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The State and the Stork: The Population Debate and Policy Making in US History

by Derek S. Hoff  · 30 May 2012

. The first census in 1790 recorded 4 million people, and, even as birthrates began coming down in response to modernization (a process demographers call the “demographic transition”), the population had risen to 31 million by the Civil War. In 1900, 76 million citizens inhabited the United States; in 2000, 281 million. After

the one before it, and the birthrate decreased from about eight babies per woman in 1800 to four in 1900.)110 White Americans underwent the “demographic transition” to lower birthrates well in advance of women in every European nation except France. The immediate causes of the transition were later marriages and planned

, but they bought into population concerns nonetheless. To begin with, rapid overseas population growth was the defining topic in postwar demography via the maturation of “demographic transition theory.”12 First sketched by Scripps demographer Warren Thompson in 1929, and greatly refined at midcentury, transition theory holds that industrialization and economic development in

occupy the middle ground. Though they generally fretted about global population trends, the assumption that technology could improve living standards was built into their dominant demographic transition theory, and they generally distrusted the Malthusians.67 The popular press, notwithstanding an occasional foray into headlinegrabbing Malthusianism, also struck a balanced note, especially regarding

that population growth was a serious problem in the developing world, but in The Closing Circle (1971), he assumed that material prosperity would induce the demographic transition toward lower birthrates.170 Instead of a mere emphasis on fertility reduction, Commoner sought a more ecologically sensitive capitalism and a new ethos of how

idea (ironically attributable to late-career Malthus as well as Adam Smith) that wealth and freedom lower fertility. This idea was already central to midcentury demographic transition theory, and Ludwig von Mises, one of the early giants of modern conservatism, offered an important statement of it in 1949.70 Yet MKBD matured

cause zero economic growth. Interestingly, a theoretical separation between zero population growth and zero economic growth remained in the context of the developing world, since demographic transition theory assumed that economic growth there was an essential precursor to lowering birthrates. And occasionally, population economists imported this premise to the domestic debate. Following

, Principles of Economics, 2d rev. ed., vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan, 1921), 213 (quotation) and 237. However, Taussig did anticipate the modern idea of the “demographic transition” to lower fertility. See Warren C. Robinson, “F. W. Taussig’s Economic Theory of Population,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 91 (February 1977): 165–70; and

book before [Rachel Carson’s] Silent Spring” (308). 12. Demographer Paul Demeny called transition theory “the central preoccupation of modern demography” (cited in Dudley Kirk, “Demographic Transition Theory,” Population Studies 50 [November 1996]: 361). The American demography profession further retreated into a neutral-research posture after the war as it confronted the

: A Study of the Tennessee Valley Authority, Japanese Occupation, and Point Four Program” (master’s thesis, Kansas State University, 2009). 14. An excellent entry into demographic transition theory and the evolution from 1945 to 1955 of activist support for family planning programs is Dennis Hodgson, “Demography as Social Science and Policy Science

consistent policy orientation among demographers and stresses the influence of the Cold War in driving the theory’s evolution, see Simon Szreter, “The Idea of Demographic Transition Theory and the Study of Fertility Change: A Critical Intellectual History,” Population and Development Review 19 (December 1993): 659–701. For a literature review, consult

three historical fertility regimes—primitive societies with high birth and death rates, societies with rapid population increase due to improved sanitation, and societies undergoing the demographic transition. 29. The editors of Fortune in collaboration with Russell W. Davenport, U.S.A.: The Permanent Revolution (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1951), 170–72. 30

, for example, Dudley Kirk, review of The Modern Dilemma by Robert C. Cook, Population Studies 7 (July 1953): 89–90. An original theorist of the demographic transition, Kirk was a State Department official and later demographic director of the Population Council. 68. Compare, for example, the dire “Population Boom: Too Many New

of Economic Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 70 (February 1956): 65–94. 110. Committee meetings centered on the developing world and reflected the shift in demographic transition theory from the assumption that modernization and economic development were sufficient to lower population growth to the stress on direct family planning programs. 111. “Minutes

the second half of the twentieth century colonialism had robbed the developing world of its wealth without improving standards of living and thus blocked the demographic transition. 171. Ibid., chap. 8 and 233–35. 172. Quoted in Jeffrey C. Ellis, “On the Search for a Root Cause: Essentialist Tendencies in Environmental Discourse

population growth, 11, 15; doctrine of classical republicanism, 15, 21; fostering of free trade, 24 demographic bubble, 137–38, 140 demographic revisionism, 227–28, 330n11 demographic transition theory, 1, 108, 117, 207, 234, 263n43, 289n12, 289n14 demography: debates over scientific inquiry versus social action, 66; emergence as independent social science, 62; and

–4; and human capital theory, 208; and natural resources, 168; spurred by reducing inequality, 85–86; and zero population growth movement, 191–94. See also demographic transition theory; Stable Population Keynesianism (SPK) Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 141 economic regulation, support for, in 1930s encouraged by lower fertility, 96 Economic Report of

, 113, 137 Family Planning Act, 1970, 204 family planning programs, 6, 9, 228; AfricanAmerican response to, 149; backlash from Catholics and social conservatives, 149; and demographic transition theory, 108; domestic programs, 145; emergence of, in 1960s, 136, 145–49; lobbying for, by population community, 146; post-WWII support for in developing nations

; nongovermental organizations and family planning in, 246; percent of global population growth in, 1; post-WWI support for family planning programs in, 108. See also demographic transition theory 368 Lewis, W. A., Theory of Economic Growth, 124 liberal institutionalists, and population debates, 50–51 liberals: classical, 15, 18; Cold War, 130; contradictions

, 112; delayed, as check on population growth, 2, 25; delay of marriage during the 1970s, 348n30; increase in, when wages grow, 57; and nineteenth-century demographic transition in United States, 32; women trapped in old-fashioned, 153; zero population growth movement’s goal of later marriages, 176 Marshall, Alfred, 48, 93, 282n107

The Human Tide: How Population Shaped the Modern World

by Paul Morland  · 10 Jan 2019  · 405pp  · 121,999 words

fields and relied for transport on their feet and, if lucky, their shoes. But full modernity is not a necessary condition for having made the demographic transition. As the twentieth century progressed it was possible for a still relatively rural country with low levels of income and education to achieve low fertility

observed in England starting from the late eighteenth century would become a classic feature of societies in transformation, and has come to be called the ‘demographic transition’. As living conditions improve, people live longer. Yet for a time, people continue to have very large families of six or seven. Only later

data on declining fertility disguises some underlying patterns and regional variations. Within a particular country, the pace of development and therefore its position in the demographic transition was often variable. Channels of communication, cultural association and religious belief were particularly important in impacting regional trends, with low fertility rates spreading from France

were, but ultimately moral.44 This was, in a sense, a precursor of McCleary’s worry about excessive individuality, a premonition, perhaps, of the ‘second demographic transition’ which was, half a century later, to see fertility rates across much of Europe plunge far lower than anything experienced in the interwar years. It

theorised and described the post-Malthusian world. Less well remembered than Malthus, the American Frank Notestein described what would come to be known as the ‘demographic transition’. Rather than existing in a state of eternal Malthusian constraint, a country would start with a high fertility, a high mortality rate and a small

still relatively unindustrialised, had a much larger rural population and a higher although falling fertility rate, and was still in the process of completing its demographic transition. In Spain, under the authoritarian rule of Franco and the domination of the Catholic Church, fertility rates rose from two and a half to three

now somewhat beyond this point. Against this backdrop, the post-war baby boom can be seen in retrospect as an aberration–a kink–in the demographic transition, rather than a reversal. The virtuous cycle (virtuous at least to some) of new families creating demand for new goods, boosting the economy, boosting

dramatic. It was also, in most cases, starting from a lower base. Canada moved, from a fertility perspective, into the new paradigm of the second demographic transition more convincingly than the US, enjoying a fertility rate of over three children per woman already in 1945, and seeing that climb to almost four

over the long term, these differences should nevertheless be seen within an overall picture of strong general movement into the last phase of the first demographic transition and, at least in some cases, beyond it. Those countries in central Europe that became part of the West (specifically those that joined NATO

the Soviet empire), but those to the US’s immediate south, the poor of Latin America and particularly Mexico, their numbers swelling through their own demographic transition and the tantalising prospects of the American dream just a river away. Conveniently, this coincided with the nosedive in the US fertility rate. America’s

of what was once the Eastern bloc. Russia, always ambiguously partly in, partly out of Europe, was a late but rapid adopter of the European demographic transition in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and after 1945 once again the human tide turned east. 7 Russia and the Eastern Bloc from

