information asymmetry

Expected Returns: An Investor's Guide to Harvesting Market Rewards

by Antti Ilmanen  · 4 Apr 2011  · 1,088pp  · 228,743 words

short-selling constraints together predict relatively low equity returns because overvalued stocks cannot be shorted and tend to be held by the most optimistic investors. Asymmetric information refers to situations in which one party is better informed than the other, leading to so-called principal–agent problems (including moral hazard, adverse selection

…

, or financial intermediaries or arbitrage capital looking for attractive opportunities—raise the cost of trading. Liquidity differences can often be explained by varying degrees of information asymmetry—a key determinant of illiquidity that can in extreme situations cause market breakdowns. At such times, the credibility of information about market prices—which comes

…

of counterparties supports the liquidity of all assets but especially that of more complex and opaque assets; the loss of such confidence raises concerns about information asymmetry and can result in virtual closing of more fragile markets. What is the (il-)liquidity premium? The illiquidity premium, often called the liquidity premium, is

…

than various debt instruments traded over the counter. Complex securities whose contents, risks, and prices were opaque saw exceptionally sharp price falls, consistent with the asymmetric information stories noted above. 18.3 HISTORICAL EVIDENCE ON AVERAGE LIQUIDITY-RELATED PREMIA Average liquidity premia across global markets Before turning again to U.S. equities

…

-term relative stock price moves predictable if the needed option-pricing data are available. Such predictability is empirically stronger for firms that face an especially asymmetric information environment. This apparent underreaction in stock prices to option market information could partly reflect insider trading; users of superior information may prefer to trade options

…

assets risky assets seasonal regularities survey-based returns tactical forecasting tail risks time-varying illiquidity premia volatility see also asset classes assets under management (AUM) asymmetric information asymmetric returns asymmetric risk at-the-money (ATM) options seasonal regularities tail risks volatility selling attention bias AUM see assets under management BAB see betting

…

tactical forecasting time-varying premium uncertainty US growth rates 1814—2009 inflation risk premium (IRP) asset sensitivities BRP inflation process uncertainty inflation-linked bonds (linkers) information asymmetry infrastructure investment instant history bias institutional window dressing insurance selling/buying interest, UIP interest rate swaps interest rates internal rate of return (IRR) Intertemporal CAPM

…

models rare disasterssee also “bad times”; peso problems rational expectations rational explanations commodity momentum survey-based returns value premium volatility selling rational learning rational theories asymmetric information covariance with “bad times” disagreement models EMH illiquidity premia investor irrationality marginal utility market frictions market price equations multiple risk factors the “new world” the

Trading and Exchanges: Market Microstructure for Practitioners

by Larry Harris  · 2 Jan 2003  · 1,164pp  · 309,327 words

do with the distribution of information. This unusual result comes from our assumption that all traders are equally ignorant. In practice, traders are asymmetrically informed. 14.4.2.5 Asymmetrically Informed Traders In real markets, some traders are better informed than other traders. If the well-informed traders compete with each other to profit

…

compensate. The additional widening of the bid/ask spread is the adverse selection spread we discussed earlier. For most securities and contracts, the degree of information asymmetry varies inversely with how well traders estimate values. When most traders estimate values poorly, those traders who can estimate values well have a great advantage

…

14.4.2.6 Summary Equilibrium spreads in continuous order-driven auction markets depend on many factors. The most important factors are the degree of information asymmetry among the traders, how quickly traders can cancel their limit orders, and the volatility of the instrument. Table 14-2 provides a summary of the

…

relative spreads. 14.6.1 The Three Primary Spread Determinants The three primary spread determinants are asymmetric information, volatility, and utilitarian trading interest. Their effects on spreads are not independent of each other. For example, if information asymmetries are high, spreads will be wide. Wide spreads, however, discourage uninformed investors, decrease trading volumes (

…

a secondary spread determinant), and thereby make spreads even wider. Asymmetric Information The adverse selection spread model suggests that markets with asymmetrically informed traders will have wide spreads. Spreads will be

…

traders know material information about instrument values that would have an immediate and significant effect on values if it were common knowledge. When traders are asymmetrically informed, liquidity suppliers set their prices far from the market to recover from uninformed traders what they lose to well-informed traders. Volatility The equilibrium spread

…

available information when they form their value estimates. Since it is harder for traders to be fully informed about volatile instruments than about stable instruments, asymmetric information problems are probably greater for volatile instruments than for stable instruments. Volatility therefore has a strong secondary effect on spreads because it is a good

…

proxy for asymmetric information. The adverse selection spread component generally will be large for volatile instruments. Utilitarian Trading Interest Utilitarian traders—primarily investors, borrowers, hedgers, asset exchangers, and

…

order flow when they trade. The adverse selection spread component therefore will be small when utilitarian trading interest is strong. Since we discussed above how asymmetric information affects bid/ask spreads, we now focus on how market activity affects bid/ask spreads. Dealers who trade frequently can spread their fixed costs of

…

from its predicted effect. For example, we argue below that firms in emerging industries should have wider spreads than firms in established industries because of asymmetric information problems. However, firms in emerging industries tend to have substantial investment interest, which creates substantial volumes and therefore narrower spreads. Firms in emerging industries

…

factors are correlated, it is often necessary to use statistical methods to disentangle their conflicting effects. 14.6.2.1 Asymmetric Information Proxies Information Disclosure Rules Rules that require information disclosure decrease information asymmetries. Stock markets that require their listed firms to disclose reliable, comprehensive financial information on a regular and timely basis will

…

This secondary effect of volatility on spreads works in the opposite direction to the primary effect. 14.6.3 Liquidity and Capital Structure When the asymmetric information problem is particularly severe, or when utilitarian interest is very small, spreads may be so wide that no trading occurs. Dealers will not make markets

…

. ◀ * * * 14.7 SUMMARY Bid/ask spreads depend on numerous factors. The most important are asymmetric information, volatility, and utilitarian trader interest. Information is asymmetrically distributed among traders when some traders are better informed than others. Asymmetric information makes the order flow informative and causes dealers to lose money to better-informed traders. Dealers

…

from the market, to decrease the value of the timing option. Volatility also indirectly determines bid/ask spreads because it is a good proxy for asymmetric information. Utilitarian trader interest ultimately determines market trading activity. Actively traded instruments have narrow spreads because dealers can spread their costs of doing business over more

…

uninformed traders for bearing their adverse selection risk. Uninformed traders thus lose however they trade. If they want to avoid losing, they must avoid trading. Asymmetric information is extremely important in trading. In this chapter, we used it to explain bid/ask spreads, why uninformed traders lose no matter how they trade

…

away from them. The price discrimination problem makes liquidity suppliers reluctant to trade with large traders because they fear that more size will follow. The asymmetric information problem makes liquidity suppliers reluctant to trade with block initiators because they fear that the block initiators are well informed. 15.2.1 The Latent

…

more than they own. If they want to sell their entire positions, block traders know that no further size will follow. 15.2.4 The Asymmetric Information Problem Block initiators have trouble finding liquidity because block liquidity suppliers suspect that they are well informed. They base their suspicions on two arguments. First

…

concerns, block liquidity suppliers suspect that anonymous traders tend to be well informed. Accordingly, block liquidity suppliers avoid anonymous traders. Large block initiators solve the asymmetric information problem by convincing block liquidity suppliers that they are uninformed. To do this, they must reveal their identities. If they have a reputation for being

…

of their orders to solve the price discrimination problem. Finally, block initiators must convince block liquidity suppliers that they are uninformed traders to address the asymmetric information problem. Successful block trading therefore requires significant exchanges of information among traders besides the usual price and size information that all traders must exchange. Since

…

of their motives for trading. Traders cannot conduct such investigations on exchange floors or in screen-based trading systems. Although sunshine trading may solve the asymmetric information problem for some very well-known traders, it introduces another serious problem. By revealing their intended trades, sunshine traders give free trading options to the

…

LOR was an uninformed trader following a well-known and well-understood trading strategy, LOR hoped that its announcements would solve the price discrimination and asymmetric information problems that large traders normally face. ◀ * * * * * * ▶ Wolves and Sheep Traders sometimes call well-informed traders wolves and uninformed traders sheep. This biological analogy represents

…

Since spreads cannot be smaller than the minimum price increment, a large price increment can force them to pay artificially high spreads. 26.3.2 Asymmetric Information Well-informed and uninformed traders generally prefer different market structures. Most traders want to avoid trading with well-informed traders. Well-informed traders therefore prefer

…

transparency on Nasdaq’s national market system. Journal of Financial Economics 50(2), 231–252. Schnitzlein, Charles R. 1996. Call and continuous trading mechanisms under asymmetric information: An experimental investigation. Journal of Finance 51(2), 613–636. Smidt, Seymour. 1979. Continuous vs. intermittent trading on auction markets. Journal of Financial and

…

impact asymmetry of block trades: An institutional trading explanation. Review of Financial Studies 14(4), 1153–1182. Seppi, Duane J. 1990. Equilibrium block trading and asymmetric information. Journal of Finance 45(1), 73–94. Smith, Brian F., D. Alasdair S. Turnbull, and Robert W. White. 2001. Upstairs market for principal and

…

254 asset bubble, 254 asset exchanger, 6, 33, 181–82, 193, 214, 252 Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR), 65, 66, 448 asymmetrically informed trader, 299, 310 asymmetric information, 7, 312, 314–15, 323, 326–27, 332, 531–32 AT&T, 11–14 ATM-fit currency, 182 at parity order, 117 ATSs. See

…

facilitators, 195, 196, 328 block initiators, 322 block liquidity suppliers, 322, 330 block markets, 140 block positioners. See block dealers block traders, 322–37, 521 asymmetric information problem, 323, 326–27, 332 definition of, 294, 322 hardworking, 324 latent demand problem, 323–24, 332 motives, 330–31 order exposure problem, 323, 324

…

230–32, 235, 243 informative prices, 4, 206–14, 218, 222, 224, 235, 237, 238–39, 241, 243 informed traders, 223–24, 252, 384–85 asymmetric information, 299, 310, 531 and block trading, 330 competition among, 239–40, 243 in crossing networks, 135 and dealers, 287–92, 295, 519 definition of, 177

