digital sovereignty

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Money in the Metaverse: Digital Assets, Online Identities, Spatial Computing and Why Virtual Worlds Mean Real Business

by David G. W. Birch and Victoria Richardson  · 28 Apr 2024  · 249pp  · 74,201 words

, the benefits of this growing market are not distributed evenly.4 Many countries are revising their data policies and localization rules in a thrust for ‘digital sovereignty’. This is a useful catch-all description of the many ways in which governments are trying to assert more control over their digital infrastructure. It

Digital Empires: The Global Battle to Regulate Technology

by Anu Bradford  · 25 Sep 2023  · 898pp  · 236,779 words

, which has become easier to conduct in the digitalized world. In addition to this defensive agenda, the EU is now increasingly seeking to bolster its “digital sovereignty” in an effort to shed its dependencies on American and Chinese technologies by building its own technological capabilities.49 This horizontal conflict has morphed into

surveillance practices—and, with that, its values—around the world. Many receiving countries have welcomed Chinese technologies and accompanying regulatory standards as a path toward digital sovereignty and development. For authoritarian governments, an additional motivation has been to gain access to surveillance technologies that they eagerly use toward illiberal ends. The chapter

control on the other. It shows how, in pursuit of these goals, the government has made concerted efforts to enhance China’s technological leadership and digital sovereignty, while also leveraging the internet as a tool for control, propaganda, and state surveillance. The chapter also examines the role of Chinese tech companies in

Chinese regulatory model. The EU institutions are assuming an increasingly dirigiste role in steering the digital economy with the goal of asserting the EU’s “digital sovereignty,” which can be seen as a move toward a state-driven regulatory model. In today’s tense geopolitical environment, European political leadership is stressing the

technological self-sufficiency and boost its own strategic and industrial capabilities. In the digital economy domain, this entails bolstering the EU’s “technological sovereignty” or digital sovereignty, including assuming control of European data and digital infrastructure, as well as nurturing European tech champions. “We must have mastery and ownership of key technologies

in November 2019.162 This is one of many recent statements by European leaders that emphasize the importance of Europe’s “strategic autonomy,” including its digital sovereignty. In its 2020 Communication, the Commission emphasizes “the integrity and resilience of our data-infrastructure, networks and communications” as a foundation of European technological sovereignty

reinforce Europe’s ability to “define its own rules and values in the digital age.”163 The EU’s recent push for strategic autonomy and digital sovereignty remains a contested policy goal for its regulatory policies. Some associate these terms with a desirable goal to bolster European capabilities while others see them

as an undesirable attempt to build a “fortress Europe” through protectionist measures. At its core, digital sovereignty emphasizes the need for the EU to retain—or to regain—the freedom to make its own choices in the digital age, to reduce its

. Another question is whether an unintended consequence of the EU’s digital sovereignty agenda is that it may even lend legitimacy to more extreme variants of digital sovereignty that authoritarian governments, including most prominently China and Russia, are pursuing. As such, the digital sovereignty narrative can be invoked to justify many forms of government control over

the internet, offering a blueprint for autocracies to engage in extensive surveillance of their citizens. For example, China deploys the notion of digital sovereignty to justify the extensive government control of the digital sphere that goes beyond protectionism and competitiveness concerns and severely limits individual freedoms. The more the

their criticism becomes when they ask China to loosen its reins over the Chinese digital economy. Ultimately, the EU will likely undertake this quest for digital sovereignty mindful of its core values that have been discussed earlier in this chapter—fundamental rights, democracy, and fairness—which set limits to how the EU

an advantage in the tech race due to the amount of data its government and companies have harnessed. Thus, even in its newfound pursuit for digital sovereignty, the EU is expected to be committed to a digital order that is rooted in respect for fundamental rights, the defense of democracy, and the

, and innovation-friendly AI regulation geared at fostering economic growth and European competitiveness.216 The EU member states are also split in their support for digital sovereignty, with France leading the more dirigiste, industrial policy–oriented camp whereas the Northern European countries, in particular, emphasize the need to retain Europe’s commitment

the mercy of the warring rivals, the EU is now pursuing greater technological self-sufficiency—or, as the EU calls it, “strategic autonomy”7 or “digital sovereignty”8—in the tense geopolitical environment. The EU response shows how the US–China tech war is fueling broader distrust in digital trade and international

are an especially prominent example of this phenomenon. Today, the 5G market is a major battleground in the US and China’s broader fight for digital sovereignty. In the US, like elsewhere in the world, the 5G network forms a vital backbone to essential societal services and economic activities—ranging from electricity

a path toward “self-reliance” has dominated China’s economic policy under President Xi long before the Europeans introduced concepts such as “strategic autonomy” and digital sovereignty into policy conversations. China’s ambitious Made in China 2025 agenda only reinforces this existing trend. Not unlike the US and the EU, the key

