liberal capitalism

Capitalism, Alone: The Future of the System That Rules the World
by Branko Milanovic
Published 23 Sep 2019

Relative to liberal capitalism, political capitalism has a greater tendency to generate bad policies and bad social outcomes that cannot be reversed because those in power do not have an incentive to change course. It can also, quite easily, engender popular dissatisfaction due to its systemic corruption. Both of these “scourges” are less important in liberal capitalism. Political capitalism therefore needs to sell itself on the grounds of providing better societal management, higher rates of growth, and more efficient administration (including administration of justice). Unlike liberal capitalism, which can take a more relaxed attitude toward temporary problems, political capitalism, if it is to succeed, must be permanently on its toes.

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The objective is to reduce the ability of the rich to control the political process and form a durable upper class. Or convergence of liberal and political capitalisms? An altogether different evolution of liberal capitalism would be a movement toward a plutocratic and ultimately political capitalism. This scenario is also possible—and the stronger the plutocratic features in today’s liberal capitalism become, the more likely such an evolution is. It would be an evolution to a large extent compatible with the interests of the new elite that is being formed under liberal capitalism. It would enable the elite to be much more autonomous from the rest of society. In fact, as shown in Chapter 2, the preservation of the elite requires its control of the political domain, what I called “tying up the knot on wealth and power.”

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In fact, as shown in Chapter 2, the preservation of the elite requires its control of the political domain, what I called “tying up the knot on wealth and power.” The more economic and political power in liberal capitalism become united, the more liberal capitalism becomes plutocratic and comes to resemble political capitalism. In the latter, political control is the way to acquire economic benefits; in plutocratic, formerly liberal, capitalism, economic power is used to conquer politics. The end point of the two systems becomes the same: unification and persistence of the elites. Elites may also believe that they are able to run society more effectively by using the technocratic toolkit of political capitalism.

The Glass Half-Empty: Debunking the Myth of Progress in the Twenty-First Century
by Rodrigo Aguilera
Published 10 Mar 2020

For starters, the existential economic debate of our day should no longer be how to reform capitalism but whether and even how we should replace it. Chapters Five and Six will have hopefully convinced the open-minded reader that liberal capitalism’s problems are not the result of deviant behavior by a few economic agents in an environment that would otherwise produce desired outcomes. Rather, it is the very structure of liberal capitalism that denies these outcomes. Readers will also have hopefully appreciated the attempt to show not so much liberal capitalism’s failures but its many contradictions that have led to those failures. That liberalism’s demand for freedom and democracy in the public sphere has not corresponded with a similar demand in the private sphere and in fact, has eroded it.

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The second part of the book (Chapters Four–Six) focuses on the crisis of liberalism in the twenty-first century, as evidenced by the resurgence of far-right authoritarian populism as well as the delegitimization of liberal capitalism in the wake of the 2008–2009 global financial crisis. Chapter Four deals specifically with the threats to liberal democracy from far-right populist movements in the West and abroad. Unlike previous challenges to liberal democracy, this threat now manifests itself from within, due to discontentment over the growing oligarchization and lack of choice among liberal political elites. Chapter Five is a critique of liberal capitalism that focuses on markets and the corporation, the latter of which in many respects represents the antithesis of liberal and democratic values.

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It is a shame that his later, more radical ideas have been left obscured by his earlier work but they should make for uneasy reading to those who assume that even Rawls’s seemingly benign, social democratic version of liberalism has any future in the twenty-first century. The recognition that liberal capitalism has not produced just outcomes therefore begs the question as to whether the processes that led to these outcomes were fair in the first place. If these processes are inseparable from liberal capitalism itself then we should be less concerned about “saving” capitalism but about preparing for what will succeed it. And making sure that any new orthodoxy is not one that appeases the anti-democratic urges of far-right demagogues, but rather, offers the ultimate remedy against them: economically prosperous and just societies that prioritize the needs of society over the greed of a few.

