demographic transition

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After the Spike: Population, Progress, and the Case for People

by Dean Spears and Michael Geruso  · 7 Jul 2025  · 264pp  · 96,174 words

as a progression from high mortality and high fertility, to low mortality and high fertility, and then to low mortality and low fertility is called Demographic Transition Theory. Demographic Transition Theory is an idea from the mid-twentieth century. Its story ended with equally low birth and death rates. When the demographer Frank Notestein

the parents of high school students taking AP exams. Study guides for the AP Environmental Science and AP Human Geography exams taught students to explain Demographic Transition Theory. That theory tells a story that ends in zero population growth, incorrectly assuming that birth rates and death rates would end up equally low

deaths, 27 rough estimates in the distant past, 33 Deaton, Angus, 33, 92 DeLong, J. Bradford Slouching Towards Utopia, 38 Demographic and Health Surveys, 251 Demographic Transition Theory, 30, 32, 37 Demography journal “Black-White Disparities in Life Expectancy” (Geruso), 105–6 heritability of high-fertility culture, 186, 187, 286n Denmark 84

Grand Transitions: How the Modern World Was Made

by Vaclav Smil  · 2 Mar 2021  · 1,324pp  · 159,290 words

, open up new capabilities, and result in new (second- and third-order) impacts and consequences. For example, how does the late stage of the demographic transition affect the advanced state of the food transition? A simple mechanistic view would be that, everything else being equal, countries with reduced fertilities (that resulted

plague (caused by bacterium Yersinia pestis), and comparable regional losses were inflicted between 1618 and 1648 by the Thirty Years’ War (Parker 1984). During demographic transitions, the gradual decline of birth rates lags behind the progressing decline in death rates, and this lag produces relatively high rates of population growth. At

, the result was a temporary period of hyperbolic growth that ended during the late 1960s and has been followed by declining rates of increase. With demographic transitions now accomplished (or significantly advanced) in every major region except for sub-Saharan Africa, low fertilities are accompanied by low mortalities, resulting, once again,

in turn, influenced by a multitude of other contributions and interferences. Examples of these realities abound. The first topical chapter of this book deals with demographic transitions. How did this fundamental shift in family and social dynamics, whose consequences have affected every aspect of modern civilization, begin? Was it triggered by a

eventually led to epochal outcomes began at different times in different countries (and continents), and why some of them had proceeded relatively slowly (particularly the demographic transition that took many generations to unfold in some countries), while others (particularly some shifts dependent on technical innovation and also some dietary transitions) were accomplished

stylized simplification (Figure 2.1) but, as expected, actual national sequences show many departures from this idealized pattern. Figure 2.1 Simplified trajectory of the demographic transition, showing successive declines of death and birth rates and the resulting temporary increase in natural growth rate. In the long run, the fortunes of any

most fundamental demographic evidence. In their eagerness to expose the inability of a generalized model to replicate many nation-specific historical experiences the critics of demographic transition err by questioning the very existence of such an undeniable, and a hugely consequential, phenomenon. In order to understand the process and to appreciate

as many early events and actions carry long-term consequences and determine future feedbacks. They are diffusion processes with different mechanisms and specific adoption rates. Demographic Transition The concept of this epochal population shift was first outlined in 1929 by an American demographer, Warren Thompson (Thompson 1929), and it was succinctly defined

poor diet creating temporary sterility and causing long intervals between births (Mosk 1977). Consequently, there is no reason to reject the concept of a demographic transition for Japan. Similarly, some demographers and historians have maintained that China’s pre-transitional marital fertility was lower than in Europe and that both the

and other reasons, the option made highly acceptable thanks to low infant and childhood mortalities. Transition trajectories American demographer Frank Notestein identified three stages of demographic transition that describe the basic dynamics, and this division became a common model of the process (Notestein 1945). Countries where the transition has not started experience

replacement level and its drop eventually results in population decline. Idealized illustration of this sequence has been commonly reproduced to represent the typical process of demographic transition (see Figure 2.1)—but reconstructions of actual long-term trajectories for a number of countries with reliable historic data show many departures from the

familial to national and global—but the driving forces of this epochal shift cannot be reduced to just a few obvious factors. Explaining demographic transition Search for the causes of demographic transitions has proceeded both along particularistic and synergetic lines but, as already noted in the opening chapter, it failed to produce an explanation

those impacts have amounted to the most fundamental transformations of modern civilization, none more so than the rapid multiplication of global population. Consequences of demographic transition The focus should start with the profound effects the process has had on the lives of children and families. Reduced suffering and pain have been

the world) has further social and economic repercussions ranging from increasing divorce rates to demand for state-supported child care. Two major outcomes of demographic transition that have affected every aspect of economic and social development as well as the quality of the environment have been the unprecedented growth of human

dividend in particular. This approach recognizes the enormous impacts of existential requirements and economic behavior at different stages of life. In the earliest periods of demographic transition, economies have to take care of large cohorts of children, and the diversion of resources to requisite health care and schooling slows down the

provide much of the capital for further economic expansion. Higher disposable incomes create new demand and economies profit from this virtuous cycle. Since the 1950s demographic transition has produced this temporary dividend in many countries in Asia and Latin America. East Asian countries have been its greatest beneficiaries, because their total dependency

animal feeding operations. The next focus will be on shifts in food supply at the retail level and on notable nutritional transitions. Much like the demographic transition, the dietary transition has followed trajectories characterized by universal shifts (most notably decreased consumption of staple grains and legumes and increased intakes of lipids and

htm BLS. 2018. Service-providing industries. https://www.bls.gov/iag/tgs/iag07.htm Blue, L. and T.J. Espenshade. 2011. Population momentum across the demographic transition. Population and Development Review 37:721–747. BNEF (Bloomberg New Energy Finance). 2020. Electric Vehicle Outlook 2020. https://about.bnef.com/electric-vehicle-outlook/ Bocquier

, P. and R. Costa. 2015. Which transition comes first? Urban and demographic transitions in Belgium and Sweden. Demographic Research 33. doi:10.4054/DemRes.2015.33.48 Boeing. 2013. World class supplier quality. http://787updates.newairplane.com/787

demand to peak in 2040. https://www.enerdata.net/publications/daily-energy-news/cnpc-expects-chinese-energy-demand-peak-2040.html Coale, A. 1973. The demographic transition reconsidere. In: International Population Conference, Leige 1973, vol. 1, International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, pp. 53–57. Cobbett, J.P. 1824.