objective behind China’s digital sovereignty agenda is to reduce China’s dependence on foreign technologies and enhance China’s standing in the global tech race. Yet China has to date

sovereignty while restricting foreign tech companies’ abilities to operate in its domestic market.204 These developments in the US and China have also hardened the digital sovereignty narrative in Europe, illustrating how the US–China conflict is having global implications. Many Europeans continue to urge the EU to defend the open internet

sovereignty, even when that contributes toward techno-protectionism elsewhere as well. And the EU is far from being alone in this effort. The pursuit of digital sovereignty has become a defining feature of national digital strategies around the world. Scott Malcomson goes as far as characterizing the “mission for self-sufficiency” as

globalization and ushering in “the New Age of Autarky.”206 If the US and the EU refashion their economies around a technological self-sufficiency and digital sovereignty agenda, they risk diminishing their ability to convince the rest of the world of the merits of an open digital economy and their respective regulatory

models. Governments around the world are starting to deploy this concept of digital sovereignty as a veneer to legitimize measures such as data localization and industrial policies designed to favor domestic technologies over foreign ones. The EU’s emphasis

a central policy objective in the EU may even lend legitimacy to the more extreme variants of digital sovereignty that authoritarian governments such as China and Russia are pursuing. The digital sovereignty narrative can be invoked to justify many forms of government control over the internet, offering a blueprint for autocracies to engage in

extensive surveillance of the digital space. For example, China deploys the notion of digital sovereignty to justify extensive government control of the digital sphere that extends beyond protectionism and competitiveness concerns into intruding on free speech and other individual freedoms

’s fundamentally so much more about which we agree than disagree.”157 Some members of the US Congress similarly expressed concern about the EU’s “digital sovereignty campaign” and the DMA’s adverse effect on US companies in a letter addressed to President Biden in June 2021.158 The DMA also became

business leaders have pointed out that the EU’s antitrust protectionism is consistent with the European broader digital agenda that rests on its pursuit of digital sovereignty and is marked by anti-American bias. Commenting on the EU’s $5 billion antitrust fine imposed on Google, Republican Senator Orrin Hatch tweeted in

the criticism of the Alstrom/Siemens decision can be viewed as blunt endorsements of European protectionism and techno-nationalism. The EU’s recent quest for digital sovereignty is also moving the EU toward more actively managed industrial policy, which risks crossing the line from protection to protectionism. The techno-nationalist rhetoric across

Although these statements reveal there is no uniform European view on how to balance the EU’s commitment to openness with its need for greater digital sovereignty, the general political environment today is nevertheless conducive to a more nationalist economic policy orientation in Europe. The combination of populist governments in several EU

so.17 Finally, by providing technology and training that help foreign governments exert greater control over their digital societies, China is exporting its notion of digital sovereignty and state control abroad. This way, the DSR also paves the way for the Chinese government to externalize its state-driven regulatory model abroad—one

Thus, while failing to elevate the role of the UN as the central decision-making body for internet governance, China is entrenching its vision for digital sovereignty by gradually transforming multistakeholder organizations into more state-controlled institutions where digital authoritarian norms can better challenge the ideals of the free, open, and global

’s digital regulation but also acknowledged that protectionist pressures are growing in the EU and around the world, as countries are seeking to enhance their “digital sovereignty” in a volatile world. Another strand of criticism leveled against the Brussels Effect relates to its inherent ability to undermine democratic institutions in foreign countries

the US–China tech war, there is a risk that its regulatory instincts are veering it toward techno-nationalism in an effort to safeguard its digital sovereignty in a volatile and uncertain world, as recognized in Chapter 5. This could lead to regulations calling for data localization or industrial policy–driven antitrust

://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/communication-shaping-europes-digital-future-feb2020_en_4.pdf. 164.Jeremy Shapiro, Introduction: Europe’s digital sovereignty, in Carla Hobbs (ed.), Europe’s Digital Sovereignty: From Rulemaker to Superpower in the Age of Us–China Rivalry, 6, 10 (2020). 165.Robbie Gramer, Trump Turning More Countries in

Sustainable Growth Strategy 2021, COM (2020) 575 final (Sep. 17, 2020). 181.See Frances G. Burwell & Kenneth Propp, The European Union and the Search for Digital Sovereignty: Building “Fortress Europe” or Preparing for a New World?, Atlantic Council (June 2020), at 5. 182.Jonathan Ponciano, The World’s Largest Technology Companies in

/08/recovery-plan-powering-europe-s-strategic-autonomy-speech-by-president-charles-michel-at-the-brussels-economic-forum/. 8.Jeremy Shapiro, Introduction: Europe’s Digital Sovereignty, in Europe’s Digital Sovereignty: From Rulemaker to Superpower in the Age of US–China Rivalry 6 (Carla Hobbs ed., 2020), https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/europe