The Coming of Neo-Feudalism: A Warning to the Global Middle Class
by Joel Kotkin
Published 11 May 2020

But during the twentieth century, especially after the Second World War, life became measurably better even for most of the working class, and the middle orders continued to grow in prosperity and numbers. Some government action came into play—for example, subsidizing homeownership, building new infrastructure, and permitting labor unions. Linking such policies to the engines of economic growth promoted a mass movement to affluence, the premier achievement of liberal capitalism. Although liberal capitalism has generated many social, political, and environmental challenges, it has freed hundreds of millions from the widespread servility, entrenched cruelty, and capricious regimes that have dominated most of history. The material conditions of life have improved dramatically, not only in Europe and America but throughout much of the world.

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In Europe as well as Japan, and even in the once relatively fecund United States, fertility rates are nearing historic lows, even though young women state a wish to have more children.29 This demographic stagnation, another throwback to the Middle Ages, has various explanations, including women’s high levels of participation in the workforce and a desire for more leisure time. Other reasons are economic, including a shortage of affordable family housing. Liberal capitalism in its heyday built large stretches of affordable housing for the upwardly mobile middle and working classes, but the new feudalism is creating a world where fewer and fewer people can afford to own homes.30 A trend of diminishing expectations has weakened support for liberal capitalism even in solidly democratic countries, particularly among younger people.31 Far more than older generations, they are losing faith in democracy, not only in the United States but also in Sweden, Australia, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and New Zealand.

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Likewise, some leading architects, including Britain’s Richard Rogers, seek a return to something like the medieval city with its public market squares, which they consider a more livable alternative to the modern suburban sprawl.30 Such backward-looking ideas have been offered as remedies for the weaknesses and failings of modern society. But they might also provide a rationale to discourage upward mobility for the many and to concentrate property in fewer hands. CHAPTER 3 The Rise and Decline of Liberal Capitalism Liberal capitalism weakened and dissolved the feudal order, allowing a robust middle class to rise. More efficient agricultural practices brought growth into the static economies that had mostly benefited rentiers and inheritors, gradually lifting small property owners such as the English yeomanry. Commercial growth empowered the innovative, aggressive, risk-taking entrepreneurs.

Utopia or Bust: A Guide to the Present Crisis
by Benjamin Kunkel
Published 11 Mar 2014

“I’m definitely thinking about it.” And that was how my article ended, which may or may not have influenced GQ’s editors to kill the piece and neglect to solicit future contributions from me. Most of my youth went by during the end of history, which has itself now come to an end. If no serious alternative to liberal capitalism can yet be made out, surely it’s also become difficult for anyone paying attention to view the present system as viable. The more substantial book I intend to be my next will sketch a different possible order. The aim is not unique; several important postcapitalist visions marked by what might be called a tough-minded utopianism (notably, in the US, After Capitalism by David Schweickart, and What Then Must We Do?

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It was in the light of the feeling of a windless postmodern stasis that Jameson wanted to stick up for utopianism, especially in Archaeologies of the Future (2005), his appreciation of utopia as a subgenre of science fiction and an immortal human desire: “The very political weakness of utopia in previous generations—namely that it furnished nothing like an account of agency, nor did it have a coherent historical and practical-political picture of transition—now becomes a strength in a situation in which neither of these problems seems currently to offer candidates for a solution.” The dialectic, Adorno said, would renounce itself if it renounced the “idea of potentiality,” and it was just this dimension that Jameson meant to preserve amid the deadly consensus as to the unsurpassable virtues of liberal capitalism. In “The Valences of History,” the concluding essay of the new book, Jameson argues that when the fitful apprehension of history does enter the lives of individuals it is often through the feeling of belonging to a particular generation: “The experience of generationality is … a specific collective experience of the present: it marks the enlargement of my existential present into a collective and historical one.”