Britain’s experience nearly a hundred years earlier, although because it was happening later, it was happening faster. Russia then experienced a classic case of demographic transition, with falling mortality rates followed by falling fertility and the gradual slowdown in the growth of the population. From the mid 1920s to the mid

Ukrainians. These were the first populations to urbanise and become fully literate, and were also, as would be expected, the areas first to experience the demographic transition–with attendant population expansion–while the Caucasus and central Asia were still stuck in the Malthusian trap. In addition, there was a degree of pressurised

in which Muslims predominated, began to undergo their own modernisation. This was no longer just socialism in one country; it was multiple stages of the demographic transition in one country. As ever, infant mortality serves as an excellent indicator of social and economic progress. Fewer than sixty babies per thousand were dying

the Soviet collapse. That the Soviet Union was not ethnically more homogeneous was due, ultimately, to demography and specifically to the differential timing of the demographic transition between the very different areas of what was the world’s largest country. Is Russia Dying? In 1991 the USSR was formally dissolved and its

Russia than in the West.32 In other ways Russia continues to be fairly unlike those countries of the West which have undergone the second demographic transition: premarital cohabitation has, at least until recently, remained relatively unusual and marriage (as well as first childbearing) remains fairly early.33 Abortion rates have

Communist regimes and its churches were for the most part marginalised or persecuted). Most Orthodox countries had by 1950 completed a large part of their demographic transition with only Russia and Serbia reporting a fertility rate of above three children per woman, and both were witnessing a rapid decline below that level

Kosovo’s total fertility rate is only around replacement level. In summary, the former Yugoslavia is an exemplary case of the destabilising impact of uneven demographic transition, striking people of different religious or ethnic backgrounds at different times. The Demography of Disappearance Throughout the Christian Orthodox world the same forces have been

which are unprecedented from a demographic point of view: Japan because it was the first non-European country to break through the Malthusian bonds into demographic transition and now has the world’s oldest population; China because it has a larger population than any other country in the world’s history. Both

century, not least the Black Death, which set the continent’s population back for centuries. The point, however, is not that nothing happened until the demographic transition, but rather that only when modernisation, however defined, commenced did populations follow a more or less uniform and predictable path, at least for a period

broadly be termed the end of feudalism and the birth of the modern state. At first industrial and demographic progress (that is, progress through the demographic transition) was slow, but both accelerated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Official figures for this period suggest rising birth rates, from 25.4

suggest rising mortality, other sources suggest it was dropping, which would be more in line with what would be expected in the early stages of demographic transition.9 The latter does indeed seem more likely: however basic conditions were in the cities of early industrial Japan, conditions for the peasant were probably

gathering from 1920, the picture developed of a gradually falling birth rate accompanying increasing urbanisation, a sharply falling mortality rate and therefore, in line with demographic transition theory, a fast rise in the population.16 Although the growth in population was driven by improving economic circumstances, the discourse in Japan showed an

. It was until recently generally believed that China was closer than Japan to the pre-modern norm assumed by Malthusians and by proponents of the demographic transition theory.59 However, even this has now been challenged, with some historians suggesting that the Chinese, like the Japanese, may have been managing, by

in this region in recent decades. Just as neither the Anglo-Saxons nor Europeans more generally had a monopoly on the early, expansive stages of demographic transition, so they have had no monopoly on the later stages, with smaller family sizes leading to older and eventually shrinking societies across many other parts

Italians occupying Egypt and North Africa and the Germans increasingly influencing the Ottoman Empire itself; with European occupation and influence often came the start of demographic transition. In this region as elsewhere the data may be imperfect, but it is notable that Ottoman censuses began in 1831, not so long after

gone from living to their mid thirties to surviving into their early seventies since the middle of the twentieth century). Meanwhile, typical of countries in demographic transition, fertility rates at first held up: Iraqi and Saudi women were typical in continuing to have six children each well into the 1980s. The result

fivefold in not much more than half a century.18 It is this phenomenon that lies at the heart of the demographic whirlwind: namely, later demographic transitions have tended to be significantly more intense and result in greater population growth, with countries in the post-war developing world, including in the Middle

Japanese peers in associating early marriage and childbearing with conservatism, religiosity and lifestyle limitations. Even Islamic societies, it seems, are not immune to the second demographic transition, in which fertility choices are more a reflection of personal values and preferences than of purely material conditions, and many eschew parenthood altogether to prioritise

large families. Israeli Jewish fertility is more extraordinary. Early Zionist immigrants to Palestine were predominantly from east European Jewish families who had already undergone a demographic transition, and when Jews from the Middle East joined them in Israel after 1948, their birth rate too fell rapidly to what would be considered ‘normal

is typical not only of the region (it is almost inevitable, of course, given its regional preponderance) but also of countries around the world. Its demographic transition has occurred along with economic development, and while fertility fell sharply so life expectancy lengthened well before the arrival of high levels of prosperity. The

of the last quarter of a century. It is worth noting that while Sri Lanka was one of the first developing countries to experience the demographic transition, its fertility rate has stabilised at around replacement level, unlike many countries in the developed world, which have had fertility rates that undershot replacement

through which eventually fertility rates fall towards replacement level. After that, the bets are off; it is far from clear, for example, that the second demographic transition of personal choice, individualism and sub-replacement fertility will become truly universal. Perhaps we are simply too close to events to be able to see

relatively cheaply been able to adopt the techniques, technologies and policies which reduce mortality. Africa south of the Sahara is the final frontier of the demographic transition. This can be seen simply from the data produced by the UN in 2017. Of the forty-eight states and territories with fertility rates of

the small European family, demographic momentum will remain powerful for some time to come. And as we have seen, many civilisations which have experienced the demographic transition later have experienced it more intensely, with higher population growth at some periods in the twentieth century than, say, Britain ever managed in the nineteenth

global population has grown less white and the trend is set to continue. It amounts to a ‘first mover disadvantage’: those who went through the demographic transition earliest experienced the least growth and are set to decline as a share of global population. The decline in people of European origin can be

only to how manpower matters, but why the perception of population shifts may be even more consequential than the shifts themselves. By the time the demographic transition runs its course, nations’ ethnic and religious politics, the balance of global power, and the world economy will have been radically upended. If you

Tim, The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1997 Kaa, D. J. van de, Europe’s Second Demographic Transition, Washington DC, Population Reference Bureau, 1987 Kalbach, Warren E., and McVey, Wayne, The Demographic Bases of Canadian Society, Toronto, McGraw Hill Ryerson, 1979 Kanaaneh, Rhoda

