by James B. Stewart · 14 Oct 1991 · 706pp · 206,202 words
other solutions. Max Chapman, Jr., the head of fixed income and financial futures, had turned Kidder, Peabody into a major player in the field of index arbitrage and program trading (using options on broad market indices traded in Chicago and computer-driven trading strategies). He had become DeNunzio's heir apparent. DeNunzio
by Larry Harris · 2 Jan 2003 · 1,164pp · 309,327 words
of instrument-specific factors to basis risk may be small, however, if the hedge portfolio is a well-diversified portfolio of many instruments. Most stock index arbitrage portfolios have very little residual risk. 17.2 A SIMPLE CHARACTERIZATION OF ARBITRAGE Arbitrage is particularly easy to understand if you imagine that the arbitrage
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required premiums because traders who hold the futures contracts do not receive these dividends. Since traders cannot perfectly predict financing costs and future dividends, stock index arbitrage is not risk free. ◀ * * * Virtual shippers are most successful when they can predict whether (and when) the arbitrage basis will close so that they can
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may occur when instrument-specific factors diverge or when common factors are not priced correctly. For many arbitrages, basis risk is the most important risk. * * * ▶ Index Arbitrage Program Trading Index arbitrageurs use program trades to buy or sell a basket of index stocks while simultaneously selling or buying the corresponding index futures
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. Few traders now use the portfolio insurance strategy. Now that they know the full cost of portfolio insurance, most traders choose not to buy it. ◀ * * * Index arbitrage normally would ensure that such a huge discount would never exist. Arbitrageurs, however, largely stopped trading because they could not obtain quick executions of their
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effect of circuit breakers on transitory volatility is indeterminate. * * * ▶ NYSE Rule 80A NYSE Rule 80A prevents index arbitrageurs from using market orders to trade their index arbitrage program trades in S&P 500 Index stocks after the Dow Jones Industrial Average has moved up or down by approximately 2 percent. Instead, when
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collar is in effect, arbitrageurs must use tick sensitive orders to trade S&P 500 stocks. The primary effect of Rule 80A is to make index arbitrage more difficult and expensive when the collar is active. It probably increases transitory volatility because it forces the cash and futures markets to operate more
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Regulatory Capture The other circuit breaker adopted by the New York Stock Exchange following the 1987 stock market crash was the Rule 80A collar on index arbitrage program trading. Although a similar analysis of regulatory risks may explain why the Exchange adopted this rule, an analysis of rent-seeking behavior (self-interest
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types of traders compete in the following sense: When either trader cannot act, the profit opportunities for the other are greater. Since Rule 80A restricts index arbitrage, it benefits specialists at the expense of arbitrageurs. Specialists also benefit from Rule 80A because it helps them avoid trading with arbitrageurs. When a specialist
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: Arbitrageurs Brennan, Michael J., and Eduardo S. Schwartz. 1990. Arbitrage in stock index futures. Journal of Business 63(1), S7-S32. Holden, Craig W. 1995. Index arbitrage as cross-sectional market making. Journal of Futures Markets 15(4), 423–455. Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny. 1997. The limits of arbitrage. Journal
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. Who should buy portfolio insurance. Journal of Finance 35(2), 581–594. New York Stock Exchange, Office of Research and Planning. 1991. The Rule 80A index arbitrage tick test. Report to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, May 31. Roll, Richard. 1988. The international crash of October 1987. Financial Analysts Journal
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implementation risk, 363, 364, 366–67 implementation shortfalls, 424, 426 implicit transaction costs, 421, 422–23 inappropriate order exposure, 165 in-balance inventories, 283, 284 index arbitrage, 563, 577, 580 index components, 484 index creators, 485 index divisors, 485 indexed limit orders, 309 index enhancement funds, 354 index funds, 40, 484, 486
by Vijay Singal · 15 Jun 2004 · 369pp · 128,349 words
from hedged short sales.3 Hedged short sales include merger arbitrage where an investor short-sells the bidder and buys the target (see Chapter 9), index arbitrage between futures and cash markets, short selling by put option writers to hedge their positions, shorting against the box (short-selling a stock that is
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only speculative short positions. IPOs are not good candidates for hedged short sale activity because (1) they are usually not part of an index (no index arbitrage), (2) they are not likely to be takeover candidates (no merger arbitrage); and (3) the high volatility of IPOs inhibits other types of nonspeculative short
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Sales Most of the transactions in this category occur from perceived mispricings, some of which are discussed in Chapters 2 through 11 of the book. Index arbitrage occurs when an index futures contract trades at a price different from that implied by the underlying cash index. For example, if the S&P
