income per capita

163 results

pages: 272 words: 71,487

Getting Better: Why Global Development Is Succeeding--And How We Can Improve the World Even More
by Charles Kenny
Published 31 Jan 2011

It is a worldwide phenomenon, brooking only limited exceptions, which are mostly concentrated in Asia. Consider Brazil, one of the bright spots in the South American economic scene. In 1975, Brazil’s income per capita was 30 percent of the United States’. By 2003, this had dropped to just above 20 percent.3 Evidence of a growing gap in global incomes—what Harvard economist Lant Pritchett calls “Divergence, Big Time”—fosters a broader sense of doom regarding development because income per capita has become the most common gauge for the overall quality of life in a country. We care about income because, worldwide, the answer to the question “Would you rather be richer or poorer” is pretty much always the same.

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Indeed, from 1200 to 1650 there was seemingly complete stagnation of the production technology of the British economy; GDP changed hardly at all, and any rise in population was offset by a proportionate fall in income per capita. More people working the same land made each individual worker less productive, as suggested by Malthus.2 From 1650 until the nineteenth century, innovation in the UK did allow for a slow expansion in output, but not at a fast enough rate to outpace population growth, so GDP per capita remained stagnant. Only with the Industrial Revolution did the link between population and wages break down, allowing for rising income per capita. The final escape from the Malthusian trap in the UK involved moving from a stagnant economy accompanied by cycling population growth to comparatively rapid output expansion (GDP growth) accompanied by declining birthrates, improved health, and a growing population.3 The exact nature of the relationship between rising incomes, declining fertility, and improved health in the nineteenth century in the UK is debated—all three changed at the same time, so it’s difficult to see what caused what.

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Fewer than 1 percent of children die before the age of five in rich countries compared to 12 percent of children in low-income countries—a comparative toll of 100,000 children dying each year in wealthy countries compared to 10 million in the developing world. Data covering one hundred countries from the year 2000 suggest that variation in income is associated with over 70 percent of the variation in global life expectancies—infant and under-five mortalities, for example. No country with an income per capita above $1,500 has an infant mortality rate above 10 percent. No country with an income per capita above $10,000 sees an infant mortality rate above 2 percent. Again, within countries, evidence from forty-four surveys in twenty-two countries suggests that wealth is significantly correlated with infant and child health—children in richer households are more likely to survive childhood, and adults are more likely to live into old age.4 Education is also more easily available to those who can afford the time and resources required for schooling.

pages: 426 words: 83,128

The Journey of Humanity: The Origins of Wealth and Inequality
by Oded Galor
Published 22 Mar 2022

Living standards of humanity as a whole, seen through a broader lens, have swiftly recovered from each of these catastrophes. This progress is captured crudely by the unprecedented growth of income per capita that has taken place across the globe since the onset of the Demographic Transition. Between 1870 and 2018, worldwide average income per capita surged by a previously inconceivable factor of 10.2 to $15,212 a year. Income per capita in the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand rose by a factor of 11.6 to $53,756 a year; in Western Europe it rose by a factor of 12.1 to $39,790 a year; in Latin America, by a factor of 10.7 to $14,076 a year; in East Asia, by a factor of 16.5 to $16,327 a year; in Africa, while this improvement had been significantly smaller, income per capita still rose by a factor of 4.4 to $3,532 a year.[6] Perceived from a distance, then, the main trend of the past two centuries has been the transition from a world in which most people were illiterate and indigent farmers who toiled incessantly, ate like paupers, and bore large numbers of children only to watch nearly half of them die before reaching adulthood, to one in which most of the world’s population bears children they can expect will outlive them; enjoys varied diets, entertainment and culture; works in a relatively less perilous and strenuous environment; and benefits from significantly higher incomes and longer lives.

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This unprecedented rise in living standards contributed to an extraordinary increase in life expectancy. For millennia, as income per capita was near subsistence, life expectancy had oscillated in a narrow range, between thirty and forty years. Changes in resources, as well as wars, famines and epidemics, triggered temporary swings in fertility and mortality rates, but life expectancy remained relatively stable because the Malthusian mechanism prevented sustained improvement or deterioration in living conditions. However, in the middle of the nineteenth century, as income per capita began its unprecedented ascent, life expectancy started to soar (Fig. 10).

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In 2019, prior to the impact of Covid-19, in the world’s richest country, the United States, life expectancy of African Americans was 74.7, whereas that of white Americans was 78.8; infant mortality rates per 1,000 were 10.8 for African Americans and 4.6 for white Americans; and 26.1 per cent of African Americans had a college degree by the age of twenty-five, in contrast to 41.1 per cent of white Americans.[2] Even so, the gulf in living standards between the richest and the poorest countries is so much larger that millions of women and men risk their lives in the attempt to reach the developed world. Disparate Factors At the surface of this global inequality is the fact that income per capita in developed nations is significantly higher than that in developing countries (Fig. 14), resulting in a much higher expenditure on education, health care, nutrition and housing. Figure 14. Income Per Capita in US Dollars, 2017[3] But why do the citizens of some countries earn significantly more than the residents of others? This earning gap partly reflects differences in ‘labour productivity’: each hour of work in some world regions produces goods or services of greater value than an equivalent hour of work elsewhere.

pages: 192

Kicking Awaythe Ladder
by Ha-Joon Chang
Published 4 Sep 2000

Africa 133, 136t, 138t see also individual countries agriculture 52 Denmark 109, 112-13 France 38 Germany 23, 33 Sweden 39, 40 UK 4, 13, 23, 61 USA 5, 26, 29, 30 aid 140 America see USA 'American System' 28, 32 anti-trust regulations 11, 93-5, 117 Argentina 79t auditing 91-2, 115, 117, 121t, 123t Australia income, per capita 79t, 124,126t, 127t, 134, 135t social welfare institutions 106t, 117, 122t suffrage 75t, 76, 116 Austria 17, 49, 85 child labour 108,110c, 122t income, per capita 79t, 124,126t, 127t, 135, 135t intellectual property rights 57, 86, 114 protectionism 43, 60 social welfare institutions 106t suffrage 75t tariffs 17t Bangladesh 79t, 124, 126t banking 16, 95-9, 114-16, 117, 121t, 123t see also central banking bankruptcy laws 89-91, 114, 115, 121t, 123t, 124 Belgium 19-21, 23, 42-3, 44, 56 banking 48, 96, 97-8, 99t bureaucracy 81-2 child labour 109, llOt, 116 income, per capita 79t, 126t, 127t, 135t intellectual property rights 86 limited liability 89,115 social welfare institutions 106t suffrage 75t tariffs 17t, 60 tax, income 103 Bhagwati 2, 15, 29 'big push' theory 15 Brazil 15, 68, 79t, 102, 116, 124, 127t Britain see UK Bulgaria 79t bureaucracy 1,73,78-82,114,115,120,121t UK 80, 124 USA 80-2, 103, 116-17 Burma 79t, 126t Canada income, per capita 79t, 126t, 127t, 134, 135t intellectual property rights 121t social welfare 106t, 117, 122t suffrage 75t cartels 66, 93, 94, 117 East Asia 49-50 Germany 14, 35, 117 Sweden 40 central banking 1, 3, 10, 11,16, 96-9,119, 1231 Italy 117, 124' note issue monopoly 114, 115 Sweden 121t UK 118, 121t, 124 USA 117, 118, 121t, 125 child labour 107-10, 114, 116, 118, 122t, 123t, 124-5 Chile 79t, 104 China 133, 141 . income, per capita 124, 127t unequal treaties 16, 54 Classical economics 32 Clay, Henry 28, 32 Cobden, Richard 23,38,52, 61 Cobden-Chevalier treaty (1860) 23, 38 Colbert, Jean-Baptiste 36, 62 Colombia 68, 79t, 116, 124, 127t colonialism 16, 21, 22, 25, 52-3, 139-40 Communism 15, 72, 89, 99, 133 Competiton law see anti-trust regulations copyrights 52, 84, 86-7, 121t, 123t, 125 Corn Laws Belgium 43 UK 13, 16, 23, 29, 43, 52, 61 Cote d'lvoire 124, 126t Defoe, Daniel 20-1 democracy 1, 71, 73-8, 84, 121t, 124, 141 Denmark 56, 95 child labour 109, llOt income, per capita 79t, 126t, 127t, 135t labour regulations 111, 112-13 social welfare institutions 106t, 117 suffrage 75t, 115 tariffs 17t, 68-9 tax, income 103, 114 deregulation 1 dirigisme 4, 14, 62 disclosure of corporate information 91-2, 115, 117, 121t, 123t East Asia 15, 22, 25, 41, 46-51, 61, 64 see also individual countries East India Company British 43, 88, 118 Dutch 43 economic growth 2, 8, 9, 132-3, 134-8, 142-3, 144 and property rights 84-5 and social welfare institutions 104 education 18, 104 East Asia 51 France 37 Germany 34 Japan 48, 64 Netherlands 45 Sweden 41 USA 30-1 Edward III 19-20, 61, 130 Egypt 79t, 124, 126t Elizabeth I 20-1 employment 14, 48, 105, 106t England see UK espionage, industrial 18, 34, 36, 41, 56, 65 Ethiopia 68, 79t, 126t exports 2, 18, 66 East Asia 50 France 38 Prussia 33 Sweden 39 UK 19-23, 52, 55, 61 USA 32 Finland 40 income, per capita 68, 79t, 124, 126t, 127t, 135t social welfare 106t, 117 suffrage 75t, 76, 77 First World War 14, 28-9 foreign investment 46, 51, 99, 140-2 France 8, 10, 16, 23, 35-9, 56 bankruptcy law 90 banks 95, 97, 99t bureaucracy 80, 81 child labour 108, llOt competition law 93 free trade 33, 62 income, per capita 79t, 124,126t, 127t, 135t intellectual property rights 57,86,114 interventionism 1, 2,13 judiciary 83 labour regulations 112 limited liability 89, 115 nationalization 85, 135 social welfare 105, 106t, 117, 122t subsidies 38 suffrage 74,75t, 76,77,115,116,118, 121t tariffs 17t tax 80 Frederick the Great 33^1, 56, 82, 130 Frederick William I 33, 81-2 free trade 1, 7-8, 53, 65-6, 131, 144 Belgium 42 France 36-7 Germany 37 Netherlands 44 Sweden 39 Switzerland 46 UK 3-5, 13-14, 16, 23-4, 61 USA 2, 27-8, 29, 32, 62 GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs) 14 GDP (Gross Domestic Product) 30, 40, 132-3, 138t German Historical School 6, 105 Germany 3-4, 14, 24, 32-5, 40, 65, 129 see also Prussia, Saxony, Wiirttemberg banks 96, 98, 99t, 115 bureaucracy 80-2, 114 child labour 107, 108, llOt competition law 94, 117 income, per capita 45, 79t, 124,126t, 127t, 135, 135t intellectual property rights 46, 58-9, 85, 87, 115 judiciary 83 labour regulations 111 limited liability 89 social welfare 105-6, 106t, 122t subsidies 33, 35, 63 suffrage 75t, 116 tariffs 17t, 49, 61, 63, 66 zollverein (customs union) 4, 32-3 Ghana 79t, 124, 126t Gladstone, William 24, 103 globalization 15, 99, 140 Gold Standard 14 Great Depression 1, 14, 29, 49, 94, 98 Greece 126t Gross Domestic Product see GDP Hamilton, Alexander 25, 26, 61, 98, 130 health see social welfare institutions Henry VII 20-2, 61 Holland 109, llOt see also Netherlands Hong Kong 43, 50 Hungary 79t, 133 IDPE (international development policy establishment) 71, 131, 134, 138, 140, 142-4 banks 95 democracy 74, 141 IMF 104, 140, 145 imports France 37 Sweden 39 UK 19-20, 21, 22, 37, 52, 61 USA 25, 26-7, 28 income, per capita 67-9, 79t, 120, 124, 126-7t, 134-5 India 15, 22-3, 53, 137, 142 income, per capita 68, 79t, 124, 126t tariffs 68 Indonesia 79t, 124, 127t industrial espionage 18, 34, 36, 41, 56, 65 Industrial Revolutions 8, 60 Belgium 42 Switzerland 45 UK 21, 22 industrial, trade and technology policies see ITT policies industrialization 7, 54, 105, 113-18 France 36, 37, 39 Japan 47 Netherlands 43-5 Sweden 42 Switzerland 45 UK 21 USA 52 infant industries 130 protection of 2,3,10,15,18,61,67,131 France 62 Germany 32, 63 Japan 48-9, 60 Sweden 40, 60 Switzerland 46 UK 3, 20, 21, 65 USA 5, 24-6, 28, 30, 31, 62 inflation 11 infrastructure 18 Belgium 43 France 37 Japan 47 Netherlands 45 Sweden 40, 64 USA 31, 62 insurance, social 105,106,112,116-7,119, 122-3t Germany 105, 116 USA 112 intellectual property rights 1, 2, 57, 84-7, 115, 121t see also copyrights; patents; trademarks international development policy establishment see IDPE International Monetary Fund see IMF interventionism 3, 15, 16-18, 130-1, 132 see also tariffs; protectionism, infant industries France 1, 2, 13, 36, 62 Germany 34-5, 63 Japan 64 Netherlands 45 UK 19 investment planning 16 IPR see intellectual property rights Iran see Persia Ireland 79t, 106t, 117, 126t, 127t Italy 3, 4, 50, 124 banks 96, 98, 99t, 114, 115, 117 bureaucracy 81 child labour 109, HOt, 116 income, per capita 79t, 126t, 127t, 134, 135, 135t intellectual property rights 121t judiciary 83 labour regulations 112 social welfare 106t suffrage 74, 75t tariffs 17t I T T (industrial, trade and technology) policies 9, 59-60, 66-7, 130-2, 144 Belgium 43 East Asia 50, 51 Japan 61, 64 UK 18, 61 USA 18 Japan 8, 14, 22, 46-51, 100 banks 16 cartels 14, 49-50 income, per capita 68, 79t 126t, 135 intellectual property rights 86 ITT policies 61 judiciary 83 property rights 85 subsidies 47, 64 suffrage 75t, 121t tariffs 17t, 44, 54, 66 joint stock companies see limited liability judiciary 1, 71, 82-3, 121t Kenya 79t, 124, 126t Keynes, John Maynard 99-100, 135 Korea 16, 50, 51, 61, 65, 79t, 85 tariffs 22, 39, 54 labour regulations 72, 111-13, 114, 118— 19, 122t laissez-faire 13-16, 65-6 France 36, 37 Germany 33, 63 Netherlands 44-5 Switzerland 46 UK 1, 14, 19, 24, 61-2 Latin America 15,16, 54,132-3, 136t, 138t see also individual countries liberalism 3, 13-14, 15, 29, 37-8 liberalization of trade 1,14,15,16,23-4,69 limited liability 3,10, 88-9,114,115,118, 121t, 123t France 37 UK 92,117 Lincoln, Abraham 27-8, 32 List, Friedrich 3-6,25,32,44,52,61,129-30 Low Countries 19, 20, 42 see also Belgium; Netherlands Malawi 68 manufacturing 18 France 38 Germany 33 Japan 48 Sweden 39 UK 20-4, 26, 52, 61 USA 25, 26, 28-9, 52, 62, 89 Marxism 15 McCulloch, John 88,103 mercantilism 13-14, 23, 33, 43 Mexico 15, 79t, 116, 124, 127t monopolies 66, 87, 93, 94-5 banknote-issue 97, 98, 99, 114, 115 East Asia 50 Germany 33 Netherlands 44 UK 85 USA 31 Morocco 124, 127t NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) 15 Napoleonic Wars 8, 39, 60, 103, 114 nationalization 16, 47, 85, 135 see also state-owned enterprises Neoclassical economics 6, 7 Neo-liberalism 15, 59, 132-3 Netherlands 43-5, 60, 131 banks 97, 99t bureaucracy 80 income, per capita 68, 79t, 126t, 127t infant industry protection 18 intellectual property rights 9, 57-8, 86-7, 121t social welfare 106t, 117 subsidies 44, 45 suffrage 75t tariffs 17t tax 80 technology 55-6 New Zealand income, per capita 79t, 124, 127t social welfare 105, 106t, 117 suffrage 75t, 76, 116, 121t Nicaragua 68 Nigeria 79t, 124, 126t Norway 17, 56, 92, 94-5 child labour 109, llOt, 116 income, per capita 79t, 126t, 127t, 135t labour regulations 111 social welfare 106t, 117 suffrage 75t, 76, 77 Ottoman Empire 16, 54 see also Turkey Pakistan 79t, 124, 126t patents 2, 18, 57-8, 65, 85-7, 114-15, 121-2t see also intellectual property rights Netherlands 9, 44 Switzerland 9, 46 pensions 105, 106, 106t, 117, 119, 122t Persia 16, 54 Peru 79t, 124, 127t Philippines 79t, 124, 127t Poland 5,133 Portugal banks 95, 97, 99t child labour 109, llOt, 122t income, per capita 79t, 126t intellectual property rights 86 limited liability 89,115 social welfare 106t, 117 suffrage 75t tariffs 67 tax, income 103 PPP (purchasing power parity) 68-9 property rights 1, 2, 83-5, 114, 139, 141 see also intellectual property rights protectionism 15, 16, 59, 67, 107, 130-1 see also infant industries Belgium 43 France 37, 38 Japan 46, 48-9 Netherlands 60 Sweden 39 Switzerland 60 UK 4 - 5 , 1 3 , 24 USA 1, 5, 24-5, 27-31, 62 Prussia 8, 17t, 32-5, 47, 56, 62 see also Germany banks 95 bureaucracy 80-2, 114, 115, 121t child labour 108, llOt, 116, 122t intellectual property rights 86 suffrage 75, 77 tariffs 32 quotas 29 R & D see research and development race 75, 76, 77, 124 railways 16, 27, 40, 47, 112 Raymond, Daniel 25, 31, 61 research and development 18, 56, 66 East Asia 51 France 37 Sweden 40, 41, 64 USA 30-1, 62 resources 11 Ricardo, David 13-14, 32 Roosevelt, Theodore 78, 93-4 Russia 17t, 28, 39, 56, 67, 86 Saxony 75-6, 85-6, 89, 108, llOt see also Germany Schmoller, Gustav 105 Second World War 8, 39, 60,103, 114 securities 99-102, 114, 116-17, 121-3t slavery 27-8, 142 Smith, Adam 4, 5, 13-14, 24, 88 Smoot-Hawley Tariff 1-2, 14, 29 social welfare institutions 72, 103-6, 114, 116-17, 122t, 142 Soviet Union 133,140 Spain auditing 93 banking 97, 99t bureaucracy 81, 116 child labour 109, llOt income, per capita 126t, 127t intellectual property rights 86, 121t labour regulations 112 limited liability 89 social welfare 106t, 117 suffrage 75t, 76 tariffs 17t, 67 tax, income 103 state-owned enterprises 39, 40, 47-8 see also nationalization stock market see securities structural adjustment 72 structuralism 15 suborning 55 subsidies 2, 18, 63, 66, 67, 130, 145 East Asia 50, 51, 61 France 38 Germany 33, 35, 63 Japan 47, 64 Netherlands 44, 45 Sweden 39, 40 UK 22, 52, 61 USA 26, 29, 31 suffrage 74-8,79t, 105,113,115,116,121t see also democracy Sweden 39-42, 56, 60, 66 banking 95, 97, 99t, 121t child labour 107, 108-9, llOt, 116 income, per capita 79t, 126t, 127t, 135t intellectual property rights 86 labour regulations 111, 112 limited liability 88, 115, 121t social welfare 106t, 117 suffrage 75t tariffs 17t, 38, 63-4 tax, income 103 Switzerland 10, 18, 23, 45-6, 60, 131 banks 98, 99t, 115 child labour llOt income, per capita 68, 79t, 127t intellectual property rights 2 , 9 , 5 7 - 8 , 86, 87, 121t patents 2, 9, 58, 87 social welfare 106t, 117, 122t suffrage 75t, 76, 118, 119, 121t tariffs 17t Taiwan 16, 22, 50, 51, 61, 79t, 85 Tanzania 68, 79t tariffs 3, 9, 17t, 53, 54, 65-6, 67-9 Belgium 43 East Asia 57 France 38 Germany 33, 35, 63 Japan 46-7, 48-9, 50-1 Netherlands 44 protection 3, 59,130 Sweden 39, 40, 64 UK 22-4 USA 1-2, 14, 16, 25-7, 62 tax 16, 19, 28, 43, 80, 101, 120 income 102-3, 104, 122t, 141, 142 technology 7, 18, 55-7, 60, 65 Belgium 42 France 36, 39 Germany 34 Japan 48, 50 Sweden 40, 41 Switzerland 45-6 UK 20, 22, 23, 54, 55 USA 31 Thailand 16, 54, 116, 124, 127t trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) 57, 86, 87 trade sanctions 29, 107 trade unions see unions trademarks 58, 65, 84, 86, 87, 121t TRIPS (trade-related intellectual property rights) 57, 86, 87 Turkey 16, 54, 79t, 116, 127t see also Ottoman Empire UK 1, 19, 24, 51-9, 121-3t, 132 anti-trust regulations 94 auditing 92, 117 banking 95-6, 97, 99t, 114, 118, 121t bankruptcy law 90-1, 115 and Belgium 19-21, 23, 42 bureaucracy 80, 82 child labour 107-8, llOt, 116, 122t and East Asia 22, 50 and France 23, 36, 37t, 38, 39, 55, 56 free trade 3-5, 7 - 8 , 1 3 - 1 4 , 1 6 , 61, 62 income, per capita 68, 69, 79t, 124, 126t, 127t, 135t and India 22-3, 53 and Ireland 22, 53 infant industry protection 65 intellectual property rights 85-6,114, 121t judiciary 83 labour institutions 111 limited liability 88, 115, 117 and Netherlands 43, 44 property rights 85 securities 100-1, 116, 117 social welfare institutions 106t suffrage 74, 75t, 77 and Switzerland 45-6 tariffs 17t, 39 tax 80, 102 income 103, 114, 122t technology 18, 20, 22-3, 54-5 unemployment see employment unions 41, 94, 105, 107 and the USA 5, 23-6, 28, 32, 52-3 USA 1-2, 3, 24-32, 102, 115-18, 121-3t banking 96, 98, 99t bankruptcy laws 90-1 bureaucracy 80-1, 82, 119 child labour 107, 109-10, llOt civil war 2, 25, 27-9 competition law 93-4 disclosure 92 free trade 7-8, 65 income, per capita 68, 79t, 124, 126t, 127t, 135t, 142 industrialization 52 infant industry protection 5,61-2,66, 131 intellectual property rights 57, 58, 114 judiciary 83 labour regulations 111-12, 113 limited liability 89 securities 99-100, 101 social welfare 104, 106t subsidies 26, 29, 31 suffrage 75t, 77-8 tariffs 16, 17t, 47, 66, 67 tax, income 103 Venezuela 79t Vietnam 133 voting see democracy; suffrage Walpole, Robert 21, 25, 52, 61,130 wars 102, 103 America Civil War 2, 25, 27-9 War of Independence 26 First World War 14, 28-9 Napoleonic War 39, 60 Second World War 8,14,17, 49 Washington consensus 1, 13 Weber, Max 6, 80, 82 welfare state see social welfare institutions women 111-12, 116, 118, 124 workers, migration of 54-6, 57, 65 World Bank 71, 104, 136t, 138t, 140, 145 tariffs 17t, 53-4, 67 World Trade Organization 2, 15, 71, 107, 131-2, 140, 145 intellectual property rights 57, 86, 87 tariffs 67, 68-9, 145 Wiirttemberg 86, 89 see also Germany Zaire 79t Zimbabwe 68 zollverein (German customs union) 4, 32-3

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pages: 264 words: 76,643

The Growth Delusion: Wealth, Poverty, and the Well-Being of Nations
by David Pilling
Published 30 Jan 2018

The year was 1985 and India was an extraordinarily poor country. In dollar terms, according to the World Bank, its income per capita was around $300. Life expectancy was fifty-six. The most abject poverty was visible everywhere, with gangs of shoeless children roaming the streets and beggars jauntily waving deformities at passersby. Sickness, malnourishment, and destitution were in plain view, in the cities, in the towns and in the villages. India today is still very poor. But it is another country. Its income per capita has quintupled to more than $1,500—or roughly $6,000 if you adjust for local prices—and life expectancy has improved by more than a decade to sixty-eight.* Infant mortality has fallen by almost two-thirds from one in ten live births in 1985 to thirty-seven per thousand today.1 Though poverty is still endemic and India retains the capacity to shock, the trappings of modern life are everywhere: cars, motorbikes, flyovers, mobile phones, supermarkets, tall buildings, call centers, pace, energy.

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With a consistency that has often been called into question, China registered growth of around 10 percent in virtually every year from 1992 to 2010.5 In the process, it catapulted itself from poor peasant economy to modern powerhouse. The results were astonishing. In 1979 income per capita was a miserable $272. That was the year when Deng embraced market-driven policies by allowing farmers to sell surpluses and by establishing free-trade manufacturing zones to attract foreign investment. By 2015 income per capita had surged to $8,000, pushing China comfortably into middle-income status. Because of its huge population, China was also becoming a power to be reckoned with on the world stage.

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Ryan is proud of Kenyan statistics, which he says are among the best in Africa. Kenya has a competent civil service and a reasonably sophisticated economy, with cash crops, a cut-flower industry, light manufacturing, and a well-developed tourism sector. It is also relatively prosperous by African standards, with income per capita of about $3,200 adjusted for local prices.7 Kenya follows the UN national accounts guidelines to the letter, though Ryan calls the income numbers it collects “very iffy.” Adherence to standard methodology notwithstanding, Ryan is at pains to point out that Kenya’s economic statistics are in no way comparable with those of, say, the US.

pages: 561 words: 87,892

Losing Control: The Emerging Threats to Western Prosperity
by Stephen D. King
Published 14 Jun 2010

Taken together, the emerging nations are now at least as big economically as the US and they’re growing around three times faster. Admittedly, despite their gains, many in the emerging nations are still very poor. For example, the median income per capita for China’s rural workers in 2008 stood at RMB4, 700 or, in 2008 dollars, $691. Yet, for urban workers, life is getting better; income per capita for Chinese urbanites in 2008 was RMB15,000 or $2,205. Within this urban group, there are now millions of people earning annual incomes in the $5,000–10,000 range. At these levels, citizens begin to place increasing demands on the world’s scarce resources.

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By the beginning of the twentieth century, the world economy was completely dominated by the Western powers, who directly produced more than 50 per cent of the world’s GDP, a result of their rapid economic growth over many previous decades. By the mid-twentieth century, other nations just didn’t seem to matter: their shares of world income were tiny and their incomes per capita were minute. Across East Asia, for example, incomes per capita were less than one-tenth of those of the United States. THE NEW FORCES OF GLOBALIZATION While the progress of Western economies was, thus, hugely impressive compared with the competition, their progress did not depend purely on technology gains and the benefits of free markets, important though these sometimes were.

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China is the first economy of size still to have remarkably low per-capita incomes by global standards. In the past, there has been a strong correlation between overall output and output per head. For example, the US is the world’s biggest economy and, of the major industrial nations, has one of the highest levels of income per capita. Conversely, the majority of poor countries are poor both in per-capita terms and also in total. China is unique. Following thirty years of rapid economic growth it is still poor in relation to the industrialized world, but already it has become a huge global player in resource markets. Imagine, then, that China keeps growing at its current rate.

pages: 573 words: 115,489

Prosperity Without Growth: Foundations for the Economy of Tomorrow
by Tim Jackson
Published 8 Dec 2016

The Eagles (‘Long Road out of Eden’, 2007) CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS FOREWORD TO THE FIRST EDITION PROLOGUE TO THE SECOND EDITION 1 The limits to growth 2 Prosperity lost 3 Redefining prosperity 4 The dilemma of growth 5 The myth of decoupling 6 The ‘iron cage’ of consumerism 7 Flourishing – within limits 8 Foundations for the economy of tomorrow 9 Towards a ‘post-growth’ macroeconomics 10 The progressive State 11 A lasting prosperity NOTES REFERENCES INDEX FIGURES 1.1 Global Commodity Price Index, 1992–2015 2.1 US government debt and private sector credit, 1955–2015 2.2 Productivity growth in advanced economies, 1950–2015 3.1 Income per capita and the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) 3.2 Subjective wellbeing (SWB) and income per capita 4.1 Life expectancy at birth and income per capita 4.2 Under-5 mortality rate and income per capita 4.3 Mean years of schooling and income per capita 4.4 Life expectancy through times of economic crisis 5.1 Annual carbon dioxide emission intensities, 1965–2015 5.2 Annual carbon dioxide emissions by world region, 1965–2015 5.3 Carbon dioxide emissions in richer and poorer nations, 1965–2015 5.4 The material footprint of OECD nations, 1990–2014 5.5 Global trends in resource production, 1990–2014 5.6 Carbon dioxide intensities: now and required to meet carbon targets 6.1 The ‘engine of growth’ in market economies 7.1 UK household debt and savings ratios, 1990–2016 7.2 An evolutionary map of the human heart 8.1 Greenhouse gas intensity v. employment intensity across sectors 9.1 The rise and fall of UK labour productivity growth 9.2 The stabilising role of countercyclical public spending 10.1 The health and social benefits of equality ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I owe a huge debt of gratitude to the many people who generously gave me their help and support during the writing of this book: both in the original and in the revised editions.

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The GDP is broadly speaking a measure of the overall ‘busyness’ of the economy; or, in more precise terms, of the monetary value of the goods and services that are being produced and consumed within a given nation or region. Economic growth takes place when the GDP is rising – usually at a given ‘rate of growth’ – across the economy.4 It’s worth pointing out that a rising GDP will lead to rising income (per capita GDP) only if the economy grows faster than the population does. If the population expands but GDP remains constant, then income levels will fall. Conversely, if the GDP rises but the population stabilises (or declines) then incomes will rise even faster. In general, the GDP must rise at least as fast as population just to conserve the average level of people’s income.

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But the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) levelled off in the late 1970s and even began to decline slowly over the subsequent two decades. The average growth rate of the GDP per capita was around 2.3 per cent over the period. The average growth rate in GPI was barely 0.5 per cent. And from the mid-1970s onwards it declined at 0.3 per cent per year.23 Figure 3.1 Income per capita and the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) Source: Data from Kubiszewski et al. (2013) and World Bank (see note 23) Such a radical departure from the GDP is a worrying indication that the exchange value is a poor proxy for the overall utility that goods and services provide us with. When we start to subtract out the ‘disutility’ – the damage caused by the production of those goods and service, for instance – then economic growth can even begin to look a bit like ‘uneconomic growth’, as Daly has described it.24 Happiness wars The suggestion that income is a poor proxy for utility draws further support from evidence of people’s life-satisfaction.

pages: 483 words: 134,377

The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor
by William Easterly
Published 4 Mar 2014

While the average Nigerian may find it difficult to afford adequately nutritious meals every day, the average citizen of Luxembourg need not worry too much about buying the latest generation cell phone on the market.21 There are two commonly used measures of overall development success: the growth of income per capita and the level already attained of income per capita. This chapter has already discussed the small share of national differences in growth, but what about levels of development as measured by income per capita? Is it time to salute the remarkable performance of the Luxembourg development experts? One answer to that question is evident in the map of life expectancy shown in Figure 10.1. Income, infant mortality, and life expectancy are characteristics much more of regions than they are of nations.

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The difference between 6 percent growth and the global average of 2 percent growth for one year is a 4 percent difference in income, which is good but hardly merits miracle designation. But if the 6 percent growth of income per capita were really permanent, the consequences indeed would be miraculous. Over fifty years, a sustained average of 6 percent growth produces an eighteen-fold increase in income per capita. Average global growth of 2 percent per capita increases income over the same period at less than three-fold. A three-fold increase in income is great, but it is a lot less than the eighteen-fold increased produced by the 6 percent growth-miracle cases.

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If there is one number to which the rights of millions will be happily sacrificed, it is the national GDP growth rate. National leaders believe national growth takes place as the result of national actions. These leaders take great pride in rapid national growth, as do their expert advisers who think their advice is paying off. The unofficial line for a “growth miracle” seems to be annual growth of income per capita of 6 percent. Grow 6 percent, and all will be forgiven. The national state justifies itself partly as the custodian of economic management charged with promoting growth. The development agencies and experts justify themselves as advisors to these states on how to raise growth. Their claims to be able to raise growth are part of the justification for nation-states and their technocratic advisors to have more power.

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Melting Pot or Civil War?: A Son of Immigrants Makes the Case Against Open Borders
by Reihan Salam
Published 24 Sep 2018

Ideally, we could reduce migration pressures by raising incomes in source countries. It is an idea that’s been endlessly pursued by politicians in rich countries hoping to stem the tide of migration, but with little success. Michael Clemens, a champion of low-skill immigration, has found1 that development reduces emigration only at fairly high levels of income per capita. Once a country’s income per capita is in the neighborhood of $8,000 or so,2 adjusted for purchasing power, which we can think of as the threshold for upper-middle-income status, its residents become less inclined to leave the country as their incomes rise. Before the upper-middle-income threshold is reached, however, rising income tends to spur more emigration, presumably because it gives truly impoverished people the means to pack up and leave.

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And it’s not as though emigration suddenly comes to an end above the $8,000 threshold, which is, of course, a moving target; even as countries reach upper-middle-income status, emigration typically remains above the levels seen in the poorest countries, those with incomes per capita of $1,000 or below. By way of comparison, income per capita in the United States is $59,500, and in India and Nigeria, two of the world’s most populous countries, it is $7,200 and $5,900, respectively. In other words, India and Nigeria have yet to reach upper-middle-income status, and they’re markedly better off than the world’s poorest countries, such as Burundi and the Central African Republic.

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They are wealthy enough that Central Americans might see rising prosperity at home as a realistic possibility. One of the reasons migration from Mexico to the United States has slowed so sharply in recent years is that Mexico’s GDP per capita (PPP) is now $19,500. This is still substantially lower than income per capita in the United States, and this gap remains big enough to tempt Mexican workers northward. Yet as the standard of living has improved in Mexico, its people are less eager to leave their families and neighborhoods behind. Something similar can happen in Central America, provided the United States and Mexico work together.

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The Globalization of Inequality
by François Bourguignon
Published 1 Aug 2012

This means that on average, the gap between the standard of living of two people This difference is due to corporate and state income that is not distributed, as well as the differences in how income is defined in household surveys and the national accounts (see above). In what follows, standard of living will generally refer to the mean income per capita given by household surveys. 10 Global Inequality21 taken at random was 58% of average income, thus slightly less than $12,000. Among wealthy countries, France has moderate levels of inequality. The ratio of the standard of living of the richest 10% to the poorest 10% was lower (slightly less than 5, to be precise) in the Scandinavian countries, which have the highest levels of equality among wealthy countries.

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Of course, there are other dimensions to inequality and poverty than income: access to basic infrastructure, health, education, access to the legal system, or ability to participate in public decision-making, among others. We could Global Inequality25 have covered them in more detail, even though they are often harder to observe on an individual basis.13 Across countries, on the other hand, they turn out to be highly, but not perfectly, correlated with differences in income per capita. This is the sad snapshot of world inequality today. Any snapshot, however, is marked by the moment in which it was taken. The global distribution of standard of living is certainly dramatically unequal, but has this always been the case? Are things on track to improve or, on the contrary, are they getting worse?

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Since 1990, the number of people in poverty has dropped by around 500 million individuals. For the first time since the Industrial Revolution two centuries ago, economic progress is moving more quickly than population growth, in part because the latter has slowed down but overwhelmingly because of accelerated growth in average income per capita in the developing world. This is a stunning turn of events. Given these undeniable statistics, why do we still read and hear that global inequality continues to worsen? The answer to this question has two parts. The first is purely statistical. As we have seen, the numbers for the recent period in figure 1 refer to the standard of living distribution after normalization to a particular country’s GDP per person.

The Singularity Is Nearer: When We Merge with AI
by Ray Kurzweil
Published 25 Jun 2024

BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 131 Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, “HHS Poverty Guidelines for 2023,” US Department of Health and Human Services, January 19, 2023, https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines. BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 132 US Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Personal Income per Capita (A792RC0A052NBEA),” retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, updated March 30, 2023, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A792RC0A052NBEA; “Consumer Price Index, 1913–,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis; US Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers.” BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 133 US Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Personal Income Per Capita (A792RC0A052NBEA)”; Peter H. Lindert and Jeffrey G. Williamson, “American Incomes 1774–1860” (working paper 18396, National Bureau of Economic Research, September 2012), 33, https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w18396/w18396.pdf; Alexander Klein, “New State-Level Estimates of Personal Income in the United States, 1880–1910,” in Research in Economic History, vol. 29, ed.

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Louis, updated September 13, 2022, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MEPAINUSA672N; “Consumer Price Index, 1913–,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis; US Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers.” BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 141 US Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Personal Income Per Capita (A792RC0A052NBEA)”; Lindert and Williamson, “American Incomes 1774–1860”; Klein, “New State-Level Estimates of Personal Income in the United States, 1880–1910,” 220; “Consumer Price Index, 1800–,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis; US Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers.” BACK TO NOTE REFERENCE 142 US Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Personal Income Per Capita (A792RC0A052NBEA)”; Huberman and Minns, “The Times They Are Not Changin’,” 548; University of Groningen and University of California, Davis, “Average Annual Hours Worked by Persons Engaged for United States; “Consumer Price Index, 1913–,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.

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US GDP per Capita[138] Linear scale Sources: Maddison Project Database; Bureau of Economic Analysis; Federal Reserve US GDP per Capita[139] Logarithmic scale Sources: Maddison Project Database; Bureau of Economic Analysis; Federal Reserve GDP reflects overall economic activity, including big businesses, but the same trend also holds when we focus only on personal income. Personal income per capita measures earnings by real people, as opposed to those of corporations. Thus, it includes salaries and wages but also the dividends and profits that shareholders and business owners make from their companies. Since the statistic was first recorded in 1929, personal income in the United States in constant dollars per capita has risen enormously, with only brief downturns during the Great Depression and major recessions.

The Limits of the Market: The Pendulum Between Government and Market
by Paul de Grauwe and Anna Asbury
Published 12 Mar 2017

Based on this fact, Kuznets decided that capitalism contains a law which ensures that as a country becomes richer, income inequality drops. He expressed this in what would later be called the Kuznets curve, as shown in Figure .. The horizontal axis represents income per capita, the vertical axis income inequality. We can see that when income per capita rises, inequality initially rises. Once a certain level of wealth is achieved, income inequality begins to fall.  T HE U TO PIA OF SE LF - RE GUL ATIO N INCOME INEQUALITY INCOME PER CAPITA Figure .. The Kuznets curve The Kuznets curve had a great inﬂuence on generations of economists and policy makers, debunking the Marxist idea that capitalism would lead to increasing inequality.

