demographic dividend

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description: the economic growth potential that can result from shifts in a population's age structure, mainly when the share of the youth and elderly dependents decreases

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Grand Transitions: How the Modern World Was Made

by Vaclav Smil  · 2 Mar 2021  · 1,324pp  · 159,290 words

and older than 65 years of age per 100 people of working age between 15 and 64 years. Then, as fertilities decline, nations enjoy their demographic dividends due to the rising share of economically active adults. If they are accompanied by effective policies, those periods are highly conducive to unprecedented rates of

economic and social development as well as the quality of the environment have been the unprecedented growth of human populations and the creation of a demographic dividend engendered by a shifting population structure. The time lag between the falling mortalities and natalities created temporary periods of rapid population growth that brought sequentially

role in economic growth is by focusing on changing age structures in general, and on the importance of what has become widely known as the demographic dividend in particular. This approach recognizes the enormous impacts of existential requirements and economic behavior at different stages of life. In the earliest periods of demographic

(or children and adolescents below 20) and elderly people above 65 (Mason et al. 2017). Nations experiencing falling total dependency ratios benefit from a temporary demographic dividend (Bloom et al. 2003). This shift may happen rapidly but it provides the strongest stimulus to economic productivity only if the growing cohort of economically

from very high to high ratios (Kenya’s rate fell from more than 110 in the early 1980s to less than 80 by 2015). The demographic dividend is inherently time limited but its positive consequences can endure well beyond its end. As the large cohorts of working-age population age and retire

migrations. Consequently, the remainder of this chapter will look at the challenges of aging, population decline, urbanization, and migration. Life Expectancy, Aging, and Population Decline Demographic dividend has its obverse in demographic burden, which is imposed on those countries where the fertility falling far below the replacement level results not only in

- or Canadian-style) immigration. So far, it has shown only a very limited willingness to take migrants from neighboring countries. The conversion of China’s demographic dividend to demographic burden will proceed even faster: in 2015 slightly less than 10% of the country’s people were older than 65, but by 2050

capita GDP was twice that of China, and today’s Nigeria still has (in relative terms) more resources than China, and it still enjoys its demographic dividend—but during the past three decades its per capita GDP grew by just 50% while China’s average rose tenfold! All of these inescapable uncertainties

:10.3390/nu9070655 Bloch, M. 1931. Les caractères originaux de l’histoire rurale française. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin. Bloom, D.E. et al. 2003. The Demographic Dividend: A New Perspective on the Economic Consequences of Population Change. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics). 2006. 100 Years of U

. 2005. Twilight of the Mammoths. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Mason, A. 2005. Demographic Transition and Demographic Dividends in Developed and Developing Countries. Mexico City: UN. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/252403184_Demographic_Transition_and_Demographic_Dividends_in_Developed_and_Developing_Countries/link/5432ee0c0cf225bddcc99892/download Mason, A. et al. 2017. Support Ratios and

Demographic Dividends: Estimates for the World. New York: UN. Mateos-Planas, X. 2002. The demographic transition in Europe: A neoclassical

Africa; specific countries air travel, 282 anthropogenic land-use changes, 219–20 arable land, 266–67 city growth, 210–11 deforestation, 109–10, 212–13 demographic dividend, 45 demographic transition, 31 economic growth, 161 electrification, 139 environmental pollution, 228 fertility rates, 32, 38, 40, 264 food supplies, need for, 268–69 healthcare

, 191 DeLong, J. B., 247, 248–49 dematerialization in product production, 282–83 Democratic Republic of Congo, primary forests, 212 demographic burden, 46–47, 51 demographic dividend, 44–45 demographic transitions. See populations (demographics), transitions in Dempster, G. M., 174 Deng Xiaoping, 5, 160, 252 Denmark birth rate declines, 35 demographic transitions

, 253 Dupin, C., 126 Dutch Republic, energy sources, 115. See also Netherlands Dyson, F., 257 Dyson, Tim, 15, 25, 39 Earth System, 208 East Asia demographic dividend, 45 demographic transition, 31 dietary transition, 88 draft animals, 82 fertility rates, 36, 43 food variety, 103 fruit supply, 97 international tourist arrivals, 196 literacy

impact of, 8–9. See also megacities Latin America. See also specific countries arable land in, 266–67 croplands, 214 deforestation, 109–10, 212–13 demographic dividend, 45 dietary transition, 88 fertility rates, 263, 264 food expenditures per capita, 102 growth rate, during late nineteenth century, 159 immigration, 58–59 increased childhood