Robert (eds), The Changing Population of Europe, Oxford, Blackwell, 1993 Novikoff-Priboy, A. (trans. Paul, Eden and Cedar), Tsushima, London, Allen & Unwin, 1936 Obuchi, Hiroshi, ‘Demographic Transition in the Process of Japanese Industrialization’, in Smitka, Michael (ed.), Japanese Economic History 1600–1960: Historical Demography and Labor Markets in Prewar Japan, New York

The Demography of Africa, Westport, CT, Praeger, 1996 Tauber, Irene B., The Population of Japan, Princeton University Press, 1958 Teitelbaum, Michael, The British Fertility Decline: Demographic Transition in the Crucible of the Industrial Revolution, Princeton University Press, 1984 , ‘U.S. Population Growth in International Perspective’, in Westoff (ed.), Towards the End, pp

Schofield, R. S., English Population History from Family Reconstitution 1580–1837, Cambridge University Press, 1997 Zakharov, Sergei, ‘Russian Federation: From the First to the Second Demographic Transition’, Demographic Research, 19 (24), 2008, pp. 907–72 Zubrin, Robert, Merchants of Despair: Radical Environmentalists, Criminal Pseudo-Scientists and the Fatal Cult of Antihumanism,

, 89 data, 33–5 Davy, Sir Humphry, 55 death rate: effect on demography, 29–31; global fall, 104, 107–8, 266; and life expectancy, 33 demographic transition: in Japan, 196–7, 199; Notestein on, 132, 135; and population stabilisation, 111; in Russia, 167; second, 141–2; in USA, 140 demography: and

(1745–6), 46 Japan: adopts European practices, 120; centenarians, 208; death rate, 30, 33; defeat (1945), 211; defeats Russia (1904–5), 162, 195–6, 201; demographic transition, 196, 199; economic decline, 209; economy and population size, 24, 203; extra-marital births, 204; falling birth rates, 18, 205–6; fertility rate falls, 204

–13; and historical change, 7, 9–10; and international tensions, 94; post-First World War increase, 102–3; and racial quality, 112–15; stabilisation and ‘demographic transition’, 111, 132 potato: as staple in Ireland, 52 Protestants: fertility rates, 142, 146 Puerto Rico: fertility rate, 269; median age, 275 Putin, Vladimir, 178,

single-child women, 179; deaths from diseases, 181; deaths from wars, famines and purges, 168–9; defeated by Japan (1904–5), 162, 195–6, 201; demographic transition, 167; ethnic Germans emigrate to Germany, 184; ethnic and regional differences, 170–2, 175–7, 184–5; fall in child death rates, 17, 171; female

Grand Transitions: How the Modern World Was Made

by Vaclav Smil  · 2 Mar 2021  · 1,324pp  · 159,290 words

, open up new capabilities, and result in new (second- and third-order) impacts and consequences. For example, how does the late stage of the demographic transition affect the advanced state of the food transition? A simple mechanistic view would be that, everything else being equal, countries with reduced fertilities (that resulted

plague (caused by bacterium Yersinia pestis), and comparable regional losses were inflicted between 1618 and 1648 by the Thirty Years’ War (Parker 1984). During demographic transitions, the gradual decline of birth rates lags behind the progressing decline in death rates, and this lag produces relatively high rates of population growth. At

, the result was a temporary period of hyperbolic growth that ended during the late 1960s and has been followed by declining rates of increase. With demographic transitions now accomplished (or significantly advanced) in every major region except for sub-Saharan Africa, low fertilities are accompanied by low mortalities, resulting, once again,

in turn, influenced by a multitude of other contributions and interferences. Examples of these realities abound. The first topical chapter of this book deals with demographic transitions. How did this fundamental shift in family and social dynamics, whose consequences have affected every aspect of modern civilization, begin? Was it triggered by a

eventually led to epochal outcomes began at different times in different countries (and continents), and why some of them had proceeded relatively slowly (particularly the demographic transition that took many generations to unfold in some countries), while others (particularly some shifts dependent on technical innovation and also some dietary transitions) were accomplished

stylized simplification (Figure 2.1) but, as expected, actual national sequences show many departures from this idealized pattern. Figure 2.1 Simplified trajectory of the demographic transition, showing successive declines of death and birth rates and the resulting temporary increase in natural growth rate. In the long run, the fortunes of any

most fundamental demographic evidence. In their eagerness to expose the inability of a generalized model to replicate many nation-specific historical experiences the critics of demographic transition err by questioning the very existence of such an undeniable, and a hugely consequential, phenomenon. In order to understand the process and to appreciate

as many early events and actions carry long-term consequences and determine future feedbacks. They are diffusion processes with different mechanisms and specific adoption rates. Demographic Transition The concept of this epochal population shift was first outlined in 1929 by an American demographer, Warren Thompson (Thompson 1929), and it was succinctly defined

poor diet creating temporary sterility and causing long intervals between births (Mosk 1977). Consequently, there is no reason to reject the concept of a demographic transition for Japan. Similarly, some demographers and historians have maintained that China’s pre-transitional marital fertility was lower than in Europe and that both the

and other reasons, the option made highly acceptable thanks to low infant and childhood mortalities. Transition trajectories American demographer Frank Notestein identified three stages of demographic transition that describe the basic dynamics, and this division became a common model of the process (Notestein 1945). Countries where the transition has not started experience

replacement level and its drop eventually results in population decline. Idealized illustration of this sequence has been commonly reproduced to represent the typical process of demographic transition (see Figure 2.1)—but reconstructions of actual long-term trajectories for a number of countries with reliable historic data show many departures from the

familial to national and global—but the driving forces of this epochal shift cannot be reduced to just a few obvious factors. Explaining demographic transition Search for the causes of demographic transitions has proceeded both along particularistic and synergetic lines but, as already noted in the opening chapter, it failed to produce an explanation

those impacts have amounted to the most fundamental transformations of modern civilization, none more so than the rapid multiplication of global population. Consequences of demographic transition The focus should start with the profound effects the process has had on the lives of children and families. Reduced suffering and pain have been

the world) has further social and economic repercussions ranging from increasing divorce rates to demand for state-supported child care. Two major outcomes of demographic transition that have affected every aspect of economic and social development as well as the quality of the environment have been the unprecedented growth of human

dividend in particular. This approach recognizes the enormous impacts of existential requirements and economic behavior at different stages of life. In the earliest periods of demographic transition, economies have to take care of large cohorts of children, and the diversion of resources to requisite health care and schooling slows down the

provide much of the capital for further economic expansion. Higher disposable incomes create new demand and economies profit from this virtuous cycle. Since the 1950s demographic transition has produced this temporary dividend in many countries in Asia and Latin America. East Asian countries have been its greatest beneficiaries, because their total dependency

animal feeding operations. The next focus will be on shifts in food supply at the retail level and on notable nutritional transitions. Much like the demographic transition, the dietary transition has followed trajectories characterized by universal shifts (most notably decreased consumption of staple grains and legumes and increased intakes of lipids and

htm BLS. 2018. Service-providing industries. https://www.bls.gov/iag/tgs/iag07.htm Blue, L. and T.J. Espenshade. 2011. Population momentum across the demographic transition. Population and Development Review 37:721–747. BNEF (Bloomberg New Energy Finance). 2020. Electric Vehicle Outlook 2020. https://about.bnef.com/electric-vehicle-outlook/ Bocquier

, P. and R. Costa. 2015. Which transition comes first? Urban and demographic transitions in Belgium and Sweden. Demographic Research 33. doi:10.4054/DemRes.2015.33.48 Boeing. 2013. World class supplier quality. http://787updates.newairplane.com/787

demand to peak in 2040. https://www.enerdata.net/publications/daily-energy-news/cnpc-expects-chinese-energy-demand-peak-2040.html Coale, A. 1973. The demographic transition reconsidere. In: International Population Conference, Leige 1973, vol. 1, International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, pp. 53–57. Cobbett, J.P. 1824.

