definition of cities here economic liberalization here entry into WTO here Household Responsibility System here hukou system here One Child Policy here Open Coastal Cities here per capita emissions here rapid ageing here Special Economic Zones here technology here urbanization here China Towns here Chinese Communist Party here cholera here, here, here, here Chongqing here cities, definition of here Citigroup here city networks here civil wars here Cleveland here, here, here, here climate change here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here coastal cities here, here, here, here commuting here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here Concentric Zone Model here Confucius here conspiracy theories here Constantinople here, here containerization here, here Copenhagen here, here Corinth here Cornwall here corruption here Coventry here, here covid-19 see pandemics crime rates here ‘cyberbalkanization’ here cycling here, here, here, here Damascus here Dark Ages here, here data science here de Soto, Hernando here deforestation here, here, here, here Delhi here Dell here Delphic oracle here democracy here, here, here Democratic Republic of Congo here, here, here, here, here, here Deng Xiaoping here dengue fever here Denmark here, here Detroit here, here, here, here, here, here, here Dhaka here, here, here, here, here Dharavi here Diana, Princess of Wales here diasporas here, here Dickens, Charles here district heating systems here Dresden here drought here, here, here, here, here, here, here Drucker, Peter here dual-income households here, here Dubai here, here, here Dunbar, Kevin here Düsseldorf here East Antarctic ice sheet here East China Sea here, here Easterly, William here Eastern Mediterranean here, here, here Ebola here Edinburgh here education here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here higher education here, here, here, here; see also universities Japanese school system here Egypt here, here Ancient here, here, here, here Ehrenhalt, Alan here electric vehicles (EVs) here Engels, Friedrich here Enlightenment here Epic of Gilgamesh here Erfurt here Ethiopia here, here Euripides here European Enlightenment here exchange rates here Facebook here, here, here fake news here famine here, here fertility rates here, here, here ‘15-minute city’ principle here Fischer, Claude here Fleming, Alexander here flooding here, here, here, here, here, here, here Florida, Richard here, here food shortages here Ford, Henry here, here foreign aid here fossil fuels here, here France here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here Frankfurt here Franklin, Benjamin here Friedman, Thomas here, here Fryer, Roland here Fukuoka here, here Gaetani, Ruben here Galileo Galilei here Ganges River here Garden Cities here Garden of Eden here Gates, Bill here, here gay community here General Electric here General Motors here genetic engineering here gentrification here, here, here, here, here George, Andy here Germany here, here, here, here, here, here Gingrich, Newt here glaciers here Glasgow here Glass, Ruth here global financial crisis here, here, here global population, size of here globalization here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here Goldstein, Amy here Google here, here, here Goos, Maarten here Grant, Adam here Great Depression here, here Greece, Ancient here, here, here, here, here Griffith Observatory here Gropius, Walter here Gruen, Victor here Gulf Stream here Haiti here Hamburg here Hanseatic League here, here Harappa here, here Harry, Prince here Harvard University here hate speech here Haussmann, Baron here, here Hawaii here Hazlitt, William here healthcare here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here heatwaves here, here Hebei here Heckscher, Eli here Herodotus here Himalayas here Hippocrates here Hippodamus here Hittite Empire here HIV here, here Ho Chi Minh City here Holocene here, here, here homophily here Hong Kong here house prices here, here, here, here, here, here, here Houston here, here, here Howard, Ebenezer here Hudson River here Hugo, Victor here Hume, David here Hurricane Katrina here hybrid working, see remote and hybrid working ice melting here, here import substitution industrialization here InBev here India here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here fertility rates here Indonesia here, here Indus River here Indus Valley here, here, here inequality here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here infant and child mortality here, here, here, here influenza here, here, here ‘information cocoons’ here Instagram here internet here, here, here, here, here, here invention here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here irrigation here, here, here, here Italy here Jacobs, Jane here, here, here Jakarta here, here James, Sheila here Japan here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here post-war development here schooling system here Jenner, Edward here Jesus Christ here Jobs, Steve here jobs apprenticeships here ‘lousy’ and ‘lovely’ here tradeable and non-tradeable here Justinian Plague here Kashmir here Kenya here Kinshasa here, here Kish here knowledge workers here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here Koch, Robert here Kolkata here Korean War here Krugman, Paul here Kushim Tablet here Lagash here Lagos here, here, here, here, here, here, here Lahore here land titling programmes here Las Vegas here Latin language here Lee Kuan Yew here, here Leeds here, here Leicester here Leipzig here, here, here, here Letchworth here life expectancy here, here, here, here, here, here Liverpool here, here Ljubljana here London here, here, here, here, here, here, here bike lanes here Canary Wharf here, here Chelsea here, here, here China Town here cholera outbreaks here City of London here, here coffeehouses here and Covid-19 pandemic here financial services here gentrification here, here, here Great Stink here, here heatwaves here, here house prices here, here hybrid working here, here immigration here, here incomes here, here mayoralty here migration into inner London here population growth here, here, here poverty here, here public transport here, here, here slum housing here social housing here suburbanization here Los Angeles here, here, here, here Louisville here Luoyang here Luther, Martin here Luton Airport here Luxembourg here, here Lyon here McDonald’s here McDonnell Douglas here McLuhan, Marshall here Madagascar here malaria here, here, here, here Malaysia here Mali here malls, reinvention of here Manchester here, here, here, here, here, here, here Manila here Manning, Alan here Markle, Meghan here marriage here Marshall, Alfred here Marshall, Tim here Marx, Karl here Maya here, here measles here, here, here Meetup here mega regions here Mekong River here Memphis, Egypt here, here Mesoamerica here, here Mesopotamia here, here, here metallurgy here metaverse here methane here, here Mexico here Miami here, here, here microbiology here Microsoft here, here, here middle class, rise of here migration policy here millennial generation here Milwaukee here, here Minoan civilization here Mistry, Rohinton here MIT here MMR vaccine here ‘modernization’ theory here Mohenjo-Daro here, here Moretti, Enrico here, here mortality rates here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here motor car, invention of here Moynihan, Daniel here Mumbai here, here Mumford, Lewis here, here, here, here Munich here, here Mycenaean civilization here Nagoya here, here Nairobi here Nashville here National Landing, Arlington here Natural History Museum here natural resource exports here Nestlé here Netherlands here network effects here New Economics Foundation here New Orleans here, here New York here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here carbon emissions here and Covid-19 pandemic here gentrification here, here housing here, here, here incomes here, here Manhattan here, here, here, here, here population growth here, here and rising sea levels here slum housing here suburbanization here, here subway here waste and recycling here New York Central Railroad here New York World Fair here Newcastle here Nextdoor here Niger here Nigeria here, here, here, here Nilles, Jack here, here Nipah virus here Norway here, here Nottingham here Novgorod here ocean and air circulation here office rental and sales prices here Ohlin, Bertil here Oldenburg, Ray here online deliveries here OpenTable here Osaka here, here Oslo here Ottoman Empire here Oxford, population of here Oxford University here Pacific Belt Zone here Padua here Pakistan here, here, here pandemics here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here and zoonotic diseases here paramyxovirus here Paris here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here Paris Conference (2015) here Park Chung-hee, General here parks here Pasteur, Louis here Pearl River Delta here, here Peñalosa, Enrique here per capita income here Philadelphia here Philippines here, here Phoenix here, here Pixar here plague here, here, here, here Plato here plough, invention of here pollution here, here, here, here air pollution here, here, here, here population growth here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here PORTL here potter’s wheel, invention of here printing press here, here productivity here, here, here, here, here agricultural here, here Protestantism, rise of here public transport here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here Putnam, Robert here, here quarantine here railways here, here, here, here, here high-speed rail here, here, here Ralston Purina here Reagan, Ronald here recycling here, here religion here remote and hybrid working here, here, here, here Renaissance Florence here, here, here renewable energy here, here Republic of Letters here République des Hyper Voisins here ‘resource curse’ here Rheingold, Howard here Ricardo, David here Rio de Janeiro here Riverside, San Francisco here robotics here Rockefeller, John D. here Roman Empire here, here, here Rome, Ancient here, here, here, here, here, here Romer, Paul here Rotterdam here Rousseau, Jean-Jacques here, here Sahel here, here sailboat, invention of here St Augustine here St Louis here, here, here Salesforce here San Diego here San Francisco here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here gentrification here, here hybrid working here, here San Francisco Bay Area here, here, here Santa Fe here São Paulo here Savonarola, Girolamo here Scientific American here Scott, Emmett J. here sea levels, rising here, here, here Seattle here, here, here, here, here, here Second Opium War here Seneca here Seoul here Shanghai here, here, here, here, here Shantou here Sheffield here, here, here Shen Nung here Shenzhen here, here Siemens here Silk Roads here, here Sinclair, Upton here Singapore here, here, here, here Slater, Samuel here smallpox here, here Smith, Adam here, here Snow, John here social capital here social housing here, here social media here, here, here, here, here Socrates here solar panels here South Africa here South Korea here, here, here, here, here, here Southdale Center here specialization here, here, here, here, here, here Spengler, Oswald here Starbucks here Stephenson, Neal here Stewart, General William here Stuttgart here Sub-Saharan Africa here subsidiarity principle here suburbanization here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here Sunstein, Cass here Sweden here, here Sydney here, here, here, here, here, here Syrian refugees here, here Taiwan here Tanzania here telegraph here Tempest, Kae here Thailand here Thames River here, here Thatcher, Margaret here, here, here ‘third places’ here Tianjin here Tocqueville, Alexis de here Toffler, Alvin here Tokyo here, here, here, here trade liberalization here trade routes here Trump, Donald here, here tuberculosis here, here, here Twain, Mark here Twitter here, here typhoid here, here typhus here, here Uber here Uganda here Ukraine here, here Umayyad Caliphate here unemployment here, here United Nations here, here United States anti-global populism here anti-trust regulation and industrial consolidation here anxiety and depression here broadcasting here car registrations here cost of education here decline in trust here deindustrialization here Gilded Age here Great Migration here house prices here, here immigration here industrialization here inequality here labour mobility here ‘magnet schools’ here parking spaces here patent filings here per capita emissions here, here per capita incomes here remote working here, here, here return on equity here Rust Belt here schools funding here slavery here socioeconomic mobility here suburbanization here tax revenues here US Federal Housing Authority here US General Social Survey here US Trade Adjustment Assistance Program here universities here, here, here University College London here University of Texas here university-educated professionals here Ur here urban heat island effect here urbanism, subcultural theory of here Uruk here, here, here, here, here vaccines here, here Van Alstyne, Marshall here Vancouver here Venice here, here Vienna here, here Vietnam here voluntary associations here, here Wakefield, Andrew here walking here, here, here Wall Street here Warwick University here Washington University here WELL, The here Welwyn Garden City here wheel, invention of here wildfires here, here William the Conqueror here Wilson, Edward Osborne here, here Wilson, William here World Bank here, here World Health organization here World Trade Organization here World Wide Web here writing, invention of here Wuhan here, here Xiamen here Yangtze River here, here Yangtze River Delta here yellow fever here Yellow River here, here Yersinia pestis here Yokohama here YouTube here, here Yu the Great here Zhuhai here Zoom here Zoroastrianism here BLOOMSBURY CONTINUUM Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 29 Earlsfort Terrace, Dublin 2, Ireland BLOOMSBURY, BLOOMSBURY CONTINUUM and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc This electronic edition first published in Great Britain 2023 Copyright © Ian Goldin and Tom Lee-Devlin 2023 Ian Goldin and Tom Lee-Devlin have asserted their right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Authors of this work All rights reserved.

The Technology Trap: Capital, Labor, and Power in the Age of Automation
by Carl Benedikt Frey
Published 17 Jun 2019

Bush’s 2000 results—in areas most exposed to Chinese imports.47 But while globalization is the most frequently cited villain, automation has also helped shatter the communities of the so-called blue-collar’s aristocracy. Even if production is brought back to the United States, it will not replace the vast numbers of jobs for non-college-educated members of the middle class that have been lost to the process of deindustrialization. The computer revolution, which has also been an underlying facilitator of globalization, has meant diminishing opportunity for the unskilled across the board: routine work is now disappearing in parts of the developing world as well.48 In America, this process has been going on for decades, yet it was hidden by other factors.

…

Globalization did not lift all of the boats, but neither did automation. As the economist Dani Rodrik writes, “Globalization was hardly the only shock which gutted established social contracts. By all accounts, automation and new digital technologies played a quantitatively greater role in de-industrialization and in spatial and income inequalities.”58 Rodrik also offers a powerful explanation for why globalization has become the political target that automation has not. “What gives trade particular political salience,” he argues, “is that it often raises fairness concerns in ways that the other major contributor to inequality—technology—does not.”59 Inequality is more problematic when it occurs due to unfair competition.

…

In the words of the economist Robert LaLonde, “Whereas private markets offer insurance for storms and fire, no such insurance is available when a middle-aged worker loses a job and suffers a permanent drop in wages. There is a market failure here, and government should correct it.”33 Tax Credits In the popular press, universal basic income (UBI) has become a widely discussed way of limiting individual losses resulting from automation and deindustrialization. Of course, there are arguments in favor of UBI that have nothing to do with technological change, but this is not the place to dwell on them. The question here is whether it provides a good way of addressing the discontents brought about by the rise of the robots. In essence, UBI—which is closely tied to Milton Friedman’s old idea of a negative income tax—would give people a minimum income regardless of whether they worked or not.

The Meritocracy Myth
by Stephen J. McNamee
Published 17 Jul 2013

What is more, these forms of discrimination often become components of cumulative disadvantage, which have been referred to as “multiple jeopardy,” or the effects of intersectionalities. We conclude that discrimination trumps merit; the more forms of discrimination that are operative, the more effective the trump. In the concluding chapter, “Growing Inequality in the Twenty-First Century,” we outline the implications of globalization and deindustrialization, the long wage recession, and increasing economic inequality since the 1970s for the sustainability of the notions of meritocracy and the American Dream in the twenty-first century. We examine strategies that individual Americans have developed to cope with the problems created by these changes.

…

In addition, as part of the overall downsizing strategy, middle-level management jobs were trimmed while new computer technologies automated routine information-processing tasks. In the postwar period, it had been possible for many working-class Americans with only a high school diploma to realize the American Dream by working in factories and corporate offices with good pay, good benefits, and long-term job stability. With “deindustrialization” and “downsizing,” many of these workers were laid off (Uchitelle 2006). New jobs were created, but these were mostly in the “soft,” low-wage, low-skill service sector. Reflecting on her interviews with these workers, economist Paula Rayman put it this way: During the early 1980s, many workers in America who thought they had it made in the major industrial corporations of auto, steel, and aircraft found themselves unemployed. . . .

…

Economist Frank Levy points to several factors responsible for this change: the civil rights movement, which reduced economic discrimination; the extension of the interstate highway system and the development of network television, which helped link the South to other regions; and the spread of air-conditioning, making the South more amenable to the “climatically challenged” (1998, 133). The availability of cheap land, low wages, low taxes, and low levels of unionization also encouraged industrial development in the South. During the same period, deindustrialization of the Northeast and Midwest (the Rust Belt) depressed wages, especially in the manufacturing sectors. Despite these changes, significant regional gaps in income and poverty rates remain. Table 6.2 depicts median household income differences and family poverty rates among regions in the United States in 2011.[1] Median household income ranges from a high of $53,864 in the Northeast to a low of $46,899 in the South, representing a 12.9 percent gap.

Global Financial Crisis
by Noah Berlatsky
Published 19 Feb 2010

In the name of ‘free trade’ and ‘comparative advantage’ [the ability of a country to produce a good at a lower relative cost than an192 Solutions to the Global Financial Crisis other] African countries were forced to accept sweeping trade liberalisation that has been very costly in economic and social terms. Trade liberalisation has increased Africa’s external dependence, destroyed domestic industries, accelerated deindustrialisation and led to the deterioration of its terms of trade. While African countries were being told about the virtues of ‘free trade’, OECD countries were provided huge agricultural subsidies erecting disguised or open protectionist policies, all of which have made ‘free trade’ a joke. Still in the name of ‘comparative advantage’, African countries were forced to give priority to cash crops at the expense of food production.

We Were Eight Years in Power: An American Tragedy
by Ta-Nehisi Coates
Published 2 Oct 2017

But the awareness was imprecise and could not match the visceral power of Wilson’s theory, which was not historical but observable, as Jay would say, on any Martin Luther. For those seeking immediately actionable solutions, there was also something useful about this perspective. If white supremacy was not the primary injury, if what injured black people was the same deindustrialization and governmental retreat that threatened working people everywhere, then there was no need for solutions that took racism into account. Instead, programs could be targeted at those in need, and the residual problems of a presumably historical racism could be solved while eliding any discussion of their origins.

…

After voters rejected funding for more prisons, Cuomo pulled the money from the Urban Development Corporation, an agency that was supposed to build public housing for the poor. It did—in prison. Under the avowedly liberal Cuomo, New York added more prison beds than under all his predecessors combined. This was penal welfarism at its finest. Deindustrialization had presented an employment problem for America’s poor and working class of all races. Prison presented a solution: jobs for whites, and warehousing for blacks. Mass incarceration “widened the income gap between white and black Americans,” writes Heather Ann Thompson, a historian at the University of Michigan, “because the infrastructure of the carceral state was located disproportionately in all-white rural communities.”

…

Taylor is a sociologist at Michigan State University, where he researches urban communities and violence and serves as an adviser to Michigan’s prisons and juvenile detention centers. A twenty-four-year age gap separates Taylor and Shakur, a gap that’s reflected in their visions of Detroit. Shakur, who is forty-two, recalls a town ravaged by deindustrialization, where unemployment was rampant, social institutions had failed, and gangs had taken their place. “The community collapsed,” Shakur said. “Our value system became surviving versus living. Drugs, gangs, lack of education all came to the forefront. And prison and incarceration.” Taylor, who is sixty-six, recalls a more hopeful community where black professionals lived next door to black factory workers and black maids and black gangsters, and the streets were packed with bars, factories, and restaurants.

Making the Modern World: Materials and Dematerialization
by Vaclav Smil
Published 16 Dec 2013

Given the country's still unfavorable fuel mix (with a high dependence on coal) and far from exhausted opportunities for higher industrial, commercial, and household efficiencies, this downward trend of average energy intensities should continue, albeit at a slower rate, for decades to come. In the UK, the decline has been led by the country's continuing shift from coal to hydrocarbons and by further deindustrialization; the first process has now gone about as far as it can go, while the fate of the country's once globally dominant industrial sector remains in question. Deindustrialization has been also an important contributing factor in the American decline of energy intensity and, as I will demonstrate, that decline is less impressive once the energies needed to produce the increasing mass of imports are accounted for.

…

But while metal recycling has shown a generally upward trend (albeit with some notable recession-induced downturns), domestic consumption of primary metals reached a fluctuating plateau in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, followed by a general decline for the next 30 years that is ascribable to the first wave of deindustrialization of America, that is to the country's loss of global dominance in iron and steelmaking and the declining output of color metals. Steel production peaked in 1979 at 91.9 Mt, a decade later it was 52% lower, and by the century's end it was, at 47.9 Mt, barely above that level. The peak years of domestic output were 1969 for zinc, 1972 for copper and nickel, and 1973 for lead (only copper production was eventually surpassed, for eight years starting in 1992, before it fell back again).

…

After a temporary decline in fuel imports total primary energy supply (TPES) resumed its growth (albeit at a slower rate) but the consumption of metallic ores and nonmetallic minerals began to stagnate and after 1990 to decline. Japan remains an affluent society based on mass consumption of mostly imported materials, but the post-1990 combination of population aging, economic setbacks, and deindustrialization have brought reduced imports and stagnating or declining output and consumption rates. A more profitable task than to offer such brief summaries for other leading industrialized nations (most of them sharing heavy dependence on imports of essential materials) is to turn to some fundamental attributes of material flows, to their energy costs and to their environmental impacts.

An Extraordinary Time: The End of the Postwar Boom and the Return of the Ordinary Economy
by Marc Levinson
Published 31 Jul 2016

Data on Japanese R&D spending are from Steven Englander and Axel Mittelstädt, “Total Factor Productivity: Macroeconomic and Structural Aspects of the Slowdown,” OECD Economic Survey 10 (1988): 36. 17. Dale W. Jorgenson and Masahiro Kuroda, “Productivity and International Competitiveness in Japan and the United States, 1960–1985,” in Hulten, ed., Productivity Growth in Japan and the United States, 45. 18. The term “deindustrialization” was popularized by Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America (New York: Basic Books, 1982). 19. James Chan Lee and Helen Sutch, “Profits and Rates of Return in OECD Countries,” OECD Economics and Statistics Department, working paper 20, 1985. 20. See US International Trade Commission, Bolts, Nuts, and Screws of Iron and Steel (Washington, DC, 1975).

…

Japan ran steady trade deficits with the countries that supplied it with raw materials—Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Canada, Australia—but large surpluses with the high-income countries whose sophisticated industrial products competed with Japan’s. As Japan’s trade shifted from deficit to surplus, the United States went from rough balance before 1975 to persistent and large trade deficits. The upper Midwest, the heartland of heavy industry, became known as the “Rust Belt,” the victim of a disease that would soon be labeled “deindustrialization.” Canada and Europe had their rust belts, too, and the English Midlands, the German Ruhr, and the coal and steel towns of France and Belgium would soon be just as depressed as the erstwhile industrial hotspots in the United States.18 Throughout the Golden Age, manufacturers in every country had benefited from seemingly unlimited demand for their products.

…

See also political parties Cost of Living Council, 107 cost-push inflation, 75–77 Council of Economic Advisers, 48, 65–66 crisis cartels, 127 Czechoslovakia, 19 Dai-ichi Kangyo of Tokyo, 91 Daly, Herman E., 63 Dance of Death (Strindberg), 164 Davignon, Étienne, 127 Davignon Plan, 127 de Gasperi, Alcide, 24 de Gaulle, Charles, 24, 162, 200, 201 de Larosière, Jacques, 244, 249 debt crisis, 243–256; cause of and solution to, 253–256; emergency loans and, 247–249; impact on First World, 251–252; inflation and, 246; unemployment and, 246 deindustrialization, 124 Delors, Jacques, 209, 210 demand-pull inflation, 75–76 democracy, 268 Denison, Edward, 231 Denmark: anti-tax movement in, 151–153, 154; income per person in, 160 dependency theory (government intervention re: raw materials and manufacturing), 42 Der Spiegel, 89 deregulation, 12, 99–114, 237; of aviation, 113; of electricity, 113; of energy sector, 99–109, 110, 113; of gas, 99–100, 102, 103–104, 107–108, 109, 113; of interest rates on deposits and loans, 112, 113; of natural gas, 103, 104, 108–109, 110, 113; of oil, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104–106, 107–108, 109, 110, 113; positive and negative results of, 113–114; of telecommunications sector, 107, 113; of transportation sector, 106–107, 110–112, 113–114.

Occupy
by Noam Chomsky
Published 2 Jan 1994

One of the underlying factors, discussed mainly by economic historian Robert Brenner, was the falling rate of profit in manufacturing. There were other factors. It led to major changes in the economy—a reversal of the several hundred years of progress towards industrialization and development and that turned to a process of de-industrialization and de-development. Of course, manufacturing production continued overseas—very profitable, but no good for the work force. Along with that came a significant shift of the economy from productive enterprise—producing things people need or could use—to financial manipulation. The financialization of the economy really took off at that time.

…

“Working class,” as it’s called in other countries. But it was real. And the 1960s accelerated it. The activism of the 1960s, after a pretty dismal decade, really civilized the country in lots of ways that are permanent. They’re not changing. They’re staying on. When the 1970s came along there were sudden and sharp changes: de-industrialization, off-shoring of production, and shifting to financial institutions, which grew enormously. I should say that, in the 1950s and 1960s, there was also the development of what several decades later became the high-tech economy: computers, the Internet, the IT Revolution, mostly developed in the 1950s and 1960s, substantially in the state sector.

The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order
by Rush Doshi
Published 24 Jun 2021

Politically, Beijing would project leadership over global governance and international institutions, split Western alliances, and advance autocratic norms at the expense of liberal ones. Economically, it would weaken the financial advantages that underwrite US hegemony and seize the commanding heights of the “fourth industrial revolution” from artificial intelligence to quantum computing, with the United States declining into a “deindustrialized, English-speaking version of a Latin American republic, specializing in commodities, real estate, tourism, and perhaps transnational tax evasion.”8 Militarily, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would field a world-class force with bases around the world that could defend China’s interests in most regions and even in new domains like space, the poles, and the deep sea.

…

By the early 2000s, it was clear that China had played its weak hand well in the negotiations over PNTR and WTO. China had bought itself stable market access abroad, which in turn made multinational companies more willing to invest in and export from China—setting off a virtuous cycle of explosive growth in China while accelerating deindustrialization and increasing unemployment in the industrialized world. Just as critically, PNTR and WTO helped Beijing bind American economic coercion for two decades, until the Trump administration broke some of those self-imposed constraints in 2018 and pursued a trade war with China. By then, of course, China’s economy was no longer quite so weak: an economy that had been only 10 percent the size of the American economy at the time of WTO accession was now 70 percent the size of the American economy at the dawn of the trade war.

…

Politically, Beijing would project leadership over global governance and international institutions, advance autocratic norms at the expense of liberal ones, and split American alliances in Europe and Asia. Economically, it would weaken the financial advantages that underwrite US hegemony and seize the commanding heights of the “fourth industrial revolution” from artificial intelligence to quantum computing while the United States deindustrializes. Militarily, the PLA would field a world-class force with bases around the world that could defend China’s interests in most regions and even in new domains. Taken together, China would erect a “zone of super-ordinate influence” in its home region and “partial hegemony” across the developing countries tied to its Belt and Road Initiative—and perhaps parts of the developed world too, a vision some Chinese popular writers describe using Mao’s revolutionary guidance to “surround the cities from the countryside” [农村包围城市].11 The fact that aspects of China’s global ambitions and strategy are visible in high-level speeches is strong evidence that China’s ambitions are not limited to Taiwan or to dominating the Indo-Pacific.

Trade Wars Are Class Wars: How Rising Inequality Distorts the Global Economy and Threatens International Peace
by Matthew C. Klein
Published 18 May 2020

Yet despite the inflation of the health care, government, construction, finance, and education sectors—which accounted for most of the jobs created in the years before the financial crisis—the age-adjusted share of Americans with a job never surpassed the peak reached in 2000. The drop was particularly severe for those without college degrees. The collapse of the housing bubble eventually revealed the full extent of the damage wrought by deindustrialization.37 Government disability payments helped displaced workers make ends meet but could not replace the lost income. This magnified the impact of imports to everyone who lived in affected communities, regardless of whether they worked in retail, restaurants, or higher-paid industries such as accountants and lawyers.

…

To the misfortune of American workers, the overvaluation of the dollar meant that American consumers would prefer to buy goods made abroad at the expense of domestic manufacturing.39 The rest of the world’s unwillingness to spend—which in turn was attributable to the class wars in the major surplus economies and the desire for self-insurance after the Asian crisis—was the underlying cause of both America’s debt bubble and America’s deindustrialization. Foreign financial inflows forced Americans to absorb their glut of manufacturing capacity at the expense of U.S. jobs and incomes. This necessarily required foreign savers to mitigate the impact of job losses on American spending by buying dollar-denominated assets, which pushed down interest rates, expanded credit, and facilitated a surge in household borrowing.

…

Starting in the 1990s, however, savers in the rest of the world decided that the dollar was the international reserve asset, regardless of any formal commitments. The resulting financial inflows were accommodated by the U.S. political and financial system—with disastrous consequences for Americans. When foreign savers buy U.S. assets, America’s current account deficit rises through some combination of lower income from deindustrialization and higher spending on imports. Unless there are trillions of dollars of worthwhile investments in the United States waiting for funding—and there are not—the higher spending must take the form of wasteful investment or additional consumption. And unless the U.S. government fully offsets the purchases from foreign central banks by commensurately increasing its debt issuance, the American private sector will have to absorb additional foreign financial inflows by selling assets, issuing equity, or borrowing.

Work in the Future The Automation Revolution-Palgrave MacMillan (2019)
by Robert Skidelsky Nan Craig
Published 15 Mar 2020

At the most radical end of this school of thought is accelerationism, a utopian leftist theory that the pace of automation should be sped up as much as possible in order to achieve a society in which human labour is unnecessary.2 I would argue, perhaps predictably, that the answer is more nuanced than either camp would have it. Those in the first camp often draw examples from areas in the UK affected by deindustrialisation in which whole communities have lost their jobs and incomes, and with these their sense Recent commentators to advocate this include Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams (2015) and Aaron Bastani (2018). 2 180 R. Kay of purpose and self-respect. However, this outcome is specific to the circumstance: it does not mean that work is inherently necessary for meaning.

The American Dream Is Not Dead: (But Populism Could Kill It)
by Michael R. Strain
Published 25 Feb 2020

The data are also consistent with the conservative populists’ narrative regarding declining opportunities for men with lower educational attainment. Participation rate declines are choppy, with periods of decline alternating with periods of stability. The declining periods roughly coincide with periods of known deindustrialization, times when recessions and global competition forced outmoded factories to close down. This suggests that some men have failed to find their way back into the labor force after each period of adjustment despite the overall trend of rising wages and opportunity. More research is needed, but I suspect one will find that certain groups of men become unemployable after these downturns and drop out of a labor market that has no use for them.

…

According to a 2018 Brookings report, 62 percent of U.S. counties identified as having a disproportionately large share of manufacturing jobs in 1970 have successfully transitioned to new industries, and 22 percent exhibited strong or emerging economic performance over the past two decades while still having a large manufacturing sector intact.58 In his inaugural address, President Trump described an “American carnage” of “rusted-out factories scattered like tombstones across the landscape of our nation.”59 This populist characterization is inaccurate. Few towns have been devastated by deindustrialization. Similarly, the common experience of Americans is to have some postsecondary education. It isn’t to be without a high school diploma. Only 10 percent of American adults have less than a high school education.60 And every death of despair is a tragedy. Though there are far too many such deaths, they remain far from the common experience.

The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order
by Benn Steil
Published 14 May 2013

“As one who has played around with psychological warfare,” added State Department Press Division head Michael McDermott, “ … I wouldn’t be at all surprised if this Conference didn’t contribute a good deal” to ending the war. The Germans “couldn’t but say, ‘My God, what are we up against?’ and quit.” Tragically, this was not to be the case; the Germans would fight on another eight and a half months. Furthermore, Morgenthau’s own soon-to-be publicized ideas for deindustrializing postwar Germany would arguably serve to buttress rather than weaken German war morale, and thereby extend the war and its attendant carnage. Brown pledged to “do what I can to sell [the agreement] to the bankers of the country.” Morgenthau was grateful, “because they seem to be the only people who right now are vociferous [against] this thing.”

…

In a radio broadcast from London, the Secretary told British listeners: “It is not enough for us to say, ‘we will disarm Germany and Japan and hope that they will learn to behave themselves as decent people.’” He radically split both his British and American government interlocutors by arguing that Germany needed to be partitioned into two independent, deindustrialized states. The economy was to be remade around tiny agricultural provinces. Further, the Saar, Ruhr, and Upper Silesia regions were to be internationalized, and other areas hived off to neighboring countries. Angered that the State Department was proceeding against what he discovered to be the agreement among Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin to dismember Germany, made at the Tehran conference in November 1943, Morgenthau, on his return home from Europe, petitioned the president for his intervention.

…

It was a mark of his desire for Keynes’s approbation that White offered as support for his work the claim that “Keynes seems to be wholly in our corner” on German partition.33 This was at best an exaggeration, as Keynes was sympathetic only to a temporary partition and rejected entirely the idea of deindustrializing the country.34 For his part, Morgenthau cared little what Keynes thought, and focused his energies on gaining the support of Stimson, Hull, and others in the administration who mattered. In this exercise, Morgenthau could not have resembled Keynes less, relying on unrefined instinct and emotion rather than facts and reason, at times straying into the realm of the bizarre.

The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy
by Dani Rodrik
Published 23 Dec 2010

They deindustrialized. At the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, Asia and Latin America had levels of industrial activity roughly similar to Europe’s. Europe experienced a nearly sixfold increase in these levels between 1750 and 1913. Asia and Latin America meanwhile witnessed a decline to less than a third of their initial level.9 In 1900, developing nations produced only about half the quantity of manufactured goods that they did in 1830. As the economic historian Paul Bairoch, the source of these estimates, writes: “There cannot be any question but that the cause of de-industrialization in the Third World lay in the massive influx of European manufactured goods, especially textiles, on the markets of these countries.”10 Chalk up two against globalization.

…

What matters ultimately is having a government that understands the nature of the challenge and is willing to try different solutions to overcome it. By 2009, South Africa had elected a new president, Jacob Zuma, and installed a new government. Government officials were warning about the risk of deindustrialization and talking about industrial policy as the central plank of South Africa’s response to the global financial crisis.36 A New Narrative for Development As early as 1791, Alexander Hamilton had argued that those who believed that modern industries would develop on their own, without support from government, were mistaken.37 There were too many obstacles, not the least competition from more advanced nations, for these industries to arise spontaneously and naturally in the United States.

…

Sokoloff, “Factor Endowments, Institutions and Differential Paths of Growth Among New World Economies: A View from Economic Historians of the United States,” in Stephen Huber, ed., How Latin America Fell Behind (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997). 6 evket Pamuk and Jeffrey G. Williamson, “Ottoman De-Industrialization 1800–1913: Assessing the Shock, Its Impact, and the Response,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 14763, March 2009. 7 Jeffrey G. Williamson, “Globalization and Under-development in the Pre-Modern Third World,” The Luca d’Agliano Lecture, Turin, Italy, March 31, 2006. 8 Oded Galor and Andrew Mountford, “Trading Population for Productivity: Theory and Evidence,” Review of Economic Studies, vol. 75, no. 4 (October 2008), pp. 1143–1179. 9 I am referring here to manufacturing output levels in per capita terms. 10 Paul Bairoch, “International Industrialization Levels from 1750 to 1980,” Journal of European Economic History, 11 (Spring 1982), pp. 269–310. 11 The tale of the contrasting paths of Argentina and the United States is told in Alan Beattie, False Economy: A Surprising Economic History of the World (New York: Riverhead Books, 2009), chap. 1. 12 Ichirou Inukai and Arlon R.

The Age of Illusions: How America Squandered Its Cold War Victory
by Andrew J. Bacevich
Published 7 Jan 2020

In the final debate, he took a swipe at the media for going “bonkers” over his proposal to consult citizens directly by instituting electronic “town halls.” (“I guess it’s because you will lose your right to tell them what to think.”) Yet he concentrated his fire on what he called “the center of the bull’s-eye”: the deindustrialization of the American economy. If NAFTA became law, “you’re going to hear a giant sucking sound of jobs being pulled out of this country,” he declared, “right at a time when we need the tax base to pay the debt and pay down the interest on the debt and get our house back in order.” While Perot’s candidacy centered on economic concerns, he joined Buchanan in expressing his wariness about Washington’s growing appetite for military interventions abroad.

…

The rich were once again getting richer, but the take-home pay of working-class Americans remained stagnant, as it had for decades.14 And the shuttering of factories that had long sustained the middle class—4.5 million manufacturing jobs lost since the passage of NAFTA in 1994—continued.15 Globalization was accelerating the deindustrialization of the U.S. economy, exporting more jobs than it was creating. As for those Americans born into poverty, they were likely to die poor as well: Studies revealed a sharp decline in social mobility dating back to the 1980s, but worsening in the wake of the Cold War.16 Globalization was supposed to lift all boats.

…

collapse of Nixon in China and Wallace and conservatives consumerism and materialism consumer protection containment Coolidge, Calvin Council on Foreign Relations credit card debt crime criminal justice reform Cruz, Ted Cuba invasion of 1898 Obama and Cuban Missile Crisis culture wars Culture Wars (Hunter) Cyrus the Great death penalty Declaration of Independence Defense Department Defense of Marriage Act (1996) deindustrialization Deliberate Force, Operation demagogues democracy Democratic Party primaries of 2016 “deplorables” depression and anxiety Desert Storm, Operation Dewey, Commodore Dewey, Thomas discrimination diversity military and Obama and divorce Donaldson, Sam Doonesbury (Trudeau) Douthat, Ross Dowd, Maureen drugs and substance abuse Dukakis, Michael Duke University Dulles, John Foster Earth Summit (Rio de Janeiro, 1992) Eastern Europe economy.

The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War
by Benn Steil
Published 13 Feb 2018

Yet like Henry Wallace—who who would tap him as a future treasury secretary during his 1948 presidential campaign—White was also a great admirer of the Soviet Union and its economic system. He would, over the course of twelve years in Washington, to a much greater degree than Wallace, use his position to aid Moscow materially and with secret intelligence.25 He would also give substance to the so-called Morgenthau Plan to deindustrialize postwar Germany—effectively to render the country pastoral and infirm. Together with the dismantling of Britain’s empire under Washington’s approving gaze, the Morgenthau Plan became a pillar of Stalin’s expectations that he would be able to control a buffer of central and eastern European nations without interference from an indifferent United States and a weak and divided western Europe.

…

The Truman administration was now in revolt against the Morgenthau mind-set that had held sway, however tenuously, in Washington a mere two and a half years prior, which viewed a united, industrially revived Germany as a continued threat to Europe. FDR’s State Department never supported Morgenthau’s plan for deindustrialization and dismembership, believing it “would provide a ready-made program for nationalistic agitators”; instead it supported only decentralization, or federalization, as a means of containing German nationalism and militarism. Once Truman became president, he condemned Morgenthau’s “meddling” and put the State Department back in control of foreign policy.91 Europe’s economic crisis now made Morgenthau’s ideas look reckless.

…

“With the aim of military security,” explained a French foreign office official to his American counterpart in 1946, “we prefer to increase French steel production and output to the detriment of the Ruhr.”16 Yet to put the plan into action would require huge imports of German coal and coke, and thus dependence on unlikely German collaboration in its own deindustrialization. The Monnet Plan therefore relied on French control of the German Ruhr area, Rhineland, and Saarland, or at least a measure of such control through schemes aimed at “internationalizing” them. Here, French interests clashed with those of the Benelux, which saw a robust German recovery as essential for generating the industrial and consumer demand for its exports.

Culture works: the political economy of culture
by Richard Maxwell
Published 15 Jan 2001

A rapid rise in automobile ownership and the federal postwar highway building programs allowed large numbers of people—and retail businesses—to move out of the downtowns.26 At the same time, in some parts of the urban United States, the mobility of industrial capital had already begun pulling plants and businesses out of urban areas, setting off the racialized “urban crisis” of the 1960s and prefiguring the catastrophic deindustrialization of the 1980s.27 According to Lizabeth Cohen, “between 1947 and 1953 alone, the suburban population increased by 43 percent, in contrast to a general population increase of 11 percent,” and this population was increasingly racially and ethnically segregated.28 Tax and lending laws were changed at this time to favor the interests of large real-estate developers and investors.

…

Although this critique of the political economy of shopping has refused to embrace the ideals of consumerism or the practical realities of commercialization, it has shown the importance of analyzing consumption and production as parts of a single system. This is crucial for rethinking how activist consumers can shape demands for a more transparent shopping landscape—a clearer picture of where products come from and how they are made. There is abundant evidence that the same processes of capital flight, deindustrialization, and internationalization that have increased poverty, part-time work, and more stressful and unsafe working days have created the bounty that Wal-Mart, Target, and Westfield Villages celebrate. Indeed, megaretailers have played an important part in driving wages, job security, and working conditions downward for many people—and not just Americans—as they have helped flood the world with cheap goods.

…

Also during the 1980s, under the influence of the law and economics movement, the judiciary gradually shifted the burden of proof in intellectual property cases concerning the boundaries of the public domain: where previously the assumption was that things in the public domain should stay that way unless a compelling case could be made for privatization, these days the assumption is the reverse, that things should be privatized unless a compelling case can be made not to. Finally, faced with deindustrialization at home and the realization that intellectual property was the last remaining area of clear-cut U.S. industrial domination, the U.S. State Department embraced these trends and took on the expansion of intellectual property rights internationally as a key foreign-policy goal.23 In sum, it is significant that executives such as NBC’s Scott Sassa no longer refer to popular programs, films, or songs when discussing media strategy.

The Metropolitan Revolution: How Cities and Metros Are Fixing Our Broken Politics and Fragile Economy
by Bruce Katz and Jennifer Bradley
Published 10 Jun 2013

Quoted in Iver Peterson, “‘Mistake by the Lake’ Wakes Up, Roaring,” New York Times, September 10, 1995 (www.nytimes.com/1995/09/10/us/mistake-bythe-lake-wakes-up-roaring.html). 7. Ibid. 8. Brookings Analysis of Moody’s Analytics. 9. John Russo and Sherry Lee Linkon, “Collateral Damage: Deindustrialization and the Uses of Youngstown,” in Beyond the Ruins: the Meanings of Deindustrialization, edited by Jefferson Cowie and Joseph Heathcott (Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 208. 10-2151-2 notes.indd 219 5/20/13 7:00 PM 220 NOTES TO PAGES 66–77 10. Ibid. 11. Lavea Brachman and Alan Mallach, “Ohio’s Cities at a Turning Point: Finding the Way Forward” (Brookings, 2010), p. 13. 12.

…

The informal power to convene is probably the least respected tool an elected official or recognized private or civic leader possesses but the most important one when addressing issues as multidimensional as the desired shape and structure of a metropolitan economy. Mayor Bloomberg understood this in responding to the Lehman Brothers collapse, when he and his administration reached out to dozens of corporate and civic leaders. So did philanthropic leaders in Northeast Ohio and Detroit as the “quiet crisis” of deindustrialization took full effect in the early years of this century. A metro, of course, does not need a crisis to build a network. Houston’s Neighborhood Centers has been creating and stewarding networks throughout its 100-year history, accumulating trust and legitimacy in the process. Network building can be a useful technique in the early months of a new administration, the path chosen by Chicago mayor Rahm Emanuel in 2011, at the beginning of his term, when he deputized a group of business, civic, and community leaders to establish the city’s Plan for Economic Growth and Jobs.

…

New York: Basic Books, 2012. 11-2151-2 biblio.indd 247 5/20/13 7:00 PM 248 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Marklund, Göran, Nicholas S. Vonortas, and Charles W. Wessner. The Innovation Imperative: National Innovation Strategies in the Global Economy. Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, 2009. McComb, David G. Houston, a History. University of Texas Press, 1981. Mercier, Laurie. “Remembering and Redefining Deindustrialized Youngstown.” American Quarterly 55, no. 2 (2003): 315–21. Miller, Carol Poh, and Robert Anthony Wheeler. Cleveland: A Concise History, 1796–1996. 2nd ed. Indiana University Press, 1997. Moretti, Enrico. The New Geography of Jobs. Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012. Moynihan, Daniel P., ed.

The Rise and Fall of the Neoliberal Order: America and the World in the Free Market Era
by Gary Gerstle
Published 14 Oct 2022

The most notorious headline ever to the grace the front page of a New York tabloid simply read: “Ford to City: Drop Dead.”32 Four hundred fifty miles away, in the far northwest corner of New York State, the heretofore vigorous steel center of Buffalo was hemorrhaging jobs and people at an alarming rate. Twenty years later its factories were largely gone and its population halved. Scholars coined a new phrase, “deindustrialization,” to denote such developments in Buffalo and elsewhere. Many residents of these areas began to think about pulling up stakes and moving to the South or West, where the economy seemed more robust. But the poorest citizens of these urban districts were generally not mobile. With plunging tax revenues and land values, municipal governments had fewer and fewer resources with which to address urgent social welfare needs.

…

Life across America’s urban centers became markedly less safe during the 1970s and 1980s.33 In the cities of America’s industrial core, the crisis frequently pitted working-class and lower-middle-class whites, many of them of European origin, against working-class blacks. White ethnics who had scrambled to get a piece of the American dream now felt as though their future was imperiled. Blacks, by and large, had never gotten a part of that dream; they understood all too well that the heaviest consequences of deindustrialization would fall on them. The conflict between white ethnics and blacks would erupt in fierce fights over housing, employment, and the busing of schoolchildren. Violence always lay just beneath the surface and would occasionally break through. A long night of urban crisis descended on America’s once proud cities of the Northeast and Midwest.34 As blacks and white ethnics fought out their battles in urban politics and sometimes on city streets, economists were struggling to understand the nature of the economic crisis.

…

Falwell was conscripting his evangelical followers into a major political campaign to take down the New Deal order.30 In 1980, Reagan crushed Carter both in the popular vote and in the electoral college, winning forty-four out of fifty states, almost as many as Reagan’s hero Roosevelt had carried in the epic election of 1936.31 Americans had never elected a president so hostile to the New Deal. White southerners flocked to Reagan. So, too, did many urban white ethnics in the North, locked in turf wars over jobs, homes, and political power with African Americans in deindustrializing manufacturing cities. These white ethnics would style themselves “Reagan Democrats.” White southerners and white northern ethnics had been groups long devoted to the Democratic Party, pillars of the New Deal order. Their shift to Reagan in 1980 pushed him over the top. If the Republicans were to find a way to make these switches in party loyalty permanent, they would possess an electoral formula for making the GOP the majority party for a long time to come.32 Neoliberalism, Reagan-Style Upon becoming president, Reagan quickly deployed neoliberal policies that had long been marinating in counter-establishment think tanks.

Give People Money
by Annie Lowrey
Published 10 Jul 2018

Walmart has 1.5 million employees: Walmart, “Company Facts,” https://corporate.walmart.com/​newsroom/​company-facts, accessed Nov. 7, 2017. Amazon had a third: Amazon, Third Quarter Earnings Report, Oct. 26, 2017, http://phx.corporate-ir.net/​phoenix.zhtml?c=97664&p=irol-reportsother. Instagram employed just 13: Jaron Lanier, Who Owns the Future? (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), 2. “Premature deindustrialization”: Dani Rodrik, “Premature Deindustrialization” (NBER Working Paper no. 20935, Feb. 2015). “East Asian growth model”: Mike Kubzansky, telephone interview by author, Feb. 10, 2017. automated chatbots: Mike Lewis, Denis Yarats, Yann N. Dauphin, Devi Parikh, and Dhruv Batra, “Deal or No Deal? Training AI Bots to Negotiate,” Facebook code, June 14, 2017, https://code.facebook.com/​posts/​1686672014972296/​deal-or-no-deal-training-ai-bots-to-negotiate/.

…

Countries such as Turkey, South Korea, China, and Vietnam have seen bang-up rates of growth in no small part due to industrialization—factories requiring millions of hands to feed machines and sew garments and produce electronics. But the plummeting cost and lightspeed improvement of robotics now threaten to halt and even shut down that source of jobs. “Premature deindustrialization” might turn lower-income countries into service economies long before they have a middle class to buy those services, warns the Harvard economist Dani Rodrik. A common path to rapid economic growth, the one that aided South Korea, among other countries, might simply disappear. The tidal shift could “be devastating, if countries can no longer follow the East Asian growth model to get out of poverty,” Mike Kubzansky of the Omidyar Network, a nonprofit foundation funded by the eBay billionaire, told me.

The Knowledge Economy
by Roberto Mangabeira Unger
Published 19 Mar 2019

In a world economy in which relatively capital-intensive mass production was associated with the richest societies, industrialization meant ascent in the international division of labor. Developing countries can no longer rely on this prescription to sustain economic growth and begin to close the gap separating them from the richest economies. Some have long suffered from what has been described as premature deindustrialization. Others have tried to prolong the life of mass production by combining low wages (by international standards) with a specialized and subordinate niche in global value chains, useful to the megafirms of knowledge-intensive production. They have embraced the commoditized side of a business that in its upper reaches, typically in a faraway rich country, exemplifies the familiar insular form of experimentalist, knowledge-intensive production.

…

A figure that plays a strategic role in most contemporary economies—the advanced middle-size firm—is, however, largely missing. And none of the institutional equipment of the Brazilian state or of the doctrines of development—from import-substituting industrialization to the pursuit of financial confidence—has saved the country from becoming one of the most striking examples of premature deindustrialization. In the wake of the commodity-price boom of the first decade of the twenty-first century and of Chinese demand for agricultural, ranching, and mining products, manufacturing has declined dramatically as a percentage of both output and exports. Rather than being replaced or converted, belated Fordism simply shrank.