…

Ultra OTC Fund, 447 program trading, 368, 489 proprietary orders, 70 proprietary traders, 32 proprietary trading, 32, 149 pro rata allocation, 117, 134, 447 proxies asymmetric information, 314–15 for utilitarian trading interest, 316–17 volatility, 315–16 proxy variables, 312 pseudo-informed traders, 197, 229–30, 231 public benefits definition of

…

129–30 unilateral search, 395–96 uninformed liquidity demanders, 339–40, 373, 376 uninformed traders, 6, 237–38, 241 and adverse selection, 303, 304 and asymmetric information, 531 and block trading, 327, 331 and dealers, 291, 292 definition of, 177 and fundamental values, 239 reasons for trading, 252 United States Lime & Minerals

Skin in the Game: Hidden Asymmetries in Daily Life

by Nassim Nicholas Taleb  · 20 Feb 2018  · 306pp  · 82,765 words

goes back to a disagreement between two stoic philosophers, Diogenes of Babylon and his student Antipater of Tarsus, who took the higher moral ground on asymmetric information and seems to match the ethics endorsed by this author. Not a piece from both authors is extant, but we know quite a bit from

…

term in decision theory that does not exist in English; it means both uncertainty and deception—my personal take is that it means something beyond informational asymmetry between agents: inequality of uncertainty. Simply, as the aim is for both parties in a transaction to have the same uncertainty facing random outcomes, an

Empirical Market Microstructure: The Institutions, Economics and Econometrics of Securities Trading

by Joel Hasbrouck  · 4 Jan 2007  · 209pp  · 13,138 words

markets—the (electronic) limit order book. Much of the material here can be perceived as an attempt to understand this mechanism. The second theme is asymmetric information, an economic term that refers to the varying quality of the information that traders bring to the market. It often establishes a motive for trade

…

−1 + ut + z, where z is a zero-mean random variable drawn once at time zero. The economic models discussed in later chapters (particularly the asymmetric information models) are often placed in settings where there is a single random draw of the security’s terminal payoff and the price converges toward this

…

here is that a buy order is associated with an increase in the security value, a connection that will be developed in the models of asymmetric information. Suppose that ρ is known. UNIVARIATE TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS a. Show that Var(pt ) = 2c 2 + σu2 + 2cρσu , Cov(pt , pt−1 ) = −c(c + ρσu

…

realities. It turns out that dropping the assumption of uniform information opens the door for sensible economic explanations for these features of market behavior. The asymmetric information models described in this and following chapters take this direction. These models have the following general features. The security payoff is usually of a common

…

(e.g., the coefficient of risk aversion, a value signal) are identically distributed across all participants. In an asymmetric information model, some subset of the agents has superior private information. The majority of the asymmetric information models in microstructure examine market dynamics subject to a single source of uncertainty, that is, a single information

…

not time-homogenous, although path realizations can be sequentially stacked to provide a semblance of ongoing trading. Theoretical market microstructure has two main sorts of asymmetric information models. In the sequential trade models, randomly selected traders arrive at the market singly, sequentially, and independently. Key early references along this line of inquiry

…

broader concept of private information. This important point has been stressed by Lyons (2001). 5.4.2 Fixed Transaction Costs Suppose that in addition to asymmetric information considerations, the dealer must pay a transaction cost c on each trade (as in the Roll model). The modification is straightforward. The ask and bid

…

of trade prices is not a martingale (due to the ± c asymmetry in the problem). In terms of the original Roll model, the effect of asymmetric information is to break the independence between trade direction qt and the innovation to the efficient price ut . Developments along these lines are discussed in Glosten

…

in real markets), a trade can trigger a wave of elections. 5.5 Empirical Implications This book’s presentation of information asymmetry focuses on its role in trading situations. More broadly, though, asymmetric information figures SEQUENTIAL TRADE MODELS prominently in many models of corporate finance and asset pricing. The sequential trade models (and others

…

the latter ranks as one of the most important goals of empirical microstructure research. In the model of section 5.2, the structural asymmetric information parameter is µ (the proportion of informed

…

.7) and (5.1)). These results suggest use of the bid-ask spread or the impact an order has on subsequent prices as proxies for asymmetric information. Although it is often most convenient to measure the spread, the spread impounds noninformational costs (c in the Roll model) and inventory effects (discussed in

…

-specific information asymmetries, making index securities generally cheaper to trade. Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992, 1994), Foster and Viswanathan (1996), and Back, Cao, and Willard (2000) consider multiperiod models with multiple informed traders. 8 A Generalized Roll Model 8.1 Overview Following the economic analysis, we now turn to empirical examination of asymmetric information by

…

reflects the noninformational fixed costs of the trade (clearing costs, clerical costs, etc.) and λ reflects the adverse selection cost. In the spirit of the asymmetric information models, λ is the price impact necessary to balance expected gains from trading against uninformed agents with expected losses to informed agents. These conventions suggest

…

}. One option is to fix one of the structural parameters. Setting λ = 0 returns us to the original Roll model (no asymmetric information). If σu2 = 0, then we are left with only asymmetric information (no public information). Setting c = 0 eliminates noninformational costs. It is sometimes useful to consider these special cases, but from

…

information and trade-related (“private information”) components. From the perspective of the sequential and strategic trade models, the effects of trades on prices arise from asymmetric information. The foregoing decomposition therefore suggests proxies for the latter. λ2 σv2 is an absolute measure. If the prices are measured in logs, λσv is approximately

…

that are attributed to trades. The logic of the sequential and strategic trade models broadly connect the trade-related variance components to asymmetric information. The variance measures, and other microstructure-based information asymmetry proxies, such as price impact coefficients and spreads, may readily be estimated in many important settings. It is then tempting to

…

based proxies are meaningfully connected to asymmetric information, at least as it pertains to securities’ cash flows. Neal and Wheatley (1998) examine the spreads of closed-end mutual funds. The most meaningful valuation number for these securities is their net asset value. As this is publicly known, information asymmetries are presumably low. Despite this

…

of dealer behavior to this point have focused on their recovery of noninformational operating costs (via c in the Roll model) and their pricing under asymmetric information. This chapter examines other aspects of the dealer’s role and behavior. The discussion first considers the inventory control models. These analyses (which generally predate

…

the asymmetric information models) essentially view the securities dealer as being similar in key respects to a dealer in any other commodity. Normally a vendor maintains an inventory

…

to encourage an offsetting sell order and discourage another incoming buy order. The problem is that the same short-term relation is predicted by the asymmetric information models. (Is the dealer raising the quotes on account of the possibility that the purchaser is informed?) To differentiate the two effects empirically, it is

…

, the inventory control component of the quotes should vanish. Madhavan and Smidt (1991) describe a theoretical model of dealer behavior that incorporates both inventory and asymmetric information effects (also see Madhavan and Smidt (1993)). For NYSE data, Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) estimate VARs that include price changes, signed orders, and specialist inventory

…

limit order, being a bid or offer, is simply a dealer quote by another name. The implication is that a limit order is exposed to asymmetric information risk and also must recover noninformational costs of trade. This view supports the application of the economic and statistical models described earlier to LOM, hybrid

…

and Market Order Most of our models of dealer quoting are characterized by indifference to execution. The zero expected profit condition underlying the Roll and asymmetric information models is conditional on a trade, in which event the dealer simply recovers his costs. The exceptions are the inventory control models where the dealer

…

, William J., Laurie S. Hodrick, and Robert A. Korajczyk, 2002, Predicting equity liquidity, Management Science 48, 470–83. Brunnermeier, Markus K., 2001, Asset Pricing under Asymmetric Information (Oxford University Press, Oxford). Brunnermeier, Markus K., and Lasse Heje Pedersen, 2005. Market liquidity and funding liquidity (Stern School, NYU). Caballe, Jordi, and Murugappa Krishnan

…

, Transactions, volume, and volatility, Review of Financial Studies 7, 631–51. Kagel, John H., Chung Kim, and Donald Moser, 1996, Fairness in ultimatum games with asymmetric information and asymmetric payoffs, Games and Economic Behavior 13, 100–110. Karlin, Samuel, and Howard M. Taylor, 1975, A First Course in Stochastic Processes (Academic Press

…

, Gideon, 1998, Information and the pricing of assets when orders arrive one at a time (Johnson School, Cornell University). Saar, Gideon, and Lei Yu, 2002. Information asymmetry about the firm and the permanent price impact of trades: Is there a connection? (Finance Department, Stern School, NYU). Sandas, Patrik, 2001, Adverse selection and

…

, Review of Financial Studies 14, 705–34. Sargent, Thomas J., 1979, Macroeconomic Theory (Academic Press, New York). Seppi, Duane J., 1990, Equilibrium block trading and asymmetric information, Journal of Finance 45, 73–94. Seppi, Duane J., 1997, Liquidity provision with limit orders and a strategic specialist, Review of Financial Studies 10, 103

…

foreign exchange market (Stern School of Business, New York University). 195 Index Decimalization, 175 Depth improvement, 141 Amihud, Yakov, 108 Asymmetric information, 42; sequential trade models, 43; in strategic trade model, 61 Asymmetric information measures, 53, 85. See also Probability of informed trading Auctions, 17, 18, 64, 170 Autocovariances, univariate, 29; vector, 78 Autoregressive

Markets, State, and People: Economics for Public Policy

by Diane Coyle  · 14 Jan 2020  · 384pp  · 108,414 words

between competition and regulation can be hard to strike, particularly for markets with one or both of two market failures: increasing returns to scale and asymmetric information. Regulatory Policy All businesses complain about red tape—the regulations the government forces them to implement. These take a wide range of forms; figure 2

…

low or high quality—the former are known as “lemons” • Only the seller knows the quality of the car she is selling (this is the information asymmetry) • The seller has a minimum price she is willing to accept • The buyer has a maximum price he is willing to pay Think about the

…

life these get bought and sold a lot. The point of the model is to highlight the role of the various mechanisms for accommodating the information asymmetry. Here are some examples: • Second-hand car dealers can build a reputation for fair dealing through investing in showrooms, offering mechanical inspections, promising money-back

…

/schumpeterian-creative-destruction-the-rise-of-uber-and-the-great-taxicab-collapse/. These regulations might perhaps be justified in terms of market failures such as asymmetric information. After all, taking a taxi is an experience good: if you turn up at the airport in a strange city, you do not know if