R.J. and R. Rosenberg. 2008. Spreading dead zones and consequences for marine ecosystems. Science 321:926–929. Diebolt, C. and F. Perrin. 2017. Understanding Demographic Transitions An Overview of French Historical Statistics. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Dikötter, F. 2010. Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958

/images/documents/plants-animals/animals/canetoads/20140470_CaneToadStrategyWA2014-19_FINWEB.pdf Dribe, M. et al. 2014. Socioeconomic status and fertility before, during, and after the demographic transition: An introduction. Demographic Research 31:161–182. Duchène, C. et al. 2017. La consommation de viande en France. Paris: CIV. Duesterberg, T.J. and

cities: An explanation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114:739–767. Galor, O. 2011a. Unified Growth Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Galor, O. 2011b. The Demographic Transition: Causes and Consequences. Cambridge, MA: NBER. Gartner. 2018. Gartner says worldwide sales of smartphones recorded first ever decline during the fourth quarter of 2017. https

Hanley, S.B. 1974. Fertility, mortality, and life expectancy in pre-modern Japan. Population Studies 28:127–142. Hara, T. 2015. A Shrinking Society Post-Demographic Transition in Japan. Tokyo: Springer. Haraguchi, N. et al. 2016. The importance of manufacturing in economic development: Has this changed? World Development 93:293–315. Harari

2013. Fiscal sustainability under an aging population in Japan: A financial market perspective Public Policy Review 9:735–750. O’Sullivan, J.N. 2013. Revisiting demographic transition: Correlation and causation in the rate of development and fertility decline. Paper presented at the 27th IUSSP International Population Conference, 26–31 August 2013, Busan

of ideas: Widespread patenting and invention during the English Industrial Revolution. The Journal of Economic History 50:349–362. Szreter, S. 1993. The idea of demographic transition and the study of fertility change: A critical intellectual history. Population and Development Review 19:659–701. Takahashi, E. 1984. Secular trend in milk consumption

and B.J. McElroy. 2007. The impact of humans on continental erosion and sedimentation. Geological Society of America Bulletin 119:140–156. Willekens, F. 2014. Demographic Transitions in Europe and the World. Rostock: Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research. Willett, W. et al. 2019. Food in the Anthropocene: The EAT–Lancet Commission

air travel, 282 anthropogenic land-use changes, 219–20 arable land, 266–67 city growth, 210–11 deforestation, 109–10, 212–13 demographic dividend, 45 demographic transition, 31 economic growth, 161 electrification, 139 environmental pollution, 228 fertility rates, 32, 38, 40, 264 food supplies, need for, 268–69 healthcare, 48 hydrocarbon

235 plastics, pollution from, 232 soil acidification, 233 wastewater treatment, 230 wilderness area, 221 China, population transitions children, desired number of, 32 demographic burden, 56 demographic transitions, speed of, 36 fertility rates, 33, 36, 38, 40, 43 household registration system, 61–62 intranational migrations, 58–59 old-age dependency ratios, future possibilities

126 Dutch Republic, energy sources, 115. See also Netherlands Dyson, F., 257 Dyson, Tim, 15, 25, 39 Earth System, 208 East Asia demographic dividend, 45 demographic transition, 31 dietary transition, 88 draft animals, 82 fertility rates, 36, 43 food variety, 103 fruit supply, 97 international tourist arrivals, 196 literacy, 247–48 marital

, 123, 128, 193 transition from phytomass fuels to coal, 114–15 England/Britain/United Kingdom, population transitions birth rates, 36 children, desired number of, 32 demographic transitions, speed of, 36 fertility rates, 41 immigration, 61 life expectancy, 49 medical advances, impact of, 47 population of, 35, 265 urban population growth, 59

Ethiopia food, yield gaps, 267 inequalities, 66 material consumption, 286 meat consumption, 93–94 EU. See European Union Europe. See also Eastern Europe; specific countries demographic transitions, 37 industrialization, 179 life expectancy, 48 literacy, 247–48 marital patterns, 35 monocultures, 109–10 premodern, legume consumption, 90 sugar consumption, 96 windmills, 127–

30, 266 large cities, 60 medieval cities, population of, 57 old-age dependency ratios, future possibilities of, 264–65 population aging and declines, 56 second demographic transition, 37 urban population growth, 59 European Union aging societies in, reliance on public-sector transfers, 51 commuting in, 195 compound feeds, use of, 83

to-coal transition, 118 France, environmental transitions, reforestation in, 212 France, generational transitions, 3–5, 4f, 5f, 6f France, population transitions birth rates, 35, 36 demographic transitions in, 36 elderly population, 51 fertility rates, 37, 41 health insurance programs, 47 life expectancy and longevity, 48–49 population declines, 265 urban population growth

70–113 economic transitions, 152–204 environmental transitions, 205–43 interactive nature of, 57–58 introduction to, 1–24 outcomes and outlooks, 244–96 population (demographic) transitions, 25–69 study of, 14–24 Great Leap Forward (China), 160 Great Pacific Garbage Patch (GPGP), 232 Greece fertility rates, 38 meat supply, 92

interpersonal electronic interaction, 203 invasive species, 227–28 inverse power formulas, 62f, 62 IPBES (Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services), 253 Iran demographic transitions, speed of, 36 economic sectors, 167–68 fertility rates, 32, 36–37 Ireland, famines, 99–100 iron and ironmaking, 115–17, 118, 144, 207,

in agriculture, 73–77 North America. See also Canada; Mexico; United States childhood nutrition, 101–2 croplands, 214, 217 dead zones, 111–12 deforestation, 212 demographic transition, 31 dietary transition, 88 ecosystem changes, 209–10 feed crops, 83–84 fertility rates, 37 fires, 243 food transportation, greenhouse gases from, 112 food waste

58–59 industrialization, 179 life expectancy, 48 malnutrition, 102 meat exports from, 92 natural gas, 121–22 pastures, 214–15 primary energy consumption, 273 second demographic transition, 37 services, deindustrialization and transition to, 185 staple grains, 89 sweeteners, 95 wastewater treatment, 230 water usage, 189–90 wilderness area, 221 wood supply, 115

Union anthropogenic land-use changes, 219–20 boreal forests, 212 cereal grain exports, 270 city growth, 210–11 croplands, 214, 217 crude oil use, 121 demographic transitions in, 36 economic development, 169 energy intensity, 150 energy sources, 117–18 famines, 99–100 fertility rates, 37, 38 gas lighting, 138 grassland conversions,

81 Somalia, fertility rates, 32 Sombart, Werner, 190–91 South, P. F., 267 South Africa inequalities, 66 material consumption, 286 obesity in, 106 South Korea demographic transitions, speed of, 36 economic growth and development, 45–46, 160 economic sectors, 167–68 fertility rates, 36, 43 happiness rankings, 192–93 industrialization, 179 longevity