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.  Gini coefﬁcients b global capitalism b global ﬁnancial crisis ()  immigration – imperialism  import protection  income, share of total going to top % f,   INDEX income distribution –b, , , –,  income equality and economic growth trade-off , f,  income inequality , f, , , ,  reformist scenario  United Kingdom and United States  income per capita , f income redistribution policies  income tax f, ,  on highest incomes , , –, , , – productivity, labour costs and public sector  in selected countries f India ﬁve-year plans  gross domestic product (GDP) per capita f individual rationality and collective rationality –, –, ,  environment (external limit)  external limits of governments  industrial production, worldwide  inequality –,  assets – reduction  and social and political instability , f wealth ,  world –b see also income inequality inﬂation and lender of last resort –b insolvency/bankruptcy , ,  interbank market  interest rates , –, – on Spanish and British ten-year government bonds f internal contradictions of capitalism –,  internal limits of capitalism – internal limits of free market system –, , ,  internal limits of government – winner-takes-all phenomenon – International Monetary Fund (IMF) ,  investment boom  in eurozone  projects (efﬁciency)  public  as share of GDP  ‘invisible hand’ ,  Ireland eurozone government bond spreads, ten-year f global ﬁnancial crisis ()  labour costs, gross hourly f Italy eurozone government bond spreads, ten-year f gross domestic product (GDP) per capita f labour costs, gross hourly f social security spending as percentage of government spending f Jacobson Schwartz, A.

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When the Money Runs Out: The End of Western Affluence
by Stephen D. King
Published 17 Jun 2013

‘Please, sir,’ replied Oliver, ‘I want some more.’ The master aimed a blow at Oliver's head with the ladle; pinioned him in his arm; and shrieked aloud for the beadle. (Charles Dickens, Oliver Twist) Thanks to persistent economic growth, twenty-first century Britain is a very different proposition. Incomes per capita have risen twelvefold since Dickens published Oliver Twist in 18386 and, thankfully, we no longer have workhouses. Yes, poverty still exists and vulnerable individuals are still, at times, poorly treated. Amazingly, during the Queen's Diamond Jubilee celebrations in June 2012, up to 30 unemployed people bussed in from the West Country to work as stewards in the Jubilee Thames Pageant found themselves having to sleep rough under London Bridge before performing their (unpaid) duties.7 But, for the most part, twenty-first century Britain has a different and more enlightened attitude.

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None of this mattered too much so long as the economy was performing well. Suharto's initial success in the late 1960s was to stamp out the hyperinflation that had proved so incredibly debilitating under his predecessor, Sukarno. Suharto's so-called ‘New Order’ delivered significant increases in living standards, with incomes per capita quadrupling between the mid-1960s and the mid-1990s. Nevertheless, Indonesia was still a poor country and, even before the Asian crisis, was losing ground to others. China, in particular, was catching up rapidly. Meanwhile, on the home front, the mid-1990s saw an increase in political opposition, led by Megawati Sukarnoputri, the head of the Indonesian Democratic Party and, by happy coincidence, the daughter of Sukarno, Indonesia's former leader.

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He managed to avoid domestic upheaval – preventing the majority Malays and minority Chinese from fighting each other – by aiming the nation's ire at the rest of the world. Korea: Democracy and Self-Sacrifice Unlike either Indonesia or Malaysia, Korea was already a reasonably wealthy country at the onset of the Asian crisis. It had a properly developed – if relatively new – democracy.16 Its incomes per capita averaged around $13,000 a year, higher than in either Portugal or Greece. Yet, for all its success, it was nevertheless unable to avoid the perils of the crisis. Korea, too, had become dependent on capital inflows from abroad: its current account deficit exceeded 4 per cent of GDP in 1996. And, like the other two nations, there was a whiff of corruption in the air: the connections between government and the chaebol (translated literally as ‘wealth clan’ or ‘wealth faction'), Korea's large industrial conglomerates, were seen by many as yet another example of Asian crony capitalism.

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Slouching Towards Utopia: An Economic History of the Twentieth Century
by J. Bradford Delong
Published 6 Apr 2020

This does not mean that humanity in 2010 was 21.5 times as rich in material-welfare terms as it had been in 1870: there were six times as many people in 2010 as there were in 1870, and the resulting increase in resource scarcity would take away from human living standards and labor-productivity levels. As a rough guess, average world income per capita in 2010 would be 8.8 times what it was in 1870, meaning an average income per capita in 2010 of perhaps $11,000 per year. (To get the figure of 8.8, you divide 21.5 by the square root of 6.) Hold these figures in your head as a very rough guide to the amount by which humanity was richer in 2010 than it was in 1870—and never forget that the riches were vastly more unequally distributed around the globe in 2010 than they were in 1870.5 A 2.1 percent per year growth rate is a doubling every thirty-three years.

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Indeed, if it had happened that such difficulties proved unavoidable, it seemed likely that Western Europe would vote to join Stalin’s empire. Yet Europe avoided these traps. By 1949, national income per capita in Britain, France, and Germany had recovered to within a hair of prewar levels. By 1951, six years after the war, as the US-led Marshall Plan to offer foreign aid to Europe came to an end, national incomes per capita were more than 10 percent above prewar levels. Measured by the admittedly imperfect yardstick of the national product estimates, the three major economies of Western Europe had achieved a degree of recovery that post–World War I Europe had not reached in the eleven years between World War I and the Great Depression.

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In 1870, when the long twentieth century began, British industry stood at the leading edge of economic and technological progress, and the nation’s real income per capita had reached perhaps $6,000 a year. However, that was already at least double what was found anywhere outside the charmed area of Britain (in the circle centered on Dover), its overseas settler colonies, and the United States, its ex-colony. Outside this nascent global north, our standard estimates show annual income per capita levels with a spread of a factor of five, ranging from $600 in the poorer parts of Africa to $3,000 in those European economies about to join the global north.

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Age of the City: Why Our Future Will Be Won or Lost Together
by Ian Goldin and Tom Lee-Devlin
Published 21 Jun 2023

The Midwest meanwhile remained isolated and sparsely populated, with an economy heavily dependent on the fur trade. In 1800 a one-way trip from New York to Chicago still took six weeks.4 At the close of the eighteenth century, before industrialization had taken off, there was little difference in incomes per capita across the original states of the union.5 Most of the population continued to live off subsistence agriculture, with fewer than 10 per cent inhabiting the fledgling nation’s early cities.6 By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the early growth of manufacturing in the Northeast meant inhabitants of that region had become twice as rich and twice as urbanized as those in other states, with factories in cities like New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore drawing inhabitants from their hinterlands and beyond.7 With time, the advantage of the Northeast began to dissipate.

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St Louis was just a small town in 1800, but by 1900 it had grown to become the fourth largest city in the nation thanks to its role as a major centre for the manufacture of hardware and furniture, among other things.10 , 11 Its rising status was signalled by its role in 1904 as host to both the World Fair and the Summer Olympics. St Louis continued to prosper over the course of the twentieth century, with income per capita reaching 90 per cent of that of New York by the end of the 1970s.12 The city was not without its problems – starting in the 1950s, rapid suburbanization led to the hollowing out and impoverishment of St Louis’ urban core, an issue we return to in the next chapter. But the wider metropolitan area continued to thrive until late into the twentieth century.

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Since the 1980s, however, economic activity has concentrated in a small number of major cities such as New York, San Francisco and Chicago, while many formerly thriving cities and towns have been left behind. Cities like Detroit, Cleveland and Milwaukee, once among the richest in the country,16 have entered seemingly intractable cycles of urban decay, with high rates of poverty, deteriorating public finances, decaying infrastructure and widespread crime. Income per capita in St Louis has fallen from 90 per cent of the level in New York in the late 1970s back down to 67 per cent.17 The urban-rural income gap has also surged to historic heights, as numerous rural centres have found themselves wrestling with joblessness and stagnating incomes.18 The decline in the tyranny of distance through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries helped to spread economic opportunity across the United States, and turned the economy into a network of many thriving cities and towns.

Falling Behind: Explaining the Development Gap Between Latin America and the United States
by Francis Fukuyama
Published 1 Jan 2006

Countries in the upper right portion—that is, countries 142 The Politics of Underdevelopment in Latin America Number of Regime Changes 8 Panama 7 6 5 Ecuador Argentina Bolivia Brazil Dominican Republic Paraguay Peru 4 Venezuela El Salvador 3 Colombia Guatemala 2 Costa Rica Uruguay 1 Nicaragua 0 0 Chile 2000 Mexico 4000 6000 8000 10000 Average Annual per Capita Income ($) figure 6.4 Per Capita Income and Regime Change in Latin America, 1940–1970. Note: Income per capita expressed in 1996 purchasing power parity dollars. Sources: Data elaborated from the Penn World Table, http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php; and the Third World Government Stability database, http://colfa.utsa.edu/govstability. Number of Regime Changes 8 7 6 Argentina Panama 5 4 Bolivia 3 2 Nicaragua El Salvador Dominican Republic Peru Ecuador Brazil Guatemala Chile Mexico 1 Colombia 0 0 2000 4000 Costa Rica Uruguay Venezuela 6000 8000 10000 Average Annual per Capita Income ($) figure 6.5 Per Capita Income and Regime Change in Latin America, 1970–2000.

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Number of Regime Changes 8 7 6 Argentina Panama 5 4 Bolivia 3 2 Nicaragua El Salvador Dominican Republic Peru Ecuador Brazil Guatemala Chile Mexico 1 Colombia 0 0 2000 4000 Costa Rica Uruguay Venezuela 6000 8000 10000 Average Annual per Capita Income ($) figure 6.5 Per Capita Income and Regime Change in Latin America, 1970–2000. Note: Income per capita expressed in 1996 purchasing power parity dollars. Sources: Data elaborated from the Penn World Table, http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php; and the Third World Government Stability database, http://colfa.utsa.edu/ govstability. with relatively high per capita income levels and high numbers of regime changes, such as Argentina (for both subperiods) and Venezuela (for the ﬁrst subperiod)—should have experienced fewer instances of regime change.

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The Politics of Underdevelopment in Latin America part iii INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS IN LATIN AMERICA’S DEVELOPMENT This page intentionally left blank 7 The Latin American Equilibrium james a. robinson O ne of the enduring puzzles of Latin American history is its comparative economic performance.1 At the time of conquest and settlement, though Latin American countries were relatively poor and economically backward compared to their colonists from Spain and Portugal, the gap was small in relation to what it is today. For example, in 1500, Spain’s income per capita was probably about 50 percent greater than the Latin American average. Today, average income in Spain is about 300 percent greater.2 Even more puzzling, at the time of conquest, the most prosperous parts of the Americas were not those which are today the richest. In 1492, it was not Canada, the United States, or the Southern Cone of Latin America that were the most economically advanced; it was Mexico, Peru, and Bolivia with their complex centralized societies.3 Though the technology of the Mexicas or Tawantinsuyu may not have been very advanced by modern standards, they had developed extraordinary abilities to provide public goods, irrigation works, and infrastructure, and they had systems of taxation and resource mobilization that would be the envy of many modern developing countries.

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A Pelican Introduction Economics: A User's Guide
by Ha-Joon Chang
Published 26 May 2014

Before the rise of capitalism, the Western European societies, like all the other pre-capitalist societies, changed very slowly. The society was basically organized around farming, which used virtually the same technologies for centuries, with a limited degree of commerce and handicraft industries. Between 1000 and 1500, the medieval era, income per capita, namely, income per person, in Western Europe grew at 0.12 per cent per year.1 This means that income in 1500 was only 82 per cent higher than that in 1000. To put it into perspective, this is a growth that China, growing at 11 per cent a year, experienced in just six years between 2002 and 2008.

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The Soviet Union – even its more developed European part – was a very backward economy in which capitalism had been hardly developed, where socialism really had no business emerging. To everyone’s surprise, the early Soviet industrialization was a big success, most graphically proven by its ability to repel the Nazi advance on the Eastern Front during the Second World War. Income per capita is estimated to have grown at 5 per cent per year between 1928 and 1938 – an astonishingly rapid rate in a world in which income typically grew at 1–2 per cent per year.15 This growth came at the cost of millions of deaths – from political repression and the 1932 famine.* However, the scale of the famine was not known at the time, and many were impressed by Soviet economic performance, especially given that capitalism was then on its knees, following the Great Depression of 1929.

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Even the larger middle-income developing countries (30–50 million people), such as Colombia or South Africa, may have GDP of $300–400 billion. These are only as large as the GDP of a mid-sized US state, such as Washington or Minnesota. In terms of GDP per capita figures, we have a huge range. Since these figures are similar – actually identical in theory, although not necessarily so in practice – to income per capita figures that we discuss shortly, suffice it to say here that we are talking about differentials over 500 times. Income Gross Domestic Income, or GDI GDP may be seen as a sum of incomes, rather than outputs, as everyone who is involved in the production activity is paid for his/her contribution (whether the amounts paid are ‘fair’ is another matter).

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Capital in the Twenty-First Century
by Thomas Piketty
Published 10 Mar 2014

In practice, many people earn much less than 2,500 euros a month, while others earn dozens of times that much. Income disparities are partly the result of unequal pay for work and partly of much larger inequalities in income from capital, which are themselves a consequence of the extreme concentration of wealth. The average national income per capita is simply the amount that one could distribute to each individual if it were possible to equalize the income distribution without altering total output or national income.11 Similarly, private per capita wealth on the order of 180,000 euros, or six years of national income, does not mean that everyone owns that much capital.

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One conclusion stands out in this brief history of national accounting: national accounts are a social construct in perpetual evolution. They always reflect the preoccupations of the era when they were conceived.19 We should be careful not to make a fetish of the published figures. When a country’s national income per capita is said to be 30,000 euros, it is obvious that this number, like all economic and social statistics, should be regarded as an estimate, a construct, and not a mathematical certainty. It is simply the best estimate we have. National accounts represent the only consistent, systematic attempt to analyze a country’s economic activity.

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In 2013–2014, for example, global economic growth will probably exceed 3 percent, thanks to very rapid progress in the emerging countries. But global population is still growing at an annual rate close to 1 percent, so that global output per capita is actually growing at a rate barely above 2 percent (as is global income per capita). Growth over the Very Long Run Before turning to present trends, I will go back in time and present the stages and orders of magnitude of global growth since the Industrial Revolution. Consider first Table 2.1, which indicates growth rates over a very long period of time. Several important facts stand out.

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The Economists' Hour: How the False Prophets of Free Markets Fractured Our Society
by Binyamin Appelbaum
Published 4 Sep 2019

Charles Darwin, visiting in the 1830s, observed that the “feudal-like” system kept most Chileans in extreme poverty. In the decades that followed, Chileans found a measure of prosperity by exporting the ground beneath their feet, first mining nitrates and then copper.10 But as the United States industrialized and prospered, Chile stagnated. In 1913, income per capita in Chile was 50 percent of income per capita in the United States. By 1975, the figure was 27 percent.11 After World War II, as Chile’s population boomed — and as voting rights were expanded — political leaders began to pursue economic growth with greater urgency, attempting to break up the great agricultural estates and to promote industrialization.12 Raúl Prebisch, an Argentine economist hired by the United Nations to run a think tank devoted to South America’s development, advanced the influential view that the continent needed to turn inward.

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“The most important new development in economic thought,” he said in 1924, “will be the recognition of the economic value of human life.”37 In assigning a value to accident victims nearly a half century later, Gates borrowed the insurance industry’s logic. He calculated the difference between the age of the average victim and average life expectancy, and multiplied that by annual income per capita. The result was a figure of $140,000, or about $885,000 in 2019 dollars.38 The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration added a few more items to the ledger later that same year, including the price of a funeral and the inconvenience to the victim’s employer, which raised the value of life to $200,700.

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Four years later, in 1981, Hayek’s free-market Mont Pelerin Society held a meeting in Chile, a decision widely seen as a seal of approval. But there was little cause for celebration. The growth of the late 1970s and early 1980s only served to offset the recession of the early Pinochet years. In 1973, when Pinochet seized power, income per capita in Chile was about 12 percent higher than the average for Latin America. By 1981, the difference once again was approaching 12 percent.43 Then de Castro and the Chicago Boys crashed the Chilean economy for the second time. Economists in the midcentury had supported the freedom to trade across borders, but not the freedom to invest across borders.

Economic Gangsters: Corruption, Violence, and the Poverty of Nations
by Raymond Fisman and Edward Miguel
Published 14 Apr 2008

The countryside has started to empty as China’s rural masses seek their fortunes in coastal cities. More than twice as many Chinese lived in 127 CH A PTER F I VE urban areas in 2005 than they did twenty-five years earlier, when the reforms began. This economic miracle has brought higher living standards to hundreds of millions of people in a few short decades: China’s income per capita was at African levels in the 1970s before the reforms, but now workers there earn many times as much as their African counterparts. But China’s modern economic growth is fuelled, literally, by burning coal, gas, and oil. The torrid rate of expansion of Chinese manufacturing is outstripped only by its growing fossil fuel consumption.

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And no matter how rapid the recovery, the war, in addition to all the direct pain and suffering the conflict wrought, was definitely a short-run economic disaster since so much time and energy was spent fighting rather than working at economically productive activities. Vietnam’s southeast Asian neighbors—like the “Tiger economies” of Malaysia and Thailand—didn’t suffer from the American War. Income per capita is now $4,970 in Malaysia and $2,720 in Thailand—but only $620 in Vietnam.9 Yet for all the suffering it caused, the war did have at least a hint of a silver lining for the Vietnamese people. The conflict generated a stronger sense of Vietnamese national identity, forged through shared struggles and sacrifice.

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Peace meant that diamond firms no longer got the same sweetheart deals. Royalty payments to the government for mining concessions jumped from $37.5 million in 2002 to nearly $110 million one year later, despite only a modest increase in the value of the diamonds extracted. Overall, the Angolan economy has taken off since the war’s end, with income per capita rising by more than 20 percent between 2003 and 2005— proving once again that the poorest economies can quickly rebound from war. If the old diamond companies are suffering, the rest of the country isn’t. In the oil rush that has seized much of Africa in recent years, we may be witnessing another disconnect 184 TH E RO A D BA CK F RO M WAR between economic prosperity and business profits.

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The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics
by William R. Easterly
Published 1 Aug 2002

A country that wanted to triple growth from 1 percent to 4 percent had to raise its investment rate from 4 percent Aid for Investment 31 of GDP to 16 percent of GDP. The 4 percent GDP growth would give a per capita growth rate of 2 percent if population growth was 2 percent. At a 2 percent per year rate of growth, income per capita would double every thirty-six years. Investment had to keep ahead of population growth. Development was a race between machines and motherhood. How do you get investment highenough? Say thatcurrent national saving is 4 percent of GDP. The early development economists thought that poor countries were so poor they had little hope of increasing their saving.

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I wouldn't argue that Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, and Syria had technological regress, but clearly other factors got in the way of technological progress. Technologically driven growth is anything but automatic. Just as productivity growth explains most of the difference in per capita growth across countries, so differences in technological levels explain most of the differences in income per capita. U.S.workers produce twenty times the output per worker that Chinese workers do. If Chinese workershad the same technology as U.S. workers, then U.S. workers would produce only twice as much as Chinese workers (which wouldbe explained by more education and machinery for U.S. workers). Most of the higher output of American workers compared to Chinese workers is explained by higher technological productivity.l0 Poor countries like China continue to lag behind technologically, despite the widespread availability of advanced technology.

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They argue that this is a causal relationship, by identifying the geographic component of trade (the tendency for neighbors to trade more with each other and the tendency for larger economies to have more internaltrade).21 The effect is large: a 1 point rise in the shareof trade in GDP raises income per capita by 2 percent. Maryland economist Francisco Rodriguez and Harvard economist DaniRodrik express a contrarian view. They argue that many of these measures do not really capture trade interventions and that they are not robust to changes in the sample period or other control variables (they did not study all of the results mentioned here, however).22Still, few variables in the research on growth captureexactly a specific policy or are robust to all possible control variables.It is too easy to drive out individual associations with other controlvariables.

Basic Income: A Radical Proposal for a Free Society and a Sane Economy
by Philippe van Parijs and Yannick Vanderborght
Published 20 Mar 2017

Even in a closed economy, the high tax rate could induce many Â�people to perform alienated activities in the informal sphere or to earn part of their income in the form of untaxed perks.70 In this case, a significant part of total income would escape taxation and would keep growing as the tax rate rises. In Figure 5.1, therefore, total income per capita Y' would exceed taxable income per capita Y and fall more slowly than Y in response 125 BASIC INCOME Levels of average income, average taxable income, and basic income Y GMax Y G G* 1 2 Tax rate Figure 5.1â•‡â•‰Optimal level of basic income from a “real-Â�libertarian” and a “market-Â� communist” perspective Y: taxable income per capita Y': total income per capita Tax rate t: normal range from 0 to (1), prohibitive range from (1) to 100 Â�percent. Real-Â�libertarian optimal tax rate (1): corresponds to the maximum sustainable level of basic income GMax Market-Â�communist optimal tax rate (2): highest tax rate consistent with basic income meeting fundamental needs G* to higher taxation.

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Â�These illustrative amounts are calculated using Word Bank estimates for GDP per capita in 2015: http://Â�dataâ•‰.Â�worldbankâ•‰.Â�orgâ•‰/Â�indicatorâ•‰/ Â�N Yâ•‰.Â�GDPâ•‰.Â�PCAPâ•‰.Â�CD and http://Â�dataâ•‰ .Â�worldbankâ•‰.Â�orgâ•‰/Â�indicatorâ•‰/ Â�N Yâ•‰.Â�GDPâ•‰.Â�PCAPâ•‰.Â�PPâ•‰.Â�CD. Both Â�here and in the preÂ�senÂ�taÂ�tion of specific schemes and proposals, we use Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita rather than the Gross National Product (GNP) per capita (which includes net receipts from the rest of the world) or the national income per capita (which excludes the consumption of fixed capital by government and Â�houseÂ�holds), mainly Â�because of the easy availability of relevant data. In most cases, this choice is unimportant. In some, however, especially when the entities considered are small, the sum of the incomes earned by the residents of a territory (GNP) can diverge significantly, upward or downward, from the incomes generated within that territory (GDP).

…

According to some (for example, Van Trier 1992), the transition from socialism to capitalism in East-Â�European countries was a missed opportunity to get Â�there without too much difficulty. 28. Â�Meade 1989: 34–8; 1995: 54–62. 29. Â�Meade 1995: 62. 30. Atkinson (1993d) estimates that a basic income at 15 Â�percent of national income per capita could be funded sustainably in this way (to be supplemented, as proposed by Â�Meade, by part of the yield of an expenditure tax). Getting Â�there is not ecoÂ�nomÂ�ically impossible, he argues—Â�from the late 1940s to the late 1970s, the UK Â�rose from a public debt of over 100 Â�percent of GDP to a net worth of the public sector of 100 Â�percent—Â�but the unfairness to the transition generations is a decisive obstacle. 291 NO TES TO PAGES 150–151 31.

pages: 322 words: 84,580

The Economics of Belonging: A Radical Plan to Win Back the Left Behind and Achieve Prosperity for All
by Martin Sandbu
Published 15 Jun 2020

Economists Arvind Subramanian and Martin Kessler have shown that such globalisation only started in earnest in the 1990s, as illustrated by Figure 5.2, which traces the relative average income of the trading partners of the United States, the European Union, and Japan, weighted by their share of trade.15 FIGURE 5.2. Average income per capita of three major economies’ trading partners, as a ratio of their own income levels. “EU” is 27 European Union member states as of 2013. Source: Arvind Subramanian and Martin Kessler, “The Hyperglobalization of Trade and Its Future” (Peterson Institute Working Paper 13-6, July 2013), https://piie.com/publications/working-papers/hyperglobalization-trade-and-its-future, with updated data provided by the authors. For decades, the United States’ trade partners consistently hovered around two-thirds of American income per capita, until 1991, when poorer countries began to increase their share in US exports and imports.

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See also antisystem proponents; nationalism immigration: arguments for restricting, 14–15; economic discouragement of, 217; economic downturns coinciding with, 84–85; employment market effects of, 82–83, 215–16, 224–25, 250n17; exposure to, as factor in attitudes toward, 47, 85, 251n24; globalisation and, 82–85; home countries as affected by, 251n23; labour standards compatible with, 224–25; in Norway, 213–14, 269n4; policy restrictions on, 11; populist criticisms of, 85; public finances affected by, 83–84, 216, 250n20; in United Kingdom, 270n5; voter opposition to, 47 income growth, 19–21, 19, 52, 241n3 income inequality: cultural values influenced by, 31; economic insecurity linked to, 58–60; in Germany, 60; incomes of lower 50 percent, 63; market power as factor in, 127; Scandinavia as counterexample to, 99–100; postwar decline in, 53; regional character of, 153; in Sweden, 43–44; tax policy as contributing factor to, 56–57, 169, 171; technology as factor in, 30; trade not a factor in, 79–82; union declines linked to, 56–58, 121; voter behaviour influenced by, 43–44; wages as factor in, 79–80; and wealth concentration, 169; in Western countries, 20 income per capita, of trading partners, 80 Independent Workers’ Union, 125 industry: China’s role in, 25, 75; in emerging economies, 75; employment in, as share of total employment, 76, 76; geographical effects of changes in, 70, 81; income inequality arising from decline of, 56; output of, 23–25, 24, 25; skill levels required in, 81, 106, 199–200, 204; social contract linked to, 52, 54, 61; successful policies to reverse declines in, 203–4; technology in, 79; unemployment linked to, 22–27, 22, 77; urbanization and, 29 Inglehart, Ronald, 42 interest rates, 163–65 International Monetary Fund, 20, 64, 121, 140, 145, 155, 182 in-work tax credits, 117–18 Ireland, 64, 86, 270n6 Italy: banking crisis in, 150; economic insecurity in, 59; populism in, 31; regional economic decline in, 192; voter behaviour in, 41–42 Japan: manufacturing technology in, 79; negative interest rates in, 164–65; public spending in, 234; response to global financial crisis in, 133; Western social order influential on, 6 Jews, blamed for financial problems, 89 job mobility, 31–33, 107, 107, 114–15, 117, 119–20, 125, 128 jobs.

pages: 365 words: 88,125

23 Things They Don't Tell You About Capitalism
by Ha-Joon Chang
Published 1 Jan 2010

For example, when the World Bank changed its method of estimating PPP incomes in 2007, China’s PPP income per capita fell by 44 per cent (from $7,740 to $5,370), while Singapore’s rose by 53 per cent (from $31,710 to $48,520) overnight. Despite these limits, a country’s income in international dollars probably gives us a better idea of its living standard than does its dollar income at the market exchange rate. And if we calculate incomes of different countries in international dollars, the US (almost) comes back to the top of the world. It depends on the estimate, but Luxemburg is the only country that has a higher PPP income per capita than that of the US in all estimates.

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Index active economic citizenship xvi, xvii Administrative Behaviour (Simon) 173–4 Africa see Sub-Saharan Africa AIG 172–3 Air France 131 AOL 132–3 apartheid 214–16 Argentina education and growth 181 growth 73 hyperinflation 53–4 Austria geography 121 government direction 132 protectionism 70 balance of payments 97–100, 101 Baldursson, Fridrik 235 Bangladesh entrepreneurship 159–60 and microfinance 161–2, 163, 164 Bank of England 252 (second) Bank of the USA 68 Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 262 bankruptcy law 227–8 Barad, Jill 154 Bard College 172 Bateman, Milford 162 Baugur 233 Baumol, William 250 Bebchuk, Lucian 154 behaviouralist school 173–4 Belgium ethnic division 122 income inequality 144, 146 manufacturing 70, 91 R&D funding 206 standard of living 109 Benin, entrepreneurship 159 Bennett, Alan 214 Besley, Tim 246 big government 221–2, 260–61 and growth 228–30 see also government direction; industrial policy BIS (Bank for International Settlements) 262 Black, Eugene 126 Blair, Tony 82, 143, 179 borderless world 39–40 bounded rationality theory 168, 170, 173–7, 250, 254 Brazilian inflation 55 Britain industrial dominance/decline 89–91 protectionism 69–70 British Academy 246–7 British Airways 131 brownfield investment 84 Brunei 258 Buffet, Warren 30, 239 Bukharin, Nikolai 139 Bunning, Senator Jim 8 Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta) 121, 200 Bush, George W. 8, 158, 159, 174 Bush Sr, George 207 business sector see corporate sector Cameroon 116 capital mobility 59–60 nationality 74–5, 76–7 capitalism Golden Age of 142, 147, 243 models 253–4 capitalists, vs. workers 140–42 captains of industry 16 Carnegie, Andrew 15 Case, Steve 132–3 Cassano, Joe 172–3 CDOs (collateralized debt obligations) 238 CDSs (credit default swaps) 238 CEO compensation see executive pay, in US Cerberus 77–8 Chavez, Hugo 68 chess, complexity of 175–6 child-labour regulation 2–3, 197 China business regulation 196 communes 216 economic officials 244 industrial predominance 89, 91, 93, 96 as planned economy 203–4 PPP income 107 protectionism and growth 63–4, 65 Chocolate mobile phone 129 Chrysler 77–8, 191 Chung, Ju-Yung 129 Churchill, Winston 253 climate factors 120–21 Clinton, Bill 143 cognitive psychology 173–4 collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) 238 collective entrepreneurship 165 communist system 200–204 Concorde project 130–31 conditions of trade 5 Confucianism 212–13 Congo (Democratic Republic) 116, 121 consumption smoothing 163 cooperatives 166 corporate sector importance 190–91 planning in 207–9 regulation effect 196–8 suspicion of 192–3 see also regulation; transnational corporations Cotton Factories Regulation Act 1819 2 credit default swaps (CDSs) 238 Crotty, Jim 236–8 culture issues 123, 212–13 Daimler-Benz 77–8 Darling, Alistair 172 de-industrialization 91 balance of payments 97–100, 101 causes 91–6 concerns 96–9 deflation, Japan 54 deliberation councils 134 Denmark cooperatives 166 protectionism 69 standard of living 104, 106, 232–3 deregulation see under regulation derivatives 239 Detroit car-makers 191–2 developing countries entrepreneurship and poverty 158–60 and free market policies 62–3, 71–3, 118–19, 261–2 policy space 262–3 digital divide 39 dishwashers 34 distribution of income see downward redistribution of income; income irregularity; upward redistribution of income domestic service 32–3 double-dip recession xiii downward redistribution of income 142–3, 146–7 Dubai 235 Duménil, Gérard 236 East Asia economic officials 249–50 educational achievements 180–81 ethnic divisions 122–3 government direction 131–2 growth 42, 56, 243–4 industrial policy 125–36, 205 École Nationale d’Administration (ENA) 133 economic crises 247 Economic Policy Institute (EPI) 144, 150 economists alternative schools 248–51 as bureaucrats 242–3 collective imagination 247 and economic growth 243–5 role in economic crises 247–8 Ecuador 73 Edgerton, David 37 Edison, Thomas 15, 165, 166 education and enterprise 188–9 higher education effect 185–8 importance 178–9 knowledge economy 183–5 mechanization effect 184–5 outcome equality 217–18 and productivity 179–81 relevance 182–3 Elizabeth II, Queen 245–7 ENA (École Nationale d’Administration) 133 enlightened self-interest 255–6 entrepreneurship, and poverty 157–8 and collective institutions 165–7 as developing country feature 158–60 finance see microfinance environmental regulations 3 EPI (Economic Policy Institute) 144, 150 equality of opportunity 210–11, 256–7 and equality of outcome 217–20, 257 and markets 213–15 socio-economic environment 215–17 equality of outcome 217–20 ethnic divisions 122–3 executive pay and non-market forces 153–6 international comparisons 152–3 relative to workers’ pay 149–53, 257 US 148–9 fair trade, vs. free trade 6–7 Fannie Mae 8 Far Eastern Economic Review 196 Federal Reserve Board (US) 171, 172, 246 female occupational structure 35–6 Fiat 78 financial crisis (2008) xiii, 155–6, 171–2, 233–4, 254 financial derivatives 239, 254–5 financial markets deregulation 234–8, 259–60 effects 239–41 efficiency 231–2, 240–41 sector growth 237–9 Finland government direction 133 income inequality 144 industrial production 100 protectionism 69, 70 R&D funding 206 welfare state and growth 229 Fischer, Stanley 54 Ford cars 191, 237 Ford, Henry 15, 200 foreign direct investment (FDI) 83–5 France and entrepreneurship 158 financial deregulation 236 government direction 132, 133–4, 135 indicative planning 204–5 protectionism 70 Frank, Robert H 151 Franklin, Benjamin 65–6, 67 Freddie Mac 8 free market boundaries 8–10 and developing countries 62–3, 71–3, 118–19, 261–2 labour see under labour nineteenth-century rhetoric 140–43 as political definition 1–2 rationale xiii–xiv, 169–70 results xiv–xv, xvi–xvii system redesign 252, 263 see also markets; neo-liberalism free trade, vs. fair trade 6–7 Fried, Jesse 154 Friedman, Milton 1, 169, 214 Galbraith, John Kenneth 16, 245 Garicano, Luis 245 Gates, Bill 165, 166, 200 General Electric (GE) 17, 45, 86, 237 General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) 194, 237 General Motors (GM) 20, 22, 45, 80, 86, 154, 190–98 decline 193–6 financialization 237 pre-eminence 191–2 geographical factors 121 Germany blitzkrieg mobility 191 CEO remuneration 152–3 cooperatives 166 emigration 69 hyperinflation 52–4 industrial policy 205 manufacturing 90 R&D funding 206 welfare state and growth 228–9 Ghana, entrepreneurship 159 Ghosn, Carlos 75–6, 78 globalization of management 75–6 and technological change 40 GM see General Motors GMAC (General Motors Acceptance Corporation) 194, 237 Golden Age of Capitalism 142, 147, 243 Goldilocks economy 246 Goodwin, Sir Fred 156 Gosplan 145 government direction balance of results 134–6 and business information 132–4 failure examples 130–31 and market discipline 44–5, 129–30, 134 share ownership 21 success examples 125–6, 131–4 see also big government; industrial policy Grameen Bank 161–4 Grant, Ulysses 67 Great Depression 1929 24, 192, 236, 249, 252 greenfield investment 84 Greenspan, Alan 172, 246 Hamilton, Alexander 66–7, 69 Hayami, Masaru 54 Hennessy, Peter 246–7 higher education 185–8 Hirschman, Albert 249 History Boys (Bennett) 214 Hitler, Adolf 54 home country bias 78–82, 83, 86–7 Honda 135 Hong Kong 71 household appliances 34–6, 37 HSBC 172 Human relations school 47 Hungary, hyperinflation 53–4 hyperinflation 52–4 see also inflation Hyundai Group 129, 244 Iceland financial crisis 232–4, 235 foreign debt 234 standard of living 104–5 ICT (Information and Communication Technology) 39 ILO (International Labour Organization) 32, 143–4 IMF see International Monetary Fund immigration control 5, 23, 26–8, 30 income per capita income 104–11 see also downward redistribution of income; income inequality; upward redistribution of income income inequality 18, 72–3, 102, 104–5, 108, 110, 143–5, 147, 247–8, 253, 262 India 99, 121 indicative planning 205 indicative planning 204–6 Indonesia 234 industrial policy 84, 125–36, 199, 205, 242, 259, 261 see also government direction Industrial Revolution 70, 90, 243 infant industry argument 66–8, 69–70, 71–2 inflation control 51–2 and growth 54–6, 60–61 hyperinflation 52–4 and stability 56–61 Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 39 institutional quality 29–30, 112–13, 115, 117, 123–4, 165–7 interest rate control 5–6 international dollar 106–7 International Labour Organization (ILO) 32, 143–4 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 54–5, 57, 66, 72, 244, 262 SAPs 118 International Year of Microcredit 162 internet revolution 31–2 impact 36–7, 38, 39 and rationality 174 investment brownfield/greenfield 84 foreign direct investment 83–5 share 18–19 invisible reward/sanction mechanisms 48–50 Ireland financial crisis 234–5 Italy cooperatives 166 emigrants to US 103 Jackson, Andrew 68 Japan business regulation 196 CEO remuneration 152–3 deflation 54 deliberation councils 134 government direction 133–4, 135, 259 indicative planning 205 industrial policy 131, 135, 242–5 industrial production 100 production system 47, 167 protectionism 62, 70 R&D funding 206 Jefferson, Thomas 67–8, 239 job security/insecurity 20, 58–61, 108–9, 111, 225–8, 247, 253, 259 Journal of Political Economy 34 Kaldor, Nicolas 249 Keynes, John Maynard 249 Kindleberger, Charles 249 knowledge economy 183–5 Kobe Steel 42–3, 46 Kong Tze (Confucius) 212 Korea traditional 211–13 see also North Korea; South Korea Koufax, Sandy 172 Kuwait 258 labour free market rewards 23–30 job security 58–60 in manufacturing 91–2 market flexibility 52 regulation 2–3 relative price 33, 34 Latin America 32–3, 55, 73, 112, 122, 140, 196–7, 211, 245, 262 Latvia 235 Lazonick, William 20 Lenin, Vladimir 138 Levin, Jerry 133 Lévy, Dominique 236 LG Group 129, 134 liberals neo-liberalism xv, 60, 73 nineteenth-century 140–42 limited liability 12–15, 21, 228, 239, 257 Lincoln, Abraham 37, 67 List, Friedrich 249 London School of Economics 245–6 LTCM (Long-Term Capital Management) 170–71 Luxemburg, standard of living 102, 104–5, 107, 109, 232–3, 258 macro-economic stability 51–61, 240, 259, 261 Madoff, Bernie 172 Malthus, Thomas 141 managerial capitalism 14–17 Mandelson, Lord (Peter) 82–3, 87 manufacturing industry comparative dynamism 96 employment changes 91–2 importance 88–101, 257–9 productivity rise 91–6, 184–5 relative prices 94–5 statistical changes 92–3 Mao Zedong 215–16 Marchionne, Sergio 78 markets and bounded rationality theory 168, 173–6, 177, 254 conditions of trade 5 and equality of opportunity 213–15 failure theories 250 financial see financial markets government direction 44–5, 125–36 government regulation 4–6, 168–9, 176–7 participation restrictions 4 price regulations 5–6 and self-interest 44–5 see also free market Marx, Karl 14, 198, 201, 208, 249 Marxism 80, 185, 201–3 mathematics 180, 182–3 MBSs (mortgage-backed securities) 238 medicine’s popularity 222–4 Merriwether, John 171 Merton, Robert 170–71 Michelin 75–6 microfinance critique 162 and development 160–62 Microsoft 135 Minsky, Hyman 249 Monaco 258 morality, as optical illusion 48–50 Morduch, Jonathan 162 mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) 238 motivation complexity 46–7 Mugabe, Robert 54 NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) 67 National Health Service (UK) 261 nationality of capital 74–87 natural resources 69, 115–16, 119–20, 121–2 neo-liberalism xv, 60, 73, 145 neo-classical school 250 see also free market Nestlé 76–7, 79 Netherlands CEO remuneration 152–3 cooperatives 166 intellectual property rights 71 protectionism 71 welfare state and growth 228–9 New Public Management School 45 New York Times 37, 151 New York University 172 Nissan 75–6, 84, 135, 214 Nobel Peace Prize 162 Prize in economics 170, 171–2, 173, 208, 246 Nobel, Alfred 170 Nokia 135, 259–60 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 67 North Korea 211 Norway government direction 132, 133, 205 standard of living 104 welfare state and growth 222, 229 Obama, Barack 149 OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) 57, 159, 229 Oh, Won-Chul 244 Ohmae, Kenichi 39 Opel 191 Opium War 9 opportunities see equality of opportunity Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 57, 159, 229 organizational economy 208–9 outcomes equality 217–20 Palin, Sarah 113 Palma, Gabriel 237 Park, Chung-Hee 129 Park, Tae-Joon 127–8 participation restrictions 4 Perot, Ross 67 Peru 219 PGAM (Platinum Grove Asset Management) 171 Philippines, education and growth 180, 181 Phoenix Venture Holdings 86 Pigou, Arthur 250 Pinochet, Augusto 245 PISA (Program for International Student Assessment) 180 Plain English Campaign 175 planned economies communist system 200–204 indicative systems 204–6 survival 199–200, 208–9 Platinum Grove Asset Management (PGAM) 171 Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO) 127–8 pollution 3, 9, 169 poor individuals 28–30, 140–42, 216–18 Portes, Richard 235 Portman, Natalie 162 POSCO (Pohang Iron and Steel Company) 127–8 post-industrial society 39, 88–9, 91–2, 96, 98, 101, 257–8 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) 118 see also SAPs PPP (purchasing power parity) 106–9 Preobrazhensky, Yevgeni 138–40, 141 price regulations 5–6 stability 51–61 Pritchett, Lant 181 private equity funds 85–6, 87 professional managers 14–22, 44–5, 166, 200 Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) 180 protectionism and growth 62–3, 72–3 infant industry argument 66–8, 69–70, 71–2 positive examples 63–5, 69 PRSPs see Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers purchasing power parity (PPP) 106–9 R&D see research and development (R&D) Rai, Aishwarya 162 Rania, Queen 162 rationality see bounded rationality theory RBS (Royal Bank of Scotland) 156 real demand effect 94 regulation business/corporate 196–8 child labour 2–3, 197 deregulation 234–8, 259–60 legitimacy 4–6 markets 4–6, 168–9, 176–7 price 5–6 Reinhart, Carmen 57, 59 Renault 21, 75–6 Report on the Subject of Manufactures (Hamilton) 66 The Rescuers (Disney animation) 113–14 research and development (R&D) 78–9, 87, 132, 166 funding 206 reward/sanction mechanisms 48–50 Ricardo, David 141 rich individuals 28–30, 140–42 river transport 121 Rogoff, Kenneth 57, 59 Roodman, David 162 Roosevelt, Franklin 191 Rover 86 Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) 156 Rubinow, I.M. 34 Ruhr occupation 52 Rumsfeld, Donald 174–5 Rwanda 123 Santander 172 SAPs (Structural Adjustment Programs) 118, 124 Sarkozy, Nicolas 90 Scholes, Myron 170–71 Schumpeter, Joseph 16, 165–7, 249 Second World War planning 204 (second) Bank of the USA 68 self-interest 41–2, 45 critique 42–3 enlightened 255–6 invisible reward/sanction mechanisms 48–50 and market discipline 44–5 and motivation complexity 46–7 Sen, Amartya 250 Senegal 118 service industries 92–3 balance of payments 97–100, 101 comparative dynamism 94–5, 96–7 knowledge-based 98, 99 Seychelles 100 share buybacks 19–20 shareholder value maximisation 17–22 shareholders government 21 ownership of companies 11 short-term interests 11–12, 19–20 shipbuilders 219 Simon, Herbert 173–6, 208–9, 250 Singapore government direction 133 industrial production 100 PPP income 107 protectionism 70 SOEs 205 Sloan Jr, Alfred 191–2 Smith, Adam 13, 14, 15, 41, 43, 169, 239 social dumping 67 social mobility 103–4, 220 socio-economic environment 215–17 SOEs (state-owned enterprises) 127, 132, 133, 205–6 South Africa 55, 121 and apartheid 213–16 South Korea bank loans 81 economic officials 244 education and growth 181 ethnic divisions 123 financial drive 235 foreign debt 234 government direction 126–9, 133–4, 135, 136 indicative planning 205 industrial policy 125–36, 205, 242–5 inflation 55, 56 job insecurity effect 222–4, 226, 227 post-war 212–14 protectionism 62, 69, 70 R&D funding 206 regulation 196–7 Soviet Union 200–204 Spain 122 Spielberg, Steven 172 Sri Lanka 121 Stalin, Josef 139–40, 145 standard of living comparisons 105–7 US 102–11 Stanford, Alan 172 state owned enterprises (SOEs) 127, 132, 133, 205–6 steel mill subsidies 126–8 workers 219 Stiglitz, Joseph 250 Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) 118, 124 Sub-Saharan Africa 73, 112–24 culture issues 123 education and growth 181 ethnic divisions 122–3 free market policies 118–19, 262 geographical factors 121 growth rates 73, 112, 116–19 institutional quality 123 natural resources 119–20, 121–2 structural conditions 114–16, 119–24 underdevelopment 112–13, 124 Sutton, Willie 52 Sweden 15, 21–2 CEO remuneration 152 income inequality 144 industrial policy 205 industrial production 100 per capita income 104 R&D funding 206 welfare state and growth 229 Switzerland CEO remuneration 152–3 ethnic divisions 122 geography 121 higher education 185–6, 188 intellectual property rights 71 manufacturing 100, 258 protectionism 69, 71 standard of living 104–6, 232–3 Taiwan business regulation 196 economic officials 244 education and growth 180 government direction 136 indicative planning 205 protectionism 69, 70 Tanzania 116 TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program) 8 tax havens 258 technological revolution 31–2, 38–40 telegraph 37–8 Telenor 164 Thatcher, Margaret 50, 225–6, 261 Time-Warner group 132–3 TIMSS (Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study) 180, 183 Toledo, Alejandro 219 Toyota and apartheid 214 production system 47 public money bail-out 80 trade restrictions 4 transnational corporations historical debts 80 home country bias 78–82, 83, 86–7 nationality of capital 74–5, 76–7 production movement 79, 81–2 see also corporate sector Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) 180, 183 trickle-down economics 137–8 and upward distribution of income 144–7 Trotsky, Leon 138 Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 8 2008 financial crisis xiii, 144, 155–6, 171–2, 197–8, 233–4, 236, , 238–9, 245–7, 249, 254 Uganda 115–16 uncertainty 174–5 unemployment 218–19 United Kingdom CEO remuneration 153, 155–6 financial deregulation 235–6, 237 NHS 261 shipbuilders 219 see also Britain United Nations 162 United States economic model 104 Federal Reserve Board 171, 172, 246 financial deregulation 235–8 immigrant expectations 103–4 income inequality 144 inequalities 107–11 protectionism and growth 64–8, 69 R&D funding 206 standard of living 102–11 steel workers 219 welfare state and growth 228–30 United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 136 university education effect 185–8 Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) 200 upward redistribution of income 143–4 and trickle-down economics 144–7 Uruguay growth 73 income inequality 144 USAID (United States Agency for International Development) 136 vacuum cleaners 34 Venezuela 144 Versailles Treaty 52 Vietnam 203–4 Volkswagen government share ownership 21 public money bail-out 80 wage gaps political determination 23–8 and protectionism 23–6, 67 wage legislation 5 Wagoner, Rick 45 Wall Street Journal 68, 83 Walpole, Robert 69–70 washing machines 31–2, 34–6 Washington, George 65, 66–7 Welch, Jack 17, 22, 45 welfare economics 250 welfare states 59, 110–43, 146–7, 215, 220, 221–30 and growth 228–30 Wilson, Charlie 192, 193 Windows Vista system 135 woollen manufacturing industry 70 work to rule 46–7 working hours 2, 7, 109–10 World Bank and free market 262 and free trade 72 and POSCO 126–8 government intervention 42, 44, 66 macro-economic stability 56 SAPs 118 WTO (World Trade Organization) 66, 262 Yes, Minister/Prime Minister (comedy series) 44 Yunus, Muhammad 161–2 Zimbabwe, hyperinflation 53–4