Imagining India

by Nandan Nilekani  · 25 Nov 2008  · 777pp  · 186,993 words

particular kinds of population growth could dramatically drive the country’s growth, not impede it as economists used to believe.” David called this effect the “demographic dividend,” a phrase that has quickly caught on. And with good reason. When demographers went back and looked at previous periods of sustained economic growth from

true for developing countries—in India, health progress has triggered its dividend.”m In developed countries, with their already low mortality and fertility rates, a demographic dividend was rare and indicated an unusual event. That event was usually a war. The Second World War—which forced people to postpone having children, and

then have them all together in one big wave—led to a baby boom and demographic dividend in the United States. Here, the postwar dividends enabled rapid growth, and it contributed to an estimated 20 percent of GDP growth between 1970 and

, growing older. Which brings us to the question—where are the young now? In the 1970s, two very large economies were yet to experience a demographic dividend: India and China. The dividends of an autocracy, versus a democracy As early as 1938, India’s National Planning Committee had made a statement on

implementing policies that are good for you, whether you like it or not, autocratic regimes are far better than democracies. In the age of the demographic dividend, however, China’s highly effective family planning policy has looked like a case of winning the battle, but perhaps losing the war. In 1975 both

literacy, improved health indicators and economic growth. Because of a more “natural” curve, India’s dividend will last longer—we have started to experience a demographic dividend since 1980, and it will take until 2035 to peak. By this time India will have added more than 270 million people to the working

ideas.”25 This trend of an aging, shrinking population now visible across much of the developed world, is coinciding with India’s experience of a demographic dividend that will last until 2050. This opens up interesting new opportunities for the country, as the challenge of maintaining wealth in aging societies means that

, with a middle class that is already larger than the population of the United States and two thirds the size of the European Union. Our demographic dividend is set to trigger a further explosion in middle-class consumers as the boom generation comes of age, and over the next two decades India

the median age in the south would be about thirty-four—similar to Europe’s in the late 1980s.28 This means that India’s demographic dividend is actually a double hump, one of which is already nearly exhausted. The first hump of the dividend came from the south and has been

gold. Before sunset Our double hump dividend is a particular challenge—India has to ensure a fall in infant mortality and a rise in the demographic dividend in the north that is rapid enough to coincide with the waning of the dividend in the south. A slow response could create a gap

a certainty.” Like people, countries are young once. The flip side of an enormous opportunity is the consequence of failing to take advantage of it. Demographic dividends bring with them the potential for rapid growth and innovation, but also, if we fail to take advantage of them, for dramatic social and cultural

advantage. There is a growing realization within our government that India’s most critical reforms will be those that impact the quality of our upcoming demographic dividend—and it is consequently policies in education, health and labor laws that are receiving the closest attention. We can trace the change in sentiment to

jigsaw piece that is falling perfectly into place in the landscape of the global economy. The single biggest advantage in this context is India’s demographic dividend, which is well-known thanks to the landmark Goldman Sachs BRICs report that came out in 2003. I discuss this demographic opportunity with Roopa Purushothaman

projections would have,” Roopa tells me, “but the report created waves, and it drew a lot of attention to the potential effects of India’s demographic dividend.” It certainly did—I remember the somewhat premature blowing of trumpets across India when the report was released, and it formed the basis of the

young population means that more than 270 million people are expected to join the workforce over the next two decades. As Roopa points out, the demographic dividend will be the wave on which India rides to high and stable growth rates over the next four or five decades. This dividend also underlines

-end manufacturing base, new opportunities are emerging in the large-scale manufacturing sector, and these will only grow over the next decade, as China’s demographic dividend begins to wane. With our factory worker costs 80 percent lower than averages in developed markets, India can, with a deepening of reforms, become the

to expand and our price-sensitive consumers the widest possible choice of goods. And considering that India is set to cash in on its massive demographic dividend, it would be bad policy indeed to turn trade opportunities away. Trade has become especially important for our sustained development and for sufficient long-term

reform, determine India’s economic future. We cannot forget after all that the toughest questions around education are now rearing up even as India’s demographic dividend ramps up. Our response will make all the difference between the world’s largest lumpen community of illiterates in an uncertain nation, and a country

in India from a regional perspective; even as most of India has taken off with growth, middle India—the BIMARU states—languishes. Here, the emerging demographic dividend comes with a largely illiterate population. The green revolution, the white revolution and the IT revolution have, to a great extent, passed them by. And

