first-price auction

Mining of Massive Datasets

by Jure Leskovec, Anand Rajaraman and Jeffrey David Ullman  · 13 Nov 2014

simplified model, when a user clicks on an advertiser’s ad, the advertiser is charged the amount they bid. This policy is known as a first-price auction. In reality, search engines use a more complicated system known as a second-price auction, where each advertiser pays approximately the bid of the advertiser

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the advertiser in second place, plus one cent. It has been shown that second-price auctions are less susceptible to being gamed by advertisers than first-price auctions and lead to higher revenues for the search engine. 8.4.5A Lower Bound on Competitive Ratio for Balance In this section we shall prove

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Feature, 252, 297, 298 Feature selection, 421 Feature vector, 416, 455 Fetterly, D., 67 Fikes, A., 67 File, 21, 198, 215 Filtering, 130 Fingerprint, 107 First-price auction, 279 Fixedpoint, 96, 182 Flajolet, P., 153 Flajolet–Martin Algorithm, 134, 376 Flow graph, 39 Fortunato, S., 382 Fotakis, D., 382 French, J.C., 265

The Upside of Irrationality: The Unexpected Benefits of Defying Logic at Work and at Home

by Dan Ariely  · 31 May 2010  · 324pp  · 93,175 words

with their own frogs and cranes, they would bid more when using the second-price auction (when only their value matters) than when using the first-price auction (when they should also take into account the values of others). In contrast, if the creators did not realize that they were the only ones

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amount when they considered only their own evaluation for the product (second-price auction) as when they also considered what noncreators would bid for it (first-price auction). The lack of difference between the two bidding approaches suggested not only that we overvalue our own creations but also that we are largely unaware

Reinventing the Bazaar: A Natural History of Markets

by John McMillan  · 1 Jan 2002  · 350pp  · 103,988 words

this way. A variant is the second-price auction, in which there is a single round of bidding and the high bidder wins, but unlike first-price auctions, the price paid is the second-highest bid. Second-price auctions are used for selling stamps. eBay chose open auctions. Economic theory endorses this decision

Who Gets What — and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design

by Alvin E. Roth  · 1 Jun 2015  · 282pp  · 80,907 words

make any profit, since if they win the auction, they will have to pay the full amount of their bid. So the seller in a first-price auction receives the amount of the highest bid, which is, however, less than the true value of the highest bidder. By comparison, in a second-price

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ground might suffer the “winner’s curse”—that is, win the auction only because it overestimated the value of winning and paid too much. But first-price auctions, in which the winning bidder pays what she bids, have their own charms and exist in many varieties. One version of a

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first-price auction is used to sell cut flowers in bulk, in a “descending bid” auction. The auctioneer sets up a “clock” that has the current bid on

Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach

by Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig  · 14 Jul 2019  · 2,466pp  · 668,761 words

point of view, a better result could have been obtained by any of these changes to the mechanism: a higher reserve price; a sealed-bid first-price auction, so that the competitors could not communicate through their bids; or incentives to bring in a third bidder. Perhaps the 10% rule was an error

Understanding Sponsored Search: Core Elements of Keyword Advertising

by Jim Jansen  · 25 Jul 2011  · 298pp  · 43,745 words

was relatively straightforward, with a transparent ranking factor (i.e., money), advertisers bidding on exact phrases, and editors checking for relevance. This concept is a first-price auction, where the top bidder gets the top advertising position. GoTo.com also provided nonsponsored listings, provided by Inktomi.com. Potpourri: GoTo.com was the rebranded

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model was introduced with some significant changes relative to the Overture model. First, developers of Google’s AdWords platform changed the pricing scheme from a first-price auction to a more stable second-price auction. In a single-item second-price auction, the highest bidder wins but only pays the second-highest bid

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more likely to click on relevant advertisements. These two auction mechanism changes helped make Google’s auction more stable and more profitable than the original first-price auction. Modeling the Process of Sponsored Search 15 Potpourri: Overture (later known as Yahoo! Search Marketing) updated its pricing scheme to second-price after Google in

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few wide or wild price swings once the auction reaches a point of stability. This is especially true relative to a first-price auction [22] (i.e., you pay what you bid). The first-price auction has no point of equilibrium or stability, so the bids can constantly be in flux. However, stability is a range

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advertisement (Source: IAB) (see Chapter 6 BAM!). Fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG): products that are sold quickly at relatively low cost (see Chapter 6 BAM!). First-price auction: an auction in which the bidder who submitted the highest bid is awarded the object being sold and pays a price equal to the amount