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Since the 1970s—and especially since 1991—perhaps the greatest challenge for Marxism has been to keep alive the belief in the possibility of a superior future society. The belief was trampled almost to extinction by miscarried Third World revolutions, capitalist transformation in China, the capitulations of European socialist parties, Soviet collapse, and the ostensible triumph of liberal capitalism. The skepticism that replaced it was twofold. The would-be revolutionary left seemed to possess neither a serious strategy for the conquest of power nor a program to implement should power be won. In this context, the maximalism of the left at its high-water marks could only ebb into a kind of survivalist minimalism.

The Power Law: Venture Capital and the Making of the New Future
by Sebastian Mallaby
Published 1 Feb 2022

He had tried to stand up for the eight scientists, but had succeeded only partially. What he had done, however, was to demonstrate that liberation capital was about much more than keeping a team together in the place where its members happened to own houses. Liberation capital was about unlocking human talent. It was about sharpening incentives. It was about forging a new kind of applied science and a new commercial culture. Chapter Two Finance Without Finance If liberation capital launched the Traitorous Eight and Fairchild Semiconductor, the following decade brought two further advances that forged the modern venture-capital profession.

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—Michael Moritz Spend as little as you can, because every dollar of the investor’s money you get will be taken out of your ass. —Paul Graham John, venture capital, that’s not a real job. It’s like being a real estate agent. —Intel’s Andy Grove, addressing John Doerr Contents Introduction Unreasonable People Chapter 1 Arthur Rock and Liberation Capital Chapter 2 Finance Without Finance Chapter 3 Sequoia, Kleiner Perkins, and Activist Capital Chapter 4 The Whispering of Apple Chapter 5 Cisco, 3Com, and the Valley Ascendant Chapter 6 Planners and Improvisers Chapter 7 Benchmark, SoftBank, and “Everyone Needs $100 Million” Chapter 8 Money for Google, Kind of for Nothing Chapter 9 Peter Thiel, Y Combinator, and the Valley’s Youth Revolt Chapter 10 To China, and Stir Chapter 11 Accel, Facebook, and the Decline of Kleiner Perkins Chapter 12 A Russian, a Tiger, and the Rise of Growth Equity Chapter 13 Sequoia’s Strength in Numbers Chapter 14 Unicorn Poker Conclusion Luck, Skill, and the Competition Among Nations Acknowledgments Appendix: Charts Notes Timeline Index Introduction Unreasonable People Not far from the headquarters of Silicon Valley’s venture-capital industry, which is clustered along Palo Alto’s Sand Hill Road, Patrick Brown strode out into his yard on the Stanford University campus.

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To understand venture capitalists—to grasp how they think and why they matter—we must begin at the beginning. For, without this strange tribe of financiers, the orchards of the Santa Clara valley might never have been linked to silicon, and a staggering amount of wealth might never have been created. Chapter One Arthur Rock and Liberation Capital Success has many fathers, and Silicon Valley is no exception. Searching for the origins of this miraculously innovative region, some fasten on 1951, when Fred Terman, the engineering dean at Stanford, created the university’s famous research park. Others begin the story five years later, when William Shockley, the father of the semiconductor, abandoned the East Coast to launch a company on Terman’s campus, bringing silicon to the Valley for the first time.

How Will Capitalism End?
by Wolfgang Streeck
Published 8 Nov 2016

The fact that capitalism has, until now, managed to outlive all predictions of its impending death, need not mean that it will forever be able to do so; there is no inductive proof here, and we cannot rule out the possibility that, next time, whatever cavalry capitalism may require for its rescue may fail to show up. A short recapitulation of the history of modern capitalism serves to illustrate this point.10 Liberal capitalism in the nineteenth century was confronted by a revolutionary labour movement that needed to be politically tamed by a complex combination of repression and co-optation, including democratic power sharing and social reform. In the early twentieth century, capitalism was commandeered to serve national interests in international wars, thereby converting it into a public utility under the planning regimes of a new war economy, as private property and the invisible hand of the market seemed insufficient for the provision of the collective capacities countries needed to prevail in international hostilities.