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–63, 266–70, 280–81 futures December effect and, 34–36 forward rate bias and, 274– 76, 275, 278, 282, 283n2 implementing strategies with, 320 index arbitrage, 44 index futures, 320, 329 industry momentum, 83–84, 92–93 mutual fund mispricings and, 108, 113, 131 risk and, 129 Russell 2000 index, 116
by Richard Bookstaber · 5 Apr 2007 · 289pp · 113,211 words
Stanley christened Analytical Proprietary Trading (APT). He automated Bamberger’s techniques, linked them to the SuperDOT network that had been developed for program trading and index arbitrage, and applied them to an array of thousands of stocks, often holding a portfolio containing more than 600 names at a time. In 1986, with
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the early opportunistic strategies included basis trading on the cheapest-to-deliver bond shortly after the introduction of the Treasury bond futures, and cash-futures index arbitrage in the years following the introduction of the S&P and the Value Line futures. Both strategies peaked within a few years, and a decade
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for margin contractions in the floor marketmaking business, and O’Connor’s sold itself to Swiss Bank. On the heels of the cash-futures and index arbitrage opportunities came statistical arbitrage, which was the first to emerge in a hedge fund structure. In 1985, the first statistical arbitrage strategy was developed at
by Jack D. Schwager · 5 Oct 2012 · 297pp · 91,141 words
from Brooklyn College (1970) and an MA in economics from Brown University (1971). Index Adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) Allocation bias Allocation decisions, future AMEX Internet Index Arbitrage Arbitrary investment rules ARM subprime mortgages Asness, Clifford Automatic selling Automatic trading Average maximum retracement (AMR) Average pair correlation Average return Back-adjusted return measures
by Igor Tulchinsky · 30 Sep 2019 · 321pp
strategies have become more popular among buy-side firms in recent years, including large quant- and arbitrage-focused hedge funds and market- making firms. INDEX ARBITRAGE IN PRACTICE Index arbitrage is an alpha strategy that attempts to profit from differences between the actual and theoretical futures prices of a stock index, adjusted for the
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investments, particularly in the US), but it forces contract holders to forgo dividends, thus making interest rates and dividends the two primary differences affecting futures index arbitrage. Finding Alphas: A Quantitative Approach to Building Trading Strategies, Second Edition. Edited by Igor Tulchinsky et al. and WorldQuant Virtual Research Center. © 2020 Tulchinsky et
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investment bank trading desks in the past can be illuminating in this context. In the mid-2000s, some banks operated as follows: •• The bank’s index arbitrage desk would calculate its own fair value using one or more of the following methods: top-down (by adjusting variables in the formula above based
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could then be taken opportunistically in single names around those event dates. In some cases, multiple overlays to a seemingly simple index arbitrage strategy could increase the overall returns of an index arbitrage desk from less than 1% to 5% or more. How easy would this implementation be for buy-side firms? The answer
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hedge fund firms or active managers with related broker-dealer entities had the potential ability to negotiate such advantageous deals. Some segments of the overall index arbitrage strategy, however, such as predicting market impact for certain indices, can be implemented by active managers without necessarily requiring a large balance sheet. MARKET IMPACT
by Irene Aldridge · 1 Dec 2009 · 354pp · 26,550 words
a 1- to 2-second advantage. However, profit-taking opportunities still exist for powerful high-frequency trading systems with low transaction costs. Indexes and ETFs Index arbitrage is driven by the relative mispricings of indexes and their underlying components. Under the Law of One Price, index price should be equal to the
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that of the index itself, sell index, buy portfolio, and close the position when the gains have been realized. Alexander (1999) shows that cointegration-based index arbitrage strategies deliver consistent positive returns and sets forth a cointegrationbased portfolio management technique step by step: 1. A portfolio manager selects or is assigned a
by Diana B. Henriques · 18 Sep 2017 · 526pp · 144,019 words
Steve Wunsch realized, it could provide ballast to the market when LOR’s clients had to make their required purchases and sales. It was called “index arbitrage.” Here’s how it worked. Each second of the trading day, the price of each stock in the S&P 500 index was fluctuating on
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opportunity. Of course, assuming it meets the same standard of purity, gold in London is identical to gold in New York. What gave rise to index arbitrage was the ingenious realization that, while the S&P 500 futures weren’t exactly identical to the S&P 500 stocks, they were close enough
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money to buy a lot of stocks and futures contracts at one time. Doing trades like that, day in and day out, was called index arbitrage, and it was a low-risk way for sophisticated money managers to pick up a few extra pennies of profit for an index fund that
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fell to the point where stocks were cheaper than the futures, index arbitrageurs would be buying stocks—just when LOR would be selling them. Similarly, index arbitrage traders were a source of demand in the futures pits, where they could absorb sales by the portfolio insurers who relied on the S&P