…

See knowledge economy–inclusive vanguardism indivisibility thesis, 235–36 industrialization, 2–3, 159–63, 165, 167–68 industrial mass production agriculture and, 87–88 decline of, 212 described, 83–84 developing countries and, 15, 160 diffusion of, 54, 84–85, 88–89 division of labor under, 55, 84 as most advanced practice, 3–4, 10, 15, 55, 83, 220 educational requirements of, 85 formulaic character of, 85, 86 innovation and, 29–30, 84 labor under, 39–40, 64, 65, 84, 163, 185 positive externalities and, 28 public services under, 86–87 trust required in, 47 inequality confinement of knowledge economy leads to, 11, 13, 56, 72–73, 75, 77, 81 demand constraints and, 205–8 education and, 13–14 inclusive vanguardism addresses, 2, 13–14, 71 redistributive measures and, 13, 73–74, 76–78, 182, 205, 206 scarcity and, 33, 280 inflation, 63, 247, 249 innovation cooperation and, 47, 48–50, 93, 95, 106–7, 109, 110–11 diminishing marginal returns and, 28–29 discontinuity and, 29–30 disruptive, 216–19 economic growth and, 32–33 by firms, 215–19 government support for, 130–31, 132–33, 134 in industrial mass production, 84 institutional, 75, 119, 122–28, 207, 209, 211, 235, 269–70 as knowledge economy requirement, 20, 47, 49–50, 93, 94, 97, 130–31, 235 in market economy, 67 as perpetual rather than episodic, 29, 31, 33, 98, 130–31, 213, 221 public domain and, 131 Smith and Marx understatement of, 267–68 technology and, 20, 30–31, 67, 107 institutional structure and change day-to-day economic activity and, 250 economic theory on, 233–38, 264–65 first stages of, 119–21 fragmentary and gradual changes in, 16, 80–81, 118, 182–83, 269, 272 fundamentalist thesis on, 246–47 imagination and, 155, 243–50, 254, 264–65 as imperative, 227–33 in labor-capital relations, 221, 224–25 knowledge economy requirements and, 67, 119, 122–36, 169–71, 177, 179–80, 222–25 market economy changes and, 82, 119–36, 170, 207, 211, 228–29 moral culture and, 104 no single market economy structure, 106, 113, 114–15, 136, 179–80, 228, 237, 245, 255 post-marginalist economics and, 243–50 practical reasons for, 269–70 in property regime, 124–28 supply-demand questions and, 209, 219–24, transformative politics and, 91, 150–51, 157–58, 211–12, 221–22, 235–36, 286 intellectual property knowledge economy and, 127–28, 135 “non-rivalrous” good and, 27 proposals for transforming, 129–35 unified property right and, 130, 131 international division of labor classical development economics on, 167 developing countries and, 161, 162–63 most advanced practice and, 55–56, 168 inventory, 57, 215–16 Jevons, William Stanley, 229, 238 Kaldor, Nicholas, 79 Kant, Immanuel, 36–37, 108 Kelsen, Hans, 240 Keynes, John Maynard, and Keynesianism, 232, 256–62 countercyclical economic management and, 176, 231, 260 demand-oriented focus of, 200–201, 214, 257–58 on disequilibrium, 201, 259–60 lack of institutional vision by, 199–201, 202 on money, 194, 256 psychological explanations in, 200, 257 on scarcity, 277–79, 283 on supply-demand relationship, 197–98, 258–59 works Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren, 278 General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, 197 knowledge economy alternative futures of, 17–18 in Brazil, 165 broadens access to resources/opportunities, 80, 105–6, 114, 119, 120–25, 170, 184, 186, 195, 200, 206, 209, 212, 218, 221–22, 224 consequences of confinement of, 1, 2, 25, 71–82, 89–90, 175, 178–79 cooperation and, 49–50, 81, 133–34 demand for services and, 282 destandardization of production and, 20, 255, 280 diminishing marginal returns and, 25–26, 28–29, 30, 31, 33, 130, 196, 213, 221, 279 diversity and, 255–56 economic sectors and, 11–12, 27, 53–55, 183, 220 firms’ relationship to, 7, 27, 224 imagination as requirement in, 37, 39–40, 81, 93, 95, 186, 286–87 industrial mass production compared to, 88–89 innovation in, 20, 47, 49–50, 93, 94, 97, 130–31, 235 insular vs. inclusive, 1–2, 8, 17–18, 228 intellectual property and, 127–28, 135 machines as formulaic devices under, 41–42 military analogy to, 38–39, 103 mind and, 35, 100 moral basis of, 47–51, 81, 107–10 as most advanced production practice, 4–5, 14, 196 present confinement of, 1, 5–8, 10–11, 14, 53–56, 58, 71–72, 88–90, 277 returns to scale and, 26–27, 28, 30 richest economies and, 15–16, 55 scientific discovery and, 30–31, 35 social capital and, 49–50 technical division of labor and, 20–21, 37–38, 94 as term, 1, 4 trading of data and, 128, 129–30 worker-machine relationship and, 40, 44–45 worldwide presence of, 55–56 knowledge economy – inclusive vanguardism capitalism and, 236–37 as cooperative regime, 50, 93, 214 developing countries and, 159, 163–64, 167, 171–72 disruptive innovation and, 218–19 economic decentralization and, 50, 255–56 economic stagnation and, 183, 230 educational requirements for, 50, 82, 90, 93–99, 186–87 entrepreneurial impulse and, 168 experimentalism and, 138, 186–87 finance/real economy relationship and, 184 high-energy democracy and, 145 higher purpose of, 9, 277–87 inequality alleviation and, 2, 13–14, 71 innovation as requirement of, 50, 93, 97, 235 insular vanguardism vs., 1–2, 8, 17–18, 228 labor and, 68–69, 184–86, 222–24, 283 legal and institutional requirements of, 67, 117–36, 169–71, 177, 179–80, 222–25 market economy reshaping and, 50, 117, 225, 228–29 moral culture and, 101, 102–4, 108–10 as necessary and possible, 7, 10, 14–15, 54, 69, 173 patent and copyright law and, 127–28 path to creation of, 1–2, 90–92, 134–35, 228–29 potential of, 1–2, 10, 169, 287 productivity increase under, 1, 13, 221 rich countries and, 179–81, 183, 186–88 role of imagination in, 93, 100, 286–87 supply and demand in, 16–17, 159, 195, 196, 202–3, 213, 220–21, 225, 258 trust/discretion and, 82, 103, 104, 255 unified property right and, 222, 223 wage labor and, 222–24 knowledge economy – insular and confined consequences of confinement, 1, 25, 71–72, 81–82, 89–90, 175, 178–79 cooperative competition in, 124 economic stagnation in, 56, 59, 71, 72, 81, 117, 178, 277 existence of, 5–8, 10–11, 14, 53–56, 58, 277 explanations for confinement, 54–56, 88–90 global oligopolies’ control over, 6, 58, 59–60, 66, 128 hyper-insular vanguardism and, 59–60, 63, 65–66, 72, 162 inclusive vanguardism vs., 1–2, 8, 17–18, 228 inequality and, 11, 13, 56, 72–73, 75, 77, 81 labor in, 63, 65–66 as path of least resistance, 270 pseudo-vanguardism and, 57, 59 labor cooperation and, 21–22, 35–36, 45, 69, 185–86, 222 economic security and, 49, 67–68, 109 empowerment of, 184 flexsecurity and, 67–68, 112 free, 45, 69, 184, 185–86, 222–23, 282, 286 as honorable calling, 285 hyper-insular vanguardism and, 63, 65–66 in inclusive knowledge economy, 184, 222–24, 283 in industrial mass production, 39–40, 64, 65, 84, 163, 185 instrumental view of, 283, 285 market order and, 67–69, 222–23 Marx on, 32, 65, 69, 237, 283 mechanized manufacturing and, 39–40, 48, 267 precarious employment and, 59, 63–69, 178, 185, 186, 224, 279 productivity and, 63, 184, 225 pseudo-vanguardism and, 63, 66 scarcity and, 283 self-employment and, 45, 69, 185–86, 222, 282, 286 in services, 65, 72–73 sliding scale and, 68 Smith on, 32, 266 as transformative vocation, 285–86 wages and, 45, 59, 63, 102, 104, 185, 222–24, 236–37, 251 worker-machine relationship, 40, 43–45, 223–24 See also division of labor labor-capital relations cooperative, 115 inclusive vanguardism and 184–86 institutional innovation in, 221, 224–25 supply/demand and, 63–64 labor law, 64, 68–69, 185 law antitrust, 66–67 contract and property, 48, 102, 113–14, 124, 262 dual nature of, 118–19 labor, 64, 68–69, 185 patent and copyright, 127–28, 129, 130, 131, 132 liberalism, 285 social, 76, 177–78, 181, 186, 208 licensing, 132, 156–57 Machiavelli, Niccolò, 105 machines evolution of, 41–42 mind and, 36, 37, 39–40, 100, 186 numerically controlled, 21, 94 workers’ relationship to, 40, 43–45, 223–24 macroeconomics, 231, 249, 260, 261 Madison, James, 150–51 Malthus, Thomas, 263 marginal cost, 26–27, 28, 60–61 marginalist economics alternative approaches to, 229 contributions of, 230, 238 empirical perspective of, 229–30 limitations of, 247, 272 pure economics espoused by, 244 relative prices and, 238–40 market economy and order corrective redistribution and, 73–74 democracy and, 144 economic theory’s idealization of, 231–32 fundamentalist economics on, 245 government regulation of, 121–22, 177, 182 inclusive vanguardism’s reshaping of, 50, 117, 225, 228–29 inequality alleviation and, 73–74, 76–78 initial stage of reconstruction of, 119–20 Keynes view of, 202 knowledge economy requirements and, 7, 45, 50, 255–56 labor and, 67–69, 222–23 legal-institutional reconstruction measures for, 82, 122–36, 170, 207, 228–29 need for experimentalist impulse in, 135 New Deal’s innovation to, 211 no single institutional structure for, 106, 113, 114–15, 136, 179–80, 228, 237, 245, 255 prevailing view of, 117–18 second stage of reconstruction of, 120–21 trust and, 47–48 unified property right and, 102, 109, 124–28 Marshall, Alfred, 198, 273 Principles of Economics, 229 Marx, Karl, and Marxism on capitalism, 32, 172, 210, 237, 266, 268 on coercion, 266 on historical evolution, 172, 235, 268, 269 imagination undervalued by, 267–68 insights of, 227, 232, 235, 236 on labor, 32, 65, 69, 237, 283 on most advanced practice of production, 3–4, 18, 159, 227 on primitive accumulation, 32 on production, 251–52, 264–65 on scarcity, 277–78 and social theory, 105, 234, 263, 271 on value and price, 239 works Capital, 65 The German Ideology, 278 Introduction to the Critique of the Gotha Program, 278 mass-production industry in Brazil, 164–65, 169 as economic rearguard, 12, 220 labor and, 40, 48, 163 protectionism toward, 12–13 See also industrial mass production mathematics, 273, 274–75 mechanized manufacturing, 3, 6, 10, 36 economic transformation and, 54 innovation under, 28, 29–30 labor in, 39–40, 48, 267 Marx and Smith study of, 252, 269 trust under, 47, 48 Menger, Carl, 229, 238 mental colonialism, 171, 173 microeconomics, 231, 260 military, 38–39, 103 Mill, John Stuart, 69 mind duality of, 36, 99–100, 287 imagination and, 36–37, 43, 81, 99–100, 186–87, 287 as machine, 36, 37, 39–40, 100, 186 monetary policy countercylical management, 176, 231, 247, 260 equivocating economics on, 249 money management and, 181, 247–48, 256 through debt, 203–4 money and expansionary monetary policy, 181 Keynes on, 194, 256 liquidity of, 194, 200, 247, 257 marginalist economics on, 247–48 politics and, 156–57 Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat, 105 moral culture of production, 13–14, 47, 101–15 cooperative capability and, 104–8, 109–10 educational requirements for, 103–4, 110 psychological expressions of, 111–13 security and, 112–13 social solidarity and, 108, 110, 114–15 trust and discretion in, 82, 101–3, 104, 107–8, 121 most advanced practice of production in agriculture, 88 broadening access to, 80, 119, 195–96, 224 consequences of confinement of, 71, 75, 89, 270, 271, 277 cooperative practices and, 105, 267–68 defining characteristics of, 3, 4, 5 development economics on, 161, 167–68, 219 economy-wide dissemination of, 6, 7–8, 14, 20, 81, 83, 178, 212, 213–14, 219–20 importance of studying, 4–5, 159, 227, 252, 264 industrial mass production as, 3–4, 10, 15, 55, 83, 161, 220 international division of labor and, 55–56, 168 knowledge economy characterized as, 4–5, 14, 196 labor regime and, 64, 184, 286 mechanized manufacturing as, 3, 10, 29–30, 39, 252, 269 productivity and, 3, 178 Smith and Marx on, 3–4, 18, 159, 227, 252 transformative potential of, 5, 71–72 national divisions, 253–54 negative capability, 36, 37, 43 New Deal, 175–76, 204 “non-rivalrous” good, 27 patents, 127–28, 129, 130, 131, 132 petty bourgeoisie, 166, 168, 169 Phillips curve, 249 Piaget, Jean, 42 Pigou, Arthur C., 198 politics constitutional structure and, 150–52 culture and, 109 democracy and, 77, 97, 156, 279 engagement and, 155 history of, 37, 100 hot and cold, 157–58 money and, 156–57 in rich countries, 178–82 security and, 111–12 transformative, 91, 150–51, 157–58, 211–12, 221–22, 235–36, 286 populism, 171, 179, 180, 188 post-marginalist economics, 239 competitive selection theory and, 253–56 deficit of institutional imagination in, 243–50 production and exchange theory of, 251–52 precarious employment, 63–69, 178 as growing practice, 59, 66, 185, 279 protection measures for, 67–69, 224 premature deindustrialization, 162, 165–66 price neutrality, 68–69, 185 primitive accumulation, 32 product differentiation, 22–23 production exchange’s relationship to, 227, 251–52 imagination and, 37, 39, 40, 286–87 manufacturing and, 22–23 subcontracting of, 58, 65, 185 transformation of nature and, 35 See also industrial mass production; mechanized manufacturing; moral culture of production; most advanced practice of production productivity confinement of knowledge economy consequences for, 10, 56, 71 cooperation and innovation required for, 106, 184 development economics on, 85–86, 161, 212 digital technologies’ boost to, 9, 19 inclusive vanguardism’s potential in, 1, 13, 221 labor and, 8, 63, 184, 211, 225 law of diminishing marginal returns and, 25, 28–29, 191 mass production and, 84, 85–86 most advanced practice of production and, 3, 178 Smith on, 266 social liberalism/social democracy on, 178, 186 and supply-demand relationship, 193, 215 of US economy, 8–9, 19 progressive taxation, 64, 76, 208 attenuating inequalities through, 73, 74, 182, 205 redistributive goals of, 78–80 property rights current organization of, 109 need for institutional innovation in, 124–28 no universal applicability for, 106, 247 See also contract and property law protectionism, 12–13 pseudo-vanguardism, 89–90, 100 characteristics of, 57–59 labor and, 63, 66 psychology cognitive, 42 cooperation/innovation and, 111–12 economics and, 273 Keynesianism on, 200, 257 public domain, 131 public services administrative Fordism and, 86–87, 110, 185, 187 civil society and, 87, 110 public spending, 198, 205, 207–8 pure economics, 243–44, 247, 248, 249 Qualcomm, 59 relative prices, 251, 252 marginalist economics and, 238–40 taxes and, 78, 207 value theory and, 265–66 returns to scale, 25–27, 28, 29, 30 Ricardo, David, 263 Roosevelt, Franklin, 175, 204 Samuelson, Paul, 253 savings, 9, 266–67 growth and, 32–33 hoarding and, 197, 259 productive investment and, 197, 202 Say, Jean-Baptiste, 263 scale product differentiation and, 22–23 returns to, 25–27, 28, 29, 30 scarcity inequality and, 33, 280 Marx and Keynes on, 277–79 persistence of, 279–83 Schopenhauer, Arthur, 139 scientific agriculture, 6, 53, 88, 163 secular stagnation, 8–11, 259 self-employment, 144 as free labor, 45, 69, 185–86, 222, 282, 286 Senior, Nassau, 263 services bureaucratic rationalization in, 86–87 desire for, 281–82 firms providing, 7, 87 knowledge-intensive, 6, 11, 53 manufacturing and, 22–23, 53, 163 workforce in, 65, 72–73 See also public services Simmel, Georg, 47, 105 sliding scale, 68 small businesses, 54–55, 77, 170 as economic rearguard, 11–12 government and, 165 Smith, Adam, 3, 39, 159, 251–52, 263 classical economics and, 232, 263, 271 imagination undervalued by, 267–68 on labor brutalization, 32, 266 and most advanced practice study, 3–4, 18, 159, 227 on production, 251–52, 264–65 on value and price, 239 social capital, 49–51, 105 social democracy, 75, 76–77, 112, 171 liberalization of, 177–78, 181 social-democratic settlement, 181–83, 186, 261 social entitlements, 76, 181, 209, 248 consumption taxes used to finance, 78, 208 demand restraints and, 64, 205, 258 moderating inequality through, 73, 74–75, 117, 205, 206 social inheritance, 138–39, 112–13 social protection, 77, 112, 177, 181 Social Security, 176, 204 social spending, 80, 206, 211 attenuating inequality through, 2, 13, 77, 177, 182 demand constraints and, 193, 205–7 solidarity, 48, 108, 110, 114–15 stagnation, 15, 191, 192, 259 confinement of knowledge economy effect on, 56, 59, 71, 72, 81, 117, 178, 277 inclusive vanguardism as response to, 183, 230 secular, 8–11, 259 stakeholders, 112–13, 125–26, 133–34, 135, 222 stock options, 58 subcontracting, 58, 65, 185 supervision and implementation, 23, 37–38, 49 supply-demand relationship, 189–96 broadening demand access, 13, 195–96, 200–201, 203–7, 209, 213, 257–58 broadening supply access, 13, 180, 195–96, 214–25 discontinuity in, 191–92 economic growth and, 191 economic instability and, 193–95 heteronomy in, 192–93 inclusive knowledge economy and, 16–17, 159, 195, 196, 202–3 individual firms and, 215–19 Keynesianism on, 197–98, 257–59 labor-capital relations and, 63–64 marginalist economics on, 238 Sweden, 76–77 tax-and-transfer, 13, 64, 78, 207, 209 taxes compensatory redistribution and, 74, 78–80, 207–8 on consumption, 75, 77–78, 79, 208 indirect and regressive, 75, 77–78, 208 progressive, 64, 73, 74, 76, 78–80, 182, 205, 208 public spending and, 77–78, 207–8 relative prices and, 78, 207 value-added, 77–78 Taylor, Frederick, 39 technical division of labor, 84, 266 changes to, 21–22, 23, 35–36, 37–38 ideal of, 223–24 knowledge economy and, 20–21, 37–38, 94 in military, 38–39 technical education, 93–94 technology digital and information, 9, 19, 57 increased access to, 119, 123, 184, 224 innovation and, 20, 30–31, 67, 107 productivity and, 9, 19 relation to practices, 4, 22, 40–41, 43 scientific experimentalism and, 30–31 Toyota method of production, 20, 22 transformative variation, 37, 43, 285–86 trust and discretion inclusive vanguardism and, 82, 103, 104 innovation and, 49 in knowledge economy, 47, 94 market economy and, 47–48 moral culture of production and, 101, 107–8, 121 unemployment, 178, 249 unified property right advantages and disadvantages of, 125–26 disaggregated property and, 126–27 economic decentralization and, 102, 125, 186, 237 under generalized knowledge economy, 222, 223 intellectual property and, 130, 131 legal doctrine of, 48, 102, 127 market economy and, 102, 109, 245 United States agriculture in, 88, 209–10 constitutional structure of, 150–51 expansionary monetary policy in, 203–4 financial crisis and, 198–99, 204 New Deal in, 175–76, 204 productivity in, 8–9, 19 regressive income redistribution in, 199, 205 during World War II, 50–51 value-added tax (VAT), 77–78 value theory, 239–40, 265–66 venture capital, 119–20, 194 Vico, Giambattista, 105 wage labor, 63, 251 employment contract and, 102 free labor and, 45, 69, 104, 185, 222–23 in inclusive knowledge economy, 222–24 overcoming of, 224, 236–37 Walras, Léon, 229, 238, 241, 257 Walmart, 57, 59 Weber, Max, 47, 86, 105 work teams, 22, 38, 48

China's Superbank
by Henry Sanderson and Michael Forsythe
Published 26 Sep 2012

Having moved up the value chain, the ubiquitous “Made in China” image is changing as costs for labor rise in the country’s southern and eastern manufacturing heartlands. Labor costs have risen 15 percent annually since 2005, at the same time as the currency, the yuan, has appreciated.14 Table 3.1 De-Industrialization of Africa (Manufacturing as a Percentage of GDP) Decade Sub-Saharan Africa 1960s 9.4 1970s 10.1 1980s 10.7 1990s 10.8 2000s 8.5 Source: World Bank. Today China has set up economic zones in Nigeria, Mauritius, Egypt, Algeria, Zambia, and Ethiopia. The zones in Africa, like the ones that had been set up in China—those hated by Chen Yuan’s father for being corrupt and inviting foreign influence—enable Chinese companies to invest in factories while other Chinese firms help build the infrastructure in the surrounding country with the support of China’s state-owned banks.

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Only in the late 1990s did many countries get rid of their debt burden, through the Heavily Indebted Poor Country initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative. Today, 29 countries have completed the entire process, including Ghana.46 “I think China has learned from the mistakes at the World Bank and the IMF, and I think the conditionalities often were counterproductive and were an important ingredient in the deindustrialization,” Stiglitz told us in Beijing in March 2012. Can the Chinese make sure a large buildup in debt doesn’t happen again? African Tiger: Can Ghana Escape the Resource Curse? In June 2007, as oil prices had begun an escalation that would see them rising to over $140 a barrel, the UK company Tullow Oil and US company Kosmos Energy announced that they had discovered 600 million barrels of light oil off the coast of Ghana, one of Africa’s most successful democracies.47 Tullow’s shares rose 10 percent on the news, one of the biggest oil finds of recent times in Africa.

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Index A ABN Amro (Dutch lender) Aero-Space and Aeronautics Ministry (Beijing) Africa CDB loans and eventual involvement in domestic politics to protect its assets, including oil and energy supplies CDB loans for industry and infrastructure CDB outstanding loans ($13.7 billion) in China is criticized for being the new colonialist in China’s focus on extraction of oil and metals to fuel China’s insatiable thirst for raw materials corruption, $150 billion a year is lost to debt history by country deindustrialization of economies financed their deficits by borrowing abroad to counter the global downturn oil producers: Ghana, Nigeria, Angola, and Gabon penalty from not paying back a loan to China is likely to be more difficult and catastrophic than not paying back a Western bank structural adjustment and stabilization programs of IMF and World Bank African Union Agricultural Bank of China Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud (Iranian President) Al-Assad, Bashar (Syrian President) Alcatel-Lucent Alibaba Aluminum Corp. of China AMCs.

With Liberty and Dividends for All: How to Save Our Middle Class When Jobs Don't Pay Enough
by Peter Barnes
Published 31 Jul 2014

Americans were told not to worry—we’d become a service economy, and white-collar jobs would fill the blue-collar void. But food servers, retail clerks, and health aides were paid considerably less than their industrial counterparts. A steadily tightening squeeze, with wages stagnating and prices of middle-class necessities rising, took hold. In addition to deindustrialization, three other long-term phenomena gained momentum after 1980: globalization, automation, and deunionization. Globalization. Since the early 1800s, economists have argued that trade is good and more trade is better. Their rationale is the theory of comparative advantage. As David Ricardo reasoned, if England could make textiles more efficiently than Portugal, and Portugal could make wine more efficiently than England, then both countries—including their workers—would benefit by trading woolens for port.

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See also Dividends; Rent adjacent possible and, 121 audit of, 62 benefits, entitlement to, 62 components of, 60–61 defined, 11 at economy-wide level, 140–141 externalities and, 64 guidelines for creating, 89–92 management of, 62 mental ideas and, 122–127 one person, one share, 123–124 political environment and, 120 potential dividends and, 139–146 pre-distribution and, 125–127 quantity of assets needed for, 93–95 shared wealth dividends, 124–125 specific assets and, 141–146 user fees for, 85–86 Copyrights, rent from, 144 Cowen, Tyler, 135 Creative destruction, 120 Credo, 45 Crisis preparing for, 121–127 to-do lists and preparing for, 127–131 Currency trading, 92 D Dales, John, 98 Darwin, Charles, 120 Debt fractional reserve banking and, 90 leverage, 47 Debt-free money distribution, 90–91 Lincoln, Abraham and, 91 Defined-benefits pensions, 123 Deindustrialization, 17 Dell Computers, 25–26 Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, 109 Democrats and direct spending, 22 The Depression and the Townsend Plan, 133–134 Deregulation, 21 Derivatives, potential revenue from transaction fees, 143 Deunionization, 18–19 Distribution of wealth, 14 Dividends, 9–10.

Men Without Work
by Nicholas Eberstadt
Published 4 Sep 2016

Each recession following the 1979 one shows a drop in the employment-to-population ratio, which we would expect, but each one is followed by a recovery with an employment peak lower than the one immediately preceding. Even the nearly twenty-year Reagan-Clinton expansionary period showed a peak prime-age male employment-to-population ratio of about 90 percent, or about 5 percent lower than the peak that pertained during the 1948–73 period. This is a time of the deindustrialization of America. Manufacturing is closing down or streamlining, and the jobs that are being created are jobs for which less-well-educated, native-born males have no comparative advantage over females or, in many cases, less-well-educated immigrants. But the post-1999 period shows just how relevant these developments are.

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Between 1970 and 2012, manufacturing jobs as a share of total employment in the United States dropped by about sixteen percentage points, to just over 10 percent. But that outcome was hardly unique: in France, for example, the drop was over fifteen points; in Sweden, sixteen points; in Australia sixteen points. France and Sweden follow closely the United States’ “de-industrial” trend line, and Australia now has a markedly lower share of employment in manufacturing than America—yet trends in labor force participation for prime-age men in the United States were uniquely disappointing when compared to other rich Western societies. Why this unwelcome “American exceptionalism”?

Cogs and Monsters: What Economics Is, and What It Should Be
by Diane Coyle
Published 11 Oct 2021

Political shifts of this kind never have a single cause, but economic disadvantage was certainly involved: studies of different votes have mapped the correlation between populist vote shares and places ‘left behind’ (the term in vogue) by economically-thriving big urban centres. The chickens dating back to deindustrialisation in the 1980s were coming home to roost. Although the big increases in income and wealth inequality had occurred during the 1980s, policy attention focused on this far more after the headline-grabbing Occupy movements, the success of Thomas Piketty’s Capital (2014), and the increased awareness of the social costs of being left behind, so authoritatively documented by Anne Case and Angus Deaton in Deaths of Despair (2020).

Poverty Safari: Understanding the Anger of Britain's Underclass
by Darren McGarvey
Published 2 Nov 2017

Thousands of families, already struggling to make ends meet, were placed under so much strain that it altered them physically, psychologically and emotionally. What was left of the local economy adapted to supply the community’s mutating demands; off licences, pubs, chip shops, licensed bingo halls, bookmakers and, latterly, drug dealers, provided temporary relief from the grim reality of deindustrialisation. But these seemingly harmless activities soon became vices that would later find expression as public health epidemics. In such oppressive and downtrodden social conditions, people began to distrust public institutions and the various authority figures, like police and social workers, despatched to mop up the rising tide of social problems.

Green Tyranny: Exposing the Totalitarian Roots of the Climate Industrial Complex
by Rupert Darwall
Published 2 Oct 2017

This put the vast majority of small- and medium-sized businesses—the famed German Mittelstand, contributing to over half the nation’s total economic output and generating two trillion euros of annual revenues—on the hook for the rising costs of Energiewende.39 In the eight years to 2014, electricity prices for businesses consuming between 160 to 120,000 megawatt hours (MWh) a year increased by 35 percent, a lower rise than for households, as they did not have to foot the bill for exempting the largest electricity consumers.40 The value of the 90 percent exemption created a perverse incentive to overconsume electricity to keep above the threshold. Unsurprisingly, the number of exempt firms has been rising. Funding the exemption constitutes around one-fourth of the household levy. Big energy users’ gain is households’ loss, setting up a conflict between households and industry in which the biggest winner is the Greens’ deindustrialization agenda. Despite the exemptions, a January 2014 research note by Deutsche Bank found that Germany’s energy cost penalty was already eroding its industrial base. German industrial users paid 26 percent more for electricity compared to the EU average, while the disparity with the United States was even more pronounced.41 In only two of the previous 17 years had companies in the energy-intensive sectors invested in excess of depreciation, indicating they were running down their assets.42 At the same time, investment by German companies abroad had been increasing.

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True, Energiewende constitutes a veritable catalogue of policy errors: promoting renewables in parallel with cap and trade; having an escalating scale of feed-in tariffs that overrewarded the least efficient technology (i.e., solar); not cutting subsidies when solar PV prices plunged thanks to Chinese imports; the 2009 EEG amendment that tapered down subsidies, sparking a stampede to lock in high tariffs with obsolescing technologies; rewarding poorly located wind farms with higher tariffs; incentives for self-consumption by wealthy households so the less well-off are burdened with a higher proportion of grid costs. In principle, wise policymakers not in hock to green interests would avoid all these mistakes. That would miss the big picture. The Greens and their Far Left allies in the SPD wanted renewable energy to bring about the deindustrialization of Germany, a vision articulated by Wilhelm Ostwald in the first decade of the last century and subsequently revived by Hermann Scheer. In that sense, Energiewende is working to plan. For those who don’t share this vision, there are problems inherent in renewables technology that perfect policy execution and the wisdom of a King Solomon could not overcome.

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Cold ocean currents and nearby mountains lead to frequent temperature inversions, when warm air traps cooler—often polluted—air. Meeting the standards prescribed in the 1970 Clean Air Act presented California with insuperable problems: Pollution from trucks and autos means that the big cities of Southern California could be completely deindustrialized and still suffer from poor air quality. Something else was in the air in 1975, when Jerry Brown succeeded Ronald Reagan as governor. Reagan had supported economic growth and conservation, backing tougher auto emission standards, blocking development around Lake Tahoe and extending state parks.

The Light That Failed: A Reckoning
by Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes
Published 31 Oct 2019

Giving them security for free was bad enough. But America encouraged them to divert their scarce resources and energy to economic development, helping them channel their nationalistic ambitions into manufacturing high-end products for global, including American, markets. This misbegotten policy has purportedly led to the disastrous de-industrialization of the United States. What originally irked Trump most was that Germany and Japan, after being crushed militarily, developed copy-cat automobile industries that succeeded in beating their American forerunners on the world consumer market. His famous fondness for Cadillacs and dislike of their competitors helps explain his otherwise inexplicable obsession with German luxury cars in particular.

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In Chapter 1 we explained the emergence of anti-immigrant politics in Central Europe, even in the absence of actual immigrants, as a roundabout expression of the demographic anxiety caused by catastrophic depopulation throughout the region. In the American case, the first-hand experience fostering hostility to immigrants is not depopulation as in Eastern Europe but de-industrialization.82 Without being the cause of economic insecurity, illegal immigration has been turned by populists into a focal point around which those suffering most from the loss of jobs and opportunities can rally. During the two decades after the Second World War, when the United States was the world’s sole industrial powerhouse, working-class America did extraordinarily well.

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M., 18 Tarde, Gabriel, 7–8, 71 Tiananmen Square protests (1989), 188–90 Treaty of Trianon (1920), 68 Trump, Donald: and ‘America First,’ 157–63; anti-EU, 142; anti-immigration, 47; anti-liberalism of, 138–40; attitude toward the truth, 173–9; foreign policy, 180, 198; Inaugural Address, 150; lack of interest in the Cold War, 162; and the Mueller investigation, 182; and murder of Jamal Khashoggi, 184–5; Playboy interview, 160; popular appeal of, 169–70; rejection of American exceptionalism, 90, 143–8, 150; and truth telling, 179–85; view of America as ‘victim’ of its imitators, 16–17; and the wall, 153; and white nationalism, 139, 161, 183, 184; world-view of, 140–2 Twelve Angry Men (film, 1957), 115–16 Ukraine: ‘Orange Revolution’ (2004–2005), 93, 105, 109; Russian intervention in, 2, 110, 111, 126, 136 United Nations (UN), 37 United Russia Party, 102, 104 United States of America: and Amercian exceptionalism, 142–8, 165; ‘America First,’ 157–63; Birtherism movement, 177; and the Cold War, 151–2; confrontation with China, 195–7; and conspiracy theories, 134; de-industrialization, 167; demographic anxiety, 164; economic disparities in, 167–8; economic protectionism, 159; and economic rise of China, 16–18; effects of Americanization, 154–5; financial crisis (2008), 167; illiberal populism in, 46; immigration anxiety, 163–7, 170–1; interference in foreign elections, 126–7; invasion of Iraq, 149, 150, 151, 180, 183; loss of the moral high ground, 151–2; military aid to the Afghan mujahedeen, 89; monolinguism of, 153–4, 156–7; moon landing (1969), 187; and regime change, 198; Russian sanctions, 136; sense of victimization, 16–17, 139–42, 149, 162; War on Terror, 149, 151, 152; white nationalism, 164–5, 170–2 Vallet, Elisabeth, 2 Van Parijs, Phillipe, 153 Veblen, Thorsten, 8–9 ‘velvet revolutions’ (1989), 23–7, 45 Venezuela, 126 Vienna, Muslim siege of (1683), 46 Vietnam, 203 Vietnam War, 90 Visegrád Group, 34 Voloshin, Alexander, 156 Warsaw Pact, 90 Weizsäcker, Richard von, 82 Welles, Orson, The Lady from Shanghai, 80 Western hypocrisy, 125, 135 Western values, 52 Westernization, 9–11, 30–1, 42, 52–4, 57, 121–2 WikiLeaks, 155 Wilde, Oscar, 162 Williams, Bernard, 176, 177 Wilson, Andrew, 95 Wilson, Woodrow, 125, 145 Witkiewicz, Stanislaw, Insatiability, 25 Woodward, Bob, 155–6, 174, 180 Wright Laboratory, Ohio, 120 xenophobia, 5, 71, 74 Xi Jinping, 192, 193–4, 196–7, 199, 201–2, 203 Yakunin, Vladimir, 84 Yeats, William Butler, ‘The Second Coming,’ 3 Yeltsin, Boris, 79, 85, 87, 94, 98, 109, 126 Yugoslav wars, 59, 87 Zhirinovsky, Vladimir, 102 Zucman, Gabriel, 134 Zyuganov, Gennady, 98, 102 THE LIGHT THAT FAILED Pegasus Books, Ltd.

Road to Nowhere: What Silicon Valley Gets Wrong About the Future of Transportation
by Paris Marx
Published 4 Jul 2022

After it was founded in 1993, the magazine engaged in “a cycle of mutual legitimation” with the ascendant Christian right wing, placing figures such as Newt Gingrich and anti-evolution telecommunications analyst George Gilder on its cover.26 As it declared Gingrich a “wired” politician, it also helped to legitimize calls for tax cuts, deregulation, and an embrace of a more “flexible” work culture, while imbuing the so-called “New Right” of the Republican Party with the countercultural ethos. As deindustrialization and globalization sent more jobs overseas, the push for project-based work that was in line with the long-standing libertarian opposition to the hierarchal corporate management structure continued. Instead of being an employee with security, benefits, and a union, a worker would be a self-employed agent that joined a company for a particular project, then went back to searching for their next one.

…

Yet these efforts are just the tip of a much larger iceberg that has been forming over decades that helped ensure cities orient themselves and their policy agendas around the tech industry. Beginning in the 1970s, the governance practices of cities began to realign to reflect changing economic conditions. Spurred by deindustrialization, fewer restrictions on international money flows, and the 1973 recession, geographer David Harvey explained that cities adopted an “urban entrepreneurialism” where they had to compete for new industries and investment. Urban areas had to more effectively brand themselves, offer subsidy packages to entice corporations to relocate, and embrace gentrification and consumption-oriented growth.

…

See Interstate Highway System Convention and Visitors Authority, 148 copper mines, 79, 80 counterculture, 41–2, 44 Covid-19 air pollution and, 231 autonomous delivery companies and, 173 rapid delivery services during, 192 “creative class” theory, 200 CVS, 172–3 cyberoptimists, 56 Cybertruck (Tesla), 84, 188, 189 DARPA, 45–6, 120 DARPA Strategic Computing Initiative, 119 Daub, Adrian, 59 deaths pedestrian, 16–7, 31–2 from road traffic crashes, 30–2 The Death and Life of Great American Cities (Jacobs), 26–7 de Bortoli, Anne, 169–70 “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace” (Barlow), 52–3 defense spending, 38–9, 45–6 deindustrialization, 199 Delaney, Matt, 173 Delanoë, Bertrand, 210, 211 delivery companies, autonomous, 173, 177–9, 192–3 Dell, 72 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 72–3 Department of Transportation (DOT), 119–20 Detroit, MI Detroit Economic Club, 138 superhighway plan, 22 Detroit Economic Club, 138 Dickmanns, Ernst, 119 Didi Chuxing, 152 digital redlining, 195 Do Androids Dream of Electric Cars?

The Wires of War: Technology and the Global Struggle for Power
by Jacob Helberg
Published 11 Oct 2021

Yet China’s growing exploitation of supply chains and information networks exposes the grave dangers of American deindustrialization. We are facing what political scientists term “weaponized interdependence,” whereby a nation such as China exploits control of critical nodes in the global economy to exert geopolitical leverage.21 A decade later, the question is not whether U.S. manufacturing can return but whether the country can afford not to bring it back. In the Gray War, a deindustrialized United States is a disarmed United States. During the 1970s, the United States responded to OPEC’s geopolitical blackmail by creating the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and investing in alternative sources of domestic energy production.

…

Democrats, in turn, have been mindful that a high-profile failure—like the collapse of California solar company Solyndra, which received a Department of Energy loan guarantee22—would be used to discredit government intervention more broadly. Now, however, it’s become clear that the United States’ slow drift toward deindustrialization is not a threat to Democrats or a threat to Republicans—it’s a threat to the country. In a 2019 speech at the National Defense University, a prominent United States senator dismissed talk of picking winners and losers and called for “a twenty-first-century pro-American industrial policy” to counter China.

…

This was the rationale behind more than a dozen manufacturing hubs the Obama administration established, in cities from Detroit, Michigan35 to Knoxville, Tennessee.36 Future efforts should continue to focus on building hubs in the industrial Midwest—for instance in my father’s native Ohio—which has been hardest hit by deindustrialization but retains deep manufacturing expertise. A number of notable efforts—including Mark Kvamme and Chris Olsen’s Drive Capital, former AOL CEO Steve Case’s Rise of the Rest fund, and J. D. Vance’s Narya, a venture capital firm, Naryafund—have begun to incubate a Silicon Valley start-up culture in struggling midwestern communities, defying the narrative that says only Silicon Valley can reap the gains of the tech revolution.

It's Better Than It Looks: Reasons for Optimism in an Age of Fear
by Gregg Easterbrook
Published 20 Feb 2018

That anyone can get high-quality health care, rather than the rich being in teaching hospitals while the poor are in dingy charity institutions, has been a boon to public health. As more workers in nearly all nations, including China and India, shift from manual labor to white-collar or service industry employment, public health improves. Deindustrialization is spoken of by politicians and pundits as if referring to something dreadful—in health terms, deindustrialization is a major plus. Commentators like to glamorize factory labor and underground mining: both lead to chronic degenerative health problems that arrive during the prime of life. The more people there are who sit at desks rather than work in factories, the more public health improves.

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See war and combat Comey, James, 184, 217 Coming Apart (Murray), 89–90 communism, 66, 164–165 economy and, 174 industrial production and, 166–167 Communist Manifesto (Marx and Engels), 4–5 conservation of energy principle, 138 constitutions, 123–124 corruption, 178, 193 in Brazil, 176–177 construction contracts and, 181 internet and, 181–182 Nixon and, 179 in US, 179–181 Cowen, Tyler, 263, 264 crime capital punishment for, 116, 155–156 cash bail for, 115 cell phone and, 113–114 in Chicago, 112–113 Clinton, B., crime bill, 110–111 decline of, 109–111, 120, 137–139 global rates of, 106, 111 law enforcement and, 110–115 lead and violent, 111–112 media and, 105, 107 political campaigns and, 105–106 sentencing for, 115–116 violent, 106 See also terrorism crime-boss government, 182 The Culture of Narcissism (Lasch), 84 death air pollution and, 30 capital punishment, 116, 155–156 of law enforcement officers, 115 leading causes in US of, 24 by prescription drugs, 34 self-inflicted, 35 technology and workplace, 155 traffic deaths, 28, 142–143, 145–146 Deaton, Angus, 82 The Decline of the West (Spengler), 197, 198 declinism, 210, 285 academia and, 201 aging and, 203 anecdotes and, 218–220 Big Sort communities and, 222–223 blame and identity groups and, 218 blame-Washington attitude and, 207–209 Brexit referendum and, 204, 209, 217 freedom of association and, 222–223 history of panics of, 200 homogamy and, 223 Kaus on, 223–224 logic of, 92 luck and, 217–218 media and, 202 national bookkeeping switcheroo and, 208 natural selection and, 202 Obama and, 200–201, 221 opinionization of America and, 214–215 Plato and, 202–203 politics and, 84, 200–202, 206–209, 220–222 power and, 221 religious attendance and, 222 Sanders and, 84, 201–202 Sharkey on, 224–225 smartphones and, 212 Sputnik and, 200 victimhood and, 204–205, 217 Western civilization and, 201 See also Facebook and social media; Trump, Donald DeConto, Robert, 233–234 deindustrialization, 29 democracy China and, 170 creativity and, 167 Diamond, L., on, 165–166, 178, 183–184, 185–186 dictatorship and, 164–166 economy and, 167–168, 170, 173–174, 193 education and, 169–170 ethics and, 174 freedom of thought and, 168–169 internet and, 175–176 inventions and inventiveness in, 172–173 recession of, 165 short-selling strategy for, 175 slavery and oppression and, 174–175 Trump lying and, 184–185 World War I and, 170–171 World War II and, 171–173 See also corruption developing world positive change in, 17, 18 poverty in, 20, 280 sanitation infrastructure in, 30 traffic deaths in, 142–143 Diamond, Larry, 165–166, 178, 183–184 two-party duopoly for, 185–186 dictatorship, 193 Carnation Revolution and, 165 coup d’état and, 166 democracy and, 164–166 education and, 169 internet and, 175–176 World War II and, 171–173 dietary habits, of West, 25, 116 disability, 249, 257 education and, 37 veterans and, 36–37, 258 disease in Africa, 25, 39 avian and swine flu, 22 chemical and biological weapons and, 26–27 Ebola, 23, 25 films and, 28 influenza pandemic, 27–28 malaria, 39 media negativity and, 24–25 MERS, 23 mosquitoes and, 39 news coverage and, 24–25 obesity as, 5, 26, 35 smoking and, 24 unstoppable contagion, 27, 28 vaccinations and, 25, 39–40 weight gain and metabolic syndrome, 25–26 See also public health Dodd-Frank Act, 92–93 Dust Bowl, 5 dynamism catastrophism and, 20–21, 221, 283 food production and, 21 East of Eden (Steinbeck), 17–18, 58, 134 Easy Rider (movie), 198, 199 Ebola, 23, 25 echo chamber, 215–216 economy, 209–210 bulk transportation and, 80–81 buying power and, 85–86, 87, 246, 249 Clinton, H., on, 67 coal mining and, 61, 76–77, 233 collapse anxiety and, 68 communism and, 174 comparative advantage and, 79–80 control and, 65–66 currency and, 69 democracy and, 167–168, 170, 173–174, 193 Dodd-Frank Act and, 92–93 education and, 169 fascism and, 66 Feldstein on, 91 globalization and, 82 golden age of, 69–70 Great Recession and, 64, 68, 97 inequality and, 84–85 inflation and, 87 infrastructure and, 93–95 Keynes on, 98–99 marriage and, 267, 268 media negativity and, 77, 79, 87–88 modern monetary theory and, 96 Panasonic and, 68–69 paper mills and, 78–79 Piketty on, 84–85 predictions and, 64 pretax income and, 84–85, 91 regulations of, 92–93 retirement economics, 31, 273–274 slow growth and, 90–92 Soviet and American, 167 state pension accounts and, 97–98 trade boosting, 79, 245–246 Trump and, 70–71 US domestic production and, 77–78 US GDP and, 84, 90–91 war and, 93, 132–134 Washington Consensus and, 66–67 Western living standards and, 88 See also market economy; middle class, US; national debt, US education, 280 book reading and, 271 in China, 170 college as, 269–271 democracy and, 169–170 disability and, 37 economy and, 169 immigrants and, 269–270 jobs and, 89–90 longevity and, 37–38 marriage and, 267 public school system and, 38, 269 skilled trades and, 270 wage and, 89–90 The Education of Henry Adams (Adams), 197, 198 Ehrlich, Paul, 5 elections.

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See specific topics Nike, 253, 256 Nixon, Richard, 54–55, 179, 256–257 nuclear power, 226–227 nuclear weapons, 125–126, 160–161, 277–280 Obama, Barack, 62, 109, 131 anecdotes of, 219 declinism and, 200–201, 221 Dodd-Frank Act and, 92–93 on drone aircrafts, 159 fuel-economy regulatory regime and, 147–148 on infrastructure, 94 national debt and, 97, 100 ObamaCare and, 29, 220, 249 on tax, 254 ObamaCare, 29, 220, 249 obesity, 5, 26, 35 optimism, 283–285 ozone, 48, 49–50, 62 Paine, Lincoln, 80 Paine, Thomas, 256 Panasonic, 68–69 Paris Agreement, 239, 243 The Passing of the Great Race (Grant), 197, 198 Piketty, Thomas, 84–85 Pinker, Steven, 120, 137, 138–139 Plank, Terry Ann, 278 Plato, 202–203 pollution, 26, 30, 59 See also air pollution Prince William Sound, 43 The Promised Land (Lemann), 71 public health, 27 ability to pay and, 29 carbon dioxide and, 62 deindustrialization and, 29 flu pandemics and, 28 health care and, 29, 40, 101–102, 220, 247–248, 249 inequality and healthcare, 247–248 longevity and, 30–31 mosquitoes and, 39 ObamaCare and, 29, 220, 249 pollution reduction and, 30 sanitation infrastructure and, 29–30 racism, 223, 259–260, 266 law enforcement and, 113–114 refugees and, 197 slavery and, 174–175, 191 Radelet, Steven, 20 Reagan, Ronald, 206–207, 209, 273 Reilly, Bill, 45–46 religion, 222, 282 resource consumption, 280 resource depletion fossil fuels and, 52–53, 54, 55–57 immensity of geology and, 54 market forces and, 51–52 price controls and, 54–55 uninterrupted trends and, 51 in US and European Union, 51–52 Resources for the Future, 45, 46 Ricardo, David, 134 Rose, Reginald, 197–199 Rubenstein, David, 271 Russia.

This Land: The Struggle for the Left
by Owen Jones
Published 23 Sep 2020

But it was in this equivocal support for Remain that Labour’s later problems were born – and even at this point, the gaps were beginning to open between Leave and Remain factions within the party. With the leadership having more or less switched off, they failed to take account of what individual Labour MPs – mostly in England’s de-industrialized North – were picking up during the referendum campaign: the strength of support for Leave. At the time, Gloria de Piero – a plain-speaking former broadcast journalist, often to be spotted puffing at an e-cigarette – was MP for Ashfield, a former mining area in the East Midlands with depressed wages and a lack of amenities.

…

Postal votes had proved pivotal. Ironically, on the actual day itself the country had voted 52–48 in favour of Remain. Whatever the failings on Labour’s part, the later claim that responsibility for the result lay with Corbyn belies the actual evidence. While a large chunk of Labour voters – people let down by the deindustrialization of the 1980s and then by austerity – voted Leave, two thirds of Labour supporters did opt for Remain – a similar proportion as the voters of the avowedly pro-Remain Scottish National Party. Where it went so badly wrong is that only 40 per cent of Tory supporters voted Remain. The wavering demographic that in the end plumped for Leave was, explains the head of Britain Stronger in Europe, Will Straw, ‘the 10 per cent of well-to-do shire Tories who had not very much to lose – probably retired owner-occupiers.

…

‘Why would we support exactly the same so-called rights which they already have, but which have held back the Yorkshire coalfield? They voted Brexit to reject the status quo. If Labour was insisting that our response to Brexit was to say: let’s keep what we already have, they will think “hang on we voted to leave and now we are being told by Labour stick with what we have got. Get stuffed.” The same applies to all the de-industrialized regions in our country.’ At one strategy meeting, Trickett made his objections so forcefully that Corbyn was described as ‘visibly pale’. Whatever the individual merits of the pledges, they were effectively a holding position, and summed up what would become a growing problem for Labour: having a stance on Brexit that was indecipherable and impenetrable to most.

The Economics of Inequality
by Thomas Piketty and Arthur Goldhammer
Published 7 Jan 2015

From the end of the nineteenth century to the 1970s, wage inequality decreased in all the developed countries. The phase of decreasing inequality occurred because skill gaps narrowed considerably thanks to rapid development of mass education and training, and growing demand for industrial workers with mid-level skills. Since the beginning of deindustrialization in the late 1960s, however, a new phase has ostensibly begun. New sectors (such as business services, computers, and communications) require workers with very high skill levels, but much of the population has been unable to acquire these skills through either the educational system or personal experience.

…

The apparent ineffectiveness of affirmative action contributed greatly to the conservative reaction against social programs in general in the 1980s and 1990s. In fact, it is likely that the deterioration of the relative position of African Americans in the labor market since the 1970s, which fueled this reaction, is more simply explained as a by-product of the general increase in wage inequality and of deindustrialization, which hit African American workers hard, especially in the northern United States (Wilson, 1987). The Social Determination of Wage Inequality Some wage inequalities cannot be explained solely in terms of an underlying inequality of human capital (whether efficient or inefficient). For example, certain economic actors (such as firms or trade unions) may attempt to manipulate the wage structure resulting from the supply and demand of human capital to their advantage.

The Extreme Centre: A Warning
by Tariq Ali
Published 22 Jan 2015

The astonishing development of technology, the third industrial revolution in the Western world and Japan, has undoubtedly created the material basis to satisfy the needs of all its citizens; but the economic structure based on maximizing profits at any cost is like a concrete wall that divides the top layers from the rest. The cost of production is now so low that the practical value of the commodity has to be ignored in order to keep prices artificially high. With the savage deindustrialization of the West, the parasitic marketing and advertising industries are amongst the largest in the world, second only to arms production. Consumerism has conquered all. Our needs are manipulated. Sixty-seven varieties of jeans, washing powders organic and non-organic, hi-tech gadgets and thousands of other commodities large and small, most of them unnecessary.

…

The huge social movements against privatizations and social restructuring in Venezuela (IMF impositions), Bolivia (water) and Peru (electricity) challenged this relegation and helped launch political parties which they then lifted into government. The movements had already pledged a series of anti-capitalist structural reforms to transform conditions. It was their successes in this field that enabled their repeated electoral triumphs. This process had no equivalent in Europe. Here, deindustrialization had broken the spinal cord of the old working classes. Neoliberal impositions completed the process. Defeated and demoralized, the official trade unions, linked to a segment of the extreme centre, capitulated to neoliberalism. Their protest now tends to be confined to ritual marches or one-day strikes that have virtually nil impact, ignored by both the rulers and the new generation of semi-employed or unemployed youth who want change but feel that none of the traditional parties can provide it.

The Tyranny of Nostalgia: Half a Century of British Economic Decline
by Russell Jones
Published 15 Jan 2023

Flawed Recovery Chapter 13. The Brexit Referendum and Its Aftermath Chapter 14. Decline and Fall Main Sources and Further Reading Notes Foreword Born in 1967, I am certainly one of Thatcher’s children. I grew up in Dundee, Scotland, which is by some accounts one of the first western cities to deindustrialize when nylon displaced jute in packaging in the 1940s. Born in a city on the skids, my childhood was filled first with blackouts, strikes and three-day weeks and then, later, by ever-rising unemployment, poverty and a pervading sense of hopelessness. When I left school in 1983 the only jobs I saw in the job centre for young people were on oil tankers in the gulf.

…

The limits of their solutions in turn discredited organized labour and incomes policies, setting the stage for Thatcher’s experimentation with monetarism. The failure of that strand of numerology eventually morphed into the grab bag of policies that was the ‘medium-term financial strategy’ plus financial deregulation – a combination that effectively deindustrialized the UK while powering a series of asset price bubbles, especially in housing, that have both propelled it forward and crippled it ever since. As the policies of Thatcher and Lawson evaporated in a housing bust and the poll tax debacle in the very early 1990s, the search for inflationary anchors – the focus of the decade – moved offshore to the European Monetary System and anchoring to the Deutschmark, in classic 1925 style, at too high a rate and for no good purpose.