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Portfolio Design: A Modern Approach to Asset Allocation
by R. Marston
Published 29 Mar 2011

The International Finance Corporation traditionally used one criterion, gross national income per capita.2 Any country that was classified by the World Bank as a low income or middle income country was also classified as an emerging market. In 2008, China had a total gross national income of $3,899 billion, but a per capita income of only $2,940. Singapore, in contrast, had a gross national income of $168 billion, but a per capita income of $34,760.3 So China is classified as an emerging market even though its total output was many times that of Singapore because its income per capita is so low. The bulk of the world’s income is earned by the high income countries.

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When measuring national income, it’s sensible to adjust for the cost of living. That is certainly true within a single country over time. If you want to measure the income of the average American today relative to decades ago, the only sensible way to measure income is to adjust for changes in the cost of living. So we might compare gross national income per capita in the year 1960 versus that of 2010 in terms of today’s cost of living (2010 dollars). A similar approach might be used in comparing GNI per capita between countries at the same time since there might be substantial differences in the cost of living across countries. A basket of goods might be much less expensive in China than in Japan even if the basket itself were identical in both countries.

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See Federal Housing Finance Agency fixed income, 121–122 fixed income arbitrage, 171 forecast error, 240–241 foreign bonds, 135 correlation with currency, 139 correlation with U.S. bonds, 137 interest rates, 135 returns, 135–136 foreign stocks correlation with U.S. stocks, 87–88 currency and, 79–85 diversification benefits, 85–90 key features, 93–94 owning, 90–93 returns, 79–85 shortcuts to owning, 90–93 U.S. versus, 75–79 foundations, 285–286 spending rules, 5, 286–288 French, Kenneth, 33, 35, 37–38, 49–50, 57, 65 frontier markets, 103 fund of funds, 172, 182–186 Fung, K.H., 187 G geometric averages, 16, 46 Getmansky, Mila, 176 global macro, 172 GNI. See gross national income Goetzmann, William N., 117–118 gold, 249–251 Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI), 240–243 Gorton, Gary, 236, 239 gross national income (GNI), 98–99 gross national income per capita, 98, 103 growth index, value versus, 59–64 growth indexes, 64–65 growth portfolios, 69–71 growth stocks in portfolios, 69–71 key features, 71 GSCI. See Goldman Sachs Commodity Index Gyourko, Joseph, 221 H He, Guangliang, 154–155 health care, 195 hedge funds, 167 Hedge Funds Research (HFR), 173 hedge funds biases, 178–181 databases, 172–173 fund of funds, 182–186 investment strategies, 169–172 investors, 168 key features, 187 managers, 181–183 portfolio, 186–187 returns, 172–178 hedges, currency, 138–139 HFR.

pages: 421 words: 125,417

Common Wealth: Economics for a Crowded Planet
by Jeffrey Sachs
Published 1 Jan 2008

By 2050, today’s developing countries would have an average income of $40,000 per person, roughly equal to U.S. income in 2005, and the United States would have a projected 2050 level of $90,000. Of course, this scenario is highly optimistic in that it assumes the world avoids any prolonged crisis, that the United States grows at the historical average, and that all other countries achieve convergent growth. Figure 2.2(a): The Convergence of Global Income per Capita through 2050 Source: Calculated using data from World Bank (2007) Note: Vertical axis on logarithmic scale. Income is measured in purchasing power parity (PPP) to adjust for difference in price levels across countries. More People and Higher Incomes Not only will most of the world be richer, but there will be a lot more people around enjoying those higher incomes.

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Man-made climate change is not a sin of humanity, or even a result we could have easily predicted and avoided; it is, rather, an accident of chemistry, specifically, the accident that carbon dioxide has greenhouse climate effects (described in detail in Chapter 4). This accident is so novel and has come upon us so recently that global society has been caught largely unawares as to how it should respond. Figure 3.2(a): World Income per Capita from 1500 to 2001 Source: Data from Maddison (2001) Figure 3.2(b): World Income from 1500 to 2001 Source: Calculated using data from Maddison (2001) A tenfold increase in human population since 1750 and a similar increase in production per person on the planet mean that human society’s level of economic activity is perhaps one hundred times what it was at the start of the industrial era.

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As a recent study shows, perhaps two thirds or more of the world’s major marine fisheries are “fully exploited, overexploited, or depleted.” RISING PRESSURES Today’s rates of economic activity, if they were to be maintained at current rates into the future with current technologies, would be environmentally unsustainable. Yet both population and income per capita are rising rapidly. The pressures on the ecological systems are intensifying, and development and dissemination of sustainable technologies are far too slow. If we do little more than scale up what we are consuming today, we will drive many of the planet’s ecosystems, and countless species, to the point of collapse.

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GDP: A Brief but Affectionate History
by Diane Coyle
Published 23 Feb 2014

The economist Amartya Sen, who subsequently won the Nobel Memorial Prize, had electrified the world of development economics with the argument that famines had nothing to do with income and poverty; rather, they were caused when governments were not responsive to the needs of their people, and in particular when there were no newspapers or broadcasters with sufficient independence to challenge and criticize government decisions. Democracies did not suffer famines, at any level of GDP per capita.9 Sen went on to argue that although income per capita was important, it was not as complete a measure of people’s welfare as their capabilities—this would include income or command over resources but also variables such as health, education, women’s freedom, and access to key technologies such as electricity and roads.10 The HDI measures these separate indicators and combines them into a single ranking.

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Ironically, those people who argue most strongly for using an alternative to GDP for the developed economies tend to be focused on income and poverty measures above all else when it comes to developing countries. The difference between GDP per capita and human development does matter for how you assess the efforts to assist developing countries, all those trillions of dollars in aid. The results in terms of GDP have been disappointing. The gap between incomes per capita of the world’s poorest and richest countries has soared in the past half century. But in many other ways—the indicators included in the HDI—there is good news. The gap between rich and poor countries in terms of life expectancy and infant mortality has narrowed significantly, despite the scourge of HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa.

Visions of Inequality: From the French Revolution to the End of the Cold War
by Branko Milanovic
Published 9 Oct 2023

At a given time in the 1970s they would be at different income positions (with Sweden more to the right in a chart such as Figure 6.2 ), and the underlying curves that Brazil and Sweden were “traveling” on might be quite different in their heights (Gini coefficients, plotted on the vertical axis) even if both looked like an inverted U. Therefore, putting all the Gini numbers together might result in something that resembled the Kuznets relationship, as indeed most of the regressions found the required signs on the coefficients of income per capita and squared income per capita, but the goodness of the fit would probably be very low. One such relationship, where no additional control variables are used, is displayed in Figure 6.3 . Using data spanning almost half a century, it shows that, while the quadratic relationship between income level and inequality can be discerned, the R-squared is very low (here only 0.12)—so low that the data points look more like a random blur than a distribution belonging to one specific relationship.

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Second, through his work in the 1950s and 1960s, with which we are concerned here, Kuznets influenced our view of the forces that create and shape income distribution. Thus, we can credit Kuznets with not only a measure of aggregate welfare (national income) but also an approach to its distribution across households. Those more statistically minded might say he helped define the first and second moments of income distribution: its mean (national income per capita) and its distribution (standard deviation of income across households). Even if his work in the area of income distribution is not as widely accepted today as his definitions of various national account concepts, what would become known as the Kuznets hypothesis, a theory about the evolution of inequality over time, is still very much present in economics.

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Inequality in the United States around the Mid-twentieth Century The period during which Kuznets developed his view of income distribution was a very special, and probably unique, period in American economic history. At the end of World War II, the United States was not only the incontestable victor and the sole power in possession of atomic weapons, it was also by far the world’s richest country (in total and in terms of income per capita). The experience of the war left Germany devastated, the western parts of the Soviet Union largely destroyed in terms of both human and physical capital, Great Britain exhausted, and China, Korea, and Japan, for various reasons, in situations of abject poverty. But in the United States income increased tremendously.

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Unhealthy societies: the afflictions of inequality
by Richard G. Wilkinson
Published 19 Nov 1996

RA418.W45 1996 306.4´61–dc20 96–21560 ISBN 0-203-42168-X Master e-book ISBN ISBN 0-203-72992-7 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0-415-09234-5 (hbk) ISBN 0-415-09235-3 (pbk) Contents List of illustrations Preface 1 Introduction: the social economy of health vii ix 1 Part I The health of societies 2 Health becomes a social science 13 3 Rising life expectancy and the epidemiological transition 29 Part II Health inequalities within societies 4 The problem of health inequalities 53 5 Income distribution and health 72 Part III Social cohesion and social conflict 6 A small town in the USA, wartime Britain, Eastern Europe and Japan 113 7 An anthropology of social cohesion 137 8 The symptoms of disintegration 153 Part IV How society kills 9 The psychosocial causes of illness 10 Baboons, civil servants and children’s height 175 193 vi Contents Part V Redistribution, economic growth and the quality of life 11 Social capital: putting Humpty together again 211 Bibliography Name index Subject index 233 247 251 Illustrations FIGURES 3.1 3.2 4.1 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 Life expectancy and income per capita for selected countries and periods Increases in life expectancy in relation to percentage increase in GDPpc Relative risk of death from coronary heart disease according to employment grade, and proportions of differences that can be explained statistically by various risk factors Income and mortality among white US men GDP per capita and life expectancy in OECD countries in 1990 The cross-sectional relationship between income distribution and life expectancy (M&F) at birth in developed countries, c. 1981 The annual rate of change of life expectancy in twelve European Community countries and the rate of change in the percentage of the population in relative poverty, 1975–85 The relationship between income distribution and mortality among fifty states of the USA in 1990 Life expectancy (M&F) and Gini coefficients of posttax income inequality (standardised for household size) Social class differences in infant mortality in Sweden compared with England and Wales Social class differences in mortality of men 20–64 years: Sweden compared with England and Wales 34 37 65 73 74 76 77 79 84 87 88 viii Illustrations 5.9 Widening income differences: distribution of disposable income adjusted for household size, UK 5.10 Indices showing changes in death rates among young adults, children and infants (M&F combined, England and Wales, 1975–92) 5.11 Trends in life expectancy among blacks and whites in the USA (M&F combined) 5.12 Three measures of self-reported health in relation to income (M&F combined) 65 years and over living alone or in two-person households 8.1 The relationship between income distribution and homicide among the states of the USA in 1990 8.2 The decline in reading standards.

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It sets out the relationship between Gross National Product per capita (GNPpc) and life expectancy at birth for men and women combined among countries at all stages of development. Each point is a country, and the four curves show the relationship between GNPpc and life expectancy as it was in 1900, 1930, 1960 and 1990. 34 The health of societies Figure 3.1 Life expectancy and income per capita for selected countries and periods Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1993 At lower levels of GNPpc there was, at each point in time, an apparent relationship with life expectancy in that the two seem to rise together. However, at higher levels of GNPpc the relationship seems to disappear: at each point in time the curve flattens out towards the horizontal.

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The same is true in relation to questions about which equivalence scales should be used. Equivalence scales is the name given to the system used for adjusting aggregate household incomes to allow for the number of people living in each household. You could simply divide household income by the number of people in the household to get household income per capita. But as it is much cheaper for Income distribution and health 91 (say) four people to live together, sharing a washing machine, fridge, television, heating bills and the costs of services, it would seem appropriate to use an equivalence scale which took account of those kinds of economies.

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Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization
by Branko Milanovic
Published 10 Apr 2016

Outbreaks of diseases like HIV/AIDS and Ebola have not had a demonstrable effect on reducing inequality in rich countries. In a highly stylized way, what we expect to find when we consider inequality over time is a cyclical pattern, as shown in Figure 2.3. But when we look at changes in inequality versus income per capita (where income is really a proxy for structural changes such as industrialization or the movement of people from rural to urban areas), we expect to find a pattern such as that shown in Figure 2.4.12 At low income levels (say, below $1,000 or $2,000 per year in 1990 international dollars), there would be both increases and decreases of inequality while the mean income is stagnant, resulting in a scrambled picture resembling a noise signal.13 But with the first and second technological revolutions, we would expect to find a much clearer picture of rises and then declines in inequality with increasing income.

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But when we look at changes in inequality versus income per capita (where income is really a proxy for structural changes such as industrialization or the movement of people from rural to urban areas), we expect to find a pattern such as that shown in Figure 2.4.12 At low income levels (say, below $1,000 or $2,000 per year in 1990 international dollars), there would be both increases and decreases of inequality while the mean income is stagnant, resulting in a scrambled picture resembling a noise signal.13 But with the first and second technological revolutions, we would expect to find a much clearer picture of rises and then declines in inequality with increasing income. FIGURE 2.4. Expected pattern of changes in inequality versus income per capita from the preindustrial through the postindustrial period and into the future (dotted line) This graph shows that the pattern of regular cycles of inequality unfolding over time (as shown in Figure 2.3) changes when inequality is plotted against mean income instead of time. Changes in inequality versus mean income are irregular in preindustrial societies but shift into regular cycles in industrial and postindustrial societies.

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Hence unskilled laborers became scarcer and their wages went up. In contrast, in New Zealand and Argentina, where there was migration, expansion led to increased inequality. 31. These Kuznets waves, which are well-delineated when plotted against time, are much more difficult to find, or rather vanish, when we plot them against income per capita. It is, however, only in the first period identified by Rodríguez Weber (1850–1903) that we can treat the evolution in Chile as that of the evolution in a country with no increase in mean income—where, indeed, we do not expect to see a relationship between Gini value and income level. During that half century, per capita income growth was around 1 percent per annum; afterward, that is, for the entire twentieth century, it exceeded 2 percent per annum. 32.

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Portfolios of the poor: how the world's poor live on $2 a day
by Daryl Collins , Jonathan Morduch and Stuart Rutherford
Published 15 Jan 2009

In our study, these households were able to “leverage” their more regular sources of income to engage in larger-scale financial intermediation: with a regular income, they were more comfortable taking on higher levels of debt and lenders were more willing to provide loans. As table 2.4 shows, regular wage earners in South Africa are usually better off in terms of both absolute income and income per capita than those earning irregularly (those whose income 44 T H E DA I LY G R I N D Table 2.4 Regular versus Irregular Income Households, South Africa Wage-earning households Share of sample in profile Financial statistics Average monthly income Average monthly income per capita Debt/service ratio Debt/equity ratio Grant-receiving households Irregular income households 49% 27% 21% $635 $188 $235 $219 13% 22% $61 17% 23% $87 7% 19% Note: US$ converted from South African rand at $ = 6.5 rand, market rate.

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South Africa: Urban 2 60 households in a township outside Cape Town; 15 households dropped out during the study year, so results are based on 45 households from this area. Half the urban sample was drawn from the township of Diepsloot, about a 45-minute car ride outside Johannesburg. This sample includes only two households that have PPP income per capita per day less than $2. Fifty-six percent of the able-bodied adults in this sample have regular jobs. The area was originally developed as a relocation area for residents of another flooded and overcrowded township. Diepsloot residents were ultimately promised Reconstruction and Development Programme homes supplied by the governments, but many were still waiting.

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Basic Economics
by Thomas Sowell
Published 1 Jan 2000

Those decisions and their consequences can be more important than the resources themselves, for there are poor countries with rich natural resources and countries like Japan and Switzerland with relatively few natural resources but high standards of living. The values of natural resources per capita in Uruguay and Venezuela are several times what they are in Japan and Switzerland, but real income per capita in Japan and Switzerland is more than double that of Uruguay and several times that of Venezuela.{4} Not only scarcity but also “alternative uses” are at the heart of economics. If each resource had only one use, economics would be much simpler. But water can be used to produce ice or steam by itself or innumerable mixtures and compounds in combination with other things.

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At that time, Ghana was not only more prosperous than the Ivory Coast, it had more natural resources, so the bet might have seemed reckless on the part of the president of the Ivory Coast. However, he knew that Ghana was committed to a government-run economy and the Ivory Coast to a freer market. By 1982, the Ivory Coast had so surpassed Ghana economically that the poorest 20 percent of its people had a higher real income per capita than most of the people in Ghana.{23} This could not be attributed to any superiority of the country or its people. In fact, in later years, when the government of the Ivory Coast eventually succumbed to the temptation to control more of their country’s economy, while Ghana finally learned from its mistakes and began to loosen government controls on the market, these two countries’ roles reversed—and now Ghana’s economy began to grow, while that of the Ivory Coast declined.{24} Similar comparisons could be made between Burma and Thailand, the former having had the higher standard of living before instituting socialism, and the latter a much higher standard of living afterwards.

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Nevertheless, some political rhetoric might suggest that most people are either “haves” or “have nots.” Trends over Time If our concern is with the economic well-being of flesh-and-blood human beings, as distinguished from statistical comparisons between income brackets, then we need to look at real income per capita, because people do not live on percentage shares. They live on real income. Among those Americans who were in the bottom 20 percent in 1975, 98 percent had higher real incomes in 1991—and two-thirds had higher real incomes in 1991 than the average American had back in 1975, when they were in the bottom 20 percent.{313} Even when narrowly focusing on income brackets, the fact that the share of the bottom 20 percent of households declined from 4 percent of all income in 1985 to 3.5 percent in 2001 did not prevent the real income of the households in this bracket from rising by thousands of dollars in absolute terms,{314} quite aside from the movement of actual people out of the bottom 20 percent between the two years.

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The Great Reversal: How America Gave Up on Free Markets
by Thomas Philippon
Published 29 Oct 2019

Imagine a change in policy that leads to an increase in competition in domestic markets. This leads to a temporary increase in the rate of growth of the economy. Afterward, GDP remains permanently higher than it would have been without the policy change, but it eventually grows at the same rate as before because the long-term rate of growth of income per capita depends only on technological progress. Competition can have a permanent impact on growth if it encourages technological innovation. This is a hotly debated issue. The evidence suggests that competition induces more innovation, but there is no consensus on the size of this effect. We will discuss the links between competition, investment, and productivity in Chapter 4.

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FIGURE 12.3 Health-care cost versus GDP per capita in select countries. US = United States; CH = Switzerland; NO = Norway; IE = Ireland; LU = Luxembourg. Data source: Kaiser Family Foundation analysis of OECD data Figure 12.3 shows the Balassa-Samuelson effect for health care. You can see that per-capita health-care costs increase systematically with income per capita. However, Figure 12.3 also shows that US health-care costs are completely off the chart (or off the regression line, to be precise). Health-care costs per capita are much higher in the US than in Norway or Switzerland, both of which have similar levels of GDP per capita. (GDP per capita in Luxembourg and Ireland is biased by the activities of large multinationals.)

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profit rate: The ratio of income net of depreciation over the stock of capital at the beginning of the year. purchasing power parity (PPP): A measurement tool to compare standards of living between countries by using the price of a common basket of goods and services. PPP can be used to define exchange rates and to compare real income per capita. The Big Mac index is PPP using the price of Big Mac sandwiches. pure monopoly: A situation in which there is only one seller in a market, such as when a firm is the only supplier of a particular product in a particular location. Cases of pure monopoly are relatively rare. real GDP: Gross domestic product adjusted for inflation.

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Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty
by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson
Published 20 Mar 2012

The countries shaded in the darkest color are the poorest in the world, those where average per-capita incomes (called by economists GDP, gross domestic product) are less than $2,000 annually. Most of Africa is in this color, as are Afghanistan, Haiti, and parts of Southeast Asia (for example, Cambodia and Laos). North Korea is also among this group of countries. The countries in white are the richest, those with annual income per-capita of $20,000 or more. Here we find the usual suspects: North America, western Europe, Australasia, and Japan. Another interesting pattern can be discerned in the Americas. Make a list of the nations in the Americas from richest to poorest. You will find that at the top are the United States and Canada, followed by Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Uruguay, and maybe also Venezuela, depending on the price of oil.

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The intensity of extraction in these different countries obviously varies and has important consequences for prosperity. In Argentina, for example, the constitution and democratic elections do not work well to promote pluralism, but they do function much better than in Colombia. At least the state can claim the monopoly of violence in Argentina. Partly as a consequence, income per capita in Argentina is double that of Colombia. The political institutions of both countries do a much better job of restraining elites than those in Zimbabwe and Sierra Leone, and as a result, Zimbabwe and Sierra Leone are much poorer than Argentina and Colombia. The vicious circle also implies that even when extractive institutions lead to the collapse of the state, as in Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe, this doesn’t put a conclusive end to the rule of these institutions.

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Because of the party’s control over economic institutions, the extent of creative destruction is heavily curtailed, and it will remain so until there is radical reform in political institutions. Just as in the Soviet Union, the Chinese experience of growth under extractive political institutions is greatly facilitated because there is a lot of catching up to do. Income per capita in China is still a fraction of that in the United States and Western Europe. Of course, Chinese growth is considerably more diversified than Soviet growth; it doesn’t rely on only armaments or heavy industry, and Chinese entrepreneurs are showing a lot of ingenuity. All the same, this growth will run out of steam unless extractive political institutions make way for inclusive institutions.

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An Extraordinary Time: The End of the Postwar Boom and the Return of the Ordinary Economy
by Marc Levinson
Published 31 Jul 2016

During the same period many developing countries turned in impressive records of economic growth, as governments tried to wean their countries from dependence on crops or minerals and push them down the road toward industrialization. Newly independent Kenya grew at an annualized rate of more than 6 percent between 1960 and 1975, Pakistan and Bolivia almost as much. Collectively, the developing countries outperformed North America and Europe by a considerable margin. Even with rapid population growth, income per capita in many poor countries rose by more than half over those fifteen years. In the fifty-eight countries the World Bank designated as middle-income countries, manufactured goods accounted for a scant 5 percent of exports in 1960. In just over a decade, that share tripled. The urban slums mushrooming around every major city were the best indicator of success; for the landless peasants who fled penury in the countryside to take jobs in new factories, city life, with all its filth, crime, and tension, was immeasurably better than village life.23 On the surface, Prebisch’s formula seemed to work.

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See also political parties Cost of Living Council, 107 cost-push inflation, 75–77 Council of Economic Advisers, 48, 65–66 crisis cartels, 127 Czechoslovakia, 19 Dai-ichi Kangyo of Tokyo, 91 Daly, Herman E., 63 Dance of Death (Strindberg), 164 Davignon, Étienne, 127 Davignon Plan, 127 de Gasperi, Alcide, 24 de Gaulle, Charles, 24, 162, 200, 201 de Larosière, Jacques, 244, 249 debt crisis, 243–256; cause of and solution to, 253–256; emergency loans and, 247–249; impact on First World, 251–252; inflation and, 246; unemployment and, 246 deindustrialization, 124 Delors, Jacques, 209, 210 demand-pull inflation, 75–76 democracy, 268 Denison, Edward, 231 Denmark: anti-tax movement in, 151–153, 154; income per person in, 160 dependency theory (government intervention re: raw materials and manufacturing), 42 Der Spiegel, 89 deregulation, 12, 99–114, 237; of aviation, 113; of electricity, 113; of energy sector, 99–109, 110, 113; of gas, 99–100, 102, 103–104, 107–108, 109, 113; of interest rates on deposits and loans, 112, 113; of natural gas, 103, 104, 108–109, 110, 113; of oil, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104–106, 107–108, 109, 110, 113; positive and negative results of, 113–114; of telecommunications sector, 107, 113; of transportation sector, 106–107, 110–112, 113–114. See also regulation Derthick, Martha, 107 developing countries, 35–46; commonality among, 41; debt crisis in (see Third World debt crisis); economic growth in, 44, 45–46; economies of, and Prebisch, 40–43; hardship in, 44; income per capita in, 44; industrialization in, 36; new industries vs. raw materials and, 45–46. See also specific countries; Third World Diefenbaker, John, 24 discontents, 21 Dresdner Bank, 94 DuPont, 66 Earth Day, 61, 62 East Asia, 265 East Germany, 29; ungovernability in, 156, 157 East Pakistan, 44 Eastern Europe, 29; debt crisis in, 246; democracy in, 179; income per person in, 160–161; ungovernability in, 160–162 ECLA.

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See International Monetary Fund import substitution, 40, 43, 45 income: defined, 136 income distribution, 136–138, 235–236; destruction of capital and loss of wealth and, 138; economic development and, 134–135; explanations for increasing disparities in, 140–143; income equality reversal in mid-1970s and, 138–140; labor share and, 141–142; labor/trade unions and, 137–138; tax rate and, 137 income equality: reversal of, in mid-1970s, 138–140 income inequality: U-curve and, 135 income per capita, 265; in developing countries, 44; in Japan, 116 income per person, 5, 160–161; productivity bust and, 261 income tax: economic crisis of 1970s and, 164–167; individual earnings and, 150; inflation and, 149; welfare state and, 145–147, 149–151. See also taxes/tax rate/tax policy; under specific countries India, 241; hardship/poverty in, 21; license raj and, 45 Indonesia, 46, 124, 245 industrialization, 37–38, 58, 134–135, 161; in developing countries, 36 inflation, 11–12; cost-push inflation, 75–77; debt crisis and, 246; demand-pull inflation, 75–76; income tax and, 149; jawboning and, 76–77; monetary policy and, 51–56; oil crisis of 1973 and, 74–77, 78; political pressure and, 76; price and wage controls and, 53–54; price controls and, 76–77; productivity bust and, 261; Third World debt crisis and, 246; as unavoidable nuisance, 75; varieties of, 75–77.

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The Oil Factor: Protect Yourself-and Profit-from the Coming Energy Crisis
by Stephen Leeb and Donna Leeb
Published 12 Feb 2004

This point has been made frequently and cogently, in particular by the New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, who has noted that the Saudis have used their oil revenues not to foster economic growth in their country but to keep their populace oppressed and in tow. Friedman’s arguments have been based in part on his personal observations, but there is ample hard data leading to the same conclusion. As figure 3b, “Declining Saudi GDP,” shows, income per capita in Saudi Arabia has been in a steady downtrend over the past decade. This has occurred despite the fact that the country has been receiving massive amounts of money—nearly $100 billion, or $4,500 per capita, a year—in oil revenues for very little effort. Given this tremendous influx of funds, it seems almost unimaginable that Saudi Arabia hasn’t managed to provide a vibrant economy for its citizens, and it is evidence of repression with a capital R.

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This means that for a while to come China is likely to be the world’s leading economic engine, even more important than the U.S. China’s economic heft comes from the sheer size of its population, in contrast to the U.S., where it is a matter of population in conjunction with an elevated standard of living, or income per capita. On a per capita basis, income in China is modest by world standards. Most important for our argument, per capita oil consumption in China is currently just one-half or so of the world’s average. And it’s about one-tenth that of many modern industrialized economies, such as the U.S. Like other major world economies, China also is making a significant transition.

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The Triumph of Injustice: How the Rich Dodge Taxes and How to Make Them Pay
by Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman
Published 14 Oct 2019

The national income of the United States was about 5 billion current US dollars (the Historical Statistics of the United States report a total “private production income” of $4.1 billion in 1859 in series A154, which is likely to be slightly on the low end and must be adjusted upward for the small amount of government production), and hence average income per capita was around $150 in 1860, i.e., a fourth of the exemption threshold of $600. From 1860 to 1864 the price index increases by about 75% (Atack and Passell, 1994, p. 367, Table 13.5), so the average income per capita reached about $250 in 1864. 8. Huret (2014), p. 25. 9. The price index was multiplied by a factor of about forty between 1860 and 1864 in the Confederacy but increased only by about 75% in the Union.

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The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty
by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson
Published 23 Sep 2019

Though Wong (1997) and Pomeranz (2001) argued that in fact China, or at least the most developed parts of it such as the Yangtze River valley, had standards of living in the eighteenth century similar to the most developed parts of Western Europe, subsequent research has not supported their claims. Broadberry, Guan, and Li (2017) provide a synthesis of work on historical measures of average living standards suggesting that while Song China had the highest levels of income per capita in the world in the medieval period, they subsequently stagnated, with fluctuations, for example, falls during the Ming and late Qing. In their data, income per capita in China was about one-third of that in the Netherlands in 1800 and only 30 percent of the British figure. Even the focus on the Yangtze as the relative comparison doesn’t change the big picture, with Bozhong and van Zanden (2012) finding average living standards there to be about half of the contemporary Dutch level in the 1820s.

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Though Liu fell from grace, most don’t. In 2012, 160 of China’s wealthiest 1,000 people were members of the Communist Party Congress. Their net worth was $221 billion, about twenty times that of the top 660 officials in all three branches of the government of the United States, a country whose income per capita is over seven times that of China. All of this shouldn’t be completely surprising. Controlling corruption, whether in the bureaucracy or in the education system, requires cooperation from society. The state needs to trust that people will report to it truthfully, and the people need to trust state institutions to the extent that they put their neck on the line by sharing their information.

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Nyabiondo was systematically looted with even the tiles being stolen from rooftops. This is Warre with obvious and wrenching human consequences. The economic consequences are just as evident. The economy of the Kivus is devastated and the same is true for much of the rest of the Congo. The result is abject poverty. Income per capita in the Congo is about 40 percent of the level it was in 1960 when the country became independent. At about $400, less than 1 percent of the U.S. level, it’s as poor as any country in the world. Life expectancy is twenty years less than it is in the United States. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Hobbes was right.

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Wealth, Poverty and Politics
by Thomas Sowell
Published 31 Aug 2015

Among nations, as among individuals and groups, there is a fundamental difference between measuring what is happening over time to particular statistical categories and what is happening over time to specific sets of human beings. For example, data from the World Bank show that in 1960 the average per capita income of the 20 nations with the highest incomes per capita was about 23 times the average per capita income of the 20 nations with the lowest incomes per capita— and that this ratio rose to about 36 times as high by the year 2000. This fits the familiar notion of a growing gap between “the rich” and “the poor.” But, comparing the same set of nations initially in the top and bottom categories, and following those particular nations over the same years, leads to the directly opposite conclusion, for the ratio between the per capita incomes of the particular nations initially in each category fell from about 23-to-one to less than 10-to-one.63 As for the more general question of the reasons for large economic disparities between nations, genetic determinists offer the simplest answer to that question— namely, that some races are genetically superior and others genetically inferior.

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Much of the influence of geography on income and wealth derives from its effects on the size of the cultural universe available to different peoples in different physical settings. An enumeration of places with rich concentrations of natural resources, such as oil in Saudi Arabia or gold in South Africa, would be a very poor guide to places with high incomes per capita. As The Economist magazine said of Nigeria, it is “rich in oil reserves but otherwise desperately poor.”1 Without the cultural prerequisites for developing natural resources into real wealth, the raw physical resources themselves are of little or no value. The natural resources we use today were even more abundant in the era of the cave man, but the people of that prehistoric era were culturally not yet able to use most of those resources.