R. J., 156 Sumatra, wilderness area, 221 Sun, lifecycle of, 244 Svensksund, Second Battle of, 10 Swan, Joseph Wilson, 135, 140 Sweden birth rates, 35 demographic transitions, speed of, 36 employment transition, 153 energy intensity, 150 energy sources, 117 fertility rates, 37, 41 forests, 212 fuelwood use, 115–17 life expectancy and

materials, pollution from, 231–33 synthetic species (designed organisms), 260 Syria, emigration to European Union, 61 Szreter, Simon, 25–26 Taiwan air conditioners, 142–44 demographic transitions, speed of, 36 economic growth and development, 45–46, 160 economic sectors, 167–68 fertility rates, 36, 43 industrialization, 179 population aging, 56, 264–65

The State and the Stork: The Population Debate and Policy Making in US History

by Derek S. Hoff  · 30 May 2012

. The first census in 1790 recorded 4 million people, and, even as birthrates began coming down in response to modernization (a process demographers call the “demographic transition”), the population had risen to 31 million by the Civil War. In 1900, 76 million citizens inhabited the United States; in 2000, 281 million. After

the one before it, and the birthrate decreased from about eight babies per woman in 1800 to four in 1900.)110 White Americans underwent the “demographic transition” to lower birthrates well in advance of women in every European nation except France. The immediate causes of the transition were later marriages and planned

, but they bought into population concerns nonetheless. To begin with, rapid overseas population growth was the defining topic in postwar demography via the maturation of “demographic transition theory.”12 First sketched by Scripps demographer Warren Thompson in 1929, and greatly refined at midcentury, transition theory holds that industrialization and economic development in

occupy the middle ground. Though they generally fretted about global population trends, the assumption that technology could improve living standards was built into their dominant demographic transition theory, and they generally distrusted the Malthusians.67 The popular press, notwithstanding an occasional foray into headlinegrabbing Malthusianism, also struck a balanced note, especially regarding

that population growth was a serious problem in the developing world, but in The Closing Circle (1971), he assumed that material prosperity would induce the demographic transition toward lower birthrates.170 Instead of a mere emphasis on fertility reduction, Commoner sought a more ecologically sensitive capitalism and a new ethos of how

idea (ironically attributable to late-career Malthus as well as Adam Smith) that wealth and freedom lower fertility. This idea was already central to midcentury demographic transition theory, and Ludwig von Mises, one of the early giants of modern conservatism, offered an important statement of it in 1949.70 Yet MKBD matured

cause zero economic growth. Interestingly, a theoretical separation between zero population growth and zero economic growth remained in the context of the developing world, since demographic transition theory assumed that economic growth there was an essential precursor to lowering birthrates. And occasionally, population economists imported this premise to the domestic debate. Following

, Principles of Economics, 2d rev. ed., vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan, 1921), 213 (quotation) and 237. However, Taussig did anticipate the modern idea of the “demographic transition” to lower fertility. See Warren C. Robinson, “F. W. Taussig’s Economic Theory of Population,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 91 (February 1977): 165–70; and

book before [Rachel Carson’s] Silent Spring” (308). 12. Demographer Paul Demeny called transition theory “the central preoccupation of modern demography” (cited in Dudley Kirk, “Demographic Transition Theory,” Population Studies 50 [November 1996]: 361). The American demography profession further retreated into a neutral-research posture after the war as it confronted the

: A Study of the Tennessee Valley Authority, Japanese Occupation, and Point Four Program” (master’s thesis, Kansas State University, 2009). 14. An excellent entry into demographic transition theory and the evolution from 1945 to 1955 of activist support for family planning programs is Dennis Hodgson, “Demography as Social Science and Policy Science

consistent policy orientation among demographers and stresses the influence of the Cold War in driving the theory’s evolution, see Simon Szreter, “The Idea of Demographic Transition Theory and the Study of Fertility Change: A Critical Intellectual History,” Population and Development Review 19 (December 1993): 659–701. For a literature review, consult

three historical fertility regimes—primitive societies with high birth and death rates, societies with rapid population increase due to improved sanitation, and societies undergoing the demographic transition. 29. The editors of Fortune in collaboration with Russell W. Davenport, U.S.A.: The Permanent Revolution (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1951), 170–72. 30

, for example, Dudley Kirk, review of The Modern Dilemma by Robert C. Cook, Population Studies 7 (July 1953): 89–90. An original theorist of the demographic transition, Kirk was a State Department official and later demographic director of the Population Council. 68. Compare, for example, the dire “Population Boom: Too Many New

of Economic Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 70 (February 1956): 65–94. 110. Committee meetings centered on the developing world and reflected the shift in demographic transition theory from the assumption that modernization and economic development were sufficient to lower population growth to the stress on direct family planning programs. 111. “Minutes

the second half of the twentieth century colonialism had robbed the developing world of its wealth without improving standards of living and thus blocked the demographic transition. 171. Ibid., chap. 8 and 233–35. 172. Quoted in Jeffrey C. Ellis, “On the Search for a Root Cause: Essentialist Tendencies in Environmental Discourse

population growth, 11, 15; doctrine of classical republicanism, 15, 21; fostering of free trade, 24 demographic bubble, 137–38, 140 demographic revisionism, 227–28, 330n11 demographic transition theory, 1, 108, 117, 207, 234, 263n43, 289n12, 289n14 demography: debates over scientific inquiry versus social action, 66; emergence as independent social science, 62; and

–4; and human capital theory, 208; and natural resources, 168; spurred by reducing inequality, 85–86; and zero population growth movement, 191–94. See also demographic transition theory; Stable Population Keynesianism (SPK) Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 141 economic regulation, support for, in 1930s encouraged by lower fertility, 96 Economic Report of

, 113, 137 Family Planning Act, 1970, 204 family planning programs, 6, 9, 228; AfricanAmerican response to, 149; backlash from Catholics and social conservatives, 149; and demographic transition theory, 108; domestic programs, 145; emergence of, in 1960s, 136, 145–49; lobbying for, by population community, 146; post-WWII support for in developing nations

; nongovermental organizations and family planning in, 246; percent of global population growth in, 1; post-WWI support for family planning programs in, 108. See also demographic transition theory 368 Lewis, W. A., Theory of Economic Growth, 124 liberal institutionalists, and population debates, 50–51 liberals: classical, 15, 18; Cold War, 130; contradictions

, 112; delayed, as check on population growth, 2, 25; delay of marriage during the 1970s, 348n30; increase in, when wages grow, 57; and nineteenth-century demographic transition in United States, 32; women trapped in old-fashioned, 153; zero population growth movement’s goal of later marriages, 176 Marshall, Alfred, 48, 93, 282n107