…

The picture changed dramatically in the 1980s during the Thatcher years, as the welfare state was scaled back; unemployment was allowed, if not encouraged, to escalate, and was then left persistently high; various regressive tax reforms were implemented; and those at the top of the income distribution, and especially those at the very top, enjoyed rapidly rising real earnings and significant increases in the value of their asset holdings. This all went hand in hand with deindustrialization, widening regional income disparities and a sharp escalation of poverty and deprivation. The pace of change in the distribution of income and wealth slowed sharply during John Major’s premiership, but the trend was still, if anything, towards greater inequalities. Under Blair, various indicators – including the Gini coefficient, the 90/10 ratio and the share of income going to the richest 1% of the population – all suggest that overall income inequality broadly stabilized.

Slouching Towards Utopia: An Economic History of the Twentieth Century
by J. Bradford Delong
Published 6 Apr 2020

That 1800–1914 had concentrated industry and knowledge about industry in the global north’s industrial districts had consequences, since ideas creation builds on the ideas stock. Previous global-north industrialization accelerated global-north growth, while previous global-south deindustrialization held back global-south growth. The generation of new ideas, after all, depends on the density and magnitude of the stock of already deployed ideas in use in the region. The global north’s industrial districts thus drove growth forward. This virtuous circle was much less evident in the global south, which, remember, had been relatively deindustrialized by the workings of the earlier wave of globalization. Without vibrant manufacturing districts and deep and dense communities of engineering practice of its own, how could the global south benefit from this reglobalization?

…

The serpent in the garden was that the world diverged in relative income levels: as the market giveth (in this case, to the global north), so it may taketh away (as it did in what was to become the global south, which industrialized far less, in many places industrialized not at all, and in important places deindustrialized).24 Northwestern Europe gained an enormous comparative advantage in making manufactured goods. And natural resources out on the periphery became more valuable as well: copper, coal, coffee, and all mineral and agricultural products could be shipped by rail to the ports where the iron-hulled, steam-powered, oceangoing cargo ships lay.

…

That is fair. It, for the most part, led the world in the causal dance of economic history. And the struggle over systems was—China a very important aside—carried out in and near the global north. But now it is time to survey what was happening in the meantime in the poorer and less industrialized and deindustrialized parts of the world, addressing the era between the fall of China’s Qing dynasty in 1911 and the end of the Cold War in 1990. As economist W. Arthur Lewis warned in 1978, the history of the global south is so varied that you can find in it at least one example of any interpretive position you might wish to assert.1 For my purposes, this means acknowledging that it is where grand narratives risk running aground, again and again and again.

The Dark Net
by Jamie Bartlett
Published 20 Aug 2014

A growing number of writers have pointed to possible long-term detrimental health effects of online stimulation, such as technostress, data asphyxiation, information fatigue syndrome, cognitive overload and time famine. The only answer, he says, is to leave technology behind and return to a non-civilised way of life through large-scale deindus-trialisation and what he calls ‘rewilding’. If sci-fi writers like William Gibson inspire the transhumanists, the anarcho-primitivists prefer the writings of Henry David Thoreau: back to nature. I ask Zerzan how far back he’s willing to go in pursuit of a natural state of existence. Should we also rid ourselves of dialysis machines?

Hostile Environment: How Immigrants Became Scapegoats
by Maya Goodfellow
Published 5 Nov 2019

The BNP received just over 800,000 votes in those same elections.52 Meanwhile turnout had been falling since 1992 and Britain’s two main parties were witnessing long-term membership decline. The invasion of Iraq – which went ahead despite hundreds of thousands of people marching through the streets of London against it, me, as a young teenager, included – long-term deindustrialisation, wage stagnation and lack of affordable housing left many feeling disconnected from what they saw as an out-of-touch elite. With not much hope or faith in a democratic system that offered the political equivalent of different shades of the same colour, a lot of people simply stopped voting altogether.

Less Is More: How Degrowth Will Save the World
by Jason Hickel
Published 12 Aug 2020

There has been no decoupling. It was all an illusion of accounting.26 As it turns out, the much-celebrated shift to services has delivered no improvements at all when it comes to the resource intensity of rich nations. Services represent 74% of GDP in high-income nations, having grown rapidly since deindustrialisation began in the 1990s, and yet the material use of high-income nations is outpacing GDP growth. Indeed, while high-income nations have the highest share of services in terms of contribution to GDP, they also have the highest per capita material footprints. By far. The same is true on a global scale.

Nervous States: Democracy and the Decline of Reason
by William Davies
Published 26 Feb 2019

This conflict has been a feature of American politics since the 1960s, and now more or less determines the shape of the electoral map, with Democrats winning in coastal regions, big cities, and university towns, and Republicans winning more or less everywhere else. But a similar divide has subsequently emerged in numerous European countries in the context of deindustrialization. The geography of Britain’s 2016 EU referendum result made this abundantly clear: outside Scotland and Northern Ireland, the areas that voted “Remain” were major cities (London, Manchester, Leeds, much of Birmingham), the high-tech business cluster along the Thames Valley, and smaller university towns and cities (Norwich, Leicester, Exeter, Oxford, Cambridge), but almost the entire rest of England voted “Leave.”

…

But there is something more bewildering going on involving the body. Evidence from across Europe and the United States shows that people who are drawn toward nationalists such as Donald Trump or Marine Le Pen often have significantly lower health prospects and life expectancy than average. Pockets of economic decline in deindustrialized areas are suffering especially on this front. Increases in life expectancy have either stagnated or, in certain instances, started to reverse. Psychologists have noted that nationalists are also more likely to hold “authoritarian values.” Predictably, this involves distrust of elected representatives and the mainstream media.

…

The Silicon Valley dream, of building the machines which mediate mind and world, is dashed, once companies are restricted to serving specific markets and clearly articulated human needs. Much of the lure of populists, both of a left- and a right-wing variety, is their willingness to make promises. In many cases, these promises might be rash, as when Donald Trump campaigned around de-industrialized regions of the Midwest promising to bring back traditional manufacturing jobs. But for those who have studied the supporters of such politicians, the appeal of this type of rhetoric makes sense. The sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild’s exploration of the lives of Tea Party enthusiasts in Louisiana revealed to her a “deep story” underlying their political views.19 On a fundamental emotional level, these people felt that some basic moral agreement had been broken, whereby their patience and hard work was no longer adequate for them to be deemed respectable citizens.

To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of Christian Free Enterprise
by Bethany Moreton
Published 15 May 2009

The federal power of the 49 TO SERVE GOD AND WAL - Â�M ART court might again prove necessary to frog-Â�march them into the twenty-Â� first century. But thirty years ago, Â�women did not emerge from inequality at work into full economic citizenship in “men’s jobs”—the stable, well-Â�paid factory or professional-Â�managerial work that had been the backbone of€ postwar prosperity. Rather, under the stress of deindustrialization, men’s jobs came to look more like Â�women’s work. Casualization, “flexÂ�iÂ� bilÂ�ity,” part-Â�time or temp work, and the erosion of beneÂ�fits, seniority, and tenure—the conditions that had once best described most Â�women’s work in an industrial economy became generalized to the work force as€a whole.

…

And where sins against industrial production had galvanized some Christian activists 121 TO SERVE GOD AND WAL - Â�M ART in€ the days of the temperance campaigns, sins against reproduction evoked the most impassioned responses in the new economic dispensation.100 The evangelical revival associated with the Bible Belt became a sigÂ� nifiÂ�cant national phenomenon in the later years of the twentieth century, and its growth paralleled that of Wal-Â�Mart itself into deindustrialized areas of the country. Thus in 1992, Janet Rugg at store #1378 wrote to Wal-Â�Mart’s Bentonville headquarters explaining exactly what she valued about working for a Christian serÂ�vice company, beyond merely her paycheck. I come from a factory background, which meant work came first, before family, church, or anything else.

…

Sexual Suicide, 1973), 39, quoted in Kintz, Between Jesus and the Market, 169. 104. Kintz, Between Jesus and the Market, 157. 8. Making Christian Businessmen 1. Mark Blyth, Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 167–69; Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1982), 95; Bluestone and Harrison, The Great U-Turn: Corporate Restructuring and the Polarizing of America (New York: Basic Books, 1988), 3–5; Mike Davis, Prisoners of the American Dream: Politics and Economy in the History of the U.S.

The Cigarette: A Political History
by Sarah Milov
Published 1 Oct 2019

For an in-depth analysis of the political economy of the 1970s, see Judith Stein, Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the Seventies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010). For an overview of the process and cultural significance of deindustrialization see Jefferson Cowie and Joseph Heathcott, eds., Beyond the Ruins: The Meanings of Deindustrialization (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). For the canonical work that enshrined “deindustrialization” as part of the American lexicon, see Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1982). 65. William L. Weis and Nancy Wick, “Smokeless Office: America’s Bosses Clear the Air,” American Health, April 1985; William L.

Makeshift Metropolis: Ideas About Cities
by Witold Rybczynski
Published 9 Nov 2010

Densification has many advantages: more people on the street (which usually offers a safer environment), more shops, more amenities, more choices, more efficient mass transit, higher property values. Densification also produces a larger municipal tax base, which is important for those cities that lost population when they deindustrialized during the postwar years. Thanks to deindustrialization, smaller households, and larger residential units, current population densities in cities, even in the densest cities, are still far below what they were a hundred years ago.1 So, talk of “vertical sprawl,” an alarmist term used by opponents of urban densification, is premature.2 Urban densification is not evenly spread across the city, however, but tends to occur in proximity to amenities such as downtowns, cultural districts, parks, and waterfronts.

The Human City: Urbanism for the Rest of Us
by Joel Kotkin
Published 11 Apr 2016

“Voters reject condo complex project on San Francisco waterfront,” http://abc7news.com/archive/9315343/. ABKOWITZ, Alyssa. (2015, April 2). “A High-Rise Race in Mumbai,” Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-high-rise-race-in-mumbai-1427988257. ABLEY, Ian. (2009, July 26). “UK Green Path Leads to Deindustrialization and Worsening Housing Shortage,” New Geography, http://www.newgeography.com/content/00928-uk-green-path-leads-deindustrialization-and-worsening-housing-shortage. ABRAHAMSON, Eric John. (2013). Building Home: Howard F. Ahmanson and the Politics of the American Dream, Berkeley: University of California Press. ADACHI, Sachiho A., et al. (2014, August). “Moderation of Summertime Heat Island Phenomena via Modification of the Urban Form in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area,” Journal of Applied Meteorology & Climatology, vol. 53, 1886–1900, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/JAMC-D-13-0194.1.

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Although its dominion will be far less powerful than in the past, its prospects are far from “bleak,” as was commonly believed in the 1970s.136 That era was particularly tough for inner cities, which were still reeling from the massive loss of manufacturing and retail jobs that took place after World War II.137 Yet as historian Robert Bruegmann points out, the loss of these industries helped create the pre-conditions for a new, dynamic core economy. Deindustrialization curbed congestion and pollution and chased working-class families away from the core. The hip city of today rests on the wreckage of the old industrial version.138 This transformation has allowed city cores to maintain or even slightly expand their shares of metropolitan jobs, even if overall, suburbs accounted for more than 80 percent of all employment gains.139 As previously mentioned, certain core geographies, rid of the detritus of their past, have proved well suited for particular industries—high finance, media, and fashion—where regular face-to-face meetings, social connections, and access to privileged information remain critical.140 Analyst Aaron Renn has also noticed a recent rise in the number of “executive headquarters” located in cities.

Municipal Dreams: The Rise and Fall of Council Housing
by John Boughton
Published 14 May 2018

Black, chair of the Housing Committee in Hull (where Labour held fifty-seven of sixty council seats), was, in his own words, not ‘an idealist’ – his interest, he said, was ‘in seeking to achieve results, not some theory of government’.39 The result he wanted was £50 million to £60 million to complete the refurbishment of the North Hull Estate. 22nd Avenue, the North Hull Estate North Hull was a large, predominantly interwar cottage estate. It wasn’t by any means one of the ‘worst’ estates in the country though – with around one in five of its working-age adults jobless – it suffered the problems common to many hit by deindustrialisation. Around half the estate had been modernised by 1989 when the money ran out, and the council found its application for Estate Action funding refused. A two-hour car journey shared by Trippier and Black from Blackburn to Hull in July that year facilitated the beginnings of a deal that served the interests of both parties.

Brexit Unfolded: How No One Got What They Want (And Why They Were Never Going To)
by Chris Grey
Published 22 Jun 2021

As with the question of what form the UK’s relationship with the EU would take, this awkwardness arose from the way that the leave campaign mobilised quite contradictory sentiments. In relation to immigration, most explicitly, it advanced a nationalist and anti-globalisation agenda, but lurking more implicitly were ideas about how EU membership had led to de-industrialisation and that Brexit would enable the protection of British businesses. However, many of the leading proponents of Brexit were not nationalists or protectionists but adherents of the global free trade model against which Brexit (like Trump) was ostensibly a backlash. Hence, in September 2016, Liam Fox in his Manchester speech23 proclaimed: I believe the UK is in a prime position to become a world leader in free trade because of the brave and historic decision of the British people to leave the European Union.

Twilight of Abundance: Why the 21st Century Will Be Nasty, Brutish, and Short
by David Archibald
Published 24 Mar 2014

It is now less than 10 million metric tons per annum. The UK is now importing almost all of the fossil fuel it burns. The British decided to move to wind power but recently found that turbines were lasting only about half as long as the wind industry said they would. The Climate Change Act, effectively de-industrializing the country, was passed in the House of Commons in October 2008 by 463 votes to 3, even as snow was falling outside. The winters since that act was passed have been particularly bitter, but that is only a taste of what is to come. The UK imports 40 percent of the food it consumes and has an unemployment rate of 7.8 percent, but it is still accepting immigrants.

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Controlling criminality combined with hunger will require extreme measures by current standards, but they won’t seem extreme at the time in a world desensitized by death on a massive scale. The scientific establishment in the United States has also been corrupted by the climate change myth. But America is not so far down the path of feckless de-industrialization as Britain. Americans are in a far better position to prepare to face the real threats of the future, the dangers predicted by the actual data—but only if the United States can cast off the fashionable millenarianism that now holds sway in government and academia alike. Some parts of the dystopia really threatening the world cannot be avoided, only ameliorated by good preparation.

Heroic Failure: Brexit and the Politics of Pain
by Fintan O'Toole
Published 22 Jan 2018

I grew up with those contradictions. The official Irish culture of my childhood and youth was one that defined Ireland as whatever England was not. England was Protestant; so Catholicism had to be the essence of Irish identity. England was industrial; so Ireland had to make a virtue of its underdeveloped and deindustrialized economy. England was urban; so Ireland had to create an image of itself that was exclusively rustic. The English were scientific rationalists; so we Irish had to be the mystical dreamers of dreams. They were Anglo-Saxons; we were Celts. They had a monarchy, so we had to have a republic. They developed a welfare state; so we relied on the tender mercies of charity.

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Without a transfer of power, Brexit confronts an insoluble problem: who is to inflict the pain and who is to feel it most? Because it can never supply those answers, Brexit can never create a sustainable meaning from the pain. For at its heart, it replays the old Dublin music hall song: ‘We had sham pain that night, and real pain next morning.’ It is a release, not from the real anguish of life in deindustrialized communities, but from the phantom agony inflicted by the long campaign to make the English think of themselves as Submissives to the EU’s Dominant. Brexit is a strange hybrid – a genuine national revolution against a phoney oppressor. It has the form of a moment of liberation without the content.

Numbers Don't Lie: 71 Stories to Help Us Understand the Modern World
by Vaclav Smil
Published 4 May 2021

Again, no major shifts will take place in the near future, and the well-supplied global energy market will assure the continuation of affordable import prices. The UK—once the unrivaled inventor and pioneer of modern science-based manufacturing (it is the country of Michael Faraday, Isambard Kingdom Brunel, James Clerk Maxwell and Charles Algernon Parsons, after all)—is already more deindustrialized than Canada, historically the least industrialized Western nation. In 2018, manufacturing accounted for 9 percent of the British GDP, compared to 10 percent in Canada, 11 percent in the US, and, respectively, 19, 21, and 27 percent in such remaining manufacturing superpowers as Japan, Germany, and South Korea . . . and 32 percent in Ireland, whose share now beats even China’s 29 percent.

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Given these fundamental realities, a rational observer must wonder what tangible differences, what clear benefits could any reassertion of British insularity bring. False claims can be painted on buses, extravagant promises are easy to make, feelings of pride or satisfaction may become fleetingly convincing—but none of those intangibles can change what the UK has become: an aging nation; a deindustrialized and worn-out country whose per capita GDP is now just over half of the Irish mean (something that Swift, Gladstone, or Churchill would find utterly unfathomable); another has-been power whose claim to uniqueness rests on having too many troubled princes and on exporting costumed TV series set in fading country mansions staffed with too many servants.

The Rise of the Network Society
by Manuel Castells
Published 31 Aug 1996

By the end of 1999, the Asian economies seemed to be on their path to recovery. But a substantial part of manufacturing, of the property market, and of the banking industry of these countries, and a large proportion of formal employment, had been wiped out by the crisis. Poverty and unemployment sky-rocketed. In Indonesia a process of de-industrialization, and de-urbanization took place, as millions of people returned to the countryside, looking for survival (see volume III, chapter 4). The fall-out of the Asian crisis, of the Mexican crisis, of the Brazilian crisis, of the Russian crisis, shows the destructive power of volatility in the global economy.

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Thus, they argue that the post-industrial economy is a “myth,” and that we are in fact in a different kind of industrial economy. Much of the confusion comes from the artificial separation between advanced economies and developing economies which, under the conditions of globalization, are in fact part of the same productive structure. Thus, while analysts were proclaiming the de-industrialization of America, or of Europe in the 1980s, they simply overlooked what was happening in the rest of the world. And what was happening was that, according to studies from the ILO,6 global manufacturing employment was at its highest point in 1989, having increased by 72 percent between 1963 and 1989.

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However, while this trend was general, the shrinkage of manufacturing employment was uneven, clearly indicating the fundamental variety of social structures according to differences in economic policies and in firms’ strategies. Thus, while the United Kingdom, the United States, and Italy experienced rapid de-industrialization (reducing the share of their manufacturing employment in 1970–90 from 38.7 to 22.5 percent; from 25.9 to 17.5 percent; from 27.3 to 21.8 percent, respectively), Japan and Germany reduced their share of manufacturing labor force moderately: from 26.0 to 23.6 percent in the case of Japan, and from 38.6 percent to a still rather high level of 32.2 percent in 1987 in the case of Germany.

A Splendid Exchange: How Trade Shaped the World
by William J. Bernstein
Published 5 May 2009

Philips, ed., The Correspondence of Lord William Cavendish Bentinck, Governor-General of India, 1828-1835, 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); and Morris D. Morris, "Trends and Tendencies in Indian Economic History," in Indian Economy in the Nineteenth Century: A Symposium (Delhi: Hindustan, 1969): 165. 49. Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (Calcutta: Signet, 1956): 316. 50. Colin Simmons, "'De-industrialization,' Industrialization, and the Indian Economy, c. 1850-1947," Modern Asian Studies 19, no. 3 (April 1985): 600. 51. B. R. Tomlinson, "The Economy of Modern India," The New Cambridge History of India, vol. 3, 3. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993): 102. 52. Morris D. Morris, "Towards a Reinterpretation of Nineteenth-Century Indian Economic History," Journal of Economic History 23, no. 4 (December 1963): 613. 53.

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See, for example, Morris; Tomlinson; and Tirthankar Roy, "Economic History and Modern India: Redefining the Link," Journal of Economic Perspectives 16, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 109-130. 54. Paul Bairoch, "European Trade Policy, 1815-1914," in Peter Mathias and Sidney Pollard, eds., The Cambridge Economic History of Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), Vill:109. 55. Jeffrey Williamson, working paper, "De-Industrialization and Underdevelopment: A Comparative Assessment around the Periphery 1750-1939" (December 2004): 15, accessed at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/jwilliam/papers/ DeIndEHW I 204.pdf, December 22, 2006. 56. Recent economic research shows a fairly strong relationship between length of European rule and subsequent economic progress; the longer the period of colonial governance, the higher a nation's modern GDP.

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Schwartz, Stuart B., Tropical Babylons (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004). Scott, Philippa, The Book of Silk (London: Thames and Hudson, 1993). Serjeant, Robert B., The Portuguese off the South Arabian Coast: Hadrami Chronicles (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963). Silverberg, Robert, In the Realm of PresterJohn (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1972). Simmons, Colin, "'De-Industrialization,' Industrialization, and the Indian Economy, c. 1850-1947," Modern Asian Studies 19, no. 3 (April 1985): 593-622 Simpson, Donald, "The Treasure in the Vergulde Draek: A Sample of V. O. C. Bullion Exports in the 17th Century," The Great Circle 2, no. 1 (April 1980): 13-17. Smith, Adam, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).

The Unwinding: An Inner History of the New America
by George Packer
Published 4 Mar 2014

But it happened in Youngstown first, fastest, and most completely, and because Youngstown had nothing else, no major-league baseball team or world-class symphony, the city became an icon of deindustrialization, a song title, a cliché. “It was one of the quietest revolutions we’ve ever had,” Russo said. “If a plague had taken away this many people in the Midwest, it would be considered a huge historical event.” But because it was caused by the loss of blue-collar jobs, not a bacterial infection, Youngstown’s demise was regarded as almost normal. * * * Tammy was eleven when the mills started closing. She was too young to know or care about Steeltown, the historic strikes, deindustrialization, or the specter of a whole city’s ruin. She had her hands full surviving her own life.

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The federal government—the essential institution for keeping the industry alive—bowed out, and the fate of the mills was sealed. If the institutions and the people who led them had understood what was about to happen to Youngstown, and then to the wider region, they might have worked out a policy to manage deindustrialization instead of simply allowing it to happen. Over the next five years, every major steel plant in Youngstown shut down: Sheet and Tube’s Brier Hill Works in 1980, U.S. Steel’s Ohio Works in 1980, its McDonald Mills in 1981, Republic Steel in 1982. And not just the mills. Higbee’s and Strouss’s, two of the shopping mainstays downtown, soon closed.

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Jeff Connaughton, The Payoff: Why Wall Street Always Wins (Prospecta Press, 2012). The author generously shared an early draft. Robert G. Kaiser, So Damn Much Money: The Triumph of Lobbying and the Corrosion of American Government (New York: Vintage Books, 2010). TAMMY THOMAS AND YOUNGSTOWN Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1982). Terry F. Buss and F. Stevens Redburn, Shutdown at Youngstown: Public Policy for Mass Unemployment (Albany: SUNY Press, 1983). Stephen F. Diamond, “The Delphi ‘Bankruptcy’: The Continuation of Class War by Other Means,” Dissent (Spring 2006).

How Will Capitalism End?
by Wolfgang Streeck
Published 8 Nov 2016

While in the 1970s governments still had a choice, within limits, between inflation and public debt to bridge the gap between the combined distributional claims of capital and labour and what was available for distribution, after the end of inflation at the beginning of the 1980s the ‘tax state’ of modern capitalism began to change into a ‘debt state’. In this it was helped by the growth of a dynamic, increasingly global financial industry headquartered in the rapidly de-industrializing hegemonic country of global capitalism, the United States. Concerned about the power of its new clients – who were after all sovereign states – to unilaterally cancel their debt, the rising financial sector soon began to seek reassurance from governments with respect to their economic and political ability to service and repay their loans.

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In fact, with time, the crises of post-war OECD capitalism have become so pervasive that they have increasingly been perceived as more than just economic in nature, resulting in a rediscovery of the older notion of a capitalist society – of capitalism as a social order and way of life, vitally dependent on the uninterrupted progress of private capital accumulation. Crisis symptoms are many, but prominent among them are three long-term trends in the trajectories of rich, highly industrialized – or better, increasingly deindustrialized – capitalist countries. The first is a persistent decline in the rate of economic growth, recently aggravated by the events of 2008 (Figure 1.1). The second, associated with the first, is an equally persistent rise in overall indebtedness in leading capitalist states, where governments, private households and non-financial as well as financial firms have, over forty years, continued to pile up financial obligations (for the U.S., see Figure 1.2).

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The Volcker ‘putsch’ was sealed when President Reagan, said to have initially been afraid of the political fallout of Volcker’s aggressive disinflation policies, was re-elected in 1984. Thatcher, who had followed the American lead, had won a second term in 1983, also in spite of high unemployment and rapid de-industrialization caused, among other things, by a restrictive monetary policy. In both the United States and the United Kingdom, disinflation was accompanied by determined attacks on trade unions by governments and employers, epitomized by Reagan’s victory over the air traffic controllers and Thatcher’s breaking of the National Union of Mineworkers.

The Politics of Pain
by Fintan O'Toole
Published 2 Oct 2019

I grew up with those contradictions. The official Irish culture of my childhood and youth was one that defined Ireland as whatever England was not. England was Protestant; so Catholicism had to be the essence of Irish identity. England was industrial; so Ireland had to make a virtue of its underdeveloped and deindustrialized economy. England was urban; so Ireland had to create an image of itself that was exclusively rustic. The English were scientific rationalists; so we Irish had to be the mystical dreamers of dreams. They were Anglo-Saxons; we were Celts. They had a monarchy, so we had to have a republic. They developed a welfare state; so we relied on the tender mercies of charity.

…

Without a transfer of power, Brexit confronts an insoluble problem: who is to inflict the pain and who is to feel it most? Because it can never supply those answers, Brexit can never create a sustainable meaning from the pain. For at its heart, it replays the old Dublin music hall song: ‘We had sham pain that night, and real pain next morning.’ It is a release, not from the real anguish of life in deindustrialized communities, but from the phantom agony inflicted by the long campaign to make the English think of themselves as Submissives to the EU’s Dominant. Brexit is a strange hybrid – a genuine national revolution against a phoney oppressor. It has the form of a moment of liberation without the content.

The Nation City: Why Mayors Are Now Running the World
by Rahm Emanuel
Published 25 Feb 2020

Even cities in the Far East were suffering: Singapore went through a series of race riots and bombings in the mid-1960s during its transition to becoming a republic. Our cities were in crisis thanks mostly to the intertwined, three-headed monster of racial segregation, depopulation, and deindustrialization. The latter was the tip of the spear. As the era of the industrial city came to a close—with manufacturing jobs and businesses moving to the suburbs, the South, or overseas—many city-dwellers lost their jobs or experienced steep declines in wages. Detroit alone lost 40 percent of its industrial jobs in the 1970s.

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Jerome Cavanagh, the mayor of Detroit from 1962 to 1970, tried to build his way out of his city’s fiscal mess when what his city needed was investments in the growth of new industries and people with innovative ideas. Neither of these two mayors was effective at fighting crime in his city. All of this—the racial segregation, the deindustrialization, the depopulation, the higher taxes, the crumbling services, the general loss of faith—led, of course, to more social upheaval. Cities were caught in a downward spiral, an unvirtuous cycle that seemed to have no end. Urban America was, literally and spiritually, burning and hollowing out. It seems almost unfathomable now to believe that these cities have risen from the ashes to become the economic and cultural hubs of the world, to become beehives of activity, creativity, and progressivism.

Roller-Coaster: Europe, 1950-2017
by Ian Kershaw
Published 29 Aug 2018

The former Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, by now well into old age, famously criticized his successor, Mrs Thatcher, remarking that she was ‘selling off the family silver’. It was to no avail. Two-thirds of the once state-owned British industries were in private hands by 1992, including some of the most crucial parts of industry such as gas or telecommunications. Alongside privatization went de-industrialization. This was a European-wide trend that had set in during the 1970s. But it went farthest and fastest in Britain. West Germany had done much in the 1970s to cushion the blow on communities of the demise of the old coal and steel industries, as well as protecting newer industries, upholding a large manufacturing sector, and sustaining high levels of technological and engineering skills.

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The council houses, once sold, could not be resold by the state. And if the state was not going to replenish the supply of council houses – as, it was obvious, the Thatcher government had no interest in doing – the long-term consequence was likely to be a housing shortage and a transfer of rental profits to private landlords. The pattern of de-industrialization and privatization in Britain in the 1980s was extreme. Labour legislation meant that employees on the continent were often better protected than was the case in Britain, making changes in working practices more difficult to achieve. Modernization of industries and investment in training as well as capital was much more significant, especially in West Germany and France.

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But as Social Democratic parties were able to offer no viable or sustainable economic alternative to the widely adopted policies of rationalization, enhanced competition in the globalized market and privatization, they started to be seen in the eyes of many – often those who had been disadvantaged by globalization and de-industrialization – as little different in essence from Conservative or Christian Democratic parties. The erosion of class-based parties was still only partial and limited. Indeed, in some countries it was still barely perceptible. It was only the beginning. But the trend towards movements of national or regional identity, though still not of major significance, was certainly discernible in some parts of Europe.

Work Won't Love You Back: How Devotion to Our Jobs Keeps Us Exploited, Exhausted, and Alone
by Sarah Jaffe
Published 26 Jan 2021

Cities like Youngstown, Ohio, saw more than one in five people out of work. Thatcher’s buddy Ronald Reagan won office that year and followed her path, slashing tax rates and breaking the air-traffic controllers’ union. The economic and political crisis of the 1970s had begun the process of deindustrialization, and Thatcher, Volcker, and Reagan stepped on the accelerator. Production was shut down in the rich countries and shipped elsewhere or automated. Autoworkers, used to calling strikes to halt production to make demands, were suddenly put in the position of calling for plants to be kept open.

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Such organizations would see it as their job to meet the workers’ needs on many levels—they would organize, for example, around immigration reform, fight deportations, and take their members’ daily experiences of racism and sexism on the job seriously. Legal assistance and training, too, would be an important part of these organizations. Personal service jobs are only growing more common, particularly in deindustrialized nations where less production is now done: they are harder to automate, so far, and the relationships that these workers build with their clients can be sources of power as well as abuse. 49 In the United States in 2010, New York’s Domestic Workers United and its outgrowth, the National Domestic Workers Alliance, won the country’s first Domestic Worker Bill of Rights.

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Those who can, therefore, jump ship from academia into “direct service to capital,” becoming analysts for finance or working exclusively for the wealthy. Those who can’t wind up as adjuncts, in the service industry, or sometimes both. In a 2019 interview, Barbara Ehrenreich explained, “I would say that what happened to the blue-collar working class with deindustrialization is now happening with the PMC—except for the top managerial end of it.” In other words, instead of a professional-managerial class, you have management—and everyone else. 38 Years after her fight with Ronald Reagan for her academic post, Angela Davis suggested, as the Ehrenreichs did, that academics had to answer for their own elitism.

The Riders Come Out at Night: Brutality, Corruption, and Cover-Up in Oakland
by Ali Winston and Darwin Bondgraham
Published 10 Jan 2023

The collective experiences of these Oaklanders—from a wide-eyed rookie cop realizing the depth of his superiors’ sadistic behavior, to two attorneys hell-bent on seeing reform implemented despite obstacles thrown their way by a rotating cast of obstinate police chiefs and politicians, to the countless innocent victims of police brutality—hold parallels for other communities that have struggled to rein in the coercive arm of the state. 1 DOGWATCH, GHOST TOWN Nobody really knows how Ghost Town got its name, but the moniker fits. Walled off from most of Oakland by freeways on its northern and eastern borders and warehouses to the west, Ghost Town—known formally as the Hoover-Foster neighborhood—has been haunted since the mid-twentieth century by the combined forces of racism, deindustrialization, and chronic unemployment. It was always a working-class community, but for most of its existence, Ghost Town residents could find decent-paying jobs on the East Bay’s burgeoning industrial waterfront. That changed starting in the 1950s as factories closed, and Oakland’s economy descended into a multidecade decline.

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Ultimately hundreds of cases would be dismissed or reversed due to the Riders’ misconduct. 2 NOBODY WILL LISTEN TO JERRY AMARO To understand the corruption and brutality that Keith Batt witnessed during his seventeen days as an Oakland police officer, one has to step back and look at the entire city, its deeply rooted problems, and the dreams of its political leaders around the turn of the millennium. As in many American cities, the 1990s were a turbulent time in Oakland. Deindustrialization and white flight ravaged its economy, starting in the 1970s and culminating in the 1980s with the bankruptcy and dissolution of several big employers, including the headquarters of the industrial metals manufacturer Kaiser Steel and the closure of factories such as the Del Monte cannery. Perhaps the biggest hit was the demise of Oakland’s retail economy.

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Now gazing out his city hall office window, Wilson could see the ramshackle sprawl of West Oakland’s empty lots and crumbling Victorians and the imposing wall of the Cypress Freeway Viaduct. As a judge, he’d had the power only to apply the law, mostly to a rotation of Black and brown defendants, suffering from deindustrialization, joblessness, poverty, and racism. Now he held the power in his hands to make policy. The city finally seemed ready for a liberal mandate. Wilson and his team could bring to bear the tools the War on Poverty had brought to Oakland, however, this time using the levers of city government. But forces far beyond Oakland’s control were about to upend everything: first, in the form of California’s statewide tax rebellion, which would eviscerate Oakland’s finances and make ambitious social programs impossible; then later in the form of drugs and firearms, which flooded the city in the 1980s and 1990s, leading to a period of unprecedented violence. 7 SMALL WARS On the evening of March 17, 1979, a squad of Oakland cops searched for a mysterious sniper who was aiming a gun at traffic on the Grove-Shafter Freeway in North Oakland.

Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity
by Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson
Published 15 May 2023

The cost of transporting raw cotton to Liverpool was low relative to the price of the final product. The East India Company had prevented the export of cotton goods back to India. But this part of its monopoly on trade ended in 1813, resulting in a massive inflow of textiles, particularly from Lancashire, into the Indian market. This was the beginning of the deindustrialization of the Indian economy. By the second half of the 1800s, domestic spinners supplied no more than 25 percent of the country’s market, and probably less. Village artisans were driven out of business by cheap imports and had to fall back on growing food or other crops. India deurbanized from 1800 to 1850, with the share of population living in urban areas declining from around 10 percent to under 9 percent.

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In his memorandum of April 20, 1853, which shaped policy in the subcontinent for nearly a century, Dalhousie made the case for rail in three parts: to improve access to raw cotton for Britain; to sell “European” manufactured goods in more remote parts of India; and to attract British capital in railway undertakings, hoping that this would subsequently lead to engagement in other industrial activities. The first train line was built in 1852‒1853, using the latest available techniques. Modern engines were imported from England. Dalhousie was right about the value of increased access to raw cotton. Between 1848 and 1856, India further deindustrialized, and its export of raw cotton doubled, making the country primarily an exporter of agricultural products. India also became a significant exporter of items such as sugar, silk, saltpeter, and indigo, and greatly increased its exports of opium. From the mid-1800s until the 1880s, opium was India’s largest export, sold mostly by the British to China.

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Women did not have the right to vote in most places during the nineteenth century; consequently, economic opportunities and broader rights for them were much slower to arrive. Even more jarringly, conditions in most European colonies, rather than improving, significantly deteriorated. Some, such as India, were forcefully deindustrialized when British textiles flowed into the country. Others, India and parts of Africa included, were turned into raw-material suppliers to meet the ferocious appetite of growing industrial production in Europe. And yet others, like the US South, saw the intensification of the worst type of coercion toward labor in the form of slavery, as well as vicious discrimination against native populations and immigrants, all in the name of progress. 7 The Contested Path I am young, I am twenty years old; yet I know nothing of life but despair, death, fear, and fatuous superficiality cast over an abyss of sorrow.

Green and Prosperous Land: A Blueprint for Rescuing the British Countryside
by Dieter Helm
Published 7 Mar 2019

The good news is that most cities in Britain are seeing improving overall air quality, albeit from a low base. There are no pea soup fogs anymore. These improvements have come from driving out domestic coal fires and more generally the closure of large-scale coal-powered industries from the surrounding areas. The coming of natural gas, gas central heating, and deindustrialisation have together made a big difference. The phasing-out of coal-fired electricity generation, which contributed nearly 80 per cent of generation as recently as the 1980s, should be completed by around 2025, representing another step change. Yet just because it has been improving does not mean that it is good enough.

Does Capitalism Have a Future?
by Immanuel Wallerstein , Randall Collins , Michael Mann , Georgi Derluguian , Craig Calhoun , Stephen Hoye and Audible Studios
Published 15 Nov 2013

But, unlike the Old Left which was an organized (more precisely, a bureaucratically organized) force, the insurgent energies of this new generation failed to translate into institutions and policies adequate to the tasks of seizing the power that was dropped on the floor. Moreover, the ensuing deindustrialization, and severe budget cuts in higher education, cultural institutions, and general welfare rapidly undid the bases of popular confidence and thus the bases of support for this new generation of antisystemic insurgents. In the meantime a different kind of popular movement began emerging from the Right.

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In the past the peripheral and semiperipheral countries often benefited from turmoil in the core because such crisis helped to lower the costs of importing advanced technologies, loosened political controls over world markets, and opened profitable niches to producers with lower labor costs. It is not incidental that the earlier wave of the import-substitution industrializations along the perimeter of the European continent and in Latin America took off in the 1930s–1940s; the export-oriented industrialization of East Asia after the 1970s was fed by outsourcing from the deindustrializing core, and the export markets and drain of resources from the former Soviet republics ought to play a role in the economic expansion of China and especially Turkey. All five of us consider the narrowing of global inequality gaps a desirable and realistic prospect. In Wallerstein’s words, this would minimize pain in the shorter run and maximize the potential for a better world transformation in the medium to longer run.

Automating Inequality
by Virginia Eubanks

After a period of rapid postwar economic advancement in South LA, declines in military spending and auto plant closures resulted in a stubborn unemployment rate of 14 percent, the highest in Los Angeles County. The neighborhood is home to the two largest public housing complexes in Los Angeles: Nickerson Gardens and Jordan Downs. Nevertheless, it has the most crowded housing in the United States. Many working-age Black men in South LA who lost their jobs during the 1980s deindustrialization found their way to Skid Row. In the last decade, the trend has reversed. The rise in aggressive policing and gentrification pressures downtown have pushed many unhoused people into South LA. But the area has meager resources with which to respond. It has less than half as many shelter beds and one-seventh the number of permanent supportive housing beds as downtown.

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See Indiana, Committee on Welfare Privatization Issues creative economy in Los Angeles in Pennsylvania criminalization and automated decision-making and digital poorhouse and homelessness and poverty and welfare reform Crouch, Suzanne Culhane, Dennis Cullors, Patrisse cultural denial Cunningham, Mary Dalton, Erin Daniels, Mitch Dare, Tim data analytics, regime of mining and right to be forgotten security warehouse decision making automated and big data human and inclusion revolutionary change in and scientific charity tracking of and transparency Declaration of Independence deindustrialization in Indiana in South LA Denton, Nancy A. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) dependency digital decision-making. See automated decision making; predictive risk models digital poorhouse and class and criminalization and discrimination dismantling the and diversion from public resources effects of and equity eternality of and “fear of falling” as hard to understand intractability of National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO) novel aspects of origins of and politics and prediction of future behavior scalability of and self-interest and values discretion of caseworkers in decision-making discrimination and child welfare and cultural denial and digital poorhouse and public assistance rational and reverse redlining and welfare reform disinvestment in neighborhoods in social service programs disproportionality in child welfare decisions disruptive innovation Dogon, General Dreyer, David driverless cars drug and alcohol abuse Drug and Alcohol Services drug and alcohol treatment drug testing Du Bois, W.E.B.

The Dying Citizen: How Progressive Elites, Tribalism, and Globalization Are Destroying the Idea of America
by Victor Davis Hanson
Published 15 Nov 2021

One of the reasons that inequality has probably gone up in our society is that people are being treated closer to the way that they’re supposed to be treated.”30 A number of popular landmark studies over the last four decades—most notably those of Fred Siegel, Joel Kotkin, social critic of popular culture and values Christopher Lasch, Charles Murray, sociologist Robert Nisbet, and political scientist Kevin Philips—all warned of the costs to the nation when middle-class viability is lost. Many earlier on had focused on the cultural ramifications of such economic erosion—from the opioid crises and rises in premature deaths and suicides to the destruction of the nuclear family. Familial erosion was particularly prevalent among the white working classes of the deindustrialized interior of America and the inlands of otherwise affluent coastal states. Such pathologies reflected a decade of inert wages, increasing labor-nonparticipation rates, ossified economic growth, and stubborn unemployment. Soon, however, a genre of social disparagement grew around the “losers” in the new economy.

…

The world itself would inevitably reach the end of history in terms of democracy and market capitalism, as it progressed on its trajectory to something like Palo Alto, the Upper West Side, or Georgetown, the assumed apogees of democracy, social welfare, and capitalism. Globalists sometimes felt that new westernized populations abroad possessed a vigor and energy lacking among the played-out population of the deindustrialized Midwest, as if an exhausted people had driven out industry instead of the corporations that had previously employed them having fled abroad for cheaper labor. Or as Bill Kristol, former editor of the Weekly Standard and subsequently editor-at-large at the Bulwark, explained, illegal immigration should not be an issue.

…

All this is not to say that the poor and working classes were completely exempt from culpability for rising rates of illegitimacy, drug use, criminality, and suicide—only that preexisting social and cultural pathologies were best alleviated by economic opportunities and methods of self-help, not through government dependence in lieu of well-paying jobs. Once deindustrialization impoverishes communities, it often rekindles repressed or dormant social and cultural toxins that in turn become force multipliers of suicide, criminality, and drug use. Similar examples were the more frequent incidents of family, spousal, and drug abuse, suicides, rioting, looting, and arson, and mental health issues that rose during the national 2020–2021 COVID-19 quarantine, when millions stayed home, lost jobs and income, and relied more on government assistance.21 Globalism was not necessarily an organic process that just appeared out of nowhere.

Open: The Story of Human Progress
by Johan Norberg
Published 14 Sep 2020

The backlash against trade is often understood as a reaction to an economy that is no longer working for a wide proportion of the workforce. The benefits go to the elites, whereas many others experience job losses or wage stagnation. In some regions that have been built around particular manufacturing industries, like the Rust Belt, deindustrialization has resulted in not just an economic collapse but also a cultural one. When you are in the midst of it, it isn’t much of a comfort that the rest of the world is making progress. As the saying goes, when you are unemployed, the unemployment rate is not 4.5 per cent, but 100 per cent. But this popular narrative is oversimplified, and it is an example of how easy it is to blame trade and foreigners for problems that are much more complex.

…

Often this boosts production and employment in the US. One study shows that if we account for the whole supply chain, the net effect of trade with China is more American jobs. The average US region sees a net job increase of 1.3 per cent a year relative to a hypothetical region with no trade with China.66 It is a mistake to blame deindustrialization on trade, because the West is producing more manufactured goods than ever before. As the economist Donald Boudreaux points out, today American factories produce 11 per cent more than they did when China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, and 45 per cent more than when NAFTA was launched in 1994.67 US industrial capacity today is twice as big as it was in 1984 when a TV commercial for Ronald Reagan declared that, ‘It is morning again in America’ and that more Americans go to work than ever before.

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(Huntington), 362–3, 365–6 classical liberalism, 185, 205, 214 Claudius, Roman Emperor, 90, 92 climate change, 75, 323, 325, 326–34 Clinton, Hillary, 238 Clouds, The (Aristophanes), 129 Cobden–Chevalier Treaty (1860), 53–4 coffee houses, 166 cognitive dissonance, 127 Cohen, Floris, 150 Colombia, 120 colonialism, 214, 232, 256 Britain, 84, 191, 194, 200 Dutch Republic, 100 Portugal, 100, 146–7, 178 Spain, 147, 178, 182 Columbia University, 223 Columbus, Christopher, 77, 177, 178, 305 Comenius, John, 152 command economies, 43, 315 communism, 54, 56, 215, 302–5, 314–18 Communist Manifesto, The (Marx and Engels), 33 compensatory control, 322–3 competition, 60 benefit–cost ratio and, 62 creative destruction and, 57, 190 Great Depression and, 54 guilds and, 190 immigration and, 117 Rust Belt and, 64, 65–6 competitive advantage, 28–9 computers, 302–14 automation, 63, 312–13 Internet, 57, 275, 278, 306–11, 312 confirmation bias, 127, 160, 161 Confucianism, 129, 149, 169, 176 Congo, 365 conquistadores, 77 conservatism, 334–40 authoritarianism and, 345 disgust and, 335, 336 dynamism and, 286, 300–302, 312, 326 economic, 185, 336 security and, 334–40, 378 superpowers study, 338–9 conspiracy theories, 322–3, 324 Constantine, Roman Emperor, 133–4 Constantinople, 92, 94, 224 contact hypothesis, 244–5 Conway, Kellyanne, 108 Coontz, Stephanie, 199 Cooper, Anthony Ashley, 1st Earl of Shaftesbury, 185 Copernicus, Nicolaus, 146, 150, 332 copper, 42 Cordoba, Spain, 137–9 Corn Laws, 53, 191 corn-based ethanol, 328, 329 coronavirus, 3, 4, 10–11, 162–3, 293, 312 corruption, 317, 345, 381 COVID-19 pandemic (2019–20), 3, 4, 10–12, 162–3, 312 cowboys, 73 Cowen, Tyler, 257 Coxe, Tench, 103 creative destruction, 57, 179, 182, 190, 270, 339 automation, 63, 312–13 nostalgia and, 296–9, 313 Schumpeterian profits, 273–4 Crete, 89 crime, 110, 119–20, 346, 377 Crisis and Leviathan (Higgs), 337 Criswell King, Jeron, 255–6 Croats, 72 Cromwell, Oliver, 183 Crone, Patricia, 207 crony capitalism, 279–80 Crusades, 94, 138 cults, 244 culture appropriation, 71–2 borrowing, 70–73 evolution, 26–30 immigration and, 69–73, 116, 119, 120–23 ‘purity’ of, 69, 70, 71, 352 Cyrus II ‘the Great’, King of Persia, 86–7, 249 Daily Mail, 119 Dalberg-Acton, John, 1st Baron Acton, 140, 180 Dalton, John, 196 Danube (Magris), 219 Danube river, 93 Darfur, 365 Darius I ‘the Great’, Persian Emperor, 86 Dark Ages, 5, 50, 140, 215 Darkening Age, The (Nixey), 134 Darwin, Charles, 24, 28, 162, 227 Davies, Stephen, 170 death penalty, 349 Defense Science Board, US, 313 Defoe, Daniel, 195 deindustrialization, 62 demagogues, 15, 217, 353–4, 360 dementia, 289 democracy, 205, 321, 357, 363, 378–82 authoritarianism and, 357 deliberative, 378–9 environment and, 327 in Greece, 5 Muslims and, 112, 113 populism and, 325 representative, 378 in United States, 200 Democratic Party, 164, 224–5, 238, 302, 349 Deng Xiaoping, 316, 317 Denisovans, 75 Department of Defense, US, 306, 313 Depeche Mode, 245, 295 Descartes, René, 100, 149, 153 Désert de Retz, France, 287 Deutsch, David, 261, 332 Diamond, Jared, 41 Diana, 89 Dickens, Charles, 197, 206 dictator game, 35 Diderot, Denis, 154 Dilmun, 42 disasters, 338 disease, 77–9, 128, 213, 293 Antonine Plague (165–80), 77 Behavioural Immune System, 222 Black Death (1346–53), 77, 139, 356 COVID-19 pandemic (2019–20), 3, 4, 10–12, 162–3, 312 Plague of Justinian (541–750), 77 Spanish flu (1918–19), 77 disgust, 222, 336–7, 371 ‘dismal science’, 206 Disraeli, Benjamin, 254 diversity, 83–4, 121–2 empires and, 84–106 problem solving and, 83 turtle theory, 121–2 division of labour, 28, 31–2, 40, 57, 117, 168 DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid), 8, 73–4, 75, 76 Doctor Who, 135 Doggerland, 74 Dollond, John, 158–9 Dominicans, 144 dreadlocks, 72 dung beetles, 284–5 Dunn, Kris, 357 Dutch East India Company, 100 Dutch Republic (1581–1795), 6, 53, 84, 99–101, 147, 184, 208 Calvinism, 149 colonies, 100 exiles in, 99, 152, 153, 158, 185, 186 Glorious Revolution (1688), 101, 185–8, 190, 193 Jewish community, 100, 150 multi-shuttle ribbon frame in, 180 Dutch Revolt (1568–1648), 98–9, 101, 208 dynamism, 301–2, 312, 318, 330 Eagles and Rattlers, 218–19, 236, 243, 252 East River Rift Valley, 24 Eastern Europe, 114, 115 Eastern Roman Empire (395–1453), see Byzantine Empire Ebola virus, 293 economies of scale, 42 Economist, The, 118, 279, 318 economy and nativism, 349–51 efflorescences, 5, 6, 10 Egypt, ancient, 43, 45, 70, 87, 88, 89, 128 Ehrlich, Paul, 160 Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman, The (Robbins), 201 Eighty Years War (1566–1648), 101 Einstein, Albert, 105 electricity, 297 Elizabeth I, Queen of England and Ireland, 179, 237, 277 Eller, Martin, 306 Elusians, 89 Elvin, Mark, 173 empathy, 219, 224 Encyclopédie, 154 ‘End of History?’

The Great Inversion and the Future of the American City
by Alan Ehrenhalt
Published 23 Apr 2012

The answer to the third question is one upon which reasonable people may differ. I think that in the coming decade, we will see that question answered in the affirmative as well. WHY HAS demographic inversion begun to happen? One might start by recounting the factors that seem obvious, or at least ought to be. The deindustrialization of the central city, for all the tragic human dislocations, has eliminated many of the things that made affluent people want to move away from it during much of the twentieth century. Since nothing much is manufactured downtown anymore (or anywhere near it), the noise and grime that prevailed through most of the twentieth century have gone away.

…

Manhattan may seem like a gritty and noisy place now, but it is nothing like the city of tenement manufacturing, rumbling elevated trains, and horses and coal dust in the streets that confronted the inhabitants of a century ago. Third-floor factory lofts, whether in SoHo or in St. Louis, can be marketed as attractive and stylish places to live. The urban historian Robert Bruegmann goes so far as to claim that deindustrialization has on the whole been good for downtowns because it has permitted so many opportunities for creative reuse of the buildings. I wouldn’t go quite that far; I doubt most of the residents of Detroit would, either. But it is true that the environmental factors that made middle-class people leave the central city for streetcar suburbs in the 1920s, and for station-wagon suburbs in the 1950s and gated enclaves in the 1970s, do not apply anymore.

Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism
by Wolfgang Streeck
Published 1 Jan 2013

(eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 1–15, and the articles in the same volume by M. Kautto (‘The Nordic Countries’, pp. 586–600) and B. Palier (‘Continental Western Europe’, pp. 601–15). 53 See, among many others, P. Emmenegger et al., The Age of Dualization: The Changing Face of Inequality in Deindustrializing Countries, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012; J. Goldthorpe (ed.), Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984; B. Palier and K. Thelen, ‘Institutionalizing Dualism: Complementarities and Change in France and Germany’, Politics and Society, vol. 38/1, 2010, pp. 119–48. 54 See Martin Höpner, Wer beherrscht die Unternehmen?

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Doering-Manteuffel, Anselm and Lutz Raphael, Nach dem Boom. Perspektiven auf die Zeitgeschichte seit 1970, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2008. Durkheim, Émile, The Division of Labour in Society, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1974 [1893]. Emmenegger, Patrick et al. (eds), The Age of Dualization: The Changing Face of Inequality in Deindustrializing Countries, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Esping-Andersen, Gosta, Politics Against Markets: The Social-Democratic Road to Power, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985. Etzioni, Amitai, The Active Society, New York: The Free Press, 1968. ———. The Moral Dimension: Toward a New Economics, New York: The Free Press, 1988.

A Small Farm Future: Making the Case for a Society Built Around Local Economies, Self-Provisioning, Agricultural Diversity and a Shared Earth
by Chris Smaje
Published 14 Aug 2020

But even if the problems we face are wicked, it still seems worth identifying orientations to them that might be more fruitful than others. The ones inspiring this book include such various and overlapping but not entirely congruent ideas as peasant or producer republicanism, political localism, degrowth, steady-state economics, deindustrialisation, bioregionalism, home economics and agrarian populism. Even though a lot of people are receptive to these ideas and although there are important traditions of localist thinking in politics, economics and agriculture, there haven’t been many attempts to describe how local agrarian producerism might be an adaptive response to these crises.

Democracy for Sale: Dark Money and Dirty Politics
by Peter Geoghegan
Published 2 Jan 2020

I approached a middle-aged man with a soft face who was also waiting for the train to Newcastle. “How will you vote?” I asked, falling into the only mode of conversation for a reporter in an unfamiliar place before a polling day. He wanted Brexit. He talked about pit closures and disinvestment, deindustrialisation and neglect. It was not hard to see why he felt politically abandoned. He had a particular worry about the EU: that Turkey would soon join. He talked about how millions of Turkish workers could soon be coming to the UK in search of jobs. I asked where he had heard about this. “Facebook,” he said.

Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism
by Stephen Graham
Published 30 Oct 2009

Many of these, in turn, have stimulated not only vast migrations but also the construction of city-scale refugee camps to accommodate the displaced populations, who already numbered some fifty million by 2002.72 The permiation of organized, political violence within and through cities and systems of cities is complicated by the fact that much ‘planned’ urban change, even in times of relative peace, itself involves warlike levels of violence, destabilization, rupture, forced expulsion and place annihilation.73 Particularly within the dizzying peaks and troughs of capitalist and neoliberal urbanism or the implementation of programmes for large-scale urban ‘renewal’, ‘regeneration’ or ‘renaissance’, state-led planning often amounts to the legitimized clearance of vast tracts of cities in the name of the removal of decay, of modernization, improvement, or ordering, of economic competition, or of facilitating technological change and capital accumulation and speculation.74 While tracts of booming cities are often erased through state-engineered speculation, the many cities that are shrinking because of de-industrialization, global industrial relocation, and demographic emptying are also vulnerable to clean-sweep planning. ‘The economically, politically and socially driven processes of creative-destruction through abandonment and redevelopment’, suggests David Harvey, ‘are often every bit as destructive as arbitrary acts of war.

…

Taking the logic of ‘malls without walls’ still further, certain districts in city centres, such as Liverpool’s Paradise St area, have now been completely privatized. Within the privatized urban streets, corporate owners may now stipulate rights of access and styles of security management more typical of purely commercial environments. In the UK, for instance, the widespread equation of privatization with ‘urban renaissance’ or ‘regeneration’ in de-industrialized cities has led to the wholesale transfer of city streets and districts to corporations. In a survey of the trend, the Guardian’s Paul Kingsnorth finds that ‘from parks to pedestrian streets, squares to market places, public spaces are being bought up and closed down, often with little consultation or publicity.

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Those that scored highest, such as the Marines’ Twentynine Palms facility in California or the Army’s billion-dollar mock Iraqi city at Fort Irwin, have ‘clutter/debris/filth’, ‘slums/shanty towns/ walled compounds’, ‘subterranean complexes’ and simulated ‘government, hospital/prison/asylum structures’.38 To address the need for more realistic physical simulations of whole cities and city districts, the RAND team recommends the construction of four new urban-warfare cities that would each include more than three hundred structures, one to be located in the Kentucky/North Carolina/Georgia region, another somewhere in the US Southwest, another at Fort Polk in Louisiana, and the fourth at Fort Hood in Texas. RAND also explored the possibility of appropriating entire ghost towns within the continental US – towns that have been de-industrialized and largely abandoned; the report states that ‘the use of abandoned towns [for urban warfare training] has moved beyond the concept phase into what might be considered the early test and development phase’.39 One such place is the virtually abandoned copper-mining town of Playas, in the southwestern corner of New Mexico (Figure 6.4), which has already been used for the training of anti-suicide bomb squads for the US Department of Homeland Security.

Industry 4.0: The Industrial Internet of Things
by Alasdair Gilchrist
Published 27 Jun 2016

Indeed, experts believe that in ten years our products will no longer be built by a Chinese or Indian worker, but rather by a US/European programmer. • Increased productivity: With the increase in efficiencies, lowering of operational costs that will lead to increased profits. This will also drive forward improvements in productivity levels. Feasibility studies conducted in Europe are forecasting vast productivity gains in de-industrialized nations such as France and the UK. • Increased revenue: The manufacturing sector will reap the benefit of an increase in its revenues. Industry 4.0 is one of the major drivers for the growth of revenue levels and government value-added GDP, even though its implementation will also require significant investment.

…

The EU in particular is striving to re-industrialize and 221 222 Chapter 14 | Smart Factories create a level of parity across a very diverse manufacturing capability of member states. Germany and Italy are modern industrial powerhouses that have well developed Industry 4.0 programs. Britain and France, on the other hand, have been de-industrializing for the last three decades and require a massive effort to re-industrialize. Ironically, it is France and the UK that are most likely to benefit from smart factories, as they can bring their manufacturing back onshore and subsequently enjoy great savings in costs and efficiency. In fact, Germany is unlikely to contribute much to the EU targets for increased efficiency and value-add to GDP, as they are already near optimum efficiency levels.

Grave New World: The End of Globalization, the Return of History
by Stephen D. King
Published 22 May 2017

The ability to transport goods by rail or ship paved the way for massive economies of scale. Using early mass production techniques, goods could be produced cheaply in a single location and thereafter easily sent all over the world.2 Yet while the new technologies hugely benefited the northern industrial superpowers, they led to massive de-industrialization elsewhere: for example, a nascent Indian steel industry was wiped out, as was much of India’s textile industry. Thanks to the need for close coordination of industrial processes – this, after all, was more than a hundred years before the information technology revolution – skills and knowledge increasingly clustered in the cities and ports of the soon-to-be superpowers.

…

CHAPTER 2: THE NEW IMPERIUM 1.The word ‘ultimately’ is there for a reason. Officially called the ‘Program to Prevent Germany from Starting a World War III’ – or more informally the Morgenthau Plan – the plan put together in September 1944 by the US Treasury Department, led by Henry Morgenthau, aimed to de-industrialize the German economy, in effect turning Germany into an eighteenth-century pastoral wasteland. Roosevelt appeared supportive. So, too, did Winston Churchill, although that was largely because the UK was desperate for US financial help and, to get it, Churchill felt he had no choice but to sign up to the plan.

American Marxism
by Mark R. Levin
Published 12 Jul 2021

It states, in part: Whereas climate change, pollution, and environmental destruction have exacerbated systemic racial, regional, social, environmental, and economic injustices (referred to in this preamble as “systemic injustices”) by disproportionately affecting indigenous communities, communities of color, migrant communities, deindustrialized communities, depopulated rural communities, the poor, low-income workers, women, the elderly, the unhoused, people with disabilities, and youth (referred to in this preamble as “frontline and vulnerable communities”); …Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that— (1) it is the duty of the Federal Government to create a Green New Deal— (A) to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions through a fair and just transition for all communities and workers; (B) to create millions of good, high-wage jobs and ensure prosperity and economic security for all people of the United States; (C) to invest in the infrastructure and industry of the United States to sustainably meet the challenges of the 21st century; (D) to secure for all people of the United States for generations to come— (i) clean air and water; (ii) climate and community resiliency; (iii) healthy food; (iv) access to nature; and (v) a sustainable environment; and (E) to promote justice and equity by stopping current, preventing future, and repairing historic oppression of indigenous communities, communities of color, migrant communities, deindustrialized communities, depopulated rural communities, the poor, low-income workers, women, the elderly, the unhoused, people with disabilities, and youth (referred to in this resolution as “frontline and vulnerable communities”); (2) the goals described in subparagraphs of paragraph (1) above (referred to in this resolution as the “Green New Deal goals”) should be accomplished through a 10-year national mobilization (referred to in this resolution as the “Green New Deal mobilization”) that will require the following goals and projects— (A) building resiliency against climate change-related disasters, such as extreme weather, including by leveraging funding and providing investments for community-defined projects and strategies; (B) repairing and upgrading the infrastructure in the United States, including— (i) by eliminating pollution and greenhouse gas emissions as much as technologically feasible; (ii) by guaranteeing universal access to clean water; (iii) by reducing the risks posed by flooding and other climate impacts; and (iv) by ensuring that any infrastructure bill considered by Congress addresses climate change; (C) meeting 100 percent of the power demand in the United States through clean, renewable, and zero-emission energy sources, including— (i) by dramatically expanding and upgrading existing renewable power sources; and (ii) by deploying new capacity; (D) building or upgrading to energy-efficient, distributed, and “smart” power grids, and working to ensure affordable access to electricity; (E) upgrading all existing buildings in the United States and building new buildings to achieve maximal energy efficiency, water efficiency, safety, affordability, comfort, and durability, including through electrification; (F) spurring massive growth in clean manufacturing in the United States and removing pollution and greenhouse gas emissions from manufacturing and industry as much as is technologically feasible, including by expanding renewable energy manufacturing and investing in existing manufacturing and industry; (G) working collaboratively with farmers and ranchers in the United States to eliminate pollution and greenhouse gas emissions from the agricultural sector as much as is technologically feasible, including— (i) by supporting family farming; (ii) by investing in sustainable farming and land use practices that increase soil health; and (iii) by building a more sustainable food system that ensures universal access to healthy food; (H) overhauling transportation systems in the United States to eliminate pollution and greenhouse gas emissions from the transportation sector as much as is technologically feasible, including through investment in— (i) zero-emission vehicle infrastructure and manufacturing; (ii) clean, affordable, and accessible public transportation; and (iii) high-speed rail; (I) mitigating and managing the long-term adverse health, economic, and other effects of pollution and climate change, including by providing funding for community-defined projects and strategies; (J) removing greenhouse gases from the atmosphere and reducing pollution, including by restoring natural ecosystems through proven low-tech solutions that increase soil carbon storage, such as preservation and afforestation; (K) restoring and protecting threatened, endangered, and fragile ecosystems through locally appropriate and science-based projects that enhance biodiversity and support climate resiliency; (L) cleaning up existing hazardous waste and abandoned sites to promote economic development and sustainability; (M) identifying other emission and pollution sources and creating solutions to eliminate them; and (N) promoting the international exchange of technology, expertise, products, funding, and services, with the aim of making the United States the international leader on climate action, and to help other countries achieve a Green New Deal; (3) a Green New Deal must be developed through transparent and inclusive consultation, collaboration, and partnership with frontline and vulnerable communities, labor unions, worker cooperatives, civil society groups, academia, and businesses; and (4) to achieve the Green New Deal goals and mobilization, a Green New Deal will require the following goals and projects— (A) providing and leveraging, in a way that ensures that the public receives appropriate ownership stakes and returns on investment, adequate capital (including through community grants, public banks, and other public financing), technical expertise, supporting policies, and other forms of assistance to communities, organizations, Federal, State, and local government agencies, and businesses working on the Green New Deal mobilization; (B) ensuring that the Federal Government takes into account the complete environmental and social costs and impacts of emissions through— (i) existing laws; (ii) new policies and programs; and (iii) ensuring that frontline and vulnerable communities shall not be adversely affected; (C) providing resources, training, and high-quality education, including higher education, to all people of the United States, with a focus on frontline and vulnerable communities, so those communities may be full and equal participants in the Green New Deal mobilization; (D) making public investments in the research and development of new clean and renewable energy technologies and industries; (E) directing investments to spur economic development, deepen and diversify industry in local and regional economies, and build wealth and community ownership, while prioritizing high-quality job creation and economic, social, and environmental benefits in frontline and vulnerable communities that may otherwise struggle with the transition away from greenhouse gas intensive industries; (F) ensuring the use of democratic and participatory processes that are inclusive of and led by frontline and vulnerable communities and workers to plan, implement, and administer the Green New Deal mobilization at the local level; (G) ensuring that the Green New Deal mobilization creates high-quality union jobs that pay prevailing wages, hires local workers, offers training and advancement opportunities, and guarantees wage and benefit parity for workers affected by the transition; (H) guaranteeing a job with a family-sustaining wage, adequate family and medical leave, paid vacations, and retirement security to all people of the United States; (I) strengthening and protecting the right of all workers to organize, unionize, and collectively bargain free of coercion, intimidation, and harassment; (J) strengthening and enforcing labor, workplace health and safety, antidiscrimination, and wage and hour standards across all employers, industries, and sectors; (K) enacting and enforcing trade rules, procurement standards, and border adjustments with strong labor and environmental protections— (i) to stop the transfer of jobs and pollution overseas; and (ii) to grow domestic manufacturing in the United States; (L) ensuring that public lands, waters, and oceans are protected and that eminent domain is not abused; (M) obtaining the free, prior, and informed consent of indigenous people for all decisions that affect indigenous people and their traditional territories, honoring all treaties and agreements with indigenous people, and protecting and enforcing the sovereignty and land rights of indigenous people; (N) ensuring a commercial environment where every businessperson is free from unfair competition and domination by domestic or international monopolies; and (O) providing all people of the United States with— (i) high-quality health care; (ii) affordable, safe, and adequate housing; (iii) economic security; and (iv) access to clean water, clean air, healthy and affordable food, and nature.66 Milton Ezrati at Forbes rounded up some of the cost estimates for this proposal.

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It states, in part: Whereas climate change, pollution, and environmental destruction have exacerbated systemic racial, regional, social, environmental, and economic injustices (referred to in this preamble as “systemic injustices”) by disproportionately affecting indigenous communities, communities of color, migrant communities, deindustrialized communities, depopulated rural communities, the poor, low-income workers, women, the elderly, the unhoused, people with disabilities, and youth (referred to in this preamble as “frontline and vulnerable communities”); …Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that— (1) it is the duty of the Federal Government to create a Green New Deal— (A) to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions through a fair and just transition for all communities and workers; (B) to create millions of good, high-wage jobs and ensure prosperity and economic security for all people of the United States; (C) to invest in the infrastructure and industry of the United States to sustainably meet the challenges of the 21st century; (D) to secure for all people of the United States for generations to come— (i) clean air and water; (ii) climate and community resiliency; (iii) healthy food; (iv) access to nature; and (v) a sustainable environment; and (E) to promote justice and equity by stopping current, preventing future, and repairing historic oppression of indigenous communities, communities of color, migrant communities, deindustrialized communities, depopulated rural communities, the poor, low-income workers, women, the elderly, the unhoused, people with disabilities, and youth (referred to in this resolution as “frontline and vulnerable communities”); (2) the goals described in subparagraphs of paragraph (1) above (referred to in this resolution as the “Green New Deal goals”) should be accomplished through a 10-year national mobilization (referred to in this resolution as the “Green New Deal mobilization”) that will require the following goals and projects— (A) building resiliency against climate change-related disasters, such as extreme weather, including by leveraging funding and providing investments for community-defined projects and strategies; (B) repairing and upgrading the infrastructure in the United States, including— (i) by eliminating pollution and greenhouse gas emissions as much as technologically feasible; (ii) by guaranteeing universal access to clean water; (iii) by reducing the risks posed by flooding and other climate impacts; and (iv) by ensuring that any infrastructure bill considered by Congress addresses climate change; (C) meeting 100 percent of the power demand in the United States through clean, renewable, and zero-emission energy sources, including— (i) by dramatically expanding and upgrading existing renewable power sources; and (ii) by deploying new capacity; (D) building or upgrading to energy-efficient, distributed, and “smart” power grids, and working to ensure affordable access to electricity; (E) upgrading all existing buildings in the United States and building new buildings to achieve maximal energy efficiency, water efficiency, safety, affordability, comfort, and durability, including through electrification; (F) spurring massive growth in clean manufacturing in the United States and removing pollution and greenhouse gas emissions from manufacturing and industry as much as is technologically feasible, including by expanding renewable energy manufacturing and investing in existing manufacturing and industry; (G) working collaboratively with farmers and ranchers in the United States to eliminate pollution and greenhouse gas emissions from the agricultural sector as much as is technologically feasible, including— (i) by supporting family farming; (ii) by investing in sustainable farming and land use practices that increase soil health; and (iii) by building a more sustainable food system that ensures universal access to healthy food; (H) overhauling transportation systems in the United States to eliminate pollution and greenhouse gas emissions from the transportation sector as much as is technologically feasible, including through investment in— (i) zero-emission vehicle infrastructure and manufacturing; (ii) clean, affordable, and accessible public transportation; and (iii) high-speed rail; (I) mitigating and managing the long-term adverse health, economic, and other effects of pollution and climate change, including by providing funding for community-defined projects and strategies; (J) removing greenhouse gases from the atmosphere and reducing pollution, including by restoring natural ecosystems through proven low-tech solutions that increase soil carbon storage, such as preservation and afforestation; (K) restoring and protecting threatened, endangered, and fragile ecosystems through locally appropriate and science-based projects that enhance biodiversity and support climate resiliency; (L) cleaning up existing hazardous waste and abandoned sites to promote economic development and sustainability; (M) identifying other emission and pollution sources and creating solutions to eliminate them; and (N) promoting the international exchange of technology, expertise, products, funding, and services, with the aim of making the United States the international leader on climate action, and to help other countries achieve a Green New Deal; (3) a Green New Deal must be developed through transparent and inclusive consultation, collaboration, and partnership with frontline and vulnerable communities, labor unions, worker cooperatives, civil society groups, academia, and businesses; and (4) to achieve the Green New Deal goals and mobilization, a Green New Deal will require the following goals and projects— (A) providing and leveraging, in a way that ensures that the public receives appropriate ownership stakes and returns on investment, adequate capital (including through community grants, public banks, and other public financing), technical expertise, supporting policies, and other forms of assistance to communities, organizations, Federal, State, and local government agencies, and businesses working on the Green New Deal mobilization; (B) ensuring that the Federal Government takes into account the complete environmental and social costs and impacts of emissions through— (i) existing laws; (ii) new policies and programs; and (iii) ensuring that frontline and vulnerable communities shall not be adversely affected; (C) providing resources, training, and high-quality education, including higher education, to all people of the United States, with a focus on frontline and vulnerable communities, so those communities may be full and equal participants in the Green New Deal mobilization; (D) making public investments in the research and development of new clean and renewable energy technologies and industries; (E) directing investments to spur economic development, deepen and diversify industry in local and regional economies, and build wealth and community ownership, while prioritizing high-quality job creation and economic, social, and environmental benefits in frontline and vulnerable communities that may otherwise struggle with the transition away from greenhouse gas intensive industries; (F) ensuring the use of democratic and participatory processes that are inclusive of and led by frontline and vulnerable communities and workers to plan, implement, and administer the Green New Deal mobilization at the local level; (G) ensuring that the Green New Deal mobilization creates high-quality union jobs that pay prevailing wages, hires local workers, offers training and advancement opportunities, and guarantees wage and benefit parity for workers affected by the transition; (H) guaranteeing a job with a family-sustaining wage, adequate family and medical leave, paid vacations, and retirement security to all people of the United States; (I) strengthening and protecting the right of all workers to organize, unionize, and collectively bargain free of coercion, intimidation, and harassment; (J) strengthening and enforcing labor, workplace health and safety, antidiscrimination, and wage and hour standards across all employers, industries, and sectors; (K) enacting and enforcing trade rules, procurement standards, and border adjustments with strong labor and environmental protections— (i) to stop the transfer of jobs and pollution overseas; and (ii) to grow domestic manufacturing in the United States; (L) ensuring that public lands, waters, and oceans are protected and that eminent domain is not abused; (M) obtaining the free, prior, and informed consent of indigenous people for all decisions that affect indigenous people and their traditional territories, honoring all treaties and agreements with indigenous people, and protecting and enforcing the sovereignty and land rights of indigenous people; (N) ensuring a commercial environment where every businessperson is free from unfair competition and domination by domestic or international monopolies; and (O) providing all people of the United States with— (i) high-quality health care; (ii) affordable, safe, and adequate housing; (iii) economic security; and (iv) access to clean water, clean air, healthy and affordable food, and nature.66 Milton Ezrati at Forbes rounded up some of the cost estimates for this proposal.

Carmageddon: How Cars Make Life Worse and What to Do About It
by Daniel Knowles
Published 27 Mar 2023

After all, in your car, you do not have to share space with somebody of another color. Billions of dollars were pumped into road-widening schemes. In the late 1970s the Downtown Connector was widened from three lanes in each direction to seven each way. But the extra capacity only encouraged housing developers, taking advantage of the flow of white migrants leaving the deindustrialization of places like Detroit, to build ever more sprawling suburbs farther and farther along the road, funneling them onto the highway. The result, argued Kevin Kruse, the author of White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism, was that “Atlanta’s transportation infrastructure was designed as much to keep people apart as to bring people together.”

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The rest are in the New York suburbs, or else in San Francisco; Washington, D.C.; and Chicago. One of the places to have survived is Greenwich Village, a neighborhood in Lower Manhattan that is now one of the most bourgeois places on Earth, but in the 1950s was considered, much like other parts of the city’s deindustrializing areas, to be a bit of a slum. By the beginning of the 1960s Robert Moses had transformed huge swathes of New York. He had built expressways, bridges, tunnels, and, through his New York City Committee on Slum Clearance Plans, demolished dozens of neighborhoods across the city. But not everything was finished.

The Warhol Economy
by Elizabeth Currid-Halkett
Published 15 Jan 2020

By the 1960s, New York designers such as Calvin Klein, Ralph Lauren, and Bill Blass were running their own operations and creating their own identities as designers heralding the beginnings of cultural commodification and celebrity in the fashion world.29 The 1970s Through the Early 1980s: Postmodernism, Punk, and the Downtown Scene Deindustrialization, the oil shocks of the 1970s, and New York’s economic recession left the city in deep social and economic decline, with massive unemployment, fiscal crisis, and depressed rents and real estate. The same period was marked by national social unrest. From Watergate to the Vietnam War to the aftermath of the civil rights movement, America as a whole was significantly dissonant in its identity and social values, and New York more acutely than most places.

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This line of thinking considers the importance of innovation and artistic and cultural production in the generation of growth and competitive advantage. In the main, these different approaches have attempted to explain more broadly how economic growth happens and why it happens in particular places in the wake of deindustrialization and the rise of a world system of cities and economies. The theories presented argue that a metropolitan area’s competitive advantage in the world economy is a result of its concentration and advantage in particular industries. 15. This distinction between industry versus occupational classification is as follows: those who have job titles that are media-related, as opposed to those who work for media as an industry (though are not necessarily doing media jobs).

Against the Web: A Cosmopolitan Answer to the New Right
by Michael Brooks
Published 23 Apr 2020

Granted, the people of Michigan voted for Bernie because his economic message inspired in a way Hillary’s centrism never did; unsurprisingly, black and Arab-American voters in the Upper Midwest have a lot of the same bread-and-butter concerns as their white counterparts. (The media’s habit of treating those economic concerns as an exclusively “white” issue is maddening given that by any measure the effects of deindustrialization have come down hardest on the rustbelt’s black population. See Malaika Jabali’s work on Wisconsin in 2016.) Nonetheless, it’s hard not to imagine that Clinton’s repellent history on issues like the mass incarceration of “superpredators” didn’t play a role in adding to the disgust and indifference that resulted in non-white voter turnout being much lower than it was in 2012, or that at least a few voters in Dearborn didn’t care that Sanders was less likely than Clinton to kill their relatives in future drone strikes.

Human Frontiers: The Future of Big Ideas in an Age of Small Thinking
by Michael Bhaskar
Published 2 Nov 2021

Zooming out, the two centuries from 1770 to 1970 become one continuous story of the world's leading edge moving from pre-industrial to fully industrialised. Within that the world had smaller revolutions – the 1IR and 2IR and their subsets: from water mills to steam factories to Fordist oilor electricity-powered factories; from canals to trains to cars to planes. But they are part of a broader pattern. Around 1970 something new began with de-industrialising, de-materialising economies and a slowing growth after the end of the ‘special century’.62 A shift became evident in technology, capitalism, society and culture.63 ARPANET, the precursor to the Internet, went live in 1969. Intel's first microprocessor was launched in November 1971, two hundred years after Richard Arkwright's mill at Cromford in Derbyshire ignited the Industrial Revolution.64 Two years later came the first instance of genetic engineering.

Making It Happen: Fred Goodwin, RBS and the Men Who Blew Up the British Economy
by Iain Martin
Published 11 Sep 2013

The thought appalled the nationalistic Mathewson. The Royal Bank was not alone in suffering an existential crisis. Outwardly, in the decades immediately after the Second World War, the Scottish economy, like the UK economy, appeared to be doing relatively well. This obscured the looming reality of deindustrialisation as old businesses with roots in the distant Industrial Revolution struggled to adapt. Ships could be made more cheaply in South Korea. Germany and others were dominant in chemicals and car manufacturing. Meanwhile, Scotland, like its banks, seemed to be relying increasingly on a fading and self-congratulatory version of its fabled past.1 Not that the Royal Bank had stood still in the period since it celebrated its bicentenary in 1927.

The Rise and Fall of Nations: Forces of Change in the Post-Crisis World
by Ruchir Sharma
Published 5 Jun 2016

In the key emerging nations, the share of manufacturing in the economy currently ranges from 10 percent of GDP in Chile to more than 30 percent in China; the commodity-driven economies of Russia and Brazil are in the low teens, near the bottom of the list. In Africa, despite the celebrations over its economic revival in the 2000s, manufacturing was actually shrinking as a share of GDP, continuing a decline from 18 percent in 1975 to 11 percent in 2014. Some of the largest African economies, including Nigeria and South Africa, were actually deindustrializing, slipping backward down the development ladder. While rising investment usually augurs well for economic growth, any strength taken too far can become a weakness. The trick is to stop short of overdoing it, which is why the ideal level of investment is capped at roughly 35 percent of GDP. Beyond that level, excess looms.

…

Africa, on the other hand, prospered by riding the tide of global commodity prices: about 400 percent of the increase in its export revenues came mainly from rising global prices for commodities like cocoa, coffee, and oil. The region had made few new investments in manufacturing plants. In sub-Saharan Africa, commodities account for half of GDP, while manufacturing has been declining and was at just 11 percent of GDP in 2014, down from 16 percent in 1990. This deindustrialization process is the opposite of what any emerging market needs for stable growth and to establish a prosperous middle class. The “rise” of these economies would end when commodity prices turned, and that started to happen in 2011. As prices for gold, iron ore, and many other commodities slipped, many African nations found it increasingly difficult to balance government budgets and current accounts.

…

Currency Wars: The Making of the Next Global Crisis (New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2012). 2 Antonia Ax:son Johnson and Stefan Persson, “Do Not Fight Free Trade—It Makes Countries Richer,” Financial Times, July 23, 2015. 3 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, “The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth,” American Economic Review 95, no. 3 (2005): 546–79. 4 John Boudreau, “The Biggest Winner from TPP Trade Deal May Be Vietnam,” Bloomberg News, October 8, 2015; Eurasia, July 2015. 5 Victor Essien, “Regional Trade Agreements in Africa: A Historical and Bibliographic Account of ECOWAS and CEMAC,” NYU Global, 2006. 6 Moisés Naím, “The Most Important Alliance You’ve Never Heard Of,” Atlantic, February 17, 2014. 7 Ibid. 8 Peter Zeihan, The Accidental Superpower: The Next Generation of American Preeminence and the Coming Global Disorder (New York: Twelve, 2014). 9 Sumana Manohar, Hugo Scott-Gall, and Megha Chaturvedi, “Small Dots, Big Picture: Is Trade Set to Fade?,” Goldman Sachs Research, September 24, 2015. Chapter 6: Factories First 1 Dani Rodrik, “The Perils of Premature Deindustrialization,” Project Syndicate, 2013. 2 Ejaz Ghani, William Robert Kerr, and Alex Segura, “Informal Tradables and the Employment Growth of Indian Manufacturing,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 7206, March 2, 2015. 3 Jaithirth Rao, “How They Killed Our Factories,” Indian Express, January 20, 2014. 4 Ejaz Ghani and Stephen D.

The Survival of the City: Human Flourishing in an Age of Isolation
by Edward Glaeser and David Cutler
Published 14 Sep 2021

The tax base declines, and the city both raises its taxes and cuts its spending on police, schools, and parks. Crime increases. New businesses stay away. More people leave. Economic trouble begets social trouble, which begets more economic trouble. For the past half century, urban decline has mostly come from deindustrialization, the exodus of factory jobs from erstwhile municipal powerhouses like Detroit and Glasgow. That crisis occurred because urban density no longer offered much of an advantage to massive, self-contained, highly automated manufacturing plants. But uncontrolled pandemic is an even more existential threat to the urban world, because the human proximity that enables contagion is the defining characteristic of the city.

…

Ellora Derenoncourt of UC Berkeley (and a former student of ours) has conducted research illustrating how the bright promise offered by northern cities to African Americans just after World War II turned into a nightmare for many. The segregation of northern cities created poor and isolated communities where crime ran unchecked. The deindustrialization of America’s cities then particularly harmed those with less formal schooling. The Great Migration of African Americans from the South to northern cities increased earnings for them dramatically, because there had been a big difference in incomes between city and non-city residents. David Autor of MIT found that in 1970, an urbanite with a high school diploma or less did substantially better than his nonurban equivalent, and that was roughly true everywhere, from Detroit to Dallas.

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Noyes Education Campus, 310–11 Croton Aqueduct of New York City, 74–75, 77, 79–80 Cuomo, Andrew, 307–8 Daboin, Carlos, 232 The Death and Life of Great American Cities (Jacobs), 239 deaths of despair, 123 Deaton, Angus, 123 deceitful corporate practices, 124–26 “defund the police” movement, 7, 14, 23, 293–96 deindustrialization, 1 De Lorme, Charles, 44 dengue, 88 Denmark, 197 Derenoncourt, Ellora, 301 DeSantis, Ron, 197 despair, deaths of, 123 Detroit, Michigan, 1 developing nations aid for, 62, 63, 92–93, 95 investments that reduce disease in, 62, 68–69 megacities of, 59, 69, 71, 98 Devens Enterprise Commission, 202 Devi, Tanaya, 293 Dharmapala, Dhammika, 292 disaster preparedness, 151–52 Disraeli, Benjamin, 76–77, 78, 145 domestic services, 187 domestic violence, 287 Dougherty, Conor, 264 Drew, Daniel, 181 drug abuse, 116–17, 121, 124.

Against Everything: Essays
by Mark Greif
Published 5 Sep 2016

Yet starting in the years just after the great Civil Rights Act of 1964, the new migrants—shunted initially into ghettos in the least desirable parts of the Northern industrial cities, racing to reach the middle class—faced the cruelest Northern joke yet, at least since the withdrawal of federal troops during Reconstruction: sudden deindustrialization and factory job loss in the 1960s and 1970s. For former industrial-economy workers, the new service economy possessed codes that discriminated powerfully against poor black men particularly. They had been acceptable in industry, where a learned ethos of strength and toughness was favored; but their toughness was viewed as frightening and hostile in service jobs.

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The fixed-gear bike came from bike messengers and the anarchist culture of groups like Critical Mass and Bikes Not Bombs. Hipster approval of locavore food (because local cheeses and grass-fed beef are expensive, rare, and knowledge-intensive) brings elitism to the left-environmentalist campaign for deindustrialized agriculture. Even those trucker hats were familiar to those of us who first saw them on the wrong heads in 1999; they’d been worn in punk rock in the late eighties and early nineties, through the Reagan-Bush recession, as an emblem of the “age of diminished expectations.” Can the hipster, by virtue of proximity if nothing else, be woken up?

Zero-Sum Future: American Power in an Age of Anxiety
by Gideon Rachman
Published 1 Feb 2011

A few left-wing students rattled tins to collect money for the striking miners, but the spirit of the times seemed to be more accurately captured by the increasingly extravagant May balls, in which students flounced around in evening dress, looking like extras from Evelyn Waugh’s Brideshead Revisited. (The Brideshead style, with its celebration of aristocratic dissipation, enjoyed a new vogue after Waugh’s book was turned into a television serial in 1981.) But the southern boom was just one aspect of the Thatcher era. The deindustrialization of much of northern Britain was the other side of the coin, leading to big job losses in traditional industries such as mining, steel, shipping, and manufacturing. The contrast between the boom in the south and the bust in the north became a theme of many of the most successful British films about the Thatcher era, from Billy Elliot to The Full Monty.

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Friedman’s views on, 127–28, 304n U.S. faith in, 95, 291 Globalization and Its Discontents (Stiglitz), 159 global problems, 174–75, 197–213 Great Recession and, 200–201, 210 Obama’s views on, 9, 198–99, 210, 211, 212, 224–27, 244, 272 search for solutions to, 212–13, 243–44, 262, 272, 274–75, 286–92 see also climate change; failed states; government, global; nuclear proliferation; terrorism Global Redesign Initiative, 213 Goldgeier, James, 117 Goldman Sachs, 76–77, 110, 112, 182 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 35, 36, 59, 87, 279 reforms of, 15, 16, 25, 27, 42, 53–61, 68, 100, 297n Soviet bloc collapse and, 61, 64–65, 298n Gorbachev, Raisa, 53 Gordon, Philip, 251–52, 313n Gore, Al, 102, 125, 267 government, 94, 114, 138, 142 financial crisis and, 191–95 government, global, 52, 157, 160, 161, 174, 215–31 EU and, 152, 175, 215–17, 221, 222, 224, 228–29, 231, 270 G2 and, 223–25, 227 G20 and, 175, 217–25, 227 Grant, Charles, 48, 49, 280 Great Britain, 3, 38, 39–52, 54, 64, 74, 114–15, 147–48, 185, 199, 253 antiglobalization in, 160–61 China and, 24–25, 135–36, 294n climate change and, 201–2 colonialism of, 17, 25, 135–36 deindustrialization in, 33–34 democracy in, 101 euro and, 150, 280 Falklands War and, 34, 43, 75, 76 financial crisis and, 191, 192 France and, 45–46, 48 Germany’s relations with, 271, 274 global government and, 219, 226 Iraq War and, 165 southern boom in, 33, 34 Thatcherism in, 16–17, 29–36, 39–51, 84, 114, 191, 279 Great Depression, 3, 111, 188, 267, 270, 282, 292 Great Moderation, 116–17 Great Recession, 7, 97, 113, 188, 200–201, 210, 240, 244, 249, 256, 262–63, 265, 272, 285 Great Society, 38, 296n Greece, 8, 150, 188, 189, 228, 235, 270 Greenspan, Alan, 54, 94–95, 107–14, 116, 117–19, 205 as guru and lucky charm, 108, 114, 116 Rand and, 108–9, 110 Reagan and, 42, 107 on technology, 119, 122 Grove, Andy, 120 Guha, Ramachandra, 80 Gulf War: first (1991), 81, 87–90, 124, 132, 167 second, see Iraq War Haass, Richard, 90, 301n Haight, David, 253–54 Haiti, 73, 132, 209 Hatoyama, Yukio, 190 Havel, Vaclav, 66, 68 Hayden, Michael, 258 Hayek, Friedrich, 112, 118 Heath, Edward, 34 hedge funds, 111, 193 Hills, Carla, 74 Holbrooke, Richard, 132 Homeland Security, U.S., 268 Hong Kong, 25, 60, 135–36 House of Commons, British, 35, 51 House of Representatives, U.S., 266 housing, 33, 116 Hu Jintao, 6, 192, 237, 285 Hum, Christopher, 24–25, 294n human rights, 72, 75, 176, 184, 223, 231, 237, 240, 244–45, 281 Human Security Report project, 131 Hungary, 61, 68, 100, 148, 267 Hussein, Saddam, 19, 104, 164, 166, 167, 239 first Gulf War and, 88, 89, 90 IBM, 120 Ideas That Conquered the World, The (Mandelbaum), 188 Immelt, Jeff, 193 immigration, 8, 147, 149, 150, 209, 258, 260, 269 illegal, 9, 147, 260, 269 imperialism, 128, 168 India, 64, 79–85, 168–69, 187, 199, 261, 290, 311n antiglobalization in, 160 in BRICs, 76–77, 196 China’s relations with, 206–7, 237, 243, 274, 286 democracy in, 80, 85, 169, 240, 243 economic crisis in (1991), 16, 79–80, 81 economic growth in, 6, 7, 80, 83–85, 95, 116 G20 and, 217, 219 global government and, 224, 226, 227 global problems and, 202, 203, 206–7, 287 information technology and, 6, 84–85, 141 optimism in, 140 outsourcing to, 122, 168 rise of, 11, 46, 76, 77, 80–85, 90, 143, 181, 271, 284 Soviet collapse and, 17, 70 win-win world and, 129–30 zero-sum future and, 262, 273 Indonesia, 6, 36, 143, 176, 206, 217 inequality, 40, 157, 160 inflation, 32, 34, 38, 39, 40, 47, 122, 126, 183, 257 in Latin America, 72, 73, 75, 77 information age, 95, 123–24 information technology (IT), 122, 123, 167 Indian, 6, 84–85, 141 Infosys, 85, 141 International Court of Justice, 220 International Criminal Court, 220, 222, 223 International Energy Agency, 204 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 30, 74, 79, 142, 159, 220, 270, 301n Internet, 6, 93, 119, 122, 124, 238 investment, foreign, 52, 83, 151, 191, 247 in China, 24, 25, 27, 115, 151, 192 in Latin America, 72, 74 investment banks, 76–77, 110–11, 112, 114, 118, 182, 195, 201 technology and, 122–23 Iran, 168, 175, 193, 195, 223, 226–27, 236, 241–48 democracy in, 241, 244, 283 nuclear proliferation and, 10, 176, 199, 212, 223, 224, 226, 227, 229, 241, 242, 243, 249, 272, 273, 275, 287, 288 Iraq, 87–90, 104, 174, 199, 211, 241, 244, 248, 258 Iraq Liberation Act (1998), 166 Iraq War, 19, 43, 90, 104, 164–69, 174, 181, 185, 190, 209–10, 233, 239, 240, 249, 272, 275 Afghanistan war compared with, 253–54 European Union and, 151–52 U.S. invasion in, 96, 105, 125, 132, 165–68, 198, 205, 209, 245, 281 Irish, Ireland, 147, 270 irrational exuberance, 110, 281 Islamabad, 211, 251, 252 Islamists, 241, 244, 245, 252, 256, 257, 273 Israel, 207, 226, 234, 272, 311n Italy, Italians, 147, 188, 219, 226, 228, 269, 270 James, Harold, 32, 183–84, 271 Japan, 50, 60, 138, 143, 186, 187, 244, 265, 266, 269 as challenge to U.S., 18–19, 88–89, 102, 119, 261, 282, 284–85 China’s relations with, 190–91, 237, 238 global government and, 217, 218, 219, 224, 226 “lost decade” in, 141 stock market in, 18–19, 88–89 win-win world and, 129–30 Jaruzelski, Wojciech, 65, 67 Jenkins, Peter, 41–42 Jiang Qing, 25 Jobs, Steve, 120 John Paul II, Pope, 67 Johnson, Lyndon, 38 Joseph, Sir Keith, 31–32 J.P.

Who Rules the World?
by Noam Chomsky

Economic historians have argued that Egypt was well placed to undertake rapid economic development at the same time that the United States was in this period.12 Both had rich agriculture, including cotton, the fuel of the early industrial revolution—though unlike Egypt, the United States had to develop cotton production and a workforce through conquest, extermination, and slavery, with consequences that are evident now in the reservations for the survivors and the prisons that have rapidly expanded since the Reagan years to house the superfluous population left by deindustrialization. One fundamental difference between the two nations was that the United States had gained independence and was therefore free to ignore the prescriptions of economic theory, delivered at the time by Adam Smith in terms rather like those preached to developing societies today. Smith urged the liberated colonies to produce primary products for export and to import superior British manufactured goods, and certainly not to attempt to monopolize crucial goods, particularly cotton.

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Collingwood, Charles Colombia Colombian Permanent Committee for Human Rights colonialism Columbia Journalism Review Columbus, Christopher Command and Control (Schlosser) Committee on Public Information commons communism Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Congo consent, manufacture of Constantine, Emperor Contras Copenhagen Global Climate Change Summit Corcoran, Paul corporations personhood and Costs of War Project counterinsurgency Counterterrorism Security Group Creveld, Martin van Crimea Crisis of Democracy, The (Crozier) Cruickshank, Paul Cruz, Ted Cuba Bay of Pigs and missile crisis and Cyprus Daily Mail (London) Damascus, Syria Danger and Survival (Bundy) Darwish, Mahmoud Davar Dayan, Moshe Debs, Eugene debt Declaration of Independence defense spending deindustrialization democracy Democratic Party Dempsey, Martin Depression deregulation Dewey, John Dhanapala, Jayantha Diem, Ngo Dinh Diskin, Yuval Dobbs, Michael Dole, Bob Domínguez, Jorge Dorman, William Dostum, Abdul Rashid Dower, John Dreazen, Yochi Dreyfus, Alfred drones Duarte, Sergio due process Dulles, John Foster E1 project East Asia Eastern Europe East Timor Ebadi, Shirin Economic Charter of the Americas economic crises crash of 2008 Economic Policy Institute Ecuador education efficient market hypothesis Egypt Israeli treaty with Israeli war of 1967 Einstein, Albert Eisenhower, Dwight D.

Essential: How the Pandemic Transformed the Long Fight for Worker Justice
by Jamie K. McCallum
Published 15 Nov 2022

The advent of a low-wage economy alongside service sector growth presents the impression that these phenomena are inherently intertwined. We’re nostalgic for manufacturing employment, which is imagined to be, by default, solid, well-paid work. Such logic suggests there is nothing that policymakers can do to change the poor conditions of service jobs—it’s just the inevitable result of deindustrialization. In fact, there’s nothing inherent to service work that makes it so bad. Rather, the development of a low-wage labor market has been a well-executed strategy following the Great Recession. Low-wage work has been mandated by the American business class and its allies in government. To call it a conspiracy isn’t far off.

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Luke’s University Health Network—are both huge, consolidated hospital systems that employ more workers than “the Steel” did at its peak.22 This doesn’t even include the droves of new nursing facilities and armies of immigrant care aides spread out across the valley. Rarely, however, did we see those two things—deindustrialization and healthcare jobs—as related. Historian Gabriel Winant’s research on Pittsburgh, our rival steel town, sheds light on this steel-work-to-care-work transformation. Winant shows that the story of the caring class is interwoven with the demise of America’s industrial working class. When industrial jobs disappeared, the bodies left in its wake were battered, bruised, hunched, addicted, poisoned, mangled, and sick.

The Gated City (Kindle Single)
by Ryan Avent
Published 30 Aug 2011

Entrepreneurship and productivity rise with a city's skill level.[7] Why is this important? Entrepreneurship is the means by which metropolitan economies -- and ultimately national economies -- are remade. Regions with lots of high-skill, high-entrepreneurship areas are more resilient in the face of broad economic changes like deindustrialization. New firm creation facilitates the development and dispersion of technology, and young firms -- small, en route to becoming big -- are the economy's biggest job creators. Cities that foster a high level of entrepreneurship will be engines of job creation and centers of innovation and economic transformation.

After Europe
by Ivan Krastev
Published 7 May 2017

In these places where the elites of the continent congregate, it refers to a test that should be passed with the right answers. These elites view the political crisis of the EU mainly as a communications crisis in which Brussels has simply failed to explain its policies effectively. But in the deindustrialized and depressed parts of the continent, the demand for leadership means something very different: a demand for sacrifice and loyalty. People expect leaders to declare their personal readiness to underwrite the cost of the crisis and to publicly exhibit their family obligations to their societies.

The Trouble With Brunch: Work, Class and the Pursuit of Leisure
by Shawn Micallef
Published 10 Jun 2014

This creative-class socio-economic subset of the middle class was identified and brought into popular thought by the academic Richard Florida in his 2002 book The Rise of the Creative Class. Published just over one hundred years after Veblen published Theory of the Leisure Class, Florida’s book came at a time when modern Western society had undergone major shifts since Veblen’s era with deindustrialization and the emergence of a service-based economy. The commonality of the creative class is creative work, with human creativity being the ‘ultimate economic resource,’ according to Florida, and one that has a broad spectrum of people toiling away in professions and vocations that include scientists, engineers, artists, musicians, designers and knowledge-based professionals.

The Life of a Song: The Fascinating Stories Behind 50 of the World’s Best-Loved Songs
by David Cheal and Jan Dalley
Published 20 Sep 2017

Thus Randy Newman sums up the city of Baltimore, Maryland on this song from his 1977 album Little Criminals. Newman is renowned for his darkly comic songwriting – also on the album is the irony-drenched ‘Short People’ – but on ‘Baltimore’ he plays it straight: this is a threnody for a hardscrabble town in the throes of de-industrialization. Apart from its grim lyrics – hookers, drunks, hopelessness – what is interesting about the song is that it takes an age to reach the chorus. A piano motif circles, the tension builds, until relief of a sort finally arrives when the drums kick in properly and Newman stretches out with ‘Oh, Baltimore’.

Three Years in Hell: The Brexit Chronicles
by Fintan O'Toole
Published 5 Mar 2020

Identities are often defined by what they are not, and this form of negative self-identification came naturally to an Irish nationalism struggling to break the link with a country that dominated not just us but much of the world. In our dictionary, ‘Us’ could be defined simply as ‘not Them’. It worked in so many ways. England was Protestant; so Catholicism had to be the essence of Irish identity. England was industrial; so Ireland had to make a virtue of its underdeveloped and deindustrialised economy. England was urban; so Ireland had to create an image of itself that was exclusively rustic. The English were scientific rationalists; so we had to be the mystical dreamers of dreams. They were Anglo-Saxons; we were Celts. They had a monarchy, so we had to have a republic. They developed a welfare state; so we relied on the tender mercies of charity.

The Strange Death of Europe: Immigration, Identity, Islam
by Douglas Murray
Published 3 May 2017

At Friday prayers worshipers spill out onto the streets and a number of the major mosques are struggling to create larger facilities to meet the demand. Of course, if you mention Saint-Denis to anyone in the centre of Paris they grimace. They know it is there and try never to go to it. With the exception of the Stade de France stadium there is little reason to go anywhere near the area. Having been scarred by waves of de-industrialisation and re-industrialisation, in recent years the government has attempted to do some social engineering, building municipal offices in the area for state employees to work in. But these employees (around 50,000) who have jobs in the area almost never live there. They come in from elsewhere in the morning and leave again in the evening, when their office blocks are carefully locked and the security fences secured.

The Verdict: Did Labour Change Britain?
by Polly Toynbee and David Walker
Published 6 Oct 2011

With the tacit encouragement of ministers, careers advisers in schools told young people that factories were finished – to the chagrin of the UK’s manufacturers. Snake-oil merchants flogging the ‘weightless economy’ wafted into Downing Street seminars. As if willed by Labour, manufacturing declined faster than during the Thatcher years, when Labour had passionately deplored deindustrialization. Manufacturing amounted to 20 per cent of the economy in 1997 but 12 per cent in 2007, its decline fostered by sterling appreciation during Labour’s first term. Fittingly in Labour’s economy, construction, estate agency and property rose from 12.6 to 16.2 per cent. By 2010 only one in eight of Coventry’s working-age population of 194,000 was in manufacturing, compared with over one in two in the 1970s.

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When Labour came to power, a third of all the poor children in the EU 15 countries were born in the UK. The 1980s had seen relative poverty shoot up; the health of the poor was bad and getting relatively worse; the gap in life expectancy between rich and poor was growing. These trends played out intensively where deindustrialization had gone furthest, in places such as Sheffield. Within the city, inequality took physical shape as poorer areas became even more concentrated, while in Hallam and the west of the city people with higher earnings clustered together even more closely. Increasingly, according to the geographer Professor Danny Dorling, ‘people in different parts of Britain and people living within different quarters of its cities are living in different worlds with different norms and expectations.

Postcapitalism: A Guide to Our Future
by Paul Mason
Published 29 Jul 2015

A glance at Scotland’s poverty map gives the context: the town is dotted with areas of extreme deprivation and ill health.1 On the wall outside Gregg’s is a plaque marking the house where Adam Smith wrote The Wealth of Nations. Nobody takes much notice. But this is where, in 1776, the economic principles of capitalism were first laid out. I’m not sure Smith would like the look of his home town today, blighted by de-industrialization, low pay and chronic sickness. But he would have understood the cause. The source of all wealth, said Smith, is work. ‘It was not by gold or by silver but by labour that all the wealth of the world was originally purchased,’ Smith wrote; ‘and its value, to those who possess it, and who want to exchange it for some new productions, is precisely equal to the quantity of labour which it can enable them to purchase or command.’2 This is the classic labour theory of value: it says the work needed to make something determines how much it’s worth.

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By the mid-1980s, the working class of the developed world had moved in the space of fifteen years from passivity to strikes and semi-revolutionary struggles to strategic defeat. Western capitalism, which had coexisted with organized labour and been shaped by it for nearly two centuries, could no longer live with a working-class culture of solidarity and resistance. Through offshoring, de-industrialization, anti-union laws and a relentless ideological warfare, it would be destroyed. DIGITAL REBELS, ANALOGUE SLAVES After more than thirty years of retreat and atomization, the working class survives, but massively transformed. In the developed world, the core-periphery model first envisaged in Japan has become the norm, replacing ‘unskilled vs skilled’ as the most important division within the working class.

Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea
by Mark Blyth
Published 24 Apr 2013

In Spain the real problem, as became plain in the spring of 2012, lay in the regional savings banks: the cajas de ahorros. To understand where Spain is today, you have to start from the fact that in 1979 Spain was the eighth-largest industrial economy in the world. Today, it has slipped to seventeenth place. In between, Spain effectively deindustrialized, becoming a banking, services, and tourism hub. The problem is that the income streams such a growth model relies on come primarily from outside the country: when such people stop spending and lending, you are in serious trouble. It’s even more of a problem when what domestic growth you do have is debt-financed and based on little more than the swapping of houses.

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The problem with this growth model was that it was extremely vulnerable to external shocks due to its high degree of dependence on transnational capital flows, its tendency to develop large current account deficits, and its chronically weak export performance. They ended up this way because the post-communist period of the 1990s was one of extensive deindustrialization in the REBLLs. This prompted the migration of between 10 percent and 30 percent of the most active part of their labor force to Western Europe. These losses compounded an already weak capacity to develop infrastructure, which in turn led to the concentration of investment in real estate and finance rather than manufacturing.

The AI Economy: Work, Wealth and Welfare in the Robot Age
by Roger Bootle
Published 4 Sep 2019

Just because there are enough new jobs to replace the old ones that have been destroyed, this does not mean that particular individuals, or groups, or even regions and countries, have been able to switch easily to the new activities that are in demand. Nor was this just a feature of the grimy, smokestack phase of the Industrial Revolution, back in the nineteenth century. Across much of Europe and North America the onset of de-industrialization and globalization in the 1980s and ’90s devastated whole communities and regions. You can still see some of the effects today. In 1980s Britain the economy was transformed by what is now called “The Thatcher Revolution.” This involved the creation of many new jobs, mainly in the services sector.

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Moreover, in both countries, but especially India, labor is still cheap, and it will still be profitable to employ human labor rather than robots or AI in a wide spread of economic activities. The serious losers could be those countries that have not yet managed to make much progress up the development ladder. The economist Dani Rodrik has warned of “premature deindustrialization,” as countries still low on the development ladder are prevented from industrializing through exports and are driven to become service economies. Many African countries readily spring to mind. It has been common to argue that some of these could be about to follow the same development path trodden by so many East Asian countries.

Capitalism, Alone: The Future of the System That Rules the World
by Branko Milanovic
Published 23 Sep 2019

The convergence of Asian incomes with those in the West took place during another technological revolution, that of information and communication technologies (ICT)—a revolution in production that this time favored Asia (further discussed in Chapter 4). The ICT revolution contributed not only to the much faster growth of Asia but also to the deindustrialization of the West, which, in turn, is not dissimilar to the deindustrialization that happened in India during the Industrial Revolution. We thus have two periods of rapid technological change bookmarking the evolution of global inequality (see Figure 1.1). The effects of the ICT revolution are not over yet, but they are, in many respects, similar to those of the Industrial Revolution: a large reshuffle in worldwide income ranking as some groups advance and others decline, along with significant geographical concentration of such winners and losers.

How to Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States
by Daniel Immerwahr
Published 19 Feb 2019

As John Foster Dulles, who presided over the treaty ending the occupation, put it, Japanese products had “little future” in the United States. They were just “cheap imitations of our own goods.” Dulles was, to put it gently, wrong about that. What he didn’t foresee—what no one foresaw—was that in using Japan to launch its military campaigns in Asia, the United States was sowing the seeds of its own deindustrialization. To understand how that happened, turn back again to the end of the war, to a Japan on the brink of starvation. That might not have seemed like an auspicious time to start a technology company, but for Masaru Ibuka, a technical officer in the then-defunct Japanese navy, it was probably as good a time as any.

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Deming,” Ford’s CEO declared. Yet while an urge to emulate Japan seized executive suites, despair reigned on the shop floor. You could hear it in the music. The bubbly tunes of Buddy Holly had given way to gloomier fare. “Born down in a dead man’s town” was how Bruce Springsteen, the bard of deindustrialization, began his grim assessment of the national prospects in the song “Born in the U.S.A.” Five years later, Sony bought Columbia Records, Springsteen’s label. “Born in the U.S.A.” was now the property of Japan. Nor was it just Springsteen. In buying Columbia Records, Sony claimed the catalogs of Bob Dylan, Johnny Cash, Simon and Garfunkel, and many other rock mainstays.

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John de Crichton, Michael Crockett, Davy Crosby, Bing Cry “Havoc” (movie) Cuba; independence of; traffic signs in; war with Spain in cultural artifacts; see also titles of movies and songs Cumberland Gap Cuneiform Curtis, Charles Czechoslovakia Daily Mirror, The Dakota Territory Danish West Indies Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) Darwin, Charles Davao (Philippines) Davy, Humphry Dawson Creek (British Columbia) D-Day DDT Deadwood (South Dakota) Deane, Gen. John De Bevoise, Ken Declaration of Independence Deep Purple Deerslayer, The (Cooper) deindustrialization Delaware Delaware Indians DeLay, Tom Deming, W. Edwards Democratic Party; Southern Democratic Party of Japan Demolins, Edmond Deng Xiaoping Denmark depopulation of Indians Detroit Dewey, Commodore George Dhahran Air Base (Saudi Arabia) dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane, see DDT Diego Garcia Dietrich, Marlene Discman diseases; English settler deaths from; of guano workers; among indigenous polities; of livestock; in wartime; see also specific diseases Disneyland “Dixie” Dixon, Thomas, Jr.

The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor
by David S. Landes
Published 14 Sep 1999

We have much to learn about new industries taking hold in smaller towns and even in the countryside. Cf. Ciriacono, “The Venetian Economy” and “Venise et la Venetie.” But the older urban centers seem to have used economic and political power to keep these in their modest place. See Sella, Crisis and Continuity, and Moioli, “De-Industrialization in Lombardy.” 12. [Anthony Walker], The Holy Life of Mrs Elizabeth Walker (1690), cited in Thomas, “Cleanliness and Godliness,” p. 56. Thanks to Keith Thomas for making this available in advance of publication. 13. Baxter, “Of Redeeming Time,” Practical Works, p. 228. Again, thanks to Keith Thomas. 14.

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Martin’s Press. Baber, Zaheer. 1996. The Science of Empire: Scientific Knowledge, Civilization, and Colonial Rule in India. Albany: SUNY Press. Baechler, Jean, John A. Hall, and Michael Mann, eds. 1988. Europe and the Rise of Capitalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Bagchi, Amiya Kumar. 1976. “De-industrialization in India in the Nineteenth Century: Some Theoretical Implications,” J. Devel. Studies, 12, 2 (January), 135-64. Bahl, Vinay. 1994. “The Emergence of Large-scale Steel Industry in India under British Colonial Rule, 1880-1907,” Indian Econ. and Soc. Hist. Rev., 31, 4 (October-December), 413-60. —————. 1995.

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Lipsey, and Mario Zejan. 1994. “What Explains the Growth of Developing Countries?”, in Baumol et al., eds., Convergence of Productivity, pp. 243-59. —————. 1996. “Is Fixed Investment the Key to Economic Growth?” QJE, 111,1 (February), 269-76. Bluestone, Barry, and Bennett Harris. 1982. The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry. New York: Basic Books. Blum, Jerome. 1956. “Prices in Russia in the Sixteenth Century,” J. Econ. Hist., 16, 2: 182-99. Bodmer, Beatriz Pastor, ed. 1992. The Armature of Conquest: Spanish Accounts of the Discovery of America, 1492-1589.

Palo Alto: A History of California, Capitalism, and the World
by Malcolm Harris
Published 14 Feb 2023

Though the jobs that lured them to California were gone, black migrants of this period were not looking to return “home” but rather were determined to make new homes. The result is that black Californians were among the first groups of American workers to face the blunt thump upside the head of deindustrialization, knocked out of the high-wage manufacturing car onto the low-wage service asphalt, left dazed while national prosperity sped away. The California suburbs mostly absorbed black labor the way they had for years, in domestic and janitorial work, both of which they had an increased demand for given the arrival of the space settlers.

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The 1960 California Master Plan for Higher Education hugely expanded post-secondary schooling in the state, offering the elite UCs tuition-free and opening admission to the junior colleges, along with a guaranteed transfer for graduates to one of the state’s public four-year programs. It was a concession to history, a subtle acknowledgment that in the face of deindustrialization most workers required some level of higher education if they wanted a middle-class lifestyle. The two-year schools switched their focus to vocational preparation, which critics alleged was designed to keep working-class youths away from professional paths, while defenders said it upheld the state tradition of the upwardly mobile technician.

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In October of 1975, the city of New York nearly defaulted, saved only by the teachers union, which reached into its pension fund.1 This situation led to what geographer David Harvey calls the “solution of the ’70s”: the re-empowerment of owners relative to workers after the uprisings at home and abroad via “unemployment and deindustrialization, immigration, offshoring, and all manner of technological and organizational changes (e.g. subcontracting).”2 Firms and municipalities alike made their numbers fit by reducing their commitments to workers. It was a solution devised by capitalists to the problem of labor, and it was particularly suited to Palo Alto.

Four Futures: Life After Capitalism
by Peter Frase
Published 10 Mar 2015

In her analysis of the California prison system, Ruth Wilson Gilmore describes the massive growth of incarceration as the construction of a “golden gulag.”24 Urban youth who lack social services and jobs are ruthlessly targeted by police, locked up for long terms under draconian drug laws and California’s “three strikes” provision. The resulting explosion in prison construction, meanwhile, provides jobs in rural areas of the state with depressed economies. With agricultural work automated or shifted to ultra-low-wage migrant labor, and manufacturing jobs lost to deindustrialization, prison work has become among the last remaining well-paid labor in these places. Prison sentencing can even be offloaded onto algorithms, the better to allow administrators to deny their active role in constructing these warehouses of misery. At least twenty US states now use so-called “evidence-based sentencing.”

When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor
by William Julius Wilson
Published 1 Jan 1996

Of the changes in the economy that have adversely affected low-skilled African-American workers, perhaps the most significant have been those in the manufacturing sector. One study revealed that in the 1970s “up to half of the huge employment declines for less-educated blacks might be explained by industrial shifts away from manufacturing toward other sectors.” Another study reported that since the 1960s “deindustrialization” and the “erosion in job opportunities especially in the Midwest and Northeast … bear responsibility for the growth of the ranks of the ‘truly disadvantaged.’ ” The manufacturing losses in some northern cities have been staggering. In the twenty-year period from 1967 to 1987, Philadelphia lost 64 percent of its manufacturing jobs; Chicago lost 60 percent; New York City, 58 percent; Detroit, 51 percent.

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Studies measuring the effects of declining manufacturing on black male income, as opposed to employment, reach different conclusions. On the basis of these studies, declining manufacturing does not appear to have the same adverse effects on black income as it does on black employment. See Bartik (forthcoming) and Danziger and Gottschalk (1993). 28 Another study reported that since the 1960s “deindustrialization” and the “erosion in job opportunities”: Bluestone, Stevenson, and Tilly (1991), p. 25. 29 The manufacturing losses in some northern cities have been staggering: Kasarda (1995). 30 Another study examined the effects of economic restructuring: Gittleman and Howell (1993). 31 “The most common occupation reported by respondents”: Testa and Krogh (1989), p. 77. 32 changes in the percentage of Chicago’s inner-city black fathers in manufacturing industries: For a discussion of these findings, see Krogh (1993). 33 quotation from Kasarda: Kasarda (1995), p. 239. 34 the employment and earnings of young black men across the nation: Sum and Fogg (1990). 35 Young high school dropouts and even high school graduates “have faced a dwindling supply of career jobs”: Sum and Fogg (1990), p. 51. 36 John Kasarda examined employment changes: Kasarda (1995). 37 Kasarda’s study also documents the growing importance of education in nine … northern cities: Kasarda (1995).

Heaven Is a Place on Earth: Searching for an American Utopia
by Adrian Shirk
Published 15 Mar 2022

They are stone, sometimes wood, often painted white or brown, some with decorative facades or box-seats in the second-story window—and a lot of them have been ravaged by sixty years of abject civic neglect and disinvestment. The houses faced each other on these extremely narrow, intimate, almost medieval-looking streets. Many of the houses were abandoned. As Caz explained, the way the neighborhood used to be set up—before deindustrialization—was that every other block or so had a factory, and around that factory were these houses, and a shop, a laundry, a church. If you lost your job, you just moved over, a block or two, and worked at the other factory, lived on that block. The old civic design she described struck me as ancient and feudal—tied as it was to industry—but also communal, maybe Soviet.

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The old civic design she described struck me as ancient and feudal—tied as it was to industry—but also communal, maybe Soviet. That existence was likely tarnished and spartan and exploitative, but the scale of a full life lived on one or two city blocks seems also so humane to me compared to the high-tech atomization of nuclear family careerism. After deindustrialization, there was nowhere for people to work—so the houses emptied, or fell apart, the tax base shrank, the factories and storefronts and churches emptied out, trash collection ceased, buildings were lost to arson or decay, and the poor people who were still here were left to salvage what they could of the empire’s dregs.

Head, Hand, Heart: Why Intelligence Is Over-Rewarded, Manual Workers Matter, and Caregivers Deserve More Respect
by David Goodhart
Published 7 Sep 2020

Supporters of the child-centered approach argue that we don’t need to know particular things any longer because we can look it up on Google; what we need is a generic facility to acquire knowledge and think critically. By contrast, traditionalists insist that knowledge is cumulative: we have to build knowledge in order to think and be creative. In the United Kingdom the popularity of generic skills also grew out of the particular deindustrializing circumstances of the 1980s. David Willetts, the British politician, again: “In my constituency in the 1970s you went to school and you knew that when you left you would do an apprenticeship in the Portsmouth dockyard. And the school had a reasonable sense of what you needed to know to work in the dockyard.

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(The only political party represented in the UK Parliament to support leaving the EU was Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party.) On the other hand, it is easy to list half a dozen policy areas that have been at a sharp angle to the expressed preferences of many of the less well educated: openness to global trade and the deindustrialization it has led to; promotion of a knowledge economy and the 50 percent target for university attendance (in the United Kingdom) and relative neglect of vocational and technical training; openness to large-scale immigration and the embrace of multiculturalism, with its attendant ambivalence about majority identities; the social and geographical mobility that strips many communities of their most able people; a family policy that downplays the private realm of the family and gives priority to both parents working; and finally the embrace by the cognitive class of a more technocratic, global politics that has stressed international integration, climate change, human rights, and sex (and sexuality) equality, and downplayed national social contracts and national democratic sovereignty.

Science Fictions: How Fraud, Bias, Negligence, and Hype Undermine the Search for Truth
by Stuart Ritchie
Published 20 Jul 2020

This is the phenomenon whereby people from Glasgow, and Scotland more generally, die younger on average than those in other similar cities or countries, even after accounting for levels of poverty and deprivation. After reviewing the evidence on this effect, the paper concluded that the root of the unique problem was the ‘political attack’ on Scotland from Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government in the 1980s, with its policies of deindustrialisation and pushback against organised labour. There are no financial conflicts listed in the conflict-of-interest section – instead, it’s noted that the lead author, Gerry McCartney, ‘is a member of the Scottish Socialist Party.’96 Good on him, I say, for this rare degree of honesty.97 My own field, psychology, is no stranger to scientists who identify as left-wing.

Who Owns England?: How We Lost Our Green and Pleasant Land, and How to Take It Back
by Guy Shrubsole
Published 1 May 2019

The isle of Eigg, one of the first such community buy-outs, has completely rejuvenated its economy as a result, with its own microbrewery, booming tourist industry and 100 per cent renewable electricity grid. Why shouldn’t English communities have this same right? It could be a shot in the arm for towns and villages run down by decades of deindustrialisation and the decline of the high street; a chance to really take back control of your neighbourhood from big corporate landowners. Imagine the renewed sense of pride a community would get from building its own affordable housing. Or the sense of security that, say, a flood-prone town would gain if it were able to acquire the denuded moor lying upstream from it, and plant it with trees to help prevent future floods.

This Is Not a Drill: An Extinction Rebellion Handbook
by Extinction Rebellion
Published 12 Jun 2019

It is now up to progressives of all stripes – from the labour movement to liberal democrats, from trade unionists to environmental campaigners – to seize this moment and campaign for something better. We need programmes to deliver massive investment in clean energy and affordable public transport, to insulate every home and to bring hope and meaningful work to communities hollowed out by deindustrialization. This Green New Deal can be paid for by measures like wealth taxes, and some initiatives will pay for themselves through the increased tax returns of those in work. Green quantitative easing is also likely to have a role to play, with banks investing directly in green projects, rather than the government handing cash to the banks.

Cocaine Nation: How the White Trade Took Over the World
by Thomas Feiling
Published 20 Jul 2010

Organized crime moved into the drugs business because it was the only entity able to absorb the rising human and financial costs of dealing in illegal drugs in New York City.8 Several developments in the 1980s made the drugs business more attractive to newcomers and encouraged them to join criminal organizations. First were the enormous changes in industry and employment in the United States. De-industrialization, a rusting process which had been gnawing its way through the inner cities since the 1960s, was gathering speed. Between 1967 and 1987, Chicago lost 60 per cent, New York City 58 per cent and Philadelphia 64 per cent of their manufacturing jobs.9 Employers left the cities for the suburbs, other parts of the United States, or overseas; others just disappeared.

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Republican party politicians didn’t want to pump money into urban communities, partly because the inner cities had always voted Democrat, and partly because Republicans proved unable to solve social problems they had played a large part in creating. Instead, President Ronald Reagan responded to de-industrialization by dramatically cutting back the very programmes that had alleviated some of the resultant poverty, as well as those that were training people to make the transition to any new jobs that were available. Baltimore is the last resting place of Edgar Allan Poe, America’s finest gothic fabulist.

A People's History of Poverty in America
by Stephen Pimpare
Published 11 Nov 2008

Schools, for a variety of reasons, tend to be inferior, further reducing opportunities for upward mobility, given the close correlation between education and income.17 Crime tends to be higher, and residents are much more likely to be the victims of violence.18 Finally, physically isolating poor people results in fewer encounters between people who are not poor and people who are: poverty is therefore an abstraction, easily dismissed or understood only through the propaganda of the privileged, contributing again to so many forming “but the vaguest notion” of poverty.19 The causes of concentrated poverty today are less clear, although sociologist William Julius Wilson’s explanation, despite challenges and refinements, still predominates: middle-class “white flight” from the central cities to the suburbs sapped cities of tax revenue from higher earners and left behind a poorer population that contributed less in taxes and needed more in public services. Exacerbating the problem, with deindustrializa-tion the jobs available to less-skilled and less-educated urbanites moved away, creating a “spatial mismatch.”20 Even before, from at least 1864 to 1923, there was an American “ethnic cleansing,” in which entire counties were forcibly emptied of blacks.21 Government itself has fostered segregation: with the complicity of the Federal Housing Administration, banks and mortgage companies for many years engaged in redlining, a policy of refusing to extend loans to African Americans for homes in predominantly white neighborhoods, or at all.

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Less than one-third thought that “everyone in American society has an opportunity to succeed.”49 The causes of growing inequality are likely complex and varied—some combination of the declining value of the minimum wage, declining rates of unionization, regressive changes in tax policy, the declining value of welfare benefits, the effects of international trade and immigration, and changes in the labor market wrought by deindustrialization.50 One analysis even found a connection between whether states have lotteries and their levels of income inequality, perhaps not quite so surprising as it might at first appear, given how often lotteries are described by policy analysts as the most regressive tax.51 The effects of inequality are pernicious: as British sociologist T.H.

Multicultural Cities: Toronto, New York, and Los Angeles
by Mohammed Abdul Qadeer
Published 10 Mar 2016

There is a pattern of ethnic groups forming a network/niche in particular industries, somewhat in line with their human and cultural resources and opportunities. Black Americans in Los Angeles present a polarized outcome of their performance in the labour market. While the income gap has steadily closed in the professions, low-skilled Blacks, previously employed in manufacturing, have lost out owing to the deindustrialization of producer-goods industries. The new low-skill industries, small businesses forming immigrant niches, leave limited opportunities for poorly educated Blacks. Black women have moved almost completely out of domestic service into low-level clerical jobs, working in both the public and private sectors.

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All these events brought new classes of Chinese immigrants to the gateway cities of Toronto, New York, and Los Angeles. They were professionals, entrepreneurs, and businessmen who joined workers from the traditional sources of Chinese immigration. In the same period, the economies of these cities also underwent extensive restructuring with the introduction of information technology, deindustrialization, the flourishing of producer and social services, and the opening of international trade and financial flows. The new talent pool of immigrants, combined with the changing opportunity structure of urban economies, realigned the Chinese economies in the three cities. The Chinese economy in the Toronto area grew new shoots, diversifying its sectoral composition and establishing new niches in the mainstream economy, for example in finances, real estate, fashion, and computer engineering.

The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It
by Yascha Mounk
Published 15 Feb 2018

For an insightful treatment of this problem, see Anthony B. Atkinson, Inequality: What Can Be Done? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 128–132. 58. See the excellent series of essays on “dualization” in Patrick Emmenegger, ed., The Age of Dualization: The Changing Face of Inequality in Deindustrializing Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), as well as the classic Gøsta Esping-Andersen, “Welfare States without Work: The Impasse of Labour Shedding and Familialism in Continental European Social Policy,” in Welfare States in Transition: National Adaptations in Global Economies, ed.

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Jimeno, “Reforming an Insider-Outsider Labor Market: The Spanish Experience,” IZA Journal of European Labor Studies 1, no. 1 (2012): 1–19, 4; as well as Silja Häusermann and Hanna Schwander, “Varieties of Dualization? Labor Market Segmentation and Insider-Outsider Divides across Regimes,” in The Age of Dualization: The Changing Face of Inequality in Deindustrializing Societies, ed. Patrick Emmenegger et al., 27–51 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 60. On the United States, see Jacob S. Hacker, “Privatizing Risk without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States,” American Political Science Review 98 (2004): 243–260.

The Great Divide: Unequal Societies and What We Can Do About Them
by Joseph E. Stiglitz
Published 15 Mar 2015

Otherwise, I fear, we will permanently scar ourselves with the rigged economic and political system that already has done so much to create today’s inequality. When I was growing up in Gary during its own smog-choked “golden age,” it was impossible to see where the city was going. We didn’t know, or talk, about the deindustrialization of America, which was about to occur. I didn’t realize, in other words, that the rather grim reality I was leaving behind as I went to college was actually as good as Gary was ever going to get. I fear America could be at the same place today. ______________ * Politico, July/August 2014.

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The incumbent mayor, Dave Bing, a Democrat, has decided not to seek a second term, which is hardly surprising given that he and other local officials have been left on the sidelines as their city’s future—and the accumulated debts owed its creditors—is being hashed out in court. As historians like Thomas J. Sugrue have demonstrated, the disintegration of Detroit precedes the conflicts over social-welfare programs and race relations (including riots in 1967) and reaches back into the postwar decades, a time when the roots of deindustrialization, racial discrimination, and geographic isolation were planted. We’ve reaped what we’ve sown. Lacking regional political unity, there is no overall structure to improve the infrastructure and public services between poorer inner cities and affluent suburbs. So the poor fall back on what means they have, which is not good enough.

The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000
by Paul Kennedy
Published 15 Jan 1989

By contrast, regions in the north and east of France, such as Alsace, enjoyed the comparative security of land-based trade. Yet even if those areas, and people within them like winegrowers and cotton-spinners, profited in their protected environment, the overall impact upon the French economy was much less satisfactory. “Deindustrialized” in its Atlantic sector, cut off from much of the outside world, it turned inward to its peasants, its smalltown commerce, and its localized, uncompetitive, and relatively small-scale industries. Given this economic conservatism—and, in some cases, definite evidence of retardation—the ability of the French to finance decades of Great Power war seems all the more remarkable.84 While the popular mobilization in the early to middle 1790s offers a ready reason, it cannot explain the Napoleonic era proper, when a long-service army of over 500,000 men (needing probably 150,000 new recruits each year) had to be paid for.

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Between, say, the 1750s and the 1830s the mechanization of spinning in Britain had increased productivity in that sector alone by a factor of 300 to 400, so it is not surprising that the British share of total world manufacturing rose dramatically—and continued to rise as it turned itself into the “first industrial nation.”12 When other European states and the United States followed the path to industrialization, their shares also rose steadily, as did their per capita levels of industrialization and their national wealth. But the story for China and India was quite a different one. Not only did their shares of total world manufacturing shrink relatively, simply because the West’s output was rising so swiftly; but in some cases their economies declined absolutely, that is, they de-industrialized, because of the penetration of their traditional markets by the far cheaper and better products of the Lancashire textile factories. After 1813 (when the East India Company’s trade monopoly ended), imports of cotton fabrics into India rose spectacularly, from 1 million yards (1814) to 51 million (1830) to 995 million (1870), driving out many of the traditional domestic producers in the process.

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Porter, Britain, Europe and the World, ch. 5; Kennedy, Realities behind Diplomacy, chs. 7–8. 227. The literature on Britain’s post-1945 relative economic decline is enormous. See, inter alia, Gamble, Britain in Decline, passim; Kirby, Decline of British Economic Power Since 1870, ch. 5; F. Blackaby (ed.), De-industrialization (London, 1979), passim; W. Beckerman (ed.), Slow Growth in Britain: Causes and Consequences (Oxford, 1979); J. Eatwell, Whatever Happened to Britain? (London, 1982), passim. 228. Bairoch, “International Industrialization Levels,” p. 303. 229. Wegs, Europe Since 1945, p. 161. The figures for world manufacturing production are from Bairoch, those for shares of world trade from Kirby, Decline, p. 149, Table 15. 230.

Saving America's Cities: Ed Logue and the Struggle to Renew Urban America in the Suburban Age
by Lizabeth Cohen
Published 30 Sep 2019

Barbieri put his own man, veteran alderman Bartholomew Guida, in the mayor’s office, officially bringing to a close Lee’s urban renewal chapter.78 PROBLEMS OF THEIR OWN MAKING Many of the difficulties that Lee and Logue encountered in successfully renewing New Haven could be attributed to factors outside their control: the unstoppable momentum of suburbanization and deindustrialization, limitations in what could be done under the housing acts, pernicious racism, a punishing tax structure, and political fragmentation in the metropolitan area. But they also made miscalculations that undermined their success in the long run. One of the most damaging was the way they went about redeveloping downtown New Haven.

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The shift from public to private funding and initiative in city development that Logue decried would only expand after he left the South Bronx and following his death. It mattered little if Democrats or Republicans governed in Washington. Although Logue lived to see Boston and New York City benefiting from growth in private investment, and even the South Bronx turning the corner, New Haven continued to struggle. Like other deindustrialized cities in the United States, it was largely ignored by investors and the young talent who flocked to places with vibrant, new economies. But in all his cities, prosperous or not, affordable housing—as it was now universally called rather than “public,” “low-income,” or “subsidized”—was in devastatingly short supply.

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Tax Treatment of Voluntary Associations, Nonprofit Organizations, and Religious Bodies in New Haven, Connecticut, 1750–2000,” in Property-Tax Exemption for Charities, ed. Evelyn Brody (Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 2002), cited in Nikolas Bowie, “Poison Ivy: The Problem of Tax Exemption in a Deindustrializing City, Yale and New Haven, 1967–1973,” Foundations 3, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 5. For years the city tried unsuccessfully to get Yale to contribute to the city’s revenues; finally, in 1978, the state instituted a PILOT (payment in lieu of taxes) program that required colleges to reimburse municipalities like New Haven for 25 percent of what local property taxes would have yielded.

Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order
by Noam Chomsky
Published 6 Sep 2011

The issue is discussed by the eminent economic historian Paul Bairoch. In an important recent study he points out that there is no doubt that the third world’s compulsory economic liberalism in the nineteenth century is a major element in explaining the delay in its industrialization” and in the very revealing case of India, the “process of de-industrialization” that converted the industrial workshop and trading center of the world to a deeply impoverished agricultural society suffering a sharp decline in real wages, food consumption, and availability of other simple commodities. “India was only the first major casualty in a very long list,” Bairoch observes, including “even politically independent third world countries [that] were forced to open their markets to Western products.”

A Framework for Understanding Poverty
by Ruby K. Payne
Published 4 May 2012

Sample topics: Drug trade (ash-advance lenders Sub-prime lenders Lease-purchase outlets Gambling Temp work Sweatshops Sex trade Internet scams Definition: Research on the economic, political, and social policies at the international, national, state, and local levels. Sample topics: Globalization Corporate influence on legislators Declining middle class De-industrialization Job loss Decline of unions Taxation patterns Salary ratio of CEO to line worker Immigration patterns Economic disparity Departmentalizing is even more pronounced when it comes to the causes of poverty that arise from political and economic structures. Community economic development is left to the market system, developers, businesses, corporations, the Chamber of Commerce, and elected officials.

The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class
by Kees Van der Pijl
Published 2 Jun 2014

Sumner Welles in 1944 put the tremendous possibilities for trade with the Soviet Union in the perspective of a gradual abandoning by the Russians of ‘many of the more radical forms of political organization which time and experience have proved to be inefficient’.76 The Morgenthau Plan which envisioned the deindustrialization of Germany also had the aspect of depriving the USSR of German reparations, and thus driving it to seek American credits. Making the Soviet Union dependent on American aid was a constant concern of those who wanted to disburse it. ‘We should … enter the postwar years with a definite willingness to aid the USSR financially’, the expert on international creditor practices in the State Department, Herbert Feis, wrote in July 1945.

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In the War and Navy Departments, Patterson, a Wall Street lawyer for US investors in Germany, and Forrestal, president of Dillon, Read, were the respective secretaries.25 In the period preceding the Marshall Plan, the old German hands in the American bourgeoisie exerted all their considerable influence against the spectres of German de-industrialization and neutralization. They lobbied strenuously against Soviet and French reparation demands in order to ensure that German industrial assets would be available to support the recovery of capitalist Europe. Their strategy was to make the heavy industries of the Ruhr a core of a new Western European economy: an idea first broached to Secretary Forrestal in 1945 by Ferdinand Eberstadt, a former Dillon, Read partner.26 John Foster Dulles, then a Republican advisor to the Democratic State Department (and capitalizing on the new weight of his party in Congress), vigorously endorsed the idea.

The Divided Nation: A History of Germany, 1918-1990
by Mary Fulbrook
Published 14 Oct 1991

Just as in the sphere of denazification there was a switch from drastic notions of collective guilt to an eventual policy of rehabilitation, so in the sphere of economic policy there was a radical change in approach. It was obvious that a primary aim of the Allies must be to prevent a resurgence of German militarism as a threat to peace, but it was not clear as to how best this was to be achieved. The early Morgenthau plan for the deindustrialization of Germany, despite its mixed reception, found some echoes in the economic proposals in the Potsdam Agreement, as well as in the Level-of-Industry Plan of March 1946. According to this, Germany's standard of living was to be reduced to the 1932 level, and was not to exceed that of other European countries; industrial capacity was to be reduced to about 5055% of the 1938 level; about 1546 plants were to be dismantled in the western zones; and there were limits on the output of almost all industries, with some (armaments and war-related) banned entirely.

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This plan was related to reparations agreements which, because of the deterioration of East-West relations, were not in practice effected; in particular, after a couple of months the agreement on partial exchange of food and raw materials from the Soviet zone for products of western dismantling was terminated. While opinion in the USA had been divided, Britain was always strongly conscious of the problems that a deindustrialization of Germany would bring, particularly with respect to feeding the German population. However, it was not only for practical reasons (the attempt to prevent mass starvation) but also because of the developing Cold War, that western approaches to the German economy changed. The change was signalled in the speech by US Secretary of State James Byrnes in Stuttgart on 6 September 1946, when the German public learned for the first time explicitly that it was to receive more lenient treatment.

The Future Is Asian
by Parag Khanna
Published 5 Feb 2019

STRIVING FOR SERVICES Even as Asia remains the world’s factory floor, its service sectors are growing far more quickly, representing an ever larger share of GDP for most Asian economies. This process is crucial in adjusting the rapid automation of factory labor. Asia’s developing urbanization is evidence of one important strategy for confronting the threat of premature deindustrialization—the theory that not enough high-wage jobs are being created by the services economy to propel countries out of the so-called middle-income trap. But Asian industry is hardly disappearing, either. There may be fewer jobs in industry relative to the size of the labor force than a generation ago, but there are still more than 100 million manufacturing workers across Asia.

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In the postwar decades it maintained the most dynamic and innovative economy and had a sense of purpose in leading the free world through the Cold War. Even as political parties changed, there was continuity in governance and a strong national ethos. The past generation has witnessed a significant departure from those heady days. Deregulation, deindustrialization, financialization, and politicization have combined to tear the American societal fabric. By 2014, a Gallup survey found not only that the majority of Americans are fed up with the performance of their government but also that 65 percent of them have have lost faith in their system of government.2 The complacency with which many Western politicians continue to view the world makes no sense to millennials, who aren’t animated by the fading spirit of Western Cold War triumphalism.

The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European Politics
by John B. Judis
Published 11 Sep 2016

Whereas now entire communities set themselves up within France, governed by their own codes and traditions,” she explained to an interviewer in 2011. Economic Nationalism: Le Pen’s biggest departure in policy was in her economics. She was influenced by having served as a regional councilor in an area devastated by deindustrialization whose-working class citizens felt abandoned by the major parties in Paris. Her views were also shaped by an advisor she hired to run her 2012 campaign. In 2009, she had met Florian Philippot, 30, a graduate of the super-elite École nationale d’administration. (Presidents Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Jacques Chirac, and François Hollande were all graduates.)

The Rich and the Rest of Us
by Tavis Smiley
Published 15 Feb 2012

We can boldly imagine the unimaginable only if history serves as our touchstone. CHAPTER 7 The Poverty Manifesto There are nearly 150 million persistently poor and near poor people in America who are not responsible for the damage done by the Great Recession. Yet they pay the price. The poor did not create the deindustrialization of America, unmatched corporate profiteering and greed, more than a decade of foreign wars, and unregulated tax benefits for the wealthy. When the largest economic institutions in the world were brought to their collective knees, they went crawling to the government’s doorstep in search of salvation.

How to Change the World: Reflections on Marx and Marxism
by Eric Hobsbawm
Published 5 Sep 2011

The socialists, traditional brains-trust of labour, do not know any more than anyone else how to overcome the current crisis. Unlike in the 1930s, they can point to no examples of communist or social-democratic regimes immune to the crisis, nor have they realistic proposals for socialist change. In the old capitalist countries of the West de-industrialisation had already shrunk and would continue to contract their main basis, both industrial and electoral: the industrial working class. In newly emergent countries where this was not so, labour movements might well expand, but there was no real basis for their alliance with the traditional ideologies of social liberation, either because these were linked to actual or former communist regimes or because the ‘red’-linked movements of earlier times had atrophied in the meantime.

The Default Line: The Inside Story of People, Banks and Entire Nations on the Edge
by Faisal Islam
Published 28 Aug 2013

The promise was no less than the return of Manchester’s rag trade, but in a form less dark and less satanic than its nineteenth-century predecessor. Reshoring, rebalancing and reindustrialising Manchester’s textile industry was the call – the rag trade returning to its historic home. In theory, this was the reverse of offshoring, imbalances, and deindustrialisation: just what George Osborne said he wanted for the UK economy. At Headen & Quarmby in Middleton, the retail guru Mary Portas commissioned a range of upscale women’s underwear called ‘Kinky Knickers’. They started hand-making them in north Manchester this year, and the results have been incredible.

Adventures in the Anthropocene: A Journey to the Heart of the Planet We Made
by Gaia Vince
Published 19 Oct 2014

Africans are expected to be the worst hit by climate change, suffering worsening droughts that will directly reduce food availability. Whether you believe it is relevant or not – and most people I speak to think it is – Africans have contributed the least to climate change, belonging to the only continent bar Antarctica that has not yet significantly industrialised (indeed, many parts have been deindustrialising since the 1980s). In the Anthropocene, deaths from climate change will not be caused by the weather per se (apart from a tiny percentage of cases), but rather by the fatal synergy between climate change and a catalogue of other misfortunes: natural disasters such as locust plagues; fake seeds; low productivity due to poor health; poor governance and corruption (that sees, for example, much of the agricultural budget vanish); social and gender inequalities; poor infrastructure; and trade laws and protectionist agreements that favour rich countries.

Small Men on the Wrong Side of History: The Decline, Fall and Unlikely Return of Conservatism
by Ed West
Published 19 Mar 2020

And yet even during this period my parents saw the powers that be, and the organs of the state, as essentially Leftist. The collective consciousness of the 1980s is now dominated by the miners’ strike, symbolic of class conflict between Hooray Henrys in Annabel’s on the one hand and pitiful northerners facing deindustrialisation and ruin. Yet a lot of political conflict is obviously motivated by intraclass, not interclass, hatred. The most bitter enemies of Thatcher, the ones who viscerally loathed her, were only around the corner from us, in Campden Hill, where Harold Pinter used to invite his literary circle around and presumably swear a lot while talking about the Tories.

Why Orwell Matters
by Christopher Hitchens
Published 1 Jan 2002

Even Robert Conquest wrote a poem entitled ‘1974: Ten Years to Go’, in which the menacing figures of Tony Benn, the TUC (again), student Sparts and the IRA were pressed into service. Not all that frightening even at the time, they seem almost quaint today. There is an aesthetic as well as an ideological difference between a deindustrialized banana republic and a hermetic terror state; Orwell’s insistence on the distinction was just and necessary. It is superfluous for Conservatives to claim Orwell as an ally in the Cold War. He was fighting it when most Tories were still hailing Britain’s gallant Soviet ally. Indeed, he is credited with coining the term ‘cold war’, in a paragraph that deserves quotation.

Let Them In: The Case for Open Borders
by Jason L. Riley
Published 14 May 2008

But given that black alienation from the workforce has not ebbed and flowed with Hispanic migration patterns but remained stubbornly consistent for decades, there’s probably more to the story. When William Julius Wilson was writing about black nonattachment to the labor force twenty years ago, immigration was scarcely mentioned. He was primarily concerned with the deindustrialization of the U.S. economy, the lack of job training for blacks, and a hellish, self-perpetuating ghetto culture that encouraged criminal behavior and left too many black men not simply unemployed but unemployable. The 1980s and 1990s saw two of the longest periods of sustained economic growth in U.S. history, yet the labor-force participation rates of less-educated young black men actually declined over that stretch.

Last Best Hope: America in Crisis and Renewal
by George Packer
Published 14 Jun 2021

He had learned the hard lesson of meritocracy. Politically, Smart America came to be associated with the Democratic Party. This was never inevitable. If the party had refused to accept the closing of factories in the 1970s and ’80s as a natural disaster, if it had become the voice of the millions of workers displaced by deindustrialization and struggling in the growing service economy, it might have remained the multi-ethnic working-class party that it had been since the 1930s. It’s true that the white South abandoned the Democratic Party after the civil rights revolution, but race alone doesn’t explain the epochal half-century shift of the white working class.

Angrynomics
by Eric Lonergan and Mark Blyth
Published 15 Jun 2020

The Brexit campaign slogan of “Take back control” resonates for a reason. I think we can also see this very clearly in the 2016 US presidential election. It is very telling that the five states that were supposedly solidly blue-collar Democrat, but turned out for Trump, were the ones that suffered the most in terms of de-industrialization and the export of jobs. One of those states, Wisconsin, lost one third of its industry, not to Mexico or China, but to Southern “right to work” (union-free) states in the 1970s and 1980s as business migrated south. Wisconsin has been in relative decline for a very long time. NAFTA in 1994 and then China joining the WTO in 2001 accelerated that feeling of decline and actual job losses, and over time the Democratic Party coalition that tried to embrace unions, free-up trade, and profit from global finance all at once fractured.

Star's Reach: A Novel of the Deindustrial Future
by John Michael Greer
Published 14 Apr 2014

Star’s Reach A Novel of the Deindustrial Future John Michael Greer Star's Reach Copyright © 2014 by John Michael Greer Published 2014 by Founders House Publishing, LLC Cover art © Fotografieco/Dreamstime.com Cover art © Markus Gann/Dreamstime.com Cover Design © 2014 Founders House Publishing Smashwords Edition, License Notes This ebook is licensed for your personal enjoyment only. This ebook may not be re-sold or given away to other people. If you would like to share this with another person, please purchase an additional copy for each recipient. If you are reading this book and did not purchase it, or it was not purchased for your use only, then please return to Smashwords.com and purchase your own copy.

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If you are reading this book and did not purchase it, or it was not purchased for your use only, then please return to Smashwords.com and purchase your own copy. Thank you for respecting the hard work of this author. For more information visit www.foundershousepublishing.com Full Contents Start Reading About The Author Copyright Author’s Note There’s a certain irony in the fact that this tale of the deindustrial future first appeared in serial form as a monthly blog post on the internet, that most baroque of modern industrial society’s technosystems. That said, I’m grateful to all those who read, praised, and criticized the story in its original form, and thus contributed mightily to whatever virtues it may have.

Killing Hope: Us Military and Cia Interventions Since World War 2
by William Blum
Published 15 Jan 2003

West Germany was to become "the showcase of Western democracy"— dramatic, living proof of the superiority of capitalism over socialism; (3) in American conservative circles, and some liberal ones as well, wherein a Soviet invasion of Western Europe remained perpetually imminent, the idea of tying West Germany's industrial hands was one which came perilously close to being "soft on communism", if not worse.3 Dwight Eisenhower echoed this last sentiment when he later wrote: Had certain officials in the Roosevelt administration had their way, Germany would have been far worse off, for there were those who advocated the flooding of the Ruhr mines, the wrecking of German factories, and the reducing of Germany from an industrial to an agricultural nation. Among others, Harry Dexter White, later named by Attorney General Brownell as one who had been heavily 60 involved in a Soviet espionage ring operating within our government... proposed exactly that.4 Thus it was that the de-industrialization of West Germany met the same fate as the demilitarization of the country would in the coming years, as the United States poured in massive economic assistance: $4 billion of Marshall Plan aid and an army of industrial and technical experts. At the same time, the Soviet Union was pouring massive economic assistance out of East Germany.

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New York Times, 24 January 1952, p, 4. 13. Ibid., 30 August 1955, p. 1. 14. Ibid., 30 November 1976. 15. Stephen Ambrose, ike's Spies (Doubleday & Co., New York, 1981) pp. 235, 238. 227 8. GERMANY 1950s 1. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York, 1969) p. 260. 2. Ibid. 3. Failure of deindustrialization; for further discussion, see Richard J. Barnet, Allies: America. Europe and Japansince the War (London, 1984) pp. 33-9. 4. Dwight Eisenhower, The While House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 (New York, 1963) pp. 79-80. 5. New York Times, 6 November 1952, p. 3 6. Democratic German Report, 13 February 1953; see description of this publication below. 7.

Wealth and Poverty: A New Edition for the Twenty-First Century
by George Gilder
Published 30 Apr 1981

Oaxaca, “Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Markets,” Working Paper No. 23 (Princeton, NJ: Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University, 1971). Chapter Fourteen 1 Patrick Buchanan, quoted in Harper’s, vol. 259, no. 1554 (November 1979), p. 39. 2 David B. Wilson, “There’s a New Class in Our Society,” Boston Globe, July 16, 1979, p. 11. 3 Frances Cairncross, “‘Deindustrialization’—Odd Phenomenon,” Financier , vol. 2, no. 4 (April 1978), pp. 11–14. See also Walter Eltis and David Bacon, The British Problem: Too Few Producers, rev. American edition (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978). 4 Computed from OECD National Accounts Statistics, 1972 and OECD Revenue Statistics, 1965–1972, as tabulated by Alan T.

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New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1977. Burnss, Scott. Home, Inc.: The Hidden Wealth and Power of the American Household. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1975. Cain, Glen G. “The Challenge of Segmented Labor Market Theories to Orthodox Theory.” Journal of Economic Literature (December 1976). Cairncross, Frances. “‘Deindustrialization’—Odd Phenomenon.” Financier 2 (4) April 1978. Campbell, Colin D., ed. Income Redistribution. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977. Cipolla, Carlo. The Economic History of World Population. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1974. Cloward, Richard, and Piven, Frances Fox.

City Squares: Eighteen Writers on the Spirit and Significance of Squares Around the World
by Catie Marron
Published 11 Apr 2016

The number of nineteen-year-olds opting out of driver’s licenses has tripled since the 1970s from 8 to 23 percent. Americans are still a long way from regarding cars as a luxury or superfluous. Electric, self-driving vehicles may revolutionize transportation. But a larger portion of the U.S. population is moving downtown, where deindustrialization, plummeting crime rates, and an increasing population of singles and smaller families have reshaped countless formerly desolate urban neighborhoods. People are moving downtown for the pleasures and benefits of cultural exchange, walkable streets, parks, and public squares. Squares have defined urban living since the dawn of democracy, from which they are inseparable.

Brit-Myth: Who Do the British Think They Are?
by Chris Rojek
Published 15 Feb 2008

This mattered little to a government seeking not to represent a ‘one nation’ view of Britain but to discard the dependency culture it believed socialism engendered and supported. 48 BRIT-MYTH In cultural terms, Margaret Thatcher was very like an ostrich, and not just in respect of her deluded view that Britain was still central to world affairs. For example, she seemed genuinely astonished that the 1981 race riots in Brixton and Toxteth could possibly occur on British soil. Her public profile held no place for remorse in shredding the fabric of traditional communities by pursuing aggressive policies of de-industrialization. The Miners’ Strike (1984–5) was portrayed as a battle against what she, controversially, referred to as ‘the enemy within’, again invoking the elusive, damning and extremely divisive distinction between ‘us and them’. But this time the resonance is not primarily between the British people and other nations, or multi-ethnic migrants to Britain.

Making the Future: The Unipolar Imperial Moment
by Noam Chomsky
Published 15 Mar 2010

Today, if you’re a worker in manufacturing, with real unemployment practically at Depression levels, you know that those jobs may be gone forever if current policies persist. That change in popular understanding has evolved since the 1970s, when major changes took place in the social order. One was a sharp reversal as several centuries of industrialization turned to de-industrialization. Of course manufacturing continued, but overseas—very profitable, though harmful to the workforce. The economy shifted to financialization. Financial institutions expanded enormously. A vicious cycle was set in motion. Wealth concentrated in the financial sector. The cost of campaigns escalated sharply, driving political leaders ever deeper into the pockets of wealthy backers, increasingly in financial institutions.

Marx at the Arcade: Consoles, Controllers, and Class Struggle
by Jamie Woodcock
Published 17 Jun 2019

The growth of the industry has to be tied to the broader shifts in the economy, particularly the decline of manufacturing and the rise of service work in the Global North. In the UK and the US, this has meant a significant increase of logistics and services, particularly in areas like retail, call centers, and deliveries. As a result, following deindustrialization and the 2008 financial crisis, most of the growth in jobs has been in low-wage and insecure employment. The videogames industry, like other digital or creative sectors, is one that has bucked this trend. However, it remains a small part of overall employment. For example, in 2015 the core employment of the UK’s videogame industry was represented by only 12,100 full-time equivalent employees.

Rentier Capitalism: Who Owns the Economy, and Who Pays for It?
by Brett Christophers
Published 17 Nov 2020

Greta Krippner defines financialization in terms of profits increasingly accruing ‘through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production’.15 In 2008, Ewald Engelen described the US and UK economies as those ‘which arguably have moved furthest in the direction of being truly “financialized” ’.16 More recently, Aeron Davis and Catherine Walsh noted: ‘the UK economy has become more financialised and has gone through a more pronounced process of deindustrialisation than any of its major economic rivals’.17 Such declarations are no longer seriously questioned. That the UK’s is a financialized economy is now more or less a stylized fact – a commonplace of current scholarship.18 But it is not true. Or, rather, it is true only in small part: financialization represents only one vector of a wider structural shift in the UK economy under neoliberalism.

The end of history and the last man
by Francis Fukuyama
Published 28 Feb 2006

The first reason has to do with the expectations created by current economic growth. While individuals and small communities can “return to nature,” quitting their jobs as investment bankers or real estate developers in order to live by a lake in the Adirondacks, a society-wide rejection of technology would mean the wholesale de-industrialization of a nation in Europe, America, or Japan, and its transformation, in effect, into an impoverished Third World country. There would perhaps be less air pollution and toxic waste, but also less modern medicine and communications, less birth control and therefore less sexual liberation. Rather than freeing man from the cycle of new wants, most people would become reacquainted with the life of a poor peasant tied to the land in an unending cycle of back-breaking labor.

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Many countries have, of course, existed at the level of subsistence agriculture for generations, and the people living in them have doubtless achieved considerable happiness; but the likelihood that they could do so having once experienced the consumerism of a technological society is doubtful, and that they could be persuaded as a society to exchange one for the other even more so. Moreover, if there were other countries that chose not to de-industrialize, the citizens of the ones that did would have a constant standard of comparison against which to judge themselves. Burma’s decision after World War II to reject the goal of economic development common elsewhere in the Third World and to remain internationally isolated might have worked in a pre-industrial world, but proved very difficult to sustain in a region full of booming Singapores and Thailands.

Debtor Nation: The History of America in Red Ink (Politics and Society in Modern America)
by Louis Hyman
Published 3 Jan 2011

“Fairness” in lending, defined as objective and widespread, seemed to have been achieved, but the earlier lingering question of whether people ought to borrow, and did borrowing actually help consumers when their incomes were uncertain, remained unanswered. In a time of rising unemployment and deindustrialization, the logic of borrowing from a future income—which underpinned the postwar growth economy—began to unravel. Credit cards for all emerged at the exact moment when the future had become less certain than ever before. Membership, nonetheless, had its privileges. For women, as an American Bankers Association representative testified, the “the only way we can tell sex right now including our credit scoring system . . . is by her name.”203 Individual credit records created the possibility of individual interest rates.

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The balance of power in capitalism was not determined by the interest rate caps for consumers, but whether they were able to pay back what they borrowed. Thirty years of wage stagnation made paying back those debts through anything but accidental asset inflation—homes and home equities—impossible. In the 1990s, the full flower of deindustrialization pummeled not only blue- but white-collar America as well. While a generation of postwar consumers could safely borrow against rising incomes, the promise on which American prosperity had been built now cracked. The evanescent promise of getting a good-paying job that a generation earlier would have been seen as a sure path to upward mobility, only led in the 1990s to increased debt and certain bankruptcy after that job was downsized.275 Even those with college educations found themselves downsized in the 1990s as information technology increased the efficiency of office work, and their wages converged with high school graduates.