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500 futures for their hedging strategy. The larger reason that index arbitrage was important to the stock market and the futures market—indeed, to the entire financial system—was that it helped bring prices in the two
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prices eventually reach the same level in both markets. Similarly, by buying futures when they were cheap and selling stocks when they were expensive, index arbitrage traders helped bring the futures market and the stock market back into equilibrium, with futures prices accurately mirroring stock prices
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. Index arbitrage remained a mysterious market force for years, generating suspicion in the stock market and confusion in the media. Many traditional regulators and investors still
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S&P 500 futures price was at a premium or a discount to that “real” price. They were profoundly wrong to ignore this new phenomenon; index arbitrage and portfolio insurance were links in the invisible chain that, for the first time in history, was pulling the stock market and the derivatives markets
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inexorably together. Yet, there remained a nagging question: Could index arbitrage grow fast enough to keep up with portfolio insurance? Would there always be investors who zigged when LOR zagged? * * * IF IT HAD not been
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step that turned this “SuperDOT” system into Wall Street’s preferred tool for rapidly submitting large, complicated trades, including those generated by portfolio insurance and index arbitrage. These large transactions, calling for buying or selling a long list of stocks at the same time, were known on the NYSE floor as “program
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institutional investors were using program trading. Some just wanted to cut the time between making an investment decision and implementing it. Others were engaged in index arbitrage strategies, selling or buying the stocks in a certain index and simultaneously making the opposite trades in the futures or options markets. Some, such as
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futures and options by the largest and most active investors in the country. The study briefly acknowledged that arcane strategies such as portfolio insurance and index arbitrage had caused some aberrations in the market, but it suggested that “the potential for such disruptive trading” should merely be monitored. * * * FLURRIES OF SNOW
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them. The automated DOT system, originally set up to expedite small retail orders, already was handling larger orders, many of them arising from the complex index arbitrage strategies of institutional investors. That arbitrage trading was rapidly tying the NYSE closer to the futures and options markets in Chicago. Those new links were
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was a classic case of buying the cheap widget and selling the expensive widget to reap an instant profit. It had happened before, of course—index arbitrage had been going on since mid-1982—but not on this scale, and never with this impact on the market. “It was just unbelievable,”
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indexes lost only a few points. The American Stock Exchange index actually climbed almost four points, to a new record. Only the stocks tied to index arbitrage had been affected—but they had been affected so powerfully that they cost the market 2 percent of its value in just a few hours
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with the SEC putting in new ways to handle” the witching hour that was a week away. A far more plausible explanation was tied to index arbitrage. For the entire month of August and early September, the stock index futures contracts had been more expensive than the underlying stocks, and arbitrage traders
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upside down. In the first minutes of trading in Chicago, the price of stock index futures dropped sharply and inexplicably, creating a ripe opportunity for index arbitrage traders. They started selling stocks and buying the cheaper futures contracts. In theory, the arbitrage traders’ sudden demand for the spooz contracts should have driven
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minutes of a newswire report on some comments Paul Volcker made about bank deregulation, although the link seemed tenuous. Index futures followed the options down; index arbitrage kicked in. On the NYSE, prices “suddenly were sucked into a free fall,” the New York Times reported, a nosedive that “strained every system,
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had previously worked at Wells Fargo Investment Advisors in San Francisco. Johnson was the first to testify. He acknowledged that program trading was used for index arbitrage, and that arbitrage traders would occasionally be selling stocks in a declining market. This was unlikely to lead to a meltdown, he explained, because “
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Then it was Hayne Leland’s turn. First, he explained that LOR didn’t actually do any program trading, if that was defined to mean index arbitrage trading. He conceded that, for portfolio insurance to work, “the futures must closely track actual stock index levels” and this required the process of
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index arbitrage, which required program trading. He also said that his firm was working on ways to reduce the impact of portfolio insurance on the market.