The Human Tide: How Population Shaped the Modern World

by Paul Morland  · 10 Jan 2019  · 405pp  · 121,999 words

fields and relied for transport on their feet and, if lucky, their shoes. But full modernity is not a necessary condition for having made the demographic transition. As the twentieth century progressed it was possible for a still relatively rural country with low levels of income and education to achieve low fertility

observed in England starting from the late eighteenth century would become a classic feature of societies in transformation, and has come to be called the ‘demographic transition’. As living conditions improve, people live longer. Yet for a time, people continue to have very large families of six or seven. Only later

data on declining fertility disguises some underlying patterns and regional variations. Within a particular country, the pace of development and therefore its position in the demographic transition was often variable. Channels of communication, cultural association and religious belief were particularly important in impacting regional trends, with low fertility rates spreading from France

were, but ultimately moral.44 This was, in a sense, a precursor of McCleary’s worry about excessive individuality, a premonition, perhaps, of the ‘second demographic transition’ which was, half a century later, to see fertility rates across much of Europe plunge far lower than anything experienced in the interwar years. It

theorised and described the post-Malthusian world. Less well remembered than Malthus, the American Frank Notestein described what would come to be known as the ‘demographic transition’. Rather than existing in a state of eternal Malthusian constraint, a country would start with a high fertility, a high mortality rate and a small

still relatively unindustrialised, had a much larger rural population and a higher although falling fertility rate, and was still in the process of completing its demographic transition. In Spain, under the authoritarian rule of Franco and the domination of the Catholic Church, fertility rates rose from two and a half to three

now somewhat beyond this point. Against this backdrop, the post-war baby boom can be seen in retrospect as an aberration–a kink–in the demographic transition, rather than a reversal. The virtuous cycle (virtuous at least to some) of new families creating demand for new goods, boosting the economy, boosting

dramatic. It was also, in most cases, starting from a lower base. Canada moved, from a fertility perspective, into the new paradigm of the second demographic transition more convincingly than the US, enjoying a fertility rate of over three children per woman already in 1945, and seeing that climb to almost four

over the long term, these differences should nevertheless be seen within an overall picture of strong general movement into the last phase of the first demographic transition and, at least in some cases, beyond it. Those countries in central Europe that became part of the West (specifically those that joined NATO

the Soviet empire), but those to the US’s immediate south, the poor of Latin America and particularly Mexico, their numbers swelling through their own demographic transition and the tantalising prospects of the American dream just a river away. Conveniently, this coincided with the nosedive in the US fertility rate. America’s

of what was once the Eastern bloc. Russia, always ambiguously partly in, partly out of Europe, was a late but rapid adopter of the European demographic transition in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and after 1945 once again the human tide turned east. 7 Russia and the Eastern Bloc from

Britain’s experience nearly a hundred years earlier, although because it was happening later, it was happening faster. Russia then experienced a classic case of demographic transition, with falling mortality rates followed by falling fertility and the gradual slowdown in the growth of the population. From the mid 1920s to the mid

Ukrainians. These were the first populations to urbanise and become fully literate, and were also, as would be expected, the areas first to experience the demographic transition–with attendant population expansion–while the Caucasus and central Asia were still stuck in the Malthusian trap. In addition, there was a degree of pressurised

in which Muslims predominated, began to undergo their own modernisation. This was no longer just socialism in one country; it was multiple stages of the demographic transition in one country. As ever, infant mortality serves as an excellent indicator of social and economic progress. Fewer than sixty babies per thousand were dying

the Soviet collapse. That the Soviet Union was not ethnically more homogeneous was due, ultimately, to demography and specifically to the differential timing of the demographic transition between the very different areas of what was the world’s largest country. Is Russia Dying? In 1991 the USSR was formally dissolved and its

Russia than in the West.32 In other ways Russia continues to be fairly unlike those countries of the West which have undergone the second demographic transition: premarital cohabitation has, at least until recently, remained relatively unusual and marriage (as well as first childbearing) remains fairly early.33 Abortion rates have

Communist regimes and its churches were for the most part marginalised or persecuted). Most Orthodox countries had by 1950 completed a large part of their demographic transition with only Russia and Serbia reporting a fertility rate of above three children per woman, and both were witnessing a rapid decline below that level

Kosovo’s total fertility rate is only around replacement level. In summary, the former Yugoslavia is an exemplary case of the destabilising impact of uneven demographic transition, striking people of different religious or ethnic backgrounds at different times. The Demography of Disappearance Throughout the Christian Orthodox world the same forces have been

which are unprecedented from a demographic point of view: Japan because it was the first non-European country to break through the Malthusian bonds into demographic transition and now has the world’s oldest population; China because it has a larger population than any other country in the world’s history. Both

century, not least the Black Death, which set the continent’s population back for centuries. The point, however, is not that nothing happened until the demographic transition, but rather that only when modernisation, however defined, commenced did populations follow a more or less uniform and predictable path, at least for a period

broadly be termed the end of feudalism and the birth of the modern state. At first industrial and demographic progress (that is, progress through the demographic transition) was slow, but both accelerated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Official figures for this period suggest rising birth rates, from 25.4

suggest rising mortality, other sources suggest it was dropping, which would be more in line with what would be expected in the early stages of demographic transition.9 The latter does indeed seem more likely: however basic conditions were in the cities of early industrial Japan, conditions for the peasant were probably

gathering from 1920, the picture developed of a gradually falling birth rate accompanying increasing urbanisation, a sharply falling mortality rate and therefore, in line with demographic transition theory, a fast rise in the population.16 Although the growth in population was driven by improving economic circumstances, the discourse in Japan showed an

. It was until recently generally believed that China was closer than Japan to the pre-modern norm assumed by Malthusians and by proponents of the demographic transition theory.59 However, even this has now been challenged, with some historians suggesting that the Chinese, like the Japanese, may have been managing, by

in this region in recent decades. Just as neither the Anglo-Saxons nor Europeans more generally had a monopoly on the early, expansive stages of demographic transition, so they have had no monopoly on the later stages, with smaller family sizes leading to older and eventually shrinking societies across many other parts

Italians occupying Egypt and North Africa and the Germans increasingly influencing the Ottoman Empire itself; with European occupation and influence often came the start of demographic transition. In this region as elsewhere the data may be imperfect, but it is notable that Ottoman censuses began in 1831, not so long after

gone from living to their mid thirties to surviving into their early seventies since the middle of the twentieth century). Meanwhile, typical of countries in demographic transition, fertility rates at first held up: Iraqi and Saudi women were typical in continuing to have six children each well into the 1980s. The result

fivefold in not much more than half a century.18 It is this phenomenon that lies at the heart of the demographic whirlwind: namely, later demographic transitions have tended to be significantly more intense and result in greater population growth, with countries in the post-war developing world, including in the Middle