R.J. and R. Rosenberg. 2008. Spreading dead zones and consequences for marine ecosystems. Science 321:926–929. Diebolt, C. and F. Perrin. 2017. Understanding Demographic Transitions An Overview of French Historical Statistics. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Dikötter, F. 2010. Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958

/images/documents/plants-animals/animals/canetoads/20140470_CaneToadStrategyWA2014-19_FINWEB.pdf Dribe, M. et al. 2014. Socioeconomic status and fertility before, during, and after the demographic transition: An introduction. Demographic Research 31:161–182. Duchène, C. et al. 2017. La consommation de viande en France. Paris: CIV. Duesterberg, T.J. and

cities: An explanation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114:739–767. Galor, O. 2011a. Unified Growth Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Galor, O. 2011b. The Demographic Transition: Causes and Consequences. Cambridge, MA: NBER. Gartner. 2018. Gartner says worldwide sales of smartphones recorded first ever decline during the fourth quarter of 2017. https

Hanley, S.B. 1974. Fertility, mortality, and life expectancy in pre-modern Japan. Population Studies 28:127–142. Hara, T. 2015. A Shrinking Society Post-Demographic Transition in Japan. Tokyo: Springer. Haraguchi, N. et al. 2016. The importance of manufacturing in economic development: Has this changed? World Development 93:293–315. Harari

2013. Fiscal sustainability under an aging population in Japan: A financial market perspective Public Policy Review 9:735–750. O’Sullivan, J.N. 2013. Revisiting demographic transition: Correlation and causation in the rate of development and fertility decline. Paper presented at the 27th IUSSP International Population Conference, 26–31 August 2013, Busan

of ideas: Widespread patenting and invention during the English Industrial Revolution. The Journal of Economic History 50:349–362. Szreter, S. 1993. The idea of demographic transition and the study of fertility change: A critical intellectual history. Population and Development Review 19:659–701. Takahashi, E. 1984. Secular trend in milk consumption

and B.J. McElroy. 2007. The impact of humans on continental erosion and sedimentation. Geological Society of America Bulletin 119:140–156. Willekens, F. 2014. Demographic Transitions in Europe and the World. Rostock: Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research. Willett, W. et al. 2019. Food in the Anthropocene: The EAT–Lancet Commission

air travel, 282 anthropogenic land-use changes, 219–20 arable land, 266–67 city growth, 210–11 deforestation, 109–10, 212–13 demographic dividend, 45 demographic transition, 31 economic growth, 161 electrification, 139 environmental pollution, 228 fertility rates, 32, 38, 40, 264 food supplies, need for, 268–69 healthcare, 48 hydrocarbon

235 plastics, pollution from, 232 soil acidification, 233 wastewater treatment, 230 wilderness area, 221 China, population transitions children, desired number of, 32 demographic burden, 56 demographic transitions, speed of, 36 fertility rates, 33, 36, 38, 40, 43 household registration system, 61–62 intranational migrations, 58–59 old-age dependency ratios, future possibilities

126 Dutch Republic, energy sources, 115. See also Netherlands Dyson, F., 257 Dyson, Tim, 15, 25, 39 Earth System, 208 East Asia demographic dividend, 45 demographic transition, 31 dietary transition, 88 draft animals, 82 fertility rates, 36, 43 food variety, 103 fruit supply, 97 international tourist arrivals, 196 literacy, 247–48 marital

, 123, 128, 193 transition from phytomass fuels to coal, 114–15 England/Britain/United Kingdom, population transitions birth rates, 36 children, desired number of, 32 demographic transitions, speed of, 36 fertility rates, 41 immigration, 61 life expectancy, 49 medical advances, impact of, 47 population of, 35, 265 urban population growth, 59

Ethiopia food, yield gaps, 267 inequalities, 66 material consumption, 286 meat consumption, 93–94 EU. See European Union Europe. See also Eastern Europe; specific countries demographic transitions, 37 industrialization, 179 life expectancy, 48 literacy, 247–48 marital patterns, 35 monocultures, 109–10 premodern, legume consumption, 90 sugar consumption, 96 windmills, 127–

30, 266 large cities, 60 medieval cities, population of, 57 old-age dependency ratios, future possibilities of, 264–65 population aging and declines, 56 second demographic transition, 37 urban population growth, 59 European Union aging societies in, reliance on public-sector transfers, 51 commuting in, 195 compound feeds, use of, 83

to-coal transition, 118 France, environmental transitions, reforestation in, 212 France, generational transitions, 3–5, 4f, 5f, 6f France, population transitions birth rates, 35, 36 demographic transitions in, 36 elderly population, 51 fertility rates, 37, 41 health insurance programs, 47 life expectancy and longevity, 48–49 population declines, 265 urban population growth

70–113 economic transitions, 152–204 environmental transitions, 205–43 interactive nature of, 57–58 introduction to, 1–24 outcomes and outlooks, 244–96 population (demographic) transitions, 25–69 study of, 14–24 Great Leap Forward (China), 160 Great Pacific Garbage Patch (GPGP), 232 Greece fertility rates, 38 meat supply, 92

interpersonal electronic interaction, 203 invasive species, 227–28 inverse power formulas, 62f, 62 IPBES (Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services), 253 Iran demographic transitions, speed of, 36 economic sectors, 167–68 fertility rates, 32, 36–37 Ireland, famines, 99–100 iron and ironmaking, 115–17, 118, 144, 207,

in agriculture, 73–77 North America. See also Canada; Mexico; United States childhood nutrition, 101–2 croplands, 214, 217 dead zones, 111–12 deforestation, 212 demographic transition, 31 dietary transition, 88 ecosystem changes, 209–10 feed crops, 83–84 fertility rates, 37 fires, 243 food transportation, greenhouse gases from, 112 food waste

58–59 industrialization, 179 life expectancy, 48 malnutrition, 102 meat exports from, 92 natural gas, 121–22 pastures, 214–15 primary energy consumption, 273 second demographic transition, 37 services, deindustrialization and transition to, 185 staple grains, 89 sweeteners, 95 wastewater treatment, 230 water usage, 189–90 wilderness area, 221 wood supply, 115

Union anthropogenic land-use changes, 219–20 boreal forests, 212 cereal grain exports, 270 city growth, 210–11 croplands, 214, 217 crude oil use, 121 demographic transitions in, 36 economic development, 169 energy intensity, 150 energy sources, 117–18 famines, 99–100 fertility rates, 37, 38 gas lighting, 138 grassland conversions,

81 Somalia, fertility rates, 32 Sombart, Werner, 190–91 South, P. F., 267 South Africa inequalities, 66 material consumption, 286 obesity in, 106 South Korea demographic transitions, speed of, 36 economic growth and development, 45–46, 160 economic sectors, 167–68 fertility rates, 36, 43 happiness rankings, 192–93 industrialization, 179 longevity

R. J., 156 Sumatra, wilderness area, 221 Sun, lifecycle of, 244 Svensksund, Second Battle of, 10 Swan, Joseph Wilson, 135, 140 Sweden birth rates, 35 demographic transitions, speed of, 36 employment transition, 153 energy intensity, 150 energy sources, 117 fertility rates, 37, 41 forests, 212 fuelwood use, 115–17 life expectancy and

materials, pollution from, 231–33 synthetic species (designed organisms), 260 Syria, emigration to European Union, 61 Szreter, Simon, 25–26 Taiwan air conditioners, 142–44 demographic transitions, speed of, 36 economic growth and development, 45–46, 160 economic sectors, 167–68 fertility rates, 36, 43 industrialization, 179 population aging, 56, 264–65