The Discovery of France
by Graham Robb
Published 1 Jan 2007

There is no sign that Bie`vres would one day be the home of an industrial bakery, the Burospace technology park, the ‘RAID’ division of the riot police and the Victor Hugo car park. D’autres auront nos champs, nos sentiers, nos retraites. Ton bois, ma bien-aimée, est à des inconnus.35 * INDUSTRIAL COLONIZATION, too, left relatively few traces in French art and literature. Paris was already being deindustrialized in the 1830s as workshops moved out and property speculators moved in. Until quite late in the nineteenth century, mill chimneys and plumes of smoke drifting across the sky were described as interesting novelties. Wizened tribes of factory workers were seen as hellish exceptions rather than the face of the future.

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Aachen see Aix-la-Chapelle/Aachen Aas (Hautes-Pyrénées) ref Abriès (Hautes-Alpes) ref Adour river ref, ref Agen (Lot-et-Garonne) ref, ref Agincourt, Battle of ref Agon-Coutainville (Manche) ref Aigues-Mortes (Gard) ref Aiguilles (Hautes-Alpes) ref, ref Aiguillon (Lot-et-Garonne) ref Aiguines (Var) ref Aisne river ref, ref Aix-en-Provence (Bouches-du-Rhône) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Aix-la-Chapelle/Aachen ref Aix-les-Bains (Savoie) ref Algeria ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Algiers ref Aliermont (Seine-Maritime) ref Alise-Sainte-Reine (Côte-d’Or) ref Allier river ref, ref Alpes mancelles (Sarthe) ref Alps ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref cuisine ref, ref daily life in the ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref deforestation ref, ref education ref First World War ref livestock ref maps ref, ref, ref, ref, ref rivers ref roads ref touristes ref, ref travel ref, ref, ref Alps of Provence ref, ref Alps of Savoy ref, ref, ref Alsace, province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Alsace-Lorraine ref, ref, ref, ref Alyscamps, Arles ref, ref Ambert (Puy-de-Dôme) ref Americas ref, ref, ref Amiens (Somme) ref, ref, ref Amiens Cathedral ref Ancenis (Loire-Atlantique) ref Les Andelys (Eure) ref Andorra ref Andrézieux (Loire) ref Ange Gardien, Col de l’ (Hautes-Alpes) ref Angers (Maine-et-Loire) ref, ref, ref, ref Angoulême (Charente) ref, ref, ref, ref Angoumois, province ref Anjou, province ref, ref, ref, ref Antibes (Alpes-Maritimes) ref Antony (Hauts-de-Seine) ref Aosta see Valle d’Aosta Aquitaine ref Aramits (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref Arc de Triomphe, Paris ref Arcachon (Gironde) ref, ref, ref Arcachon Basin ref, ref Arcueil (Val-de-Marne) ref Ardèche gorges ref Ardennes region ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Argelès-Gazost (Hautes-Pyrénées) ref, ref Argoat, Brittany ref Argonne region ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Ariège département ref Aries (Bouches-du-Rhône) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Armagnac region ref, ref Armand, Aven (Lozère) ref Armor, Brittany ref Armorican peninsula ref Arpajon (Essonne) ref Arras (Pas-de-Calais) ref, ref Arreau (Hautes-Pyrénées) ref Arromanches (Calvados) ref Ars-sur-Formans (Ain) ref Art-sur-Meurthe (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref Artois, province ref, ref Arve river ref Arvieux (Hautes-Alpes) ref Asnieres-sur-Seine, Dog Cemetery (Hauts-de-Seine) ref, ref Atlantic coast ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Atlantic Ocean ref, ref, ref Aubervilliers (Seine-Saint-Denis) ref, ref AuBêterre-sur-Dronne (Charente) ref Aubigny-sur-Nère (Cher) ref Aubin (Aveyron) ref, ref Aubisque, Col d’ (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref Aubrac region ref, ref Aubry-en-Exmes (Orne) ref Auch (Gers) ref, ref Audressein (Ariège) ref Aulus-les-Bains (Ariège) ref Aumont (Lozère) ref Aunis, province ref Autun (Saône-et-Loire) ref, ref Autun Cathedral ref, ref Auvergne, province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Bête du Gévaudan ref cuisine ref, ref daily life ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref fashion ref healers of ref livestock ref maps ref rivers ref roads ref, ref Romans ref spas ref tourism ref, ref Auxerre (Yonne) ref, ref Auxois region ref Avesnes-sur-Helpe (Nord) ref Aveyron département ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Avignon (Vaucluse) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Ayen, Col d’ (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence) ref Badger’s Eyes, Montpellier-le-Vieux ref Bagnères-de-Bigorre (Hautes-Pyrénées) ref Bagneux, dolmen (Maine-et-Loire) ref, ref Balkans ref Barbary Coast ref Barbonville (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref Barcelona ref, ref Barcelonnette (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence) ref, ref Barèges (Hautes-Pyrénées) ref, ref, ref, ref Bas-Poitou, province ref Bas-Rhin département ref Basque Country ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Basses-Alpes département (now Alpes-de-Haute-Provence) ref, ref, ref La Bastide, nr le Massegros (Lozère) ref Bastille, Paris ref, ref, ref, ref Bauduen (Var) ref Baumes-Fères, Verdon Gorges ref Bauzon, forest (Ardèche) ref Bayard, Col (Hautes-Alpes) ref Bayeux (Calvados) ref Bayonne (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Béarn, province ref, ref Beaucaire (Gard) ref, ref Beauce region ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Beaufortain Alps ref Beaujolais region ref Beaumont-en-Cambrésis (Nord) ref Beauvais (Oise) ref, ref, ref Bédoin (Vaucluse) ref, ref, ref Bélesta (Ariège) ref Belfort (Territoire-de-Belfort) ref Belgium ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Belvédère, nr Saint-Amand-Montrond (Cher) ref Berck-Plage (Pas-de-Calais) ref Beresina, Crossing of the ref Berne ref Berneval (Seine-Maritime) ref Bérou-la-Mulotière (Eure-et-Loir) ref Berry, province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Berthouville (Eure) ref Besançon (Doubs) ref, ref Bétharram (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref, ref, ref Béziers (Hérault) ref, ref, ref, ref Biarritz (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref, ref, ref, ref Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris ref Bielle (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref Bièvres (Essonne) ref Blaye (Gironde) ref, ref Blois (Loir-et-Cher) ref, ref, ref, ref Bocage ref, ref Bois de Boulogne, Paris ref, ref Bonette, Col de la (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence) ref Borce (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref Bordeaux (Gironde) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref bicycle races ref cagots in ref, ref language ref roads ref, ref, ref trade ref, ref, ref, ref, ref travel ref, ref Bordelals region ref, ref Bordessoule (Creuse) ref Bort-les-Orgues (Corrèze) ref Bouches-de-l’Elbe département ref Le Bouchet-Saint-Nicolas (Haute-Loire) ref Bouillon, Duché de, Belgium ref, ref Boulogne (formerly Bourogne) (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence) ref Boulogne-sur-Mer (Pas-de-Calais) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Le Bouquet (Lozère) ref Bourbon-l’Archambault (Allier) ref Bourbon-Vendée see La Roche-sur-Yon Bourbonnais, province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Bourg d’Oisans (Isère) ref Bourg-la-Reine (Hauts-de-Seine) ref Bourges (Cher) ref, ref, ref Bourges Cathedral ref Bourget, Lac du (Savoie) ref Bourgogne (Burgundy), province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref cuisine ref, ref daily life in ref, ref, ref, ref roads ref wines ref, ref Bourgogne, canal ref Braconne, Forêt de la (Charente) ref Bramabiau, Abime de (Gard) ref Brande region ref, ref Bray, Pays de ref Brenne region ref La Bresse (Vosges) ref Brest (Finistère) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Bretagne (Brittany), province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref animals ref, ref art ref coast ref, ref cuisine ref, ref daily life in ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref fashion ref forests ref language ref laws ref livestock ref, ref maps ref, ref migrant workers ref moorland ref patron saint ref roads ref, ref, ref, ref, ref smuggling ref tourism ref, ref, ref, ref tribes/people ref, ref, ref, ref Briançon (Hautes-Alpes) ref, ref, ref Briare, canal ref Brie region ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Brighton ref Britain ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Brittany see Bretagne Brive-la-Gaillarde (Corrèze) ref Broquies (Aveyron) ref Brouage (Charente-Maritime) ref Brousse-le-Château (Aveyron) ref Bruère-Allichamps (Cher) ref Brussels ref Buenos Aires ref Bugarach, Pech de ref, ref Bugarach (Aude) ref Buissoncourt-en-France (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref Burgnac (Haute-Vienne) ref Burgundy see Bourgogne Cabourg-les-Bains (Calvados) ref, ref Cabrerets (Lot) ref Caen (Calvados) ref Les Cagots, quartier of Hagetmau (Landes) ref Cahors (Lot) ref, ref Cailhaou d’Arriba-Pardin, nr Poubeau (Haute-Garonne) ref Calais (Pas-de-Calais) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref California ref Californie (‘lieu-dit’) ref Calvados département ref Camargue delta ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Cambrai (Nord) ref Canada (‘lieu-dit’) ref Canigou mountain ref Canjuers, Grand Plan de (Var) ref Canjuers military zone (Var) ref Cannes (Alpes-Maritimes) ref, ref Cantal département ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Cantal plateau ref, ref, ref, ref Cap Ferret (Gironde) ref Capbreton (Landes) ref Carcassonne (Aude) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Carnac (Morbihan) ref, ref, ref Carpentras (Vaucluse) ref Carpentras plain ref Casteljaloux (Lot-et-Garonne) ref Castellane (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence) ref, ref Castetbon (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref Castres (Tarn) ref Catalonia ref, ref, ref, ref Catus (Lot) ref Causse Noir ref Causses plateaux ref, ref, ref, ref Cauterets (Hautes-Pyrénées) ref Caux, Pays de ref, ref Cayenne (‘lieu-dit’) ref La Caze, nr Aubin (Aveyron) ref Cellefrouin (Charente) ref Cemmenus see Cévennes Cenabum (Roman Orleans) ref Cercottes (Loiret) ref Cerdagne region ref Cevennes mountains ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Chalindrey (Haute-Marne) ref Chalon-sur-Saône (Saône-et-Loire) ref Chalons-en-Champagne (Chalons-sur-Marne) (Marne) ref Chalosse region ref Chambon, Lac (Puy-de-Dôme) ref Chambre d’Amour, Biarritz ref Chamonix or Chamouni, village and valley (Haute-Savoie) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Champ de Mars, Palais du, Paris ref Champagne, province and region ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Champagne pouilleuse ref, ref Champs-Élysées, Paris ref, ref, ref Channel Islands ref, ref Chanteloup pagoda, Amboise (Indre-et-Loire) ref Chantllly (Olse) ref, ref La Chapelle-Saint-Ursin (Cher) ref Charente region ref Charente river ref, ref La Charité-sur-Lolre (Nievre) ref, ref Charlieu (Loire) ref Charolais, canal ref Charost (Cher) ref Chartres (Eure-et-Loir) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Château-Ville-Vieille (Hautes-Alpes) ref Châteauroux (Indre) ref Châtelet, Paris ref Chaudun, Cirque de ref Chaudun (Hautes-Alpes) ref, ref Chaussée d’Antin ref ‘La Chaussée’ (place name) ref ‘Chemin de la duchesse Anne’ ref Le Chêne, nr Saint-Philbert-de-Bouaine (Vendée) ref Cher département ref, ref Cher river ref, ref Cherbourg (Manche) ref, ref ‘Chestnut Belt’ ref Cheylard-l’Évêque (Lozère) ref Clermont d’Excideuil (Dordogne) ref Clermont-Ferrand (Puy-de-Dôme) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Cloisters Museum, Manhattan ref Cluny, Abbaye de (Saône-et-Loire) ref, ref Colmar (Haut-Rhin) ref, ref, ref Colombey-les-Belles(Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref Combourg (Ille-et-Vilaine) ref Comédie Française, Paris ref Compostela see Santiago de Compostela Conches-en-Ouche (Eure) ref Corbeil (Essonne) ref Corbières hills ref, ref, ref Cordouan lighthouse ref Corniche Sublime, Verdon Gorges ref Cornwall ref Corrèze département ref Corsica ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Corte (Haute-Corse) ref Côte d’Argent ref Côte d’Azur ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Côte Émeraude ref Côte Sauvage ref Côtentin peninsula ref, ref Côtes-du-Nord département (now Côtes-d’Armor) ref Couserans region (Ariège) ref Couvin, Belgium ref Cransac (Aveyron) ref Craponne canal ref Crau plain ref, ref, ref Creuse département ref, ref, ref Le Creusot (Saône-et-Loire) ref, ref, ref, ref Croissant language zone ref, ref Croisset, nr Rouen (Seine-Maritime) ref CUDL (Communauté Urbaine de Lille) ref Cuq (Tarn) ref Cure river ref Cyrano’s Nose, Montpellier-le-Vieux ref Dammartin-en-Goële (Seine-et-Marne) ref, ref, ref Dargilan, Grotte de (Lozère) ref Darnac (Haute-Vienne) ref Dauphiné, province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Dax (Landes) ref Deauville (Calvados) ref Decazeville (Aveyron) ref, ref Découverte mine, Decazeville ref Deux Mers, Canal des ref Devil’s Citadel, the see Montpellier-le- Vieux Devoluy massif, French Alps ref Dieppe (Seine-Maritime) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Digne-les-Bains (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence) ref, ref, ref Dijon (Côte-d’Or) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Dive river ref Dognen (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref ‘Le Dolmen’ café-bar ref Dombasle-en-Argonne (Meuse) ref, ref, ref, ref Dombes plateau ref, ref, ref, ref Domrémy-la-Pucelle (Vosges) ref Dordogne département ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Dordogne river ref, ref, ref Dos du Loup hill (Ardennes) ref Douai (Nord) ref Double region ref, ref Dover ref, ref Doyenné, Quartier du, Paris ref Drac river ref Dreux (Eure-et-Loir) ref, ref Drôme département ref Dronne river ref Duhort (Landes) ref Dune du Pyla (Gironde) ref Dunkerque (Dunkirk) (Nord) ref, ref, ref Durance river ref, ref, ref Eaux-Bonnes (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref, ref Eaux-Chaudes (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref, ref Échourgnac (Dordogne) ref École des Mines, Paris ref École des Ponts et Chaussées ref Les Écossais (Allier) ref Écrins massif, French Alps ref Eiffel Tower ref, ref, ref, ref Elba, Island of ref, ref, ref, ref England ref, ref, ref English Channel ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Entre-Deux-Mers region ref Ercé (Ariège) ref Erdeven (Morbihan) ref, ref Ergué-Gabéric (Finistère) ref Escamps (Lot) ref Espère (Lot) ref Les Estables (Haute-Loire) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Estaque hills ref Esterel massif (Var) ref Étampes (Orne) ref Étaples (Pas-de-Calais) ref Étretat (Seine-Maritime) ref Étroit de la Quille, Verdon Gorges ref Eugénie-les-Bains (Landes) ref Eure river ref, ref Figeac (Lot) ref Finistère département ref, ref, ref, ref Flandres, province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Flavignac (Haute-Vienne) ref Flers (Orne) ref Florae (Lozère) ref Florence ref La Folie, nr Sausset-les-Pins (Bouches-du-Rhône) ref La Folie, nr Soissons (Aisne) ref Fontaine-de-Vaucluse (Vaucluse) ref, ref Fontainebleau (Seine-et-Marne) ref, ref Fontaygnes, Burning Mountain of (Puech que ard, Aveyron) ref Fontenay-le-Comte/Fontenay-le-Peuple (Vendee) ref Forêts département (Luxembourg) ref, ref, ref Forez region ref, ref, ref, ref ‘France Miniature’theme park ref Franche-Comte, province ref, ref, ref, ref Frankfurt am Main ref Fréjus (Var) ref, ref Fumade, ‘lieu-dit’ ref Gallia Narbonensis ref Gap (Hautes-Alpes) ref, ref, ref, ref Garabit Viaduct (Cantal) ref Gard département ref Gare du Nord, Paris ref Gare Montparnasse, Paris ref Garonne, Canal Latéral à la ref Garonne river ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Gascogne (Gascony), province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Gascon language ref ‘Gascon noir’ see Landais Gate of Mycenae, Montpellier-le-Vieux ref Gâtebourse (‘lieu-dit’) ref Gâtefer (‘lieu-dit’) ref Gâtinais, region of Île-de-France ref Gâtine, region of Poitou ref Gaul (Gallia) xv-xvi, xvii, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Gavarnie, Cirque de (Hautes-Pyrénées) ref Gave de Pau river ref Genève (Geneva) ref, ref, ref Geneve, Lac de (Lac Léman) ref, ref Gènissiat, Barrage de (Ain) ref Gennevilliers (Hauts-de-Seine) ref Genoa ref Gérardmer (Vosges) ref Gerbier de Jonc, mountain ref, ref, ref Gergovie (Puy-de-Dôme) ref Germany ref, ref, ref, ref, ref annexation of Alsace-Lorraine 1870 ref, ref World War I ref Gers département ref, ref Gévaudan region ref, ref Gier valley ref Gironde département ref, ref, ref Gironde estuary ref, ref, ref Gironde peninsula ref, ref Gleize, Col de/Col de Chaudun (Hautes-Alpes) ref Golfe du Lion ref Goust (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref, ref, ref Gracay (Cher) ref Grand Ballon mountain ref Grand Canyon see Verdon Gorges ‘Grand Chemin de France au Piémont’ ref ‘Le Grand Chemin’ (place name) ref Grand Saint-Bernard, Col du ref, ref, ref Grande Crau ref Grande Lande region ref Granville (Manche) ref, ref Grasse (Alpes-Maritimes) ref, ref, ref Gravelines (Nord) ref Greece ref Grenelle, Paris ref Grenoble (Isère) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Grenoble University ref Grosses-Saules ref Guadeloupe ref Guengat (Finistère) ref Gueret (Creuse) ref, ref, ref Guernsey ref Guingamp (Côtes-d’Armor) ref Guyenne, province ref Hagetmau (Landes) ref, ref Halles, Les, Paris ref, ref Ham (Somme) ref Hamburg ref Hastings ref Haudiomont (Meuse) ref Haut-Rhin département ref Haute-Loire département ref, ref Haute-Marne département ref, ref Hautes-Alpes département ref Hautpon, suburb of Saint-Omer ref Le Havre (Seine-Maritime) ref, ref, ref Hennebont (Morbihan) ref Hoedic, Île d’ (Morbihan) ref, ref Houat, Île d’ (Morbihan) ref, ref Houlgate (Calvados) ref Hyères (Var) ref Île Saint-Louis, Paris ref Île-de-France ref, ref Île-et-Vilaine département ref Illiers-Combray (Eure-et-Loir) ref Inaccessible Mountain (Mont Aiguille) ref Indo-China ref Indre département ref, ref Iraty forest ref, ref Ireland ref, ref Iseran, Col de l’ (Savoie) ref Isère département ref, ref Isigny-sur-Mer (Calvados) ref Issaux forest (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref Issoudun (Indre) ref, ref, ref, ref Italy ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Izoard, Col d’ (Hautes-Alpes) ref Jardin des Plantes, Paris ref, ref Jardin du Luxembourg, Paris ref Jemmapes département ref Jersey ref Jordanne river ref Jumièges Abbey (Seine-Maritime) ref, ref Jura département ref Jura mountains ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Jurvielle (Haute-Garonne), talking stone of ref Kabylie xv, ref Kerfeunteun (Finistère) ref Labouheyre (Landes) ref Laffrey hill (Isère) ref Lafitte-sur-Lot (Lot-et-Garonne) ref Lagast hill (Aveyron) ref Lamalou-les-Bains (Hérault) ref Landais ref, ref, ref Landemer-Grèville (Manche) ref Landes département ref Landes region ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref afforestation ref animals ref cuisine ref language ref maps ref, ref, ref migrant workers ref roads ref shepherds ref Landrecies (Nord) ref Langon (Ille-et-Vilaine), chapelle Sainte-Agathe ref Langres (Haute-Marne) ref, ref Languedoc, province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref everyday life ref, ref language of ref, ref livestock ref, ref maps ref roads ref, ref spread of news ref travel ref, ref Laon (Aisne) ref Laon Cathedral ref, ref Lasalle (Gard) ref Latin Quarter, Paris ref, ref, ref Lauragais region ref, ref, ref Lautenbach (Haut-Rhin) ref Laval (Mayenne) ref Lavaur (Tarn) ref Lavignac (Haute-Vienne) ref Le Mans (Sarthe) ref Le Mans Cathedral ref Lens (Pas-de-Calais) ref Levant ref, ref Libournais region ref Libourne (Gironde) ref, ref, ref Liege, Belgium ref Lieusaint (Seine-et-Marne) ref Lille (Nord) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Limagne region ref Limoges (Haute-Vienne) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Limousin, province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref L’Isle-Adam (Val-d’Oise) ref Lodève (Hérault) ref Loin-du-bruit (‘lieu-dit’) ref Loir river ref Loir-et-Cher département ref Loire, Pays de la ref Loire river ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref estuary of ref sources of ref Loire Valley ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Loire-Inférieure département ref Loiret département ref, ref Loiret river ref London ref, ref, ref, ref Longjumeau (Essonne) ref Longpont, nr Mortagne-au-Perche (Orne) ref Lorraine, province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref annexation ref, ref Lot département ref, ref Lot river ref, ref, ref, ref Lotharingia ref ‘Lou Clapas’ see Montpellier-le-Vieux Louisiana ref Le Loup-garou (‘lieu-dit’) ref Lourdes (Hautes-Pyrénées) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Louvie, Col de ref Louvre, Paris ref, ref, ref, ref Low Countries ref, ref Lozère département ref Ludres (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref Lupcourt (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref Lurbe (Landes) ref Luxembourg ref, ref, ref Luz-Saint-Sauveur (Hautes-Pyrénées) ref Lyon (Rhône) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref bicycle races ref civil order ref floods 1856 ref industry ref provincial pride ref tourism ref, ref transport ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Lyonnais, province and hills ref, ref, ref, ref Lys département ref Lysel, suburb of Saint-Omer ref Macon (Saône-et-Loire) ref Maine, province ref, ref Maintenon (Eure-et-Loir) ref, ref Maladetta mountain ref, ref Malcontent (‘lieu-dit’) ref Mandeure (Doubs) ref, ref Manhattan ref, ref Manna of Briançon ref Marais poitevin ref, ref, ref, ref La Marche, province ref Marly-le-Roi (Yvelines) ref, ref Marne river ref, ref, ref Marne-Rhine canal ref Marquèze (Landes) ref Mars-la-Tour (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref, ref Marseille (Bouches-du-Rhône) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref bicycle races ref cabanons ref civil order ref factories ref language ref, ref migrant workers ref trade ref travel ref, ref, ref, ref Martineiche (Creuse) ref Mascaret tidal wave ref Massabielle cave, Lourdes (Hautes-Pyrénées) ref Massif Central ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Matignon (Côtes-d’Armor) ref Maubert (Aveyron) ref Maubeuge (Nord) ref Maugué, Le, Verdon Gorges ref Mauléon-Licharre (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref Mauvais-vent (‘lieu-dit’) ref Mayenne département ref Médaille Miraculeuse, Chapelle Notre-Dame de la, Paris ref Mediterranean ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Mediterranean ports ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Mediterranean Sea ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Melun (Seine-et-Marne) ref Mende (Lozère) ref Menton (Alpes-Maritimes) ref Mer de Glace ref, ref Merdogne see Gergovie Meridian of Greenwich ref Meridian of Paris ref, ref, ref Mers-les-Bains (Somme) ref Métro, Paris ref, ref Metz (Moselle) ref Meurthe river ref Meuse river ref, ref Mexico, Gulf of ref, ref Mézenc range ref see also Le Gerbier de Jonc (mountain) Middle East ref Midi, Canal du ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Milan ref Millau (Aveyron) ref, ref Millau Viaduct ref Millevaches, Plateau de ref Mimizan (Landes) ref, ref Miraculous Medal, Chapel ref Molac forest (Morbihan) ref Molines (Hautes-Alpes) ref Monaco ref Le Monastier-sur-Gazeille (Haute-Loire) ref, ref Moncel-sur-Seille (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref Monein (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref Mons, Belgium ref Mons (Var) ref Mont Aiguille see Inaccessible Mountain Mont Blanc ref, ref, ref Mont Blanc département (Savoie) ref, ref Mont Cenis pass and tunnel (Savoie) ref, ref, ref, ref ‘Mont Maudite’ (Mont Blanc) ref Mont Terri ref Mont Terrible département (Swiss Jura) ref, ref Mont Ventoux ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Mont-de-Marsan (Landes) ref, ref, ref Le Mont-Dore (Puy-de-Dôme) ref Mont-Saint-Michel, Le (Manche) ref, ref, ref Mont-Sainte-Odile (Bas-Rhin) ref Montagne Noire ref, ref, ref Montagne Sainte-Victoire ref Montagnes Maudites ref Montauban (Tarn-et-Garonne) ref Montbéliard (Doubs) ref, ref Montceau-les-Mines (Saône-et-Loire) ref Montclar (Aveyron) ref Monte-Carlo, Monaco ref Montélimar (Drôme) ref Montenvers glacier ref, ref Montereau-Fault-Yonne (Seine-et-Marne) ref Montjay (Essonne) ref Montjean (Mayenne) ref Montjoie (Loiret) ref Montjoux (Drôme) ref Montluçon (Allier) ref, ref Montmartre, Paris ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Montmorency (Val-d’Oise) ref Montpellier (Hérault) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Montpellier-le-Vieux (Aveyron) ref Montrouge (Hauts-de-Seine) ref Montségur (Ariège) ref Morbihan département ref, ref, ref Morlaix (Finistère) ref Mortagne-au-Perche (Orne) ref, ref Morvan region ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Moscow, Retreat from (1812) ref, ref Moselle département ref Motte-de-Galaure (Drôme) ref Moulins (Allier) ref, ref, ref, ref Moumour (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref Moustiers-de-Sainte-Marie (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence) ref Mouzon (Ardennes) ref Mulhouse (Haut-Rhin) ref Musée Grévin, Paris ref Musée National des Arts et Traditions Populaires, Paris ref Museum of Ethnography, Paris ref Nancy (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Nangis (Seine-et-Marne) ref Nant (Aveyron) ref Nantes (Loire-Atlantique) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Naples ref Napoléon, Napoléonville or Napoléon-Vendee see La Roche-sur-Yon Narbonne (Aude) ref Nasbinals (Lozère) ref Navarre ref, ref Navarrenx (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref, ref Nemours (Seine-et-Marne) ref Nérac (Lot-et-Garonne) ref Neuf-Brisach (Haut-Rhin) ref Neufchâtel-en-Bray (Seine-Maritime) ref Nevers (Nièvre) ref New Caledonia ref New Orleans ref Nez de Cyrano, Le, Montpellier-le-Vieux ref Nice (Alpes-Maritimes) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Nièvre département ref Nile, Battle of the ref Nîmes (Gard) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Niort (Deux-Sèvres) ref Niort (Deux-Sèvres) ref Nitry (Yonne) ref Nizonne river ref Nogent-sur-Seine (Aube) ref, ref Nonancourt (Eure) ref Nord département ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Normandy, province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref animals ref bicycle races ref coast ref, ref, ref, ref everyday life in ref, ref, ref, ref roads ref tribes/people ref North Africa ref, ref North America ref Notre-Dame-de-Brusc, nr Grasse (Alpes-Maritimes) ref Notre-Dame-de-Héas (Hautes-Pyrénées) ref Notre-Dame-de-la-Grande, Poitiers ref Notre-Dame-de-Paris ref, ref, ref, ref Notre-Dame des Cyclistes (Landes) ref Nouveau Monde, Le (‘lieu-dit’) ref Le Nouvion-en-Thiérache (Aisne) ref La Nuaz (‘lieu-dit’) ref Observatoire, Paris ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Oisans region ref, ref, ref Oise river ref, ref Oléron, Île d’ (Charente-Maritime) ref Oloron-Sainte-Marie (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref Opéra, Paris ref Orange (Vaucluse) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Orléans (Loiret) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Orne département ref Ossau valley ref Ostend (Oostende, Ostende) ref Padirac, Gouffre de (Lot) ref Paimpont forest (Ille-et-Vilaine) ref Pain-perdu (‘lieu-dit’) ref Palais des Papes, Avignon ref, ref Pantheon, Paris ref Panticosa (Spain) ref Parapluie (‘lieu-dit’) ref Paris xv, xvi, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref abandoned children ref bicycle races ref, ref building of ref Chamoniards ref civil order ref cuisine ref deindustrialization ref département ref dogs ref, ref, ref expansion ref fashion ref ‘Grand Départ’ ref and Gustave Eiffel xvii illegitimacy ref life expectancy ref linguistic diversity ref, ref maps ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref meridian ref, ref migrant populace ref, ref news ref, ref population ref, ref, ref prestige of ref professions of ref Revolutionary ref, ref, ref, ref roads ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Saint-Merry massacre ref satellite towns ref slums ref social mobility ref suburbs xvi, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref time ref tourism ref, ref, ref traffic ref transport ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref ‘winter swallows’ ref, ref Paris Basin ref, ref, ref, ref Paris-Lyon road ref Paris-Orléans road ref Paris-Toulouse road ref, ref Pas-de-Calais département ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Le Pecq (Yvelines) ref Peira Dreita, Col de la (Aude) ref Perche region ref, ref Périgord, province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Périgueux (Dordogne) ref Péronne (Somme) ref Perpignan (Pyrénées-Orientales) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Perte du Rhône (Ain) ref, ref, ref Perte-de-temps (‘lieu-dit’) ref Le Pertre forest (Ille-et-Vilaine) ref Petit Saint-Bernard, Col du (Savoie) ref Petites Régions Agricoles ref Petrarch and Laura, House of ref Peyrelade (Haute-Garonne) ref Peyresourde, Col de (Haute-Garonne) ref, ref, ref Phalsbourg (Moselle) ref Picardy, province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Pied-Mouillé (‘lieu-dit’) ref Piedmont ref, ref, ref, ref Pierrelatte canal ref Plague Wall (Mur de la Peste) (Vaucluse) ref Plan (Isère) ref Planès (Pyrénées-Orientales) ref Plateau des Fossiles, Verdon Gorges ref Plénée (Côtes-d’Armor) ref Plombières-les-Bains (Vosges) ref Pluguffan (Finistère) ref Plymouth ref ‘Point Zéro’, Notre-Dame-de-Paris ref Poissy (Yvelines) ref Poitiers, Battle of ref Poitiers (Vienne) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Poitou, province ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref see also Marais poitevin Pompey (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref Pont du Gard ref, ref, ref Pont Neuf, Paris ref Pont Saint-Michel, Paris ref Pont-Aven (Finistère) ref Le Pont-de-Beauvoisin (Isère and Savoie) ref Pont-de-Soleils (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence) ref Pont-Saint-Esprit (Gard) ref Pontarion (Creuse) ref Pontarlier (Doubs) ref Pontoise (Val-d’Oise) ref Le Port (place name) ref Porte de Saint-Cloud, Paris ref Le Portel, suburb of Boulogne-sur-Mer ref Portugal ref Poubeau (Haute-Garonne) ref Pradelles (Haute-Loire) ref Prades (Pyrénées-Orientales) ref Pré-alpes de Castellane ref Prends-toi-garde (‘lieu-dit’) ref Provence, province xv, xvi, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref daily life ref, ref, ref, ref, ref livestock ref, ref, ref maps ref news ref people ref, ref roads ref, ref tourism ref, ref, ref travel ref, ref, ref, ref wildlife ref Provins (Seine-et-Marne) ref, ref Prussia ref, ref Puech Cani, nr Broquiès (Aveyron) ref Puy Violent (Cantal) ref Le Puy-en-Velay (Haute-Loire) ref, ref, ref, ref Pyla see Dune du Pyla Pyrenees ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref bears of ref, ref canals ref cuisine ref daily life ref, ref, ref, ref deforestation ref languages ref, ref, ref livestock ref, ref, ref maps ref, ref, ref politics ref rivers ref roads ref, ref spas ref, ref, ref tourism ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref travel ref Treaty of the (1659) ref wildlife ref, ref, ref Quebec ref Quercy, province ref, ref, ref Queyras region ref, ref, ref, ref Quiberon (Morbihan) ref Quimper (Finistère) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Raffetot (Seine-Maritime) ref Rambouillet forest ref Rambouillet (Yvelines) ref Regordane see Voie Regordane Reims Cathedral ref Reims (Marne) ref, ref, ref Réméréville (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref Rennes (Ille-et-Vilaine) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Rennes-le-Château (Aude) ref Rennes-les-Bains (Aude) ref République, Col de la (Loire) ref Reventin hill (Isère) ref Revercourt (Eure-et-Loir) ref Reynier (Var) ref Rheims see Reims Rhine river ref, ref, ref, ref Rhineland ref, ref, ref, ref Rhodanus (Rhône) ref Rhône river ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref floods (1856) ref Rhône Valley ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Ribiers (Hautes-Alpes) ref Riquewihr (Haut-Rhin) ref, ref Ristolas (Hautes-Alpes) ref Rive-de-Gier (Loire) ref, ref Rivesaltes military zone (Pyrénées-Orientales) ref Riviera, French ref Roanne (Loire) ref Rocamadour (Lot) ref La Roche-sur-Yon/Napoléon-Vendée (Vendée) ref, ref, ref Rochefort (Charente-Maritime) ref, ref, ref Rochefort-en-Valdaine (Drôme) ref La Rochelle (Charente-Maritime) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Rodez (Aveyron) ref Rodez Cathedral ref, ref Roissy – Charles-de-Gaulle airport ref Rome ref, ref, ref Rome, Faubourg de, Issoudun ref Roncevaux (Ronceval, Roncesvalles) ref Roquecezière, Battle of ref, ref, ref Roscoff (Finistère) ref, ref, ref Rosières-aux-Salines (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref Roubaix (Nord) ref, ref Rouen, Généralité de ref Rouen (Seine-Maritime) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Rouergue, province ref, ref Rougon (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence) ref Rousseland, nr Brécy (Cher) ref Roussillon, province ref, ref, ref Roussillon plain ref Route des Grandes Alpes ref Route des Vins, Alsace ref Route du Grand Meaulnes (Cher) ref Route du Sacre, Paris-Reims ref, ref Route Thermale, Pyrénées ref Routes de Saint Jacques ref Royan (Charente-Maritime) ref Rozel (Manche) ref Le Rozier (Lozère) ref Russia ref, ref Ry (Seine-Maritime) ref Saarland ref Les Sables-d’Olonne (Vendée) ref Sabres (Landes) ref Sacy (Yonne) ref Sahara Desert ref Saint Bernard Pass see Grand Saint-Bernard, Col du; Petit Saint-Bernard, Col du (Savoie) Saint Cirice, nr Broquiès (Aveyron) ref, ref Saint Gengoult church, Toul ref Saint Helena ref Saint-Amand-Montrond (Cher) ref Saint-André (Morbihan) ref Saint-Bénezet bridge, Avignon ref Saint-Bonnet (place name) ref Saint-Brieuc (Côtes-d’Armor) ref Saint-Crépin (Aveyron) ref Saint-Denis basilica ref, ref, ref Saint-Denis (Seine-Saint-Denis) ref, ref, ref Saint-Émilion (Gironde) ref Saint-Étienne (Loire) ref, ref, ref, ref Saint-Étienne-d’Orthe (Landes) ref Saint-Forget (Yvelines) ref Saint-Germain dog market, Paris ref Saint-Gilles (Gard) ref Saint-Jacques-de-Compostelle see Santiago de Compostela Saint-Jean-du-Gard (Gard) ref, ref Saint-Jean-Pied-de-Port (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref Saint-Malo (Ille-et-Vilaine) ref, ref Saint-Maio-Geneva line ref, ref, ref Saint-Martin-de-Carnac, nr Cuq (Tarn) ref, ref Saint-Martin-du-Tertre (Val-d’Oise) ref Saint-Maurice, Verdon Gorges ref Saint-Maximin-la-Sainte-Baume (Var) ref Saint-Maymes (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence) ref Saint-Merry church, Paris ref Saint-Michel-de-Cuxa, abbey (Pyrénées-Orientales) ref Saint-Nicolas-d’Aliermont see Aliermont (Seine-Maritime) Saint-Nicolas-de-Port (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais) ref, ref Saint-Oradoux-pres-Crocq (Creuse) ref Saint-Ouen (Seine-Saint-Denis) ref Saint-Pé-de-Bigorre (Hautes-Pyrénées) ref Saint-Raphaël (Var) ref Saint-Remimont (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref Saint-Sauveur-sur-Tinée (Alpes-Maritimes) ref Saint-Sernin-sur-Rance (Aveyron) ref Saint-Sever (Seine-Maritime) ref Saint-Tropez (Var) ref Saint-Véran (Hautes-Alpes) ref, ref, ref, ref Saint-Viâtre (Loir-et-Cher) ref Sainte-Baume massif (Bouches-du-Rhône and Var) ref, ref, ref Sainte-Croix, Lac de (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence and Var) ref Sainte-Marie-de-Campan (Hautes-Pyrénées) ref Sainte-Menehould (Marne) ref Sainte-Opportune (Orne) ref Sainte-Reine see Alise-Sainte-Reine Saintes (Charente-Marl time) ref, ref, ref Saintonge, province ref Salbris (Loir-et-Cher) ref Salency (Oise) ref, ref Salers (Cantal) ref La Salette-Fallavaux (Isère) ref Salies-de-Bearn (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref Salins-les-Bains (Jura) ref, ref Salses-le-Château (Pyrénées-Orientales) ref Sambre river ref San Salvador see Saint-Sauveur-sur-Tinée San-Sebastián ref Santiago de Compostela (Saint-Jacques-de-Compostelle) ref, ref, ref, ref Saône river ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Sarrebourg (Moselle) ref Sarthe département ref Saulzais-le-Potier (Cher) ref Saumur (Maine-et-Loire) ref, ref, ref Saverne, Col de (Bas-Rhin) ref, ref Savoie (Savoy) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Sceaux (Hauts-de-Seine) ref Scotland ref, ref, ref Sebastopol, Battle of ref Sedan, Battle of ref, ref Sedan (Ardennes) ref Seine département ref, ref, ref Seine river and valley ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref source of the river ref, ref Seine-Maritime département ref Sens (Yonne) ref, ref, ref Sermoise (Aisne) ref Sète (Hérault) ref, ref, ref, ref Seuil de Naurouze ref, ref Seven Wonders of the Dauphine ref, ref Severen, Col de ref Sèvre river ref Sèvres (Hauts-de-Seine) ref Sexey-les-Bois (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref La Sibérie (‘lieu-dit’) ref Sicié, Cap (Var) ref Signy-le-Petit (Ardennes) ref Sigottier (Hautes-Alpes) ref Simplon Pass ref Six-Fours (Var) ref Sixt (Haute-Savoie) ref Slovenia ref Soissons (Aisne) ref, ref Soleis (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence) ref, ref Solférino (Landes) ref Sologne region ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Somme département ref Songy (Marne) ref Sorbonne, Paris ref Sotteville (Seine-Maritime) ref Soulac-sur-Mer (Gironde) ref Soule (Basque province) ref La Souterraine (Creuse) ref South America ref, ref Souvigny-en-Sologne (Loir-et-Cher) ref Spain ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Sphinx, Le, Montpellier-le-Vieux ref Stevenson Trail ref Strasbourg (Bas-Rhin) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Strasbourg Minster ref, ref Suez Canal ref, ref, ref Suisse d’Alsace ref Suisse Niçoise ref Suisse Normande ref Surjoux (Ain) ref Switzerland ref, ref, ref, ref Tarare hill (Rhône) ref Tarn département ref, ref, ref, ref [del:, ref] Tarn gorges ref, ref, ref Tarn river ref, ref, ref, ref Temple, Paris ref Tende, Col de (Alpes-Maritimes) ref Texon (Haute-Vienne) ref Thann (Haut-Rhin) ref Thiérache, pays ref, ref Thiers (Puy-de-Dôme) ref, ref Thivars (Eure-et-Loir) ref, ref Thury-en-Valois (Oise) ref Tibre département ref Tonneins (Lot-et-Garonne) ref Toul (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref Toulon (Var) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Toulousain region ref, ref Toulouse (Haute-Garonne) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref bicycle races ref boat travel ref, ref, ref civil order ref cuisine ref, ref maps ref provincial pride ref roads ref, ref, ref Toulven, nr Ergue-Gabéric (Finistère) ref Le Touquet (Pas-de-Calais) ref Touraine, province ref, ref, ref, ref Tourcoing (Nord) ref Tourmalet, Col du (Hautes-Pyrénées) ref, ref Tours (Indre-et-Loire) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Tout-y-faut (‘lieu-dit’) ref Tower Without Venom ref Tranchée de Calonne (Meuse) ref Trappe de Bonne-Espérance (Dordogne) ref Traversette, Col de la (Hautes-Alpes) ref Tréguier (Côtes-d’Armor) ref, ref Treignat (Allier) ref Tremblevif see Saint-Viatre Trembling Meadow ref Le Tréport (Seine-Maritime) ref Trocadéro, Palais du, Paris ref Trouville-sur-Mer (Calvados) ref, ref Troyes (Aube) ref, ref Tuileries, Gardens and Palace, Paris ref, ref Turin ref, ref, ref Turkey ref Tyrol ref Ubaye region ref United States of America ref, ref Urdos (Pyrénées-Atlantiques) ref Usingen, Germany ref Uzès (Gard) ref, ref Vacères-en-Quint (Drôme) ref Le Val d’Ajol (Vosges) ref Valence (Drôme) ref Valenciennes (Nord) ref Valensole plain (Alpes-de-Haute-Provence) ref Valle d’Aosta ref, ref Var département ref, ref Var river ref, ref Varangéville (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref Varennes-en-Argonne (Meuse) ref, ref, ref, ref Vaucluse département ref, ref Vaugirard, Paris ref Vaumale, Pas de (Var) ref Vauxbuin (Aisne) ref Velay region ref Vendée département ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Venice ref Ventoux, Mont ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Vercors massif (Isère and Drôme) ref, ref, ref, ref Verdelot (Seine-et-Marne) ref Verdon Gorges ref, ref, ref Verdon river ref, ref Verdun (Meuse) ref, ref, ref, ref Verdun-sur-Garonne (Tarn-et-Garonne) ref Le Vernet, suburb of Perpignan ref Vernet-les-Bains (Pyrénées-Orientales) ref Versailles palace ref, ref, ref, ref Versailles (Yvelines) ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Vesdun (Cher) ref Vexin region ref Vézelay basilica ref, ref Via Agrippa ref Via Aurelia ref Via Domitia ref, ref Vichy (Allier) ref, ref, ref Vienne département ref Vienne (Isère) ref, ref, ref Vienne river ref, ref, ref Le Vigeant (Vienne) ref Vigneulles (Meurthe-et-Moselle) ref Vilaine river ref Villard, nr Bourg-Saint-Maurice (Savoie) ref Ville-Affranchie (Lyon) ref Villemomble (Seine-Saint-Denis) ref Villequier (Seine-Maritime) ref Villers-Cotterêts (Aisne) ref, ref, ref Le Vitarel (Aveyron) ref Vitteaux (Côte-d’Or) ref Vivarais region ref, ref Vizille (Isère) ref Vole Regordane ref Vosges département ref, ref, ref Vosges mountains ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref, ref Voûte d’Émeraude, Verdon Gorges ref Waterloo, Battle of ref, ref, ref Wesserling (Haut-Rhin) ref West Indies ref Western Front ref Winy Fountain ref Yeu, Île d’ (Vendée) ref Yeux du Blaireau, Les, Montpellier-le-Vieux ref Yonne river ref, ref Yonville-l’Abbaye (Madame Bavary) ref Yssingeaux (Haute-Loire) ref Acknowledgements This book began and ended with the friendliness and expertise of Andrew Kidd and Sam Humphreys at Picador, Starling Lawrence at W.

One Billion Americans: The Case for Thinking Bigger
by Matthew Yglesias
Published 14 Sep 2020

But despite these intuitions, everyone recognizes that precipitous population decline has done the cities of the American rust belt no favors. The original impulses for population decline were external. The invention of the automobile made it possible and in many cases desirable to live outside of the central city. Racism and fear of crime provided further impetus for white flight. Then for midwestern cities, deindustrialization provided a huge additional economic blow. At this point, however, population loss is not just a consequence of external problems; it’s become its own self-sustaining source of difficulty. The residents of Detroit and other shrunken cities are not farmers who are able to take over their neighbors’ vacated land and exploit it to raise their living standards.

Belt and Road: A Chinese World Order
by Bruno Maçães
Published 1 Feb 2019

Pakistan’s share in these exports was minuscule—less than half a percentage point—despite having a large agrarian base and a shared border with China. The Belt and Road will change this, but if agriculture becomes a central plank of the initiative in Pakistan that cannot but raise concerns about premature deindustrialization. The plan also shows interest in the textiles industry, but its focus is in yarn and coarse cloth, which can serve as inputs for the higher-value segments of the garments sector being developed in Xinjiang. It is suggested that some of the Chinese surplus labour force could move to Pakistan, while the establishment of international value chains is described as the model of “introducing foreign capital and establishing domestic connections as a crossover of West and East.”

Internet for the People: The Fight for Our Digital Future
by Ben Tarnoff
Published 13 Jun 2022

An interesting model for doing so comes from 1980s London. In 1981, the left wing of the Labour Party won control of the Greater London Council (GLC), a municipal administrative body, and embarked on an ambitious economic program. At the time, London had high unemployment, in large part due to deindustrialization. The GLC responded by investing public money in unionized firms, as well as encouraging the creation of worker-owned cooperatives. It also established five “Technology Networks” in different locations across the city. These were prototyping workshops, similar to “makerspaces” or “hackerspaces” today.

Termites of the State: Why Complexity Leads to Inequality
by Vito Tanzi
Published 28 Dec 2017

Similar work is higher paid in rich than in poor countries. Countries that pay low wages and that now attract much industrial production include some large ones, such as China, India, Mexico, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Indonesia, as well as many smaller ones. This development has led to the deindustrialization of advanced countries and to the stagnation of real wages for many of the latter countries’ workers. It has also, indirectly, contributed to the high incomes received by the individuals and by the enterprises in industrial countries that provide the capital, the technology, and the supervision.

…

Countries’ economies became more open, and the financial market became capable of moving, daily, trillions of US dollars across national frontiers. Potential collateral damages that could arise from these developments for some groups of citizens, such as industrial workers, in some advanced countries, were largely ignored or minimized. Why Worry about Income Distribution? 397 Examples of such damages included rapid deindustrialization, excessive borrowing, and increases in debt by governments and by the private sector that would contribute to the financial crisis of 2007. (See Mian and Sufi, 2014.) (f ) The aforementioned supply-side revolution, which brought back to prominence the role of the supply side of the economy in economic performances.

After the New Economy: The Binge . . . And the Hangover That Won't Go Away
by Doug Henwood
Published 9 May 2005

As with the black-white gap, this narrowing is the joint product of sometimes stagnant, sometime eroding male incomes and rising female ones; men's real incomes in 1998 were just 1% above 1989 levels, while women's were 14% above. 93 The gender gap has been narrowing for several reasons. Men's earnings, especially of those at the bottom of the educational and pay scales, have been slipping. Deindustrialization destroyed a lot of high-paying male jobs, and what is delicately called "deunionization" has lowered the pay of others. And, more pleasingly, women's earnings have been rising across the spectrum, both because they entered high-paying and largely RACIAL CAPS: black and Hispanic men's earnings, percent of white men's 95% 907o 85% 80% - 75% hourly 807o 75% 70% 657o 60% weekly 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 male occupations, and because they've been closing the gender gap within occupations.

Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital: The Dynamics of Bubbles and Golden Ages
by Carlota Pérez
Published 1 Jan 2002

Radosevic, Slavo (1999), International Technology Transfer and ‘Catch Up’ in Economic Development, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 180 Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital Reading, Brian (1992:1993), Japan: The Coming Collapse, London: Orion Books. Reinert, Erik S. (2000), ‘Karl Bücher and the Geographical Dimensions of Techno-Economic Change’, in Backhaus, Jürgen (ed.), Karl Bücher: Theory– History–Anthropology–Non-Market Economies, Marburg: Metropolis Verlag. Reinert, Erik S. (2001), ‘The Deindustrialization of Mongolia’, in Reinert (ed.), Evolutionary Economics and Income Equality, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar. Reinert, Erik S. and Daastøl, Arno (1997), ‘Exploring the Genesis of Economic Innovations: The Religious Gestalt-Switch and the Duty to Invent as Preconditions for Economic Growth’, European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 4, No. 2/3, June, pp. 233–83.

Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution
by David Harvey
Published 3 Apr 2012

"43 This transition, forced upon the miners through neoliberalization, is by no means unique to Bolivia or El Alto. It p os es the same dilemma that hits displaced steel workers in Sheffield, Pittsburgh, and Baltimore. In fact it is a pretty universal dilemma wherever the vast wave of 1 46 REBEL C ITIES deindustrialization and privatization unleashed since the mid 1 970s or so has hit home. How it was confronted in B olivia is therefore of more than passing interest "New kinds of trade union structures have emerged," writes Lazar, especially those of the peasants and the Informal sector workers In the cities . . .

The Global Auction: The Broken Promises of Education, Jobs, and Incomes
by Phillip Brown , Hugh Lauder and David Ashton
Published 3 Nov 2010

The same free market policies that were supposed to lift the demand for American brainpower have in reality removed the constraints on American corporations to maximize returns to shareholders through increasing corporate profits, irrespective of its implications for American workers. The assumption that national champions such as Ford or DuPont shared the interests of American workers lost much of its political credibility in the 1980s when American corporations were moving production jobs to low-cost countries, leaving a rust belt of deindustrialization symbolized by the cities of Detroit, Pittsburgh, and Cleveland. These early stages of globalization were not widely seen to undermine the opportunity bargain because it was believed that the same global forces would increase the demand for high-skill Americans. As long as knowledge workers could not be sourced more cheaply elsewhere, companies remained limited in their use of offshoring.