Japanese peers in associating early marriage and childbearing with conservatism, religiosity and lifestyle limitations. Even Islamic societies, it seems, are not immune to the second demographic transition, in which fertility choices are more a reflection of personal values and preferences than of purely material conditions, and many eschew parenthood altogether to prioritise

large families. Israeli Jewish fertility is more extraordinary. Early Zionist immigrants to Palestine were predominantly from east European Jewish families who had already undergone a demographic transition, and when Jews from the Middle East joined them in Israel after 1948, their birth rate too fell rapidly to what would be considered ‘normal

is typical not only of the region (it is almost inevitable, of course, given its regional preponderance) but also of countries around the world. Its demographic transition has occurred along with economic development, and while fertility fell sharply so life expectancy lengthened well before the arrival of high levels of prosperity. The

of the last quarter of a century. It is worth noting that while Sri Lanka was one of the first developing countries to experience the demographic transition, its fertility rate has stabilised at around replacement level, unlike many countries in the developed world, which have had fertility rates that undershot replacement

through which eventually fertility rates fall towards replacement level. After that, the bets are off; it is far from clear, for example, that the second demographic transition of personal choice, individualism and sub-replacement fertility will become truly universal. Perhaps we are simply too close to events to be able to see

relatively cheaply been able to adopt the techniques, technologies and policies which reduce mortality. Africa south of the Sahara is the final frontier of the demographic transition. This can be seen simply from the data produced by the UN in 2017. Of the forty-eight states and territories with fertility rates of

the small European family, demographic momentum will remain powerful for some time to come. And as we have seen, many civilisations which have experienced the demographic transition later have experienced it more intensely, with higher population growth at some periods in the twentieth century than, say, Britain ever managed in the nineteenth

global population has grown less white and the trend is set to continue. It amounts to a ‘first mover disadvantage’: those who went through the demographic transition earliest experienced the least growth and are set to decline as a share of global population. The decline in people of European origin can be

only to how manpower matters, but why the perception of population shifts may be even more consequential than the shifts themselves. By the time the demographic transition runs its course, nations’ ethnic and religious politics, the balance of global power, and the world economy will have been radically upended. If you

Tim, The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1997 Kaa, D. J. van de, Europe’s Second Demographic Transition, Washington DC, Population Reference Bureau, 1987 Kalbach, Warren E., and McVey, Wayne, The Demographic Bases of Canadian Society, Toronto, McGraw Hill Ryerson, 1979 Kanaaneh, Rhoda

Robert (eds), The Changing Population of Europe, Oxford, Blackwell, 1993 Novikoff-Priboy, A. (trans. Paul, Eden and Cedar), Tsushima, London, Allen & Unwin, 1936 Obuchi, Hiroshi, ‘Demographic Transition in the Process of Japanese Industrialization’, in Smitka, Michael (ed.), Japanese Economic History 1600–1960: Historical Demography and Labor Markets in Prewar Japan, New York

The Demography of Africa, Westport, CT, Praeger, 1996 Tauber, Irene B., The Population of Japan, Princeton University Press, 1958 Teitelbaum, Michael, The British Fertility Decline: Demographic Transition in the Crucible of the Industrial Revolution, Princeton University Press, 1984 , ‘U.S. Population Growth in International Perspective’, in Westoff (ed.), Towards the End, pp

Schofield, R. S., English Population History from Family Reconstitution 1580–1837, Cambridge University Press, 1997 Zakharov, Sergei, ‘Russian Federation: From the First to the Second Demographic Transition’, Demographic Research, 19 (24), 2008, pp. 907–72 Zubrin, Robert, Merchants of Despair: Radical Environmentalists, Criminal Pseudo-Scientists and the Fatal Cult of Antihumanism,

, 89 data, 33–5 Davy, Sir Humphry, 55 death rate: effect on demography, 29–31; global fall, 104, 107–8, 266; and life expectancy, 33 demographic transition: in Japan, 196–7, 199; Notestein on, 132, 135; and population stabilisation, 111; in Russia, 167; second, 141–2; in USA, 140 demography: and

(1745–6), 46 Japan: adopts European practices, 120; centenarians, 208; death rate, 30, 33; defeat (1945), 211; defeats Russia (1904–5), 162, 195–6, 201; demographic transition, 196, 199; economic decline, 209; economy and population size, 24, 203; extra-marital births, 204; falling birth rates, 18, 205–6; fertility rate falls, 204

–13; and historical change, 7, 9–10; and international tensions, 94; post-First World War increase, 102–3; and racial quality, 112–15; stabilisation and ‘demographic transition’, 111, 132 potato: as staple in Ireland, 52 Protestants: fertility rates, 142, 146 Puerto Rico: fertility rate, 269; median age, 275 Putin, Vladimir, 178,

single-child women, 179; deaths from diseases, 181; deaths from wars, famines and purges, 168–9; defeated by Japan (1904–5), 162, 195–6, 201; demographic transition, 167; ethnic Germans emigrate to Germany, 184; ethnic and regional differences, 170–2, 175–7, 184–5; fall in child death rates, 17, 171; female

Common Wealth: Economics for a Crowded Planet

by Jeffrey Sachs  · 1 Jan 2008  · 421pp  · 125,417 words

Climate Change 5. Securing Our Water Needs 6. A Home for All Species PART THREE The Demographic Challenge 7. Global Population Dynamics 8. Completing the Demographic Transition PART FOUR Prosperity for All 9. The Strategy of Economic Development 10. Ending Poverty Traps 11. Economic Security in a Changing World PART FIVE Global

, who say that population growth has already gone too far to avoid disaster; and those (including myself) who believe in the importance of spurring the demographic transition to lower fertility rates in the poorest countries. Population optimists maintain that there are no real bounds to the Earth’s population because technology can

this interpretation, the test is not the first two hundred years of economic growth but the possibility of smooth landing this century. The advocates of demographic transition, such as myself, remain cautiously optimistic. This group in the middle of the debate acknowledges that good ideas and man-made capital can substitute, though

technological advancement versus population growth and on the ability of man-made capital (for example, irrigation) to substitute for natural processes. Advocates of speeding the demographic transition emphasize the need for public efforts to speed the voluntary reduction of fertility rates as rapidly as possible to achieve the stabilization of the world

to suggest to them, and to us, that reducing the TFR from very high levels is part of their own security and ours. SPEEDING THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION The world is not locked in a demographic straitjacket but is instead in a transition, albeit one that is stretched out over many decades and

with large differences across regions. The core idea is known as the demographic transition, illustrated in Figure 7.6. A society begins with very high mortality rates (especially of young children) and very high fertility rates. The population is

demographers call the crude birth and death rates, measured as births and deaths per one thousand of total population. According to the theory of the demographic transition, the child mortality rate declines ahead of the total fertility rate. For example, the spread of immunizations, improved food production, safer water supply, and availability

population in twenty-three years. Roughly speaking, a 3 percent annual growth rate corresponds with a net reproductive rate of around 2. Figure 7.6: Demographic Transition Model Source: Haggett (1975) Let’s take the case of Kenya during 2005–10 as an illustration. The under-five mortality rate has declined to