Delhi Development Act (1957) Delhi Development Authority (DDA) Delhi Metro Delhi Public School Delhi School of Economics (DSE) Delhi University (DU) Delimitation Commission Deming awards “demographic dividend,” “Demographic Transitions and Economic Miracles in Emerging Asia” (Bloom) Deng Xiaoping Deshpande. K. de Soto, Hernando Dharavi slum Dhoni, Mahendra Singh diabetes Dickens, Charles dietary

an exact science—Bloom and Williamson’s numbers are estimates. m This also explains why sub-Saharan Africa has so far failed to experience a demographic dividend—the region has seen little gains in health and increased life expectancy; with HIV/AIDS, life expectancy is actually falling in some of these countries

Red Flags: Why Xi's China Is in Jeopardy

by George Magnus  · 10 Sep 2018  · 371pp  · 98,534 words

old-age dependency, measured by the number of those aged 15–64 as a share of the WAP, increases. This phase is known as the ‘demographic dividend’. It is open to all countries to exploit, but not all do. China, for example, is the poster country for successful exploitation. Yet, if you

replacement rate at which the population size is stable. The WAP is growing only slowly, or is falling. Old-age dependency is going up. The demographic dividend is banked. With the passage of years, we will have progressively fewer working-age people to support each older citizen, and the adverse economic and

is ageing even faster than we currently think, with further and faster increases in old-age dependency leading to more troublesome economic implications. China’s demographic dividend is banked In 2012, China’s WAP fell for the first time, by 3.45 million people, and the rate of decline is going to

emerging and developing nations. As suggested, though, the combination of the family planning policies adopted in the 1970s and the one-child policy brought the demographic dividend to China much earlier. They lowered child dependency sooner, and have now left the country with premature ageing by comparison. While India’s

demographic dividend phase is only just starting – a third of the population is aged under fifteen – China’s began in the early 1970s, and achieved its maximum

of China’s working-age population today is significantly larger than it was for these countries, meaning they were able to look forward to further demographic dividend years. China’s potential for future growth, therefore, is much less by comparison, because the share of younger workers in the economy is substantially lower

, and China’s WAP is now declining.6 Another indicator that China’s demographic dividend has been banked is the pattern of unemployment, which has probably been rising. There is a problem of measurement here because, like other emerging countries

after the mid-1990s, before which the labour market was still tightly regulated. From the 1980s until then, which coincides with the emergence of the demographic dividend, the unemployment rate averaged 3.9 per cent, according to one study. From the mid-1990s until 2009, though, reforms to state-owned enterprises, privatisation

for many citizens in the countryside, and less skilled workers in towns and cities. Is China running out of workers? The end of China’s demographic dividend, and the gradual exhaustion of surplus labour in the countryside, are changing China’s labour market dynamics slowly, but inexorably. In the process, China will

embark on a massive real-estate ownership and investment boom once. It could only enrol all of its children in secondary school once. Exploiting the demographic dividend, benefiting from rural–urban migration, and raising the share of employment in industry and manufacturing to peak levels were all achievements that could only happen

) metal ore from (i) Silk Road (i) Sub-Saharan Africa (i) ageing trap (i) see also population statistics birth rate (i) consequences of ageing (i) demographic dividends (i), (ii) family structures (i) healthcare (i) ‘iron rice bowl’ (i) mortality rates (i) non-communicable disease (i) old-age dependency ratios (i), (ii), (iii

on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms, The’ (18th Congress of the Central Committee) (i) Democratic Republic of Congo (i) demographics age-related spending (i) demographic dividends (i), (ii) effects of one-child policy abandonment (i) fertility and one-child policy (i) labour force trends (i) macroeconomic essence of ageing (i) Dempsey

) WAPs (i) immigrants see migrants income inequality (i) India Adam Smith on (i) ASEAN (i) BRI misgivings (i) BRICS (i), (ii) comparative debt in (i) demographic dividend (i) economic freedom level (i) frictions with (i) Nobel Prize (i) pushing back against China (i) regional allies of (i) SCO member (i) Indian Ocean