Borrow: The American Way of Debt
by Louis Hyman
Published 24 Jan 2012

Slowly, inexorably, that world fell apart in the 1970s, as the international economic order shifted from postwar recovery back to global competition. The seemingly unending demand for U.S. dollars in the postwar period, when the whole world wanted to buy U.S. goods, gave way to a dollar that was less in demand. The economic dislocations of the 1970s—inflation and deindustrialization—fundamentally stemmed from this return to normalcy. The stable growth of the postwar period that had rewarded budgeting and borrowing fell apart. With surging inflation and stagnating pay, real wages began to fall. Making up the gap, more married women than ever before entered the workforce, trying to make ends meet.

Chomsky on Mis-Education
by Noam Chomsky
Published 24 Mar 2000

Neoliberalism is centuries old, and its effects should not be unfamiliar. The well-known economic historian Paul Bairoch points out that “there is no doubt that the Third World’s compulsory economic liberalism in the nineteenth century is a major element in explaining the delay in its industrialization,” or even “deindustrialization,” while Europe and the regions that managed to stay free of its control developed by radical violation of these principles.46 Referring to the more recent past, Arthur Schlesinger’s secret report on Kennedy’s Latin American mission realistically criticized “the baleful influence of the International Monetary Fund,” then pursuing the 1950s version of today’s “Washington Consensus” (“structural adjustment,” “neoliberalism”).

Explore Everything
by Bradley Garrett
Published 7 Oct 2013

Till, ‘Staging the Past: Landscape Designs, Cultural Identity and Erinnerungspolitik at Berlin’s Neue Wache’, Cultural Geographies 6: 3 (July 1999). 24 Trigg, Aesthetics of Decay. 25 Matthew O’Brien, Beneath the Neon: Life and Death in the Tunnels of Las Vegas (Las Vegas, NV: Huntington Press, 2007). 26 Susan Buck-Morss, The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), p. 164. 27 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). 28 Pile, Real Cities. 29 Jefferson Cowie and Joseph Heathcott, eds, Beyond the Ruins: The Meanings of Deindustrialization (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 15. See also Milkman, Farewell to the Factory (1997). 30 DeSilvey, ‘Making Sense of Transience’. 31 Lucy R. Lippard, The Lure of the Local: Senses of Place in a Multicentered Society (New York: New Press, 1997), pp. 5–6. 32 Steinmetz (2010), ‘Colonial Meloncholy and Fordist Nostalgia: The Ruinscapes of Namibia and Detroit’, in Hell and Schönle, Ruins of Modernity, p. 317. 33 DeSilvey and Edensor, ‘Reckoning with Ruins’. 34 David Schweickart, After Capitalism (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011). 4.

Who's Your City?: How the Creative Economy Is Making Where to Live the Most Important Decision of Your Life
by Richard Florida
Published 28 Jun 2009

Many people presume that wealth generates and sustains arts and entertainment, not the other way around. But what if arts and entertainment occupations actually contribute to regional wealth as well? Many regions that have lost manufacturing jobs have rebuilt their economies around education and health care. In many deindustrialized cities around the world, the largest employers are colleges, universities, and hospitals. This is seemingly good news—at least residents of these cities can find work. But according to my team’s analysis, high concentrations of these sectors ultimately do not bode well for cities’ economies.

GDP: The World’s Most Powerful Formula and Why It Must Now Change
by Ehsan Masood
Published 4 Mar 2021

Mahbub ul Haq, “An Evaluation of Pakistan’s First Five Year Plan,” The Strategy of Economic Planning: Case Study of Pakistan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), 136. 8. Haq, Strategy of Economic Planning, 35. 9. Economy of Pakistan, 397. The late historian of economic growth Angus Maddison is among those who argued that British colonial rule helped in the deindustrialization of India. The wiping out of the Mughal court and its replacement with a new European bureaucracy reduced the home market for luxury handicrafts by 75 percent. The value of domestic manufacturing and exports was around 6.5 percent of national income. Losing that “was a shattering blow to manufacturers of fine muslins, jewellery, luxury clothing and footwear, decorative swords and weapons,” Maddison wrote.

How Elites Ate the Social Justice Movement
by Fredrik Deboer
Published 4 Sep 2023

Her abundant vulnerabilities had come back to haunt the party. The Democrats had nominated one of the least popular politicians in public polling history as their candidate for the most important political office in the world. Trump cleaned up in areas of the country that had been devastated by deindustrialization and job loss, including in Michigan and Wisconsin—two pivotal states where Clinton barely campaigned. The Clinton campaign’s focus on celebrity glitz and glamour seemed like a bad fit with a country that was still experiencing economic instability. We had spent a year hearing people declare “I’m with Her.”

The Cult of Smart: How Our Broken Education System Perpetuates Social Injustice
by Fredrik Deboer
Published 3 Aug 2020

College, after all, is a voluntary enterprise, and an expensive one. Still not making eye contact, he shrugged his shoulders. “What else am I supposed to do?” He didn’t mean it rhetorically, and I couldn’t answer. What path was there for someone in his late teens if not through college? We were surrounded, in New England, by towns that had suffered under deindustrialization, with shuttered factories and mills dotting the local geography. The fishing industry that does so much to define Rhode Island’s character was locked in a seemingly perpetual decline. Tourism and construction rose and fell with the economy, providing none of the stability needed to support a family.

When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Rise of the Middle Kingdom
by Martin Jacques
Published 12 Nov 2009

This is a dangerous equation that reproduces Africa’s old relationship with colonial powers.45 The equation is not sustainable for a number of reasons. First, Africa needs to preserve its natural resources to use in the future for its own industrialization. Secondly, China’s export strategy is contributing to the deindustrialization of some middle-income countries . . . it is in the interests of both Africa and China to find solutions to these strategies.46 Perhaps the country that most exemplifies this inequality is Zimbabwe, where the Chinese enjoy a powerful presence in the economy, controlling key strategic areas like the railways, electricity supply, Air Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation.47 The fact that China has a carefully worked-out and comprehensive strategic approach to its relationship with Africa, while the African response, in contrast, is fragmented between the many different nations, poorly informed about China, and based on an essentially pragmatic rather than strategic view, serves only to exacerbate this inequality.48 The danger is that African nations enter into agreements with China over the exploitation of their natural resources which are too favourable to China, or use the revenues gained in a short-term fashion, perhaps corruptly, to benefit various interest groups, or possibly both.

…

Chen Kuan-Hsing Chen Shui-bian Chery Chiang Kai-shek Chiang Mai Initiative China Investment Corporation Chinalco Chinese attitude, to the world Chinese citizens abroad Chinese cuisine Chinese diaspora see also overseas Chinese Chinese firms see also state enterprises Chinese hegemony attitude to the world culture economy geopolitical shifts racial order shared history values and education Chinese identity civilization-state see civilization-state as a continental system as a developed and developing country early emergence of reinforced by foreign occupation Chinese (language) Mandarin Chinese migration see overseas Chinese Chinese modernity emergence of characteristics of Chinese overseas direct investment Chinese traditional medicine Chow, Kai-wing Christian Dior Citic Securities cities citizenship, notion of civilization-state Cixi, Empress Dowager class structure clean-technology innovations climate change clothing CNPC CO2 emissions coal Cohen, Paul Cold War colonialism colonization role in industrialization Comme des Garçons commodities consumption exports from Africa prices Communism Communist Party 1949 Revolution political directions political reform race and class ruling system Confucianism and Communism and democracy and education harmony influence on Asian nations and politics and reforms on rulers and families Confucius Confucius Institutes consumer goods, falling price cooked barbarians corruption cotton credit crunch cricket Crystal, David Cultural Revolution Curtin, Michael Cwiertka, Katarzyna da zhongguo da zhonghua daimyo Dakar, Senegal Dalai Lama decentralization Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea decolonization deforestation deindustrialization democracy Greek influence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan Deng Xiaoping on economic development international system ‘Southern Expedition’ dependency theory depoliticization depressionssee also economic recession developed world see the West developing world China as rise of and the West Diamond, Jared Diaoyu/Senkaku islands Dikötter, Frank Ding Xueliang dollar domestic/corporate savings Dreyer, Edward drugs East Asia and China see regional pre-eminence democracy Japan’s attitude to racism Sino-US relation in spread of Mandarin East Asia modernity cultural characteristics nature of rise of speed of Western influence see Westernization Western view of East Asian Economic Caucus East Asian Free Trade Area East India Company ecological deficit economic recessionsee also depressions Edo (laterTokyo) education Confucian classics expenditure in family language teaching overseas Chinese reforms on science and technology strengths universities value of elites Elvin, Mark employment, in European industry energy security strategy (2007) English (language) dominance of presence in East Asia potential decline Enlightenment principles environmental awareness ethnic minorities see also individual groups euro Europe and China decline of diaspora and the international system and modernity see modernity multi-state system overseas empires share of world population and United States European embargo European exceptionalism European Union evolution Fairbank, John K.

Meltdown: How Greed and Corruption Shattered Our Financial System and How We Can Recover
by Katrina Vanden Heuvel and William Greider
Published 9 Jan 2009

Across the spectrum, American opinion leaders in the nineties were coming to an unprecedented agreement on the role of business in American life. The leaders of the left parties, both here and in Britain, accommodated themselves to the free-market faith and made spectacular public renunciations of their historic principles. Organized labor, pounded by years of unionbusting and deindustrialization, slipped below 10 percent of the U.S. private-sector workforce and seemed to disappear altogether from the popular consciousness. The opposition was ceasing to oppose, but the market was now safe, its supposedly endless array of choice substituting for the lack of choice on the ballot. Various names were applied to this state of affairs.

A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order
by Richard Haass
Published 10 Jan 2017

Plummer, The Economic Effects of the Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Estimates, Peterson Institute of International Economics Working Paper Series, January 2016, https://piie.com/system/files/documents/wp16-2_0.pdf. 10. See Robert Z. Lawrence and Lawrence Edwards, “Shattering the Myths About U.S. Trade Policy,” Harvard Business Review, March 2012, www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/rlawrence/ShatteringMyths.pdf; Robert Z. Lawrence and Lawrence Edwards, “US Employment Deindustrialization: Insights from History and the International Experience,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2013, https://plie.com/sites/default/files/publications/pb/pb13-17.pdf; and Gregg Easterbrook, “When Did Optimism Become Uncool?,” New York Times, May 12, 2016, www.nytimes.com/2016/05/15/opinion/sunday/when-did-optimism-become-uncool.html. 11.

The Complacent Class: The Self-Defeating Quest for the American Dream
by Tyler Cowen
Published 27 Feb 2017

The Rise and Fall of Violent Crime in America. New York: Encounter Books, 2016. Lawler, Peter Augustine. The Restless Mind: Alexis de Tocqueville on the Origin and Perpetuation of Human Liberty. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993. Lawrence, Robert Z., and Lawrence Edwards. “US Employment Deindustrialization: Insights from History and the International Experience.” Peterson Institute for International Economics, Policy Brief PB13-27, October 2013. Lee, Chul-In, and Gary Solon. “Trends in Intergenerational Income Mobility.” Review of Economics and Statistics 91, no. 4 (November 2009): 766–772. Lemann, Nicholas.

The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century
by George Friedman
Published 30 Jul 2008

The American economy is so huge that it is larger than the economies of the next four countries combined: Japan, Germany, China, and the United Kingdom. Many people point at the declining auto and steel industries, which a generation ago were the mainstays of the American economy, as examples of a current deindustrialization of the United States. Certainly, a lot of industry has moved overseas. That has left the United States with industrial production of only $2.8 trillion (in 2006): the largest in the world, more than twice the size of the next largest industrial power, Japan, and larger than Japan's and China's industries combined.

Twilight of the Elites: America After Meritocracy
by Chris Hayes
Published 11 Jun 2012

Both the Netroots and the Tea Party, though obviously different in many ways—geographic distribution, political heritage, ideology, and whom they blame their lot on—share a uniting frustration. It is the anger of an upper middle class that finds itself increasingly dispossessed. A group of people who feel that those with more power and access are getting away with things. Decades of deindustrialization and globalization have already squeezed and battered the poor and working classes. But the professional class that makes up the core of the new insurrectionists had, until recently, been able to escape the vise of wage stagnation and foreshortened horizons. But no longer. They are now the class that feels most keenly the sense of betrayal, injustice, and dissolution that the Crisis of Authority has ushered in.

Propaganda and the Public Mind
by Noam Chomsky and David Barsamian
Published 31 Mar 2015

First of all, India has a very rich and complex history. If you go back to the eighteenth century, India was the commercial and industrial center of the world. In the early nineteenth century, book publication in Bengal was probably higher per capita than in England, but India was severely harmed by the British occupation. The country was deindustrialized and turned into an impoverished rural society, though one maintaining a rich cultural tradition and a rich tradition of resistance. The Gandhian legacy is there, but remember, there was a revolution that threw out the British. This included the Congress Party. There was a national movement and so on.

The Vanishing Middle Class: Prejudice and Power in a Dual Economy
by Peter Temin
Published 17 Mar 2017

This book used the Lewis model of developing countries to describe conditions in the most successful industrial country—the United States of America. This seems paradoxical as the Lewis model was designed for developing economies, not for leading ones. But as I described earlier, the United States has undergone deindustrialization that has made the economy more like that of developing countries than industrial ones. American roads and bridges are more like those in developing countries than those in Western Europe. This is not the progress implied by Lewis and Solow. Another difference is in the treatment of economic growth.

The End of Policing
by Alex S. Vitale
Published 9 Oct 2017

The response of many cities has been further intensive policing. Recent crime increases and social unrest in places like Chicago, Milwaukee, and Charlotte attest to the failure to end abusive policing or produce safety. The most segregated and racially unequal cities in the country are its most violent. Decades of deindustrialization, racial discrimination in housing and employment, and growing income inequality have created pockets of intense poverty where jobs are scarce, public services inadequate, and crime and violence widespread. Even with intensive overpolicing, people feel unsafe and young people continue to use violence for predation and protection.

The Politics Industry: How Political Innovation Can Break Partisan Gridlock and Save Our Democracy
by Katherine M. Gehl and Michael E. Porter
Published 14 Sep 2020

Once again, we are living in an age of disruption. Digital transformations have shaken up virtually every industry, rendering old ways of competing obsolete. Just as these changes create possibilities for new companies, they also destabilize communities and companies alike. Industrialization has given way to deindustrialization. Rather than the displacement of farmers and the creation of large-scale national companies by mechanization, automation creates concerns about where jobs will come from and the future of work. As new technology and skills grow in importance, economic gains have disproportionately flowed to the top, again fueling rightful fears of runaway inequality.

The New Class Conflict
by Joel Kotkin
Published 31 Aug 2014

This is also the widespread conventional wisdom in both parties, among both left and right, and throughout the media.136 Yet in reality, high-technology industries have long been characterized by what one researcher described as “a highly unequal structure of employment,” with sharp divisions between the top employees and low-wage workers in retail and other service industries such as janitors, clerks, and cashiers.137 Valley boosters speak of the “glorious cocktail of prosperity” they have concocted, but they have been very slow to address the social problems festering at their feet, apparently out of their line of sight. In terms of philanthropy, with some exceptions, notes E. Chris Wilder, executive director of the Valley Medical Center Foundation, Silicon Valley “underperforms when it comes to giving.”138 This social divide has expanded greatly as the Valley has de-industrialized, losing over 80,000 jobs in manufacturing since 2000.139 The social impacts of this process have been so severe, even amidst a boom, that some parts of the Valley—particularly San Jose, where manufacturing firms were clustered—look more like “Rust Belt” cities than exemplars of tech prosperity, observes geographer Jim Russell.140 “The job creation has changed,” notes longtime San Jose economic development official Leslie Parks.

A Pelican Introduction: Basic Income
by Guy Standing
Published 3 May 2017

Why should they have lives so much more comfortable and secure than the descendants of those who created the country’s wealth and power in the first place? Thinking of Middlesbrough, and places like it in industrial societies everywhere, should remind us of Paine’s argument. Communities producing wealth that is enjoyed by others may subsequently suffer deindustrialization and impoverishment, whereas those who gained from their productive efforts may continue to flourish, often through inherited wealth and privilege. A basic income can thus be seen as a transfer of part of our collective inheritance to people in less privileged communities. Sharing the inherited wealth created by those ironworkers and their successors is a matter of inter-generational social justice.

The Anarchy: The Relentless Rise of the East India Company
by William Dalrymple
Published 9 Sep 2019

Not for nothing are so many English words connected with weaving – chintz, calico, shawl, pyjamas, khaki, dungarees, cummerbund, taffetas – of Indian origin.44 It was certainly responsible for a much larger share of world trade than any comparable zone and the weight of its economic power even reached Mexico, whose textile manufacture suffered a crisis of ‘de-industrialisation’ due to Indian cloth imports.45 In comparison, England then had just 5 per cent of India’s population and was producing just under 3 per cent of the world’s manufactured goods.46 A good proportion of the profits on this found its way to the Mughal exchequer in Agra, making the Mughal Emperor, with an income of around £100 million,* by far the richest monarch in the world.

Let them eat junk: how capitalism creates hunger and obesity
by Robert Albritton
Published 31 Mar 2009

Further, the green revolution became a substitute for much-needed land reform in many developing countries. As a result, huge numbers of people were driven off the land as only the richer farmers benefited. According to Davis: 136 L E T T H E M E AT J U N K the Third World now contains many examples of capitalintensive countryside and labor-intensive deindustrialized cities.80 As large numbers of small farmers have been forced off the land, city slums have grown to the point that now onethird of all the world’s urban dwellers live in slums, and this percentage is expected to increase in the near future.81 The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has impacted upon Mexico much as SAPs have affected other developing countries.

Ground Control: Fear and Happiness in the Twenty First Century City
by Anna Minton
Published 24 Jun 2009

‘The big story is that things got worse in the 1980s and then they got better, for property crime and for violent crime. The subsidiary story is that there is something going on in the poorest inner-city areas with gang crime and the crimes of socially excluded young men. It’s getting worse in the poorest areas, where there’s the greatest legacy of Thatcherism and de-industrialization. But the overall picture is quite a reassuring one,’ he said. These are the facts, but although the government, academics and the police – not groups which are often in agreement – all support the figures, most people do not believe them. The deeper underlying reasons, which relate to the physical environment around us, are complex and counter-intuitive, but before looking at those, the role of the media has to be understood.

Food and Fuel: Solutions for the Future
by Andrew Heintzman , Evan Solomon and Eric Schlosser
Published 2 Feb 2009

After years of distortions and cover-ups by German agricultural officials, Renate Kuenast, a member of the Green Party, became minister of Agriculture, Nutrition, and Consumer Protection in 2001. “Things will no longer be the way they are,” Kuenast declared, introducing a fundamentally new approach to food policy. The German government is now officially committed to the de-industrialization of agriculture. It vows to make 20 percent of German farmland organic within a decade. It has enacted the world’s first animal bill of rights. If Germany can head down this path, so can the rest of the world. The essays in this book suggest new agricultural technologies and new business models.

The Democracy Project: A History, a Crisis, a Movement
by David Graeber
Published 13 Aug 2012

But there is another, I suspect, even more critical element. This is the changing nature of capitalism itself. There has been much talk in recent years about the financialization of capitalism, or even in some versions the “financialization of everyday life.” In the United States and much of Europe, this has been accompanied by deindustrialization; the U.S. economy is no longer driven by exports, but by the consumption of products largely manufactured overseas, paid for by various forms of financial manipulation. This is usually spoken of in terms of the dominance of what’s called the FIRE sector (Finance, Insurance, Real Estate) in the economy.

Social Class in the 21st Century
by Mike Savage
Published 5 Nov 2015

In retrospect, the 1980s marked the last blast of this old aristocratic culture. It was the last moment when sociologists such as John Scott could still write about the ‘upper class’ as a kind of closed, landed elite.3 Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government, elected in 1979, presided over the de-industrialization of the old manufacturing heartlands, and this ushered in a new kind of cultural confidence from those with money to spend. This marked a sharp change from previous decades when the wealthy kept their heads down in a period when equality was seen as a good thing. In the 1970s levels of inequality reached their nadir and tax rates on high-income earners reached their peak.

Death of the Liberal Class
by Chris Hedges
Published 14 May 2010

The true militants of the American twentieth century, including the old communist unions, understood, in a way the liberal class does not, the dynamics of capitalism and human evil. They knew that they had to challenge every level of management. They saw themselves as political beings. They called for a sweeping social transformation that would include universal health insurance, subsidized housing, social reforms, deindustrialization, and worker-controlled factories. And for this they were destroyed. They were replaced by a pliant liberal class that spoke in the depoliticized language of narrow self-interest and pathetic “Buy American” campaigns. Our collapse, economic and environmental, might not have been thwarted by anarchists and others, but at least someone would have fought against it.

Reskilling America: Learning to Labor in the Twenty-First Century
by Katherine S. Newman and Hella Winston
Published 18 Apr 2016

Indeed, we are starting to see an increasing number of parents and kids who reject the apprenticeship pathway in favor of university education and the lure of a white-collar job. This shift has been slower to gain ground in Germany compared to the United States in part because the wage differential between blue-collar workers in Germany and their white-collar counterparts is not as large as it is in the United States, especially after decades of deindustrialization, declining union density, and falling wages in America. Nonetheless, even in Germany, we see younger people wondering about whether they want to devote their lives to blue-collar work. Industry looks on this development with dismay. Time will tell whether these changing attitudes will open up opportunities previously unfulfilled for German youth or lead them into the dead ends that many of their American counterparts have experienced.

The Great Depression: A Diary
by Benjamin Roth , James Ledbetter and Daniel B. Roth
Published 21 Jul 2009

Based on his diary, however, I think he would have soon grasped how it could come about. Stock markets and individual sectors may go up or down, for months or decades at a time, but certain broader economic forces—in his time, the international movement of gold or the buildup to war; in ours, deindustrialization and globalization—will always assert themselves. The actual diary page. CHAPTER 1 JUNE 5, 1931-OCTOBER 17, 1931 FOREWORD For the first time in my personal business life I am witnessing a major financial crisis. I am anxious to learn the lessons of this depression. To the man past middle life it spells tragedy and disaster but to those of us in the middle thirties it may be a great school of experience out of which some worthwhile lesson may be salvaged.

Going Solo: The Extraordinary Rise and Surprising Appeal of Living Alone
by Eric Klinenberg
Published 1 Jan 2012

So, too, are those that have become abandoned, impoverished, or violent, such that street-level conditions—a lack of grocery stores, well-maintained sidewalks, or safe public spaces, for instance—give elderly singletons little incentive to escape from their private burrows and participate in local life.16 Unfortunately, poor and depleted urban neighborhoods are now quite common in American cities, particularly in the regions that suffered most from deindustrialization: the Rust Belt and the Northeast. The old residents of such places are twice removed from public attention: first because of their age, and second because of their location. And while this is true in cities across the United States, it seems especially cruel in New York City, where the most dangerous and isolating neighborhoods lie in the shadows of the most safe and prosperous communities on earth.

The Classical School
by Callum Williams
Published 19 May 2020

“William Stanley Jevons and the Coal Question: An Introduction to Jevons’s ‘Of the Economy of Fuel’”. Organization & Environment 14, no. 1 (2001): 93–98. Clavin, Keith. “‘The True Logic of the Future’: Images of Prediction from the Marginal Revolution”. Victorian Review 40, no. 2 (2014): 91–108. Clingingsmith, David, and Jeffrey G. Williamson. “Deindustrialization in 18th and 19th century India: Mughal Decline, Climate Shocks and British Industrial Ascent”. Explorations in Economic History 45, no. 3 (2008): 209–234. Cole, Charles Woolsey. 1939. Colbert and a Century of French Mercantilism. New York: Columbia University Press. Coleman, David. “Economic Problems and Policies”.

Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy
by Francis Fukuyama
Published 29 Sep 2014

But this has happened in part only because labor costs as a proportion of total manufacturing costs have gotten much smaller due to increases in automation. This means that renewed onshore production will not be likely to replace the huge numbers of middle-class jobs that were lost in the initial process of deindustrialization. This points to the much more important long-term factor of technological advance, which in a sense is the underlying facilitator of globalization. There has been a constant substitution of technology for human labor over the decades, which in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries brought huge benefits not just to elites but also to the broad mass of people in industrializing countries.

…

Governments frequently had to be involved in the adjustment process since private markets and individuals on their own could not always cope with the consequences of technological change.16 Public policy must therefore be factored into the fate of middle-class societies. Across the developed world, there has been a range of responses to the challenges of globalization and technological change. At one end of the spectrum are the United States and Britain, where governments provided minimal adjustment help to communities facing deindustrialization beyond short-term unemployment insurance. Indeed, both public authorities and pundits in academia and journalism have often embraced the shift to a postindustrial world. Public policy supported deregulation and privatization at home and pushed for free trade and open investment abroad. Particularly in the United States, politicians intervened to weaken the power of trade unions and to otherwise increase the flexibility of labor markets.

Dreaming in Public: Building the Occupy Movement
by Amy Lang and Daniel Lang/levitsky
Published 11 Jun 2012

Larisa Mann argues that the Occupy movement’s growing solidarity with communities targeted by police violence accounts for the brutality of police response to OWS, and locates the radical potential of Occupy precisely in this solidarity. According to novelist Sara Paretsky, Occupy radically alters our modes of response to the overwhelming problems of the last half-century, from women’s rights to deindustrialization to the fraying social safety net. Its unwillingness to yield to the demand for demands allows it to return not merely to a language of justice and the general welfare but to their achievement. Thirteen Observations made by Lemony Snicket while watching Occupy Wall Street from a Discreet Distance Lemony Snicket 17 October 2011 1.

Messy: The Power of Disorder to Transform Our Lives
by Tim Harford
Published 3 Oct 2016

Stumped for a marketing slogan to sell this hodgepodge to a skeptical world, Birmingham’s elders have tended to go for “the city of a thousand trades.” It hasn’t really caught on.*14 When Jane Jacobs was admiring Birmingham in the early 1960s, her view seemed odd. Detroit, the quintessential one-industry town, was booming. The standard view was that cities could prosper by playing to their own strengths. But as deindustrialization ripped the life out of specialized cities from Detroit to Glasgow, it became clear that this view was shortsighted. Jacobs had been right that specialized cities were fragile. Diverse industries might seem untidy, and they might occasionally get in one another’s way. But the diversity gave a city a chance to respond to shocks.

Winners Take All: The Elite Charade of Changing the World
by Anand Giridharadas
Published 27 Aug 2018

Even would endeavor, with characteristic Silicon Valley ambition, to counteract the effects of a generation’s worth of changes in the lives of working-class Americans, rooted in policy choices and shifts in technology and the world situation—including outsourcing, stagnant wages, erratic hours, defanged unions, deindustrialization, ballooning debt, nonexistent sick leave, dismal schools, predatory lending, and dynamic scheduling—while doing nothing about those underlying problems. Like Rosenstein and other believers in win-wins, the founders of Even wanted very much to help, but thought it best to help in a way that would create some opportunity for them, too.

Ghost Work: How to Stop Silicon Valley From Building a New Global Underclass
by Mary L. Gray and Siddharth Suri
Published 6 May 2019

As noted earlier, not until World War II did organized labor and political clout combine (at least in some parts of the United States) to create full-time employment, meaning jobs that came with not just a paycheck but also stable hours, pensions, healthcare, and workplace safety. Those jobs led to the growth of a middle class that had hit its zenith in the United States by the late 1970s. In the decades that followed, the middle class was hollowed out by deindustrialization and outsourcing.3 What was left behind was the burgeoning growth of service jobs. This new form of employment rose from the thousands of retail chains, fast food outlets, and chain big-box stores that filled, first, American malls and suburbs and, not long after, their global equivalents. But service jobs weren’t designed to replace the stable salaries and lifelong careers anchored to Cold War–era full-time work.

Ghost Road: Beyond the Driverless Car
by Anthony M. Townsend
Published 15 Jun 2020

Advances in freight transportation have always wreaked havoc on cities and neighborhoods. The change is often painful. Wharves in Brooklyn and San Francisco gave way to container ports in Newark and Oakland, for instance. Tens of thousands of jobs disappeared every year, for decade after decade, as these cities deindustrialized. But over time, the cities recovered and thrived—employment, earnings, and wealth all exceeded their previous highs. No one laments the lost longshoremen of the West Side anymore except when they watch On the Waterfront (which was mostly filmed across the river in New Jersey, anyway). They picnic on those piers and surf the web with free Wi-Fi instead.

Were You Born on the Wrong Continent?
by Thomas Geoghegan
Published 20 Sep 2011

Tougher bankruptcy laws made it hard for big business to walk away. They could not go into Chapter 11 and dump their pension and health obligations. It was the power of labor not just “against” or “outside” the firm but deep “inside” the very structure of the big German firm that made it harder to deindustrialize the way we did. And maybe in a social democracy, there are just fewer investment alternatives. There is the fact that, because people have public goods, there are fewer alternative ways to profiteer. Businesses can’t make the same profits on health or education the way they can here, since in Europe, unlike in the U.S., the state will not pay for these goods at whatever price the market will bear.

The new village green: living light, living local, living large
by Stephen Morris
Published 1 Sep 2007

Goat cheese makers and Hmong long-bean growers from California find common ground with their Italian and Eastern European counterparts. Israeli and Palestinian farmers, along with Iraqi and American food producers, share space and the excited chat that food never fails to stimulate. This is Terra Madre, a gathering that is the Olympics of the international movement to deindustrialize food production. That means putting taste back at the heart of food, saving heirloom fruits, vegetables and animals, keeping small farmers in business and in local communities, and pushing farming back on sound environmental ground. Mingling with the farmers are prominent Bay Area names in the sustainable food movement – Chez Panisse founder Alice Waters and UC Berkeley journalism professor and The Omnivore’s Dilemma author Michael Pollan, just to name a couple.

The Cheating Culture: Why More Americans Are Doing Wrong to Get Ahead
by David Callahan
Published 1 Jan 2004

The malaise besetting corporate America during the downturn of the decade led to the rise of a new breed of corporate leaders and money managers who called for a take-no-prisoners brand of the bottom line in business. This crusade was motivated partly by the foreign competition that knocked a number of industries on their backs in the '70s, helping fuel deindustrialization across the U.S. as larger manufacturers pulled up stakes and moved overseas to lower costs. But the new emphasis on the bottom line was not actually about survival in many companies; it was about increasing efficiency and, ultimately, profits. Before these changes, back in the 1950s and 1960s, corporate life was pretty laid back.

The Great Race: The Global Quest for the Car of the Future
by Levi Tillemann
Published 20 Jan 2015

In the beginning, the void of authority left by Japan’s brutal military was filled by the imposing, bombastic, but basically benevolent General Douglas MacArthur. He received the title Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) in Japan and exercised complete control over the country’s military, civil, and economic future from the Allies’ General Headquarters (GHQ). MacArthur’s immediate plans for the occupation included a massive deindustrialization of the country, one that would leave it with little ability to make war—or cars—for the foreseeable future. But this soon changed. A mere three weeks after the war was declared over, GHQ realized that trucks would be necessary to achieve even basic recovery. Toyota, Isuzu, and Nissan were all allowed to resume production.28 Unbearable Retreat Japan would need a strategy for reconstruction, so on March 13, 1949, its Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Trade Agency, Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, and Industrial Technology Agency were all reorganized into the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI).29 The new bureaucracy was the heart of Japan’s postwar economic planning apparatus.

Tower of Basel: The Shadowy History of the Secret Bank That Runs the World
by Adam Lebor
Published 28 May 2013

Boughton, the IMF’s official historian, has described as ranging from “the questionable to the bizarre.”7 White’s failed attempt to bring the Soviet Union into the IMF in 1944 (when the country was an ally of the United States) and his meetings with Soviet officials were recast as support for Communism. So was his support for the Morgenthau Plan to de-industrialize Germany. White’s request to the nationalist government in China to account for how it had spent hundreds of millions of dollars in American aid was respun as sympathy for Mao Tse-Tung’s Communist forces. In August 1948, White was called to testify before the House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities to be questioned about his relations with the Soviets.

Choked: Life and Breath in the Age of Air Pollution
by Beth Gardiner
Published 18 Apr 2019

This industry once brought steady paychecks, and the pride and social stability they engender—along with steelmaking’s thick smoke—to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Youngstown, Ohio, to northern England and southern Wales. China’s cheap production was blamed by Donald Trump for the collapse of employment in the deindustrialized midwestern states that propelled him to power, and by the forces that brought about Britain’s wrenching decision to leave the European Union. It turns out to be a little touchy here too. When Xiao Jin bought our Tangshan train tickets, she indicated a destination one stop short of the city, worried someone might question why I’d wander so far off the usual tourist trail.

Rewriting the Rules of the European Economy: An Agenda for Growth and Shared Prosperity
by Joseph E. Stiglitz
Published 28 Jan 2020

Policies like these directly favor job creation and may be targeted to where the failures in the markets are most evident. They may facilitate transitions into the labor market and be fine-tuned toward job creation for people with fewer opportunities, such as minorities or those located in the deindustrialized parts of Europe.†† India has created an employment guarantee scheme for the hundreds of millions of people living in rural areas that ensures at least 100 days of work per person each year. If a country like India, with its low per capita income, can guarantee jobs, then Europe can, too. Designing a jobs program entails many complexities, such as ensuring that work is meaningful, that workers can transition to standard jobs that pay decent wages, and that the program itself will not undermine work elsewhere in the economy.

The Deficit Myth: Modern Monetary Theory and the Birth of the People's Economy
by Stephanie Kelton
Published 8 Jun 2020

Jobs in less-dense areas and rural regions grew at less than a third of their previous rate.6 In some places, effectively, there was no recovery from 2008. The job market just pulled up stakes and left. Cairo, Illinois, used to be a bustling town at the intersection of the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers, with shops and drive-ins and clubs. But deindustrialization and the depredations of racism—Cairo is mostly African American—hit it hard. Now the town has two Dollar Generals and a few other stores to its name. When author and photographer Chris Arnade asked Marva, a forty-seven-year-old local teacher, why she stayed, her answer was simple: “[Cairo] is my home.

Deaths of Despair and the Future of Capitalism
by Anne Case and Angus Deaton
Published 17 Mar 2020

While the long-term effects on mortality remain unclear as of mid-2019, it is possible that the long-term decline in working-class lives witnessed among US whites from 1970 may be on its way to the UK, with deaths of despair beginning to stir.19 But there is, as yet, no clear and accepted understanding of recent changes in mortality in Britain.20 Deaths and Deindustrialization We are not quite done with income and unemployment. Some of the writing about the epidemic, such as Sam Quinones’s outstanding book Dreamland, highlights opioid abuse and deaths in once-prosperous towns or cities where jobs have disappeared, where factories have been lost to automation or have moved abroad, and where at least some of the people who remain are abusing opioids.

Broke: How to Survive the Middle Class Crisis
by David Boyle
Published 15 Jan 2014

These days, he finds himself in rather different company, and has recently begun a defence of the embattled American middle classes.[23] What he described as ‘happy talk about the wonders of the knowledge economy’, hailing a new economy based exclusively on service and finance, was actually a ‘gauzy veil placed over the hard facts of deindustrialization’. The rewards of technological and financial innovation go overwhelmingly to a very narrow group of people, he warned, explaining that: Americans may today benefit from cheap cell phones, inexpensive clothing, and Facebook, but they increasingly cannot afford their own homes, or health insurance, or comfortable pensions when they retire.

We Are All Fast-Food Workers Now: The Global Uprising Against Poverty Wages
by Annelise Orleck
Published 27 Feb 2018

By 2016, the 62 richest people on earth controlled more wealth than 3.8 billion people. Occupy Wall Street’s rallying cry no longer seemed hyperbolic. It had become cold, hard fact.4 This was not simply a problem in developing nations. Wealth and income were more concentrated at the top in the US than in any other affluent nation. As deindustrialization, automation, and financial deregulation transformed the labor market, massive tax cuts for the wealthy deepened government deficits and provided a rationale for program cuts. The top marginal tax rate in the US during the prosperous 1950s and 1960s approached 90 percent. By the mid-1980s, it had fallen below 30 percent.

World Travel: An Irreverent Guide
by Anthony Bourdain and Laurie Woolever
Published 19 Apr 2021

Family, fried dough, and demolition.” Organized by the local Lions Club chapter, this demolition derby raises funds for local charities. “The winner gets $900. All over western Pennsylvania, from small towns like this, to the largest city—Pittsburgh—people face the same struggles as beleaguered, deindustrialized areas across the country: How do you move into the future and hold on to what you love about the past? There are probably no easy answers. Things will change; they are changing. But for now, let’s just wreck some cars.” NEW ALEXANDRIA LIONS CLUB CRASH-A-RAMA: 1874 Lions Club Road, New Alexandria, PA 15670, www.newalexandrialions.com/demolition-derbies.html Charleston, South Carolina * * * “The South is not a monolith.

The Glass Half-Empty: Debunking the Myth of Progress in the Twenty-First Century
by Rodrigo Aguilera
Published 10 Mar 2020

Economists from the right of the spectrum who ascribe the rise in inequality in recent decades mainly to outsourcing will be forced to concede that this is a virtually identical phenomenon. However, the impact will not be merely limited to the West. The developing world could end up suffering divestments and de-industrialization on a massive scale. In these countries, a large share of their most productive capital is owned by foreign (Western) firms, which will likely divest back into their home countries once robots become cheaper than Mexicans and Vietnamese. Mexico, for example, is the sixth-largest car exporter in the world but every single one of those cars is built by a foreign carmaker.31 If those cars had been built by domestic firms, at least they could be taxed domestically.

Break Through: Why We Can't Leave Saving the Planet to Environmentalists
by Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus
Published 10 Mar 2009

Like environmentalists who see their fellow humans as essentially opportunistic and reactive, Frank tends to view the average conservative Kansan as someone whose ability to reason dispassionately has been occluded by the passions. The trick never ages; the illusion never wears off. Vote to stop abortion; receive a rollback in capital gains taxes. Vote to make our country strong again; receive deindustrialization. Vote to screw those politically correct college professors; receive electricity deregulation. Vote to get government off our backs; receive conglomeration and monopoly everywhere from media to meat-packing.2 What liberals like Frank and environmentalists like Jared Diamond have in common is the view that the primary obstacle to progressive political action is that Americans are ignorant and easily manipulated.

Making It in America: The Almost Impossible Quest to Manufacture in the U.S.A. (And How It Got That Way)
by Rachel Slade
Published 9 Jan 2024

Eventually, the British corporation employed its own private army of highly paid native Indians to use terrorist tactics to break up the remains of India’s empire. Which sounds much like the CIA’s work in South America, the Middle East, and Asia during the Cold War. Between 1750 and 1800, destabilization led to widespread deindustrialization in India. Travel and trade became dangerous, which prevented exchange of goods, people, and ideas. To protect populations, resources were redirected from manufacturing and growing crops to outfitting militias. Food became scarce. India stopped producing goods for trade, let alone for domestic use.

Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World
by Adam Tooze
Published 31 Jul 2018

The world’s media labeled Germany the “sick man of Europe.”10 Germans themselves talked of a “blockierte Gesellschaft” (blocked society).11 The response from Gerhard Schroeder’s Red-Green coalition, which governed Germany from 1998 to 2005, was unexpectedly energetic. For years Germans had suffered from painfully high levels of long-term unemployment, exacerbated by the sudden deindustrialization of the former GDR. In 2005 joblessness would peak at 10.6 percent. To combat this scourge, between 2003 and 2005 the Schroeder government announced a national restructuring program titled Agenda 2010. Its main thrust was a multiphase program of labor market liberalization and benefit cuts, designed by a committee headed by VW’s head of human resources, Peter Hartz.12 The fourth and final phase of cuts, Hartz IV, became synonymous with a new German “reform” narrative.

…

We . . . will build . . . your car.1 His lines were all the more resonant because of what the audience could be expected to know about the place where the spot was filmed, Detroit. If the American motor industry was back from the dead, the same could not be said for Motor City. Since its heyday in the postwar era, Detroit had long been a city in decline. At its peak it had a population of 1.8 million, of whom 500,000 were African American. Hit by deindustrialization and white flight following the 1967 riots, by 2013 the population of the urban core of Detroit had shrunk to 688,000, of whom 550,000 were African American. They were left behind in a city that was literally falling into ruin, burdened with debts running into the tens of billions of dollars.

What's Next?: Unconventional Wisdom on the Future of the World Economy
by David Hale and Lyric Hughes Hale
Published 23 May 2011

Unlike the early years of South Africa’s democratic dispensation, when currency volatility was caused primarily by domestic sociopolitical factors, ever since the collapse of the Lehman Brothers in September 2008 the sources of rand strength and its above-average volatility are mostly exogenous. In effect, fundamental shifts in the dynamics of the global capital markets, together with marginally high domestic interest rates, lead to sustained strength and volatility of currency. This in turn leads to ongoing de-industrialization and the gradual emergence of the so-called Dutch Disease. The negative economic, fiscal, and employment consequences of this process are too severe for South Africa. The underperformance of South Africa’s export sector, despite the prevailing super cycle of commodity prices, is, to a large extent, attributed to the currency factor, which is operating within a free-float regime.

How the World Works
by Noam Chomsky , Arthur Naiman and David Barsamian
Published 13 Sep 2011

Starting from about 1700, Britain imposed harsh tariff regulations to prevent Indian manufacturers from competing with British textiles. They had to undercut and destroy Indian textiles because India had a comparative advantage. They were using better cotton and their manufacturing system was in many respects comparable to, if not better than, the British system. The British succeeded. India deindustrialized, it ruralized. As the industrial revolution spread in England, India was turning into a poor, ruralized and agrarian country. It wasn’t until 1846, when their competitors had been destroyed and they were way ahead, that Britain suddenly discovered the merits of free trade. Read the British liberal historians, the big advocates of free trade—they were very well aware of it.

Uneasy Street: The Anxieties of Affluence
by Rachel Sherman
Published 21 Aug 2017

Radical movements were decimated by anticommunist ideology and legislation during the Cold War, and poverty largely became invisible, allowing for the ascendance of the “middle class” as the central category of political discourse. Pundits believed that the future would simply entail managing affluence. Yet this state of affairs was not to last. Beginning in the 1960s and gaining steam in the 1970s, international competition, outsourcing and deindustrialization, employer attacks on unions, and political realignments spelled the end of the broad prosperity of the postwar period. Single incomes no longer sufficed to support families. Since the Reagan era of the 1980s, these trends, plus neoliberalism, globalization, financialization, technological innovation, and the continued decline of both manufacturing jobs and union strength, have given rise to an economy based primarily on knowledge and services.

The American Way of Poverty: How the Other Half Still Lives
by Sasha Abramsky
Published 15 Mar 2013

The country, its leaders were now telling the public, was closer to a complete collapse of its economy than at any time since the Great Depression.6 For an increasing number of Americans, what the political leadership was just cottoning on to was something that they had been living in the shadow of for years. For homeowners in California cities such as Stockton or Modesto, or in Arizona or Nevada suburbs, for unemployed construction workers, or social workers in hard-hit deindustrialized regions, poverty was just a part of the landscape by 2008. Omnipresent. Ugly. Too often soul-destroying. In April 2010, a group of educators and organizers from around California walked hundreds of miles up the Central Valley, from Bakersfield to the state capital of Sacramento, protesting education cuts and holding rallies and meetings with residents along the way.

Breakout Nations: In Pursuit of the Next Economic Miracles
by Ruchir Sharma
Published 8 Apr 2012

That’s an incredibly counterintuitive outcome and contrasts with the impressive performance of gold shares in other parts of the world such as Australia, Canada, and the United States. Between 2005 and 2011, the price of shares in Barick Gold of the United States was up more than 50 percent, while Harmony Gold of South Africa was down 10 percent in dollar terms. South Africa is deindustrializing at a point in its development when basic industry should still be growing. Despite the world’s largest platinum and manganese reserves, along with abundant deposits of gold, iron ore, and coal, employment in the mining industry is falling. Mining now accounts for 3 percent of GDP, down from 14 percent in the 1980s, and South African manufacturing is hollowing out as well.

This Is London: Life and Death in the World City
by Ben Judah
Published 28 Jan 2016

Twenty-five minutes by train, from the suits coming in and out like ants from the glass towers along Liverpool Street, the information city is not working. The people who live here also work in the City: as scrubbers, haulers and renovators. But their streets and estates are amongst the 4 per cent most deprived in the country. Nearly a third of the workforce here is out of a job. Edmonton is deindustrialized London. Here were the factories that made the radio transmitters for the BBC. The Lee Enfield and Bren guns for the British army. No more. These were terraces of white respectability where Norman Tebbit grew up. The cabinet minister for Margaret Thatcher was born at the right time. Because Edmonton was not made for deregulation.

The Economics of Enough: How to Run the Economy as if the Future Matters
by Diane Coyle
Published 21 Feb 2011

Recent research at the level of individual firms suggests that investment in ICTs needs to be accompanied by significant changes in structure.19 The use of the technology improves productivity only when companies at the same time invest effort in changing people’s jobs, the flow of work, and the structure of the company. More jobs in the leading economies require people to use their initiative, to be adaptable, and able to think. People need more qualifications and are not as likely as in the past to get through their working life without changing what they do. This is the familiar process of deindustrialization. There are still plenty of “unskilled” jobs; after all, cleaners and laborers are still needed. But a growing proportion of jobs require more than basic skills—the middling sorts of job that were suited to people who did not go into tertiary education, and were based on the kind of skills acquired through repetition, have been shrinking in number.

Border and Rule: Global Migration, Capitalism, and the Rise of Racist Nationalism
by Harsha Walia
Published 9 Feb 2021

Black women in the US are incarcerated at twice the rate as white women.38 Michelle Alexander argues that mass incarceration “functions more like a caste system than a system of crime control,” as she details the trajectory between slavery, Jim Crow, and mass incarceration, three primary anti-Black systems of control.39 Lisa Monchalin similarly argues that the incarceration of Indigenous women in Canada is not merely an issue of “overrepresentation” but a pillar of gendered settler-carceral governance.40 Settler colonialism is not only a pipeline to prisons but also a gendered carceral system itself, structured through land dispossession, imposition of the Indian Act disenfranchising tens of thousands of Indigenous women and regulating the Indian status and band membership of many more, and state removal of Indigenous children from their families. In racial-capitalist economies marked by debt and austerity, the consolidation of carceral governance correlates with wealth hoarding, deindustrialization and outsourcing, the dismantling of public services, spatialized segregation between gated mansions and ghettos, and the simultaneous production and policing of precarious employment and unemployment. Innocence is a limiting political stance since criminality, like illegality, is a political construction.

The City on the Thames
by Simon Jenkins
Published 31 Aug 2020

The parallel decline in manufacturing was almost as dramatic. Jobs in the sector fell by 80 per cent between 1960 and 1990, and for the first time since the war, London’s unemployment in the eighties went above the national average. Britain’s seven worst unemployment black spots were in inner London boroughs, particularly hitting recent immigrants. De-industrialization was clearly outpacing the growth in the service economy. A final burst of despairing militancy came from a well-organized group of workers, the printers. These so-called ‘aristocrats of labour’ enjoyed closed-shop working practices dating back to the invention of typesetting in the Middle Ages.

Hacking Capitalism
by Söderberg, Johan; Söderberg, Johan;

The consequences have been unfavourable to developing economies, resulting in an annual net transfer of billions of dollars to industrialised nations, with the United States as the main beneficiary.29 Writing in Monthly Review, Michael Perelman compares intellectual property to oil in its strategic importance for the Western economy: “Intellectual property rights have become the financial counterweight to deindustrialization, because the revenues that they generate help to balance the massive imports of material goods.”30 Perelman’s observation is in accordance with an estimate made by Marcelo D’Elia Branco, coordinator of Brazil’s Free Software Project. For every license paid for Word plus Windows, the country must export 60 bags of soybeans.31 It appears as if the transfer of wealth from periphery to centre will increasingly be paid as royalties instead of as interest payment on foreign debt and direct investment.

The Viral Underclass: The Human Toll When Inequality and Disease Collide
by Steven W. Thrasher
Published 1 Aug 2022

In October 2020, the Department of Health for Cabell County and the city of Huntington, West Virginia, was struggling to contend with not one viral epidemic, but four—HIV, hepatitis C, influenza, and the novel coronavirus. My interest in the region had been piqued by a Black lesbian HIV activist named A. Toni Young. In Washington, D.C., Young had observed AIDS develop among urban African Americans in the 1980s and ’90s, just as deindustrialization and AIDS were plaguing cities across the nation. When she relocated to West Virginia mining country, she began seeing HIV and hepatitis C unspooling in the bodies of rural white people, too. One can often see a clear “before” and “after” line when it comes to the impact that austerity has on cities.

The Coming Wave: Technology, Power, and the Twenty-First Century's Greatest Dilemma
by Mustafa Suleyman
Published 4 Sep 2023

The number of people who can get a PhD in machine learning will remain tiny in comparison to the scale of layoffs. And, sure, new demand will create new work, but that doesn’t mean it all gets done by human beings. Labor markets also have immense friction in terms of skills, geography, and identity. Consider that in the last bout of deindustrialization the steelworker in Pittsburgh or the carmaker in Detroit could hardly just up sticks, retrain mid-career, and get a job as a derivatives trader in New York or a branding consultant in Seattle or a schoolteacher in Miami. If Silicon Valley or the City of London creates lots of new jobs, it doesn’t help people on the other side of the country if they don’t have the right skills or aren’t able to relocate.

Our Kids: The American Dream in Crisis
by Robert D. Putnam
Published 10 Mar 2015

We extended our sample, adding Duluth, Minnesota; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Atlanta, Georgia; Birmingham, Alabama; Austin, Texas; Bend, Oregon; Orange County, California; and Waltham and Weston, Massachusetts, to our research sites. These sites represent various kinds of local economies and cultures across the United States, encompassing deindustrializing small towns in the Rust Belt (Port Clinton and Duluth), gentrifying tourist destinations (Bend), booming high-tech “miracle” cities (Austin), unevenly revitalizing urban centers (Philadelphia and Atlanta), and Birmingham, still coming to terms with the Civil Rights revolution. Orange County was chosen because of its reputation as the mecca of the extraordinarily wealthy, allowing us to explore the poor and working-class immigrant communities obscured by the “OC” mythology.

Panderer to Power
by Frederick Sheehan
Published 21 Oct 2009

In 1969, the Justice Department, several members of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, the law firm of Cravath, Swaine & Moore (Chemical Bank’s counsel), and members of the Federal Reserve Board brought Steinberg’s effort to an end.24 This was within weeks of a Time magazine cover featuring James Joseph Ling. The cover subtitle: “Threat or Boon to U.S. Business?”25 It has traditionally been true that politicians rediscover their populist leanings when such magazine headlines appear. Deindustrialization, anxiety, and the general collapse of American living standards has been the topic of thousands of books by worthy economists and sociologists. The American peak is generally considered to have been in the 1960s, with the slide commencing about 1970. John Brooks, author of The Go-Go Years, described the disorientation: 18 Brooks, Go-Go Years, p. 153. 19 Ibid., p. 165. 20 Ibid., pp. 165–166. 21 Fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/The LTV-Corporation-Company-History. 22 Brooks, Go-Go Years, p. 238. 23 Ibid., p. 230. 24 Ibid., pp. 254–255. 25 Full title of front cover: “Takeovers in High Gear: Threat or Boon to U.S.