TFR of 5 and an under-five mortality rate of 104 per 1,000 is just a sliver under 2 (1.96). The upshot of demographic transition theory is that the total fertility rate declines with a lag, leading to a massive onetime bulge of population as the society transitions from high

choose to have only two children. THE COMPELLING CASE FOR FERTILITY DECLINE There are four compelling reasons why the poorest countries need to speed the demographic transition, and why we need to help them do it. The first, and most important, is that poor families cannot surmount extreme poverty without a decline

are among the most private of all decisions and the least amenable to government action (except, perhaps, by coercion). Yes, societies will pass through a demographic transition, but it would seem to be one that can, should, and will be determined by individual choices, not by government policies. Indeed, for today’s

rich countries of Western Europe and the United States, the demographic transition that took place during the twentieth century occurred largely through such decision making of individual households. Yet the same has not been the case in

the poorer countries. Their demographic transitions, where they have occurred, have typically been accelerated, and even triggered, by proactive government policies. Since governments have played a key role in the rapid

, a decade or so later, in North Africa as well. Countries with higher levels of literacy, women’s rights, and per capita incomes achieved the demographic transition earlier, but family planning programs also provoked rapid changes in countries with pervasive rural poverty, rigid gender roles, and widespread illiteracy. The transitions to low

progress, improve environmental protection and reduce unsustainable consumption and production patterns are mutually reinforcing.” The plan makes clear that one objective is “to facilitate the demographic transition as soon as possible in countries where there is an imbalance between demographic rates and social, economic and environmental goals,” thereby contributing “to the stabilization

financial goals have not yet been met. We now turn to reviving the global cooperation on family planning and fertility reduction. Chapter 8 Completing the Demographic Transition SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THIS DECADE, population policy has been hijacked by shortsighted ideology. Leaders of the U.S. religious right have called for ending

, the world’s population rises to 9.2 billion by 2050 and is roughly stable thereafter. A plausible policy alternative is to assume a faster demographic transition in the developing countries, as presented in the UN’s low-fertility forecast. This low-fertility scenario puts the TFR at 0.5 lower than

and underfunding of global efforts, we are much more likely to find ourselves in more real wars instead. Table 8.1: Global Population with Faster Demographic Transition (billions) Source: Data from the UN Population Division (2007). The low-fertility forecast is for the less-developed countries only. The developed-country population forecast

, education, and infrastructure) with aid for family planning. We should view the fertility transition and the economic development takeoff as a package deal. COMPLETING THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION Family planning, a worldwide policy-led effort since the 1950s to empower households to reduce their fertility rates through access to contraception and health services

from World Bank (2007) Education of Girls Girls’ education has time and again been shown to be one of the decisive entry points into the demographic transition. Girls’ education has multiple effects, all leading in the same direction: lower fertility (see Figure 8.3, which shows lower TFR in countries with higher

to home production. While urbanization is not a policy target per se, the trend to urbanization is likely to be a factor in speeding the demographic transition. Legal Abortion Even with widespread contraception available, many pregnancies will be accidental and unwanted. Abortions will take place, legally or illegally, as has been found

is ironic that the Bush administration’s attitudes toward family planning are in many ways more fundamentalist than Iran’s. Figure 8.4: Iran’s Demographic Transition Source: Data from World Bank (2007) AFRICA’S PROSPECTS Africa’s fertility decline lags behind the rest of the world. The progress is real, but

no social safety net. In addition to these standard factors, there are other more subtle barriers that have contributed to the lag in Africa’s demographic transition. First, since Africa has by far the highest disease burden in the world and the highest rates of mortality of infants and young children, the

, and Barkat-e-Khuda, “The Future of Family Planning Programs,” Issues in Family Planning 33, no. 1 (March 2002): 1–10. CHAPTER 8: COMPLETING THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION 186 Correlation does not prove: To show lower mortality causes lower fertility see Jeffrey Sachs, Dalton Conley, and Gordon C. McCord, “Africa’s Lagging

Demographic Transition: Evidence from Exogenous Impacts of Malaria Ecology and Agricultural Technology,” NBER Working Paper 12892, February 2007. Whether the effect of reducing the fertility is greater

33, no. 1 (March 2002): 76–86. 192 thereby leading to an indirect: Jeffrey D. Sachs, Dalton Conley, and Gordon C. McCord, “Africa’s Lagging Demographic Transition: Evidence from Exogenous Impacts of Malaria and Agricultural Technology,” NBER Working Paper Series, no. 12892, February 2007. 194 importance of privacy to: Caldwell and Caldwell

, 1972, pp. 339–63. Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. http://www.ctbto.org. Conley, Dalton, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Gordon C. McCord. “Africa’s Lagging Demographic Transition: Evidence from Exogenous Impacts of Malaria and Agricultural Technology.” NBER Working Paper Series, no. 12892, February 2007. The Convention on Biological Diversity. http://www.biodiv

Immigration worldwide: policies, practices, and trends

by Uma Anand Segal, Doreen Elliott and Nazneen S. Mayadas  · 19 Jan 2010  · 492pp  · 70,082 words

; Villasin & Phillips, 1994) for its sexist and classist regulations, such as the ‘‘livein’’ requirement. The province of Quebec has its own immigration regulations. Canada’s Demographic Transition Primary Sending Countries The peak years of immigration in Canadian history were 1913, when more than 400,000 newcomers came to Canada, and 1957, when

Capital in the Twenty-First Century

by Thomas Piketty  · 10 Mar 2014  · 935pp  · 267,358 words

are probably the richest in the world over the long run. My second reason is that because France was the first country to experience the demographic transition, it is in some respects a good place to observe what awaits the rest of the planet. Although the country’s population has increased over

0.4 percent, in the period 1913–2012, compared with 0.8 percent between 1820 and 1913. Here we see the phenomenon known as the demographic transition: the continual increase in life expectancy is no longer enough to compensate for the falling birth rate, and the pace of population growth slowly reverts