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made that difficult—so he urged regulators to raise those limits. After Tom Loeb of Mellon Capital gave a brief history of index funds and index arbitrage—he said there was currently $250 billion in index funds, which should have been a sobering figure for the subcommittee—it was Steve Wunsch’s
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notable economic news, there was a lot of theorizing about what had caused Tuesday’s epic decline. But what was clearly true was that index arbitrage trading had surged at the end of the day, most of it tied to offsetting trades in the S&P 500 futures pit at the
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the index arbitrageurs to go into action. So the relatively modest selling of takeover stocks on the NYSE merged into the much heavier selling by index arbitrage traders, who sent their huge trades directly to the specialists on the trading floor via the NYSE’s automated DOT system. In its first thirty
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of the S&P 500 futures on the Merc fell first, driven down by portfolio insurers who were selling in response to previous declines. Then index arbitrage traders stepped in to buy the cheaper futures contract in Chicago and sell the more expensive stocks in New York, transmitting the price decline from
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the Merc to the NYSE. These concentrated index arbitrage trades were a stormy force, accounting for about a quarter of all the trading during this turbulent hour. This wasn’t Main Street suddenly dumping
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and big brokerage houses trading for their own profit. That was the story for the final hours of trading on the NYSE—heavy selling by index arbitrage traders concentrated within short windows of time, with similarly concentrated but not as abundant buying in the futures pits in Chicago. As had happened before
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of buy orders into the unruly scrum of traders. By the end of the day, the NYSE had handled $1.4 billion worth of index arbitrage trades, twice the normal level and 17 percent of the entire day’s trading volume. But the flip side of those trades in Chicago had
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A momentary rally just before 2:30 p.m. jerked the Dow back to within 30 points of its noontime level, but then the dizzy index arbitrage dance began again. Arbitrage selling accounted for almost 20 percent of the trading volume over the next hour. By 3:30 p.m., the Dow
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division of market regulation, one floor below, to check the market’s status on the computers there. He learned that there likely had been heavy index arbitrage trading that day, and he told his staff to stay in close touch with John Phelan’s team at the New York Stock Exchange. On
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to use the DOT system for program trades, to keep it free for small investors’ orders. However well intentioned, this fateful step essentially unplugged the index arbitrage machine. Phelan may have hoped to stanch the arbitrage sell orders in New York, but the step would also curb the arbitrage buy orders in
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. By 12:30 p.m., the Dow was hovering just above 1,700 points, 38 points below Black Monday’s nadir. The shortage of index arbitrage buyers in Chicago and the inevitable whispers about a crisis at the Merc clearinghouse put the S&P 500 index futures into free fall. Between
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manipulation was needed to produce a sharp spike on the strength of a few purchases. Moreover, with the DOT system closed to program trading, many index arbitrage traders were on the sidelines that day, so it was far from certain that an MMI uptick would actually have produced any arbitrage buying in
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portfolio insurance as the single cause of the crash. He and Leland believed the blame should be shared with those who effectively banned or abandoned index arbitrage on Monday and Tuesday. As early as September 1986, they understood that they and other portfolio insurers sat on one end of the market seesaw
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. Regulators at the CFTC thought it was because John Phelan had told NYSE firms not to use his DOT system for program trading, which inhibited index arbitrage. At midmorning on Thursday, the CFTC’s acting chairman, Kalo Hineman, spoke with David Ruder at the SEC about that. Ruder understood Hineman’s
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back, seeing the discount in Chicago as evidence that prices on the NYSE would soon fall. Hineman was right, of course. With the adoption of index arbitrage strategies by a number of giant institutional traders, the two markets had been shackled together and neither market’s prices could remain in equilibrium without
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-assisted program trading blocked a lot of that now-necessary trading. But the spooz pit’s prices had swung wildly out of line even when index arbitrage was unfettered, which may have cast doubt on Hineman’s case. More important, Phelan wanted to reserve the DOT system for individual investors, who
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team at the Chicago Merc, and got a critical assessment of the NYSE’s performance from Gordon Binns at GM’s pension fund. They investigated index arbitrage. They interviewed NYSE specialists, other exchange officials, academic theorists, institutional investors, and regulators. They analyzed the global sweep of the crash. They demanded, and