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As we have seen with false alarms about an exhaustion of natural resources, a finite limit, as such, tells us nothing about whether or not we are nearing that limit. However plausible the Malthusian theory might seem, it has consistently failed the test of empirical evidence, even in Malthus’ own lifetime.6 There is no consistent correlation between population size or density and real income per capita. Poverty-stricken sub-Saharan Africa has a population density that is only a fraction of that in prosperous Japan,7 which has several times the number of people per square mile. It is possible to find some poverty-stricken countries with greater population densities than some prosperous countries.

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The Rise and Fall of American Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living Since the Civil War (The Princeton Economic History of the Western World)
by Robert J. Gordon
Published 12 Jan 2016

Annual Growth Rate of Two Concepts of Income by Distributional Group, 1979 to 2011 Income Group Market Income Post-Tax Post-Transfer Income (1) (2) Top One Percent 3.82 4.05 81–99 Percentile 1.39 1.60 20–80 Percentile 0.46 1.05 1–20 Percentile 0.46 1.23 Average All Percentiles 1.16 1.48 Average 1–99 Percentile 0.87 1.28 Difference, All vs. 1–99 0.29 0.20 Difference, All vs. Median 0.70 0.43 Source: CBO, The Distribution of Household Income and Federal Taxes, 2011 When we consider the future of American growth, we care not just about growth of average income per capita, but also about growth of income per capita for the median American household. Figure 18–2 exhibits the differences between the annual growth rate of the average and bottom 90 percent for Piketty–Saez, as well as the differences between average and median growth for the census data and for the CBO data without and with the adjustments for taxes and transfers.

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Filament incandescent bulbs cost about the same per lumen in 1990 as in 1920 in nominal terms, but in real terms, their cost was much lower, by another factor of eight. None of this decline in prices has been heretofore captured by official price indexes, and the consumer surplus captured by this decline in prices is one of many reasons to consider the growth of real income per capita during 1890–1940 substantially understated. Note that these price comparisons are all based on the quantity of light emitted by a device, so all the price declines are understated thanks to the improvement in the quality of light. All those improvements in quality—no more odors, no need to clean lamp chimneys, no more danger of fires, no more flickering—are completely missed not only by traditional measures of the cost of living, but also by Nordhaus’s creative attempts to link together the prices per lumen of candles, fuel lamps, and electric light bulbs.87 Only 3 percent of American homes had electric service in 1900.

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Finally, the black line shows an even greater decline in the ratio of the quality-adjusted price to nominal disposable income per person, demonstrating that much of the rapid adoption of the automobile between 1910 and 1929 reflected a substitution response to a rapid decline in price relative to income. Figure 5–3. Prices of Selected Automobile Models, with or without Quality Adjustment, and Relative to Nominal Disposable Income per Capita, 1906–1940 Sources: See table 5–2. AUTOMOBILES AND PAVED ROADS: CHICKEN AND EGG The most important hindrance to the development of motor transport was the lack of paved roads. The revolutionary 1901 Mercedes, commonly called the “first modern automobile,” sold in the United States at the price of $12,450 in an era when the average annual income was less than $1,000, and it could cruise at a speed of fifty miles per hour, faster than the elapsed railroad times for 1900 shown in table 5–1.

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Money Mischief: Episodes in Monetary History
by Milton Friedman
Published 1 Jan 1992

But wages both for farm and factory labour sank as economic conditions worsened, and suffering extended further and further" (p. 60). Still another example of a contemporary observation, though published much later, is Young (1971, pp. 208–11, 220–23). [back] *** * Such a low ratio was not reached in the United States until after the Civil War, by which time real income per capita in the United States was about ten times as large as estimated real income per capita in China in 1933. Such a low ratio was not reached in. France until 1952 (Saint Marc 1983, pp. 38–39)! [back] *** † Some percentages for underdeveloped countries for 1988, based on IMF estimates, are 60 for India, 62 for Syria and Mexico, 65 for Chad, 68 for Zaire and Nepal, 74 for Yemen Arab Republic, 78 for Central African Republic.

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The Fair Trade Scandal: Marketing Poverty to Benefit the Rich
by Ndongo Sylla
Published 21 Jan 2014

Here I refer only to those that are the most widely used (see Table 1.1). The first approach, at once the most basic and most widespread, consists in classifying countries on the basis of geographical location. The second approach, as used by the World Bank, differentiates developing countries based on the gross national income per capita: upper middle-income countries (between $3,946 and $12,195 per capita), lower middle-income countries (between $996 and $3,945 per capita) and low-income countries ($995 per capita or less). The third approach, developed by UNCTAD, identifies groups of developing countries that are defined through their foreign trade structure or their economic dynamism: major petroleum exporters (those for which oil exports account for at least 50 per cent of export revenue); major manufactured goods exporters (those for which manufactured products account for at least 50 per cent of export revenue); emerging countries; newly industrialised countries (a group which includes first-generation and second-generation countries).

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We obtain an average of €415 for producers and €716 for wage workers.5 For all workers combined, we obtain on average €454 in annual revenue. When taking into account workers and their families, there would be, according to FLO, close to 6 million people who rely on Fairtrade.6 Based on this estimation, the annual average income per capita amounted to €74 in 2008. It goes without saying, obviously, that the purchasing power for this amount varies according to the context. Pronouncing any judgement on the benefits that one or the other might gain from such an amount becomes a delicate task. In spite of this obvious difficulty, there is no possible ambiguity on this subject.

The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good
by William Easterly
Published 1 Mar 2006

Note that African growth over the previous ten years had been a respectable 2 percent up to about 1975 (with modest aid), contradicting the idea that Africa is always and everywhere condemned to low growth without aid. There is a negative association, but I don’t think the increase in aid caused the fall in growth. Rather, the fall in growth probably caused the increase in aid. But the surge of aid was not successful in reversing or halting the slide in growth of income per capita toward zero. Let us do more formal statistical testing. Long and inconclusive literature on aid and economic growth was produced in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, which was hampered by the limited data availability and inconclusive debate about the mechanisms by which aid would affect growth.

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The governor-general of India from 1828 to 1835 spoke of the “improvement” of India, “founding British greatness on Indian happiness.26 A British commentator on India concurred in 1854: “when the contrast between the influence of a Christian and a Heathen government is considered; when the knowledge of the wretchedness of the people forces us to reflect on the unspeakable blessings to millions that would follow the extension of British rule, it is not ambition but benevolence that dictates the desire for the whole country.27 The nineteenth-century economist John Stuart Mill saw the British empire as furnishing what sounds like a colonial combination of the Big Push and structural adjustment: “a better government: more complete security of property; moderate taxes; a more permanent…tenure of land…the introduction of foreign arts…and the introduction of foreign capital, which renders the increase of production no longer exclusively dependent on the thrift or providence of the inhabitants themselves.28 Refuting criticism that Manchester capitalists dictated imperial policy, Lord Palmerston said in 1863, “India was governed for India and…not for the Manchester people.29 In India, the British doubled the area under irrigation from 1891 to 1938, introduced a postal and telegraph system, and built forty thousand miles of railroad track.30 Railways had been part of India’s “development plan” since the 1820s, the key to “opening up” the country to commerce.31 The Indian civil servant Charles Trevelyan in 1853 had told a Commons committee that railways would be “the greatest missionary of all.32 The development efforts were not any more successful than today’s foreign aid or nation-building, however: Indian income per capita failed to rise from 1820 to 1870, grew at only 0.5 percent per annum from 1870 to 1913, then failed to grow again from 1913 to independence in 1947.33 In the American empire in the Philippines, American teachers and their Filipino successors imparted at least a rough education, raising literacy and making English the lingua franca in the ethnically fragmented islands.

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We see in figure 32 (which has a logarithmic scale in which every unit increase means a doubling of income) that these variations are minor in the long run. Starting in 1870, the Japanese economy registered miraculous growth. It recovered quickly from the destruction of World War II to post even more miraculous growth. It became a full democracy after the evil militarist detour of the 1930s and 1940s. Today, income per capita is thirty-two times higher than what it was in 1870. And it did all this without the White Man’s Burden—the West never colonized Japan. Instead, Japan had homegrown Searchers. Fig. 32. Japan Per Capita Income, 1820–2001 The first reaction to Matthew Perry’s visits to Japan in 1853–1854 was “revere the Emperor; expel the barbarians.”

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The End of Growth
by Jeff Rubin
Published 2 Sep 2013

A growing body of research shows that consumer satisfaction hasn’t kept pace with increasing consumer expenditures. Similarly, other studies in OECD countries show that our sense of individual well-being lags behind increases in personal income growth. In the United States, for example, real income per capita has more than doubled since the Second World War. Despite increased wealth, however, studies find that Americans are no more satisfied than they were sixty-five years ago. In polls that gauge well-being, citizens in countries with less personal consumption, such as Denmark, consistently score higher than Americans.

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Cities in Pakistan are routinely subjected to electricity outages that last upward of fourteen hours. In rural areas, the power rationing is even more extreme and blackouts can last even longer. Energy shortages have not only turned off the power for millions of Pakistanis, they’ve also shackled the country’s economic growth. Pakistan’s income per capita is increasing at its slowest rate since 1951, and now sits at a quarter of the pace enjoyed by neighboring India. Faced with mounting power outages, multinational firms are pulling out of the country and the economy is collapsing. And social and fiscal conditions will only get worse as Pakistan’s population continues to grow.

The State and the Stork: The Population Debate and Policy Making in US History
by Derek S. Hoff
Published 30 May 2012

On the whole, however, economists believed that pockets of overpopulation were part of a broader national pattern of population pressing on resources. Hess, for example, advocated more efficient population and industrial location within a broader context of the US population becoming “superabundant” with people.166 Baker in particular espoused Malthusian ideas, writing, “Our nation is probably near, possibly past, the crest of average income per capita; and every increment in population is likely to increase the complaint of the high cost of living.”167 Baker, notes historian David Wrobel, was one whose Malthusianism was entirely divorced from any racism.168 In the end, optimum theory and a desire among social scientists to distance themselves from polemicists fostered a moderate Malthusianism.

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Now we can begin on the really worth-while things.”104 King wrote more directly, “Complete cessation of population growth would tend to enhance the economic welfare of the nation; in other words, it would aid in accelerating rather than retarding the upward movement of per capita income.”105 King’s logic incorporated the traditional Malthusian obsession with the food supply, but it also included the consumptionist core of SPK. Whereas rapidly growing societies spend to meet the basic needs of all the new people, he suggested, demographically flat societies would spend to enhance the lives of the existing population, resulting in a “marked increase in production of consumable goods and hence in average income per capita.”106 King’s sepia portrait of plantation life also shows how some individuals believed that population leveling would usher in the Good Life, one defined by the pursuit of goals loftier than material gain. No population watcher prioritized this noneconomic, aesthetic argument, traceable to John Stuart Mill and Alfred Marshall,107 but many deployed it from time to time, suggesting that if economic growth could not be preserved in the coming stable-population era, then more humane values and ample leisure were second-best outcomes.

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He predicted an uncomfortable future for the entire globe unless population could be stabilized.61 Among the economists, Joseph Spengler reigned as the leading Malthusian, though he now showed glimmers of optimism. He continued to argue that rising numbers of people would exert pressure against finite natural resources, ultimately reducing income per capita.62 In the Harvard Business Review, Spengler announced that the United States was not immune from the resource problems endured by developed nations, and, in response to the optimists who looked to the wonders of science, asked whether a diet of plankton would really be satisfying.63 He emphasized that water was no longer virtually free in the US,64 and he warned of potential global shortages of copper, lead, zinc, tin, and chromite as consumption begat more consumption.65 Although resource utopianists and Malthusians wrote memorable copy, most social scientists’ discussion of population and resources in the 1950s took place between those two extremes.

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Oil Panic and the Global Crisis: Predictions and Myths
by Steven M. Gorelick
Published 9 Dec 2009

The concern is that when China and India improve their standards of living, their annual oil consumption will not remain at 2.2 and 0.9 barrels per person but will mirror the US annual value of 25.1 barrels per person.124 30 USA Canada Annual oil consumption in 2007 20 (barrels per person) Australia Spain Japan 10 China 0 Russia India 0 Italy Mexico Sweden France Denmark United Kingdom Germany Brazil Indonesia 20,000 40,000 60,000 Income in 2007 (per capita GDP in 2007 dollars) Figure 4.45 Oil consumption per capita versus income per capita in 2007 (2007$), based on gross domestic product (GDP) of countries shown. (Data: oil consumption, EIA; population and GDP, Economic Research Service, USDA) Consider China. In terms of GDP, China’s 2007 per capita income was one-twenty-sixth (4 percent) that of the US (in 2007, estimated average annual income in China was $1,970 versus $46,300 in the US (2007$)),125 and its per capita oil use was less than one-tenth that of the US.

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The US used less than half as much oil per GDP in 2007 as it did in 1975 (Figure 4.49). 30 Canada Annual oil consumption in 1980 20 (barrels per person) USA Sweden Denmark Australia Japan Russia 10 Spain France Germany Italy United Kingdom Mexico China Brazil 0 India 0 Indonesia 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 Income in 1980 (per capita GDP in 2007 dollars) Figure 4.46 Oil use per capita versus per capita income in 1980 (in 2007$).127 (Data: oil consumption, EIA; population and GDP, Economic Research Service, USDA) 50 Trend 1980 Annual oil consumption (barrels per person) 40 30 USA 1980 USA 2007 20 Trend 2007 10 China 0 India 0 40,000 Income (per capita GDP in 2007 dollars) 20,000 60,000 Figure 4.47 Per capita oil use versus per capita income in 2007 in comparison to the trend in 1980 (both in 2007$). Intensity of oil use (the slope of the trend line) has diminished since 1980. (Data: oil consumption, EIA; population and GDP, Economic Research Service, USDA) 150 Counter-Arguments to Imminent Global Oil Depletion Global oil-use intensity 1.0 (billion barrels per year per trillion 2007 dollars of GWP) 0.8 0.6 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Figure 4.48 World oil use per GWP over time.

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The Logic of Life: The Rational Economics of an Irrational World
by Tim Harford
Published 1 Jan 2008

Subsistence income—that is, the income that most people have relied on for most of history—is about a dollar a day, a sum that will provide food, rudimentary shelter, and almost nothing else. The halfway point between today’s living standards in the United States and those of 1 million B.C. (or 100,000 B.C., or 10,000 B.C., since little changed) is as recent as 1880: Income per capita increased tenfold, to about ten dollars a day, in the entirety of the existence of humankind running up to A.D. 1880, and it increased another ten times in the 125 years since then. Remember that these figures do not even make allowances for the Nordhaus effect. Of course, we do not have any persuasive way of measuring income in prehistoric times.

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A MILLION YEARS OF LOGIC Imagine compressing: For the chronology, I have relied on Eric Beinhocker’s summary in The Origins of Wealth (London: Random House, 2007) and encyclopedias. But economic growth didn’t simply: For the Stone Age, I am using population data from Kremer and assuming no appreciable increase in income per capita. Michael Kremer, “Population Growth and Technological Change: One Million B.C. to 1990,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, no. 3(1993): 681–716. For modern population growth, see U.S. Census Bureau, www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb. Data for after A.D. 1 are from Angus Maddison, the world’s foremost calculator of historical economic data, at www.ggdc.net/maddison/Historical_Statistics/ horizontal-file_10-2006.xls.

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The New Urban Crisis: How Our Cities Are Increasing Inequality, Deepening Segregation, and Failing the Middle Class?and What We Can Do About It
by Richard Florida
Published 9 May 2016

New Urban Crisis Index: This index combines four measures into an overall index: wage inequality, income inequality, the Overall Economic Segregation Index, and housing unaffordability, based on the ratio of housing costs to income. Each measure is equally weighted. Other Variables Other key variables used in various statistical analyses presented in the book include: Income per capita: Average income per capita, from the ACS. Wages: Average wages, from the BLS. Economic output per person: Based on gross regional product per capita, from the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). College graduates: The share of adults with a college degree or higher, from the ACS.

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The Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update
by Donella H. Meadows , Jørgen Randers and Dennis L. Meadows
Published 15 Apr 2004

Clearly there is a strong relationship between high incomes and low birth rates. Just as clearly, especially at low incomes, there are striking exceptions. China, for example, has anomalously low birth rates for its level of income. Some Middle Eastern and African countries have anomalously high birth rates for theirs. FIGURE 2-7 Birth Rates and Gross National Income per Capita in 2001 As a society becomes wealthier, the birth rate of its people tends to decline. The poorest nations experience birth rates from 20 to more than 50 births per 1,000 people per year. None of the richest nations has a birth rate above 20 per 1,000 per year. (Source: PRB; World Bank.) The factors believed to be most directly important in lowering birth rates are not so much the size or wealth of the economy, but the extent to which economic improvement actually touches the lives of all families, and especially the lives of women.

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United Kingdom Office for National Statistics (ONS), National Statistics Online: Birth Statistics: Births and patterns of family building England and Wales (FM1), http: / / www.statistics.gov.uk/ STATBASE / Product. asp?vlnk= 5 768. Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China (Taipei: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting & Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, 1995). Figure 2-7 Birth Rates and Gross National income per Capita in 2001 World Population Data Sheet 2001 (Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau, 200i)http://www.prb.org. World Bank, "World Development Indicators (WDI) Database," http: / / www.worldbank.org/ data / dataquery.html (accessed 1/ 15 / 04). Figure 2-8 Flows of Physical Capital in the Economy of World3 Figure 2-9 U.S.

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The Price of Everything: And the Hidden Logic of Value
by Eduardo Porter
Published 4 Jan 2011

And Easterlin overstates his case. The evidence arrayed against the proposition that progress—economic or otherwise—can make us consistently happier is weaker than it appears. Economic progress can still do a lot for humankind. American happiness remains peculiarly impervious to progress. Between 1946 and 1991 income per capita in the United States rose by a factor of 2.5—ownership of consumer durables from TV sets to cars soared, educational attainment jumped, and life expectancy at birth climbed. Still, Americans’ average happiness measured by surveys fell slightly. The United States was one of only four industrialized countries—alongside Hungary, Portugal, and Canada—where life satisfaction fell between 2000 and 2006.

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By contrast, the fertility rate of other Jews in Israel is about 2.3. In the United States, the most religious states tend to be the most fertile and the poorest. New Hampshire is probably the least God-fearing state in the Union: 21.4 percent of its population report being atheist or having no religious belief. It is relatively rich, with a median income per capita of $74,625 in 2007. And it had only forty-two births per one thousand women in 2006. In Mississippi, by contrast, there were sixty-two births per thousand. Mississippi is poor: its median family income was $44,769. And only 5.8 percent of Mississippians report no religion. Despite the wave of secularization experienced over the past hundred years, I suspect the world might be about to become more religious, not less.

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The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy
by Dani Rodrik
Published 23 Dec 2010

These lessons were put to good use in the most astounding development success the world has ever known. Marching to Its Own Drum: China and Globalization The feat that China’s economy pulled off would have been difficult to imagine had it not happened in front of our eyes. Since 1978, income per capita in China has grown at an average rate of 8.3 percent per annum—a rate that implies a doubling of incomes every nine years. Thanks to this rapid economic growth, half a billion people were lifted out of extreme poverty.18 During the same period China transformed itself from near autarky to the most feared competitor on world markets.

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What fueled China’s growth, along with these institutional innovations, was a dramatic productive transformation. The Chinese economy latched on to advanced, high-productivity products that no one would expect a poor, labor-abundant country like China to produce, let alone export. By the end of the 1990s, China’s export portfolio resembled that of a country with an income-per-capita level at least three times higher than China’s.22 This was the result not of natural, market-led processes but of a determined push by the Chinese government. Low labor costs did help China’s export drive, but they don’t tell the whole story. In areas such as consumer electronics and auto parts China made stupendous productivity gains, catching up with countries at much higher levels of income.

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Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress
by Steven Pinker
Published 13 Feb 2018

That’s a circuitous way to state the progress, though: what’s significant about the decline in inequality is that it’s a decline in poverty. Figure 9-2: Global inequality, 1820–2011 Source: Milanović 2016, fig. 3.1. The left-hand curve shows 1990 international dollars of disposable income per capita; the right-hand curve shows 2005 international dollars, and combines household surveys of per capita disposable income and consumption. The version of inequality that has generated the recent alarm is the inequality within developed countries like the United States and the United Kingdom.

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Inequality rose during the Industrial Revolution and then began to fall, first gradually in the late 19th century, then steeply in the middle decades of the 20th. But then, starting around 1980, inequality bounced into a decidedly un-Kuznetsian rise. Let’s examine each segment in turn. Figure 9-3: Inequality, UK and US, 1688–2013 Source: Milanović 2016, fig. 2.1, disposable income per capita. The rise and fall in inequality in the 19th century reflects Kuznets’s expanding economy, which gradually pulls more people into urban, skilled, and thus higher-paying occupations. But the 20th-century plunge—which has been called the Great Leveling or the Great Compression—had more sudden causes.

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Milanović has combined the two inequality trends of the past thirty years—declining inequality worldwide, increasing inequality within rich countries—into a single graph which pleasingly takes the shape of an elephant (figure 9-5). This “growth incidence curve” sorts the world’s population into twenty numerical bins or quantiles, from poorest to richest, and plots how much each bin gained or lost in real income per capita between 1988 (just before the fall of the Berlin Wall) and 2008 (just before the Great Recession). Figure 9-5: Income gains, 1988–2008 Source: Milanović 2016, fig. 1.3. The cliché about globalization is that it creates winners and losers, and the elephant curve displays them as peaks and valleys.

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Good Times, Bad Times: The Welfare Myth of Them and Us
by John Hills
Published 6 Nov 2014

The immediate thing that leaps out is that the scale of what we are talking about doubled in relation to incomes between those born at the start of the 1900s and those born after 1950. Those born in the early 1950s (like the author) look set to benefit from public spending on health, education and social security equivalent to well over 20 years’ worth of national income per capita on average over their lives. Since those calculations were done, improved life expectancy, more generous plans for state pensions, and increased resources for the NHS will have pushed this up further for that generation and its successors. The other side of the coin is who pays for all of this.

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As well as benefits, tax credits, and direct taxes like Income Tax and NICs, the analysis includes the impact of indirect tax changes, such as in VAT rates, which offset some of the progressive effects of the last government’s direct tax reforms.14 The two bars show the comparison against, first, a price-indexed base, and then, against one where the inherited system was uprated in line with average incomes (per capita GDP). If the comparison is between the 2009–10 tax benefit system and the 1997 system just adjusted for price inflation, Labour increased the incomes of the poorest two tenths by around 15 per cent, while the higher income groups were comparatively unaffected. But if the benchmark is taken as the inherited system adjusted in line with income growth, gains were more modest (3–4 per cent) for the bottom four income groups, while there were modest losses (up to 2 per cent) for the top four groups.

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Creating Unequal Futures?: Rethinking Poverty, Inequality and Disadvantage
by Ruth Fincher and Peter Saunders
Published 1 Jul 2001

TABLES 2.1 Relationship between poverty and social exclusion 2.2 Income inequality in OECD countries, late 1980s 2.3 Income inequality in countries in LIS database, mid-1980s 2.4 Comparison of estimates of poverty in Australia from LIS studies 2.5 Alternative estimates of relative low income in developed economies in the early 1990s 3.1 Articles on poverty and welfare in international news: 1 July–30 September 1998 3.2 Articles on poverty and welfare in domestic news: 1 July–30 September, 1998 4.1 Child poverty rates: relative poverty line 4.2 Child poverty rates: ‘real poverty line’ 4.3 Children aged 0–4 years and 5–14 years to 2006 4.4 Living circumstances of children, 1992 and 1996 4.5 Labour force status of parents with children aged under 15 years 4.6 Access and participation indicators for low socioeconomic status group, 1991–95, age group 15–24 4.7 18- to 19-year-old school leavers engaged in marginalising and non-marginalising activities, May 1996 4.8 Characteristics of 19-year-olds in 1994 and 1995 who have been consistently engaged in marginalising activities from age 16 years 5.1 Head count measures of poverty as measured by the per cent of households and income units with income below various percentages of the Australian median income, 1994–95 5.2 Multi-dimensional nature of indigenous poverty, 1994 5.3 Factors potentially correlated with poverty among indigenous households, 1994 6.1 Five-yearly population growth rate, Cairns, Kelsey, Australia, 1981–86 6.2 Dwelling structure, Cairns, Kelsey, Australia, 1996 6.3 Housing tenure, Cairns, Kelsey, Australia, 1996 6.4 Age profile, Kelsey, Cairns, Australia, 1996 6.5 Total weekly household income, Cairns, Kelsey and Australia, 1996 52 58 59 60 62 79 81 103 104 105 106 110 113 118 120 145 147 150 164 165 166 166 167 xii PDF OUTPUT c: ALLEN & UNWIN r: DP2\BP4401W\PRELIMS p: (02) 6232 5991 f: (02) 6232 6232 36 DAGLISH STREET CURTIN ACT 2605 xii FIGURES AND TABLES 7.1 Comparison between static and dynamic accounts of the labour market, Australia, mid-1990s 7.2 Proportion of dual wage-earning households by wage levels, Australia 1988–89 7.3 Occupation of spouse for various categories of wage-earning household reference persons, Australia 1988–89 7.4 Occupational composition of households 7.5 Access to training for salesworkers, labourers and plant and machine operators, Australia 1993 7.6 Overview of low-wage firms in Australia, 1995–96 7.7 Characteristics of low-wage firms in Australia, 1995–96 205 210 211 212 218 218 219 xiii PDF OUTPUT c: ALLEN & UNWIN r: DP2\BP4401W\PRELIMS p: (02) 6232 5991 f: (02) 6232 6232 36 DAGLISH STREET CURTIN ACT 2605 xiii Abbreviations ABBREVIATIONS ABC ABR ABS ACA ACIRRT ACOSS ACTU ADAM AFR ALP ATSIC AWIRS AWOTE BBC BCA BFS CDC CDEP CNN DEETYA EITC ESCAP FNQ GDP Australian Broadcasting Commission Aboriginals Benefit Reserve Australian Bureau of Statistics ‘A Current Affair’ Australian Centre for Industrial Relations Research and Training Australian Council of Social Service Australian Council of Trade Unions Agreements Database and Monitor Australian Financial Review Australian Labor Party Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey Average Weekly Ordinary Time Earnings British Broadcasting Corporation Business Council of Australia Business Funding Scheme Commercial Development Corporation Community Development Employment Projects Cable News Network Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs earned income tax credit Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific Far North Queensland Gross Domestic Product xiv PDF OUTPUT c: ALLEN & UNWIN r: DP2\BP4401W\PRELIMS p: (02) 6232 5991 f: (02) 6232 6232 36 DAGLISH STREET CURTIN ACT 2605 xiv ABBREVIATIONS HDI HDIPC IBIP ILC IMF LIS MIRE NATSIS OECD PPPs PR RMI SMH UN UNICEF Human Development Index Household Disposable Income Per Capita Indigenous Business Incentives Program Indigenous Land Corporation International Monetary Fund Luxembourg Income Study Mission Recherche National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Survey Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Purchasing Power Parties public relations Revenu minimum d’insertion Sydney Morning Herald United Nations United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund xv PDF OUTPUT c: ALLEN & UNWIN r: DP2\BP4401W\PRELIMS p: (02) 6232 5991 f: (02) 6232 6232 36 DAGLISH STREET CURTIN ACT 2605 xv This page intentionally left blank PDF OUTPUT c: ALLEN & UNWIN r: DP2\BP4401W\PRELIMS p: (02) 6232 5991 f: (02) 6232 6232 36 DAGLISH STREET CURTIN ACT 2605 xvi 1 The complex contexts of Australian inequality Ruth Fincher and Peter Saunders CREATING UNEQUAL FUTURES THE COMPLEX CONTEXTS OF AUSTRALIAN INEQUALITY The eminent economist and commentator, John Kenneth Galbraith, recently identified persistent inequality in the distribution of income (and urban poverty in particular) as a major piece of ‘unfinished business’ at the end of the twentieth century (Galbraith 1999).

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This assumption was justified on the basis that it produced a standard ‘so austere as, we believe, to make it unchallengeable. No one can seriously argue that those we define as poor are not so’ (Henderson, Harcourt and Harper 1970, quoted in Saunders 1994). Subsequent updating, first according to movements in average weekly earnings, but since the early 1980s in line with Household Disposable Income Per Capita (HDIPC) from the National Accounts, means that the Henderson line has evolved into a purely relative measure, currently around 60 per cent of median income. 5 This does not mean that all choices are equally valid—there are specific equivalence scales, for example, that differ markedly from the consensus of this research.

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Conscious Capitalism, With a New Preface by the Authors: Liberating the Heroic Spirit of Business
by John Mackey , Rajendra Sisodia and Bill George
Published 7 Jan 2014

Consider these facts: Just 200 years ago, 85 percent of the world’s population lived in extreme poverty (defined as less than $1 a day); that number is now only about 16 percent.1 Free-enterprise capitalism has created prosperity not just for a few, but for billions of people everywhere. As figure 1-1 shows, average income per capita globally has increased 1,000 percent since 1800.2 It has increased 1,600 percent in developed countries. Japan’s income per capita has increased by 3,500 percent since 1700. Adjusting for affordability and quality improvements, the standard of living of ordinary Americans has increased 10,000 percent since 1800!3 Perhaps most startling, the gross domestic product (GDP) of South Korea has grown 260-fold since 1960, transforming it from one of the poorest countries in the world to one of the richest and most advanced.4 Over tens of thousands of years, the human population grew very slowly and declined frequently as huge epidemics such as the plague and influenza claimed millions of lives.

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Stakeholder Capitalism: A Global Economy That Works for Progress, People and Planet
by Klaus Schwab
Published 7 Jan 2021

His point is clear: technology has a tendency to increase inequality, but as we adapt to it and take measures to deal with the inequality it creates, we can achieve a reduction of inequality later. We will come back to this notion in Part II of the book. Figure 2.5 Expected Pattern of Changes in Inequality versus Income per Capita, Based on State of Technological Revolution Source: Redrawn from Piketty, Saez, and Zucman (2018), World Inequality Report 2018.. But in spite of Kuznets’ early warnings and Milanovic's more recent work, policymakers around the world went ahead and implemented policies that favored top-line growth over inclusive development and quick technological deployment over more considered technological governance.

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Countries that truly only account for GDP will run into a wall sooner or later, as you can only ignore investments in education, training, and care for the planet for so long before they start to affect the economic production function. In addition to the tools provided by indices on competitiveness and inclusiveness, the world also desperately needs to walk to a different drum than that provided by GDP. Some complementary measures already exist, and others are on the way. “One quick fix is to adopt a measure like median income per capita, which better reflects the economic conditions real people face,” I wrote in a 2019 op-ed. “A more ambitious measure is Natural Capital,29 based on a country's ecosystems, fish stocks, minerals, and other natural assets. Because this balance sheet would also need to include human capital, we could incorporate all of the relevant elements in one composite scorecard.30 And a third, concrete option is to include the Climate Action Tracker in the dashboard of governments, as it shows each country's progress toward meeting its national commitments under the Paris agreement.”31 Some of these proposals are developed by the Wealth Project, a group consisting of economists including Diane Coyle and Mariana Mazzucato,32 who have long expressed their concern of the dominance of GDP.

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Stakeholder Capitalism: A Global Economy That Works for Progress, People and Planet
by Klaus Schwab and Peter Vanham
Published 27 Jan 2021

…

pages: 356 words: 106,161

The Glass Half-Empty: Debunking the Myth of Progress in the Twenty-First Century
by Rodrigo Aguilera
Published 10 Mar 2020

As a result, convergence with Western income levels not only stagnated but declined, reversing the catch-up process that many of these countries had begun during the post-war period. My country and darling of globalization in Latin America, Mexico, is a fine example of this, having seen its income per capita (in PPP terms) peak at just over half of the US’s in 1981, only to see that fall to one-third by 201834 — despite the ambitious North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that Ivy League-educated Mexican technocrats thought would bring the country first-world prosperity. Economist and globalization critic Dani Rodrik explained the consequences of this free-market fundamentalism: The one thing that is generally agreed on about the consequences of these reforms is that things have not quite worked out the way they were intended.

…

Returning to Hans Rosling’s comparison of the Zambia of today and the Sweden of 1921 that was mentioned in Chapter Three, he may have been surprised to know that Zambia in those days was probably richer relative to Sweden than it is now: at least using 1950 data (the earliest available for Zambia), it had an income per capita that was 12% of Sweden’s compared to just 8% in 2016.39 And that’s using purchasing power parities, which often overestimate the income of developing countries since most tradable goods are priced globally rather than locally. In other words, a haircut or taxi ride will be considerably cheaper in Lusaka than Stockholm but a smartphone or airline ticket (which presumably these new middle classes will be consuming more) will cost roughly the same.

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More Guns, Less Crime: Understanding Crime and Gun-Control Laws
by John R. Lott
Published 15 May 2010

I know from personal communication that some critics (such as Black and Nagin) did indeed examine numerous diﬀerent specifications.15 A more systematic, if time-consuming, approach is to try all possible combinations of these so-called control variables—factors which may be interesting but are included so that we can be sure of the importance of some other “focus” variables.16 In my regressions to explain crime rates there are at least nine groups of control variables—population density, waiting periods and background checks, penalties for using guns in the commission of a crime, per-capita income, per-capita unemployment insurance payments, per-capita income maintenance payments, retirement payments per person for those over sixty-five, state poverty rate, and state unemployment rate.17 To run all possible combinations of these nine groups of control variables requires 512 regressions. The regressions for murder rates also require a tenth control variable for the death-penalty execution rate and thus results in 1,024 combinations of control variables.

…

Let us return to the main focus, guns and crime. To examine the impact of right-to-carry laws, the following list of variables has been accounted for: city population, arrest rate by type of crime, unemployment rate, percentage of families headed by females, family poverty rate, median family income, per-capita income, percentage of the population living below poverty, percentage of the population that is white, percentage that is black, percentage that is Hispanic, percentage that is female, percentage that is less than five years of age, percentage that is between five and seventeen, percentage that is between eighteen and twenty-five, percentage that is between twenty-six and sixty-four, percentage that is sixty-five and older, median population age, percentage of the population over age twenty-five with a high school diploma, percentage of the population over age twenty-five with a college degree, and other types of gun-control laws (waiting periods, background checks, and additional penalties for using guns in the commission of a crime).

…

To answer this I added the sales of the diﬀerent gun magazines into the crime regressions reported earlier in this book. This allows us to account for the impact that other factors have on murder rates. These include the arrest rate for murder, the death penalty execution rate, the population density, the unemployment rate, the poverty rate, per capita income, per capita welfare payments, and detailed demographic information on the share of the population by age, sex, and race.6 The results are reported in table A7.1. If more sales of a gun magazine lead in a year or two to higher murder rates, it appears to occur only for the fourth largest magazine, Guns and Ammo, where a 1 percent increase in magazine sales increases murder rates by 0.24 percent the following year and by 0.17 percent two years later.

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Exceptional People: How Migration Shaped Our World and Will Define Our Future
by Ian Goldin , Geoffrey Cameron and Meera Balarajan
Published 20 Dec 2010

In a study comparing the wages for migrant workers in the United States to what they could have earned at home, the average migrant worker (the mean across forty-two countries) would make more than five times as much in the United States than at home.24 Some of the individual country wage ratios are presented in table 7.1. Even the most conservative estimate of the welfare gain to a moderately skilled worker in the median country of their sampling who moves to the United States is $10,000 (PPP adjusted) per worker, per year—which is double the average income per capita in the developing world.25 TABLE 7.1 ESTIMATES OF WAGE RATIOS FOR MIGRANT WORKERS IN THE U.S. (COMPARING HOME WAGES WITH U.S. WAGES). Source: Michael A. Clemens, Claudio E. Montenegro, and Lant Pritchett. 2009. “The Place Premium: Wage Differences for Identical Workers across the U.S. Border,” Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Research Working Paper Series, RWP 09-004.

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These countries transitioned from being primarily source countries to become migration destinations. In this section, we are concerned with the first part of this process, or what Timothy J. Hatton and Jeffrey G. Williamson call the “emigration life cycle”: Country-specific emigration life cycles across the long nineteenth century make it clear that real wage or income per capita gaps will not by themselves explain emigration: during the course of modern economic growth in Europe, country emigration rates rose steeply at first from very low levels, after which the rise began to slow down as the emigration rates climbed to a peak, and subsequently they fell. This life cycle stylized fact has emerged from study after study, both for aggregate time series as country emigration rates and for regional emigration rates within countries.26 People in poor, agrarian countries generally do not move in large numbers, so the rising rate of emigration follows their emergence from what Hatton and Williamson call “the poverty trap” of low wages and low mobility.

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The Great Surge: The Ascent of the Developing World
by Steven Radelet
Published 10 Nov 2015

This idea was not just popular with academics but also provided convenient cover for authoritarian leaders making economic progress, who argued that democracy could wait: Park in South Korea, Suharto in Indonesia, Pinochet in Chile, and so on. Yet when Mali became a democracy in 1992, it had an income per capita of just $300 (in constant price 2005 US dollars), making it one of the poorest countries in the world. Nepal’s income was just $230 per person in 1990 when King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev began a political transition. Timor-Leste launched its long-awaited independence in 1999 with an average income of $430, and Malawi made the jump in 1994 with an average income of barely $200.

…

With the upheaval of the early twentieth century—the end of imperial rule, the long civil war, the emergence of the People’s Republic in 1949, the disasters of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution—China made little development progress. While there was some slow income growth alongside larger improvements in health, it remained a poor country. In 1970 its income per capita was around $350 (in constant 2005 PPP prices)—less than today’s Democratic Republic of the Congo, now the poorest country in the world. China, largely disconnected from the global economy, was no longer a source of innovation and technology. In 1970 its exports accounted for a paltry 3 percent of GDP, the lowest among all developing countries.

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The Economics of Enough: How to Run the Economy as if the Future Matters
by Diane Coyle
Published 21 Feb 2011

Both hold some truth, depending on how you look at inequality. In particular, there is a distinction between inequality within countries and inequality between countries. Starting with the latter, and looking at average income per capita nation by nation, countries such as the United States and United Kingdom have pulled much further ahead of the poorest countries such as Zimbabwe and Niger. At the same time, there has been a huge rise in average income per capita in China and India such that they have narrowed the gap with the richest countries. This latter development means global inequality has decreased substantially, but inequality within nations has not.14 In general developing countries divide into sheep and goats—a group including India and China that have been gaining ground on the rich countries in average per capita incomes and a group concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa where this process (which economists term convergence) has not been taking place.

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The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood
by Rashid Khalidi
Published 31 Aug 2006

During the quarter century between 1922 and 1947, it maintained an annual growth rate of 13.2 percent. By contrast, the Arab sector of the economy grew at less than half that rate during the same period: by the much less spectacular (but still respectable) figure of 6.5 percent annually.43 This translated into an annual growth rate in real income per capita over these twenty-five years—including the Great Depression—of 3.6 percent for the Arabs and 4.8 percent for the Jews.44 This meant that during the Mandate, while the Arab economy of Palestine had a vigorous average growth rate, the Jewish economy had one of the highest sustained growth rates in the world.