…

economists for the first time in some decades, with recent economic thinking emphasizing the important coordination role of government when there are missing markets and asymmetric information, and also an important role for the production of public (knowledge) goods via investment in the science base. This chapter links the theory and history

…

of the shifting boundary of state and private production to specific market failures: public goods, natural monopolies, asymmetric information, and incomplete markets (assumptions A3, A4, A5, and A6 fail—see box 1.4). The History of Nationalization and Privatization: The UK and Beyond The

…

1973 article. A degree, along with the identity of the institution awarding it, acts as a signal.* Signaling theory is another area of economics where asymmetric information plays a big part in explaining less than fully efficient behavior and outcomes. Increasingly, many employers now look for candidates with a master’s degree

…

increasingly prevail in legislation and regulation. What, though, is the economic efficiency rationale in terms of market failures? There are in fact several. They concern asymmetric information (assumption A4 fails), incomplete markets (A6 fails), and externalities (A5 fails) (see box 1.4). When it comes to providing an income in times of

…

need, the most important rationale concerns the inability of individuals to insure themselves privately against some kinds of risk, because of asymmetric information and missing markets (assumptions A4 and A6 fail). The welfare state is in essence society’s mutual insurance. There are some risks it is impossible

…

individuals for whom the risk of making a claim is quite low; and anyway such policies are costly. These kinds of market failures due to asymmetric information and adverse selection are pervasive in insurance, including health insurance. People know more than the insurance company about their own health, and it is hard

…

the point of need, at one end of the spectrum and the US emphasis on the private insurance market at the other. There is another asymmetric information rationale for direct public provision, which is that professionals such as doctors and teachers know far more than their “customers” about the service being provided

…

contracted out to the private sector either at the construction stage or once the new infrastructure is operational. But such contractual relationships are fraught with asymmetric information—the contractor knows more than the government customer—and therefore there are agency problems of the kind that have cropped up repeatedly through this book

…

in a timely fashion. On the other hand, there are many routine medical procedures, such as varicose vein treatments or tests not affected by the asymmetric information problem, that could be contracted out to a private provider safe in the knowledge that the quality of the service and its outcomes can be

…

training and support for their rehabilitation. There are several reasons contracting out may fail to deliver efficient results, in addition to the principal-agent and asymmetric information problems. One is that contracts are incomplete, meaning it is not possible to write down in sufficient detail all the possible contingencies, particularly in complicated

…

. How Well Have Reforms Worked? The debate about how to organize public services, triggered initially by the public choice revolution, is far from over. The asymmetric information and incentive problems in the principal-agent relationship described above are not trivial. One of the key points made by the public choice theorists is

…

show, markets and governments tend to fail in the same contexts, because the challenges of collective action are hard whenever there are characteristics such as asymmetric information or externalities. The assessment of efficiency also ideally should account for uncertainty, transaction costs, cognitive costs, and likely behavioral responses. This includes incentives created for

…

when there are no close substitutes for the good or amenity in question. GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL TERMS Adverse selection: A situation that occurs because of asymmetric information, which leads to distortions in market allocations. Either the buyer or seller holds more information about the expected value of the transaction, which they do

…

of, 297 Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), 57 Army Corps of Engineers, 304–5 Arnault, Bernard, 231 Arrow, Kenneth, 15, 40, 305 artificial intelligence (AI), 129 asymmetric information, 24, 36, 44, 101, 289, 293, 303; competition vs. regulation and, 64, 68, 72, 73–75, 76, 95, 113, 174, 266; contracting out and, 278

…

, Japan), 131 missing markets, 101, 128, 209 Mitterrand, François, 102, 107 monetary policy, 56 monitoring, 65, 94, 113, 145; of agents by principals, 284–85; asymmetric information and, 35, 146, 285; in cartels, 57; in competition policy, 55; cost of, 303; of free riding, 155; in markets, 32, 35, 291 monopoly, 13

Corporate Finance: Theory and Practice

by Pierre Vernimmen, Pascal Quiry, Maurizio Dallocchio, Yann le Fur and Antonio Salvi  · 16 Oct 2017  · 1,544pp  · 391,691 words

firms issue convertible debt?, European Financial Management Journal, 10(2), 339–374, June 2004. T. Chemmanur, What drives the issuance of putable convertibles: Risk-shifting, asymmetric information, or taxes?, Financial Management, 39(3), 1027–1067, Autumn 2010. T. Chemmanur, D. Nandy, A. Yan, Why issue mandatory convertibles? Theory and empirical evidence . Downloadable

…

equal to its present value, as long as all publicly available information has been priced in. This is the very basis of market efficiency. Conversely, asymmetric information is the main factor that can keep a company from selling an asset at its fair value. Investors must therefore be given the information they

…

the basic tenets of the equilibrium theory, which is that all parties have access to the same information (see Chapter 15). 2. Signalling theory and asymmetric information Signalling theory is based on two basic ideas: the same information is not available to all parties: the managers of a company may have more

…

is fairly distributed to all parties at all times, i.e. that it is symmetrical as in the case of efficient markets. On the contrary, asymmetric information is the rule. In short, perfect and equally shared information is at best an objective, and most often an illusion. This can clearly raise problems

…

. Asymmetric information may lead investors to undervalue a company. As a result, its managers might hesitate to increase its capital because they consider the share price to

…

signals and discourage managers of ailing companies from using these same signals to give a misleading picture of their company’s financial health. In sum, information asymmetry may lead to a share being priced at less than its objective value, with two consequences: investments are not maximised because the cost of financing

…

is too high; the choice of financing is skewed in favour of sources (such as debt) where there is less information asymmetry. Stephen Ross initiated the main studies in this field in 1977. 3. Agency theory Agency theory says that a company is not a single, unified

…

markets in equilibrium. Signal theory is based on the assumption that information is not equally available to all parties at the same time, and that information asymmetry is the rule. This can have disastrous consequences and result in very low valuations or a suboptimal investment policy. Accordingly, certain financial decisions, known as

…

signals, are taken to shake up this information asymmetry. These signals can, however, have a negative financial impact on the party who initiates them if they turn out to be unfounded. Agency theory calls

…

choice of financing is far more an endeavour to reduce conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers or shareholders and lenders, as well as the information asymmetry between management and investors. Section 33.1 The benefits of debt or the trade-off model 1. Corporate income taxes Up to now, our reasoning

…

be credible, there must be a penalty for the wrong signals in order to dissuade companies from deliberately misleading the market. In the context of information asymmetry, markets would not understand why a corporate manager would borrow to undertake a very risky and unprofitable venture. After all, if the venture fails, he

…

shares they hold or control in the companies they work for or of which they are board members. Section 33.4 Information asymmetries and the pecking order theory Having established that information asymmetry carries a cost, our next task is to determine what type of financing carries the lowest cost in this respect. The

…

by riskier forms of debt and hybrid securities. Capital increases come last, because they are automatically interpreted as a negative signal. To counter this, the information asymmetry must be reduced by means of roadshows, one-to-one meetings, prospectuses and advertising campaigns. Investors have to be persuaded that the issue offers good

…

.vernimmen.com. In this chapter we went beyond the simplified structure of perfect markets, and looked at a number of different factors (tax, bankruptcy costs, information asymmetry, conflicts of interest) which make analysis more complex, but also more relevant. Modigliani and Miller demonstrated how, when corporate tax is included in the equation

…

enjoys at a corporate level. For individual taxpayers, the tax breaks on income on equity are better than they are for debt. Problems stemming from information asymmetry between shareholders and investors have an obvious impact on the choice of capital structure. Managers believing that their companies are undervalued would prefer to increase

…

’s confidence in its ability to meet payments on the debt and an indirect sign that the project is likely to be profitable. Pushing the information asymmetry problem to the limit brings us to the pecking order theory, which holds that managers choose sources of financing on the basis of the amount

…

those investments carry low risk. In addition, retained earnings are one source of financing about which not much disclosure is necessary. The cost of any informational asymmetry having to do with internal financing is therefore very low. It is not surprising that, as predicted by Jensen (1986) and observed in a study

…

the projects proposed to them by the managers. This is the virtuous cycle of finance. Although attractive intellectually because it greatly reduces the problem of asymmetric information, this solution runs up against the high costs of carrying out a capital increase – not just the direct costs, but the cost in terms of

…

are overvalued – has to be countered (signalling theory). A capital increase can cause acrimonious discussions between managers and shareholders. It entails a temporary reduction in informational asymmetry (agency theory). The reduction in equity rights of a shareholder that neither puts in nor takes out funds on the occasion of a capital increase

…

bank loans, Journal of Finance, 64(2), 823–860, April 2009. A. Berger, M. Espinosa-Vega, W. Scott Frame, N. Miller, Debt maturity, risk and asymmetric information, Journal of Finance, 60(6), 2895–2923, December 2005. P. Brockman, E. Unlu, Dividend policy, creditor right and the agency cost of debt, Journal of

…

generally sold on the market at a discount of between 10% and 20% compared with the first listed price. Different theoretical explanations, based mainly on information asymmetry, have been put forward to explain this. IPOing a company is a complex process and success cannot be taken for granted. Even at the last

…

allocate revenues to themselves at the expense of the company’s shareholders, its creditors and employees and, more generally, society as a whole. Given the information asymmetry that exists between management and shareholders, corporate governance also covers financial communication in the very broadest sense of the term, including information provided to shareholders

…

governance, i.e. a good set of rules, should make it possible to: limit existing or potential conflicts of interest between shareholders and management; limit information asymmetry by ensuring transparency of management with regard to shareholders. Corporate governance can help to resolve potential conflicts between shareholders and management in the same way

…

is a preventative measure. Unsurprisingly, agency theory shows that in firms where there are few potential conflicts of interest between shareholders and management and where information asymmetry is low, i.e. in small and medium-sized companies where, more often than not, the manager and shareholder is one and the same person

…

equal dissemination of information. Anti-takeover measures can deprive shareholders of the capital gains that come out of the free process of auctions. Management of information asymmetry. Notes 1 The share price of Daimler was divided by three between the acquisition of Chrysler and its sale in 2007. 2 See Boone and

…

of listed companies constantly growing and investment possibilities therefore expanding, investors prefer simplicity. In addition, large conglomerates communicate less about smaller divisions, thus increasing the information asymmetry. Lack of motivation of managers of non-core divisions. Small base of investors interested by all the businesses of the group. The conglomerate has operating