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In the early twentieth century, capitalism was commandeered to serve national interests in international wars, thereby converting it into a public utility under the planning regimes of a new war economy, as private property and the invisible hand of the market seemed insufficient for the provision of the collective capacities countries needed to prevail in international hostilities. After the First World War, restoration of a liberal-capitalist economy failed to produce a viable social order and had to give way in large parts of the industrial world to either Communism or Fascism, while in the core countries of what was to become ‘the West’ liberal capitalism was gradually succeeded, in the aftermath of the Great Depression, by Keynesian, state-administered capitalism. Out of this grew the democratic welfare-state capitalism of the three post-war decades, with hindsight the only period in which economic growth and social and political stability, achieved through democracy, coexisted under capitalism, at least in the OECD world where capitalism came to be awarded the epithet, ‘advanced’.

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The most important liaison between the two was, of course, Friedrich von Hayek, who for a few years occupied a chair at Freiburg, the academic home of the German ordoliberal school.9 Michel Foucault’s analysis of the rise of neoliberalism rightly focuses on Germany rather than Anglo-America.10 In anchoring ordoliberalism in the German state tradition and the politics of post-war and post-Nazi Germany, Foucault might have gone back further to Schmitt and Heller, where he would have found the basic figure of thought that informed and informs liberal ideas of the economic role of state authority under capitalism – the idea, in the words of the title of a 1980s book on Margaret Thatcher, of the need of a ‘free economy’ for a ‘strong state’.11 The unique qualification of ordoliberalism for building a bridge from the authoritarian liberalism of interwar Germany, as conceived by Schmitt and analysed by Heller, to the neoliberalism that began to dismantle the post-war political economy in the 1980s can be seen when comparing it to the economic common sense of the 1950s and 1960s. The Frankfurt School of ‘Critical Theory’, for example, was convinced that the capitalist economy had become inseparably merged into the state, which in the process had turned into the dominant institutional complex in contemporary society.12 After ‘the end of laissez-faire’, the place of liberal capitalism was supposed to have been taken by three competing economic systems, communism, fascism and New Deal democracy. All of them were seen as deeply politicized, democratically or not, with markets having given way to large, bureaucratically organized corporate monopolies closely affiliated with the bureaucracies of the state.

The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time
by Karl Polanyi
Published 27 Mar 2001

By the accepted yardsticks of economic welfare—real wages and population figures—the Inferno of early capitalism, they maintained, never existed; the working classes, far from being exploited, were economically the gainers and to argue the need for social protection against a system that benefited all was obviously impossible. Critics of liberal capitalism were baffled. For some seventy years, scholars and Royal Commissions alike had denounced the horrors of the Industrial Revolution, and a galaxy of poets, thinkers, and writers had branded its cruelties. It was deemed an established fact that the masses were being sweated and starved by the callous exploiters of their helplessness; that enclosures had deprived the country folk of their homes and plots, and thrown them on the labor market created by the Poor Law Reform and that the authenticated tragedies of the small children who were sometimes worked to death in mines and factories offered ghastly proof of the destitution of the masses.

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Twelve years later it was still in eclipse, with all signs against a real comeback. Without any tragic loss of welfare or of freedom the country, by suspending the gold standard, had taken a decisive step toward a transformation. During World War II this was accompanied by changes in the methods of liberal capitalism. However, these latter were not meant to be permanent and did not, therefore, remove the country from the danger zone. In all important European countries a similar mechanism was active and with very much the same effect. In Austria in 1923, in Belgium and France in 1926, in Germany in 1931, Labour Parties were made to quit office “to save the currency.”

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The deflationist’s ideal came to be a “free economy under a strong government”; but while the phrase on government meant what it said, namely, emergency powers and suspension of public liberties, “free economy” meant in practice the opposite of what it said, namely, governmentally adjusted prices and wages (though the adjustment was made with the express purpose of restoring the freedom of the exchanges and free internal markets). Primacy of exchanges involved no less a sacrifice than that of free markets and free governments—the two pillars of liberal capitalism. Geneva thus represented a change in aim, but no change in method: while the inflationary governments condemned by Geneva subordinated the stability of the currency to stability of incomes and employment, the deflationary governments put in power by Geneva used no fewer interventions in order to subordinate the stability of incomes and employment to the stability of the currency.