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For Egypt, where the best statistics exist outside of Palestine, estimates of national income for the late 1930s range from LE (Egyptian pounds) 168 to 200 million,80 while we have seen that the national income of Palestine for 1936 was LP 33 million, of which the Arab sector produced LP 16 million (both the Egyptian and Palestinian pound were at parity with sterling, so the figures are comparable). This amounted to a national income per capita for the Arabs of Palestine of about LP 17.4, as against a range of LE 10.5–12.5 per capita for Egypt in 1937, at a time when Egypt’s population was 13.8 million. Although reliable national income estimates for other Arab countries are hard to come by, there is one other set of figures that perhaps provides a yardstick for comparison: government revenue and expenditure.

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The Great Divide: Unequal Societies and What We Can Do About Them
by Joseph E. Stiglitz
Published 15 Mar 2015

The policies failed: Africa saw its per capita income fall; Latin America saw stagnation, with the benefits of the limited growth going to a small sliver at the top. Meanwhile, East Asia took a different course; with governments leading the development effort (“the developmental state,” as it was called), incomes per capita rapidly doubled, tripled—eventually increasing eightfold. In the third of a century that Americans saw their incomes stagnate, China went from being an impoverished country, with a per capita income less than 1 percent that of the United States and a GDP that was less than 5 percent that of the United States, to being the largest economy in the world (measured in what economists called purchasing power parities).

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China has now become the world’s largest economy—which simply means that because it has roughly five times the population, its income per head is only one-fifth that of the United States (based on standard statistics, called “purchasing power parities,” designed to convert the income in one country into an equivalent income in another). Still, that’s much better than it was even 25 years ago, when purchasing-power-parity income per capita was less than 5 percent that of the United States. But at the same time there has been an enormous growth of inequality in China—more millionaires, more billionaires. Although India’s growth spurt has not been as long or as fast as China’s, it did peak at 9 percent per year. But while fewer people and a smaller percentage of the population moved out of poverty, the increase in millionaires and even billionaires was equally impressive.

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Automation and the Future of Work
by Aaron Benanav
Published 3 Nov 2020

Deindustrialization unfolded first in high-income countries in the late 1960s and early 1970s, at the tail end of a period in which levels of income per person had converged across the United States, Europe, and Japan. In the decades that followed, deindustrialization then spread “prematurely” to middle-and low-income countries, with larger variations in incomes per capita (Figure 2.2).22 In the late 1970s, deindustrialization arrived in southern Europe; much of Latin America, parts of East and Southeast Asia, and southern Africa followed in the 1980s and ’90s. Peak industrialization levels in many poorer countries were so low that it may be more accurate to say that they never industrialized in the first place.23 Figure 2.2.

Making Globalization Work
by Joseph E. Stiglitz
Published 16 Sep 2006

Arrow and Debreu’s analysis also assumed that technology was unchanging, or at least unaffected by actions of market participants; yet changes in technology are at the center of development. 4.Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations (New York: Pantheon, 1968). 5.Its performance in the past fifteen years has been a little bit better—a measly annual increase in per capita income of 0.2 percent. 6.See World Bank, China 2020: Development Challenges in the New Century (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1997), p. 3; available at http://www-wds.world bank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1997/09/01/000009265_398 0625172933/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf. 7.Since 1970, the total (average annual rate of ) increase in income per capita has been: China, 923 percent (6.8 percent); Indonesia, 286 percent (4.0 percent); Korea, 566 percent (5.6 percent); Malaysia, 283 percent (3.9 percent); Thailand, 347 percent (4.4 percent). Though data on poverty over such longtime spans are unreliable and spotty, it appears that in less than two decades, using the $2-per-day measure of poverty, China’s poverty rate dropped from 67 percent to 47 percent between 1987 and 2001, Indonesia’s poverty rate dropped from 76 percent to 52 percent between 1987 and 2002, Malaysia’s poverty rate dropped from 15 percent to 9 percent between 1987 and 1997, and Thailand’s poverty rate dropped from 37 percent to 32 percent between 1992 and 2000.

…

See Sandra Polaski, “Mexican Employment, Productivity, and Income a Decade after NAFTA,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, brief submitted to the Canadian Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, February 25, 2004. 7.See Gruben, “Was Nafta Behind Mexico’s High Maquiladora Growth?,” op. cit. In the case of Mexico, the debate is complicated by its 1994–95 financial crisis. A World Bank study concluded that without NAFTA, Mexican income per capita would have been 4 percent lower. (Daniel Lederman, William F. Maloney, and Luis Servén, Lessons from NAFTA for Latin America and the Caribbean Countries: A Summary of Research Findings, World Bank, December 2003.) But there were serious flaws with that study. See, for instance, Mark Weisbrot, David Rosnick, and Dean Baker, “Getting Mexico to Grow with NAFTA: The World Bank Analysis,” Center for Economic Policy Research, September 20, 2004, available at www.cepr.net/publications/nafta_2004_10.htm.

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Competition Overdose: How Free Market Mythology Transformed Us From Citizen Kings to Market Servants
by Maurice E. Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi
Published 14 May 2020

Krueger, “Developments in the Measurement of Subjective Well-Being,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 3, 15–16, http://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/089533006776526030 (stating that despite China’s real income per capita increasing by a factor of 2.5 between 1994 and 2005, there has been no increase in reported life satisfaction, and an increase in percentage who are dissatisfied); Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer, “What Can Economists Learn from Happiness Research?,” Journal of Economic Literature 40, no. 2 (June 2002): 402, 413, http://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/002205102320161320 (stating that Japan’s income per capita increased sixfold between 1958 and 1991, while average life satisfaction remained unchanged). 66.For a review of the happiness literature, see Maurice E.

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Money, Real Quick: The Story of M-PESA
by Tonny K. Omwansa , Nicholas P. Sullivan and The Guardian
Published 28 Feb 2012

Mombasa, on the Indian Ocean, and Kisimu, on Lake Victoria, are the other two big cities, but the country’s population is 78% rural. Kenya is an enterprising country, with a largely agricultural base (tea, coffee, corn, wheat, sugarcane, fruit, vegetables, dairy products, beef, pork, poultry, eggs), but suffers high unemployment (circa 40%) and a 50% poverty rate (average income per capita is about $1600). From its independence (from the British) in 1963 until 2002, Kenya had two presidents, Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel Moi. President Mwai Kibaki has been in power since, but his reelection in December 2007 brought charges of vote rigging, which led to two months of horrendous tribal violence in early 2008 in which 1,500 died.

Rethinking Islamism: The Ideology of the New Terror
by Meghnad Desai
Published 25 Apr 2008

The฀ countries฀ in฀ Arabia฀ are฀ in฀ a฀ middle-income฀ rather฀ than฀ low-income฀ range฀ by฀ international฀ standards,฀ richer฀ than฀ Africa฀  ฀  and฀South฀Asia,฀if฀not฀Southeast฀Asia฀as฀well.฀The฀United฀Nations฀ Development฀Programme฀(UNDP)฀has฀published฀a฀Human฀Development฀Report฀since฀.฀It฀publishes฀a฀Human฀Development฀Index฀ (HDI)฀which฀summarises฀three฀measures฀of฀well-being฀–฀longevity,฀ literacy฀and฀access฀to฀resources฀as฀measured฀by฀income฀per฀capita฀(in฀ purchasing฀power฀parity฀units฀to฀make฀international฀comparisons฀ easier).฀For฀each฀of฀the฀three฀dimensions฀measures฀are฀calibrated฀to฀ lie฀between฀฀and฀,฀with฀one฀representing฀the฀highest฀achievable฀ level.฀The฀three฀separate฀measures฀are฀then฀combined฀in฀an฀overall฀ measure,฀ also฀ lying฀ between฀ ฀ and฀ ,฀ which฀ gives฀ us฀ the฀ HDI.฀ Countries฀are฀also฀ranked฀from฀฀to฀฀by฀their฀HDI฀score,฀with฀฀ for฀the฀country฀with฀the฀highest฀HDI.

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Angrynomics
by Eric Lonergan and Mark Blyth
Published 15 Jun 2020

That is, a world of seemingly ever-tighter budgets, ever-rising costs (despite being constantly told that there is no inflation), and ever-increasing stresses in and beyond the work place. At some point, the disconnect between our experience of the world and the model used to explain it has to come to a head. Economics as it stands can’t seem to explain why the pressures of life appear to be intensifying, at the same time as income per capita is rising. Nor can it explain why pensioners, whose incomes depend upon the number of workers in work paying taxes, reject immigration more than any other group, when they forgot to have enough kids to keep it all going? Why do we see the rise of nationalism everywhere when we hear that globalization, on average, has made us all richer?

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The End of Indexing: Six Structural Mega-Trends That Threaten Passive Investing
by Niels Jensen
Published 25 Mar 2018

According to the World Bank, more than one billion people around the world survive on as little as $1–2 per day, and people in the poorest countries spend nearly 80% of their income on food. Meanwhile, at the other end of the scale, only 6–7% of total consumer expenditures in the US is spent on food products, whereas the typical OECD country would spend 10–15%58. We know that income per capita across emerging markets is likely to rise dramatically in the years to come, and we know that, when poor people have more money to spend, the very first thing they spend it on is more and better food. Consequently, if history repeats itself, demand for protein-rich food such as meat will rise exponentially in the years to come.

pages: 172 words: 51,837

How to Read Numbers: A Guide to Statistics in the News (And Knowing When to Trust Them)
by Tom Chivers and David Chivers
Published 18 Mar 2021

But it’s the sort of assumption that can wildly change the output of the model, and it’s important to understand the decision to include or not include it. The LSE critique found that using a model of trade which included the gravity equation changed the outcome from a 4 per cent boost to the economy to a blow ‘equivalent to a 2.3% decline in UK income per capita’, even if they held all of the Economists for Brexit model’s other assumptions steady. We’re not here to declare a winner: it will be years before we know the impact of Brexit to any degree of certainty. And the partisan nature of the question means that those impacts will be highly disputed anyway, whether or not you have heard of the gravity equation.

pages: 462 words: 150,129

The Rational Optimist: How Prosperity Evolves
by Matt Ridley
Published 17 May 2010

Zimbabwe today needs better rules before it can have better markets. But note here that a country’s economic freedom predicts its prosperity better than its mineral wealth, education system or infrastructure do. In a sample of 127 countries, the sixty-three with the higher economic freedom had more than four times the income per capita and nearly twice the growth rate of the countries that did not. A few years ago the World Bank published a study of ‘intangible wealth’ – trying to measure the value of education, the rule of law and other such nebulous things. It simply added up the natural capital (resources, land) and produced capital (tools, property) and measured what was left over to explain each country’s per capita income.

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Abbasids 161, 178 Abelard, Peter 358 aborigines (Australian): division of labour 62, 63, 76; farming 127; technological regress 78–84; trade 90–91, 92 abortion, compulsory 203 Abu Hureyra 127 Acapulco 184 accounting systems 160, 168, 196 Accra 189 Acemoglu, Daron 321 Ache people 61 Acheulean tools 48–9, 50, 275, 373 Achuar people 87 acid rain 280, 281, 304–6, 329, 339 acidification of oceans 280, 340–41 Adams, Henry 289 Aden 177 Adenauer, Konrad 289 Aegean sea 168, 170–71 Afghanistan 14, 208–9, 315, 353 Africa: agriculture 145, 148, 154–5, 326; AIDS epidemic 14, 307–8, 316, 319, 320, 322; colonialism 319–20, 321–2; demographic transition 210, 316, 328; economic growth 315, 326–8, 332, 347; international aid 317–19, 322, 328; lawlessness 293, 320; life expectancy 14, 316, 422; per capita income 14, 315, 317, 320; poverty 314–17, 319–20, 322, 325–6, 327–8; prehistoric 52–5, 65–6, 83, 123, 350; property rights 320, 321, 323–5; trade 187–8, 320, 322–3, 325, 326, 327–8; see also individual countries African-Americans 108 agricultural employment: decline in 42–3; hardships of 13, 219–20, 285–6 agriculture: early development of 122–30, 135–9, 352, 387, 388; fertilisers, development of 135, 139–41, 142, 146, 147, 337; genetically modified (GM) crops 28, 32, 148, 151–6, 283, 358; hybrids, development of 141–2, 146, 153; and trade 123, 126, 127–33, 159, 163–4; and urbanisation 128, 158–9, 163–4, 215; see also farming; food supply Agta people 61–2 aid, international 28, 141, 154, 203, 317–19, 328 AIDS 8, 14, 307–8, 310, 316, 319, 320, 322, 331, 353 AIG (insurance corporation) 115 air conditioning 17 air pollution 304–5 air travel: costs of 24, 37, 252, 253; speed of 253 aircraft 257, 261, 264, 266 Akkadian empire 161, 164–5 Al-Ghazali 357 Al-Khwarizmi, Muhammad ibn Musa 115 Al-Qaeda 296 Albania 187 Alcoa (corporation) 24 Alexander the Great 169, 171 Alexander, Gary 295 Alexandria 171, 175, 270 Algeria 53, 246, 345 alphabet, invention of 166, 396 Alps 122, 178 altruism 93–4, 97 aluminium 24, 213, 237, 303 Alyawarre aborigines 63 Amalfi 178 Amazon (corporation) 21, 259, 261 Amazonia 76, 138, 145, 250–51 amber 71, 92 ambition 45–6, 351 Ames, Bruce 298–9 Amish people 211 ammonia 140, 146 Amsterdam 115–16, 169, 259, 368 Amsterdam Exchange Bank 251 Anabaptists 211 Anatolia 127, 128, 164, 165, 166, 167 Ancoats, Manchester 214 Andaman islands 66–7, 78 Andes 123, 140, 163 Andrew, Deroi Kwesi 189 Angkor Wat 330 Angola 316 animal welfare 104, 145–6 animals: conservation 324, 339; extinctions 17, 43, 64, 68, 69–70, 243, 293, 302, 338–9; humans’ differences from other 1, 2–4, 6, 56, 58, 64 Annan, Kofi 337 Antarctica 334 anti-corporatism 110–111, 114 anti-slavery 104, 105–6, 214 antibiotics 6, 258, 271, 307 antimony 213 ants 75–6, 87–8, 192 apartheid 108 apes 56–7, 59–60, 62, 65, 88; see also chimpanzees; orang-utans ‘apocaholics’ 295, 301 Appalachia 239 Apple (corporation) 260, 261, 268 Aquinas, St Thomas 102 Arabia 66, 159, 176, 179 Arabian Sea 174 Arabs 89, 175, 176–7, 180, 209, 357 Aral Sea 240 Arcadia Biosciences (company) 31–2 Archimedes 256 Arctic Ocean 125, 130, 185, 334, 338–9 Argentina 15, 186, 187 Arikamedu 174 Aristotle 115, 250 Arizona 152, 246, 345 Arkwright, Sir Richard 227 Armenians 89 Arnolfini, Giovanni 179 art: cave paintings 2, 68, 73, 76–7; and commerce 115–16; symbolism in 136; as unique human trait 4 Ashur, Assyria 165 Asimov, Isaac 354 Asoka the Great 172–3 aspirin 258 asset price inflation 24, 30 Assyrian empire 161, 165–6, 167 asteroid impacts, risk of 280, 333 astronomy 221, 270, 357 Athabasca tar sands, Canada 238 Athens 115, 170, 171 Atlantic Monthly 293 Atlantic Ocean 125, 170 Attica 171 Augustus, Roman emperor 174 Augustus the Strong, Elector of Saxony 184–5 Australia: climate 127, 241, 300, 334; prehistoric 66, 67, 69–70, 127; trade 187; see also aborigines (Australian); Tasmania Austria 132 Ausubel, Jesse 239, 346, 409 automobiles see cars axes: copper 123, 131, 132, 136, 271; stone 2, 5, 48–9, 50, 51, 71, 81, 90–91, 92, 118–19, 271 Babylon 21, 161, 166, 240, 254, 289 Bacon, Francis 255 bacteria: cross fertilisation 271; and pest control 151; resistance to antibiotics 6, 258, 271, 307; symbiosis 75 Baghdad 115, 177, 178, 357 Baines, Edward 227 Baird, John Logie 38 baking 124, 130 ‘balance of nature’, belief in 250–51 Balazs, Etienne 183 bald eagles 17, 299 Bali 66 Baltic Sea 71, 128–9, 180, 185 Bamako 326 bananas 92, 126, 149, 154, 392 Bangladesh 204, 210, 426 Banks, Sir Joseph 221 Barigaza (Bharuch) 174 barley 32, 124, 151 barrels 176 bartering vii, 56–60, 65, 84, 91–2, 163, 356 Basalla, George 272 Basra 177 battery farming 104, 145–6 BBC 295 beads 53, 70, 71, 73, 81, 93, 162 beef 186, 224, 308; see also cattle bees, killer 280 Beijing 17 Beinhocker, Eric 112 Bell, Alexander Graham 38 Bengal famine (1943) 141 benzene 257 Berlin 299 Berlin, Sir Isaiah 288 Bernard of Clairvaux, St 358 Berners-Lee, Sir Tim 38, 273 Berra, Yogi 354 Besant, Annie 208 Bhutan 25–6 Bible 138, 168, 396 bicycles 248–9, 263, 269–70 bin Laden, Osama 110 biofuels 149, 236, 238, 239, 240–43, 246, 300, 339, 343, 344, 346, 393 Bird, Isabella 197–8 birds: effects of pollution on 17, 299; killed by wind turbines 239, 409; nests 51; sexual differences 64; songbirds 55; see also individual species bireme galleys 167 Birmingham 223 birth control see contraception birth rates: declining 204–212; and food supply 192, 208–9; and industrialisation 202; measurement of 205, 403; population control policies 202–4, 208; pre-industrial societies 135, 137; and television 234; and wealth 200–201, 204, 205–6, 209, 211, 212; see also population growth Black Death 181, 195–6, 197, 380 Black Sea 71, 128, 129, 170, 176, 180 blogging 257 Blombos Cave, South Africa 53, 83 blood circulation, discovery of 258 Blunt, John 29 boat-building 167, 168, 177; see also canoes; ship-building Boers 321, 322 Bohemia 222 Bolivia 315, 324 Bolsheviks 324 Borlaug, Norman 142–3, 146 Borneo 339 Bosch, Carl 140, 412 Botswana 15, 316, 320–22, 326 Bottger, Johann Friedrich 184–5 Boudreaux, Don 21, 214 Boulton, Matthew 221, 256, 413–14 bows and arrows 43, 62, 70, 82, 137, 251, 274 Boxgrove hominids 48, 50 Boyer, Stanley 222, 405 Boyle, Robert 256 Bradlaugh, Charles 208 brain size 3–4, 48–9, 51, 55 Bramah, Joseph 221 Branc, Slovakia 136 Brand, Stewart 154, 189, 205 Brando, Marlon 110 brass 223 Brazil 38, 87, 123, 190, 240, 242, 315, 358 bread 38, 124, 140, 158, 224, 286, 392 bridges, suspension 283 Brin, Sergey 221, 405 Britain: affluence 12, 16, 224–5, 236, 296–7; birth rates 195, 200–201, 206, 208, 227; British exceptionalism 200–202, 221–2; climate change policy 330–31; consumer prices 24, 224–5, 227, 228; copyright system 267; enclosure acts 226, 323, 406; energy use 22, 231–2, 232–3, 342–3, 368, 430; ‘glorious revolution’ (1688) 223; income equality 18–19, 218; industrial revolution 201–2, 216–17, 220–32, 255–6, 258–9; life expectancy 15, 17–18; National Food Service 268; National Health Service 111, 261; parliamentary reform 107; per capita income 16, 218, 227, 285, 404–5; productivity 112; property rights 223, 226, 323–4; state benefits 16; tariffs 185–6, 186–7, 223; see also England; Scotland; Wales British Empire 161, 322 bronze 164, 168, 177 Brosnan, Sarah 59 Brown, Lester 147–8, 281–2, 300–301 Brown, Louise 306 Bruges 179 Brunel, Sir Marc 221 Buddhism 2, 172, 357 Buddle, John 412 Buffett, Warren 106, 268 Bulgaria 320 Burkina Faso 154 Burma 66, 67, 209, 335 Bush, George W. 161 Butler, Eamonn 105, 249 Byblos 167 Byzantium 176, 177, 179 cabbages 298 ‘Caesarism’ 289 Cairo 323 Calcutta 190, 315 Calico Act (1722) 226 Califano, Joseph 202–3 California: agriculture 150; Chumash people 62, 92–3; development of credit card 251, 254; Mojave Desert 69; Silicon Valley 221–2, 224, 257, 258, 259, 268 Cambodia 14, 315 camels 135, 176–7 camera pills 270–71 Cameroon 57 Campania 174, 175 Canaanites 166, 396 Canada 141, 169, 202, 238, 304, 305 Canal du Midi 251 cancer 14, 18, 293, 297–9, 302, 308, 329 Cannae, battle of 170 canning 186, 258 canoes 66, 67, 79, 82 capitalism 23–4, 101–4, 110, 115, 133, 214, 258–62, 291–2, 311; see also corporations; markets ‘Captain Swing’ 283 capuchin monkeys 96–7, 375 Caral, Peru 162–3 carbon dioxide emissions 340–47; absorption of 217; and agriculture 130, 337–8; and biofuels 242; costs of 331; and economic growth 315, 332; and fossil fuels 237, 315; and local sourcing of goods 41–2; taxes 346, 356 Cardwell’s Law 411 Caribbean see West Indies Carnegie, Andrew 23 Carney, Thomas 173 carnivorism 51, 60, 62, 68–9, 147, 156, 241, 376 carrots 153, 156 cars: biofuel for 240, 241; costs of 24, 252; efficiency of 252; future production 282, 355; hybrid 245; invention of 189, 270, 271; pollution from 17, 242; sport-utility vehicles 45 The Rational Optimist 424 Carson, Rachel 152, 297–8 Carter, Jimmy 238 Carthage 169, 170, 173 Cartwright, Edmund 221, 263 Castro, Fidel 187 Catalhoyuk 127 catallaxy 56, 355–9 Catholicism 105, 208, 306 cattle 122, 132, 145, 147, 148, 150, 197, 321, 336; see also beef Caucasus 237 cave paintings 2, 68, 73, 76–7 Cavendish, Henry 221 cement 283 central heating 16, 37 cereals 124–5, 125–6, 130–31, 143–4, 146–7, 158, 163; global harvests 121 Champlain, Samuel 138–9 charcoal 131, 216, 229, 230, 346 charitable giving 92, 105, 106, 295, 318–19, 356 Charles V: king of Spain 30–31; Holy Roman Emperor 184 Charles, Prince of Wales 291, 332 Chauvet Cave, France 2, 68, 73, 76–7 Chernobyl 283, 308, 345, 421 Chicago World Fair (1893) 346 chickens 122–3, 145–6, 147, 148, 408 chickpeas 125 Childe, Gordon 162 children: child labour 104, 188, 218, 220, 292; child molestation 104; childcare 2, 62–3; childhood diseases 310; mortality rates 14, 15, 16, 208–9, 284 Chile 187 chimpanzees 2, 3, 4, 6, 29, 59–60, 87, 88, 97 China: agriculture 123, 126, 148, 152, 220; birth rate 15, 200–201; coal supplies 229–30; Cultural Revolution 14, 201; diet 241; economic growth and industrialisation 17, 109, 180–81, 187, 201, 219, 220, 281–2, 300, 322, 324–5, 328, 358; economic and technological regression 180, 181–2, 193, 229–30, 255, 321, 357–8; energy use 245; income equality 19; innovations 181, 251; life expectancy 15; Longshan culture 397; Maoism 16, 187, 296, 311; Ming empire 117, 181–4, 260, 311; per capita income 15, 180; prehistoric 68, 123, 126; serfdom 181–2; Shang dynasty 166; Song dynasty 180–81; trade 172, 174–5, 177, 179, 183–4, 187, 225, 228 chlorine 296 cholera 40, 310 Chomsky, Noam 291 Christianity 172, 357, 358, 396; see also Catholicism; Church of England; monasteries Christmas 134 Chumash people 62, 92–3 Church of England 194 Churchill, Sir Winston 288 Cicero 173 Cilicia 173 Cisco Systems (corporation) 268 Cistercians 215 civil rights movement 108, 109 Clairvaux Abbey 215 Clark, Colin 146, 227 Clark, Gregory 193, 201, 401, 404 Clarke, Arthur C. 354 climate change 328–47, 426–30; costs of mitigation measures 330–32, 333, 338, 342–4; death rates associated with 335–7; and ecological dynamism 250, 329–30, 335, 339; and economic growth 315, 331–3, 341–3, 347; effects on ecosystems 338–41; and food supply 337–8; and fossil fuels 243, 314, 342, 346, 426; historic 194, 195, 329, 334, 426–7; pessimism about 280, 281, 314–15, 328–9; prehistoric 54, 65, 125, 127, 130, 160, 329, 334, 339, 340, 352; scepticism about 111, 329–30, 426; solutions to 8, 315, 345–7 Clinton, Bill 341 Clippinger, John 99 cloth trade 75, 159, 160, 165, 172, 177, 180, 194, 196, 225, 225–9, 232 clothes: Britain 224, 225, 227; early homo sapiens 71, 73; Inuits 64; metal age 122; Tasmanian natives 78 clothing prices 20, 34, 37, 40, 227, 228 ‘Club of Rome’ 302–3 coal: and economic take-off 201, 202, 213, 214, 216–17; and generation of electricity 233, 237, 239, 240, 304, 344; and industrialisation 229–33, 236, 407; prices 230, 232, 237; supplies 302–3 coal mining 132, 230–31, 237, 239, 257, 343 Coalbrookdale 407 Cobb, Kelly 35 Coca-Cola (corporation) 111, 263 coffee 298–9, 392 Cohen, Mark 135 Cold War 299 collective intelligence 5, 38–9, 46, 56, 83, 350–52, 355–6 Collier, Paul 315, 316–17 colonialism 160, 161, 187, 321–2; see also imperialism Colorado 324 Columbus, Christopher 91, 184 combine harvesters 158, 392 combined-cycle turbines 244, 410 commerce see trade Commoner, Barry 402 communism 106, 336 Compaq (corporation) 259 computer games 273, 292 computers 2, 3, 5, 211, 252, 260, 261, 263–4, 268, 282; computing power costs 24; information storage capacities 276; silicon chips 245, 263, 267–8; software 99, 257, 272–3, 304, 356; Y2K bug 280, 290, 341; see also internet Confucius 2, 181 Congo 14–15, 28, 307, 316 Congreve, Sir William 221 Connelly, Matthew 204 conservation, nature 324, 339; see also wilderness land, expansion of conservatism 109 Constantinople 175, 177 consumer spending, average 39–40 containerisation 113, 253, 386 continental drift 274 contraception 208, 210; coerced 203–4 Cook, Captain James 91 cooking 4, 29, 38, 50, 51, 52, 55, 60–61, 64, 163, 337 copper 122, 123, 131–2, 160, 162, 164, 165, 168, 213, 223, 302, 303 copyright 264, 266–7, 326 coral reefs 250, 339–40, 429–30 Cordoba 177 corn laws 185–6 Cornwall 132 corporations 110–116, 355; research and development budgets 260, 262, 269 Cosmides, Leda 57 Costa Rica 338 cotton 37, 108, 149, 151–2, 162, 163, 171, 172, 202, 225–9, 230, 407; calico 225–6, 232; spinning and weaving 184, 214, 217, 219–20, 227–8, 232, 256, 258, 263, 283 Coughlin, Father Charles 109 Craigslist (website) 273, 356 Crapper, Thomas 38 Crathis river 171 creationists 358 creative destruction 114, 356 credit cards 251, 254 credit crunch (2008) 8–10, 28–9, 31, 100, 102, 316, 355, 399, 411 Cree Indians 62 Crete 167, 169 Crichton, Michael 254 Crick, Francis 412 crime: cyber-crime 99–100, 357; falling rates 106, 201; false convictions 19–20; homicide 14, 20, 85, 88, 106, 118, 201; illegal drugs 106, 186; pessimism about 288, 293 Crimea 171 crocodiles, deaths by 40 Crompton, Samuel 227 Crookes, Sir William 140, 141 cruelty 104, 106, 138–9, 146 crusades 358 Cuba 187, 299 ‘curse of resources’ 31, 320 cyber-crime 99–100, 357 Cyprus 132, 148, 167, 168 Cyrus the Great 169 Dalkon Shield (contraceptive device) 203 Dalton, John 221 Damascus 127 Damerham, Wiltshire 194 Danube, River 128, 132 Darby, Abraham 407 Darfur 302, 353 Dark Ages 164, 175–6, 215 Darwin, Charles 77, 81, 91–2, 105, 116, 350, 415 Darwin, Erasmus 256 Darwinism 5 Davy, Sir Humphry 221, 412 Dawkins, Richard 5, 51 DDT (pesticide) 297–8, 299 de Geer, Louis 184 de Soto, Hernando 323, 324, 325 de Waal, Frans 88 Dean, James 110 decimal system 173, 178 deer 32–3, 122 deflation 24 Defoe, Daniel 224 deforestation, predictions of 304–5, 339 Delhi 189 Dell (corporation) 268 Dell, Michael 264 demographic transition 206–212, 316, 328, 402 Denmark 200, 344, 366; National Academy of Sciences 280 Dennett, Dan 350 dentistry 45 depression (psychological) 8, 156 depressions (economic) 3, 31, 32, 186–7, 192, 289; see also economic crashes deserts, expanding 28, 280 Detroit 315, 355 Dhaka 189 diabetes 156, 274, 306 Diamond, Jared 293–4, 380 diamonds 320, 322 Dickens, Charles 220 Diesel, Rudolf 146 Digital Equipment Corporation 260, 282 digital photography 114, 386 Dimawe, battle of (1852) 321 Diocletian, Roman emperor 175, 184 Diodorus 169 diprotodons 69 discount merchandising 112–14 division of labour: Adam Smith on vii, 80; and catallaxy 56; and fragmented government 172; in insects 75–6, 87–8; and population growth 211; by sex 61–5, 136, 376; and specialisation 7, 33, 38, 46, 61, 76–7, 175; among strangers and enemies 87–9; and trust 100; and urbanisation 164 DNA: forensic use 20; gene transfer 153 dogs 43, 56, 61, 84, 125 Doll, Richard 298 Dolphin, HMS 169 dolphins 3, 87 Domesday Book 215 Doriot, Georges 261 ‘dot-communism’ 356 Dover Castle 197 droughts: modern 241, 300, 334; prehistoric 54, 65, 334 drug crime 106, 186 DuPont (corporation) 31 dyes 167, 225, 257, 263 dynamos 217, 233–4, 271–2, 289 dysentery 157, 353 eagles 17, 239, 299, 409 East India Company 225, 226 Easter Island 380 Easterbrook, Greg 294, 300, 370 Easterlin, Richard 26 Easterly, William 318, 411 eBay (corporation) 21, 99, 100, 114, 115 Ebla, Syria 164 Ebola virus 307 economic booms 9, 29, 216 economic crashes 7–8, 9, 193; credit crunch (2008) 8–10, 28–9, 31, 100, 102, 316, 355, 399, 411; see also depressions (economic) ecosystems, dynamism of 250–51, 303, 410 Ecuador 87 Edinburgh Review 285 Edison, Thomas 234, 246, 272, 412 education: Africa 320; Japan 16; measuring value of 117; and population control 209, 210; universal access 106, 235; women and 209, 210 Edwards, Robert 306 Eemian interglacial period 52–3 Egypt: ancient 161, 166, 167, 170, 171, 192, 193, 197, 270, 334; Mamluk 182; modern 142, 154, 192, 301, 323; prehistoric 44, 45, 125, 126; Roman 174, 175, 178 Ehrenreich, Barbara 291 Ehrlich, Anne 203, 301–2 Ehrlich, Paul 143, 190, 203, 207, 301–2, 303 electric motors 271–2, 283 electricity 233–5, 236, 237, 245–6, 337, 343–4; costs 23; dynamos 217, 233–4, 271–2, 289 elephants 51, 54, 69, 303, 321 Eliot, T.S. 289 email 292 emigration 199–200, 202; see also migrations empathy 94–8 empires, trading 160–61; see also imperialism enclosure acts 226, 323, 406 endocrine disruptors 293 Engels, Friedrich 107–8, 136 England: agriculture 194–6, 215; infant mortality 284; law 118; life expectancy 13, 284; medieval population 194–7; per capita income 196; scientific revolution 255–7; trade 75, 89, 104, 106, 118, 169, 194; see also Britain Enron (corporation) 29, 111, 385 Erie, Lake 17 Erie Canal 139, 283 ethanol 240–42, 300 Ethiopia 14, 316, 319; prehistoric 52, 53, 129 eugenics 288, 329 Euphrates river 127, 158, 161, 167, 177 evolution, biological 5, 6, 7, 49–50, 55–6, 75, 271, 350 Ewald, Paul 309 exchange: etiquette and ritual of 133–4; and innovation 71–2, 76, 119, 167–8, 251, 269–74; and pre-industrial economies 133–4; and property rights 324–5; and rule of law 116, 117–18; and sexual division of labour 65; and specialisation 7, 10, 33, 35, 37–8, 46, 56, 58, 75, 90, 132–3, 350–52, 355, 358–9; and trust 98–100, 103, 104; as unique human trait 56–60; and virtue 100–104; see also bartering; markets; trade executions 104 extinctions 17, 43, 64, 68, 69–70, 243, 293, 302, 338–9 Exxon (corporation) 111, 115 eye colour 129 Ezekiel 167, 168 Facebook (website) 262, 268, 356 factories 160, 214, 218, 219–20, 221, 223, 256, 258–9, 284–5 falcons 299 family formation 195, 209–210, 211, 227 famines: modern 141, 143, 154, 199, 203, 302; pessimism about 280, 281, 284, 290, 300–302, 314; pre-industrial 45, 139, 195, 197 Faraday, Michael 271–2 Fargione, Joseph 242 farming: battery 104, 145–6; free-range 146, 308; intensive 143–9; organic 147, 149–52, 393; slash-and-burn 87, 129, 130; subsidies 188, 328; subsistence 87, 138, 175–6, 189, 192, 199–200; see also agriculture; food supply fascism 289 Fauchart, Emmanuelle 264 fax machines 252 Feering, Essex 195 Fehr, Ernst 94–6 female emancipation 107, 108–9, 209 feminism 109 Ferguson, Adam 1 Ferguson, Niall 85 Fermat’s Last Theorem 275 fermenting 130, 241 Ferranti, Sebastian de 234 Fertile Crescent 126, 251 fertilisation, in-vitro 306 fertilisers 32, 129, 135, 139–41, 142, 143, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149–50, 152, 155, 200, 337 Fibonacci 178 figs 125, 129 filariasis 310 Finland 15, 35, 261 fire, invention of 4, 50, 51, 52, 60, 274 First World War 289, 309 fish, sex-change 280, 293 fish farming 148, 155 fishing 62, 63–4, 71, 78–9, 81–2, 125, 127, 129, 136, 159, 162, 163, 327 Fishman, Charles 113 Flanders 179, 181, 194 flight, powered 257, 261, 264, 266 Flinders Island 81, 84 floods 128, 250, 329, 331, 334, 335, 426 Florence 89, 103, 115, 178 flowers, cut 42, 327, 328 flu, pandemic 28, 145–6, 308–310 Flynn, James 19 Fontaine, Hippolyte 233–4 food aid 28, 141, 154, 203 food miles 41–2, 353, 392; see also local sourcing food preservation 139, 145, 258 food prices 20, 22, 23, 34, 39, 40, 42, 240, 241, 300 food processing 29–30, 60–61, 145; see also baking; cooking food retailing 36, 112, 148, 268; see also supermarkets food sharing 56, 59–60, 64 food supply: and biofuels 240–41, 243, 300; and climate change 337–8; and industrialisation 139, 201–2; pessimism about 280, 281, 284, 290, 300–302; and population growth 139, 141, 143–4, 146–7, 192, 206, 208–9, 300–302 Ford, Ford Maddox 188 Ford, Henry 24, 114, 189, 271 Forester, Jay 303 forests, fears of depletion 304–5, 339 fossil fuels: and ecology 237, 240, 304, 315, 342–3, 345–6; fertilisers 143, 150, 155, 237; and industrialisation 214, 216–17, 229–33, 352; and labour saving 236–7; and productivity 244–5; supplies 216–17, 229–30, 237–8, 245, 302–3; see also charcoal; coal; gas, natural; oil; peat Fourier analysis 283 FOXP2 (gene) 55, 375 fragmentation, political 170–73, 180–81, 184, 185 France: capital markets 259; famine 197; infant mortality 16; population growth 206, 208; revolution 324; trade 184, 186, 222 Franco, Francisco 186 Frank, Robert 95–6 Franken, Al 291 Franklin, Benjamin 107, 256 Franks 176 Fray Bentos 186 free choice 27–8, 107–110, 291–2 free-range farming 146, 308 French Revolution 324 Friedel, Robert 224 Friedman, Milton 111 Friend, Sir Richard 257 Friends of the Earth 154, 155 Fry, Art 261 Fuji (corporation) 114, 386 Fujian, China 89, 183 fur trade 169, 180 futurology 354–5 Gadir (Cadiz) 168–9, 170 Gaelic language 129 Galbraith, J.K. 16 Galdikas, Birute 60 Galilee, Sea of 124 Galileo 115 Gandhi, Indira 203, 204 Gandhi, Sanjay 203–4 Ganges, River 147, 172 gas, natural 235, 236, 237, 240, 302, 303, 337 Gates, Bill 106, 264, 268 GDP per capita (world), increases in 11, 349 Genentech (corporation) 259, 405 General Electric Company 261, 264 General Motors (corporation) 115 generosity 86–7, 94–5 genetic research 54, 151, 265, 306–7, 310, 356, 358 genetically modified (GM) crops 28, 32, 148, 151–6, 283, 358 Genghis Khan 182 Genoa 89, 169, 178, 180 genome sequencing 265 geothermal power 246, 344 Germany: Great Depression (1930s) 31; industrialisation 202; infant mortality 16; Nazism 109, 289; population growth 202; predicted deforestation 304, 305; prehistoric 70, 138; trade 179–80, 187; see also West Germany Ghana 187, 189, 316, 326 Gibraltar, Strait of 180 gift giving 87, 92, 133, 134 Gilbert, Daniel 4 Gilgamesh, King 159 Ginsberg, Allen 110 Gintis, Herb 86 Gladstone, William 237 Glaeser, Edward 190 Glasgow 315 glass 166, 174–5, 177, 259 glass fibre 303 Global Humanitarian Forum 337 global warming see climate change globalisation 290, 358 ‘glorious revolution’ (1688) 223 GM (genetically modified) crops 28, 148, 151–6, 283, 358 goats 122, 126, 144, 145, 197, 320 Goethe, Johann von 104 Goklany, Indur 143–4, 341, 426 gold 165, 177, 303 golden eagles 239, 409 golden toads 338 Goldsmith, Edward 291 Google (corporation) 21, 100, 114, 259, 260, 268, 355 Gore, Al 233, 291 Goths 175 Gott, Richard 294 Gramme, Zénobe Théophile 233–4 Grantham, George 401 gravity, discovery of 258 Gray, John 285, 291 Great Barrier Reef 250 Greece: ancient 115, 128, 161, 170–71, 173–4; modern 186 greenhouse gases 152, 155, 242, 329; see also carbon dioxide emissions Greenland: ice cap 125, 130, 313, 334, 339, 426; Inuits 61; Norse 380 Greenpeace 154, 155, 281, 385 Grottes des Pigeons, Morocco 53 Groves, Leslie 412 Growth is Good for the Poor (World Bank study) 317 guano 139–40, 302 Guatemala 209 Gujarat 162, 174 Gujaratis 89 Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden 184 Gutenberg, Johann 184, 253 Guth, Werner 86 habeas corpus 358 Haber, Fritz 140, 412 Hadza people 61, 63, 87 Haiti 14, 301, 315 Halaf people 130 Hall, Charles Martin 24 Halley, Edmond 256 HANPP (human appropriation of net primary productivity) number 144–5 Hanseatic merchants 89, 179–80, 196 Hansen, James 426 hanta virus 307 happiness 25–8, 191 Harappa, Indus valley 161–2 Hardin, Garrett 203 harems 136 Hargreaves, James 227, 256 Harlem, Holland 215–16 Harper’s Weekly 23 Harvey, William 256 hay 214–15, 216, 239, 408–9 Hayek, Friedrich 5, 19, 38, 56, 250, 280, 355 heart disease 18, 156, 295 ‘hedonic treadmill’ 27 height, average human 16, 18 Heller, Michael 265–6 Hellespont 128, 170 Henrich, Joe 77, 377 Henry II, King of England 118 Henry, Joseph 271, 272 Henry, William 221 Heraclitus 251 herbicides 145, 152, 153–4 herding 130–31 Hero of Alexandria 270 Herschel, Sir William 221 Hesiod 292 Hippel, Eric von 273 hippies 26, 110, 175 Hiroshima 283 Hitler, Adolf 16, 184, 296 Hittites 166, 167 HIV/AIDS 8, 14, 307–8, 310, 316, 319, 320, 322, 331, 353 Hiwi people 61 Hobbes, Thomas 96 Hock, Dee 254 Hohle Fels, Germany 70 Holdren, John 203, 207, 311 Holland: agriculture 153; golden age 185, 201, 215–16, 223; horticulture 42; industrialisation 215–16, 226; innovations 264; trade 31, 89, 104, 106, 185, 223, 328 Holy Roman Empire 178, 265–6 Homer 2, 102, 168 Homestead Act (1862) 323 homicide 14, 20, 85, 88, 106, 118, 201 Homo erectus 49, 68, 71, 373 Homo heidelbergensis 49, 50–52, 373 Homo sapiens, emergence of 52–3 Hong Kong 31, 83, 158, 169, 187, 219, 328 Hongwu, Chinese emperor 183 Hood, Leroy 222, 405 Hooke, Robert 256 horses 48, 68, 69, 129, 140, 197, 215, 282, 408–9; shoes and harnesses 176, 215 housing costs 20, 25, 34, 39–40, 234, 368 Hoxha, Enver 187 Hrdy, Sarah 88 Huber, Peter 244, 344 Hueper, Wilhelm 297 Huguenots 184 Huia (birds) 64 human sacrifice 104 Hume, David 96, 103, 104, 170 humour 2 Hunan 177 Hungary 222 Huns 175 hunter-gatherers: consumption and production patterns 29–30, 123; division of labour 61–5, 76, 136; famines 45, 139; limitations of band size 77; modern societies 66–7, 76, 77–8, 80, 87, 135–6, 136–7; nomadism 130; nostalgia for life of 43–5, 135, 137; permanent settlements 128; processing of food 29, 38, 61; technological regress 78–84; trade 72, 77–8, 81, 92–3, 123, 136–7; violence and warfare 27, 44–5, 136, 137 hunting 61–4, 68–70, 125–6, 130, 339 Huron Indians 138–9 hurricanes 329, 335, 337 Hurst, Blake 152 Hutterites 211 Huxley, Aldous 289, 354 hydroelectric power 236, 239, 343, 344, 409 hyenas 43, 50, 54 IBM (corporation) 260, 261, 282 Ibn Khaldun 182 ice ages 52, 127, 329, 335, 340, 388 ice caps 125, 130, 313, 314, 334, 338–9, 426 Iceland 324 Ichaboe island 140 ‘idea-agora’ 262 imitation 4, 5, 6, 50, 77, 80 imperialism 104, 162, 164, 166, 172, 182, 319–20, 357; see also colonialism in-vitro fertilisation 306 income, per capita: and economic freedom 117; equality 18–19, 218–19; increases in 14, 15, 16–17, 218–19, 285, 331–2 India: agriculture 126, 129, 141, 142–3, 147, 151–2, 156, 301; British rule 160; caste system 173; economic growth 187, 358; energy use 245; income equality 19; infant mortality 16; innovations 172–3, 251; Mauryan empire 172–3, 201, 357; mobile phone use 327; population growth 202, 203–4; prehistoric 66, 126, 129; trade 174–5, 175, 179, 186–7, 225, 228, 232; urbanisation 189 Indian Ocean 174, 175 Indonesia 66, 87, 89, 177 Indus river 167 Indus valley civilisation 161–2, 164 industrialisation: and capital investment 258–9; and end of slavery 197, 214; and food production 139, 201–2; and fossil fuels 214, 216–17, 229–33, 352; and innovation 38, 220–24, 227–8; and living standards 217–20, 226–7, 258; pessimistic views of 42, 102–3, 217–18, 284–5; and productivity 227–8, 230–31, 232, 235–6, 244–5; and science 255–8; and trade 224–6; and urbanisation 188, 226–7 infant mortality 14, 15, 16, 208–9, 284 inflation 24, 30, 169, 289 influenza see flu, pandemic Ingleheart, Ronald 27 innovation: and capital investment 258–62, 269; and exchange 71–2, 76, 119, 167–8, 251, 269–74; and government spending programmes 267–9; increasing returns of 248–55, 274–7, 346, 354, 358–9; and industrialisation 38, 220–24, 227–8; and intellectual property 262–7, 269; limitlessness 374–7; and population growth 252; and productivity 227–8; and science 255–8, 412; and specialisation 56, 71–2, 73–4, 76–7, 119, 251; and trade 168, 171 insect-resistant crops 154–5 insecticides 151–2 insects 75–6, 87–8 insulin 156, 274 Intel (corporation) 263, 268 intellectual property 262–7; see also copyright; patents intensive farming 143–9 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 330, 331, 332, 333–4, 338, 342, 347, 425, 426, 427, 428 internal combustion engine 140, 146, 244 International Planned Parenthood Foundation 203 internet: access to 253, 268; blogging 257; and charitable giving 318–19, 356; cyber-crime 99–100, 357; development of 263, 268, 270, 356; email 292; free exchange 105, 272–3, 356; packet switching 263; problem-solving applications 261–2; search engines 245, 256, 267; shopping 37, 99, 107, 261; social networking websites 262, 268, 356; speed of 252, 253; trust among users 99–100, 356; World Wide Web 273, 356 Inuits 44, 61, 64, 126 IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) 330, 331, 332, 333–4, 338, 342, 347, 349, 425, 426, 427, 428 IQ levels 19 Iran 162 Iraq 31, 158, 161 Ireland 24, 129, 199, 227 iron 166, 167, 169, 181, 184, 223, 229, 230, 302, 407 irradiated food 150–51 irrigation 136, 147–8, 159, 161, 163, 198, 242, 281 Isaac, Glyn 64 Isaiah 102, 168 Islam 176, 357, 358 Israel 53, 69, 124, 148 Israelites 168 Italy: birth rate 208; city states 178–9, 181, 196; fascism 289; Greek settlements 170–71, 173–4; infant mortality 15; innovations 196, 251; mercantilism 89, 103, 178–9, 180, 196; prehistoric 69 ivory 70, 71, 73, 167 Jacob, François 7 Jacobs, Jane 128 Jamaica 149 James II, King 223 Japan: agriculture 197–8; birth rates 212; dictatorship 109; economic development 103, 322, 332; economic and technological regression 193, 197–9, 202; education 16; happiness 27; industrialisation 219; life expectancy 17, 31; trade 31, 183, 184, 187, 197 Jarawa tribe 67 Java 187 jealousy 2, 351 Jebel Sahaba cemeteries, Egypt 44, 45 Jefferson, Thomas 247, 249, 269 Jenner, Edward 221 Jensen, Robert 327 Jericho 127, 138 Jevons, Stanley 213, 237, 245 Jews 89, 108, 177–8, 184 Jigme Singye Wangchuck, King of Bhutan 25–6 Jobs, Steve 221, 264, 405 John, King of England 118 Johnson, Lyndon 202–3 Jones, Rhys 79 Jordan 148, 167 Jordan river 127 Joyce, James 289 justice 19–20, 116, 320, 358 Kalahari desert 44, 61, 76 Kalkadoon aborigines 91 Kanesh, Anatolia 165 Kangaroo Island 81 kangaroos 62, 63, 69–70, 84, 127 Kant, Immanuel 96 Kaplan, Robert 293 Kay, John 184, 227 Kazakhstan 206 Kealey, Terence 172, 255, 411 Kelly, Kevin 356 Kelvin, William Thomson, 1st Baron 412 Kenya 42, 87, 155, 209, 316, 326, 336, 353 Kerala 327 Kerouac, Jack 110 Khoisan people 54, 61, 62, 67, 116, 321 Kim Il Sung 187 King, Gregory 218 Kingdon, Jonathan 67 Kinneret, Lake 124 Klasies River 83 Klein, Naomi 291 Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers (venture capitalists) 259 knowledge, increasing returns of 248–50, 274–7 Kodak (corporation) 114, 386 Kohler, Hans-Peter 212 Korea 184, 197, 300; see also North Korea; South Korea Kuhn, Steven 64, 69 kula (exchange system) 134 !