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to be big enough to cover the cost of shipping gold across the Atlantic. there might be a chance to profit from the opposite trade: Index arbitrage was also being conducted using other stock index futures, or even index options. A popular arbitrage strategy involved the 30 stocks in the Dow Jones
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the Dow. Some arbitrageurs shifted cash between the Standard & Poor’s 100 Index and the OEX options traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange. Index arbitrage remained a mysterious market force: The record is not entirely clear about who first came up with the idea of
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first minutes of trading in Chicago: James Sterngold, “A Harrowing Day on Wall St.,” New York Times, September 12, 1986, D1. a ripe opportunity for index arbitrage: “The Role of Index-Related Trading in the Market Decline on September 11 and 12, 1986” (hereafter “SEC September 1986 Report”), a Report by the
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Financial Futures Department of Kidder Peabody and Co., June 9, 1987, in the author’s files. Wunsch was arguing for publicly announcing portfolio insurance and index arbitrage orders in advance so they could be matched up and filled separately—what he called sunshine trading. Wunsch warned that although Phelan and other NYSE
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a great deal of faith in bargain hunters coming into the market to avert a meltdown (ibid., pp. 182–83). this required the process of index arbitrage: Ibid., p. 201. he said there was currently $250 billion in index funds: Ibid., p. 222. to permit a greater use of index options
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agency.” The Dow dropped sharply at the opening bell: SEC Crash Report, p. 2.4. By the closing bell, the Dow was down: Ibid. index arbitrage trading had surged at the end of the day: SEC Crash Report, Appendix A, p. A.2. It noted: “While the DJIA declined throughout most
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700 points: Ibid., p. 40. put the S&P 500 index futures into free fall: Ibid. “Contributing greatly to this freefall was the lack of index arbitrage buying which would normally have been stimulated by the huge discount of futures to stock,” the Brady Commission reported. that implied that the Dow’s
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and the House Commerce Committee’s finance subcommittee were private, but Brodsky held a press conference at midday, at which he repeated the argument that index arbitrage had little effect on the markets on Black Monday, and that futures market selling prevented the Dow’s drop from being even greater than it
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Stock Exchange (Amex) Black Monday and options trading American Stock Exchange index Anderson, Roger E. Annunzio, Frank antitrust apartheid divestment Apple Computer arbitrage. See also index arbitrage Arizona Stock Exchange asbestos lawsuits Asian markets AT&T pension fund audit trail rules Australian market automated trading Automobile Club of Southern California pension fund
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Honeywell pension fund Hong Kong futures market Hong Kong stock market Hoover, Herbert Hull, Blair Hunt, Nelson Bunker Hunt, William Herbert IBM stock Icahn, Carl index arbitrage Black Monday and defined DOT system and futures and stock market equilibrium and portfolio insurance and SuperDOT system and program trading witching hour drops and
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index futures price limits Standard & Poor’s 100 index options Standard & Poor’s 500 index Standard & Poor’s 500 index futures (spooz) Black Monday and index arbitrage and price gap between stock cash values and price limits set trading “at a discount” vs. “at a premium” trading halts and Standard & Poor’s
by Peter L. Bernstein · 19 Jun 2005 · 425pp · 122,223 words
own pension funds. There are markets for options (puts and calls) and markets for futures, and markets for options on futures. There is program trading, index arbitrage, and risk arbitrage. There are managers who provide portfolio insurance and managers who offer something called tactical asset allocation. There are butterfly swaps and synthetic
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Investment Performance” (O’Brien) “How to Use Security Analysis to Improve Portfolio Selection” (Treynor/Black) IBM IBM computers ICI v. Camp Illinois Bell Income tax Index arbitrage Index funds. See also Single-index model Industrial Average (Dow Jones) Industrial Average (S&P) Industrial Management Review Inflation Information competition for identifiable insufficient monopolistic
by Lasse Heje Pedersen · 12 Apr 2015 · 504pp · 139,137 words
returns of other stocks with similar characteristics, and then bet that the residual between the stock’s actual return and its expected return will revert. Index Arbitrage and Closed-End Fund Arbitrage Finally, stat arb traders pursue strategies that seek to arbitrage the difference between a “basket security” and its components. For
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. See also funding costs; transaction costs implementation shortfall (IS), 70–72, 73f implied cost of capital, 93 implied expected returns, 93 implied volatility, 239, 262 index arbitrage, 153 index funds, 28 index options: demand pressure for, 46; implied volatilities of, 239 index weightings, Maverick’s indifference to, 111 industry-neutral portfolio construction
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