forced technology transfer

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The Capitalist Manifesto

by Johan Norberg  · 14 Jun 2023  · 295pp  · 87,204 words

since the previous year is on average 47 per cent during these ten years. The proportion who experience a deterioration is just 3 per cent. Forced technology transfers is a major concern but only ends up in twenty-fourth place among the twenty-seven biggest concerns that US companies experience in China.8

, 73, 75 Financial Fiasco (Norberg), 142 financial markets, 141–3 Financial Times, 8, 267 Finland, 76, 78, 268, 285 Foodora, 102 Forbes’ list, 129–30 forced technology transfers, 211 Foroohar, Rana, 8 Fortune 500 list, 151 Fortune magazine, 169 France, 79–80, 97, 159, 192, 281, 285 Fraser Institute, 35 free markets, 2

Four Battlegrounds

by Paul Scharre  · 18 Jan 2023

cases where U.S. firms have stumbled in the China market, the Chinese government’s systemic protectionist policies of state subsidies, support for “national champions,” forced technology transfer, forced joint ventures for foreign firms, intellectual property theft, and outright bans on some foreign firms have also played a major role in bolstering China

MegaThreats: Ten Dangerous Trends That Imperil Our Future, and How to Survive Them

by Nouriel Roubini  · 17 Oct 2022  · 328pp  · 96,678 words

advantage on exports as trade surpluses mounted: “For many years, China has pursued industrial policies and unfair trade practices—including dumping, discriminatory non-tariff barriers, forced technology transfer, overcapacity, and industrial subsidies—that champion Chinese firms and make it impossible for many United States firms to compete on a level playing field.”18

Open: The Story of Human Progress

by Johan Norberg  · 14 Sep 2020  · 505pp  · 138,917 words

property rights has improved in the past year, every year. The share who thinks it deteriorated is in the very low single digits every year. Forced technology transfers is a concern, but only ranks as 24 out of 27 top challenges US companies face in China.61 China also has more trade barriers

Belt and Road: A Chinese World Order

by Bruno Maçães  · 1 Feb 2019  · 281pp  · 69,107 words

foreign firms, and indicates strong negotiating power on the part of the host country—in this case China—which sees it as a way to force technology transfers. In other words, China deliberately avoided both the Mexican and the Korean models of subordination to large foreign firms or autonomous national development, opting to

Owning the Sun

by Alexander Zaitchik  · 7 Jan 2022  · 341pp  · 98,954 words

-product of protecting trade secrets; it is an integral part of national security and industrial strategy. In a section of the Special 301 Report called “Forced Technology Transfer, Indigenous Innovation, and Preferences for Indigenous IP,” the government highlights its displeasure with technology-transfer requirements deceptively “styled as means to incentivize domestic ‘indigenous innovation

Digital Empires: The Global Battle to Regulate Technology

by Anu Bradford  · 25 Sep 2023  · 898pp  · 236,779 words

://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/Home-advantage-How-Chinas-protected-market-threatens-Europes-economic-power.pdf. 38.Alan O. Sykes, The Law and Economics of “Forced” Technology Transfer (FTT) and Its Implications for Trade and Investment Policy (and the U.S.–China Trade War), 13 J. Legal Analysis 127, 128–129 (2021). 39

Vassal State

by Angus Hanton  · 25 Mar 2024  · 277pp  · 81,718 words

Chinese espionage, and specifically the loss of intellectual property from both British and American industry to Chinese hacking, in accordance with China’s policy of ‘forced technology transfer’ (FFT). This risk, which was real, was routinely considered but did not prevent the buying of Chinese products for critical infrastructure in both countries. Then

Chokepoints: American Power in the Age of Economic Warfare

by Edward Fishman  · 25 Feb 2025  · 884pp  · 221,861 words

sector: under an approach known as “military-civil fusion,” Beijing broke down barriers between the military and commercial domains. Just as intellectual property theft and forced technology transfer helped Chinese companies conquer world markets, they also accelerated China’s military modernization. Even private Chinese firms were legally bound to gather intelligence for the

of the WTO in 1995, but the law remained on the books. If the United States demonstrated that China’s theft of intellectual property and forced technology transfers met the criteria of Section 301, Lighthizer reasoned, the administration would be on strong legal footing to hit China with retaliatory tariffs. As soon as

that—at least in draft form—would commit Beijing to revise its laws and regulations to better protect intellectual property and put an end to forced technology transfers. Lighthizer had come to respect Liu and trusted that he was serious about making a deal. Bringing down the hammer on Huawei would endanger that

edits from the Chinese side in Track Changes. Crossed out in red were all of Beijing’s key concessions on issues like intellectual property and forced technology transfers. Apparently, Xi had weighed in and deemed the proposed concessions a bridge too far. An apoplectic Trump took to Twitter over the weekend, warning that

of the digital economy. The long-standing misconduct of Chinese authorities and companies in their dealings with the West, ranging from intellectual property theft to forced technology transfer to unfair trade practices, was not motivated by a simple desire for economic gain; it was integral to China’s strategy to replace the United