pages: 868 words: 147,152

How Asia Works
by Joe Studwell
Published 1 Jul 2013

When the regional recession struck in the early 1980s, the Philippine economy collapsed under the weight of unserviceable debt and shrank an astonishing 20 per cent. It only really stabilised in the mid 1990s, and there has been no sustained period of growth since. The Philippines has no indigenous, value-added manufacturing capacity. At the end of the Second World War only Japan and Malaysia had higher incomes per capita in Asia. Then Korea and Taiwan overtook the Philippines in the 1950s. The country slid down past Thailand in the 1980s, and Indonesia more recently. From having been in a position near the top of the Asian pile, the Philippines today is an authentic, technology-less Third World state with poverty rates to match.231 What was not important North-east and south-east Asia provide small variations around clear themes.

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Thus far, institutional deficiency has not been a significant drag on China’s economic growth. But it will catch up with it eventually. The Chinese government already spends more money trying to micro-manage people’s lives through its domestic security apparatus than it does on defence.69 On its present trajectory, China is set to be a middle-income per capita, but profoundly institutionally retarded state. At an economic level, this gives leading nations nothing to fear. At a political level the outlook is more tricky. We must hope that the fact that China is more cosmopolitan, and its military more subject to civilian control, than nineteenth-century Germany or inter-war Japan makes it a less threatening rising power.

pages: 524 words: 155,947

More: The 10,000-Year Rise of the World Economy
by Philip Coggan
Published 6 Feb 2020

Even India, still subject to British rule, was making 70% of its own steel in 1938, up from 14% in 1919.64 This process would continue, with a vengeance, after the Second World War. Latin American countries were badly hit by the Depression. Ten countries in the region suffered an export drop of more than half. Chile’s exports fell by 83% and its income per capita dropped by a third.65 The crisis accelerated over the course of 1930, when industrial production fell 20% in Britain, 25% in Germany and 30% in America.66 Banks started to fold, with 600 US institutions failing in the last two months of 1930. The most serious demise was that of the Bank of the United States in New York’s Bronx district.

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The proportion of people living past their 65th birthday has risen from 34% to 77%.8 Globally, there has been just as dramatic a change. Life expectancy in 1820 was 36 in the developed world and 24 elsewhere; by 2000, the respective figures were 79 and 64. Over that same period, global population rose sixfold and income per capita ninefold (see chart).9 Occasionally, there are terrible famines, as in Ethiopia in the 1980s or in Yemen at the time of writing. But they are much rarer and more isolated than they used to be. Malthus has been conquered. A stronger economy supports a bigger population World population, bn Source: Our World In Data The most exciting news of the last 30 years has been that the developing world has been catching up.

pages: 515 words: 152,128

Material World: A Substantial Story of Our Past and Future
by Ed Conway
Published 15 Jun 2023

In 1800, 95 per cent of Britain’s energy came from coal; at the very same point, almost all of France’s energy – over 90 per cent – still came from burning wood. No longer was Britain yoked to the organic limitations of how many trees could be grown on its landmass. And around this time, its income per capita, which for most of history had been more or less the same as France’s, began to soar. By the early nineteenth century it was 80 per cent richer than France.7 Perhaps the simplest way to illustrate the importance of this energy transition – this rupture with humankind’s natural constraints – is to ask what life would look like today if we ditched coal and coke from our blast furnaces and returned to using wood and charcoal instead?

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Indeed, while you might have expected nations with mineral wealth to enjoy better prospects than their neighbours, invariably the opposite was the case, as geological abundance correlated with weak economic growth. And when it comes to the ‘resource curse’ – a consequence in part of the endemic corruption often fuelled by the availability of mining royalties – few countries provide as vivid a case study as the Belgian Congo, or as it is known today, the Democratic Republic of Congo (the DRC). Here, income per capita is among the world’s lowest, as is life expectancy. Most of the country lives in crushing poverty while a handful of people make untold sums. Yet no other country in the world has quite the same kind of endowment of critical minerals. In the preceding pages we have visited some of the world’s richest sources of minerals, but few can claim to be genuine anomalies.

pages: 851 words: 247,711

The Atlantic and Its Enemies: A History of the Cold War
by Norman Stone
Published 15 Feb 2010

Bohley, Bärbel Böhm, Karl Bokassa, Jean-Bédel Bolivia Bologna Bolsheviks: and bureaucracy and China Civil War Congress of the Peoples of the East (1920) lies of Revolution and science Bond, James (fictional character) Bonn Borinage Borland Software Corporation Borodin, Mikhail Boston Bourgès-Maunoury, Maurice BP (British Petroleum) Bradlee, Ben Braestrup, Peter Brandt, Willy: background and character elected Chancellor foreign minister mayor of West Berlin memoirs Nobel Peace Prize Ostpolitik resignation Braşov Bratislava author’s imprisonment in Braudel, Fernand Braun, Otto Brazil Breakfast at Tiffany’s (film) Brecht, Bertolt Brentano, Lujo Brescia Brest-Litovsk Bretherton, Russell Bretton Woods conference (1944) Bretton Woods system end of Triffin Dilemma Brezhnev, Leonid: and Afghanistan and arms limitiation talks background and character and de Gaulle death and East Germany and Helsinki conference (1975) and Johnson and Middle East nationalities policy and Orthodox Church ‘our common European home’ and Poland political reforms and ‘Prague Spring’ and Soviet satellite states and Stalin succeeds Khrushchev and Vietnam Brioni island Britain: agriculture atomic bombs automobile industry balance of payments banking system and Chinesewar civil service class system coal industry Communist Party council housing crime cultural institutions currency controls and Cyprus defence expenditure Department of Trade and Industry Depression (1930s) devaluation of sterling divorce rates economic and political decline education system (see also universities) and EEC/EU and Egypt emigration and establishment of NATO and European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) Falklands War (1982) family breakdown film industry financial deregulation fishing industry general elections: (1945); (1950); (1951); (1959); (1970); (1974); (1979); (1983) gold reserves and GreekWar IMF bail-out (1976) import surcharges income per capita Industrial Revolution industrial wastelands inflation intelligentsia and Iran Lend-Lease aid and Malaya and Marshall Plan middle classes miners’ strike (1984-5) monarchy National Health Service nationalization of industry navy North Sea oil nuclear weapons oil imports Poll Tax post-war debt post-war shortages and rationing privatizations productivity levels property prices public transport race riots scientific and technological developments Second World War shipbuilding steel industry strikes Suez crisis taxation television textile industry trade unions underclass unemployment universities Welfare State Westland affair (‘Westgate’; 1986) winter weather of 1946-7 withdrawal of forces from Gulf (1971) zone of occupation in Germany British Airways British Commonwealth British Empire: American antipathy towards decline of decolonization revitalization attempts trade British Leyland (automobile manufacturer) British Petroleum (BP) British Steel British Telecom Brittan, Sir Samuel Bronfman, Edgar Brown, Andrew Brucan, Silviu Bruce, David Bruges Brussels Brussels Exhibition (1958) Brussels Pact (1948) Bryan, William Jennings Brzezinski, Zbigniew Bucak, Mehmet Celal Bucharest Buck, Pearl S.

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Turin University Turing, Alan Türkeş, Alparslan Turkey: Alevi population ANAP (‘Motherland’ Party) banking system Christian minorities coal industry consumer goods production corruption and Cyprus Democratic Party education system (see also universities) and EEC/EU elections: (1950); (1974); (1977); (1983); (1986); (1989); (1991) emigration establishment and success of Atatürk’s republic GAP project Greek population ‘guest workers’ in Germany and human rights hydro-electricity inflation infrastructure Inönü’s government intelligentsia Islam Jews in Justice Party and Korean War Kurdish population language and Marshall Plan Marxism military coup (1960) military coup (1971) military coup (‘generals’ coup’; 1980) Nationalist Party NATO membership Özal’s economic reforms Özal’s premiership and presidency peasantry political instability of multi-party period population growth refugees in relations with USSR Republican Party Second World War secularism Soviet territorial claims steel industry taxation trade unions universities US aid US bases war with Greece (1919-22) Turner Broadcasting Tutzing U2 spy planes UB (Polish secret police) Uganda Uglich Ukraine: birth rate Communist takeover demolition of churches Khrushchev as Party head nationalism Russian population transfer of Crimea to Uniates Ukrainians: in Poland in Soviet Politburo Ulbricht, Walter unemployment: Britain Chile ‘downsizing’ France Nazi Germany Phillips Curve reunified Germany USA Uniates (Orthodox Church) ‘Uniscan’ (proposed European free-trade area) Unitarians United Nations: and Afghanistan and Chilean coup (1973) and Cuban crisis of 1962 and Cyprus development of bureaucracy establishment of as forum for ‘world opinion’ investigation of German reunification and Korean War ‘non-aligned’ states and Palestine ‘peacekeeping’ role Security Council and Suez crisis and Yom Kippur War United Nations Economic Council for Latin America United Nations Human Rights Commission United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) United Workers’ Party (Hungarian) universities: Belgium Britain Chile France Germany Italy Poland Romania student demonstrations student exchanges student loans Turkey USA USSR UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) Untergang, Der (Downfall; film) uranium Uriage, administrators’ school Urrutia, Manuel USA: and Afghanistan ‘Alliance for Progress’ (plan for Latin America) armaments industry atomic bombs automobile industry balance of payments banking system Bay of Pigs invasion (1961) business management methods and Chile and Chinesewar Civil Rights Act (1964) coal production coin-clipping Communists conservatism Constitution consumer goods production crime Cuban crisis of 1962 and Cyprus Declaration of Independence defence expenditure Democratic Party Depression (1930s) and division of Germany education system (see also universities) and Egypt and establishment of NATO and European Defence Community European resistance to cultural domination and Falklands War (1982) family breakdown farm subsidies fast food Federal Reserve feminism film industry financial deregulation and German economic miracle gold reserves grain exports to USSR Great Society and Greekwar and Haiti health care ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) immigration income per capita inflation intelligentsia interest rates and Iran Iran-Contra affair and Israel Jews in Korean War Lend-Lease aid to Britain McCarthyism mass culture missionaries in China motorways National Security Council (NSC) New Deal New Frontier nuclear weapons development oil industry and Pakistan personal debt and Poland post-war occupation of Japan poverty Presidential elections: (1952); (1960); (1964); (1968); (1972); (1976); (1980); (1984); (1988) productivity public transport ‘pursuit of happiness’ racial problem refugee groups Republican Party ‘rust belt’ SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) and Saudi Arabia Savings and Loans crisis Second World War space programme steel production Strategic Defense Initiative (‘Star Wars’) strikes ‘supplyside’ economics Supreme Court taxation technological developments trade unions and Turkey underclass unemployment universities urban development and decay visa system Watergate scandal welfare system westward migration see also CIA; Marshall Plan; Vietnam War USSR: Afghanistan war (1979-89) Agitation and Propaganda department alcoholism American grain imports and Angola anti-alcohol campaign atomic bombs and Austria Berlin blockade (1948-9) birth rate border conflicts with China business management methods censorship and Chile and Chinesewar collapse of communism collectivization policy commissariat for culture coup of August 1991 Cuban crisis of 1962 cultural institutions deportations disintegration dissidents ‘Doctors’ plot’ (1952) and East Germany economic stagnation and Egypt and Ethiopia Five Year Plans friendship treaty with China (1950) German invasion (1941) glasnost and human rights and Hungarian uprising of 1956 ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) inflation information technology institutchiki intelligentsia internment camps invasion of Czechoslovakia and Iran Jews in and Korean War life expectancy rates and Marshall Plan Molotov Plan nationalism navy New Economic Policy non-Russian populations nuclear power nuclear weapons development oil and gas production ‘Optimal Functioning’ planning system ‘our common European home’ ‘peaceful coexistence’ doctrine peasantry perestroyka and Poland power struggle following Stalin’s death and ‘Prague Spring’ refugees in Turkey relations with West Germany religious persecution reparations demands and Romania SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) scientific and technological developments Second World War shortages and starvation Siberian gas pipeline Sino-Soviet split slave labour space programme Spetsnaz (‘special forces’ troops) stage managment of revolutions of 1989 Stalin’s purges steel industry strikes television and Turkey underground theatre universities and Vietnam Western studies of Soviet economy winter war with Finland (1939-40) see also Communist Party of Soviet Union; KGB; Red Army; RussianWar; Russian Revolution Ussuri river Ustinov, Dmitry Uzbekistan Uzbeks Uzunada island Vaizey, John, Baron Valparaíso Van, Turkey Vance, Cyrus Vandenberg Resolution (1948) Vann, John Vatican Papal Guard Vatican(ecumenical council) Venezuela, oil production Venice Venice conference (1956) venture capital Verheugen, Günter Verlaine, Paul Vernadsky, George Vernadsky, Vladimir Vial (Chilean conglomerate) Vichy France Vienna: airport bombing (1985) Atomic Energy Commission author’s studies in espionage in Karl-Marx Hof bombardment (1934) Kraus on OPEC headquarters post-war rebuilding State Opera Taylor on Vienna conference (1961) Vienna OPEC conference (1973) Vienna school of economics Vietnam: agricultual collectivization ‘boat people’ Buddhists Catholics Chinese minority population Communist Party famine French rule France-Indochina war independence movement industrialization invasion of Cambodia (1978) Japanese invasion (1941) partition peasantry war with China see also North Vietnam; South Vietnam Vietnam War (1959-75): American conscription American public opposition Ap Bac, battle of (1963) bombing campaigns ceasefire CIA involvement civilian casualty totals corruption European response to fall of Saigon (1975) guerrilla warfare Gulf of Tonkin incident (1964) Ho Chi Minh Trail Khe Sanh, battle of (1968) Lam Son operation (1971) media coverage military casualty totals My Lai massacre (1968) numbers of American troops deployed origins of Paris peace talks ‘peace initiatives’ Phoenix ‘pacification’ programme Tet offensive (1968) use of Agent Orange use of helicopters ‘Vietnamization’ Vilna Vinde, Pierre Vladikavkaz Volcker, Paul Volga Famine (1921-2) Volga river Volhynia Volkswagen (automobile manufacturer) Volobuyev, P.

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Werfel, Franz Werfel, Roman Werner, Pierre West Berlin: access agreements with East birth rate Brandt as mayor isolation of student population subsidies symbolism of war damage Weizsäcker as mayor see also Berlin Wall West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany): agriculture automobile industry balance of payments birth rates Bundesbank (Federal Bank) Catholic Church Christian Democrats (CDU) coal production Communist Party conservatism constitution contraceptivedevelopment cultural institutions economic miracle education system (see also universities) elections: (1965); (1969); (1972) establishment of West German state and European Atomic Community and European Economic Community exports fiftieth anniversary floating of currency Franco-German reconciliation Free Democrats (FDP) Grand Coalition (SPD-CDU) Green Party ‘guest workers’ and Helsinki conference (1975) immigration from East Germany income per capita inflation intelligentsia introduction of Deutsche Mark and Kurdish nationalism ‘Little’ coalition (SPD-FDP) missile bases NATO membership neo-Nazism and nuclear weapons Ostpolitik peasantry political institutions privatizations productivity levels protectionism rearmament Red Army Faction refugee leagues regional policy relations with Poland relations with USSR reunification shipbuilding Social Democrats (SPD) Soviet gas supplies Sozialmarktwirtschaft steel production taxation television terrorism trade unions traffic policy treaties with East Germany (1971-2) Turkish immigrants universities welfare system Western European Union Westland affair (‘Westgate’; 1986) Westmoreland, William Weyand, Frederick.

pages: 251 words: 63,630

The End of Cheap China: Economic and Cultural Trends That Will Disrupt the World
by Shaun Rein
Published 27 Mar 2012

Chinese consumers are well aware of what products you are selling in other markets, because of information flow via the Internet and tourism, and they don’t want to wait months or years to buy the newest products. They have no compunctions about going through illegal channels if it means faster gratification. Key Action Item Your former factory workers now might be your target market. With rising incomes, per capita GDP has tripled in the last decade from $1,000 to $3,000 per year. Revamp your China-based factories to sell within China rather than just for export. Release in China before Other Markets Many companies make the mistake of taking too long to introduce the season’s newest products into China.

pages: 217 words: 61,407

Twilight of Abundance: Why the 21st Century Will Be Nasty, Brutish, and Short
by David Archibald
Published 24 Mar 2014

A storage system for intermittent wind power to be stored so it can be drawn on when required at least doubles the cost of wind power, even before taking into account the conversion losses, which would be at least 40 percent of generated power. Relying on wind would take the percentage of U.S. GDP outlaid on energy from the current 9 percent to at least 29 percent, slashing disposable income per capita. According to figures released by the wind power industry, individual wind turbines have a high energy return on investment—that is, twenty times. As part of an integrated power supply system with energy storage and backup power generation, however, energy return on investment falls to less than five times, even going by industry figures.

pages: 252 words: 60,959

Numbers Don't Lie: 71 Stories to Help Us Understand the Modern World
by Vaclav Smil
Published 4 May 2021

Since 1990, the most common alternative has been to use the Human Development Index (HDI), a multivariable measure constructed in order to provide a better yardstick. It combines life expectancy at birth and educational achievements (mean and expected years of schooling) with the gross national income per capita—but (not surprisingly) it correlates highly with the average per capita GDP, making the latter variable about as good a measure of the quality of life as the more elaborate index. My own choice of a single-variable measure for rapid and revealing comparisons of quality of life is infant mortality: the number of deaths during the first year of life that take place per 1,000 live births.

pages: 242 words: 68,019

Why Information Grows: The Evolution of Order, From Atoms to Economies
by Cesar Hidalgo
Published 1 Jun 2015

Chile has a long mining tradition or as I like to say, Chile is heavily involved in “atomic ranching.” But this was not always the case. During the nineteenth century Chile’s wealth came mostly from the export of saltpeter, a mineral used as a fertilizer and as an ingredient in gunpowder. Saltpeter made the Chilean economy boom. At the turn of the twentieth century Chile had an income per capita that was larger than that of Spain, Sweden, or Finland.6 Things were good, but the pendulum was about to swing the other way. Figure 3. Products that Brazil exported to China in 2012. Total exports USD 41.3B (Source: atlas.media.mit.edu) Figure 4. Products that China exported to Brazil in 2012.

pages: 262 words: 66,800

Progress: Ten Reasons to Look Forward to the Future
by Johan Norberg
Published 31 Aug 2016

In Asia, some attribute this fertility decline to brutal policies like China’s one-child policy, but fertility fell much further among the Chinese in Taiwan and by exactly the same rate in Thailand. Women don’t suffer through as many pregnancies, and parents are spared the agony of having to see their children dying. The wealthier a country is, the healthier it is. Variation in income can explain over seventy per cent of the variation in infant and child mortality. No country with an income per capita above $10,000 has an infant mortality rate above two per cent. Richer people can invest more in sanitation and water facilities, and can afford food and medicine. But it is not just that humanity is getting richer, so it can afford a better standard of living. That is not even the major cause.

pages: 251 words: 69,245

The Haves and the Have-Nots: A Brief and Idiosyncratic History of Global Inequality
by Branko Milanovic
Published 15 Dec 2010

About 5 percent of people in the world, living in the poorest and most conflict-ridden countries such as Sudan, Afghanistan, North Korea, Somalia, and Iraq, are not included since their countries do not conduct national household surveys. Thus, all inequality results shown here are (slight) underestimates compared to “real” values. 5 It takes $90,000 of net income per capita to be in the top 1 percent of U.S. income distribution. 6 We know that 60/(2.06)α has to yield 6. Hence, α = 3.2. Vignette 3.2 1 One example is Thomas Friedman, The World Is Flat (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2005). 2 Pioneered by Lester Thurow, “A Surge in Inequality,” Scientific American 256 (1987), it was used recently in Carol Graham, Nancy Birdsall, and Stefano Pettinato, Stuck in the Tunnel: Is Globalization Muddling the Middle?

Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
by Daron Acemoğlu and James A. Robinson
Published 28 Sep 2001

Democracy and Income 1990s. Figure 3.6. Democracy and Income 1990s. 53 54 What Do We Know about Democracy? Figure 3.7. Democracy and Education 1990s. Figure 3.5 shows this by plotting the average Freedom House index during the 1990s versus the average log gross domestic product (GDP) (income) per capita during the 1990s (in purchasing-power party terms, calculated from the latest version of the Summers–Heston data set; Heston, Summers, and Atten 2002). Figure 3.6 does the same using the average Polity score during the 1990s. Both ﬁgures show a strong positive relationship between income and democracy.

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This way of looking at the data is useful because it differences out potentially ﬁxed characteristics that are simultaneously affecting income and democracy (thus bringing us closer to the causal relationship between income and democracy). Both ﬁgures show a clear pattern: there is no relationship between changes in income per capita and changes in democracy. In other words, although richer countries are more democratic, there is no evidence that countries that grow faster than others tend to become more democratic, at least over this period. A natural interpretation of the patterns shown in Figures 3.5 and 3.6 in light of these results is that they are largely driven by some ﬁxed country characteristics.

The Handbook of Personal Wealth Management
by Reuvid, Jonathan.
Published 30 Oct 2011

For this reason, buying art associated with future economic development and a strong national culture while understanding the fashions of the past ឣ 162 PLEASURABLE INVESTMENT ______________________________________________ may reap the best rewards; the logic being that as the wealthy proportion of a population reaches a certain income level they tend to buy their own art before exploring art from other countries. Looking beyond the BRIC countries of Brazil, Russia, China, and India, Goldman Sachs recommends the ‘Next 11’ as general investment opportunities; in order of projected income per capita in 2025, these are South Korea, Mexico, Turkey, Iran, Vietnam, Egypt, Indonesia, Philippines, Pakistan, Nigeria and Bangladesh. The major art auction houses are represented in five of these countries. Nevertheless, the best advice as always is to buy something you like and hope your enthusiasm is shared with buyers of the future.

Blindside: How to Anticipate Forcing Events and Wild Cards in Global Politics
by Francis Fukuyama
Published 27 Aug 2007

See International Health Regulations Imagination: believability and, 93–94, 98; of low-probability events, 3, 8–9, 98; as psychological barrier, 8–9; of strategic surprises, 93–94, 97–99 IMF. See International Monetary Fund Immigration, 148, 149, 156, 161–62 Incentives: for good vs. bad predictions, 2, 171; against infectious disease preparedness, 87, 88, 89; political, 4, 171 Income gap, 137, 149 Income per capita: increases in, 137; and value of life, 11, 15 Incubation period, of SARS, 87 India: energy dependence of, 76; poverty rates in, 164; predictions of famine in, 135–36 Indian Ocean tsunami (2004), political barriers to preparing for, 10–11 Individualism, expressive, 133 Indonesia: breakup of, as future surprise, 106, 144; conditions before economic crisis in, 44, 46; effects of economic crisis in, 42, 47, 49 Inequality, income, 137, 149 Infectious disease, emerging, 82–90; drug resistance in, 84, 85; funding for response to, 89–90; gaps in preparation for, 83; global approach to, 83, 89–90; international regulations on, 88–89, 90; optimism vs. pessimism about prospect of, 129–30, 136; preparedness for, 85–86, 171; prevention of, 83–85; reporting on, 87, 88; response to, 87, 89–90; sources of, 82, 83; surveillance of, 86–87, 88; transmission of, 82–83, 85; treatment of, 84; vs. wellestablished disease, 84–85 Influenza pandemic: bird flu and, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86; funding for response to, 89–90; optimism vs. pessimism about prospect of, 129–30, 136; 2990-7 ch17 index 7/23/07 12:33 PM Page 190 190 1918–19 outbreak of, 83, 130, 136; preparedness for, 85; prevention of, 84, 85; response to, 87, 89–90; sources of future, 82; surveillance of, 86 Information collection, filters for, and strategic surprises, 99–100 Information processing, and strategic surprises, 100–01 Information technology innovation, 120–25; convergence of ideas in, 123–25; at DARPA, 63–65; individuals driving, 120–23; in scenario thinking, 110, 117–19; trends in, 120; U.S. leadership in, 58 Innovation organization, 59–70; DARPA model of, 63–67; definition of, 59; and energy dependence, 59–60, 67–70; fragmentation of, 62–63; at institutional level, 59, 63–67; at personal level, 59, 63–65; precursors to DARPA model of, 60–63; in World War II, 60–61 Inside-out perspective, 101–03 Institute of Medicine, 89 Institutional barriers: to energy innovation agency, 68–69; to preparedness, 2–5, 171 Institutional organization, of DARPA, 59, 63–67 Intel, 122–23 Intelligence, U.S.: examples of failures in, 41.

pages: 381 words: 78,467

100 Plus: How the Coming Age of Longevity Will Change Everything, From Careers and Relationships to Family And
by Sonia Arrison
Published 22 Aug 2011

In their paper titled “The Health and Wealth of Nations,” Harvard economist David Bloom and Queen’s University economist David Canning explain that, based on the available research, if there are “two countries that are identical in all respects, except that one has a 5 year advantage in life expectancy,” then the “real income per capita in the healthier country will grow 0.3–0.5% per year faster than in its less healthy counterpart.”9 Although these percentages might look small, they are actually quite significant, especially when we consider that between 1965 and 1990 countries experienced an average per capita income growth of 2 percent per year.

pages: 267 words: 78,857

Discardia: More Life, Less Stuff
by Dinah Sanders
Published 7 Oct 2011

—Gretchen Rubin, author So much stuff If you combine mass production and rising standards of living over the past century, pretty much anyone outside the Third World can have more belongings than they’ll ever need—and more than their homes can accommodate. This reality reached a fever pitch after the 1960s as real disposable personal income per capita in the United States grew and spending increased while prices for most goods dropped dramatically. By the 1990s, heftily squatting on the scales opposite voluntary simplicity and similar movements, the average American family had twice as many possessions as their counterpart 25 years prior, according to a September 2009 article by Jon Mooallem in The New York Times, “The Self-Storage Self - Storing All the Stuff We Accumulate.”

pages: 309 words: 78,361

Plenitude: The New Economics of True Wealth
by Juliet B. Schor
Published 12 May 2010

The Path to Sustainability: Population, Affluence, and Technology Ecological economists often organize their thinking with an accounting framework developed by two scientists: Paul Ehrlich of Stanford and Harvard’s John Holdren, currently President Obama’s chief scientific adviser. It says that environmental impact is a product of three things: population, affluence, and technology. Affluence is income per capita, and includes not just what individuals earn, but the entire production of a society. Population measures the number of people consuming that level of income. Technology stands for an operator that translates total production into all of its ecological effects. Strictly speaking, this “technology” concept covers more than the word does in its common usage, because it also incorporates the mix of different products and activities.

pages: 241 words: 75,516

The Paradox of Choice: Why More Is Less
by Barry Schwartz
Published 1 Jan 2004

“defined contribution” pension plans depression attributional style and epidemic of individualism and learned helplessness and maximizing and social cost of symptoms of deregulation, of utilities Development as Freedom (Sen) diets diminishing marginal utility, law of discounts vs. surcharges divorce domain specificity “dress down” wardrobe durable goods E eating disorders Eckersley, Richard education, positional competition and egocentrism Ehrenreich, Barbara elections, U.S., of 2000, 26 electricity service electronic gadgets employment at home mobility in wardrobe and endowment effect Epstein, Benita error, susceptibility to evolution existential choice exit Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Hirschman) expectations: control of high raised rising see also prospect theory expected utility experience, diversity of experienced utility expressive value, of choice F family “fear of falling,” feelings, memories and predictions of framing comparison and definition of prospect theory and psychological accounting and reference prices and risk assessment and France Frank, Robert freedom “freedom from” and “freedom to,” self-respect and, see also autonomy friendship G gains, see risk, risk assessment Gallup polls Gawande, Atul Gawande, Hunter Germany goal-setting God, belief in “good enough,” see satisficers Gore, Al gratitude Great Britain grocery shopping gross domestic product guarantees, money-back H habits happiness autonomy and choice and decline in maximizing as obstacle to measurements and surveys of social comparison and social relations and status and wealth and see also satisfaction Harris, Lou Harvard University health care health insurance heart disease hedonic adaptation hedonic lag helplessness, learned heuristic, definition of high expectations, curse of Hirsch, Fred Hirschman, Albert HMOs human progress Hungary hypertension I Iceland identity, choice of illness immune system inaction inertia income per capita individualism infants “infomercial,” information: evaluations of filtered by consciousness gathering of quality and quantity of information costs instrumental value, of choice Internet medical misinformation on interviews, effect of J jams, of choice Japan jeans, selection of job mobility Johnson, Paul Joyless Economy, The (Scitovsky) justification, of choices K Kahneman, Daniel Kaiser Permanente Kaminer, Wendy Katz, Jay L Landman, Janet Lane, Robert learned helplessness liberty, negative vs. positive liking, wanting and loss aversion Loss of Happiness in Market Democracies, The (Lane) losses.

pages: 233 words: 75,712

In Defense of Global Capitalism
by Johan Norberg
Published 1 Jan 2001

During the last decades 24 developing countries with a combined population of more than 3 billion people have integrated into the global economy through increased trade flows and by reducing their tariffs more than three times more than the others. Those globalized developing countries saw growth in incomes per capita increase step by step from 1 percent annually in the 1960s to 5 percent in the 1990s. According to those trends, the average person in those countries will see her income doubled every 15 years.11 A clear connection exists between greater free trade and growth on the one hand and poverty reduction on the other.

pages: 246 words: 76,561

Radical Cities: Across Latin America in Search of a New Architecture
by Justin McGuirk
Published 15 Feb 2014

The current housing deficit stands at about 100,000, which is nothing by Latin American standards. So the focus ought now to shift to the quality of life enjoyed by people in government housing. The fact is that Chile no longer needs a housing solution as drastic as the one Aravena pioneered in Iquique. Thanks to its copper, the country has grown rich. It has the highest income per capita in Latin America, and no public debt. Within five years of Quinta Monroy being built the national housing budget has doubled – twice. The evidence of that is written all over Aravena’s subsequent housing projects. He parks his VW Beetle outside a row of houses in Lo Espejo. They look similar to the ones in Iquique, but they are different.

pages: 269 words: 77,876

Brilliant, Crazy, Cocky: How the Top 1% of Entrepreneurs Profit From Global Chaos
by Sarah Lacy
Published 6 Jan 2011

Sixteen years ago, Rwanda was written off as a place that would forever be mired in chaos and ethnic fighting. Today, by many accounts it’s the cleanest, safest, and least corrupt African nation, but Rwanda is stil incredibly poor—so poor that going jogging is considered a luxury in parts of the country because you are purposely expending calories just to stay thin. The gross national income per capita is less than half the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. If Rwanda can be considered an African startup, President Kagame—the general of the army that defeated the genocidaires and took back over the country when the rest of the world did nothing—is the entrepreneur crafting it. Let’s be clear: Kagame is a dictator, but most people I spoke with in Rwanda felt he was an overwhelmingly benevolent one.

pages: 277 words: 79,360

The Happiness Curve: Why Life Gets Better After 50
by Jonathan Rauch
Published 30 Apr 2018

When Helliwell and other researchers crunch the data, they find that six factors account for three-fourths of reported wellbeing: • social support: having someone to count on in times of trouble • generosity: people are happier when they do generous things and live among generous people • trust: corruption and dishonesty are bad for life satisfaction • freedom: feeling that you have sufficient freedom to make important life decisions • income per capita • healthy life expectancy If you look at that list, you will notice, again, that of the six factors, four have to do with social interaction. Of the bunch, social support is the most important, and together the social four—“relational goods,” as the term of art would have it—comprise the bulk of what makes us happy.