), (iii), (iv) pollution (i) Polo, Marco (i) Pomeranz, Kenneth (i) population statistics (i) see also ageing trap; WAP (working-age population) consequences of ageing (i) demographic dividends (i), (ii) hukou system and other effects (i) low fertility (i), (ii), (iii) migrants (i), (ii) old-age dependency ratios (i), (ii), (iii) one-child

The Great Demographic Reversal: Ageing Societies, Waning Inequality, and an Inflation Revival

by Charles Goodhart and Manoj Pradhan  · 8 Aug 2020  · 438pp  · 84,256 words

Dependency ratios rising in the AEs, mixed among the EMEs (per 100) Diagram 3.4 Life expectancy (in years) and the geographical distribution of the demographic dividend Diagram 3.5 Dependency ratio (per 100) in the different demographic cycles, % of world population Diagram 3.6 Gross domestic product contributions (% of global) in

The Demographic Cycle: Uniform Geographically, Lopsided Economically The World Bank provides a useful classification of the demographic cycle by splitting economies into those where the demographic dividend has already passed by to those that have yet to live through theirs. The four sets of economies—pre-dividend, early-dividend, late-dividend and

longevity among these economies help explain their labels. Countries with high fertility rates and low longevity are the ones that have yet to reap their demographic dividend. The expected fall in fertility rates and the increase in longevity, following the pattern in the rest of the world, will create the

demographic dividend in the future. By contrast, post-dividend economies are the ones where fertility rates have plummeted and remain near their lows, and longevity too has

converged to the global peak (Diagram 3.4). Diagram 3.4Life expectancy (in years) and the geographical distribution of the demographic dividend (Source World Bank) At first glance, the current distribution of countries across these categories is fairly widely spread—which seems to paint a promising picture

the richer ones. The concentration of economic power thus rests heavily in the hands of economies that are ageing and have already ‘used up’ their demographic dividend, as shown in Table 3.3.Table 3.3Share of growth of countries at different stages of demographic cycle 2012–2018 period GDP Growth Contributions

Africa (SSA) is only just embarking on its period of demographic tailwinds, but many parts of Africa that are quite advanced in terms of the demographic dividend are the ones that are also advanced in terms of administrative efficiency (IMF 2015). Unfortunately, governance scores in the demographically rich SSA and in Africa

). The Geography of Development. Journal of Political Economy, 126(3), 903–983.Crossref International Monetary Fund. (2015, April). How Can Sub-Saharan Africa Harness the Demographic Dividend? IMF African Department. Kotlikoff, L. J. (2019). Ageing in Global Perspective, Chapter 4. In D. E. Bloom (Ed.), Live Long and Prosper? The Economics of

Dementia treatments, R&D costs of Demographic backdrop, changing Demographic change Demographic changes, macroeconomic consequences of Demographic change, tip of the spear of Demographic cycle Demographic dividend Demographic factors Demographic factors, dominate long-run change Demographic factors, reverting to Labour’s advantage Demographic factors, unimportant in short run Demographic gridlock Demographic headwinds

The Human Tide: How Population Shaped the Modern World

by Paul Morland  · 10 Jan 2019  · 405pp  · 121,999 words

and rising per capita income. This was true both after 1868 when Japan opened itself to the world and after 1945 when it enjoyed the demographic dividend of a fast-growing population but falling fertility, allowing increased workforce participation. What is striking was the way the country’s economic dynamism seemed to

to make economic progress as the dependency ratio falls from over ninety in 1980 to an (estimated) under sixty by 2020.42 This so-called ‘demographic dividend’ is often seen to apply where the number of children relative to the workforce reduces; this may in part be responsible for the economic rise

in Mexico, it will be her choice.12 The improving standard of living in Mexico is linked to its altered demography. Mexico is enjoying the demographic dividend which often comes when a fertility rate drops. Regardless of the economy, the number of young Mexicans has stopped growing, and so the need for

world increasingly reliant on India for its contribution to global economic growth. With the decline in its fertility rate, India is set to enjoy a demographic dividend as China’s fades. Both India and China undertook cruel and unnecessary coercive steps to curb population as well as sensible ones allowing women to

make their own choices. In part because of its slower economic development, in part because of its culture, India has the prospect of a long demographic dividend to enjoy, while China faces imminent challenges of a declining workforce and an ageing population. Sub-Saharan Africa: The Final Frontier The human tide takes