A Game as Old as Empire: The Secret World of Economic Hit Men and the Web of Global Corruption
by Steven Hiatt; John Perkins
Published 1 Jan 2006

Walden Bello, executive director of Focus on the Global South, interviewed by Ellen Augustine, January 22, 2006. Hereafter cited as Bello interview. 53. Joy Chavez, senior associate, Focus on the Global South and Coordinator of the Philippines Program, interviewed by Ellen Augustine, February 5, 2006. Hereafter cited as Chavez interview. 54. Stop De-Industrialization: Re-Calibrate Philippine Tariffs Now (Manila: Fair Trade Alliance, 2003), p. 16. 55. Family of Madge Kho, interviewed by Ellen Augustine, January 30, 2006. 56. Freddie de Leon, businessman, interviewed by Ellen Augustine, February 12, 2006. 57. Ibid. 58. Bello interview. 59. Sta Ana interview. 60.

The Levelling: What’s Next After Globalization
by Michael O’sullivan
Published 28 May 2019

Scotland, for instance, has not yet had a chance to build the policy capability to make the most of its brand as a country and of its access to markets. Indeed, until recent decades, the absence of very distinctive Scotland-facing policies from London has been a real constraint on Scotland; most notable has been the absence of a policy response to the (global) process of deindustrialization that Scotland experienced starting in the 1980s. Today, its economic model will need to be the small-country one described earlier in this chapter. In Scotland, the first referendum on independence was fought largely on the basis of the potential for independence to bring economic gains or losses.

Competition Demystified
by Bruce C. Greenwald
Published 31 Aug 2016

But from 1970 to 1980, annual growth dropped to0.7 percent. This performance was far behind that in most of the other advanced industrial countries. Japan, Germany, and Italy outpaced the United States. Canada and Britain did only slightly better. As a result, the late 1970s and early 1980s were the years of America’s “deindustrialization,” when it appeared only a matter of time before all U.S. workers would be serving food to Japanese tourists, in buildings that Japanese investors had already purchased. Yet instead of continuing in this direction, between 1986 and 1991, productivity growth in U.S. manufacturing accelerated by about 2 percent per year, both absolutely and relative to most other major manufacturing countries.

The Abandonment of the West
by Michael Kimmage
Published 21 Apr 2020

On the surface, it was remarkable that Germany should be the beneficiary of American largess at all. Hitler had maliciously declared war on the United States, and his refusal to surrender cost many, many American lives once Germany had lost the war (well before 1945). During the war, the United States government floated a plan for the deindustrialization of postwar Germany, the so-called Morgenthau Plan, after Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau. A Germany put to pasture would have been a Germany removed from the list of potential military problems and a Germany punished, but it would also have been a Germany removed from the global economy, leaving a pastoral no-man’s land at Europe’s center.

Heat Wave: A Social Autopsy of Disaster in Chicago
by Eric Klinenberg
Published 11 Jul 2002

In The Truly Disadvantaged (1987) and When Work Disappears (1996), sociologist William Julius Wilson documents the extent of Chicago’s devastation as the city lost hundreds of thousands of manufacturing jobs. Wilson’s focus on the extreme impact of this decline on Chicago’s poor African Americans should not obscure the broader consequences of de-industrialization on the city. 26. Fegelman 1995, 3. 27. Shen, et al. 1998. 28. Schreuder and Stein 1995, 1. 29. In a 1970 article published in the journal Environmental Research, Frank Oechsli and Robert Buechley (1970) used the excess mortality concept to assess the death tolls from Los Angeles heat waves in 1939, 1955, and 1963. 30.

Dopesick: Dealers, Doctors and the Drug Company That Addicted America
by Beth Macy
Published 4 Mar 2019

“On the other side of the cities [many Americans] live in, there’s poverty and poor health probably just as bad,” he said. In Appalachia, he conceded, poverty and poor health were not only harder to camouflage; they were increasingly harder to recover from. For decades, black poverty had been concentrated in urban zones, a by-product of earlier inner-city deindustrialization, racial segregation, and urban renewal projects of the 1950s and 1960s that decimated black neighborhoods and made them natural markets for heroin and cocaine. Whites had historically been more likely to live in spread-out settings that were less marred by social problems, but in much of rural America that was clearly no longer the case.

American Kleptocracy: How the U.S. Created the World's Greatest Money Laundering Scheme in History
by Casey Michel
Published 23 Nov 2021

There was a plant in the small town of New Haven, West Virginia, constructed in 1952, that Optima snapped up in early 2006 for $20 million.36 There was a seamless steel tube factory in South Lyon, Michigan, founded in 1927, that Optima grabbed just a couple months later.37 Not long thereafter, in the crease where Kentucky, West Virginia, and Ohio meet, Kolomoisky’s network found a 450,000-square-foot steel mill in the town of Ashland, Kentucky, on the block, and shelled out a substantial $112.5 million for the plant.38 And soon after that, it used one of their Delaware LLCs to purchase another major plant on the opposite side of the state, in a tiny place called Calvert City (population 2,566).39 Final sale price for this 400,000-square-foot plant: $188.1 million.40 In the span of just a few years, Kolomoisky’s network had collected a half-dozen major mills across the American heartland, each of them the beating economic hearts of the surrounding regions. All of them had fallen casualty to America’s yearslong manufacturing slump, part of America’s broader deindustrialization that began in the 1970s. All of them were eager for any injection of financing they could get, and for any promise of a brighter future—no matter the source of the income. And all of them were now connected directly to Kolomoisky’s network, to this corporate lattice of shell companies, including some in Delaware.

Austerity Britain: 1945-51
by David Kynaston
Published 12 May 2008

Ultimately, it was the vision of a Glasgow that would retain not only all its population but also its nineteenth-century heavy industrial base. By contrast, the Clyde Valley Regional Plan, appearing in interim form in 1946 and predominantly the work of the ubiquitous Sir Patrick Abercrombie, envisaged a depopulated, deindustrialised Glasgow, surrounded by a green belt and sending many of its ill-housed inhabitants to healthier, ‘overspill’ new towns beyond the city’s boundaries. ‘Whole districts are obsolescent and past the possibility of reconstruction to modern standards, alike for industry, commerce and housing,’ Abercrombie would declare in his final report, published in 1949; all told, he expected that nearly half of Glasgow’s 1.1 million population would move to outside the city.

Dreamland: The True Tale of America's Opiate Epidemic
by Sam Quinones
Published 20 Apr 2015

By then, those records show, he regularly prescribed Valium, Vicodin, the sedative Soma, Xanax, and a steady regimen of Redux diet pills—all with almost no diagnosis or suggestions for other treatment, such as physical therapy. Nor was there any discussion of improving diet as a way to lose weight and reduce pain. As I read the Licensure Board investigative reports, it seemed that many years in deindustrialized America seeing vulnerable people and manipulative people who used drugs and the government dole to navigate economic disaster had corroded any medical ethics Procter once possessed. So I went to Portsmouth to see if I could learn more about the doctor whom locals called the Godfather of the Pill Mill, the man who had started the first business and showed others how it was done.

To the Ends of the Earth: Scotland's Global Diaspora, 1750-2010
by T M Devine
Published 25 Aug 2011

‘The Canadian Boat Song’, first published in Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine in 1829 and ostensibly from the Gaelic, has become the single most popular commentary on the Highland immigrant experience in Canada, despite its entirely bogus origins as the invention by a non-Gael who was not even an emigrant: I’ve looked at the ocean Tried hard to imagine The way you felt the day you sailed From Wester Ross to Nova Scotia We should have held you We should have told you But you know our sense of timing We always wait too long A sentimental version of Scottish emigration also flourishes within the current renaissance in folk music in the Canadian Maritimes while, in Scotland, the Proclaimers’ ‘Letter from America’ (1987) links the forced Highland diaspora of the past with Lowland deindustrialization in the modern era. The chorus of the song, starting with ‘Lochaber no more’, is followed by the melancholy litany of industrial closures in the 1980s: ‘Methil no more’, ‘Bathgate no more’, ‘Linwood no more’ and ‘Irvine no more’.16 So what was the impact of Scottish immigrants on Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand in the nineteenth century?

The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World Economy Bigger
by Marc Levinson
Published 1 Jan 2006

Almost two-thirds of the city’s manufacturers were located in Manhattan, where the apparel and printing industries dominated. The factory sector held steady through 1967, then abruptly collapsed. Between 1967 and 1976, New York lost a fourth of its factories and one-third of its manufacturing jobs. The scope of this deindustrialization was shockingly widespread, with forty-five of forty-seven important manufacturing industries experiencing double-digit declines in employment.41 How much of the loss of industry can be blamed on the container? There can be no definitive answer, as containerization was only one of many forces affecting manufacturers during the late 1960s and the first half of the 1970s.

Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the Seventies
by Judith Stein
Published 30 Apr 2010

As the improved economic state of the nation took center stage, Mondale was easily tarred with Carter’s performance. Democrats had better opportunities in 1988. Although the macro numbers on inflation, economic growth, and unemployment continued to be good during Reagan’s second term, the wrenching effects of deindustrialization produced an edgy electorate, which returned the Senate to the Democrats in 1986. Big cities and their industrial suburbs were ravaged by job loss and a crack cocaine epidemic. There was a consensus that crumbling infrastructure, poor education, and inadequate child care needed to be addressed.

Sacred Economics: Money, Gift, and Society in the Age of Transition
by Charles Eisenstein
Published 11 Jul 2011

The larger economic system, based as it is on the eternal conversion of a finite commonwealth into money, is unsustainable as well. It is like a bonfire that must burn higher and higher, to the exhaustion of all available fuel. Only a fool would think that a fire can burn ever-higher when the supply of fuel is finite. To extend the metaphor, the recent deindustrialization and financialization of the economy amount to using the heat to create more fuel. According to the second law of thermodynamics, the amount created is always less than the amount expended to create it. Obviously, the practice of borrowing new money to pay the principal and interest of old debts cannot last very long, but that is what the economy as a whole has done for ten years now.

Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City
by Matthew Desmond
Published 1 Mar 2016

Today in Milwaukee, former leather tanneries line the banks of the Menominee River Valley like mausoleums of the city’s golden industrial age; the Schlitz and Pabst breweries have been shuttered; and one in two working-age African American men doesn’t have a job.2 In the 1980s, Milwaukee was the epicenter of deindustrialization. In the 1990s, it would become “the epicenter of the antiwelfare crusade.” As President Clinton was fine-tuning his plan to “end welfare as we know it,” a conservative reformer by the name of Jason Turner was transforming Milwaukee into a policy experiment that captivated lawmakers around the country.

Shutdown: How COVID Shook the World's Economy
by Adam Tooze
Published 15 Nov 2021

The commitment to national economic policy goes back to independence.71 India’s inefficient manufacturing sector had reason to fear Chinese competition. Since 2017, India’s growth rate had sharply slowed.72 Given its huge and growing population, India could ill afford to accelerate the tendency toward deindustrialization. Proponents of the “opening up” strategy argued that India’s focus should be on the infrastructure investment and regulatory change necessary to enable its vast low-wage workforce to prosper in the face of global competition. Though the initial shock of surging imports had been severe, China’s rising wage costs offered a historic opportunity for India to displace it in global markets.

Water: A Biography
by Giulio Boccaletti
Published 13 Sep 2021

It is a well-known chapter of twentieth-century history. After the Second World War, America became the pre-eminent global consumer. This transition had been assisted by the Bretton Woods system in which the dollar was pegged to gold. The United States became a net importer of manufactured goods, in turn leading to its de-industrialization and to a consequent rise in unemployment. According to economic orthodoxy, still informed by Keynes’s policy prescriptions, unemployment called for monetary stimulus to sustain demand. So, the Federal Reserve pumped money into the economy in an attempt to stem the rise of unemployment.

Worn: A People's History of Clothing
by Sofi Thanhauser
Published 25 Jan 2022

Every small farmer had 20 to 50 acres of land, and two or three looms in his house. The factories and mills destroyed all weaving of this kind, and now they are exclusively agriculturalists. Your Indian hybrids will end in the same way. Ultimately, in the words of historian Eric Hobsbawm, “India was systematically deindustrialized and became in turn a market for Lancashire cottons.” In a huge and swift historic paradigm shift, India became a cloth importer, indeed the largest market for British cotton exports. Millions of people gave up their spinning and weaving. In 1869 Henry Rivett-Carnac, the Berar cotton commissioner, observed that spinners and weavers of Berar had taken to work on roads, or as farm laborers.

Straphanger
by Taras Grescoe
Published 8 Sep 2011

Rather than building from scratch, the time has come to recycle and reuse existing neighborhoods, whether they’re in central cities or close-in suburbs. Which is why I’d come to Philadelphia. It’s not a place, admittedly, that tends to show up in the PowerPoints of the globe-trotting gurus of urbanism. Deindustrialization hit this city on the eastern edge of the Rust Belt harder than most; from its midcentury high of 2.1 million, it lost 30 percent of its population in fifty years, and a quarter of Philadelphians still live beneath the poverty line. But unemployment here is now below the national average, and in 2010 Philadelphia recorded its first population increase in decades—less than 1 percent, but still an addition of 18,000 new households, most of them downtown, and enough to reclaim its title as the nation’s fifth-largest city from foundering Phoenix.

Jihad vs. McWorld: Terrorism's Challenge to Democracy
by Benjamin Barber
Published 20 Apr 2010

Had cooperators with Hitler’s regime been rooted out with the same efficiency as cooperators with and fellow travelers of the German Democratic Republic’s regime, postwar Germany would have been stripped of its professional and business classes altogether.4 Had Germany done without such servants, it would have had to import juridical, political, and managerial cadres from abroad, especially since most of the antifascist Germans who had combatted Hitler and might have constituted an untainted cohort for the postwar West German government had joined the new Communist regime in the East—the regime whose children and grandchildren are being exiled from their posts today.5 East Germany also underwent the economic acid bath of privatization, which is why with Russia it offers important lessons about the shock therapy’s destabilizing impact. Under the direction of a specially constituted trust agency (Treuhandanstalt), West Germany radically trimmed down or closed much of East Germany’s industrial plant—a radical deindustrialization that eventually cost more than 3 million out of the 4.5 million jobs that had existed in the German Democratic Republic. Women who had come to expect equal treatment and equal pay as laborers and special consideration as mothers under communism (which for all its tyranny did manage to make good on a few of its boasts) found themselves at the mercy of a market that had no particular interest in gender equality.

Ayn Rand Cult
by Jeff Walker
Published 30 Dec 1998

The same goes for Rand themes such as: the counterproductivity of government planning; the case for limited government; the factual nature of morality (though Lane’s was religious); that contradictions cannot exist in reality; that words have an exact meaning; that human rights cannot exist without property rights; that more supposed democracy actually means more rule by gangs and less individual liberty; that statist meddling could completely de-industrialize a country; that capitalism does not cause wars; that American intellectuals are being seduced by European intellectuals into fantasies of benevolent state intervention; that we must never forget that effects cease when their causes cease; that governments are inimical to the exploitation of new inventions; that Bismarckian welfare statism, Marxism, and Fascism are all German-styled counter-revolutions against the values of the American revolution; that the enemies of freedom succeed only by appropriating and turning against freedom the technology that only freedom could create, . . . and so on.

Adam Smith: Father of Economics
by Jesse Norman
Published 30 Jun 2018

As Nobel laureate Herbert Simon presciently remarked, ‘What information consumes… is the attention of its recipients. Hence a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention’, in ‘Designing Organizations for an Information-Rich World’, in Martin Greenberger (ed.), Computers, Communication, and the Public Interest, Johns Hopkins Press 1971 Movement of skilled workers: see Dani Rodrik, ‘Premature Deindustrialization’, NBER Working Paper 20935, 2015 Modern divergences in mortality and health: cf. Anne Case and Angus Deaton, ‘Mortality and Morbidity in the 21st Century’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2017 Gated communities: see Branko Milanovic, ‘The Welfare State in the Age of Globalization’, http://glineq.blogspot.co.uk/2017/03/the-welfare-state-in-age-of.html Capacity of companies to bully cities, states: Cf. e.g.

Super Continent: The Logic of Eurasian Integration
by Kent E. Calder
Published 28 Apr 2019

That remains indeterminate, with the uncertainty compounded by US domestic political fluidity, including the populist surge that dismantled the Trans-Pacific Partnership and other supports for multilateral integration. If the deepening inequality of American society, including the erosion of the middle class, were arrested together with deindustrialization of its Midwest manufacturing core, 204 chapter 9 protectionist impulses might be arrested. And if the pace of immigration slowed, without recrimination, ethnic tensions might ease. Yet all these trends have deep-seated economic origins and cannot easily be reversed. Critical uncertainties regarding Washington, DC, remain a shadow hanging heavily over Eurasia’s future, and over conversely related prospects for a global Crossover Point that reconfigures global governance.

Fulfillment: Winning and Losing in One-Click America
by Alec MacGillis
Published 16 Mar 2021

If there had been something shameful in that earlier escape from the new neighbors, this new flight could be easily rationalized. There had been a riot, in the days after Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination, which claimed six lives and resulted in more than 5,000 arrests; there was crime and drugs, as heroin grew more entrenched; and there was now, to a degree there had not been before, deindustrialization. The city’s population fell by 119,000 over the 1970s, still its largest drop in a decade in both absolute and proportional terms. Virtually the entire loss was from white residents. In 1970, the city was majority white. After a decade’s flight, that share had fallen to well below half and was on its way to less than a third

When McKinsey Comes to Town: The Hidden Influence of the World's Most Powerful Consulting Firm
by Walt Bogdanich and Michael Forsythe
Published 3 Oct 2022

The 1980s brought more instability, sparking a breathless string of stories about sudden riches, corporate raids, leveraged buyouts, and the fading appeal of once stable companies. “Billions could be made by buying up American companies and loading them with mountains of debt,” said Les Leopold, director of New York’s Labor Institute and author of Runaway Inequality. As these raiders got rich off what Leopold called “the deindustrialization of America,” their apologists praised them for making corporations more efficient. Some companies had indeed become complacent, but raiders often bought companies to break them up and sell off the pieces, leaving thousands of employees without jobs. “This is not the invisible hand of the market,” Leopold said.

Vulture Capitalism: Corporate Crimes, Backdoor Bailouts, and the Death of Freedom
by Grace Blakeley
Published 11 Mar 2024

At the nadir of global copper prices, under pressure from the international financial institutions, the US-friendly president Frederick Chiluba sold off most of the Zambian copper sector on the cheap to international investors.195 The multinationals that purchased these assets knew they were getting an excellent deal, yet the government still offered the companies generous tax breaks to ensure the negotiations were wrapped up quickly, in line with the wishes of the World Bank and the IMF.196 By 1996, 223 state-owned companies had been privatized.197 Throughout the privatization process, both the Zambian government and the international investors seeking to buy its assets were being advised by large international banks and law firms based in the rich world.198 The government was also under immense pressure from the international financial institutions from which it was borrowing, then gripped by a relentless drive for privatization. While the World Bank was holding the Zambian privatization process up as a model for the rest of the world, keener observers were criticizing the process for the “looting, deindustrialization, deepening debt and increasing poverty that would emanate from it.” The newly privatized, and now foreign-owned, corporations were—and are—able to avoid substantial amounts of tax through loopholes and deductions. This tax avoidance, combined with the low tax rates the government had imposed and financial deregulation, meant that profits were sucked out of the country and into the pockets of shareholders in the rich world.199 What’s more—and as has been the case with IMF- and World Bank–driven privatization programs all over the world—domestic elites walked away from the process with substantial kickbacks, generating visible inequalities that remain a source of resentment in Zambia to this day.

Wall Street: How It Works And for Whom
by Doug Henwood
Published 30 Aug 1998

Forecasts for the composition of GNP were even worse than the ag- WALL STREET gregate numbers: the consumption share projected for 1990 in 1978 was too high; that predicted in 1981 was too low; 1983 and 1985 projections were much closer to the market — but all missed the fall in spending on nondurable goods and the rise in spending on medical and financial services. The BLS also missed deindustrialization and the overbuilding of commercial real estate — trends that unhappily shaped the U.S. macroeconomy of the early 1990s. In the words of the Bureau's own summary of its review, "the projections improve the nearer to the target year they are made...; the downside is that they often fail to forsee major structural shifts in the U.S. economy" (Saunders 1992, p. 15).

The People: The Rise and Fall of the Working Class, 1910-2010
by Selina Todd
Published 9 Apr 2014

‘New precincts to shop in. New art galleries … New flats and flyovers … At the moment our car industry is in the doldrums, but watch us zoom out of this, too.’6 Alas, by 1981 when the Coventry-born band The Specials released their single ‘Ghost Town’, their lyrical account of the decimation of deindustrialization resonated in their home town. It is an image that today’s residents feel sums up the city’s problems, but says nothing about the spirit of its people. Back in 1933, Liverpool was poorer and darker than Coventry, ‘like a city in a rather gloomy Victorian novel’, according to the writer J.B.

India's Long Road
by Vijay Joshi
Published 21 Feb 2017

The Indian-​born population in the United States grew from around 12,000 in 1960 to 51,000 in 1970. It then climbed to 206,000 in 1980, 450,000 in 1990, 1 million in 2000 and 3.2 million in 2010. INDIA’S GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: IMPACT ON INDIA The development discourse in post-​independent India was dominated by fears of the ruinous effects of foreign exposure, such as deindustrialization, destabilization, and general impoverishment. Opening up of the economy has dispelled these apprehensions: the outcomes of India’s [ 252 ] Political Economy 253 globalisation have been substantially positive. Foreign industry has not destroyed Indian industry and foreign companies have not devoured Indian companies.

Connectography: Mapping the Future of Global Civilization
by Parag Khanna
Published 18 Apr 2016

Record numbers of elderly are moving to Mexico, Panama, and elsewhere seeking more affordable sunset years. Yet more emigrants come from America’s unskilled youth who make up 50 percent of the unemployed. (Some American scholars have even suggested that the United States should export its structurally unemployed so they can reduce demands on the government.) The combination of deindustrialization and the sub-prime meltdown has created severe internal dislocation as well, with droves of unemployed or homeless migrating to America’s 350 major metro areas in search of jobs at any wage. Maps 20, 21, 22, and 23, corresponding to this chapter, appear in the map insert. Higher up the value chain, America’s wealthy and talented not only share ambivalence about remaining at home but act on it.

Evil Geniuses: The Unmaking of America: A Recent History
by Kurt Andersen
Published 14 Sep 2020

In a 1985 cover profile I wrote for Time, I said he was “overbearing,” had “a Daffy Duck lisp,” and went “hardly a half-minute without mentioning ‘guys’—specific guys or guys in the abstract, guys who build automobiles (‘car guys’) or sell automobiles or buy them.” But I kind of liked him. In our interviews, he slagged Reagan’s economic right-wingism. The Democrats today are more pragmatic, not so ideological….We are deindustrializing the country….I’m not very popular with the people around the White House anymore. I told them [on trade policy], “Let’s make sure we don’t get hosed.” They don’t like that. This Administration sees you either as a protectionist or a free-trader, with no shades in between. And we’re going to lose, as a country, for it….Where’s Dave Stockman?

A Classless Society: Britain in the 1990s
by Alwyn W. Turner
Published 4 Sep 2013

As they emerged from school and college – part of the most numerous generation in British history – into a society scarred by record levels of unemployment and beset by uncertainty, the world felt like an inhospitable place, on both a political and a personal level. Much of this was experienced most keenly in the deindustrialised wastelands, far beyond the prosperous enclaves of the South-East, but there was also a tranche of the population who, in another time, might have expected to be among society’s success stories, the should-be middle class who now found themselves, as Jon Savage wrote of the original punks, ‘people whose intelligence is surplus to requirements’.

Meat: A Benign Extravagance
by Simon Fairlie
Published 14 Jun 2010

In the above, the FAO are describing a process of industrialization that has, in its own individual way, already taken place in the UK over the last 200 years and whose spread throughout the developing world they predict, endorse and promote. Today many people in Britain have misgivings about the industrialized agricultural system that we have inherited, and are trying to de-industrialize it through support for organic farming, local foods, real meat, community supported agriculture, animal welfare measures, and campaigns against GM, pesticides and junk food. To the FAO these are an indication that we in Britain, have reached the ‘post-industrial’ phase where, as they put it, ‘environmental and public health objectives take predominance’.

The Relentless Revolution: A History of Capitalism
by Joyce Appleby
Published 22 Dec 2009

These colorful cottons caused an instant sensation with the English, who could now adorn their bodies, their windows, or divans with light and bright fabrics. At the height of the calico craze, the company carried the designs for favorite English patterns like paisleys to Indian weavers to copy. Pretty quickly, English clothiers summoned their political clout and got laws passed to reduce these imports to a trickle. Thus began Britain’s deindustrialization of India, whose fabrics had been famous since the time of Heroditus. The East India Company stopped buying finished cloth and instead imported raw materials for English clothiers to work up. Indian cloth manufacturers confined themselves to nearby markets that didn’t interest the English. This story bears heavily on the colonial history of India.

Trust: The Social Virtue and the Creation of Prosperity
by Francis Fukuyama
Published 1 Jan 1995

Turks living in Germany for generations would never be considered real Germans, and there is no German equivalent of Léopold Senghor, the Senegalese-born poet who was admitted to the Académie française. There is also a fanatic character to leftwing German politics, evident among Greens who argue that Germany needs to be deindustrialized, or supporters of the Palestinians who readily compare the Israelis to the Nazis. This suggests that something of the hardness of the Germans’ old Protestant culture has not yet disappeared. 20Until the apology for the war given by reformist prime minister Masuhiro Hosokawa in 1993, no Japanese prime minister had apologized formally for Japan’s role in the war, and it is safe to say that no Japanese politician has yet made Willy Brandt’s gesture of falling to his hands and knees in contrition for the Holocaust.

Addiction by Design: Machine Gambling in Las Vegas
by Natasha Dow Schüll
Published 15 Jan 2012

From 1995 to the mid-2000s, Las Vegas maintained the highest new job growth in the country, garnering a reputation as “the most highly developed version of a low-skilled service economy in the nation and possibly the world” (Rothman and Davis 2002, 8). Newcomers to the city have been described as “castoffs of de-industrialization” (ibid., 14) and “a prolonged wave of new Okies” who, displaced from their rust belt vocations, “retooled themselves in the Nevada desert as hotel cooks and maids, if not construction drywallers and carpenters or casino craps dealers and parking valets” (Cooper 2004, 63). Las Vegas’s dependence on tourism, construction, and the housing market made the city more acutely vulnerable to the 2008 recession than any other state (in 2010 Las Vegas had the highest unemployment rate in the country). 24.

Not Working: Where Have All the Good Jobs Gone?
by David G. Blanchflower
Published 12 Apr 2021

Between 1975 and 1984, the region lost over 130,000 jobs and unemployment rose to 14 percent of the working population, well above the national average. In more recent years, the area has faced economic hardship as the mines closed, alongside a decline in the steel industry and major problems in the textile industry. The Front National won large parts of the deindustrialized north and east, as well as the south, while Macron took the west. He was strong in cosmopolitan cities, while Le Pen was strong in small towns and rural areas that felt abandoned. Le Pen took nine of the ten départements with France’s highest unemployment rates. What happened in France looks much like what happened in the UK and the United States.

The Economists' Hour: How the False Prophets of Free Markets Fractured Our Society
by Binyamin Appelbaum
Published 4 Sep 2019

He did not, however, buy anything Made in the U.S.A.88 A few months later, Japan made a more substantive gesture, signing a deal with other major developed nations at the Plaza Hotel in New York to drive down the exchange value of the dollar. In his 1986 State of the Union, Reagan came close to acknowledging his error. “We must never again permit wild currency swings to cripple our farmers and other exporters,” he said. For Japan, the Plaza Accord accelerated a process of deindustrialization — the Japanese term was kudoka, or “hollowing out.” Japanese companies started moving more manufacturing overseas, including to the United States. Honda had opened its first American auto plant in Marysville, Ohio, in 1982, and other carmakers followed. As with Nixon’s devaluation, the dollar remained at a lower level for about a decade and U.S. manufacturing staged a modest recovery.

Addiction by Design: Machine Gambling in Las Vegas
by Natasha Dow Schüll
Published 19 Aug 2012

From 1995 to the mid-2000s, Las Vegas maintained the highest new job growth in the country, garnering a reputation as “the most highly developed version of a low-skilled service economy in the nation and possibly the world” (Rothman and Davis 2002, 8). Newcomers to the city have been described as “castoffs of de-industrialization” (ibid., 14) and “a prolonged wave of new Okies” who, displaced from their rust belt vocations, “retooled themselves in the Nevada desert as hotel cooks and maids, if not construction drywallers and carpenters or casino craps dealers and parking valets” (Cooper 2004, 63). Las Vegas’s dependence on tourism, construction, and the housing market made the city more acutely vulnerable to the 2008 recession than any other state (in 2010 Las Vegas had the highest unemployment rate in the country). 24.

The Singularity Is Nearer: When We Merge with AI
by Ray Kurzweil
Published 25 Jun 2024

First, innovations in logistics and transportation, most notably containerized shipping, made it cheaper for companies to outsource manufacturing to countries with less expensive labor and import finished products to the United States.[55] Containerization is not a flashy technology like factory robotics or AI, but it has had one of the most profound impacts on modern society of any innovation. By drastically reducing the cost of worldwide shipping, containerization made it possible for the economy to become truly global. This made an enormous range of products available more cheaply to ordinary people, but it was also a key factor in the deindustrialization of large parts of the United States. Second, automation reduced the amount of human labor demanded by the domestic manufacturing sector. While early assembly lines involved significant hands-on work at each step, the introduction of robotics reduced this need. That trend was reinforced in the 1990s as computerization and artificial intelligence started making automation ever more capable and efficient.

Power at Ground Zero: Politics, Money, and the Remaking of Lower Manhattan
by Lynne B. Sagalyn
Published 8 Sep 2016

Fears of firms leaving the city in a mass exodus, fears of residents fleeing, fears of tourists staying away, fears of the end of skyscraper development and, by extension, the very self of the city were paramount, and news headlines in the weeks after 9/11 messaged the doubts: “In Wounded Financial Center, Trying to Head Off Defections,” “Reaching for the Sky, and Finding a Limit; Tall Buildings Face New Doubt as Symbols of Vulnerability,” “When the Towers Collapsed, So Did Their Desire to Live Here.” Like the fiscal crisis of the mid-1970s, the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center shook New Yorkers’ confidence in the future of their city. Uncertainties existed across the five boroughs and beyond. Was New York still the resilient city that had overcome so many post–World War II crises—deindustrialization, disinvestment and property abandonment, racial and ethnic change, white suburban flight, social and cultural conflict, and a near brush with bankruptcy? Based on well-founded and widespread fears prevalent at the time, no one was able to say for sure that the attack would not have a lasting negative economic impact on the city and the region.

…

Like many a central city in older metropolitan regions in the East and Midwest where the industrial and mercantile economy had created a troika of economic power, wealth, and prestige that gave rise to a great many institutions of cultural excellence and supported a great many nonprofit social-service institutions and philanthropic organizations, New York City during the 1960s experienced profound economic and social change that shook the foundations of its civic self. The forces of “deindustrialization, disinvestment, racial change, and suburbanization that began full force in the 1950s [and] culminated in the racial conflict of the late 1960s and the fiscal crisis of the mid-1970s” had profound impacts—white flight, property abandonment, arson, crime, deep social unrest—which devastated the physical and social fabric of New York City.

Imagining India
by Nandan Nilekani
Published 25 Nov 2008

The language became an additional accessory for the elite, a pretty bauble to be acquired in the same way upper-crust Indians adopted British dress, tea parties and socials. 11 Alongside this, English also rapidly took on the role of a career language. The Indian colony had been significantly deindustrialized under the British, and an administrative career was the major, and probably only, avenue for the educated Indian.12 This made British education immensely popular, and by the 1900s India’s education in the arts (the more favored stream) was dominated by 140 English colleges with more than 17,000 students, compared with five Indian colleges, which had a total of 503 students.

In Pursuit of Privilege: A History of New York City's Upper Class and the Making of a Metropolis
by Clifton Hood
Published 1 Nov 2016

Morris, The Cost of Good Intentions: New York City and the Liberal Experiment (New York: Norton, 1980), 11–33; and Robert Fitch, The Assassination of New York (London: Verso, 1993), vii–xxi. See also Vincent J. Cannato, The Ungovernable City: John Lindsay and His Struggle to Save New York City (New York: Basic, 2001), ix–xv. Scholars commonly understand the concept “urban decline” to involve combined processes of depopulation, deindustrialization, chronic unemployment, social disintegration, building abandonment, and infrastructure decay. Katharine L. Bradbury, Kenneth A. Small, and Anthony Downs, Urban Decline and the Future of American Cities (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982), 18–67. 36. Miriam Greenberg, Branding New York: How a City in Crisis Was Sold to the World (New York: Routledge, 2008), 3–17; “Press Conference No. 23 of the President of the United States, 7:30 P.M., November 26, 1975,” New York City Finances, President’s Press Conference, November 26, 1975 Folder, Box 19, Edward C.

Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste: How Neoliberalism Survived the Financial Meltdown
by Philip Mirowski
Published 24 Jun 2013

For neoliberals, the manifestation of an economic crisis is never traceable to any defects in their own previous policies (say, the deregulation of finance, or the quasi-privatization of the securitization function with regard to newer classes of debt, the breakdown of private-label debt issuance, or deindustrialization); rather, it is a consequence of the unstoppable evolution of nature and society (of which their interventions are a significant component), which can never be fully comprehended by mere human intelligence. The demonization of the government becomes one salient corollary of this fundamental precept: in their version of events, nothing was ever intrinsically wrong with the mortgage market or CDOs or the megabanks or the shadow banking sector or trade imbalances between China and the rest of the world; the snafu came when governments sought to rein them in, encourage them, or call them to account.

After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire Since 1405
by John Darwin
Published 5 Feb 2008

For obvious reasons, it was the dominant element in Soviet thinking. Hence the reconstruction of Europe was meant to proceed in a continent made safe from German aggression. A four-power commission (France would join the ‘Big Three’) was to dismantle permanently the apparatus and sources of German imperialism. Disarmed, denazified and deindustrialized, Germany could empire-build no more. But it was over this programme that the Allies fell out. To the Western powers economic recovery was paramount. They feared that its delay would spark mass unrest across Western Europe, and refused to postpone economic normalization in their part of Germany.

The Tragedy of Great Power Politics
by John J. Mearsheimer
Published 1 Jan 2001

Austria, Prussia, and Russia, for example, partitioned Poland four times in the past three centuries.31 The victor might also consider disarming and neutralizing the beaten state. The Allies employed this strategy against Germany after World War I, and in the early years of the Cold War, Stalin flirted with the idea of creating a unified but militarily weak Germany.32 The famous “Morgenthau Plan” proposed that post-Hitler Germany be de-industrialized and turned into two largely agrarian states, so that it no longer could build powerful military forces.33 Finally, conquering states might divide a defeated great power into two or more smaller states, which is what Germany did to the Soviet Union in the spring of 1918 with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and is also what the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union effectively did to Germany after World War II.

Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration and the Future of White Majorities
by Eric Kaufmann
Published 24 Oct 2018

The consensus of over 200 academic papers in the literature (an exhaustive sample up to 2016) is that increases in diversity almost always produce elevated anti-immigration and far-right support.43 Only if change slows and a decade passes does local hostility to immigration return to its former level.44 Accordingly, in 2006, in a shock result, the BNP won 20 per cent of the vote and twelve councillors on Barking’s fifty-six-seat council. Barking nicely encapsulates the debate about the forces driving the rise of the populist right. On the one hand, the Ford auto plant was a major local employer which had been downsizing its workforce for decades. Did deindustrialization and the offshoring of jobs lead to working-class disaffection? A number of factors suggest otherwise. First, the ethnic composition of the shrinking Ford plant was 45 per cent non-white by 1999 – no longer representative of the wider borough.45 Only a few thousand still worked there. Second, the car industry had declined in fits and starts over the course of several decades, yet far-right movements were not an important player in local elections until the 2000s.

The Code: Silicon Valley and the Remaking of America
by Margaret O'Mara
Published 8 Jul 2019

For all its determination to push away the gatekeepers, dismantle ossified power structures, and think differently, the “new economy” of tech was deeply intertwined with the old. Venture capital came from Rockefellers and Whitneys and union pension funds. Microprocessors powered Detroit autos and Pittsburgh steel. Amid 1970s stagflation and 1980s deindustrialization, when all of America was looking for a more hopeful economic narrative, old-line media and old-line politicians championed technology companies and turned their leaders into celebrities. The whole enterprise rested on a foundation of massive government investment during and after World War II, from space-age defense contracts to university research grants to public schools and roads and tax regimes.

Understanding Power
by Noam Chomsky
Published 26 Jul 2010

In fact, India generally was a real competitor with England: as late as the 1820s, the British were learning advanced techniques of steel-making there, India was building ships for the British navy at the time of the Napoleonic Wars [1803–1815], they had a developed textiles industry, they were producing more iron than all of Europe combined—so the British just proceeded to de-industrialize the country by force and turn it into an impoverished rural society. 47 Was that competition in the “free market”? And it goes on and on: the United States annexed Texas [in 1845], and one of the main reasons for that was to ensure that the U.S. achieved a monopoly on cotton—which was the oil of the nineteenth century, it was what really fueled the industrial economies.

Empire of Guns
by Priya Satia
Published 10 Apr 2018

A., 11, 384 Holden, William, 116–19, 199 Hollier, Thomas, 47, 75 Hollow Sword Blades Company, 214 Holy Roman Empire, 30 homicide, see murder Hopkins, Thomas, 117 Hornbuckle, Richard, 104 Horne, Henry, 72, 76 How, Richard, 104 Howell, David, 228 HSBC, 6 Hudson, Henry, 269 Hudson’s Bay Company, 28–29, 38, 42, 44–45, 51, 58, 269–75, 279, 281, 345, 359 Hume, David, 199 Hungerford massacre, 402 Hunter, John, 471n hunting, 184, 185, 219–21, 238, 239, 244, 254, 257–59, 275, 276, 278, 298, 307, 313 Huntsman, Benjamin, 148 Hurd, W., 129, 130 Hutton, William, 165 Hyder Ali, 111, 290, 293, 294 imperialism, 11, 12, 13–14, 41, 63, 175, 176, 179, 250, 256, 261–99, 310, 346, 368, 373, 382–84, 386–87, 389–90, 404, 409, 420n India, xi, 41, 111, 112, 116, 117, 133, 137, 176–79, 208, 211–12, 218, 283–97, 348, 373, 382–84, 386, 399, 409 deindustrialization of, 177–79, 291–95 gun use and gunmaking in, 176–77, 250, 285–86, 291–96, 383, 466n, 468n map of, 284 rebellion of 1857 in, 365, 382 soldiers in, 289, 364–65 see also Awadh; Bengal; Bombay; Calcutta; Punjab; Madras; Marathas; Mughals; Mysore; Sindh; South Asia Indian Ocean, 285 Indonesia, 199, 206, 282, 285, 287, 376 industrial capitalism, 8–12, 99, 341, 343, 385, 404, 405 industrial enlightenment, 4, 67, 146, 149, 177 industrial revolution, 378–79 domestic consumerism in, 4 factories in, 19–20, 134, 137, 140–41, 144, 166, 349, 357–59, 362, 378 gradual process in, 20, 21 innovations in, 148–61, 377 narratives of, 2–4, 12–13, 15, 377, 378 preindustrial modes and, 20, 21 property and, 219 role of industrial organization in, 6, 19–21, 101, 118, 134–35, 141, 144–45, 165, 352, 378, 447n science and, 161–62 second, 370 self-help and, 14 state’s role in, 2, 3, 6, 7, 16, 18, 19, 142, 145, 146–80, 212, 219, 250, 349, 378–79, 401 tinkering culture in, 73, 147–50, 449n, 452n war and, 2–3, 7, 10–16, 18–19, 21–22, 145, 146–80, 327–28, 343, 378, 395, 418n Ingram, Francis, 98 International Armament Corporation, 374 Iraq, 376 Ireland, 28, 32, 102, 106, 128–30, 133, 135–36, 193, 221, 243, 283, 313, 347, 375, 383, 387–89, 402 iron, 12, 57, 60, 66–70, 72–77, 93, 107, 148, 152–58, 162, 167–68, 176–77, 179, 199, 200, 214–16, 368, 394, 420n, 430n, 450n puddling process, 157, 158, 161 Iron Act, 72, 176 Islington Committee, 388, 389, 403 ivory, 29, 187, 190, 298, 367 Jacobins, 127, 134, 244 Jacobites, 27, 35–37, 39, 40, 42, 45, 102, 127, 239–41, 353, 409 Jamaica, 28, 31, 41, 283 James, Charles, 169 James, Paul Moon, 338, 339 James, William, 98 James II of England, 26, 30, 31, 222 Jamestown, 267–69 Jannuzzo, Paul, 410 Japan, 183, 184, 228, 408–9 Jefferson, Thomas, 353, 354, 408 jewelry, 67, 75, 82, 84, 85, 153, 204, 210, 346 John, A.

This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. The Climate
by Naomi Klein
Published 15 Sep 2014

(And there remains little momentum at the U.N. for changing that, despite the reality that shipping emissions are set to double or even triple by 2050.)33 And fatefully, countries are responsible only for the pollution they create inside their own borders—not for the pollution produced in the manufacturing of goods that are shipped to their shores; those are attributed to the countries where the goods were produced.34 This means that the emissions that went into producing, say, the television in my living room, appear nowhere on Canada’s emissions ledger, but rather are attributed entirely to China’s ledger, because that is where the set was made. And the international emissions from the container ship that carried my TV across the ocean (and then sailed back again) aren’t entered into anyone’s account book. This deeply flawed system has created a vastly distorted picture of the drivers of global emissions. It has allowed rapidly de-industrializing wealthy states to claim that their emissions have stabilized or even gone down when, in fact, the emissions embedded in their consumption have soared during the free trade era. For instance, in 2011, the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences published a study of the emissions from industrialized countries that signed the Kyoto Protocol.

Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe, 1945-1956
by Anne Applebaum
Published 30 Oct 2012

There was some mild argument, and Churchill pointed out that the harsh sanctions placed on Germany after the First World War had not exactly produced peace in Europe. But Roosevelt was inclined not to argue. His own Treasury secretary, Henry Morgenthau Jr., was also pushing for the dismemberment and deindustrialization of Germany, which he imagined would become a purely agricultural society.42 The matter wasn’t resolved in Potsdam either, and discussions of reparations continued through 1947 and although the USSR presented a bill for the total amount of destruction the Nazis had caused in the Soviet Union—$128 billion, to be precise—no treaty to this effect was ever signed.

The River Cottage Fish Book: The Definitive Guide to Sourcing and Cooking Sustainable Fish and Shellfish
by Hugh Fearnley-Whittingstall
Published 19 Nov 2007

They need clean, well-oxygenated water in order to survive. In many ways they are the canary in the watery coal mine—if brown trout turn belly up, then other species will soon follow suit. The good news is that, after suffering over a century of pollution, our native wild brown trout are on the up again. Deindustrialization and strict legislative action against polluters mean that our waterways are now the cleanest they have been for over 150 years. Once again, brown trout are populating rivers where they hadn’t been caught in over a century. They can do this because of their double life as sea trout—fish that leave one river to feed at sea may return to spawn in another.

Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress
by Steven Pinker
Published 13 Feb 2018

The root cause is the Enlightenment commitment to reason, science, and progress: “Scientific and technological progress cannot be equated with the progress of humanity and history,” wrote Francis. “The way to a better future lies elsewhere,” namely in an appreciation of “the mysterious network of relations between things” and (of course) “the treasure of Christian spiritual experience.” Unless we repent our sins by degrowth, deindustrialization, and a rejection of the false gods of science, technology, and progress, humanity will face a ghastly reckoning in an environmental Judgment Day. As with many apocalyptic movements, greenism is laced with misanthropy, including an indifference to starvation, an indulgence in ghoulish fantasies of a depopulated planet, and Nazi-like comparisons of human beings to vermin, pathogens, and cancer.

Growth: From Microorganisms to Megacities
by Vaclav Smil
Published 23 Sep 2019

The long-term impact of this demographic retreat may have a relatively limited impact on Japan’s manufacturing. Cohorts of young people best suited for this work will be declining, but significant shares of production capacities have been already moved offshore as Japan followed (with the lag of 10–20 years) the deindustrialization trend so evident in the EU and the US, and further progress of robotization should keep productivity rising: Japan has pioneered this automation trend, it already deploys by far the largest number of industrial robots, and several companies remain among the leading global enablers of plant automation.

The Second World Wars: How the First Global Conflict Was Fought and Won
by Victor Davis Hanson
Published 16 Oct 2017

Under the auspices of the Potsdam Agreement arranged by Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States (July 17–August 2, 1945), the Western Allied occupation of Germany would prove comparatively mild compared to the recent German occupations of other nations’ territory, especially for a country that had killed five to six times more soldiers and civilians than it had lost. The harsher so-called Morgenthau Plan—a trial balloon memorandum of 1944 floated by the American secretary of the treasury, Henry Morgenthau Jr.—called for deindustrializing Germany and was eventually shelved. Western capital and troops poured into the American, British, and French zones of occupation both to help rebuild the cities and to protect the new West Germany from Soviet absorption. Compliant German postwar behavior was ensured by the Allied destruction of Nazi ideology.

A History of Modern Britain
by Andrew Marr
Published 2 Jul 2009

The episode was an early indication, long before the poll tax, that Thatcher’s charge-ahead politics could produce mistakes as well as triumphs. The electoral consequences of the Falklands War have been argued about ever since. The government had got inflation down and the economy was at last improving but the overall Conservative record in 1983 was not impressive. The most dramatic de-industrialization of modern times, with hundreds of recently profitable businesses disappearing for ever, had been caused in part by a very high pound, boosted by Britain’s new status as an oil producer. This, with the Howe squeeze, was deadly. Later Joseph admitted that ‘we hadn’t appreciated, any of us’ that this ‘would lead to such rapid and large de-manning’.

Bourgeois Dignity: Why Economics Can't Explain the Modern World
by Deirdre N. McCloskey
Published 15 Nov 2011

To speak of the “middle class” below the gentry, none of Austen’s major characters are conventionally bourgeois, though some quite important secondary ones are—in Pride and Prejudice, for example, the Gardiners, aunt and uncle to Elizabeth Bennet, the protagonist. Uncle Edward Gardiner is in trade in London, where Elizabeth visits. Yet in Austen’s finished novels no merchant or manufacturer is featured largely. True, the fact is less surprising when one realizes that Austen Country, like the Dickens City later on, was in the south, the deindustrializing part of England at the time—though London had only recently given up its place among the chief manufacturing areas in Europe, and was still the trading hub of empire. The critic Markman Ellis asserts that “characters in Austen express a profound distaste for trade.” Many do, but Austen’s own opinion behind her ironies is plain and is by no means antibourgeois.

Karl Marx: Greatness and Illusion
by Gareth Stedman Jones
Published 24 Aug 2016

It precipitated the first large wave of emigration to America from Ireland, south-west Germany and to a far lesser extent France.117 The crisis in the 1840s was not simply a combination of industrial depression and exceptional dearth. It represented a more secular turning point in the history of the Western European economy. It inaugurated the de-industrialization of the countryside and the pastoralization of extensive areas that until then had combined agriculture and domestic industry, though it did not in England or anywhere else diminish the importance of small workshop production in the towns.118 The most direct connection between this crisis and the revolutions of 1848 was its creation of mass unemployment, exacerbated by an unprecedented scale of migration to the cities.

The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living Since the Civil War (The Princeton Economic History of the Western World)
by Robert J. Gordon
Published 12 Jan 2016

Those who have stopped looking for jobs and have thus dropped out of the labor force consist of workers who have lost their jobs in an economic setting in which they do not expect to be employed again, and a sizeable fraction of them have been able to obtain Social Security disability benefits.48 To call attention to the plight of these victims of deindustrialization, in late July 2013, President Obama toured several Rust Belt cities that have lost most of their manufacturing jobs base. Cities such as Galesburg, Illinois; Scranton, Pennsylvania; and Syracuse, New York now mainly rely on government, health care, and retail jobs. In Scranton, 41.3 percent of those older than 18 have withdrawn from the workforce, and in Syracuse, that percentage is an even higher 42.4 percent.49 The devastating effect of manufacturing plant closures throughout the Midwest is captured by remarks of the newly appointed British consul-general in Chicago, who toured the Midwest during the autumn of 2013, in the first three months of his four-year term.

Empire of Things: How We Became a World of Consumers, From the Fifteenth Century to the Twenty-First
by Frank Trentmann
Published 1 Dec 2015

For understandable reasons, most enterprising restaurateurs played it safe and opted for a generic standardized menu where India is everywhere and nowhere. Regional and religious authenticity were sacrificed. British authorities played their role in marketing an airbrushed ‘India’ that fitted their local interests. De-industrializing old industrial towns began to reinvent themselves as regional curry capitals. In the 1980s, Bradford promoted a ‘curry trail’ for visitors. Birmingham pushed wok-style balti cooking as its civic trademark.94 The effects of these invented hybrids must not be exaggerated. Eating in an ethnic restaurant may give locals a sense of difference, however inauthentic the dish or decor might be, but it is little more than multiculturalism at a distance.

The Rough Guide to England
by Rough Guides
Published 29 Mar 2018

Beyond are the rural shires that stretch out towards Wales, with the bumpy Malvern Hills, one of the region’s scenic highlights, in between; you could also drift north to the rugged scenery of the Peak District, whose surly, stirring landscapes enclose the attractive little spa town of Buxton. Change was forced on Birmingham by the drastic decline in its manufacturing base during the 1980s; things were even worse in the Black Country, that knot of industrial towns clinging to the west of the city, where deindustrialization has proven particularly painful. The counties to the south and west of Birmingham – Warwickshire, Worcestershire, Herefordshire and Shropshire – comprise a rural stronghold that maintains an emotional and political distance from the conurbation. Of the four, Warwickshire is the least obviously scenic, but draws by far the largest number of visitors, for – as the road signs declare at every entry point – this is “Shakespeare Country”.