The Broken Ladder
by Keith Payne
Published 8 May 2017

The former is China, where the communist government actively suppressed religion for decades. It’s no surprise that religion would be less important than predicted from the nation’s average income. The more puzzling exception is the highly religious United States. Despite having by far the highest income per capita in the survey, its measure of religious belief is on par with that of Mexico, Lebanon, and South Africa. Of course, the prevalence of religion depends on many factors beyond income, like a country’s particular history and culture. America, for example, was founded in part by immigrants seeking refuge from religious persecution, which surely accounts for some of its unusual levels of devoutness.

pages: 261 words: 74,471

Good Profit: How Creating Value for Others Built One of the World's Most Successful Companies
by Charles de Ganahl Koch
Published 14 Sep 2015

The Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World Index takes into account many factors that affect the ability of people in a particular country to choose how they work, produce, consume, and invest. Those factors include property rights, free trade, sound money, and harmful regulation.6 Greater economic freedom is strongly correlated with not only higher income per capita, but with longer life expectancy, better environmental quality, improved health and education, less corruption, and better living standards—especially for the poor. Empirical study should lead one to conclude that long-term, widespread well-being is much more likely in free societies. By the same token, examples of prosperity in unfree societies—based on such things as superior natural resources—are few and far between, and generally short-lived.

pages: 829 words: 186,976

The Signal and the Noise: Why So Many Predictions Fail-But Some Don't
by Nate Silver
Published 31 Aug 2012

Nor did the inflation rate or the unemployment rate matter. And the identity of the candidates made no difference: a party may as well nominate a highly ideological senator like George McGovern as a centrist and war hero like Dwight D. Eisenhower. The key instead, Hibbs asserted, was a relatively obscure economic variable called real disposable income per capita. So how did the model do? It forecasted a landslide victory for Al Gore, predicting him to win the election by 9 percentage points. But George W. Bush won instead after the recount in Florida. Gore did win the nationwide popular vote, but the model had implied that the election would be nowhere near close, attributing only about a 1 in 80 chance to such a tight finish.32 There were several other models that took a similar approach, claiming they had boiled down something as complex as a presidential election to a two-variable formula.

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David, 206 Mathis, Catherine, 25, 462 matrices, in weather forecasting, 114–18 Mauna Loa Observatory, 375, 401 Maunder Minimum, 392 Mayfield, Max, 109, 110, 138–41 measles, 214, 223–24, 225 Mechanical Turk, 262–64, 263, 265, 281, 282 media bias, 60 medical diagnoses, 448 meditation, 328 Medvedev, Dmitri, 48 Memphis, Tenn., 396 Mercury, 374 Merrill Lynch, 353 metacognition, 273 methane, 374, 375 Met Office (UK), 394, 408 Mexico, 210, 215–16 Mexico City, 144 middle class, 189 Middle East, 398 Midway Islands, 413 Milledge, Lastings, 89 Millikan, Arikia, 334 mind blindness, 419 minor league system, 92–93 Mississippi, 109, 123–24 MIT, 384 MMR shots, 224 modeling for insights, 229 models: agent-based, 226, 227–29, 230 bugs in, 285–86 of CDO defaults, 13, 22, 26, 27, 29, 42, 45 for chess, 267 of climate system, 371, 380, 384–85, 401–6, 402 crudeness of, 7 of elections, 15 foxlike approach of, 68 FRED, 226 fundamentals-based, 68 language as, 230 naïve trust in, 11 overfitting in, 163–71, 166, 168–71, 185, 191, 452n, 478 for predicting earthquakes, 158–61, 167 regression, 100 signal vs. noise in, 388–89 SIR, 220–21, 221, 223, 225, 389 thought experiments as, 488 use and abuse of, 230 as useful even in failure, 230–31 for weather forecasting, 114–18, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123–25, 225, 226, 388 Model T, 212 Mojave Desert, 159–60 Molina, Yadier, 101 moment magnitude scale, 142n momentum trading, 344–45, 345, 368 Moneyball (Lewis), 9, 10, 77, 86, 87, 92, 93–94, 95, 99, 101, 105, 107, 314, 446 Moneymaker, Chris, 294–95, 296, 327 Mongols, 145n Monroe Doctrine, 419 Moody’s, 19, 24–25, 43, 44, 45, 463 Morgan, Joe, 102 Morris, Dick, 55, 56, 61 mortgage-backed securities, 462 home sales vs., 34–35, 35, 39, 42, 43 nonlinearity of, 119 ratings of, 19, 20, 24, 68 shorting of, 355 mortgages, 24 defaults on, 27–29, 184 subprime, 27, 33, 464 Mount Pinatubo, 392, 399–400 Moussaoui, Zacarias, 422, 444 MRSA, 227, 228 MSM, 222, 222, 487 MSNBC, 51n Müller-Lyer illusion, 366, 367 multiplier effect, 42 mumps, 224 Murphy, Allan, 129 Murphy, Donald, 89 mutual funds, 339–40, 340, 356, 363–64, 498 Nadal, Rafael, 331, 357-58, 496 Naehring, Tim, 77 Nagasaki, Japan, 432 Nagin, Ray, 110, 140–41 Napoleon I, Emperor of France, 262 NASA, 174–75, 370, 379, 393–95 NASDAQ, 346, 346, 348, 365 Nash, John, 419 National Academy of Sciences, 384 National Basketball Association (NBA), 92, 234–40, 255n National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR), 110, 111, 118 National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), 451n national debt, 189, 509 National Economic Council, 37 National Football League (NFL), 92, 185–86, 336, 480 National Hurricane Center, 108, 109–10, 126, 138–41 National Institute of Nuclear Physics, 143 National Journal, 57–58 National League, 79 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 122, 393–95 National Park Service, 267 National Science Foundation, 473 National Weather Service (NWS), 21, 122–23, 125, 126, 127–28, 131, 135, 139, 178–79, 393–94 NATO, 428–29, 429, 430–31, 431, 437, 438, 439 Nature, 13, 254, 409 Nauru, 372 nearest neighbor analysis, 85 negative feedback, 38, 39 neighborhoods, 224–25, 226–27, 230 Netherlands, 31, 210 New Jersey, 391 New Madrid Fault, 154 New Orleans, La., 108–9, 138, 139–40, 387, 388 Newsweek, 399 Newton, Isaac, 112, 114, 118, 241, 249, 448 New York, N.Y., 219n, 391, 391, 396, 432, 474, 514 New Yorker, 103 New York Knicks, 119 New York Stock Exchange, 329, 363, 370 New York Times, 146, 205–6, 276, 281, 356, 433, 484 New York Yankees, 74 New Zealand, 210 9/11 Commission, 444, 445 9/11 Commission Report, 423 Ninety-Five Theses (Luther), 4 Ningirsu, 112 nitrous oxide, 375 Nixon, Richard, 400 No Free Lunch, 361–62 noise, 63, 250 in batting averages, 339 in climatology, 371–73 definitions of, 416 in financial markets, 362–64 increase in, 13 in predictive models, 388–89 signals vs., 8, 13, 17, 60, 81, 133, 145, 154, 162, 163, 173, 185, 196, 285–86, 295, 327, 340, 371–73, 388–89, 390–91, 404, 448, 451, 453 in stock market, 368 “Noise” (Black), 362 no-limit hold ’em, 300–308, 309–11, 315–16, 316, 318, 324n, 495 nonlinear systems, 29, 118–19, 120, 376–77 Nordhaus, William, 398 North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), 423 Norway, 31 NRSROs, see ratings agencies Nuclear Cities Initiative, 512 nuclear weapons, 434, 436, 438 see also weapons of mass destruction null hypothesis, 260 see also statistical significance test Nunn, Sam, 434 Oakland Athletics, 87, 92, 99–100, 106, 471 Obama, Barack, 40, 49, 55, 59, 252, 358, 379, 444, 468, 473 obesity, 372, 373 objective truth, 14 objectivity, 14, 64, 72–73, 100, 252, 253, 255, 258-59, 288, 313, 403, 453 observer effect, 188, 472 Occam’s razor, 389 Odean, Terrance, 359 Oklahoma City bombing, 425, 427 Okun’s law, 189 Omaha, Nebr., 396 O’Meara, Christopher, 36 Omori’s Law, 477 On-base percentage (OBP), 95, 106, 314, 471 O’Neal, Shaquille, 233–34, 235, 236, 237 options traders, 364 order, complexity and, 173 outliers, 65, 425–28, 452 out of sample, 43–44, 420 Overcoming Bias (blog), 201 overconfidence, 179–83, 191, 203, 323–24, 386, 443, 454 in stock market trading, 359–60, 367 overeating, 503 overfitting, 163–68, 166, 191, 452n, 478 earthquake predictions and, 168–71, 185 over-under line, 239–40, 257, 286 ozone, 374 Ozonoff, Alex, 218–19, 223, 231, 483 Pacific countries, 379 Pacific Ocean, 419 Pacific Poker, 296–97 Page, Clarence, 48, 467 PageRank, 291 Pakistan, 434–35 Palin, Sarah, 59 Palm, 361, 362 panics, financial, 38, 195 Papua New Guinea, 228 Pareto principle, 312–13, 314, 315, 316n, 317, 496 Paris, 2 Parkfield, Calif., 158–59, 174 partisanship, 13, 56, 57, 58, 60, 64, 92, 130, 200, 378, 411, 452 Party Poker, 296, 319 patents, 7–8, 8, 411, 411n, 460, 514 pattern detection, 12, 281, 292 Pearl Harbor, 10, 412–13, 414, 415–17, 419–20, 423, 426, 444, 510 Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decisions (Wohlstetter), 415, 416, 418, 419–20 PECOTA, 9, 74–75, 78, 83, 84, 85–86 scouts vs., 88–90, 90, 91, 102, 105, 106–7 Pecota, Bill, 88 Pedroia, Dustin, 74–77, 85, 89, 97, 101–5 penicillin, 119 pensions, 24, 27, 34, 356, 463 P/E (price-to-earnings) ratio, 348, 349, 350–51, 354, 365, 369, 500 Perry, Rick, 59, 217 persistence, 131, 132, 132 personal income, 481 Peru, 210 Petit, Yusemiro, 89 Petty, William, 212 pharmaceuticals, 411 Philadelphia Phillies, 286 Pielke, Roger, Jr., 177n pigs, 209 Pippen, Scottie, 235, 236 pitchers, 88, 90, 92 Pitch f/x, 100–101, 106–7 Pittsburgh, Pa., 207–8, 228, 230 Pittsburgh, University of, 225–26 plate discipline, 96 Plato, 2 pneumonia, 205 Poe, Edgar Allan, 262–64, 282, 289 Poggio, Tomaso, 12, 231 point spread, 239 poker, 10, 16, 59–60, 63, 66, 256, 284, 294–328, 343, 362, 494–95 Bayesian reasoning in, 299, 301, 304, 306, 307, 322–23 boom in, 294, 296, 314–15, 319, 323 competition in, 313 computer’s playing of, 324 fish in, 312, 316, 317–19 inexperience of mid-2000s players in, 315 limit hold ’em, 311, 322, 322 luck vs. skill in, 321–23 no-limit hold ’em, 300–308, 309–11, 315–16, 316, 318, 324n, 495 online, 296–97, 310 plausible win rates in, 323 predictions in, 297–99, 311–15 random play in, 310 results in, 327 river in, 306, 307, 494 signal and noise in, 295 suckers in, 56, 237, 240, 317–18, 320 Texas hold ’em, 298–302 volatility of, 320, 322, 328 PokerKingBlog.com, 318 PokerStars, 296, 320 Poland, 52 Polgar, Susan, 281 polio vaccine, 206 political partisanship, see partisanship political polls, see polls politics, political science, 11, 14–15, 16, 53, 426 failures of predictions on, 11, 14–15, 47–50, 49, 53, 55–59, 64, 67–68, 157, 162, 183, 249, 314 small amount of data in, 80 polls, 61–63, 62, 68, 70, 426 biases in, 252–53 frequentist approach to, 252 individual vs. consensus, 335 margin of error in, 62, 65, 176, 252, 452 outlier, 65 prediction interval in, 183n Popper, Karl, 14, 15 Population Bomb, The (Ehrlich and Ehrlich), 212–13 pork, 210 Portland Trail Blazers, 234, 235–37, 489 positive feedback, 38, 39, 368 posterior possibility, 244 power-law distribution, 368n, 427, 429–31, 432, 437, 438, 441, 442 precision, accuracy vs., 46, 46, 225 predestination, 112 Predicting the Unpredictable: The Tumultuous Science of Earthquake Prediction (Hough), 157 prediction, 1, 16 computers and, 292 consensus, 66–67, 331–32, 335–36 definition of, 452n Enlightenment debates about, 112 in era of big data, 9, 10, 197, 250 fatalism and, 5 feedback on, 183 forecasting vs., 5, 149 by foxes, see foxes of future returns of stocks, 330–31, 332–33 of global warming, 373–76, 393, 397–99, 401–6, 402, 507 in Google searches, 290–91 by hedgehogs, see hedgehogs human ingenuity and, 292 of Hurricane Katrina, 108–10, 140–41, 388 as hypothesis-testing, 266–67 by IPCC, 373–76, 389, 393, 397–99, 397, 399, 401, 507 in Julius Caesar, 5 lack of demand for accuracy in, 202, 203 long-term progress vs. short-term regress and, 8, 12 Pareto principle of, 312–13, 314 perception and, 453–54, 453 in poker, 297–99, 311–15 probability and, 243 quantifying uncertainty of, 73 results-oriented thinking and, 326–28 scientific progress and, 243 self-canceling, 219–20, 228 self-fulfilling, 216–19, 353 as solutions to problems, 14–16 as thought experiments, 488 as type of information-processing, 266 of weather, see weather forecasting prediction, failures of: in baseball, 75, 101–5 of CDO defaults, 20–21, 22 context ignored in, 43 of earthquakes, 7, 11, 143, 147–49, 158–61, 168–71, 174, 249, 346, 389 in economics, 11, 14, 40–42, 41, 45, 53, 162, 179–84, 182, 198, 200–201, 249, 388, 477, 479 financial crisis as, 11, 16, 20, 30–36, 39–42 of floods, 177–79 of flu, 209–31 of global cooling, 399–400 housing bubble as, 22–23, 24, 25–26, 28–29, 32–33, 42, 45 overconfidence and, 179–83, 191, 203, 368, 443 overfitting and, 185 on politics, 11, 14–15, 47–50, 49, 53, 55–59, 64, 67–68, 157, 162, 183, 249, 314 as rational, 197–99, 200 recessions, 11 September 11, 11 in stock market, 337–38, 342, 343–46, 359, 364–66 suicide bombings and, 424 by television pundits, 11, 47–50, 49, 55 Tetlock’s study of, 11, 51, 52–53, 56–57, 64, 157, 183, 443, 452 of weather, 21–22, 114–18 prediction interval, 181-183, 193 see also margin of error prediction markets, 201–3, 332–33 press, free, 5–6 Price, Richard, 241–42, 490 price discovery, 497 Price Is Right, 362 Principles of Forecasting (Armstrong), 380 printing press, 1–4, 6, 13, 17, 250, 447 prior probability, 244, 245, 246, 252, 255, 258–59, 260, 403, 406–7, 433n, 444, 451, 490, 497 probability, 15, 61–64, 63, 180, 180, 181 calibration and, 134–36, 135, 136, 474 conditional, 240, 300; see also Bayes’s theorem frequentism, 252 and orbit of planets, 243 in poker, 289, 291, 297, 302–4, 302, 306, 307, 322–23 posterior, 244 predictions and, 243 prior, 244, 245, 246, 252, 255, 258–59, 260, 403, 406–7, 433n, 444, 451, 490, 498 rationality and, 242 as waypoint between ignorance and knowledge, 243 weather forecasts and, 195 probability distribution, of GDP growth, 201 probability theory, 113n productivity paradox, 7–8 “Programming a Computer for Playing Chess” (Shannon), 265–66 progress, forecasting and, 1, 4, 5, 7, 112, 243, 406, 410–11, 447 prospect theory, 64 Protestant Reformation, 4 Protestant work ethic, 5 Protestants, worldliness of, 5 psychology, 183 Public Opinion Quarterly, 334 PURPLE, 413 qualitative information, 100 quantitative information, 72–73, 100 Quantum Fund, 356 quantum mechanics, 113–14 Quebec, 52 R0 (basic reproduction number), 214–15, 215, 224, 225, 486 radar, 413 radon, 143, 145 rain, 134–37, 473, 474 RAND database, 511 random walks, 341 Rapoport, David C., 428 Rasskin-Gutman, Diego, 269 ratings agencies, 463 CDOs misrated by, 20–21, 21, 22, 26–30, 36, 42, 43, 45 housing bubble missed by, 22–23, 24, 25–26, 28–29, 42, 45, 327 models of, 13, 22, 26, 27, 29, 42, 45, 68 profits of, 24–25 see also specific agencies rationality, 183–84 biases as, 197–99, 200 of markets, 356–57 as probabilistic, 242 Reagan, Ronald, 50, 68, 160, 433, 466 RealClimate.org, 390, 409 real disposable income per capita, 67 recessions, 42 double dip, 196 failed predictions of, 177, 187, 194 in Great Moderation, 190 inflation-driven, 191 of 1990, 187, 191 since World War II, 185 of 2000-1, 187, 191 of 2007-9, see Great Recession rec.sport.baseball, 78 Red Cross, 158 Red River of the North, 177–79 regression analysis, 100, 401, 402, 498, 508 regulation, 13, 369 Reinhart, Carmen, 39–40, 43 religion, 13 Industrial Revolution and, 6 religious extremism, 428 religious wars of sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 2, 6 Remote Sensing Systems, 394 Reno, Nev., 156–57, 157, 477 reserve clause, 471 resolution, as measure of forecasts, 474 results-oriented thinking, 326–28 revising predictions, see Bayesian reasoning Ricciardi, J.

Four Battlegrounds
by Paul Scharre
Published 18 Jan 2023

—CHINESE GENERAL SECRETARY XI JINPING CONTENTS LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS PREFACE INTRODUCTION PART I POWER 1.THE NEW OIL 2.DATA 3.COMPUTE 4.TALENT 5.INSTITUTIONS PART II COMPETITION 6.A WINNING HAND 7.MAVEN 8.REVOLT 9.SPUTNIK MOMENT PART III REPRESSION 10.TERROR 11.SHARP EYES 12.A BETTER WORLD 13.PANOPTICON 14.DYSTOPIA PART IV TRUTH 15.DISINFORMATION 16.SYNTHETIC REALITY 17.TRANSFORMATION 18.BOT WARS PART V RIFT 19.FUSION 20.HARMONY 21.STRANGLEHOLD PART VI REVOLUTION 22.ROBOTICS ROW 23.PROJECT VOLTRON 24.FOUNDATION 25.THE WRONG KIND OF LETHALITY 26.JEDI 27.DISRUPTION PART VII ALCHEMY 28.CONTROL 29.POISON 30.TRUST 31.RACE TO THE BOTTOM PART VIII FIRE 32.ALIEN INTELLIGENCE 33.BATTLEFIELD SINGULARITY 34.RESTRAINT 35.THE FUTURE OF AI CONCLUSION ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ABBREVIATIONS NOTES INDEX LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Deep Neural Network U.S. R&D Funding as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product, 1953–2018 U.S. Share of Global R&D (1960) U.S. Share of Global R&D (2018) R&D Spending by Country, 2000–2018 Percentage of World GDP, 1970–2020 Gross National Income Per Capita—China, 1995–2019 Life Expectancy at Birth—China, 1960–2019 Infant Mortality—China, 1969–2019 Adversarial Examples Adversarial Patch Adversarial Attack in the Physical World Camouflaged Adversarial Attack MAPS Global Spread of Chinese Public Surveillance Technology, 2008–2019 PREFACE There was a singular moment when I realized robots would transform warfare.

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The result has been a monumental change in the economic quality of life for Chinese citizens. Eight hundred million people were lifted out of poverty, and per capita income increased twenty-five-fold. Average life expectancy rose from forty-four years in 1960 to seventy-seven years by 2018. Infant mortality plummeted by over 90 percent from 1969 to 2018. Gross National Income Per Capita—China, 1995–2019. China has seen unprecedented economic growth over the last several decades, lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. (Data from the World Bank. Chart by Melody Cook / Center for a New American Security.) Life Expectancy at Birth—China, 1960–2019. China’s economic miracle has dramatically improved health outcomes, including a rapid rise in life expectancy.

pages: 279 words: 87,910

How Much Is Enough?: Money and the Good Life
by Robert Skidelsky and Edward Skidelsky
Published 18 Jun 2012

Now let us compare the two predictions with actual outcomes. What has happened to growth in the rich countries plotted against Keynes’s prediction is shown in Chart 2, while what has happened to hours of work in rich countries, plotted against Keynes’s prediction, shown in Chart 3. Growth of real income per capita has been much as Keynes expected. The coincidence is in fact a bit of a fluke. Keynes assumed no major wars and no population growth in the countries covered. In fact there was another world war, and population has grown by about one-third. But he underestimated productivity growth. The two mistakes cancelled each other out, with the result that per capita incomes indeed rose fourfold in the seventy years from 1930, up to Keynes’s lower bound.

Crisis and Dollarization in Ecuador: Stability, Growth, and Social Equity
by Paul Ely Beckerman and Andrés Solimano
Published 30 Apr 2002

In addition, as the economic crisis came with instability, continuous currency depreciation, and high and volatile inflation, there was a reduction in real wages, affecting workers and their families as well as other low-income groups and classes whose incomes grow (if at all) at a slower pace than the exchange rate and average prices. In the case of Ecuador, as documented in chapter 4, unemployment, poverty, and inequality all worsened in this period. From a longer-term perspective, the low (and volatile) rate of GDP growth of the 1980s and 1990s implied almost stagnant income per capita for a long period, with minimal poverty reduction, persistent inequality, and social marginalization of minorities. This social situation worsened further because of the economic crisis of the late 1990s. The social impact of dollarization has to be evaluated against this background. Gender biases, in turn, seem to make crises affect women more adversely (see chapter 5).

The Ages of Globalization
by Jeffrey D. Sachs
Published 2 Jun 2020

Since 1500, Western Europe had made important advances on many fronts, including military power, global conquests, scale of industry, and multinational production and trade in many sectors, including cotton, sugar, tobacco, and others. By 1820, according to Maddison’s estimates, a significant gap in production per person had already opened between Western Europe and Asia. China, India, and Japan each had incomes per capita of around $600 (in 1990 international dollars) compared with Western Europe’s average of around $1,200 and Britain’s global lead at around $1,700. With the industrialization that followed, that gap widened dramatically in the nineteenth century. Figure 7.3 summarizes the dramatic story by comparing the two most dynamic industrializing nations—the United Kingdom and the United States—with several other world regions.

pages: 288 words: 85,073

Factfulness: Ten Reasons We're Wrong About the World – and Why Things Are Better Than You Think
by Hans Rosling , Ola Rosling and Anna Rosling Rönnlund
Published 2 Apr 2018

According to World Bank[3], the number is 63.2 percent, but we rounded it to 60 percent to avoid overstating progress. See gapm.io/q1. Fact Question 2: Correct answer is B. The majority of people live in middle-income countries. The World Bank[2] divides countries into income groups based on gross national income per capita in current US $. According to the World Bank[4], the low-income countries represent 9 percent of the world population, the middle-income countries, 76 percent of the world population, and the high-income countries, 16 percent of the world population. See gapm.io/q2. Fact Question 3: Correct answer is C.

pages: 354 words: 92,470

Grave New World: The End of Globalization, the Return of History
by Stephen D. King
Published 22 May 2017

Czechoslovaks, who had enjoyed considerable economic success in the interwar period, saw their average living standards fall from 37 per cent of those in the US in 1950 to 33 per cent in 1980. Poles, Hungarians and Soviet citizens made modest gains, but in relative terms were left for dust by the more dynamic Western European nations: their incomes per capita were still only between 30 and 35 per cent of those in the US in 1980. Over the same period, the incomes of the eight largest economies in Latin America rose only modestly compared with those in the US: on average up from 28 per cent to a still paltry 32 per cent. Chinese and Indian citizens were impoverished throughout, their average living standards stranded at only around 5 per cent of those in the US.

pages: 310 words: 91,151

Leaving Microsoft to Change the World: An Entrepreneur's Odyssey to Educate the World's Children
by John Wood
Published 28 Aug 2006

He was a fellow Kellogg graduate who had read an article in our alumni magazine about Room to Read’s progress. He saw serious fund-raising potential in Great Britain and was ready and willing to set up Room to Read as a public charity. Dean laid out the business case. The country had over 60 million people and one of the strongest economies and incomes per capita in the world. The average citizen was well aware of the global condition, partly as a result of the glory days of the British Empire. There was a strong history of citizens donating to causes beyond the borders. I agreed that the British market was tempting, but asked whether it wouldn’t be logistically and bureaucratically complex to set up a charitable entity.

pages: 339 words: 88,732

The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies
by Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee
Published 20 Jan 2014

In contrast, as discussed in chapter 7, productivity grew at an average of 1.56 percent per year during this period, accelerating a bit to 1.88 percent per year from 2000 to 2011. Most of the growth in productivity directly translated into comparable growth in average income. The reason why median income growth was so much lower was primarily because of increases in inequality.14 FIGURE 9.1 Real GDP vs. Median Income per Capita The Three Pairs of Winners and Losers In the past couple of decades, we’ve seen changes in tax policy, greater overseas competition, ongoing government waste, and Wall Street shenanigans. But when we look at the data and research, we conclude that none of these are the primary driver of growing inequality.

pages: 351 words: 93,982

Leading From the Emerging Future: From Ego-System to Eco-System Economies
by Otto Scharmer and Katrin Kaufer
Published 14 Apr 2013

The Economic Condition of Society Today Let us first consider the link between GDP and health or well-being. The relationship between GDP and average life expectancy is often used as an indicator of the quality of health in a country. There is in fact a close link between GDP and health up to a level of US$5,000 to US$8,000 annual income per capita (see figure 6). This link weakens significantly as GDP rises above that level. In other words, an increase in material output as measured by GDP in developed countries does not translate into better health or increased life expectancy. If a GDP increase in developed countries does little to increase the well-being of its citizens, what does improve their welfare?

pages: 327 words: 90,542

The Age of Stagnation: Why Perpetual Growth Is Unattainable and the Global Economy Is in Peril
by Satyajit Das
Published 9 Feb 2016

Chinese savings and foreign exchange reserves financed developed countries, especially their governments. China exported savings of around US$400 billion each year, helping reduce interest rates in the US by as much as 1 percent per annum. Its role as an exporter of capital was surprising because China was much poorer than the countries it financed. Its average income per capita was well below that of the US and Europe, and the latter possessed around five times more fixed capital, along with greater human capital and intellectual property wealth. The strategy of attracting foreign investment with cheap labor benefited from competition between the emerging nations.

pages: 324 words: 93,606

No Such Thing as a Free Gift: The Gates Foundation and the Price of Philanthropy
by Linsey McGoey
Published 14 Apr 2015

Locals blame the vibrant aid industry for driving up rental costs. Seen for years as one of Sub-Saharan Africa’s golden economic performers, Ghana earned middle-income status in 2011. The World Bank determines a country’s ranking according to a decades-old (many say outdated) classificatory scheme based on gross national income per capita. Boosted by a commodities boom in gold, diamonds, and recently discovered oil deposits, many Ghanaians have grown wealthier in recent years. Inequality has widened dramatically.1 While richer Ghanaians ready themselves for watching the football match, staff from the Ghana Health Service battle a recent outbreak of cholera in the capital.

pages: 292 words: 87,720

Volt Rush: The Winners and Losers in the Race to Go Green
by Henry Sanderson
Published 12 Sep 2022

Even if they paid more money in royalties and taxes, one foreign mining executive asked me, where would it all go? There would be no guarantee the money would go into spending on healthcare and education. Such sentiments were strengthened by stories of Yuma’s lavish wedding ceremonies for his daughter in Kinshasa. The data itself also told a brutal story: annual income per capita in the Congo, at $785 in purchasing power parity terms, was still among the lowest in Africa. According to the Carter Center around $750 million that was paid to Gécamines from asset sales and royalties between 2011 and 2014 was missing from its accounts.* Despite the criticisms, however, Yuma was close to Kabila and momentum had been building in Kinshasa for a change in the country’s 2002 mining code, which had been formed in the middle of a civil war – in order to secure more of the cobalt revenues for the Congo.

pages: 879 words: 233,093

The Empathic Civilization: The Race to Global Consciousness in a World in Crisis
by Jeremy Rifkin
Published 31 Dec 2009

Layard writes:From this psychological reality it follows that if money is transferred from a richer person to a poorer person, the poor person gains more happiness than the rich person loses. So average happiness increases. Thus a country will have a higher level of average happiness the more equally its income is distributed—all else being equal.69 The income per capita for Europeans is, on average, 29.3 percent lower than American income, and Europeans have smaller houses, cars, and wardrobes and fewer electronic conveniences.70 Moreover, a greater percentage of their income goes to taxes to pay for an array of “public” services, designed to improve the quality of life of the entire community.

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Huizinga, Johan human behavior human collaboration human consciousness in children six levels of human journey bodily experience and reality bridging the is/ought gap communications and energy and faith versus reason feelings/emotions in history mortality new biosphere phase in truth, freedom, and equality human migration human nature altruism versus self-interest attachment theorists on changing views on embodied approach to Freud on object relations theorists on Romantics on Human Origins (MacCurdy) human race bipedalism of common language of complex system of cosmopolitanization of Human Resource Development Quarterly human resources management humanism Humanist Age humanist psychology Hume, David hurricane intensity hydraulic societies Chinese control of nature in Egyptian entropic decline of Indian Jewish parenting in rise of theology in Sumerian See also Roman Empire hydrogen hydrogen-powered fuel-cell vehicles hydrologic cycle Iacoboni, Marco, Dr. IBM ideal self identity crisis ideological consciousness imagination imaginative identification immortality imprinting income, per capita Index of Economic Well-Being (IEWB) Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) India individuality in late Middle Ages induction scripts Indus Valley Industrial Revolution industrial societies infant Ainsworth on altruism in Bowlby on consciousness in empathic distress in Fairbairn on Freud on IQ development in isolation effects on Klein on Kohut on Levy on mimicry in nature versus nurture and orphans Suttie on Winnicott on Information and Communications Technology (ICT) revolution Information Technology (IT) Inglehart, Ronald InnoCentive Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Smith) insula intentionality, sense of interior furniture intermarriage internal combustion engine international law Internet interracial dating/marriage intimacy introspection invulnerability Iowa Child Research Welfare Station Iran Iraq is/ought gap Islamic Society of North America isolated system isolation Italian Renaissance Italy Jacobsen, Thorkild Jains James, William Japanese culture Jefferson, Thomas Jerusalem Jesus Gnostic view of story of Jews Johns Hopkins University Johnson, David W.

pages: 334 words: 98,950

Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism
by Ha-Joon Chang
Published 26 Dec 2007

Some suggest the figure may even have been as high as $35 billion.His children became some of the country’s richest business people. If we take the mid-point of these two estimates ($25 billion), Suharto has stolen the equivalent of 5.2 times his country’s national income in 1961 ($4.8 billion). Zaire’s income per capita in purchasing power terms in 1997, when Mobutu was deposed, was one third of its level in 1965, when he came to power. In 1997, the country stood 141st among the 174 countries for which the UN calculated a ‘human development index’ (HDI). The HDI takes into account not only income but also ‘quality of life’ measured by life expectancy and literacy.

The New Harvest: Agricultural Innovation in Africa
by Calestous Juma
Published 27 May 2017

Climate Change, Agriculture, and Economy As Africa prepares to address its agricultural challenges, it is now confronted with new threats arising from climate change. Agricultural innovation will now have to be done in the context of a more uncertain world in which activities such as plant and animal breeding will need to be anticipatory.1 According to the World Bank, warming “of 2°C could result in a 4 to 5% permanent reduction in annual income per capita in Africa and South Asia, as opposed to minimal losses in high-income countries and a global average GDP loss of about 1%. These 254 THE NEW HARVEST losses would be driven by impacts in agriculture, a sector important to the economies of both Africa and South Asia.”2 SubSaharan Africa is dominated by fragile ecosystems.

pages: 347 words: 99,317

Bad Samaritans: The Guilty Secrets of Rich Nations and the Threat to Global Prosperity
by Ha-Joon Chang
Published 4 Jul 2007

Some suggest the figure may even have been as high as $35 billion. His children became some of the country’s richest business people. If we take the mid-point of these two estimates ($25 billion), Suharto has stolen the equivalent of 5.2 times his country’s national income in 1961 ($4.8 billion). Zaire’s income per capita in purchasing power terms in 1997, when Mobutu was deposed, was one third of its level in 1965, when he came to power. In 1997, the country stood 141st among the 174 countries for which the UN calculated a ‘human development index’ (HDI). The HDI takes into account not only income but also ‘quality of life’ measured by life expectancy and literacy.

pages: 350 words: 103,988

Reinventing the Bazaar: A Natural History of Markets
by John McMillan
Published 1 Jan 2002

Since the full range of market-supporting institutions were in place at the outset, most prices were free, and most of the economy was privately owned, New Zealand provides a favorable test case for shock therapy. The impetus for reform was chronically low growth together with unsustainable budgetary imbalances. From 1950 to 1980, New Zealand slipped from having the world’s third-highest income per capita to twenty-second. The reforms were needed, therefore, and most observers agree that moving rapidly was justified in the circumstances. But the reforms were slow to show a return, and they brought severe social costs. In the 1960s and 1970s, the government’s knee-jerk response to any external shock was to impose controls on imports, prices, wages, profits, and interest rates.

pages: 471 words: 97,152

Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism
by George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller
Published 1 Jan 2009

Akerlof’s personal knowledge from working at the Council of Economic Advisers in 1973. 29. Meadows et al. (1972, p. 125). 30. De Long and Summers (1992), in a comparison of countries around the world, showed that those with higher levels of investment, particularly high equipment investment, have higher growth of income per capita. Hsieh and Klenow (2003, p. 1) additionally conclude that “one of the strongest relationships established in the empirical growth literature is the positive correlation between the rate of investment in physical capital and the level of output per worker.” 31. Welch and Byrne (2001, pp. 93, 94, 107, and 171). 32.