. For the period 1990–2012, the average rate is still 1.3 percent, which is extremely high.3 According to official forecasts, progress toward the demographic transition at the global level should now accelerate, leading to eventual stabilization of the planet’s population. According to a UN forecast, the demographic growth rate

noted, both Young and Malthus saw this as the reason for French rural poverty and even as the cause of the French Revolution). But the demographic transition occurred unusually early in France: a fall in the birth rate led to a virtually stagnant population as early as the nineteenth century. This is

and other regions: the generations being born now in Japan and China are roughly one-third smaller than the generations born in the 1990s. The demographic transition is largely complete. Changes in individual decisions and government policies may slightly alter these trends: for example, slightly negative rates (such as we see in

see that the rise began much earlier, in the eighteenth century, and the decrease also began much earlier. Here we see the effects of the demographic transition, which has already largely been completed. The rate of global population growth peaked in the period 1950–1970 at nearly 2 percent per year and

others. For one thing, the rate of growth, g, tends to be structurally low (generally not much more than 1 percent a year once the demographic transition is complete and the country reaches the world technological frontier, where the pace of innovation is fairly slow). For another, the rate of return on

be lower in Africa than in other continents throughout the twenty-first century (essentially because Africa is catching up economically much more slowly and its demographic transition is also delayed).45 If capital can flow freely across borders, one would expect to see a flow of investments in Africa from other countries

and, 569–­570, 573 Demographic growth, 72–­75, 174; stages of, 77–­80; negative, 80–­83; bell curve of global, 99, 589n24; decreased, 166–­168 Demographic transition, 3–­4, 29–­30, 78–­79, 81–­82 Denmark, 495 Depreciation, 43, 178 Deregulation movement, 138–­139 Di Bartolomeo, G., 637n26 “Difference principle” (Rawls), 480

/P10 ratio, 267–­269 Po­liti­cal economy, 3–­5, 574 Poll tax, 495, 634n3 Pop­u­lar Front, 286, 649n25 Population. See Demographic growth; Demographic transition Postel-­Vinay, Gilles, 18, 582n28, 599n14, 612nn4,5,9 Power laws, 367–­368 Prices: inflation and, 102–­103; monetary stability and, 103–­104; effects of

The World in 2050: Four Forces Shaping Civilization's Northern Future

by Laurence C. Smith  · 22 Sep 2010  · 421pp  · 120,332 words

which a population run-up is at first initiated, then later stabilized, by the forces of modernization is called the Demographic Transition and is a bedrock concept in demography.16 The Demographic Transition supposes that modernization tends to reduce death and fertility rates, but not simultaneously. Because people tend to readily adopt technological advances

the sum total. Even if fertility rates later fall to match death rates—thus completing the Demographic Transition and halting further growth—a new, much larger population balance is then carried forward. In the twentieth century, one Demographic Transition concluded and another began. In Europe and North America it took from about 1750 to

and Africa grew slowly. This growth then slowed or stopped as industrialized countries completed the Demographic Transition, their fertility rates falling to near or even below the death rate. But in the developing world, a new Demographic Transition that began in the early twentieth century with the arrival of modern medicine has still not

dropping, have fallen less quickly. In some countries they haven’t fallen at all, defying the classic Demographic Transition notion that all modernized women prefer fewer babies. Such discrepancies underline a known weakness of the Demographic Transition model: Not every culture will necessarily adopt the western ideal of a small nuclear family, even after

world population has been nothing short of phenomenal. In most developing countries the spread between fertility and death rates, while narrowing, remains substantial. This second Demographic Transition is not yet finished, and unlike before, it involves the vast majority of the human race. Until a few decades after it ends—if it

were still low. The unprecedented explosion of people on Earth happened because births began outnumbering deaths, but there’s more to it than that. The “Demographic Transition” concept described in Chapter 1 emerged from what transpired in Europe and the United States. And it appears to now be unfolding in the rest

of the world as well. Recall that the Demographic Transition has four stages: 1. High and similar rates of birth and death (e.g., the preindustrial era, with a small and relatively stable total human

. As we saw in Chapter 1, urbanization, modernization, and the empowerment of women push fertility rates downward, thus ushering in the final stage of the Demographic Transition. Put another way, the urbanization of society—if also associated with modernization and women’s rights—helps slow the rate of growth. There are, of

. See also M. L. Bacci, A Concise History of World population, 4th ed. (Wiley-Blackwell), 296 pp. 17 For a good discussion of how the Demographic Transition unfolded differently in developing countries than it did in Europe and North America, see the unparalleled book by J. E. Cohen, How Many People Can

Congo demography: and aboriginal populations; and aging populations; and Alaska; and biofuels; and climate distribution; connection to other global forces; and declining populations; and the Demographic Transition; as global force; and global warming; and Gulags; and human settlement patterns; and immigration; and inertia of global forces; and life expectancy; measurement types; and

Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration and the Future of White Majorities

by Eric Kaufmann  · 24 Oct 2018  · 691pp  · 203,236 words

billion. We hit 3 billion in 1960. Now 7.5 billion of us share the planet. The West was the first to go through its demographic transition from high birth and death rates to low birth and death rates. East Asia soon followed, and now much of the rest of the world

apart from a few spots in Central Africa and West Asia is following suit. During a demographic transition, death rates fall first and there is a lag period when birth rates are temporarily higher than death rates, producing a population explosion. However, the

historic demographic transition in Europe and its settler offshoots was different to that now taking place in the global South. Europe’s transition began around 1750 and lasted

times that of Denmark. Multiplied across many countries, this explains why the West’s share of world population dropped so rapidly after 1950.20 The demographic transition is important for politics because it unfolds at different times between world regions, between nations and even between ethnic groups within nations. In Northern Ireland

, for instance, Protestants entered the demographic transition sixty to eighty years before Catholics. That meant Catholic birth rates were higher than Protestant ones for decades, which is why the Catholic share of

, which played a part in the violence which gripped the province between 1969 and 1994.21 In other words, it is the unevenness of the demographic transition between groups which carries political implications.22 Now let’s zoom out to the global level. The number of children a woman bears over her

West Asia, where TFR is well above the 2.1 level needed to replace the population. Some sixty-five countries are still early in their demographic transition with the average woman expected to bear between 3.5 and 7 children over her lifetime. The developed world – the West plus East Asia – has

Flower Power and the personal computer. It’s therefore fitting that it was the first major state to undergo what David Coleman terms the ‘third demographic transition’ from predominantly white to ‘majority minority’. The state was 80 per cent non-Hispanic white as recently as 1970 and fell below the 50 per

the country have grown substantially since the end of apartheid in 1994. Given its proximity to very poor countries at an early stage of their demographic transitions, and with weak border controls across the continent, the potential for large-scale unauthorized immigration is much greater than in Europe or the United States

that whites have lower birth rates than non-whites can be dispensed with fairly quickly. Almost all modern populations are in some stage of the demographic transition to low birth and death rates. The transition took place first in the West, between the late eighteenth century and the mid-twentieth century. It

International Security and National Politics, Boulder, Colo., 2012: Paradigm, p. 182. 13. D. Coleman, ‘Immigration and ethnic change in low-fertility countries – towards a new demographic transition?’, paper presented to the Population Association of America annual meeting, Philadelphia, 31 March–2 April 2005. 14. ‘World Population to 2300’, New York, 2004: United

Exceptional People: How Migration Shaped Our World and Will Define Our Future

by Ian Goldin, Geoffrey Cameron and Meera Balarajan  · 20 Dec 2010  · 482pp  · 117,962 words