Algorithms to Live By: The Computer Science of Human Decisions

by Brian Christian and Tom Griffiths  · 4 Apr 2016  · 523pp  · 143,139 words

in secret, and the one whose bid is highest wins the item for whatever price they wrote down. This is known as a “sealed-bid first-price auction,” and from an algorithmic game theory perspective there’s a big problem with it—actually, several. For one thing, there’s a sense in which

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its basic quality: the seller is likely to begin optimistically and nudge the price down until a buyer is found. The descending auction resembles the first-price auction in that you’re more likely to win by paying near the top of your range (i.e., you’ll be poised to bid as

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a hot knife through butter. It’s called the Vickrey auction. Named for Nobel Prize–winning economist William Vickrey, the Vickrey auction, just like the first-price auction, is a “sealed bid” auction process. That is, every participant simply writes down a single number in secret, and the highest bidder wins. However, in

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need to strategize or recurse. Now, it seems like the Vickrey auction would cost the seller some money compared to the first-price auction, but this isn’t necessarily true. In a first-price auction, every bidder is shading their bid down to avoid overpaying; in the second-price Vickrey auction, there’s no need to

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shading their bid for them. In fact, a game-theoretic principle called “revenue equivalence” establishes that over time, the average expected sale price in a first-price auction will converge to precisely the same as in a Vickrey auction. Thus the Vickrey equilibrium involves the same bidder winning the item for the same

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/default.htm?job=auction_factsheet&id=97. they’re shading their bids based on their prediction of yours!: The equilibrium strategy for a sealed-bid first-price auction with two players is to bid exactly half what you think the item is worth. More generally, in this auction format with n players, you

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’t know the number of bidders in the auction, the optimal strategy gets complicated in a hurry; see, for instance, An, Hu, and Shum, “Estimating First-Price Auctions with an Unknown Number of Bidders: A Misclassification Approach.” Actually, even the seemingly clean results—(n−1)⁄n—require some serious assumptions, namely that the

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D. Demaine, and Alan Guo. “Classic Nintendo Games Are (NP-) Hard.” arXiv preprint arXiv:1203.1895, 2012. An, Yonghong, Yingyao Hu, and Matthew Shum. “Estimating First-Price Auctions with an Unknown Number of Bidders: A Misclassification Approach.” Journal of Econometrics 157, no. 2 (2010): 328–341. Anderson, John R. The Adaptive Character of

The Inner Lives of Markets: How People Shape Them—And They Shape Us

by Tim Sullivan  · 6 Jun 2016  · 252pp  · 73,131 words

willing to give, when the lot will be bought for them as low as possible consistent with the representation of other bids. In a live (first-price) auction, a bidder keeps raising his paddle until the price goes above what he’s willing to pay for the lot that’s up for bid

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. (Of course, we’ll never know what his walk-away price was, beyond the fact that it was above $51,111,111.11.) In a first-price auction, we’ve already seen that it’s not clear where Henry should set his bid—sure, it should be less than $60 million, but how

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. But his design also sees scarce application in areas like government procurement, which had been Vickrey’s primary motivation for building something better than a first-price auction in the first place. Nor has the Vickrey auction seen much action in the sale of state assets, where it matters not just how much

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such desperate need of an overhaul in 2013? It would have seemed a perfect candidate for Vickrey’s system: a single item for bid where first-price auctions had fared poorly because of uncertainty over what to offer, and the potential for career-destroying bids from unlucky auction “winners” who guessed wrong. That

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like risk preferences, first- and second-price auctions can be expected to generate the same revenues for the seller, on average. Essentially, bidders in a first-price auction will shave their bids by “just enough” so that on average the amount paid to the seller is about the same. Sometimes it’ll be

The Armchair Economist: Economics and Everyday Life

by Steven E. Landsburg  · 1 May 2012

to decide between a first-price and a second-price sealed bid auction can be difficult for the seller. On the one hand, in a first-price auction he collects the high bid, while in a second-price auction he collects only the amount of the second-highest bid. On the other hand

A Little History of Economics

by Niall Kishtainy  · 15 Jan 2017  · 272pp  · 83,798 words

you might be outbid and end up with nothing. If you hate risk you’ll tend to shade less, perhaps bidding £290,000. In the first-price auction your aversion to risk makes you bid close to your true valuation, and that’s what you’ll pay if you win. In the second

Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning About a Highly Connected World

by David Easley and Jon Kleinberg  · 15 Nov 2010  · 1,535pp  · 337,071 words

The Irrational Bundle

by Dan Ariely  · 3 Apr 2013  · 898pp  · 266,274 words

Model Thinker: What You Need to Know to Make Data Work for You

by Scott E. Page  · 27 Nov 2018  · 543pp  · 153,550 words