The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities
by Mancur Olson

The nations of Western Europe also vary greatly in the proportion of migrants and guest workers they have admitted. Many other factors are involved, but the initial impression is that countries with weaker labor unions have accepted relatively larger inflows of labor. The law of diminishing returns suggests that the growth of income per capita or per worker would be reduced when an already densely populated country imports more labor. However, as Charles Kindleberger has argued," the developed industrial economies in which per capita income has grown most rapidly are often those which have absorbed the most new labor. Kindleberger explains this in terms of Arthur Lewis's famous model of growth with "unlimited supplies of labor," and this hypothesis deserves careful study.

pages: 359 words: 97,415

Vanishing Frontiers: The Forces Driving Mexico and the United States Together
by Andrew Selee
Published 4 Jun 2018

As a result, most small businesses simply stay under the radar, avoiding taxes and labor laws but also unable to apply for loans or government contracts that would allow them to expand. Despite these limitations, overall Mexicans are more prosperous today than at any time in the country’s history. On average gross national income per capita—people’s average share of the country’s wealth—grew around a third in real terms over twenty years and is closer today to that of Russia, Romania, and Bulgaria than to other developing countries. And today average educational attainment is around nine years, up from an average of six years only two decades ago, and almost three times as many students attend college.

pages: 463 words: 105,197

Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society
by Eric Posner and E. Weyl
Published 14 May 2018

To take an extreme but illuminating example, imagine that the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the club of wealthy countries, were to accept enough migrants to double their population, presently at 1.3 billion. This would move roughly 20% of the global population to the OECD. Suppose too that each migrant on average created income gains of $11,000. This would constitute an increase on average of roughly $2,200 for every person on the planet. Given that global income per capita is approximately $11,000, this is roughly a 20% increase in global income. If historical experience is any guide, gains to those who stay in poor countries would be equally dramatic, as most migrants remit a large fraction of their income to the countries they came from.18 In sharp contrast to trade, these gains have transformative potential for global well-being, if they can be harnessed and shared.19 Why Not Just Expand Existing Migration?

pages: 363 words: 98,024

Keeping at It: The Quest for Sound Money and Good Government
by Paul Volcker and Christine Harper
Published 30 Oct 2018

Not a financial center like New York or a technology hub like Silicon Valley, Washington money is directed toward shaping public policy and laws to benefit specific interests. And it shows in the escalating demand for office space, luxury hotels, high-priced apartments and restaurants to serve a multiplying force of lawyers and lobbyists. Washington’s surrounding counties reportedly are now at the top in their residents’ average income per capita. I don’t know how many senators and congressmen are counted among those residents these days, or what their incomes may be. I do know they spend inordinate amounts of time “dialing for dollars” to finance costly campaigns and less time in Washington socializing with colleagues, seeking areas for compromise and consensus.

pages: 319 words: 106,772

Irrational Exuberance: With a New Preface by the Author
by Robert J. Shiller
Published 15 Feb 2000

P., 224 Movies, 104 Mutation rate, 160 Mutual funds, 19, 43, 54, 240n27, 263n14; growth of, 35–36; learning about, 197–200 NAIC (National Association of Investors Corporation), 58 Narrative-based thinking. See Stories NASDAQ, 19, 39 National Association of Investors Corporation (NAIC), 58 National Broadcasting Company, 104 National crises, 76–77 National Gambling Impact Study Commission, 41 National income, per capita, 219, 222 National Network of Grantmakers, 216 Nazism, 116, 149 Negative bubbles, 62, 244n21; crash of 1929 and, 88; crash of 1987 and, 90–91; media and, 88, 90; in Philippines, 124 Nelson, William, 238n9 Netter, Jeffrey M., 248n21 New era economic thinking, xvi, 14, 96–117, 118, 209, 224, 248–50n1–38; bull market of 1920s and, 103–7; bull market of 1950s/1960s and, 107–11; bull market of 1990s and, 111–14; ends of, 114–17, 128–30; ﬁnancial crises and, 128–30; in 291 France, 128; peak of 1901 and, 99– 103; in Peru, 126; in Philippines, 123; stock market creation of, 99; in Taiwan, 124 New Levels in the Stock Market (Dice), 105–6 Newsweek, 108, 109, 111 New York Daily Tribune, 101 New York Herald Tribune, 193 New York Stock Exchange, 22, 33, 35, 39, 40, 59, 225, 226, 266n21 New York Times, 75–76, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 107 Niederhoffer, Victor, 75–76, 78 Nifty Fifty, 177, 178, 258n7 Nikkei index, 3, 48, 80–81, 228, 265n17 9 Steps to Financial Freedom, The (Orman), 51 Nisbett, Robert, 257n19 No Fear of the Next Crash (Niquet), 51 Noguchi, Yukio, 265n17 Nominal interest rates, 37 Nonconsequentialist reasoning, 146 No-Ponzi condition, 245n30 Nordhaus, William, 264n5 North American Free Trade Agreement, 129 Northern Securities Company, 102 Obstfeld, Maurice, 182 Odean, Terrance, 59 Oil prices, 125–26 Okun, Arthur, 116 Online trading, 39–40, 59, 206 Only Yesterday (Allen), 47, 103 Optimism: of analysts’ forecasts, 30–32, 239n18, 241n40; bull market of 1920s and, 103–7; bull market of 1990s and, 113; peak of 1901 and, 99–103; turn-of-century, 9, 99–101, 205–6 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 129 292 Organized crime, 42 Orman, Suze, 51 Overconﬁdence, 142–46, 151, 242n3, 255n19.

pages: 430 words: 109,064

13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown
by Simon Johnson and James Kwak
Published 29 Mar 2010

As in many other low-income countries in the past half-century, economic development was dominated by a small economic elite defined by their personal ties to the ruling family, which traded favors for both political support and cold, hard cash—a pattern known as “crony capitalism.”26 For example, Indofood became one of the largest conglomerates in the country, largely because of a longtime personal friendship between its founder, Liem Sioe Liong, and Suharto.27 Suharto’s wife, Siti Hartinah Suharto, known as Madame Tien, was involved in so many business deals that she was referred to by critics as “Madame Tien Percent” for her alleged fees.28 Suharto’s children also cut themselves into many major deals; his daughter was involved in the largest taxi company, one son tried to build cars, and another son was a financial entrepreneur.29 For a long time, the system worked reasonably well. Annual income per capita grew from $1,235 in 1970, just after Suharto came to power, to just over $4,545 by 1997.30 Indonesia was still a poor country with pervasive poverty, but thirty years of economic growth had created higher standards of living for millions of people. The country was regarded as a development success story by the World Bank and by foreign investors, who supplied much of the capital needed to build factories, roads, and apartment buildings.

pages: 274 words: 93,758

Phishing for Phools: The Economics of Manipulation and Deception
by George A. Akerlof , Robert J. Shiller and Stanley B Resor Professor Of Economics Robert J Shiller
Published 21 Sep 2015

In an essay, which was little noticed when published, Keynes projected what life would be like “for our grandchildren,” in 2030: one hundred years thence.12 In one respect he almost hit a bull’s-eye. He “supposed” that the standard of living would be eight times higher. For the United States, as of 2010, real income per capita was 5.6 times higher.13 With another twenty years to go on Keynes’s stopwatch, and with annual growth in per capita income at its historic average between 1.5 percent and 2 percent, his supposition will be remarkably close to target. But in another respect, Keynes was totally off the mark. As you might expect, Keynes did not say that the grandchildren would be going to bed worried about their next pound or their next shilling.

pages: 419 words: 109,241

A World Without Work: Technology, Automation, and How We Should Respond
by Daniel Susskind
Published 14 Jan 2020

In Europe, for example, a survey found “both rising support for redistribution for ‘natives’ and sharp opposition to migration and automatic access to benefits for new arrivals.”45 In the Age of Labor, there has been a persuasive economic response to this instinct to exclude others: through their work, immigrants make the country’s economic pie bigger. As a result, letting in more people does not necessarily leave existing citizens with a smaller slice; on the contrary, there is often more income per capita to share out. But in a world with less work, that response will be far less compelling. There will be fewer opportunities for newcomers to contribute through their jobs, and a greater chance that they will depend on the efforts of others for their income. In that world, it is more likely that adding new members to a community will in fact lead to existing members having smaller slices of the pie.

pages: 374 words: 111,284

The AI Economy: Work, Wealth and Welfare in the Robot Age
by Roger Bootle
Published 4 Sep 2019

(Economists will refer to this as an increase in the marginal efficiency of capital.) Once you look at things in this way, traditional economic analysis can be brought to bear. There are several clear implications. The increase in the return on capital should lead to: • An increase in investment.4 • Upward pressure on real interest rates. • An increase in real output and income per capita. • A possible increase in average real wages. This last result is possible because, since more capital has been added, the amount of capital per worker will have risen. Yet whether this leads to an increase in average real wages will depend, just as with any other capital investment, on the extent to which, at the macro level, the new capital substitutes for labor as opposed to complementing it.

Capitalism, Alone: The Future of the System That Rules the World
by Branko Milanovic
Published 23 Sep 2019

Such a war, if it did not lead to the extinction of humankind, would not negate all of the technological advancements that have been made during the past several hundred years. The reason is that globalization has spread the knowledge of technology far and wide. Even if North America, Europe, and Russia were more or less obliterated and made uninhabitable (with resulting drastic decreases in income per capita and probably massive emigration of the surviving population to Latin America, Africa, and Asia), technological knowledge—from the production of cars and computers to genetically modified food—would not be lost. The relative powers of different states would be fundamentally altered (as after the two world wars of the twentieth century), but, although technological progress would suffer a huge setback, it would not be halted.

pages: 1,060 words: 265,296

The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor
by David S. Landes
Published 14 Sep 1999

In 1993, the World Bank, in a report ebulliently entitled The East Asian Miracle,2 fairly rhapsodized: Since the 1960s, the high performing Asian economies have grown more than twice as fast as the rest of East Asia, roughly three times as fast as Latin America and five times faster than sub-Saharan Africa. They also significantly outperformed the industrial economies and the oil-rich Middle East-North Africa region. Between 1960 and 1985, real income per capita increased more than four times in Japan and the Four Tigers [South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong] and more than doubled in the Southeast Asian NIEs.3 And to this list should be added China, which finally, in the 1980s, freed itself from some of the toils and servitudes of Marxist ideology and began encouraging enterprise, to the point of inviting in the agents of predatory capitalism.

…

Habib, Agrarian System, pp. 90, 350, 390. The latter story is from John Fryer, A New Account of East India and Persia being Nine Years’ Travels, 1672-81. The whole is cited from Kautsky, Politics of Aristocratic Empires, p. 103, n. 14. 27. Thus Andre Wink affirms that “at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution income per capita was possibly higher in many parts of Asia than in Europe.”—Wink, “‘Al-Hind,’” p. 65. Cf. Bairoch, “Ecarts internationaux,” and “The Main Trends in National Economic Disparities,” p. 7. Also Parthasarathi, “Rethinking Wages.” 28. Cf. Alam, “How Rich Were the Advanced Countries in 1760 After All?”

Poisoned Wells: The Dirty Politics of African Oil
by Nicholas Shaxson
Published 20 Mar 2007

As Equatorial Guinea’s per capita income rose from $368 per capita in 1990 to over $2,000 in 2000, the country slipped ten places down the United Nations’ Human Development ranking. It now has the dubious distinction of being the country with the greatest negative difference—93 places—between its ranking in terms of human welfare and its income per capita. Agriculture and manufacturing have fallen to less than two percent of GDP between them, while oil claims 93 percent.85 The share of health and education spending has shrunk. 142 Obiang Nguema Obiang said in 2003 that there is no poverty, only “shortages.”86 Yet the IMF in 2005 was gloomier.

pages: 474 words: 120,801

The End of Power: From Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States, Why Being in Charge Isn’t What It Used to Be
by Moises Naim
Published 5 Mar 2013

There are more people, countries, cities, political parties, armies; more goods and services, and more companies selling them; more weapons and more medicines; more students and more computers; more preachers and more criminals. The world’s economic output has increased fivefold since 1950. Income per capita is three and a half times greater than it was then. Most importantly, there are more people—2 billion more than there were just two decades ago. By 2050, the world’s population will be four times larger than it was in 1950. Comprehending the size of this population as well as its age structure, geographical distribution, longevity, health, and aspirations is critical for understanding what has happened to power.

pages: 492 words: 118,882

The Blockchain Alternative: Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy and Economic Theory
by Kariappa Bheemaiah
Published 26 Feb 2017

Owing to this mechanism, change in a certain variable can result in either the augmentation (positive feedback) or a reduction (negative feedback) of that change. When this change repeats itself, a loop is said to emerge. A feedback loop means that the loop’s behaviour is self-reinforcing: it will run on and on until something intervenes. An example of a positive feedback loop could be between income and consumption. The bigger the income per capita in an economy, the more people consume. This will produce a further increase in their per capita income, and so on. On the other hand, inequality also happens to be a kind of feedback loop found in self-organizing systems (DiMaggio and Cohen, 2003). The interaction between the two feedbacks is an example of a self-perpetuating process seen in complex systems.

pages: 395 words: 116,675

The Evolution of Everything: How New Ideas Emerge
by Matt Ridley

The economist William Easterly points out that the evidence for a change of leadership being the cause of a growth miracle anywhere in the developing world is wholly lacking: the timing simply does not match. The effect of leaders on growth rates, he says, is close to zero, a conclusion that is ‘almost too shocking to be believed’. South Korea and Ghana had the same income per capita in the 1950s. One received far more aid, advice and political intervention than the other. It is now by far the poorer of the two. In general, Asian economies grew their way out of poverty in the late twentieth century, while African economies failed to be aided out of poverty. Trade, not aid, proved the best way to achieve an increase in prosperity.

pages: 432 words: 124,635

Happy City: Transforming Our Lives Through Urban Design
by Charles Montgomery
Published 12 Nov 2013

Forget the dream of becoming as wealthy as Americans: it would take generations to catch up to the gringos, even if the urban economy caught fire and burned blue for a century. The dream of riches, Peñalosa complained, served only to make Bogotans feel bad. “If we defined our success just in terms of income per capita, we would have to accept ourselves as second- or third-rate societies—as a bunch of losers,” he said. No, the city needed a new goal. Peñalosa promised neither a car in every garage nor a socialist revolution. His promise was simple. He was going to make Bogotans happier. “And what are our needs for happiness?”

pages: 504 words: 126,835

The Innovation Illusion: How So Little Is Created by So Many Working So Hard
by Fredrik Erixon and Bjorn Weigel
Published 3 Oct 2016

In the United States alone, annual subsidies to firms amount to more than $70 billion.10 And taxpayer handouts are not the most profitable privilege or rent that a firm can get from the political system. That prize goes to regulation, leading to a far greater redistribution of money between firms, and from consumers to firms. Brussels and Washington DC, the two lobbying capitals of the West, have in recent years seen the fastest growth in income per capita in their respective countries and regions. This is not surprising. If regulation has become ever more important for business activity, lobbyists will be greatly rewarded for their work. Regulation and political romanticism Uber’s experience tells us a lot about regulation and innovation, and how political perceptions of innovation have lost touch with the reality.

pages: 413 words: 128,093

On the Grand Trunk Road: A Journey Into South Asia
by Steve Coll
Published 29 Mar 2009

Gul, Hamid Gunaratna, Rohan Gupta, Shekhar Gurfali, India Gurkhaland Gyanwapi (‘Well of Knowledge’) Mosque (Varanasi) Hapur, India Haq, Abdul Hassan, Mashoud Hassan, Mubashir Hathnuada, Randu Haveláclav health care Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin Heston, Alan Hinduism; caste system ; in Nepal; temples, Muslim destruction of Hindu Kush mountains Hindu-Muslim conflict; Ayodhya mosque destruction ; economic causes of ; in England; Gyanwapi Mosque dispute; in Kashmir; kidnappings ; religious riots Hindu revivalists; destruction of Muslim mosques ; and modem technology; nationalism ; and Nehruvian state; political parties Hindus: converts to Islam; political control in India ; violence against Sikhs Hizbollah (Party of God) Hizbul Mujaheddin Hong Kong hospitals human rights Hussain, Abida Hussein, Saddam Hyderabad, India Ignatius, David Imam, Imran imperialism income, per capita (South Asia) India; affirmative action programs ; capitalism in ; caste system in ; cold war and ; conspiracy theories in; corruption in government ; death squads ; democracy in. ; economic growth; and economic reform ; economy ; education in; elections ; employment in ; foreign debt; Hindu political control in; hostility to Pakistan; independence; Kashmir counterinsurgency campaign ; Kashmir rebellion against ; middle class in ; nationalism ; Nehruvian state in ; political violence in ; poverty in; public-sector employment ; public-sector enterprises; India (cont.)

pages: 451 words: 125,201

What We Owe the Future: A Million-Year View
by William MacAskill
Published 31 Aug 2022

Today, women can vote in every democracy in the world and have far greater opportunities to work and participate in public life. But since attitudes regarding gender roles still vary widely across different countries, some women have more opportunities than others. For example, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, India, and Pakistan all have about the same income per capita. But in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, about three out of every four women participate in the labour force, while in India and Pakistan fewer than one in four do.49 Other examples abound. In the last few decades, attitudes towards LGBTQ+ people have changed dramatically in many countries. The first US state to legalize gay marriage was Massachusetts, in 2004.

pages: 497 words: 143,175

Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the Seventies
by Judith Stein
Published 30 Apr 2010

With echoes from the 1930s, processors drowned baby chicks and farmers slaughtered calves—drastic measures that processors claimed were less expensive than raising the animals to sell at low prices.21 By August even Nixon had enough and unfroze prices, producing another price explosion. Farmers made out very well. In 1973, for the first time since such statistics were recorded, on-farm income per capita in the United States was higher than off-farm income.22 But food inflation was the inevitable result. High food prices were important in their own right, but they heated up distributional struggles between business and labor because food is an important component of working class spending. Union negotiators attempted to meet the higher food costs with higher wages for their members.

pages: 422 words: 131,666

Life Inc.: How the World Became a Corporation and How to Take It Back
by Douglas Rushkoff
Published 1 Jun 2009

According to a study conducted at the height of the market, 23 percent of brokers and traders at the seven largest firms on Wall Street suffered from depression—more than three times the national average. Scientists and United Nations sociologists alike have concluded that affluence produces rapidly diminishing returns on happiness. After achieving an income per capita of about $15,000, any increase in wealth makes little difference to a nation’s total happiness metrics. Among the six articles I found from Forbes in 2006 fiercely criticizing this “swath of studies” as well as the whole notion of “happiness research,” none mentioned any of them specifically, or their findings.

pages: 469 words: 146,487

Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World
by Niall Ferguson
Published 1 Jan 2002

Gradually, their sense of isolation diminished as more Scots settled in the area. It was reassuring to be able to celebrate Hogmanay with fellow countrymen so far from home, since ‘they don’t hold New Year out here very much just the Scotch folk’. Today their ten grandchildren live all over Canada, a country whose annual income per capita is not merely 10 per cent higher than Britain’s but second only to that of the United States. All thanks to the British Empire. So to say that I grew up in the Empire’s shadow would be to conjure up too tenebrous an image. To the Scots, the Empire stood for bright sunlight. Little may have been left of it on the map by the 1970s, but my family was so completely imbued with the imperial ethos that its importance went unquestioned.

pages: 402 words: 129,876

Bad Pharma: How Medicine Is Broken, and How We Can Fix It
by Ben Goldacre
Published 1 Jan 2012

There are more than half a million people living with HIV in Thailand (many of them can thank Western sex tourists for that), and 120,000 have AIDS. The country can afford first-line AIDS drugs, but many become ineffective with time, through acquired resistance. Abbott had been charging $2,200 a year for Kaletra in Thailand, which was – by morbid coincidence – roughly the same as the gross income per capita. We give drug companies exclusive rights to manufacture the treatments they have discovered for a limited period of time – usually about eighteen years – in order to incentivise innovation. It’s unlikely that the revenue available from selling drugs in poorer countries will ever incentivise innovation of new treatments to any great extent (we can see this very clearly from the fact that so many medical conditions that occur mainly in developing countries are neglected by the pharmaceutical industry).

pages: 545 words: 137,789

How Markets Fail: The Logic of Economic Calamities
by John Cassidy
Published 10 Nov 2009

Since the early 1990s, the Chilean economy has had its share of ups and downs, but, generally speaking, it has outperformed most other economies in Latin America. In his 1998 memoir, Friedman defended his visit to Chile and claimed that the country’s experience had demonstrated beyond doubt the efficacy of free market policies. “From 1973 to 1995, real income-per-capita multiplied more than two and a half fold, inflation fell from 500 percent per year to 8 percent, the infant mortality per 1,000 live births fell from 66 to 13, and life expectancy at birth rose from 64 years to 73 years. And authentic political freedom has been restored with the turnover of power by the junta to a freely elected government.”

pages: 447 words: 141,811

Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind
by Yuval Noah Harari
Published 1 Jan 2011

Andrew Porter (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 442. 10 Vinita Damodaran, ‘Famine in Bengal: A Comparison of the 1770 Famine in Bengal and the 1897 Famine in Chotanagpur’, The Medieval History Journal 10:1–2 (2007), 151. 16 The Capitalist Creed 1 Maddison, World Economy, vol. 1, 261, 264; ‘Gross National Income Per Capita 2009, Atlas Method and PPP’, the World Bank, accessed 10 December 2010, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf. 2 The mathematics of my bakery example are not as accurate as they could be. Since banks are allowed to loan $10 for every dollar they keep in their possession, of every million dollars deposited in the bank, the bank can loan out to entrepreneurs only about $909,000 while keeping $91,000 in its vaults.

pages: 505 words: 138,917

Open: The Story of Human Progress
by Johan Norberg
Published 14 Sep 2020

When I saw all this, I found it increasingly difficult to defend some direct lineage model of Western civilization, especially since it depended on explaining away a millennium between Rome and Renaissance as some sort of Dark-Age aberration. There is no golden nugget in history, but there are golden ages of creativity and accomplishment. Lots of them. The historian Jack Goldstone calls them ‘efflorescences’: rapid and often unexpected upturns when both population and income per capita grow. What they have in common is not their location or the ethnicity or beliefs of the populations. They happened in various places, epochs and in different belief systems: in pagan Greece, the Muslim Abbasid Caliphate, Confucian China, Catholic Renaissance Italy and the Calvinist Dutch Republic.

Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government
by Robert Higgs and Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr.
Published 15 Jan 1987

Hence tangible capital per worker rose rapidly, by about 80 percent in just three decades. 4 In addition, human capital was accumulated as the average worker became healthier, more educated, and better trained; and intellectual capital was accumulated as inventiveness and the adoption of new techniques of production flourished as never before. The result of all these productivity-enhancing endeavors was economic growth, a process-erratic in the short run but sustained in the long run-that generated rising real income per capita. Between the late sixties and the early nineties, real GNP per capita increased at an average rate of more than 2 percent per year. 5 Economic growth both caused and in part resulted from ongoing shifts in the relative importance of industries, sectors, and regions. It fed and was nourished in turn by urbanization.

pages: 497 words: 144,283

Connectography: Mapping the Future of Global Civilization
by Parag Khanna
Published 18 Apr 2016

Sitting at the mouth of the Hai River with access to the Yellow and Yangtze Rivers via the Grand Canal, Tianjin has been a naval gateway into China for centuries and became a crucial treaty port controlled by Europeans after the Opium Wars. While it has always been a shipping center, the reinvestment of its annual double-digit growth rates has created high-end jobs in airline manufacturing and other sectors. Today Tianjin boasts China’s highest income per capita ($13,500, which is $1,000 higher than Shanghai). Its downtown business district is now home to the most industrial investment funds in China, making it the headquarters for financial innovation and even commercial courts for intellectual property dispute resolution with foreign companies. Like Shanghai, it plans a free trade zone.

pages: 517 words: 147,591

Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict
by Eli Berman , Joseph H. Felter , Jacob N. Shapiro and Vestal Mcintyre
Published 12 May 2018

Moreover, practitioners, and perhaps recipients, are put in harm’s way in the process. So let’s look carefully. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND CIVIL WARS: THE CROSS-NATIONAL CORRELATION Poorer countries are more likely to experience civil war. ESOC affiliate James Fearon confirmed this for 161 countries between 1945 and 1999, comparing income per capita and the frequency of civil war outbreaks over time. (Here, civil war includes both symmetric conflicts like that between Nigeria and secessionist region Biafra, 1967–70, and asymmetric.) If you look at any given point during that half century, only about 1.5 percent of the richest one-fifth of the countries would suffer a civil war erupting within the measured five-year intervals.

pages: 585 words: 151,239

Capitalism in America: A History
by Adrian Wooldridge and Alan Greenspan
Published 15 Oct 2018

In 1857, America’s population surpassed Britain’s (which then included the whole of Ireland). From 1870 to 1910, America’s share of global manufacturing increased from 23.3 percent to 35.3 percent, while Britain’s share declined from 31.8 percent to 14.7 percent. One careful calculation suggests that, by 1910, America’s income per capita was 26 percent higher than Britain’s.3 The direction of the flow of technology and ideas was reversed. In the first half of the nineteenth century, Americans stole most of their productivity-boosting ideas from the mother country. Ambitious bankers such as Junius Morgan went to London to learn their craft.

pages: 807 words: 154,435

Radical Uncertainty: Decision-Making for an Unknowable Future
by Mervyn King and John Kay
Published 5 Mar 2020

The Vietnam War was not a war declared by the US Congress in the manner required by the US constitution (the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, approved following an attack on the American naval ship Maddox which may never actually have occurred, gave the President authority to use armed force to resist aggression), but few would dispute the label of war. 23 But are the conflicts in Ukraine or Syria ‘wars’? Vagueness can be reduced or eliminated by exact definition, but such definition is itself arbitrary. The World Bank distinguishes ‘high-income’ from low- and middle-income economies. 24 But from time to time it changes that definition (at the time of writing it was annual gross national income per capita of more than $12,056), and many people would be surprised to find that Barbados, Poland and the Seychelles are ‘high-income’ countries along with Norway, Switzerland and the United States. Although the term ‘ambiguity’ is often employed to describe many kinds of uncertainty, we prefer to limit its use to genuine linguistic ambiguity.

pages: 1,324 words: 159,290

Grand Transitions: How the Modern World Was Made
by Vaclav Smil
Published 2 Mar 2021

During the early decades of the 20th century it rose to more than 50 GJ/year in France and above 150 GJ/year in both the United Kingdom and the United States (Kander et al. 2013; Schurr and Netschert 1960) and recent averages in the European Union’s leading economies were mostly 150–160 GJ/capita (the Japanese rate was similar), while the US and Canadian means were above 300 GJ/year (BP 2020; UN 2019a). These differences are not surprising, as similar levels of affluence (GDP or disposable income per capita) may require different levels of energy consumption because of the disparities in country size, climate, dominant life styles, and structure of national economy. Despite these differences, per capita energy use in all Western countries is now either flat or has seen substantial declines. Onsets of national saturation levels have differed.

pages: 580 words: 168,476

The Price of Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers Our Future
by Joseph E. Stiglitz
Published 10 Jun 2012

We’ve been spending more than one-sixth of GDP on health care, while France has been spending less than an eighth. Per capita spending in the United States has been two and a half times higher than the average of the advanced industrial countries.30 This inefficiency is so large that after it is taken into account, the gap between income per capita in the United States and in France shrinks by about a third.31 While there are many reasons for this disparity in the efficiency of the health care system, rent seeking, in particular on the part of health insurance companies and drug companies, plays a significant role. Earlier, we cited the most notorious example: a provision in the 2003 Bush Medicare expansion that led to much higher drug prices in the United States and to a windfall gain (a rent) for the drug companies estimated at $50 billion or more a year.

The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism
by Noam Chomsky
Published 24 Oct 2014

Another facet of the official mythology and propaganda regarding arms aid is that it “contributed to Thailand’s economic growth by enabling Thailand to devote a greater share of its resources to economic development.”71 Awkwardly, however, between 1954, the year of the SEATO treaty, and 1959, the value of Thai military expenditures rose by 250%. This was explained by Unger as a result of growth stimulated by military aid, which provided “an expanding income some of which could be devoted to security expenditures.”72 But Thai income per capita in 1959 was well below the levels of 1950-1952.73 Control by an internally unconstrained military junta, dependent on the largesse of an external sponsor engaged in an anti-Communist crusade, is the key to this huge expansion of military outlays in a country with pressing development needs. Rising security expenditures were part of the total package of aid-armaments-repression that was immensely advantageous to the Thai military elite and at the same time met the requirements of the selectively benevolent tutelage of the U.S. cold warriors.

pages: 626 words: 167,836

The Technology Trap: Capital, Labor, and Power in the Age of Automation
by Carl Benedikt Frey
Published 17 Jun 2019

Though workers organized and became a force of growing political power, resistance to mechanization was feeble, if not nonexistent. The benefits of progress for labor, it seems, were simply too great for the unions and their members to resist it. PART IV THE GREAT REVERSAL Since the Industrial Revolution, mechanization has been controversial. Machines pushed up productivity, raising incomes per capita. But they threatened to put people out of work, to lower their wages and to divert all the gains from growth to the owners of businesses.… Now, it is robots that threaten work, wages and equality.… There have been long periods of economic history in which things did not work out well, and we must wonder whether we are in another.… The Luddites and other opponents of mechanization are often portrayed as irrational enemies of progress, but they were not the people set to benefit from the new machinery, so their opposition makes sense.

pages: 583 words: 182,990

The Ministry for the Future: A Novel
by Kim Stanley Robinson
Published 5 Oct 2020

Alternative measures that compensate for these deficiencies include: the Genuine Progress Indicator, which uses twenty-six different variables to determine its single index number; the UN’s Human Development Index, developed by Pakistani economist Mahbub ul Haq in 1990, which combines life expectancy, education levels, and gross national income per capita (later the UN introduced the inequality-adjusted HDI); the UN’s Inclusive Wealth Report, which combines manufactured capital, human capital, natural capital, adjusted by factors including carbon emissions; the Happy Planet Index, created by the New Economic Forum, which combines well-being as reported by citizens, life expectancy, and inequality of outcomes, divided by ecological footprint (by this rubric the US scores 20.1 out of 100, and comes in 108th out of 140 countries rated); the Food Sustainability Index, formulated by Barilla Center for Food and Nutrition, which uses fifty-eight metrics to measure food security, welfare, and ecological sustainability; the Ecological Footprint, as developed by the Global Footprint Network, which estimates how much land it would take to sustainably support the lifestyle of a town or country, an amount always larger by considerable margins than the political entities being evaluated, except for Cuba and a few other countries; and Bhutan’s famous Gross National Happiness, which uses thirty-three metrics to measure the titular quality in quantitative terms.

pages: 829 words: 187,394

The Price of Time: The Real Story of Interest
by Edward Chancellor
Published 15 Aug 2022

Four years after Draghi’s ‘do whatever it takes’ intervention, just one in five reform measures were still being implemented.fn5 The IMF abhorred the slow pace of structural reform in France, Italy and Spain, warning that ‘without drastic changes, they are likely to follow Japan’s path to long economic stagnation.’29 At least Japan had sufficient domestic savings to fund its escalating national debt and printed its own currency. Europe’s stricken periphery wasn’t so fortunate. Take Draghi’s homeland. In the fifteen years since the start of the euro project, Italy enjoyed no increase in income per capita and labour costs climbed relative to Germany’s, rendering Italian exports uncompetitive. Italy’s public debt trailed only Japan’s and Greece’s. Italian banks were loaded down with hundreds of billions of euros of bad debts. Many of its largest businesses were certified zombies. Political sclerosis accompanied the economic version.

pages: 696 words: 184,001

The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World
by Anu Bradford
Published 14 Sep 2020

In addition, while China may soon be the largest consumer market, GDP per capita—which is a better prediction of a country’s regulatory propensity than is overall GDP17—suggests that EU member states continue to fare much better against the rising economic might of China. According to an HSBC report, in 2050, China’s income per capita (in year 2000 USD) will be $17,372. This will remain well short of the figure for many, if not all, EU member states, including Germany ($52,683), France ($40,643), and Spain ($38,111).18 Affluence and social regulation are often correlated, suggesting that domestic demand for high levels of regulation is likely to be weak in China for some time to come.19 As long as Chinese consumers are not as wealthy on a per capita basis, they are likely to have a lower appetite for high levels of regulation that might compromise growth and economic development.

pages: 859 words: 204,092

When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Rise of the Middle Kingdom
by Martin Jacques
Published 12 Nov 2009

But even when it overtakes the United States in 2027, as predicted by Goldman Sachs, it will still have a relatively low GDP per head, and even in 2050 it will still only belong to the ‘upper middle group’ rather than the ‘rich club’ (see Figure 23). Welcome to a new kind of global power, which is, at one and the same time, both a developed - by virtue of the size of its GDP - and a developing country - by virtue of its GDP per capita. Figure 23. Future income per capita of major countries. The implications of a potential superpower being both a developed and a developing country are profound and multifarious. Previously the distinction between developed and developing countries was clear and unambiguous. Indeed between 1900 and 1960 there was a fundamental cleavage between those countries that industrialized in the nineteenth century and those that did not, a situation which persisted until the rise of the Asian tigers from the late fifties.

Statistics in a Nutshell
by Sarah Boslaugh
Published 10 Nov 2012

About one-third of cases have values of 66 years or fewer, and this is in the range of where the break seems to occur between a smaller group of low-life-expectancy countries and a larger group of high-life-expectancy countries, so we will use the value of 66.0 years to dichotomize life expectancy into low and high categories. Figure 10-2. Histogram of life expectancy at birth Another variable that might help our model is GNI (gross national income) per capita, expressed in international dollars in PPP (purchasing power parity) terms; this figure allows us to compare the relative wealth or poverty of different countries. In general, higher-income countries have lower adolescent fertility, so this should be a good predictor for our model. The advantage of using GNI in PPP terms is that it is expressed in terms that express the ability to purchase equivalent goods in the different countries and, thus, includes information about the different price levels in each country while avoiding issues of fluctuating international exchange rates.

pages: 537 words: 200,923

City: Urbanism and Its End
by Douglas W. Rae
Published 15 Jan 2003

By the 1920s he was operating the New Haven Baseball Exhibition Company, scheduling major league opponents for local teams. He eventually left the city and became general manager of the New York Yankees. See New Haven Register, December 24, 1999, p. D3. 4. Dollars, denominated in 2002 currency, refer to the first quarter of each named year. GDP per capita is not, of course, equivalent to income per capita, but it provides a broad indicator of total prosperity per person. Inflation from 1996 to 2002 is calculated at 15.36 percent using U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics calculations available at www.bls.gov. Source: Raymond Fair at www.Fairmodel.econ.yale.edu. Because the distribution of personal and household incomes is very unequal, real families experienced unequal changes over very much larger or smaller starting points across these decades. 5.

pages: 829 words: 229,566

This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. The Climate
by Naomi Klein
Published 15 Sep 2014

Even if that were true, however, the basic global picture still suggests that the necessary reductions are incompatible with economic growth as we have known it. As Tim Jackson shows in Prosperity Without Growth, global annual emission cuts of as little as 4.9 percent cannot be achieved simply with green tech and greater efficiencies. Indeed he writes that to meet that target, with the world population and income per capita continuing to grow at current rates, the carbon intensity of economic activity would need to go down “almost ten times faster than it is doing right now.” And by 2050, we would need to be twenty-one times more efficient than we are today. So, even if Anderson and Bows-Larkin have vastly overshot, they are still right on their fundamental point: we need to change our current model of growth.

The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World (Hardback) - Common
by Alan Greenspan
Published 14 Jun 2007

The loading-up of employment costs on business (especially retirement costs) periodically induces French governments in desperation to initiate modest reforms, only to be thwarted by opposition marches on the ChampsElysees, a tactic that has brought many a French government to grief. It is difficult not to be gloomy about France's economic prospects. In 287 More ebooks visit: http://www.ccebook.cn ccebook-orginal english ebooks This file was collected by ccebook.cn form the internet, the author keeps the copyright. T H E AGE OF T U R B U L E N C E world rankings of income per capita, France has fallen from eleventh in 1980 to eighteenth in 2005, according to IMF data. The unemployment rate in the early 1970s averaged 2.5 percent. Since the late 1980s, it has ranged between 8 percent and 12 percent.* Yet the French people's sense of freedom and nationalism is so pervasive that when pushed to the edge, they seem to regroup and productively engage the global community.

pages: 869 words: 239,167

The Story of Work: A New History of Humankind
by Jan Lucassen
Published 26 Jul 2021

It was only recognized in the 1960s that this could not be maintained, as substantial parts of the population officially lived in poverty. Out of a total population of 230 million in 1965, no fewer than some 50 million state employees and their dependents, plus 30 million kolkhoz members, lived below the poverty line.152 This points to a dramatic failure of the Soviet-style welfare state, even if real income per capita may have doubled between 1965 and 1990.153 Fortunately, reality was not entirely bleak, due to the inventiveness of the Russian population. In infinitely creative ways, it circumvented the rules and improved living conditions at the household level with the live-in grandmother as the indispensable centre.154 This was thriving babushka-household-welfare as a compensation for a very bleak state welfare.

Growth: From Microorganisms to Megacities
by Vaclav Smil
Published 23 Sep 2019

Becker (1960) believed that the reduction of fertility was a consequence of higher incomes generated during industrialization, but that was not the case throughout western Europe, where fertility rates began to decline noticeably during the same time (during the 1870s) in countries with significantly different per capita incomes. The best estimates for 1870 show German per capita GDP at only about 60% of the British value, with the Swedish and Finnish rates at, respectively, just 40% and 30% (Maddison 2007). During the opening decades of their demographic transitions, the growth rates of income per capita were similar (ranging between 1.2 and 1.6%) in western European countries despite the just noted substantial differences in the income level. An important consequence of the demographic transition has become known as the demographic dividend, first identified in the East Asian economies (Bloom et al. 2000).

pages: 492 words: 70,082

Immigration worldwide: policies, practices, and trends
by Uma Anand Segal , Doreen Elliott and Nazneen S. Mayadas
Published 19 Jan 2010

Conditions in the migrant-sending countries worsened as population growth, poverty, and unemployment were compounded by political and ethnic conflicts. Inequitable income distribution within the sender country acted as a motivation to emigrate as did the widening differential between Spain’s income per capita and that pertaining in the source countries. Interestingly, acute poverty is not always the principal driver in the decision to migrate. There is ample evidence that many migrants are educated, urban dwellers who are far from being the poorest in the source country and as such suffer from relative deprivation (Reyneri 2003).

pages: 913 words: 265,787

How the Mind Works
by Steven Pinker
Published 1 Jan 1997

In the few thousand years since the emergence of civilizations, a division of labor has allowed a class of knowledge professionals to develop methods of inference that are widely applicable and can be disseminated by writing and formal instruction. These methods literally have no content. Long division can calculate miles per gallon, or it can calculate income per capita. Logic can tell you that Socrates is mortal, or, in the examples in Lewis Carroll’s logic textbook, that no lamb is accustomed to smoking cigars, all pale people are phlegmatic, and a lame puppy would not say “thank you” if you offered to lend it a skipping rope. The statistical tools of experimental psychology were borrowed from agronomy, where they were invented to gauge the effects of different fertilizers on crop yields.

The Transformation Of Ireland 1900-2000
by Diarmaid Ferriter
Published 15 Jul 2009

This was an implicit criticism of Nancy Scheper-Hughes’s argument in her book Saints, Scholars and Schizophrenics that ‘rural Ireland is dying and its people are consequently infused with a spirit of anomie and despair’.234 ‘no doctor would dream of putting alcoholism on a patient’s certificate’ Alcohol abuse, however, continued to affect all parts of the country. In 1968, 58 per cent of the population drank alcohol; a decade later nearly 70 per cent drank. While Ireland featured low in the European drinking table in terms of litres of 100 per cent alcohol (8.7 in Ireland compared with 16.5 in France and 12.7 in Italy), due to high duties and low income per capita, Ireland spent more of its consumed expenditure on alcohol than any other EEC country. The Pioneer Association began to fade in importance and visibility, finding it more difficult to appeal to young people. There was no government that was prepared to seriously challenge the licensed vintners.

pages: 1,202 words: 424,886

Stigum's Money Market, 4E
by Marcia Stigum and Anthony Crescenzi
Published 9 Feb 2007

It is notable, for example, that during the 1990s OPEC’s oil export revenues were just $1.7 trillion when adjusted for inflation compared to $2.3 trillion in the 1980s, and $3.0 trillion in the 1970s, according to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). When combined with a surge in population growth, the reduction in inflation-adjusted oil revenues has cut incomes per capita in OPEC member countries to $700 in 2005 from $1,804 in 1980, the DOE reports. In Saudi Arabia, for example, where its inflation-adjusted oil export revenue fell from $211.7 billion in 1980 to an estimated $150 billion in 2005, a tripling of its population (Saudi Arabia has had one of the fastest growing populations in the world) has contributed to a reduction in its per capita income to $4,600 from $22,600 in 1980.