Them and Us: How Immigrants and Locals Can Thrive Together

by Philippe Legrain  · 14 Oct 2020  · 521pp  · 110,286 words

PART THREE: ECONOMIC DIVIDENDS 6 The Lottery of Life 7 Dynamism Dividend 8 Diploma Dividend 9 Deftness Dividend 10 Diversity Dividend 11 Drudgery Dividend 12 Demographic Dividend 13 Debt Dividend 14 Development Dividend PART FOUR: CULTURAL CHALLENGES 15 Cultural Cornucopia 16 Irregularity 17 Identity 18 Illiberalism 19 Integration PART FIVE: SEEKING SOLUTIONS

local ones, help pay for – and care for – the growing ranks of pensioners and support population numbers, thus spurring investment and growth. That is the demographic dividend. Newcomers tend to pay more in taxes than they receive in public services and welfare benefits, subsidising locals and helping to service government debt. That

and freight labourers; and landscaping and groundskeeping workers. (Increased demand for less-skilled jobs associated with ageing is discussed in the next chapter on the demographic dividend.) In Britain, three of the top ten occupations with the highest projected employment growth between 2014 and 2024 are relatively low-skilled.11 While mostly

study did, an influx of low-skilled migrants tends to boost local living standards significantly. And young migrants also provide a hefty demographic dividend, as the next chapter explains. 12 DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDEND It is time for the exercise class at Shintomi nursing home in Tokyo. The elderly residents, seated in a semi-circle, follow

look after themselves. Foreign youngsters also complement older locals in the workforce and help pay for the growing ranks of pensioners – thus providing a hefty demographic dividend. The US, Canada and Australia have a younger demographic profile than Europe does, but they are also ageing fast. Their population most likely to need

in the EU, migrants are increasingly important for social-care provision too.24 As well as caring for the elderly, young migrants provide an additional demographic dividend: age diversity. Chapter 10 on the diversity dividend explained how diverse workforces where people with different skills, perspectives and experiences complement and learn from each

– a demand dividend it could be called.35 Conversely, businesses in small towns that incur immigration raids tend to suffer afterwards. Paying for pensioners The demographic dividend that young newcomers can provide to depressed towns with declining populations highlights their broader benefit to society: helping to support the increasing number of pensioners

an antidote to population ageing, but it can alleviate the symptoms. Full up? Attracting more migrants to support the working-age population would provide a demographic dividend. Yet some object that their country is already full up. Far from alleviating demographic pressures, they argue that immigration exacerbates the problems of a rising

.4 in Norway. Allowing more migration to rich countries would reduce the future global population, and thus future emissions. Young migrants can deliver a hefty demographic dividend, helping to care and pay for the elderly. More broadly, they can bolster public finances, providing a debt dividend, as the next chapter argues. 13

be poorly rewarded but are nonetheless essential: construction workers such as Souleymane, cleaners such as Gabriela and carers such as Monali. Without the drudgery and demographic dividends of young, industrious hands, the more glamorous and gainful industries would grind to a halt. And don’t forget our debts that they take on

Advanced Economies during the Great Recession’, IMF Staff Discussion Note 13/02, 2013. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2013/sdn1302.pdf 12 Demographic Dividend 1 Japan’s elderly accounted for 28.4 percent of its population in 2018, a proportion that is expected to reach 30 percent by 2025

Losing Control: The Emerging Threats to Western Prosperity

by Stephen D. King  · 14 Jun 2010  · 561pp  · 87,892 words

explosion. In the early 1950s, East Asia had a population of fewer than 700 million. Half a century later, the population had more than doubled. DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDENDS AND DEFICITS These numbers, although impressive, say little about the economic consequences of demographic change. Ever since Thomas Malthus first wrote his Essay on the

positions misses the main economic point. Demographic change is significant because age structures change. In any one country, it’s possible to experience both a demographic dividend and a demographic deficit. The dividend occurs when the population of working age is large in relation to the population of non-working age. Those

in East Asia over the last fifty years. High rates of economic growth per capita were partly led by productivity, but also supported by the demographic dividend. The demographic dividend is like a surfer’s wave. The wave lifts the surfer high up, it provides a moment of excitement in the surfer’s life