…

performance and focus: Long-run stock market performance following spin-offs, Journal of Financial Economics, 54(1), 75–101, October 1999. S. Krishnaswami, V. Subramaniam, Information asymmetry, valuation, and the corporate spin-off decision, Journal of Financial Economics, 53(1), 73–112, July 1999. W. Maxwell, R. Rao, Do spin-offs expropriate

…

assets revaluing risk strike price underlying see also financial assets; fixed assets; net assets assimilation, bonds associated undertakings associates income from investments in asymmetry of information asymmetry of risk at the money options attached warrants, securities auctions “automated” financial analyses average maturity, bonds average rate, shares average strike options avoidance principle, risk

…

foreign subsidiaries growth rate to perpetuity hyperinflationary countries index-linked securities inventories and leverage effect stability principle inflation profits inflation risk inflows balance sheet financing information asymmetry information circulation information provision investors real options information systems, financial analysis information technology (IT) informational mimicry initial public offerings (IPO) creation of discount execution of

Culture and Prosperity: The Truth About Markets - Why Some Nations Are Rich but Most Remain Poor

by John Kay  · 24 May 2004  · 436pp  · 76 words

Prosperity { 223} The problem is that I know what I am selling and you don't know exactly what you are buying. There is an information asymmetry between buyer and seller. And this is true of almost every transaction in a modern economy. The auto manufacturer knows more about the car than

…

principal means through which a market economy deals with consumer ignorance. When we are ill, we suffer not just pain but asymmetric information. Our confidence in the physician deals with the asymmetric information, and we hope that his prescriptions deal with the pain. Typically, this transaction has several different layers of reputation. We visit

…

spreading risks and reducing their costs, markets in risk concentrated them and made them threatening, even fatal, to the solvency of participants. { 238} John Kay Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection * ••••••••• * ••••••••••••••••••••••••• * The risk that Seabiscuit will not come in first in the 1940 Santa Anita handicap. The risk that the Federal Reserve will

…

have married in the first place. The insurance company, which looks only at statistics, takes a different view, and the premium seems high. Soon, however, information asymmetry is reversed. Perhaps the relationship develops well, perhaps it does not. Happily married couples will not be interested in divorce insurance. Those whose marriages are

…

policy are bad risks. A "fair" premium based on the average incidence of divorce would be unprofitable for the insurance company. Culture and Prosperity { 239} Asymmetric information issues pervade risk markets. The insurer would sensibly raise the premium to match the characteristics of those who want policies. But this makes divorce insurance

…

solved by limiting the use of genetic information by insurers. That would only aggravate the issue of adverse selection. The only solution to the potential information asymmetry is to stop such information being collected at all-which would be impossible even if it were desirable. In fifty years, private medical and life

…

individual firm, and its employees and shareholders, confront the additional uncertainty of which firm will do well in the marketplace. Business risks bring problems of asymmetric information and moral hazard. Investors should always have the tale of the wallet auction in their mind. Why are people who know more about this venture

…

is precarious because one crop failure can exhaust his assets and reserves. Yet a business partner in Antonio's venture would sensibly be nervous of information asymmetry and moral hazard. Even if Antonio is completely honest and truthfully reveals all he knows, he may be more inclined to offer participations when he

…

who fail to penalize shirkers. There is a common economic interest in the enforcement of social norms. Contagious reputation-which is valuable in dealing with information asymmetry-also helps secure cooperation. The best strategy for a Prisoner's Dilemma changes if the game is repeated. The American political scientist Robert Axelrod organized

…

European system produced higher quality blood more cheaply. 16 Poor people were more likely to supply infected or contaminated blood. And the commercial transaction created information asymmetry: the prospective donor might conceal his or her medical history. Although the United States was the first rich state to experience a widespread HIV problem

…

that the behavior he fears, being irrational, will not happen. And nor are we. Information (Chapter 19) ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Asymmetric information is endemic in modern market economies. It is easy to conclude that the remedy for asymmetric information is to tell consumers more, either by regulation or by recognizing disclosure of risks as a legal defense

…

. Yet, as these examples illustrate, such measures are almost use- Culture and Prosperity { 349} less. The normal market mechanism for dealing with asymmetric information is reputation. When we place a deposit with a bank or visit a doctor, we rely on the reputation of the bank and the doctor

…

has now been said for many years without major practical consequence. Economic Science: Laureates and Prizes Name Country Year Subject George A. Akerlof USA 2001 Asymmetric information Maurice Allais France 1988 The theory of markets and efficient utilization of resources Kenneth J. Arrow USA 1972 General equilibrium theory { 358} Appendix Name Country

…

E. Meade UK 1977 Trade theory Robert C. Merton USA 1997 Finance theory Merton H. Miller USA 1990 Finance theory James A. Mirrlees UK 1996 Asymmetric information Franco Modigliani USA 1985 Macroeconomics and finance theory Robert A. Mundell Canada 1999 Exchange rates and currency areas Gunnar Myrdal Sweden 1974 Economic systems John

…

. Simon USA 1978 Decision making Vernon Smith USA 2003 Behavioral economics Robert M. Solow USA 1987 Theory of economic growth A. Michael Spence USA 2001 Asymmetric information George J. Stigler USA 1982 Industrial structures, functioning of markets, and causes and effects of public regulation Joseph E. Stiglitz USA 2001

…

Stone UK 1984 National income accounting Jan Tin bergen Netherlands 1969 Economic dynamics James Tobin USA 1981 Finance theory and macroeconomics William Vickrey USA 1996 Asymmetric information {glossary} ••••••••••••••••••••••• absolute advantage balance of payments bounded rationality See COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE. The difference between a country's exports and imports (its current account surplus or

…

of allocation mechanisms under incentive compatibility which no agent can gain an advantage by strategic behavior. A characteristic of a market in which one side information asymmetry (buyer or seller) is better informed about the properties of the good or service than the other (seller or buyer). intellectual property Rights created by

…

, 199,200 compatibility standards, 259-62 cooperation vs., 256 definition of, 137 and economic rent, 290-301 emergence of, 146 examples of, 14, 137-52 information asymmetry effects, 232-33 and Pareto efficiency, 192-94,202,291, 319 and public goods, 341-42 rigging of, 150-51 in risk, 153-61 spontaneous

…

, 89, 121, 184 education, 5, 27, 28, 302,342 efficiency, 184-94 adaptive behavior, 216-17 American business model, 320 competitive markets, 194, 200-201 information asymmetry, 223-24 measurement of, 191-92 Pareto, 192-94,202,291,319 risk markets, 158-59,234-35,246, 319-20 efficient market hypothesis, 158

…

products, 138-46 coordination of, 127-28, 137, 141-43 demand timing, 142 equilibrium of. See general equilibrium incentive compatibility, 98-100, 104, 151 and information asymmetry, 206, 207, 222-33,319 See also competitive markets; price mechanisms Sweden, 24, 26, 27,43-45,67,260,289, 304-5 Switzerland, 15-16

…

,296 trade, 177, 198 specialization, 86-92 See also production and exchange trademarks, 74,224,272,352 transactions, 73-82 costs, 205-6, 219 and information asymmetry, 222-33,319 transistor, 268 { 420} Index Trump, Donald, 317 trust, 20, 51,225,256,319 Tucker, Albert, 254, 330 Turing, Alan, 267,269,272

Virtual Competition

by Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice E. Stucke  · 30 Nov 2016

a mix of competition and interdependence among market participants. Looking beyond the Façade of Competition 31 Firms cooperate to extract data from individuals and promote asymmetrical information flows to foster behavioral exploitation, while simultaneously competing among themselves over the consumer surplus. Extraction and capture may be viewed from an evolutionary perspective: a

…

is dynamic, discriminatory, or both. Where Does the Power Reside? The power in our scenario favors those who hold and sell our personal data. These informational asymmetries support near-perfect behavioral discrimination. The first asymmetry is between the discriminating firm and its customers. The firm collects data on its customers and designs

…

substance abuse, lowerquality credit cards, or checking our prison records—but not know why these ads are directed at us.56 The second level of informational asymmetry is between the firm and its competitors. Because perfect price discrimination will remain elusive, firms will seek to refine their categorizations of consumers. Not all

…

, independent apps, and the super-platform cooperate in the extraction phase, obtaining valuable personal data (such as geolocation data) about us, tracking our behavior, promoting asymmetrical information exchanges and strategies (i.e., where they control and know about the data flow, but we don’t), and reducing our ability to maintain our

…

Reflections 241 splitting the world between those who know, and those who do not.”34 The concern is that the boom in Big Data and information asymmetry perpetuates wealth inequality.35 As one writer has noted, “the data mining of individual privacy is fundamentally reshaping markets by transferring so much knowledge about

…

, 37, 258n38; emerging trends and, 21; self-learning algorithms and autonomous pricing decisions, 74–77, 78 Aston, Daniel William, 40 Asymmetric bargaining power, 225, 332n20 Asymmetric information, 4, 31, 132 Asymmetric power, 155–158, 312nn39,45, 313nn51,52 Asymmetric price elasticity, behavioral discrimination and, 112–115, 294n62 Athena Capital Research, 68–69

Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning About a Highly Connected World

by David Easley and Jon Kleinberg  · 15 Nov 2010  · 1,535pp  · 337,071 words

” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 710 22.4 Prediction Markets and Stock Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 714 22.5 Markets with Endogenous Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 717 22.6 The Market for Lemons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 719 22.7 Asymmetric Information in Other Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 724 22.8 Signaling Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 728 22.9 Quality Uncertainty On-Line: Reputation Systems and Other Mechanisms . 729 22.10Advanced Material: Wealth

…

consider what happens in markets where the desirability of the items is endogenous. The issue we focus on in this case is the role of asymmetric information. The next two chapters in this part of the book will discuss voting and the role of property rights. Markets and voting mechanisms are alternative

…

; but with a different set of expectations, the world would have turned out in a different way that would have made those expectations come true. Asymmetric Information. There is, however, an important difference between these two stories. In the case of the social-networking site, it seems reasonable to suppose that most

…

do not know. This is an inherent feature of how the market works: there is asymmetric information. In Chapter 17 we studied self-fulfilling expectations equilibria in settings without asymmetric information. In the rest of this chapter, we add asymmetric information to the picture; this turns out to be a basic ingredient in the way that