Longevity: To the Limits and Beyond (Research and Perspectives in Longevity)

by Jean-Marie Robine, James W. Vaupel, Bernard Jeune and Michel Allard  · 2 Jan 1997

a widespread and conclusive stabilization of the world's population, the focus of recent United Nations' forecasts, is obviously mer-ely a reference model - the demographic transition. It is fairly plausible that initially populations will tend to follow this model. However, on the one hand, this is by no means certain and

As early as 1966, during the 1st European Demographic Conference convened by the Council of Europe even before the prospect of a generalization of the demographic transition became plausible enough to be adopted as the central hypothesis of the UN forecasts, Jean Bourgeois-Pichat assumed that progress in the field of biology

morbidity 110 D Data quality 92, 93, 103 Death rate 1, 3, 5, 8, 11, 15, 19, 22, 53, 54, 55, 92 Dementia 106-109 Demographic transition 29 Disease 107 DNA repair 70, 71 H Health status 91, 92, 101, 102, 103 Heritability 72, 121, 122 I Infant mortality 125, 126 180

Immigration worldwide: policies, practices, and trends

by Uma Anand Segal, Doreen Elliott and Nazneen S. Mayadas  · 19 Jan 2010  · 492pp  · 70,082 words

; Villasin & Phillips, 1994) for its sexist and classist regulations, such as the ‘‘livein’’ requirement. The province of Quebec has its own immigration regulations. Canada’s Demographic Transition Primary Sending Countries The peak years of immigration in Canadian history were 1913, when more than 400,000 newcomers came to Canada, and 1957, when

Common Wealth: Economics for a Crowded Planet

by Jeffrey Sachs  · 1 Jan 2008  · 421pp  · 125,417 words

Climate Change 5. Securing Our Water Needs 6. A Home for All Species PART THREE The Demographic Challenge 7. Global Population Dynamics 8. Completing the Demographic Transition PART FOUR Prosperity for All 9. The Strategy of Economic Development 10. Ending Poverty Traps 11. Economic Security in a Changing World PART FIVE Global

, who say that population growth has already gone too far to avoid disaster; and those (including myself) who believe in the importance of spurring the demographic transition to lower fertility rates in the poorest countries. Population optimists maintain that there are no real bounds to the Earth’s population because technology can

this interpretation, the test is not the first two hundred years of economic growth but the possibility of smooth landing this century. The advocates of demographic transition, such as myself, remain cautiously optimistic. This group in the middle of the debate acknowledges that good ideas and man-made capital can substitute, though

technological advancement versus population growth and on the ability of man-made capital (for example, irrigation) to substitute for natural processes. Advocates of speeding the demographic transition emphasize the need for public efforts to speed the voluntary reduction of fertility rates as rapidly as possible to achieve the stabilization of the world

to suggest to them, and to us, that reducing the TFR from very high levels is part of their own security and ours. SPEEDING THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION The world is not locked in a demographic straitjacket but is instead in a transition, albeit one that is stretched out over many decades and

with large differences across regions. The core idea is known as the demographic transition, illustrated in Figure 7.6. A society begins with very high mortality rates (especially of young children) and very high fertility rates. The population is

demographers call the crude birth and death rates, measured as births and deaths per one thousand of total population. According to the theory of the demographic transition, the child mortality rate declines ahead of the total fertility rate. For example, the spread of immunizations, improved food production, safer water supply, and availability

population in twenty-three years. Roughly speaking, a 3 percent annual growth rate corresponds with a net reproductive rate of around 2. Figure 7.6: Demographic Transition Model Source: Haggett (1975) Let’s take the case of Kenya during 2005–10 as an illustration. The under-five mortality rate has declined to

TFR of 5 and an under-five mortality rate of 104 per 1,000 is just a sliver under 2 (1.96). The upshot of demographic transition theory is that the total fertility rate declines with a lag, leading to a massive onetime bulge of population as the society transitions from high

choose to have only two children. THE COMPELLING CASE FOR FERTILITY DECLINE There are four compelling reasons why the poorest countries need to speed the demographic transition, and why we need to help them do it. The first, and most important, is that poor families cannot surmount extreme poverty without a decline

are among the most private of all decisions and the least amenable to government action (except, perhaps, by coercion). Yes, societies will pass through a demographic transition, but it would seem to be one that can, should, and will be determined by individual choices, not by government policies. Indeed, for today’s

rich countries of Western Europe and the United States, the demographic transition that took place during the twentieth century occurred largely through such decision making of individual households. Yet the same has not been the case in

the poorer countries. Their demographic transitions, where they have occurred, have typically been accelerated, and even triggered, by proactive government policies. Since governments have played a key role in the rapid

, a decade or so later, in North Africa as well. Countries with higher levels of literacy, women’s rights, and per capita incomes achieved the demographic transition earlier, but family planning programs also provoked rapid changes in countries with pervasive rural poverty, rigid gender roles, and widespread illiteracy. The transitions to low

progress, improve environmental protection and reduce unsustainable consumption and production patterns are mutually reinforcing.” The plan makes clear that one objective is “to facilitate the demographic transition as soon as possible in countries where there is an imbalance between demographic rates and social, economic and environmental goals,” thereby contributing “to the stabilization

financial goals have not yet been met. We now turn to reviving the global cooperation on family planning and fertility reduction. Chapter 8 Completing the Demographic Transition SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THIS DECADE, population policy has been hijacked by shortsighted ideology. Leaders of the U.S. religious right have called for ending

, the world’s population rises to 9.2 billion by 2050 and is roughly stable thereafter. A plausible policy alternative is to assume a faster demographic transition in the developing countries, as presented in the UN’s low-fertility forecast. This low-fertility scenario puts the TFR at 0.5 lower than

and underfunding of global efforts, we are much more likely to find ourselves in more real wars instead. Table 8.1: Global Population with Faster Demographic Transition (billions) Source: Data from the UN Population Division (2007). The low-fertility forecast is for the less-developed countries only. The developed-country population forecast

, education, and infrastructure) with aid for family planning. We should view the fertility transition and the economic development takeoff as a package deal. COMPLETING THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION Family planning, a worldwide policy-led effort since the 1950s to empower households to reduce their fertility rates through access to contraception and health services

from World Bank (2007) Education of Girls Girls’ education has time and again been shown to be one of the decisive entry points into the demographic transition. Girls’ education has multiple effects, all leading in the same direction: lower fertility (see Figure 8.3, which shows lower TFR in countries with higher

to home production. While urbanization is not a policy target per se, the trend to urbanization is likely to be a factor in speeding the demographic transition. Legal Abortion Even with widespread contraception available, many pregnancies will be accidental and unwanted. Abortions will take place, legally or illegally, as has been found

is ironic that the Bush administration’s attitudes toward family planning are in many ways more fundamentalist than Iran’s. Figure 8.4: Iran’s Demographic Transition Source: Data from World Bank (2007) AFRICA’S PROSPECTS Africa’s fertility decline lags behind the rest of the world. The progress is real, but

no social safety net. In addition to these standard factors, there are other more subtle barriers that have contributed to the lag in Africa’s demographic transition. First, since Africa has by far the highest disease burden in the world and the highest rates of mortality of infants and young children, the

, and Barkat-e-Khuda, “The Future of Family Planning Programs,” Issues in Family Planning 33, no. 1 (March 2002): 1–10. CHAPTER 8: COMPLETING THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION 186 Correlation does not prove: To show lower mortality causes lower fertility see Jeffrey Sachs, Dalton Conley, and Gordon C. McCord, “Africa’s Lagging