_digital_sovereignty_rulemaker_superpower_age_us_china_rivalry.pdf. 9.Emma Rafaelof, U.S.-China Econ. and Sec. Rev. Comm’n, Unfinished Business: Export Control and Foreign

.com/technology/google-appeals-court-order-unblock-youtube-account-sanctioned-businessman-2021-05-20/. 117.Max Seddon, YouTube Feels the Heat as Russia Ramps Up “Digital Sovereignty” Drive, Fin. Times (May 22, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/918d2e15-b4d7-4d02-8961-6dfc4e76d68f. 118.Id. 119.See Leonid Kovachich & Andrei Kolesnikov, Digital

digital influence, 297–302 digital protectionism, 72–77, 214 Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative, 18, 20, 27–28, 294–97, 314, 316–17, 391–92 digital sovereignty, 215 disinformation campaigns, 282–83 dual circulation strategy, 206 e-commerce, 94–95, 155 Export Control Law (ECL), 200–3 exports, 290–323 Five-Year

–92 projects in Pakistan, 300 projects in South and South-East Asia, 300 digital single market (DSM) (EU), 129–30, 371–72 digital society, 25 digital sovereignty, 132–33, 135, 186, 215, 245–46, 354 digital surveillance, 4–5, 61, 170. see also surveillance criticism of, 99–100 pervasive, 85–88 digital

, 140, 141–42, 169–70, 224, 246, 249, 340–41, 381 digital services taxes (DSTs), 236–40, 241, 352 digital single market (DSM), 371–72 digital sovereignty, 132–33, 135, 215, 245–46 digitally advanced EU countries (D9) group, 142 e-commerce Directive, 132, 137–38, 286–87 entrepreneurship, 374 Ethics Guidelines

Connectography: Mapping the Future of Global Civilization

by Parag Khanna  · 18 Apr 2016  · 497pp  · 144,283 words

advocated a cyber Magna Carta that guarantees the Internet remain a neutral utility. But it is too late: The Internet already shows signs of both digital sovereignty and feudalism, with rivalries not mapping neatly onto political geography. As the U.S. Commerce Department steps down as the de facto Webmaster, the Internet

know. Perversely, however, it is the reaction to the NSA’s surveillance programs that has “Balkanized” the Internet. Countries of all stripes have asserted their digital sovereignty, either to protect their citizens from invasions of privacy (Germany) or to gain access to more of their citizens’ data (Russia). China is launching an

Ours to Hack and to Own: The Rise of Platform Cooperativism, a New Vision for the Future of Work and a Fairer Internet

by Trebor Scholz and Nathan Schneider  · 14 Aug 2017  · 237pp  · 67,154 words

’s Ownership Economy through Union Co-ops 36. Mayo Fuster Morell - Toward a Theory of Value for Platform Cooperatives 37. Francesca Bria - Public Policies for Digital Sovereignty 38. Miriam A. Cherry - Legal and Governance Structures Built to Share 39. Rachel O’Dwyer - Blockchains and Their Pitfalls 40. Astra Taylor - Non-Cooperativism Contributors

only self-governing processes but also the capacity for people to create resources and services that garner a good online reputation. 37. PUBLIC POLICIES FOR DIGITAL SOVEREIGNTY FRANCESCA BRIA The scale of the transition to platform capitalism is massive. The builders of emerging online platforms aim to become pervasive across all productive

Divided: Why We're Living in an Age of Walls

by Tim Marshall  · 8 Mar 2018  · 256pp  · 75,139 words

new Chinese cyber-security legislation, which came into law in 2017, has built the walls higher than ever, metaphorically speaking. The legislation, formulated to ensure ‘digital sovereignty’, includes classic ‘catch-all’ laws designed to mean what the Party interprets them to mean. For example, if a foreign company is involved in any

The Dark Cloud: How the Digital World Is Costing the Earth

by Guillaume Pitron  · 14 Jun 2023  · 271pp  · 79,355 words

Europe via the Arctic (see chapters nine and ten) could indeed make the Nordic countries a ‘natural’ choice for data storage.55 But claims for digital sovereignty by a growing number of states could rearrange the cloud’s geography. This desire to control their own information flows gives rise to a new

fundamental particles of matter, just as much as by time’s arrow, the force of gravity, and the laws of thermodynamics. Europe’s quest for digital sovereignty In the shorter term, China’s ascension in the cable industry doesn’t necessarily entail Western reliance on infrastructure ‘made in China’, the operation of

rumours of Nokia selling ASN had, until 2019, been circulating in the industry. Yet Alcatel Submarine Networks is seen as a key to Europe’s digital sovereignty, allowing it to hold onto a technology that, today, only benefits a handful of countries. That is why ‘ensuring ASN remains a European asset is