…

and then showed how the resulting principles extended to much larger and more complex systems such as the stock market. For considering the role of asymmetric information, we’ll follow a similar strategy, first developing the case of the used-car market as a simple, stylized example, and then showing how the

…

fundamental markets. In focusing first on used cars, we’re following the rhetorical lead of the economist George Akerlof, who published a foundational paper on asymmetric information [10] for which he shared the 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics. His leading example in the paper was the market for used cars — or, as

…

range of prices. That is, the price of good cars will be 12 and the price of bad cars will be 6. The Market with Asymmetric Information. But what happens if buyers cannot tell in advance of a purchase what type of car they are buying? Since cars are indistinguishable to buyers

…

domain of self-fulfilling expectations equilibria, similarly to what we saw in discussing network effects in Chapter 17 (but here with the added issue of information asymmetry). We will look for a shared expectation h by the buyers that is self-fulfilling, in that if each buyer expects a fraction h of

…

the good cars out of the market. Complete Market Failure. Our example with good and bad cars illustrates the basic idea of how equilibria with asymmetric information work, but it doesn’t fully capture the possible extent of market failure, or how bad the effect can get. To explore this, let’s

…

the sellers do, Whether the lemons are sold is a question of buyer and seller indifference, since they are worth 0 to everyone. But with asymmetric information, we need to consider what the possible self-fulfilling expectations equilibria are. There are three candidates for an equilibrium: (a) all cars are offered for

…

complete information, the market would succeed in allocating items from sellers to buyers, potentially with different prices for different levels of quality. (iii) There is asymmetric information about the quality of the items — only one side in a transaction can reliably determine the quality what is being sold. (In the used-car

…

. Determining exactly which assignments are possible is complicated, but the optimal allocation that would be possible with full information cannot always be achieved. 22.7 Asymmetric Information in Other Markets The ideas behind the market for lemons turn out to be fundamental to some of society’s most important markets. Once you

…

be willing to hire any given prospective employee if they could accurately determine which jobs and wage levels were appropriate for them. (iii) There is asymmetric information: a person generally has a better sense for how productive they are than a prospective employer does. (iv) If take a strong but plausible version

…

are assuming that although workers have differing productivities, each individual’s productivity is a fixed, given amount, and not affected by anything that 22.7. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN OTHER MARKETS 725 the worker chooses to do. It is plausible that workers can affect their productivity by varying the amount of effort that

…

at all, the only thing it can be sure of is getting those with low productivity. It’s useful to work through the consequences of information asymmetry in the labor market through a simple example, whose structure closely parallels our used-car example. Suppose a firm hires workers from a large pool

…

by the high frequency of unproductive workers. The Market for Insurance. There are many markets that we can analyze in a similar fashion. For example, asymmetric information plays an important role in the market for health insurance. Health insurance companies generally know much less about the health of those they insure than

…

the group. This means that the healthiest individuals in the group are being charged a price that is greater than the expected cost 22.7. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN OTHER MARKETS 727 of providing care for them, and so they may be unwilling to buy insurance. Then, because these relatively healthy people do

…

. But just as in our earlier examples, we see how socially undesirable outcomes can occur in the market when there are imbalances in information. The information asymmetry we have focused on in the market for health insurance leads, just as in case of used cars or employment, to a type of adverse

…

, the only thing one can be sure of is that it will be bought by those who are less healthy. There is another type of information asymmetry that occurs in the market for health insurance that we have so far ignored in our discussion. As in the previous examples, we have treated

…

individuals can take actions which affect their health. If these actions are not observable to the insurance company then we have a new source of information asymmetry, since each individual knows more about his future behavior than the insurance company does. Once an individual purchases health insurance, his incentive to undertake costly

…

as moral hazard: when you’re shielded from the full cost of your potential bad behavior, you have less incentive to avoid engaging in it. Information Asymmetry in Trading and the Stock Market. It is useful to reflect further on these examples in light of one of the basic lessons of this

…

it is possible that no trade occurs, just as we saw with the example of used cars [294]. 22.8 Signaling Quality Given how powerfully information asymmetry can affect the operation of a market, it is natural to consider methods for alleviating it. One fundamental approach, useful in a number of settings

…

mechanism works even if education has no direct effect on a worker’s productivity. Of course, education is also intrinsically valuable, but when we take information asymmetry into account, we see that education has a kind of two-fold power in the market. It trains workers for future employment; but beyond this

…

, it also reduces information asymmetry about worker quality in a way that can potentially be necessary for the labor market to function effectively at all. 22.9 Quality Uncertainty On

…

can begin to appreciate that many of the standard mechanisms used in Web sites for on-line commerce are in fact motivated by considerations of asymmetric information and signaling. In this section we will discuss two of these mechanisms: reputation systems, and the role of ad-quality measures in sponsored-search advertising

…

revenue from high-clickthrough low-quality ads is being traded off against the long-term losses due to user perceptions of quality. The problem of asymmetric information is a fundamental issue behind this trade-off, 732 CHAPTER 22. MARKETS AND INFORMATION and in fact the market for search advertising exhibits the basic

…

is also a bit subtle. In particular, it is not about the relationship between the advertisers and the search engine (though one can look for information asymmetry there too), but between the users and the advertisers, with user effort in clicking on ads as the quantity being valued. In aggregate, of course

High-Frequency Trading: A Practical Guide to Algorithmic Strategies and Trading Systems

by Irene Aldridge  · 1 Dec 2009  · 354pp  · 26,550 words

, Traders, and Liquidity 130 Profitable Market Making 134 Directional Liquidity Provision 139 Conclusion 143 CHAPTER 11 Trading on Market Microstructure: Information Models 145 Measures of Asymmetric Information 146 Information-Based Trading Models 149 Conclusion 164 CHAPTER 12 Event Arbitrage 165 Developing Event Arbitrage Trading Strategies 165 What Constitutes an Event? 167 Forecasting

…

market maker’s own trading mechanism—these costs may involve exchange fees, settlement and trade clearing costs, and transfer taxes, among other charges. 3. The information asymmetry cost—a market maker trading with wellinformed traders may often be forced into a disadvantaged trading position. As a result, Stoll’s (1978) model predicts

…

bid-ask spread may also convey information from the market maker to other market participants. This chapter describes information-based microstructure trading strategies. MEASURES OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION Asymmetric information present in the markets leads to adverse selection, or the ability of informed traders to “pick off” uninformed market participants. According to Dennis and Weston

…

(2001) and Odders-White and Ready (2006), the following measures of asymmetric information have been proposed over the years: r r r r r Quoted bid-ask spread Effective bid-ask spread Information-based impact Adverse-selection components

…

bid-ask spread Probability of informed trading Quoted Bid-Ask Spread The quoted bid-ask spread is the crudest, yet most readily observable measure of asymmetric information. First suggested by Bagehot (1971) and later developed by numerous researchers, the bid-ask spread reflects the expectations of market movements by the market maker

…

using asymmetric information. When the quoting dealer receives order flow that he suspects may come from an informed trader and may leave the dealer at a disadvantage relative

…

higher the dealer’s estimate of information asymmetry between his clients and the dealer himself. Given that the dealer has the same access to public information as do most of the dealer’s clients, the quoted bid-ask spread may serve as a measure of asymmetric information available in the market at large at

…

but reflects the actual order book and allows comparison among financial instruments with various price levels. Information-Based Impact The information-based impact measure of asymmetric information is attributable to Hasbrouck (1991). Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) specify the following vector autoregressive (VAR) model for estimation of the information-based impact measure, λ

…

their counterparties to slow down further accumulation of adverse positions, at least until they are able to distribute their inventory among other market participants. 3. Information asymmetry costs. A market maker trading with wellinformed traders may often be forced into a disadvantageous trading position. For example, if a well-informed trader is

…

-processing costs. Ask t Mid t Bid t * Time Sell FIGURE 11.2 Inventory costs. Askt Mid t Bid t * Time Sell FIGURE 11.3 Asymmetric information (adverse selection). Trading on Market Microstructure 151 order. If bid-ask spreads were to compensate the dealer for the risks associated with holding excess inventory

…

were to carry information that led to permanent price changes, the bid-ask spreads would compensate the dealer for the potential risk of encountering adverse asymmetric information. Analyzing the bid-ask spreads of the market maker gives clues to the position sizes of the market maker’s inventory and allows the market

…

Anonymous orders, 69–70 Apergis, Nicholas, 88 Arca Options, 9 ARCH specification, 88 Asset allocation, portfolio optimization, 213–217 Asymmetric correlation, portfolio optimization, 208–209 Asymmetric information, measures of, 146–148 Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test, 98 Autocorrelation, distribution of returns and, 94–96 Automated liquidity provision, 4 Automated Trading Desk, LLC

…

testing for, 79–89 MarketFactory, 25 Market impact costs, 290–293 Market microstructure trading, 4, 127–128 Market microstructure trading, information models, 129, 145–164 asymmetric information measures, 146–148 INDEX bid-ask spreads, 149–157 order aggressiveness, 157–160 order flow, 160–163 Market microstructure trading, inventory models, 127–143 liquidity

Big Data and the Welfare State: How the Information Revolution Threatens Social Solidarity

by Torben Iversen and Philipp Rehm  · 18 May 2022

Money: 5,000 Years of Debt and Power

by Michel Aglietta  · 23 Oct 2018  · 665pp  · 146,542 words

Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: The History and Future of American Intelligence

by Amy B. Zegart  · 6 Nov 2021

The Price of Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers Our Future

by Joseph E. Stiglitz  · 10 Jun 2012  · 580pp  · 168,476 words

The Economics of Enough: How to Run the Economy as if the Future Matters

by Diane Coyle  · 21 Feb 2011  · 523pp  · 111,615 words

Machine, Platform, Crowd: Harnessing Our Digital Future

by Andrew McAfee and Erik Brynjolfsson  · 26 Jun 2017  · 472pp  · 117,093 words

Alpha Trader

by Brent Donnelly  · 11 May 2021

Principles of Corporate Finance

by Richard A. Brealey, Stewart C. Myers and Franklin Allen  · 15 Feb 2014

Why Stock Markets Crash: Critical Events in Complex Financial Systems

by Didier Sornette  · 18 Nov 2002  · 442pp  · 39,064 words

The Death of Money: The Coming Collapse of the International Monetary System

by James Rickards  · 7 Apr 2014  · 466pp  · 127,728 words

Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything

by Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner  · 11 Apr 2005  · 339pp  · 95,988 words