Demographic Transition: Evidence from Exogenous Impacts of Malaria Ecology and Agricultural Technology,” NBER Working Paper 12892, February 2007. Whether the effect of reducing the fertility is greater

33, no. 1 (March 2002): 76–86. 192 thereby leading to an indirect: Jeffrey D. Sachs, Dalton Conley, and Gordon C. McCord, “Africa’s Lagging Demographic Transition: Evidence from Exogenous Impacts of Malaria and Agricultural Technology,” NBER Working Paper Series, no. 12892, February 2007. 194 importance of privacy to: Caldwell and Caldwell

, 1972, pp. 339–63. Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. http://www.ctbto.org. Conley, Dalton, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Gordon C. McCord. “Africa’s Lagging Demographic Transition: Evidence from Exogenous Impacts of Malaria and Agricultural Technology.” NBER Working Paper Series, no. 12892, February 2007. The Convention on Biological Diversity. http://www.biodiv

Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration and the Future of White Majorities

by Eric Kaufmann  · 24 Oct 2018  · 691pp  · 203,236 words

billion. We hit 3 billion in 1960. Now 7.5 billion of us share the planet. The West was the first to go through its demographic transition from high birth and death rates to low birth and death rates. East Asia soon followed, and now much of the rest of the world

apart from a few spots in Central Africa and West Asia is following suit. During a demographic transition, death rates fall first and there is a lag period when birth rates are temporarily higher than death rates, producing a population explosion. However, the

historic demographic transition in Europe and its settler offshoots was different to that now taking place in the global South. Europe’s transition began around 1750 and lasted

times that of Denmark. Multiplied across many countries, this explains why the West’s share of world population dropped so rapidly after 1950.20 The demographic transition is important for politics because it unfolds at different times between world regions, between nations and even between ethnic groups within nations. In Northern Ireland

, for instance, Protestants entered the demographic transition sixty to eighty years before Catholics. That meant Catholic birth rates were higher than Protestant ones for decades, which is why the Catholic share of

, which played a part in the violence which gripped the province between 1969 and 1994.21 In other words, it is the unevenness of the demographic transition between groups which carries political implications.22 Now let’s zoom out to the global level. The number of children a woman bears over her

West Asia, where TFR is well above the 2.1 level needed to replace the population. Some sixty-five countries are still early in their demographic transition with the average woman expected to bear between 3.5 and 7 children over her lifetime. The developed world – the West plus East Asia – has

Flower Power and the personal computer. It’s therefore fitting that it was the first major state to undergo what David Coleman terms the ‘third demographic transition’ from predominantly white to ‘majority minority’. The state was 80 per cent non-Hispanic white as recently as 1970 and fell below the 50 per

the country have grown substantially since the end of apartheid in 1994. Given its proximity to very poor countries at an early stage of their demographic transitions, and with weak border controls across the continent, the potential for large-scale unauthorized immigration is much greater than in Europe or the United States

that whites have lower birth rates than non-whites can be dispensed with fairly quickly. Almost all modern populations are in some stage of the demographic transition to low birth and death rates. The transition took place first in the West, between the late eighteenth century and the mid-twentieth century. It

International Security and National Politics, Boulder, Colo., 2012: Paradigm, p. 182. 13. D. Coleman, ‘Immigration and ethnic change in low-fertility countries – towards a new demographic transition?’, paper presented to the Population Association of America annual meeting, Philadelphia, 31 March–2 April 2005. 14. ‘World Population to 2300’, New York, 2004: United

The Journey of Humanity: The Origins of Wealth and Inequality

by Oded Galor  · 22 Mar 2022  · 426pp  · 83,128 words

Education in the Pre-Industrial Era Industrialisation and Human Capital The Advent of Universal Public Education Child Labour No More 5 Metamorphosis Triggers of the Demographic Transition Family Tales Phase Transition 6 The Promised Land The Twilight of Industry The Age of Growth Growth and Environmental Degradation Coda: Resolving the Mystery of

people across the continents, the subsequent transition of societies from hunter-gatherer tribes to sedentary agricultural communities, and more recently the Industrial Revolution and the Demographic Transition.[5] Human history is rich with countless and fascinating details: mighty civilisations that rose and fell; charismatic emperors who led armies to massive conquests and

more precipitously.[2] This dramatic collapse in fertility rates along with the fall in mortality rates, which often preceded it, have become known as the Demographic Transition. The Demographic Transition shattered one of the cornerstones of the Malthusian mechanism. Suddenly, higher incomes were no longer channelled towards sustaining an expanded population; ‘bread surpluses’ no

the birth of the modern era of sustained growth.[3] Figure 8. Children per Woman in Western European Nations, 1850–1920[4] Why did the Demographic Transition occur? From our contemporary vantage point, one might suppose contraception was a major factor. In the absence of modern forms of birth control, the most

and Rome.[8] But since all these methods of managing fertility had been present throughout history and had not changed on the eve of the Demographic Transition, the catalysts for such a major, sudden and widespread decline in fertility must have been more profound. Triggers of the

Demographic Transition The Rise in the Return on Human Capital As seen in the previous chapter, the growing importance of education in response to a rapidly changing

–quality trade-off that parents had been forced to wrestle with throughout human history shifted – and thus precipitated the dramatic decline in fertility of the Demographic Transition.[9] Similar patterns can be observed in earlier periods of human history. In the first century BCE, for example, when Jewish sages decreed that all

that rises in household income in the Malthusian epoch and in early phases of industrialisation had precisely this outcome. However, at the time of the Demographic Transition there were additional forces at play.[11] The new opportunities available specifically to those with an education led parents to invest a higher proportion of

industrialised nations towards the end of the nineteenth century. Nor is it any coincidence that this took place in parallel with the onset of the Demographic Transition. However, there was an additional important factor at play: the narrowing of the gender wage gap and the rise in women’s paid employment. The

and an increase in migration from rural to urban regions, and that these factors contributed to the decline in fertility in the course of the Demographic Transition. But how did these grand transformations affect the daily lives of ordinary families? Family Tales Consider three fictional families, each representing the typical experience of

Revolution, a period in which increased income led to even larger families and sporadic training of children. Finally, the third family lives in the post–Demographic Transition era, marked by a reduction in the number of children per family, increased investment in their education, and significant improvements in living conditions. The first

of technological progress – do not recede over the next few generations but only intensify. The descendants of the Jones family will have lived through the Demographic Transition and been liberated from the Malthusian trap a little earlier than the Olssons, towards the end of the nineteenth century, while those of the Kelly

family will have broken free of it soon after them in the early part of the twentieth century. At last, thanks to the Demographic Transition, humanity has undergone its phase transition. Phase Transition From the dawn of humankind, technological progress helped generate a gradual increase in population size as well

technological environment, along with the rise in life expectancy, the decline in child labour, and the reduction of the gender wage gap set off the Demographic Transition, liberating economic growth from the counterbalancing effects of population growth. At last, societies escaped from the long arms of the Malthusian octopus, allowing living conditions

. This progress is captured crudely by the unprecedented growth of income per capita that has taken place across the globe since the onset of the Demographic Transition. Between 1870 and 2018, worldwide average income per capita surged by a previously inconceivable factor of 10.2 to $15,212 a year. Income per

a boom in international trade. As ever, this diffusion of technologies intensified both the demand for and the value of human capital formation, bringing the Demographic Transition to every corner of Planet Earth. Between 1976 and 2016, worldwide growth in human capital investment led to a rise in literacy among the world

fluctuations due to major crises, economic growth in Western Europe and North America over the past 150 years – that is, since the onset of the Demographic Transition – has maintained an average pace of about 2 per cent a year. In one of his most famous aphorisms, the British economist John Maynard Keynes