2000, it has a rugby-ball shape. Projections for 2040 are that it will look more like a coffin, with a larger elderly population. The demographic transition correlated with economic development mirrors the migration transition discussed earlier, where a country undergoing rapid economic transformation evolves from a migrant source country to a

migration pressure. Growing Working-Age populations in Developing countries In forecasting future population trends, the concept of the “demographic transition” can explain why the age distribution within nations and regions changes over time. The demographic transition is the movement of a country—over several decades—from a pattern of high mortality and high fertility

health),50 and as a result, countries beginning the transition experience a population bulge. The age distribution becomes younger at this first stage of the demographic transition, and the working-age population increases annually—with more people entering the workforce than are leaving it. 51 These population changes are linked to broader

grown so fast in developing countries—aside from rural-urban migration—is because they were typically the first part of the country to experience the demographic transition. Health care services are more easily available and information is transmitted more quickly in urban areas, which leads mortality to decline before the trend takes

this stage of accelerated population growth, which is currently contributing to growing numbers of working-age people. Historically, countries experiencing the first phase of the demographic transition have experienced high rates of emigration. This was certainly true of Europe in the nineteenth century, when a boom in the number of “migration-sensitive

, emigration from Germany was much greater than from France, where population increased at a relatively slower rate.54 Similar migration pressures are expected to accompany demographic transitions in developing countries.55 Hatton and Williamson argue that the growth in emigration from developing countries after the 1960s was related to the appearance of

say for certain is that working-age populations are already growing rapidly in some developing countries due to late demographic transitions. While many countries in East Asia are beyond the phase of their demographic transition when population growth peaks, other developing countries are still expecting significant population growth over the next forty years (see

be clear that population growth by itself does not drive migration, and population increase is not an indefinite process. Developed countries that underwent their early demographic transition in the nineteenth century benefited from out-migration because it helped to stabilize wages in the face of population growth.60 These countries have since

countries, but also in many developing countries, populations are getting older and smaller, creating demand for migrant workers. Earlier in this chapter, we outlined the demographic transition developing countries are facing in the coming century, with falling child mortality rates leading to a population boom. In the second stage of a

demographic transition—which has been well under way in developed countries for more than a century—fertility falls, and the short-term result is a growing ratio

, and Development,” SSRC Migration and Development Conference Paper No.22, p. 2. 52. Ibid. 53. Jose Antonio Ortega. 2005. “What Are the Implications of the Demographic Transitions Process for 21st Century European Population?” presented at Eurostat/ UNECE Work Session on Demographic Projection, Vienna, September. 54. Ibid.: 5. 55. Ibid.: 5. 56. Hatton

of International Migrations: Evidence from OECD Countries 1980-2005,” Working Paper 14833. Cambridge, MA: NBER. Ortega, Jose Antonio. 2005. “What Are the Implications of the Demographic Transitions Process for 21st Century European Population?” Available at: http://circa.europa.eu/irc/dsis/jointestatunece/info/data/paper_ortega.pdf. Osterholm, Michael T. 2005. “Preparing

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Irrational Exuberance: With a New Preface by the Author

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The Planet Remade: How Geoengineering Could Change the World

by Oliver Morton  · 26 Sep 2015  · 469pp  · 142,230 words

On the Future: Prospects for Humanity

by Martin J. Rees  · 14 Oct 2018  · 193pp  · 51,445 words

Losing Control: The Emerging Threats to Western Prosperity

by Stephen D. King  · 14 Jun 2010  · 561pp  · 87,892 words

Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution

by Francis Fukuyama  · 1 Jan 2002  · 350pp  · 96,803 words

The Human Swarm: How Our Societies Arise, Thrive, and Fall

by Mark W. Moffett  · 31 Mar 2019  · 692pp  · 189,065 words

A Brief History of Everyone Who Ever Lived

by Adam Rutherford  · 7 Sep 2016

Plenitude: The New Economics of True Wealth

by Juliet B. Schor  · 12 May 2010  · 309pp  · 78,361 words

Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty

by Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo  · 25 Apr 2011  · 370pp  · 112,602 words

The Meritocracy Myth

by Stephen J. McNamee  · 17 Jul 2013  · 440pp  · 108,137 words

A World Without Work: Technology, Automation, and How We Should Respond

by Daniel Susskind  · 14 Jan 2020  · 419pp  · 109,241 words

Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West

by Timothy Garton Ash  · 30 Jun 2004  · 329pp  · 102,469 words

Fortunes of Change: The Rise of the Liberal Rich and the Remaking of America

by David Callahan  · 9 Aug 2010

How Did We Get Into This Mess?: Politics, Equality, Nature

by George Monbiot  · 14 Apr 2016  · 334pp  · 82,041 words

Miracle Cure

by William Rosen  · 14 Apr 2017  · 515pp  · 117,501 words

The Evolution of Everything: How New Ideas Emerge

by Matt Ridley  · 395pp  · 116,675 words

The Zero Marginal Cost Society: The Internet of Things, the Collaborative Commons, and the Eclipse of Capitalism

by Jeremy Rifkin  · 31 Mar 2014  · 565pp  · 151,129 words

Selfish, Shallow, and Self-Absorbed: Sixteen Writers on the Decision Not to Have Kids

by Meghan Daum  · 29 Mar 2015  · 214pp  · 71,585 words

Green and Prosperous Land: A Blueprint for Rescuing the British Countryside

by Dieter Helm  · 7 Mar 2019  · 348pp  · 102,438 words

Inferior: How Science Got Women Wrong-And the New Research That's Rewriting the Story

by Angela Saini  · 29 May 2017  · 296pp  · 86,188 words

The Red Queen: Sex and the Evolution of Human Nature

by Matt Ridley  · 14 Aug 1993  · 474pp  · 136,787 words

Progress: Ten Reasons to Look Forward to the Future

by Johan Norberg  · 31 Aug 2016  · 262pp  · 66,800 words

Politics on the Edge: The Instant #1 Sunday Times Bestseller From the Host of Hit Podcast the Rest Is Politics

by Rory Stewart  · 13 Sep 2023  · 534pp  · 157,700 words

Fall; Or, Dodge in Hell

by Neal Stephenson  · 3 Jun 2019  · 993pp  · 318,161 words

A Small Farm Future: Making the Case for a Society Built Around Local Economies, Self-Provisioning, Agricultural Diversity and a Shared Earth

by Chris Smaje  · 14 Aug 2020  · 375pp  · 105,586 words

Whole Earth: The Many Lives of Stewart Brand

by John Markoff  · 22 Mar 2022  · 573pp  · 142,376 words

The 5 Types of Wealth: A Transformative Guide to Design Your Dream Life

by Sahil Bloom  · 4 Feb 2025  · 363pp  · 94,341 words

And Finally

by Henry Marsh  · 167pp  · 57,175 words