When Free Markets Fail: Saving the Market When It Can't Save Itself (Wiley Corporate F&A)

by Scott McCleskey  · 10 Mar 2011

Rethinking Capitalism: Economics and Policy for Sustainable and Inclusive Growth

by Michael Jacobs and Mariana Mazzucato  · 31 Jul 2016  · 370pp  · 102,823 words

Rewriting the Rules of the European Economy: An Agenda for Growth and Shared Prosperity

by Joseph E. Stiglitz  · 28 Jan 2020  · 408pp  · 108,985 words

The Middleman Economy: How Brokers, Agents, Dealers, and Everyday Matchmakers Create Value and Profit

by Marina Krakovsky  · 14 Sep 2015  · 270pp  · 79,180 words

The Missing Billionaires: A Guide to Better Financial Decisions

by Victor Haghani and James White  · 27 Aug 2023  · 314pp  · 122,534 words

Extreme Money: Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk

by Satyajit Das  · 14 Oct 2011  · 741pp  · 179,454 words

Beyond the Random Walk: A Guide to Stock Market Anomalies and Low Risk Investing

by Vijay Singal  · 15 Jun 2004  · 369pp  · 128,349 words

The Euro and the Battle of Ideas

by Markus K. Brunnermeier, Harold James and Jean-Pierre Landau  · 3 Aug 2016  · 586pp  · 160,321 words

Advances in Financial Machine Learning

by Marcos Lopez de Prado  · 2 Feb 2018  · 571pp  · 105,054 words

Rethinking the Economics of Land and Housing

by Josh Ryan-Collins, Toby Lloyd and Laurie Macfarlane  · 28 Feb 2017  · 346pp  · 90,371 words

To Sell Is Human: The Surprising Truth About Moving Others

by Daniel H. Pink  · 1 Dec 2012  · 243pp  · 61,237 words

The Economics Anti-Textbook: A Critical Thinker's Guide to Microeconomics

by Rod Hill and Anthony Myatt  · 15 Mar 2010

The Plundered Planet: Why We Must--And How We Can--Manage Nature for Global Prosperity

by Paul Collier  · 10 May 2010  · 288pp  · 76,343 words

The Blockchain Alternative: Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy and Economic Theory

by Kariappa Bheemaiah  · 26 Feb 2017  · 492pp  · 118,882 words

The Man Who Knew: The Life and Times of Alan Greenspan

by Sebastian Mallaby  · 10 Oct 2016  · 1,242pp  · 317,903 words

Humans as a Service: The Promise and Perils of Work in the Gig Economy

by Jeremias Prassl  · 7 May 2018  · 491pp  · 77,650 words

Other People's Money: Masters of the Universe or Servants of the People?

by John Kay  · 2 Sep 2015  · 478pp  · 126,416 words

The Inner Lives of Markets: How People Shape Them—And They Shape Us

by Tim Sullivan  · 6 Jun 2016  · 252pp  · 73,131 words

Don't Be Evil: How Big Tech Betrayed Its Founding Principles--And All of US

by Rana Foroohar  · 5 Nov 2019  · 380pp  · 109,724 words

Cogs and Monsters: What Economics Is, and What It Should Be

by Diane Coyle  · 11 Oct 2021  · 305pp  · 75,697 words

People, Power, and Profits: Progressive Capitalism for an Age of Discontent

by Joseph E. Stiglitz  · 22 Apr 2019  · 462pp  · 129,022 words

The Future of Money: How the Digital Revolution Is Transforming Currencies and Finance

by Eswar S. Prasad  · 27 Sep 2021  · 661pp  · 185,701 words

Super Thinking: The Big Book of Mental Models

by Gabriel Weinberg and Lauren McCann  · 17 Jun 2019

The End of Theory: Financial Crises, the Failure of Economics, and the Sweep of Human Interaction

by Richard Bookstaber  · 1 May 2017  · 293pp  · 88,490 words

Finance and the Good Society

by Robert J. Shiller  · 1 Jan 2012  · 288pp  · 16,556 words

The Sharing Economy: The End of Employment and the Rise of Crowd-Based Capitalism

by Arun Sundararajan  · 12 May 2016  · 375pp  · 88,306 words

Wall Street: How It Works And for Whom

by Doug Henwood  · 30 Aug 1998  · 586pp  · 159,901 words

The Captured Economy: How the Powerful Enrich Themselves, Slow Down Growth, and Increase Inequality

by Brink Lindsey  · 12 Oct 2017  · 288pp  · 64,771 words

The Great Divide: Unequal Societies and What We Can Do About Them

by Joseph E. Stiglitz  · 15 Mar 2015  · 409pp  · 125,611 words

Willful: How We Choose What We Do

by Richard Robb  · 12 Nov 2019  · 202pp  · 58,823 words

High-Frequency Trading

by David Easley, Marcos López de Prado and Maureen O'Hara  · 28 Sep 2013

Investment: A History

by Norton Reamer and Jesse Downing  · 19 Feb 2016

Economics Rules: The Rights and Wrongs of the Dismal Science

by Dani Rodrik  · 12 Oct 2015  · 226pp  · 59,080 words

The Measure of Progress: Counting What Really Matters

by Diane Coyle  · 15 Apr 2025  · 321pp  · 112,477 words

How Markets Fail: The Logic of Economic Calamities

by John Cassidy  · 10 Nov 2009  · 545pp  · 137,789 words

After the Gig: How the Sharing Economy Got Hijacked and How to Win It Back

by Juliet Schor, William Attwood-Charles and Mehmet Cansoy  · 15 Mar 2020  · 296pp  · 83,254 words

Money Free and Unfree

by George A. Selgin  · 14 Jun 2017  · 454pp  · 134,482 words

The New Division of Labor: How Computers Are Creating the Next Job Market

by Frank Levy and Richard J. Murnane  · 11 Apr 2004  · 187pp  · 55,801 words

Competition Overdose: How Free Market Mythology Transformed Us From Citizen Kings to Market Servants

by Maurice E. Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi  · 14 May 2020  · 511pp  · 132,682 words

Grave New World: The End of Globalization, the Return of History

by Stephen D. King  · 22 May 2017  · 354pp  · 92,470 words

Alchemy: The Dark Art and Curious Science of Creating Magic in Brands, Business, and Life

by Rory Sutherland  · 6 May 2019  · 401pp  · 93,256 words

Transaction Man: The Rise of the Deal and the Decline of the American Dream

by Nicholas Lemann  · 9 Sep 2019  · 354pp  · 118,970 words

Debunking Economics - Revised, Expanded and Integrated Edition: The Naked Emperor Dethroned?

by Steve Keen  · 21 Sep 2011  · 823pp  · 220,581 words

The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy

by Dani Rodrik  · 23 Dec 2010  · 356pp  · 103,944 words

No Slack: The Financial Lives of Low-Income Americans

by Michael S. Barr  · 20 Mar 2012

Termites of the State: Why Complexity Leads to Inequality

by Vito Tanzi  · 28 Dec 2017

WTF?: What's the Future and Why It's Up to Us

by Tim O'Reilly  · 9 Oct 2017  · 561pp  · 157,589 words

Thinking, Fast and Slow

by Daniel Kahneman  · 24 Oct 2011  · 654pp  · 191,864 words

Platform Revolution: How Networked Markets Are Transforming the Economy--And How to Make Them Work for You

by Sangeet Paul Choudary, Marshall W. van Alstyne and Geoffrey G. Parker  · 27 Mar 2016  · 421pp  · 110,406 words

Reinventing Capitalism in the Age of Big Data

by Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Thomas Ramge  · 27 Feb 2018  · 267pp  · 72,552 words

Democratizing innovation

by Eric von Hippel  · 1 Apr 2005  · 220pp  · 73,451 words

Profiting Without Producing: How Finance Exploits Us All

by Costas Lapavitsas  · 14 Aug 2013  · 554pp  · 158,687 words

Click Here to Kill Everybody: Security and Survival in a Hyper-Connected World

by Bruce Schneier  · 3 Sep 2018  · 448pp  · 117,325 words

State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century

by Francis Fukuyama  · 7 Apr 2004

Addiction by Design: Machine Gambling in Las Vegas

by Natasha Dow Schüll  · 15 Jan 2012  · 632pp  · 166,729 words

Who Owns the Future?

by Jaron Lanier  · 6 May 2013  · 510pp  · 120,048 words

Addiction by Design: Machine Gambling in Las Vegas

by Natasha Dow Schüll  · 19 Aug 2012

Understanding Sponsored Search: Core Elements of Keyword Advertising

by Jim Jansen  · 25 Jul 2011  · 298pp  · 43,745 words

Uberland: How Algorithms Are Rewriting the Rules of Work

by Alex Rosenblat  · 22 Oct 2018  · 343pp  · 91,080 words

Sickening: How Big Pharma Broke American Health Care and How We Can Repair It

by John Abramson  · 15 Dec 2022  · 362pp  · 97,473 words

Secrets of Sand Hill Road: Venture Capital and How to Get It

by Scott Kupor  · 3 Jun 2019  · 340pp  · 100,151 words

The Road to Ruin: The Global Elites' Secret Plan for the Next Financial Crisis

by James Rickards  · 15 Nov 2016  · 354pp  · 105,322 words

Smart Money: How High-Stakes Financial Innovation Is Reshaping Our WorldÑFor the Better

by Andrew Palmer  · 13 Apr 2015  · 280pp  · 79,029 words

Move Fast and Break Things: How Facebook, Google, and Amazon Cornered Culture and Undermined Democracy

by Jonathan Taplin  · 17 Apr 2017  · 222pp  · 70,132 words

Why We Can't Afford the Rich

by Andrew Sayer  · 6 Nov 2014  · 504pp  · 143,303 words

The Gig Economy: A Critical Introduction

by Jamie Woodcock and Mark Graham  · 17 Jan 2020  · 207pp  · 59,298 words

Augmented: Life in the Smart Lane

by Brett King  · 5 May 2016  · 385pp  · 111,113 words

Ghost Work: How to Stop Silicon Valley From Building a New Global Underclass

by Mary L. Gray and Siddharth Suri  · 6 May 2019  · 346pp  · 97,330 words

The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security

by Deborah D. Avant  · 17 Oct 2010  · 872pp  · 135,196 words

Making Globalization Work

by Joseph E. Stiglitz  · 16 Sep 2006

The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom

by Yochai Benkler  · 14 May 2006  · 678pp  · 216,204 words

Collaborative Society

by Dariusz Jemielniak and Aleksandra Przegalinska  · 18 Feb 2020  · 187pp  · 50,083 words