‘demographic dividend’) – would permit significant reductions in the projected level of carbon emissions. In fact, the decline in fertility rates since the onset of the Demographic Transition has been reducing the burden of exponential population growth on the environment. So while the Industrial Revolution triggered our current period of global warming, the

concurrent onset of the Demographic Transition may well serve to mitigate its effects, diminishing the potential trade-off between economic growth and environmental preservation. Essentially, sustaining economic growth while mitigating further

in the gender wage gap increased the cost of child rearing and contributed further to the attraction of smaller families. These joint forces triggered the Demographic Transition, severing the persistent positive association between economic growth and birth rates. This dramatic drop in fertility liberated the development process from the counterbalancing effects of

the Neolithic Revolution spread from a few hubs such as the Fertile Crescent and Yangtze River to other regions, so the Industrial Revolution and the Demographic Transition began in Western Europe and over the course of the twentieth century rippled out across most of the globe, raising prosperity levels wherever they reached

human species – the evolution of the human brain, the two monumental revolutions (the Neolithic and the Industrial), the growth of human capital investment and the Demographic Transition, the major trends that made us the dominant species on Planet Earth. These undercurrents provide a unifying conceptual framework, a clear axis from which to

a relatively highly skilled workforce. The associated rise in demand for skilled labour in these nations intensified their investment in human capital and expedited their demographic transition, further stimulating technological progress and enhancing their comparative advantage in the production of such goods. In non-industrial economies, by contrast, international trade incentivised specialisation

raw materials. The absence of significant demand for educated workers in these sectors limited the incentive for investment in human capital and thus delayed their demographic transition, further increasing their relative abundance of low-skilled labour, and enhancing their comparative disadvantage in the production of ‘skill-intensive’ goods. Accordingly, globalisation and colonisation

education, 72 per cent of Indians beyond the age of fifteen had no schooling in 1960. In the absence of significant human capital formation, the demographic transition in India was delayed well into the second half of the twentieth century. Thus, while the gains from trade in the UK expedited its fertility

have affected and interacted with institutions, in some places curtailing innovation and human capital formation, in others fostering technological progress, investment in education, and the Demographic Transition. To properly understand the role of these factors, we must journey further back in time – exploring initially the origins of the cultural traits that have

in various ways. It has played a major role in how we raise our children, affecting human capital formation and ultimately the onset of the demographic transition. It has shaped the degree of trust we have in each other as well as in political and financial institutions, fostering social capital and cooperation

societies adopted cultural traits such as a greater tendency towards investment in human capital and gender equality, which would become the central drivers of the Demographic Transition and the onset of the sustained growth regime. Furthermore, in time they came to embrace the growth-enhancing values of individualism and secularism: a belief

women entering the paid workforce. Industrialisation was a primary cause, and the resulting decline in the gender wage gap incentivised smaller families and hastened the demographic transition. But the prevailing attitude of different societies towards gender roles was also – and continues to be – an important factor, fostering women’s arrival in the

characteristics, they have contributed to the timing and the location of the technological outburst of the Industrial Revolution and ultimately to the onset of the Demographic Transition. They reveal some of the roots of the disparity in the wealth of nations today and so provide the clues to how we might address

this sector specifically, slowing down urbanisation and the rapid technological progress that went with it, and delaying human capital formation and the onset of the demographic transition. As the importance of the urban sector to the development of new technologies intensified, the adverse effect of comparative advantage in the production of agricultural

with a greater incentive to invest in the education of their existing children instead of giving birth to additional ones, triggering a fertility decline. The Demographic Transition shattered the Malthusian poverty trap, living standards improved without being swiftly counterbalanced by a population boom, and thus began a long-term rise in human

126, no. 590 (2016): 40–74. Becker, Sascha O., Francesco Cinnirella and Ludger Woessmann, ‘The Trade-Off Between Fertility and Education: Evidence from Before the Demographic Transition’, Journal of Economic Growth 15, no. 3 (2010): 177–204. Becker, Sascha O., and Ludger Woessmann, ‘Was Weber Wrong? A Human Capital Theory of Protestant

a New World Crop on Population and Economic Growth in China’, Journal of Economic Growth 21, no. 1 (2016): 71–99. Chesnais, Jean-Claude, The Demographic Transition: Stages, Patterns and Economic Implications, Oxford University Press, 1992. Cinnirella, Francesco, and Jochen Streb, ‘The Role of Human Capital and Innovation in Prussian Economic Development

Africa’, Journal of the European Economic Association 12, no. 3 (2014): 612–40. Fernihough, A., ‘Human Capital and the Quantity–Quality Trade-Off During the Demographic Transition’, Journal of Economic Growth 22, no. 1 (2017): 35–65. Fewlass, Helen, Sahra Talamo, Lukas Wacker, Bernd Kromer, Thibaut Tuna, Yoann Fagault, Edouard Bard et

Luke, Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew D. Mellinger, ‘Geography and economic development’, International Regional Science Review 22, no. 2 (1999): 179–232. Galor, Oded, ‘The Demographic Transition: causes and consequences’, Cliometrica 6, no. 1 (2012): 1–28. Galor, Oded, Unified Growth Theory, Princeton University Press, 2011. Galor, Oded, Discrete Dynamical Systems, Springer

’, Journal of Economic Growth 2, no. 1 (1997): 93–124. Galor, Oded, and David N. Weil, ‘Population, Technology, and Growth: From Malthusian Stagnation to the Demographic Transition and Beyond’, American Economic Review 90, no. 4 (2000): 806–28. Galor Oded, and David N. Weil, ‘The Gender Gap, Fertility, and Growth,’ American Economic

, ‘Finnish Life Tables since 1751’, Demographic Research 1 (1999). Kant, Immanuel, Answering the Question: What is Enlightenment?, 1784. Katz, Ori, ‘Railroads, Economic Development, and the Demographic Transition in the United States’, University Library of Munich (2018). Kendi, Ibram X., Stamped from the Beginning: The definitive history of racist ideas in America, Nation

decline of generations, 169 deindustrialisation, 107–10, 139, 140 democracy, 78, 151–2, 155, 160, 172–3 social capital and, 172–3 demographic dividend, 117 demographic transition, 6, 85–100, 106, 112–18, 175, 176, 198, 240 human capital and, 88–91, 112, 175, 211 Denmark, 104 Detroit, Michigan, 107–8, 217

, 62 human capital, 6, 52–5, 66–73, 88–91, 93, 103, 111–12, 232 child labour and, 80, 81, 83, 122 colonialism and, 158 demographic transition and, 88–91, 112, 175, 232 dictatorships and, 146 industrialisation and, 66–73, 74, 76, 80, 81, 83, 109, 110, 140, 211 investment in, 52

politeness distinctions, 197 political extremism, 106 political fragmentation, 182–7, 207 pollution, 116–18 Polynesia, 32, 48 population, 46–55, 47 composition of, 50–55 demographic transition, 6, 85–100, 106, 112–18, 175 diseases and, 204–5 diversity of, 9, 142, 160, 177, 214, 215–32, 237 institutions and, 208 labour

Immigration and Ethnic Formation in a Deeply Divided Society: The Case of the 1990s Immigrants From the Former Soviet Union in Israel

by Majid Al Haj  · 20 Nov 2003

the Israeli absorption system. Based on the conception that sociocultural differences among Jewish communities are a symbol of “Diaspora existence,” it was expected that the demographic transition of 46   Jewish Diasporas to Israel—the ingathering of exiles—should be followed by a cultural-psychological mizzug galuyot or fusion of exiles (Ayalon, Ben