but, eventually, it fades away. Demographic dividends don’t occur quite so frequently as the surfer’s wave but they have a similar effect: they temporarily raise the growth rate of an

a demographic wave but, instead, working out what to do when it’s time to jump off. No longer are these nations benefiting from a demographic dividend. Instead, their leaders should be worrying about a demographic deficit. The quandary is best expressed through the use of ‘dependency ratios’, defined as the ratio

zero and fourteen (below working age) and that aged sixty-five and above (retirees) to the population aged between fifteen and sixty-four. While the demographic dividend is at work, the dependency ratio declines. As the wave crests, the ratio begins to rise, signalling the threat of a demographic deficit. Figure 8

), (ii) deflation (i), (ii), (iii) demand-management policies (i), (ii), (iii) democracy (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii) demographic deficit (i), (ii), (iii) demographic dividend (i), (ii), (iii) demographic profile (i), (ii), (iii) Deng Xiaoping (i), (ii), (iii) dependency ratios (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) Depression see Great Depression Desai, Meghnad

(i), (ii) economic instability (i) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii) state capitalism (i) trade (i), (ii) economic growth capital markets (i), (ii), (iii) demographic dividends and deficits (i) globalization (i), (ii), (iii) political economy and inequalities (i), (ii), (iii) a post-dollar financial order (i) price stability and economic instability

(i), (ii), (iii), (iv) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii) rent-seeking behaviour (i) running out of workers (i) command over limited resources (i) demographic dividends and deficits (i) demographic dynamics (i) infant mortality (i) Japan: an early lesson in ageing (i) not the time to close the borders (i) pensions

), (iii), (iv), (v) Lincoln, Abraham (i) liquidity (i), (ii), (iii) Liverpool FC (i) living standards anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii), (iii) capital controls (i) demographic dividends and deficits (i) political economy and inequalities (i), (ii) price stability and economic instability (i), (ii) scarcity (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) trade

) state capitalism (i) politics (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) Ponzi schemes (i) population ageing anarchy in capital markets (i), (ii) command over limited resources (i) demographic dividends and deficits (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) globalization (i) government debt (i) Japan (i) migration (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) nationalism (i) pensions and healthcare (i

) political economy and inequalities (i), (ii) savings (i) trade (i) population demographics China (i), (ii) demographic dividends and deficits (i) demographic dynamics (i), (ii) globalization (i), (ii) infant mortality (i) Japan (i) migration (i) pensions and healthcare (i) political economy and inequalities

(i) women’s vote (i) wool industry (i), (ii) workers see also labour nationalism (i) running out of workers (i) command over limited resources (i) demographic dividends and deficits (i) demographic dynamics (i) infant mortality (i) Japan: an early lesson in ageing (i) not the time to close the borders (i) pensions

Stakeholder Capitalism: A Global Economy That Works for Progress, People and Planet

by Klaus Schwab and Peter Vanham  · 27 Jan 2021  · 460pp  · 107,454 words

in infrastructure (though during the COVID crisis, the debt level increased by about 10 percent). Some of these countries can be considered to have a demographic dividend, meaning a population with an average age in the low twenties, that is, heavily skewed toward younger generations. This type of population pyramid could make

an equally high surge in available jobs. (The latter, however, has proven problematic in some Arab and African economies. Faced with a job shortage, a demographic dividend can rather turn into a ticking time bomb.23, 24) How some ageing Western countries are supposed to repay their debts in a slowing economy

?” Africa Renewal, UN, 2017, https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/special-edition-youth-2017/youth-dividend-or-ticking-time-bomb. 24 “EM Youth Bulge: A Demographic Dividend or Time Bomb?” Jonathan Wheatley, Financial Times, May 2013, https://www.ft.com/content/f08db252-6e84-371d-980a-30ab41650ff2. 25 National Institute of Population and