The End of Accounting and the Path Forward for Investors and Managers (Wiley Finance)

by Feng Gu  · 26 Jun 2016

Born in Flames

by Bench Ansfield  · 15 Aug 2025  · 366pp  · 138,787 words

The Patient Will See You Now: The Future of Medicine Is in Your Hands

by Eric Topol  · 6 Jan 2015  · 588pp  · 131,025 words

On the Edge: The Art of Risking Everything

by Nate Silver  · 12 Aug 2024  · 848pp  · 227,015 words

MacroWikinomics: Rebooting Business and the World

by Don Tapscott and Anthony D. Williams  · 28 Sep 2010  · 552pp  · 168,518 words

Soonish: Ten Emerging Technologies That'll Improve And/or Ruin Everything

by Kelly Weinersmith and Zach Weinersmith  · 16 Oct 2017  · 398pp  · 105,032 words

Zero to Sold: How to Start, Run, and Sell a Bootstrapped Business

by Arvid Kahl  · 24 Jun 2020  · 461pp  · 106,027 words

The Cigarette: A Political History

by Sarah Milov  · 1 Oct 2019

Limitarianism: The Case Against Extreme Wealth

by Ingrid Robeyns  · 16 Jan 2024  · 327pp  · 110,234 words

Nobody's Fool: Why We Get Taken in and What We Can Do About It

by Daniel Simons and Christopher Chabris  · 10 Jul 2023  · 338pp  · 104,815 words

Blockchain Revolution: How the Technology Behind Bitcoin Is Changing Money, Business, and the World

by Don Tapscott and Alex Tapscott  · 9 May 2016  · 515pp  · 126,820 words

The Data Journalism Handbook

by Jonathan Gray, Lucy Chambers and Liliana Bounegru  · 9 May 2012

Mindf*ck: Cambridge Analytica and the Plot to Break America

by Christopher Wylie  · 8 Oct 2019

The Equality Machine: Harnessing Digital Technology for a Brighter, More Inclusive Future

by Orly Lobel  · 17 Oct 2022  · 370pp  · 112,809 words

Chaos Monkeys: Obscene Fortune and Random Failure in Silicon Valley

by Antonio Garcia Martinez  · 27 Jun 2016  · 559pp  · 155,372 words

Imagining India

by Nandan Nilekani  · 25 Nov 2008  · 777pp  · 186,993 words

Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society

by Eric Posner and E. Weyl  · 14 May 2018  · 463pp  · 105,197 words

Ours to Hack and to Own: The Rise of Platform Cooperativism, a New Vision for the Future of Work and a Fairer Internet

by Trebor Scholz and Nathan Schneider  · 14 Aug 2017  · 237pp  · 67,154 words

New Laws of Robotics: Defending Human Expertise in the Age of AI

by Frank Pasquale  · 14 May 2020  · 1,172pp  · 114,305 words

Capitalism and Its Critics: A History: From the Industrial Revolution to AI

by John Cassidy  · 12 May 2025  · 774pp  · 238,244 words

The Big Fix: How Companies Capture Markets and Harm Canadians

by Denise Hearn and Vass Bednar  · 14 Oct 2024  · 175pp  · 46,192 words

The Wisdom of Finance: Discovering Humanity in the World of Risk and Return

by Mihir Desai  · 22 May 2017  · 239pp  · 69,496 words

Triumph of the Optimists: 101 Years of Global Investment Returns

by Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh and Mike Staunton  · 3 Feb 2002  · 353pp  · 148,895 words

Riding for Deliveroo: Resistance in the New Economy

by Callum Cant  · 11 Nov 2019  · 196pp  · 55,862 words

The Fissured Workplace

by David Weil  · 17 Feb 2014  · 518pp  · 147,036 words

Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy

by Francis Fukuyama  · 29 Sep 2014  · 828pp  · 232,188 words

Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age

by Viktor Mayer-Schönberger  · 1 Jan 2009  · 263pp  · 75,610 words

When to Rob a Bank: ...And 131 More Warped Suggestions and Well-Intended Rants

by Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner  · 4 May 2015  · 306pp  · 85,836 words

The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information

by Frank Pasquale  · 17 Nov 2014  · 320pp  · 87,853 words

Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa

by Dambisa Moyo  · 17 Mar 2009  · 225pp  · 61,388 words

The Practice of Cloud System Administration: DevOps and SRE Practices for Web Services, Volume 2

by Thomas A. Limoncelli, Strata R. Chalup and Christina J. Hogan  · 27 Aug 2014  · 757pp  · 193,541 words

From Airline Reservations to Sonic the Hedgehog: A History of the Software Industry

by Martin Campbell-Kelly  · 15 Jan 2003

Capital Without Borders

by Brooke Harrington  · 11 Sep 2016  · 358pp  · 104,664 words

The End of Ownership: Personal Property in the Digital Economy

by Aaron Perzanowski and Jason Schultz  · 4 Nov 2016  · 374pp  · 97,288 words

Broken Markets: A User's Guide to the Post-Finance Economy

by Kevin Mellyn  · 18 Jun 2012  · 183pp  · 17,571 words

What They Do With Your Money: How the Financial System Fails Us, and How to Fix It

by Stephen Davis, Jon Lukomnik and David Pitt-Watson  · 30 Apr 2016  · 304pp  · 80,965 words

Smarter Investing

by Tim Hale  · 2 Sep 2014  · 332pp  · 81,289 words

The Green New Deal: Why the Fossil Fuel Civilization Will Collapse by 2028, and the Bold Economic Plan to Save Life on Earth

by Jeremy Rifkin  · 9 Sep 2019  · 327pp  · 84,627 words

Postcapitalism: A Guide to Our Future

by Paul Mason  · 29 Jul 2015  · 378pp  · 110,518 words

The Costs of Connection: How Data Is Colonizing Human Life and Appropriating It for Capitalism

by Nick Couldry and Ulises A. Mejias  · 19 Aug 2019  · 458pp  · 116,832 words

Radicalized

by Cory Doctorow  · 19 Mar 2019  · 444pp  · 84,486 words

Capitalism: Money, Morals and Markets

by John Plender  · 27 Jul 2015  · 355pp  · 92,571 words

Nexus: A Brief History of Information Networks From the Stone Age to AI

by Yuval Noah Harari  · 9 Sep 2024  · 566pp  · 169,013 words

Flash Crash: A Trading Savant, a Global Manhunt, and the Most Mysterious Market Crash in History

by Liam Vaughan  · 11 May 2020  · 268pp  · 81,811 words

Mastering Private Equity

by Zeisberger, Claudia,Prahl, Michael,White, Bowen, Michael Prahl and Bowen White  · 15 Jun 2017

Dawn of the New Everything: Encounters With Reality and Virtual Reality

by Jaron Lanier  · 21 Nov 2017  · 480pp  · 123,979 words

Easy Money: Cryptocurrency, Casino Capitalism, and the Golden Age of Fraud

by Ben McKenzie and Jacob Silverman  · 17 Jul 2023  · 329pp  · 99,504 words

The Price of Tomorrow: Why Deflation Is the Key to an Abundant Future

by Jeff Booth  · 14 Jan 2020  · 180pp  · 55,805 words

Site Reliability Engineering: How Google Runs Production Systems

by Betsy Beyer, Chris Jones, Jennifer Petoff and Niall Richard Murphy  · 15 Apr 2016  · 719pp  · 181,090 words

Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict

by Eli Berman, Joseph H. Felter, Jacob N. Shapiro and Vestal Mcintyre  · 12 May 2018  · 517pp  · 147,591 words

How Not to Network a Nation: The Uneasy History of the Soviet Internet (Information Policy)

by Benjamin Peters  · 2 Jun 2016  · 518pp  · 107,836 words

Barometer of Fear: An Insider's Account of Rogue Trading and the Greatest Banking Scandal in History

by Alexis Stenfors  · 14 May 2017  · 312pp  · 93,836 words

The Butterfly Defect: How Globalization Creates Systemic Risks, and What to Do About It

by Ian Goldin and Mike Mariathasan  · 15 Mar 2014  · 414pp  · 101,285 words

Age of Ambition: Chasing Fortune, Truth, and Faith in the New China

by Evan Osnos  · 12 May 2014  · 499pp  · 152,156 words

Wait: The Art and Science of Delay

by Frank Partnoy  · 15 Jan 2012  · 342pp  · 94,762 words

Chokepoint Capitalism

by Rebecca Giblin and Cory Doctorow  · 26 Sep 2022  · 396pp  · 113,613 words

Internet for the People: The Fight for Our Digital Future

by Ben Tarnoff  · 13 Jun 2022  · 234pp  · 67,589 words

Brave New Work: Are You Ready to Reinvent Your Organization?

by Aaron Dignan  · 1 Feb 2019  · 309pp  · 81,975 words

Blood in the Machine: The Origins of the Rebellion Against Big Tech

by Brian Merchant  · 25 Sep 2023  · 524pp  · 154,652 words

Matchmakers: The New Economics of Multisided Platforms

by David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee  · 23 May 2016  · 383pp  · 81,118 words

Swimming With Sharks: My Journey into the World of the Bankers

by Joris Luyendijk  · 14 Sep 2015  · 257pp  · 71,686 words

Makers and Takers: The Rise of Finance and the Fall of American Business

by Rana Foroohar  · 16 May 2016  · 515pp  · 132,295 words

Blue Ocean Strategy, Expanded Edition: How to Create Uncontested Market Space and Make the Competition Irrelevant

by W. Chan Kim and Renée A. Mauborgne  · 20 Jan 2014  · 287pp  · 80,180 words

The Spider Network: The Wild Story of a Math Genius, a Gang of Backstabbing Bankers, and One of the Greatest Scams in Financial History

by David Enrich  · 21 Mar 2017  · 513pp  · 141,153 words

The Pay Off: How Changing the Way We Pay Changes Everything

by Gottfried Leibbrandt and Natasha de Teran  · 14 Jul 2021  · 326pp  · 91,532 words