Growth: From Microorganisms to Megacities

by Vaclav Smil  · 23 Sep 2019

resulting in a temporary acceleration of natural growth before both rates found new, much lower, equilibria in modern affluent societies. In some European countries this demographic transition took a few centuries to run its course; in a few East Asian countries it was completed in just two generations. The birth rate is

the exception of Australia—was credited with the first notable population increase. This is ascribed to an expanded and more reliable food supply. This Neolithic demographic transition (also called, inaccurately because it was a long process, Neolithic or agricultural revolution) was seen as the first notable period of population growth and its

in fertility (Eshed et al. 2004). But as is the case with many grand generalizations, both the intensity and the unprecedented nature of the Neolithic demographic transition are arguable (as is the revolutionary description of a process that was clearly evolutionary, extending across millennia). A recent sequencing of 36 diverse Y chromosomes

difficulty of subsistence” that will always provide “a strong and constantly operating check.” Instead, population growth has undergone a fundamental transformation through the process of demographic transition, and our abilities to support a larger population (and with better nutrition) have been transformed no less fundamentally by reliance on high direct and indirect

energy subsidies (mechanization, irrigation, fertilization, pesticides) that have resulted in increasing harvests. Demographic Transition The unprecedented population growth of the past two centuries is explained by the gradual progress of the demographic transition, the outcome of a complex process of declining death rates (mortality) and birth rates (natality) that was

conceptualized by Warren Thompson (1929), called first a “demographic transition” by Landry (1934), and received its standard (classic) formulations from Notestein (1945) and Davis (1945). After WWII it became a subject of increasing attention not

produced fluctuating, but always very low annual rates (less than 0.1% or even below 0.05%) of natural increase. During the earliest stage of demographic transitions, the death rate begins to fall, in some cases relatively rapidly (as a result of better nutrition and better health care), while birth rates remain

). Eventually birth rates begin to fall as well (and, again, rather precipitously in some cases) and population increase decelerates. A society that has undergone a demographic transition finds itself at a new equilibrium as low birth rates and low death rates result in low natural increases, or even in no growth and

absolute population decline. The process of demographic transition began first in European countries, where it took up to two centuries. For example, Finland’s crude death rates fell from about 30/1,000

generations long, are statistically well documented for a number of other European countries. Japan was the first populous Asian country to undergo the process of demographic transition. Crude death rates remained above 20 until the early 1920s and were more than halved in just 30 years, while birth rates fell from about

has led some demographers to argue that further substantial extensions are to come (Oeppen and Vaupel 2002). An alternative way to quantify the process of demographic transition is to focus on changing fertility. The total fertility rate (TFR) is the average number of children that would be born per woman if all

new combination of interrelated trends began in some northern and western European countries during the late 1960s, and in 1986 it was labeled the second demographic transition (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986; Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006). This shift in values has weakened the traditional family, bringing widespread postponement of marriages, much

brought by the rise of the service economy and electronic communication (Sobotka 2008; Lesthaege 2014). As with all broad generalizations, the concept of the second demographic transition has been criticized (after all, in some affected countries cohort fertility rates have remained fairly close to the replacement level) and some observers questioned its

non-European (or non-Western) cultures. But there is no doubt about the direction of the fertility change, and about the presence of the second demographic transition in non-European settings, including parts of East Asia and Latin America (Lesthaege 2014). Reliable statistics document Europe’s rapid fertility declines once the post

, and Iraq, but at, or below, the replacement level in Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Iran. In fact, Iran has been through one of the fastest demographic transitions ever, as the average fertility fell rapidly from close to seven during the late 1970s (when the Shah was exiled and Khomeini took control) to

decline but total births keep rising. Keyfitz and Flieger (1971) called this phenomenon population momentum and Blue and Espenshade (2011) studied its trajectories across the demographic transitions. A new equilibrium is established only after the population momentum gets spent, but how stable that equilibrium will be has been highly country-specific. In

are driven by assumptions about the total fertility rate and life expectancy, it might appear that the task has actually become easier since the worldwide demographic transition has been marked by demonstrable similarities. Raftery et al. (2012) argued in favor of Bayesian probabilistic predictions and the result of their modeling led them

very old people in 2050 and also underestimate the uncertainty for high-fertility countries while overstating the uncertainty for countries that have already completed the demographic transition. Using cumulative probabilities is a much less misleading option—but one still affected by model assumptions. The notable exception of most sub-Saharan countries aside

partially, rebound? The same questions can be asked for the still much poorer but much more populous East Asian countries that have undergone a rapid demographic transition. The possibility of further fertility declines has been conceptualized by Lutz et al. (2006) as the low fertility trap: once a country’s fertility declines

will come close to a symmetrical (normal) distribution or if it will be highly skewed. Do these long-term trends—millennia of low population growth, demographic transitions resulting first in unprecedented increases and eventually in below-replacement fertilities, and persisting differences between affluent nations and many low-income countries—translate into orderly

then will I proceed to an examination of key growth factors and growth correlations by examining the roles of such diverse drivers as population growth, demographic transition, investment, energy inputs, education, technical innovation, and overall political setting. Quantifying Economic Growth Given the complexity of modern economies, only a broad aggregate measure can

capital (education, health), but also on diffusion of innovations, government policies (affecting the ease of doing business, taxation, infrastructural upgrading or maintenance), and population changes (demographic transition, dependency ratios, aging). America’s rise from a marginal power in 1800 to the world’s economic leader by 1900 is a perfect illustration of

be compared with their finding that a 1% increase in the investment/GDP ratio was associated with a 0.014% increase in GDP growth. The demographic transition eventually had a threefold effect on economic growth (Galor 2011). Declining population growth reduced the dilution of the growing stock of capital and of the

produced a temporarily higher fraction of the economically active population, which translated into higher productivity per capita. The search for the causal factors of the demographic transition led to some obvious conclusions and to some mistaken claims. Becker (1960) believed that the reduction of fertility was a consequence of higher incomes generated

60% of the British value, with the Swedish and Finnish rates at, respectively, just 40% and 30% (Maddison 2007). During the opening decades of their demographic transitions, the growth rates of income per capita were similar (ranging between 1.2 and 1.6%) in western European countries despite the just noted substantial

differences in the income level. An important consequence of the demographic transition has become known as the demographic dividend, first identified in the East Asian economies (Bloom et al. 2000). The boost to economic growth is provided

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–44. Bocquet-Appel, J. P. 2011. When the world’s population took off: The springboard of the Neolithic demographic transition. Science 333:560–561. Bocquet-Appel, J. P., and O. Bar-Yosef. 2008. The Neolithic Demographic Transition and Its Consequences. New York: Springer Science and Business Media. Boden, T., and B. Andres. 2017. Global

. A. Slafer.1998. Changes in yield and yield stability in wheat during the 20th century. Field Crops Research 57:335–347. Caldwell, J. C. 2006. Demographic Transition Theory. Dordrecht: Springer. Callen, T. 2017. Purchasing power parity: Weights matter. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/ppp.htm. Calnek, E. 2003

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–475 aging, 252, 304, 323, 401, 424, 430, 470–472, 475, 488, 503 decline, 108, 313, 318, 321–322, 340, 466, 474, 477, 487–488 demographic transitions, 308, 310, 317–323, 399, 420, 430 fertility, 308, 319–322, 324, 326, 329, 430, 471–472 forecasting, 303, 314–317, 329–332, 472 future

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