Empty Planet: The Shock of Global Population Decline

by Darrell Bricker and John Ibbitson  · 5 Feb 2019  · 280pp  · 83,299 words

, with the population doubling from twenty million to forty million between 1950 and 1985. This enormous cohort of the young proved to be Asia’s “demographic dividend,” as it was known: a huge number of eager young workers for the factories that produced the cheap transistor radios and their ilk that powered

soared in the last decades of the twentieth century, but that’s bunk—see the Philippines and most of Latin America for examples of a demographic dividend squandered.127 But Asian governments feared rather than welcomed their millions of young workers. Seduced by the siren warnings of the neo-Malthusians, they promoted

is 2.0, if that country’s statistical agency is to be believed—roughly replacement rate and much higher than South Korea’s. But whatever demographic dividend unification might bring would be overwhelmed by the challenges of integrating an impoverished and brainwashed (by their own government) population struggling to acquaint itself with

the modern world. The demographic dividend that allowed parts of Pacific Asia to leap ahead, bringing previously unimagined wealth and security to their people, is about to become the demographic drag

.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/urbanization/the_worlds_cities_in_2016_data_booklet.pdf 127 David Pilling, “The End of Asia’s Demographic Dividend,” Financial Times, 14 March 2012. https://www.ft.com/content/bd935806-6d00-11e1-a7c7-00144feab49a 128 Meagan Hare, “A Brief History of the Walkman,” Time

Palestinians, Says Statistics Bureau,” wafa, 29 December 2016. http://english.wafa.ps/page.aspx?id=gedjk6a51964762047agedjk6 448 Bessma Momani, Arab Dawn: Arab Youth and the Demographic Dividend They Will Bring (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015). Quote derived from a summary of the book presented by the author at an event sponsored

by the Brookings Institution, 28 December 2015. https://www.brookings.edu/events/arab-dawn-arab-youth-and-the-demographic-dividend-they-will-bring/ 449 Haas, “A Geriatric Peace? The Future of U.S. Power in a World of Aging Populations.” 450  Quote Investigator. http://quoteinvestigator

Breakout Nations: In Pursuit of the Next Economic Miracles

by Ruchir Sharma  · 8 Apr 2012  · 411pp  · 114,717 words

. The best example of this rosy thinking was the way the ongoing baby boom in India has been transformed from a “time bomb” into a “demographic dividend” in the minds of the elite. Until the 1990s the Indian government was still working hard to rally the nation against the dangers of overpopulation

means more workers who can drive economic growth. The shelves of Indian libraries groan with research reports that argue for the inevitable wonders of this demographic dividend, citing the Chinese example as precedent, but ignoring the huge challenge of educating all the young people and expanding the job opportunities available to the

years, all offering some spin on the basic idea that population growth drives economic growth, and proffering tips on which nations will enjoy the biggest “demographic dividend.” These fads come and go on Wall Street. In the 1970s and 1980s, every investment house had its own political economist, as a kind of

that official employment is growing strong. The consumer market in this nation of seventy-nine million is vibrant, and Turkey is one country where the “demographic dividend” of a growing young population (average age, twenty-nine) is a real plus because the economy is starting to produce a lot of new jobs

, 114, 118, 119, 123, 127, 143, 156, 173–76, 194, 205 Democratic Alliance Party, 175–76 Democratic Republic of Congo, see Congo, Democratic Republic of “demographic dividend,” 37–38, 55–56, 58, 126 demographics, 17–18, 21–22, 37–38, 55–56, 58, 126, 225, 231–32 Deng Xiaoping, 8–9, 17

, 45, 46–47, 49–51, 58 credit market in, 38, 51 debt levels in, 57–58 democracy in, 30, 48–49, 50, 55–56, 58 “demographic dividend” for, 37–38, 55–56, 58 domestic market of, 36, 43 economic reforms in, 28, 38–39, 49 economy of, 28, 35–58, 174, 204

The Rise and Fall of Nations: Forces of Change in the Post-Crisis World

by Ruchir Sharma  · 5 Jun 2016  · 566pp  · 163,322 words

No Ordinary Disruption: The Four Global Forces Breaking All the Trends

by Richard Dobbs and James Manyika  · 12 May 2015  · 389pp  · 87,758 words

India's Long Road

by Vijay Joshi  · 21 Feb 2017

The Rational Optimist: How Prosperity Evolves

by Matt Ridley  · 17 May 2010  · 462pp  · 150,129 words

How Asia Works

by Joe Studwell  · 1 Jul 2013  · 868pp  · 147,152 words

Stakeholder Capitalism: A Global Economy That Works for Progress, People and Planet

by Klaus Schwab  · 7 Jan 2021  · 460pp  · 107,454 words

Growth: From Microorganisms to Megacities

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Rebooting India: Realizing a Billion Aspirations

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