Modern Monopolies: What It Takes to Dominate the 21st Century Economy

by Alex Moazed and Nicholas L. Johnson  · 30 May 2016  · 324pp  · 89,875 words

Humans Need Not Apply: A Guide to Wealth and Work in the Age of Artificial Intelligence

by Jerry Kaplan  · 3 Aug 2015  · 237pp  · 64,411 words

Gigged: The End of the Job and the Future of Work

by Sarah Kessler  · 11 Jun 2018  · 246pp  · 68,392 words

Meltdown: How Greed and Corruption Shattered Our Financial System and How We Can Recover

by Katrina Vanden Heuvel and William Greider  · 9 Jan 2009  · 278pp  · 82,069 words

Merchants of Truth: The Business of News and the Fight for Facts

by Jill Abramson  · 5 Feb 2019  · 788pp  · 223,004 words

What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets

by Michael Sandel  · 26 Apr 2012  · 231pp  · 70,274 words

Give People Money

by Annie Lowrey  · 10 Jul 2018  · 242pp  · 73,728 words

Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea

by Mark Blyth  · 24 Apr 2013  · 576pp  · 105,655 words

Blockchain Chicken Farm: And Other Stories of Tech in China's Countryside

by Xiaowei Wang  · 12 Oct 2020  · 196pp  · 61,981 words

Fulfillment: Winning and Losing in One-Click America

by Alec MacGillis  · 16 Mar 2021  · 426pp  · 136,925 words

The Alternative: How to Build a Just Economy

by Nick Romeo  · 15 Jan 2024  · 343pp  · 103,376 words

So Good They Can't Ignore You: Why Skills Trump Passion in the Quest for Work You Love

by Cal Newport  · 17 Sep 2012  · 197pp  · 60,477 words

Birth of the Euro

by Otmar Issing  · 20 Oct 2008  · 276pp  · 82,603 words

Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste: How Neoliberalism Survived the Financial Meltdown

by Philip Mirowski  · 24 Jun 2013  · 662pp  · 180,546 words

Economists and the Powerful

by Norbert Haring, Norbert H. Ring and Niall Douglas  · 30 Sep 2012  · 261pp  · 103,244 words

How Will Capitalism End?

by Wolfgang Streeck  · 8 Nov 2016  · 424pp  · 115,035 words

Radical Uncertainty: Decision-Making for an Unknowable Future

by Mervyn King and John Kay  · 5 Mar 2020  · 807pp  · 154,435 words

Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State

by Paul Tucker  · 21 Apr 2018  · 920pp  · 233,102 words

The Upside of Inequality

by Edward Conard  · 1 Sep 2016  · 436pp  · 98,538 words

The Constitution of Knowledge: A Defense of Truth

by Jonathan Rauch  · 21 Jun 2021  · 446pp  · 109,157 words

The Future of Capitalism: Facing the New Anxieties

by Paul Collier  · 4 Dec 2018  · 310pp  · 85,995 words

Information: A Very Short Introduction

by Luciano Floridi  · 25 Feb 2010  · 137pp  · 36,231 words

Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioral Economics

by Richard H. Thaler  · 10 May 2015  · 500pp  · 145,005 words

Beyond Diversification: What Every Investor Needs to Know About Asset Allocation

by Sebastien Page  · 4 Nov 2020  · 367pp  · 97,136 words

The Euro: How a Common Currency Threatens the Future of Europe

by Joseph E. Stiglitz and Alex Hyde-White  · 24 Oct 2016  · 515pp  · 142,354 words

The Undercover Economist: Exposing Why the Rich Are Rich, the Poor Are Poor, and Why You Can Never Buy a Decent Used Car

by Tim Harford  · 15 Mar 2006  · 389pp  · 98,487 words

The Irrational Economist: Making Decisions in a Dangerous World

by Erwann Michel-Kerjan and Paul Slovic  · 5 Jan 2010  · 411pp  · 108,119 words

Global Governance and Financial Crises

by Meghnad Desai and Yahia Said  · 12 Nov 2003

Straight Talk on Trade: Ideas for a Sane World Economy

by Dani Rodrik  · 8 Oct 2017  · 322pp  · 87,181 words

The Armchair Economist: Economics and Everyday Life

by Steven E. Landsburg  · 1 May 2012

The Shifts and the Shocks: What We've Learned--And Have Still to Learn--From the Financial Crisis

by Martin Wolf  · 24 Nov 2015  · 524pp  · 143,993 words

Crisis Economics: A Crash Course in the Future of Finance

by Nouriel Roubini and Stephen Mihm  · 10 May 2010  · 491pp  · 131,769 words

Fixed: Why Personal Finance is Broken and How to Make it Work for Everyone

by John Y. Campbell and Tarun Ramadorai  · 25 Jul 2025

The Signal and the Noise: Why So Many Predictions Fail-But Some Don't

by Nate Silver  · 31 Aug 2012  · 829pp  · 186,976 words

Think Twice: Harnessing the Power of Counterintuition

by Michael J. Mauboussin  · 6 Nov 2012  · 256pp  · 60,620 words

From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds

by Daniel C. Dennett  · 7 Feb 2017  · 573pp  · 157,767 words

How to Own the World: A Plain English Guide to Thinking Globally and Investing Wisely

by Andrew Craig  · 6 Sep 2015  · 305pp  · 98,072 words

Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, Sixth Edition

by Kindleberger, Charles P. and Robert Z., Aliber  · 9 Aug 2011

A Pelican Introduction Economics: A User's Guide

by Ha-Joon Chang  · 26 May 2014  · 385pp  · 111,807 words

Adam Smith: Father of Economics

by Jesse Norman  · 30 Jun 2018

More Than You Know: Finding Financial Wisdom in Unconventional Places (Updated and Expanded)

by Michael J. Mauboussin  · 1 Jan 2006  · 348pp  · 83,490 words

The Myth of the Rational Market: A History of Risk, Reward, and Delusion on Wall Street

by Justin Fox  · 29 May 2009  · 461pp  · 128,421 words

The Transparent Society: Will Technology Force Us to Choose Between Privacy and Freedom?

by David Brin  · 1 Jan 1998  · 205pp  · 18,208 words

Modernising Money: Why Our Monetary System Is Broken and How It Can Be Fixed

by Andrew Jackson (economist) and Ben Dyson (economist)  · 15 Nov 2012  · 363pp  · 107,817 words

What's Next?: Unconventional Wisdom on the Future of the World Economy

by David Hale and Lyric Hughes Hale  · 23 May 2011  · 397pp  · 112,034 words

The fortune at the bottom of the pyramid

by C. K. Prahalad  · 15 Jan 2005  · 423pp  · 149,033 words

The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty

by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson  · 23 Sep 2019  · 809pp  · 237,921 words

The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World

by Niall Ferguson  · 13 Nov 2007  · 471pp  · 124,585 words

What's Wrong With Economics: A Primer for the Perplexed

by Robert Skidelsky  · 3 Mar 2020  · 290pp  · 76,216 words

Boom and Bust: A Global History of Financial Bubbles

by William Quinn and John D. Turner  · 5 Aug 2020  · 297pp  · 108,353 words

Why I Left Goldman Sachs: A Wall Street Story

by Greg Smith  · 21 Oct 2012  · 304pp  · 99,836 words

The Education of a Value Investor: My Transformative Quest for Wealth, Wisdom, and Enlightenment

by Guy Spier  · 8 Sep 2014  · 240pp  · 73,209 words

Sabotage: The Financial System's Nasty Business

by Anastasia Nesvetailova and Ronen Palan  · 28 Jan 2020  · 218pp  · 62,889 words

A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy

by Joel Mokyr  · 8 Jan 2016  · 687pp  · 189,243 words

The Content Trap: A Strategist's Guide to Digital Change

by Bharat Anand  · 17 Oct 2016  · 554pp  · 149,489 words

The Great Economists: How Their Ideas Can Help Us Today

by Linda Yueh  · 15 Mar 2018  · 374pp  · 113,126 words

What Would the Great Economists Do?: How Twelve Brilliant Minds Would Solve Today's Biggest Problems

by Linda Yueh  · 4 Jun 2018  · 453pp  · 117,893 words

Topics in Market Microstructure

by Ilija I. Zovko  · 1 Nov 2008  · 119pp  · 10,356 words

In FED We Trust: Ben Bernanke's War on the Great Panic

by David Wessel  · 3 Aug 2009  · 350pp  · 109,220 words

13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown

by Simon Johnson and James Kwak  · 29 Mar 2010  · 430pp  · 109,064 words

Barefoot Into Cyberspace: Adventures in Search of Techno-Utopia

by Becky Hogge, Damien Morris and Christopher Scally  · 26 Jul 2011  · 171pp  · 54,334 words

The Age of Em: Work, Love and Life When Robots Rule the Earth

by Robin Hanson  · 31 Mar 2016  · 589pp  · 147,053 words

Reinventing the Bazaar: A Natural History of Markets

by John McMillan  · 1 Jan 2002  · 350pp  · 103,988 words

How to Turn Down a Billion Dollars: The Snapchat Story

by Billy Gallagher  · 13 Feb 2018  · 359pp  · 96,019 words

The Bankers' New Clothes: What's Wrong With Banking and What to Do About It

by Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig  · 15 Feb 2013  · 726pp  · 172,988 words

The Powerful and the Damned: Private Diaries in Turbulent Times

by Lionel Barber  · 5 Nov 2020

Why Information Grows: The Evolution of Order, From Atoms to Economies

by Cesar Hidalgo  · 1 Jun 2015  · 242pp  · 68,019 words

The Future of Technology

by Tom Standage  · 31 Aug 2005

The Knowledge Economy

by Roberto Mangabeira Unger  · 19 Mar 2019  · 268pp  · 75,490 words

Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge

by Cass R. Sunstein  · 23 Aug 2006

Capitalism 4.0: The Birth of a New Economy in the Aftermath of Crisis

by Anatole Kaletsky  · 22 Jun 2010  · 484pp  · 136,735 words

City: Urbanism and Its End

by Douglas W. Rae  · 15 Jan 2003  · 537pp  · 200,923 words

Good Economics for Hard Times: Better Answers to Our Biggest Problems

by Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo  · 12 Nov 2019  · 470pp  · 148,730 words