No More Work: Why Full Employment Is a Bad Idea
by James Livingston
Published 15 Feb 2016

Instead, they’re in a stronger position to bargain for better wages and working conditions on their own account. Here is how Edsall, the New York Times columnist, summarized the progressive political morality of full employment in December 2013: The economics of survival have forced millions of men, women, and children to rely on “pity-charity liberal capitalism” [Edsall is here quoting Konczal]. The state has now become the resource of last resort, consigning just the people progressives would like to turn into a powerful force for reform to a condition of subjugation—living out their lives on government subsidies like Medicaid, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and now Obamacare.1 The only alternative to this vaguely, benignly fascistic version of liberalism, according to Edsall and Konczal, is a “bold” public policy commitment to full employment, presumably because more jobs mean less dependence on the state for income supplements, aka transfer payments, entitlements, and government subsidies.

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If you didn’t know any better, you’d think a Tea Party enthusiast wrote this paragraph after finishing Atlas Shrugged, particularly in view of the reference to Obamacare as a government subsidy that will subjugate the poor, to be sure, but also create a permanent constituency for the Democrats, the party of “pity-charity liberal capitalism.” From this standpoint, there’s no middle ground between work, on the one hand, and dependence on the other—between having a job and being subjugated by the state (or the party). But let’s grant the advocates of full employment their most basic assumption, that a “bold public policy commitment” to job creation through public spending is only a temporary expedient that can be dismantled once a normal rate of growth returns, post recession.

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The recession has been officially over for six years, as corporate profits and stock market prices have soared, but employment has never recovered—there’s been no net gain in jobs. Where do the jobs come from hereafter? If government spending is the permanent answer, the people employed as a result will be no less dependent on the state (or the party) than those now consigned to a “condition of subjugation” by the new ward heelers of “pity-charity liberal capitalism.” What follows? In these historical terms, the practical question can’t be how to put people back to work, but how to detach income from employment. II The contemporary advocates of workers’ cooperatives and trade unions are no less Protestant (or Hegelian, or Marxist) in their insistence that work is the essence of human nature—and so must be protected against the degradation of wage labor, on the one hand, or protected by contractual agreements (collective bargaining), on the other.

The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class
by Kees Van der Pijl
Published 2 Jun 2014

Thus the Council on Foreign Relations commissioned research to determine the minimal size of the informal empire necessary for the survival of US private capitalism in terms of raw material supplies, domestic employment and export outlets. This informal empire, called the ‘Grand Area’, was accepted as the sphere-of-interest reserved for liberal capitalism in the event of necessary accommodation with German and Soviet power. The Grand Area was envisioned as including the Western Hemisphere, the British Isles, the Commonwealth and Empire, the Dutch East Indies, China and Japan.52 (As we shall see, this concept dovetailed neatly with the ‘Atlantic Union’ idea propagated in the same period by Clarence Streit on behalf of the British imperialists organized in the Round Table Society.)

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‘These liberals will rapidly accept the leadership of the President if he undertakes a liberal diplomatic offensive, because they will find in that offensive an invaluable support for their internal domestic troubles’.18 Hitherto, the European liberal bourgeoisie had been able both to contain domestic working-class pressures and to maintain a degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the United States,19 but the Russian Revolution threw them into the arms of Wilson and the universalist policy he had been cultivating for several years. The Crusade for Democracy The revolution would not have been confined to Russia had it not been for the entry of the United States in the crucial final stage of the war and the tremendous power thus thrown into battle on the side of liberal capitalism by the internationalist fraction of the American bourgeoisie led by Wilson. By his handling of the crisis of European imperialism and the revolutionary challenge that arose from it, Wilson set a historical example of how to bring unity of purpose to the liberal capitalist world and isolate its opponents.

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In present-day France, the fate of the Left government launched on the basis of an (emaciated) programme of nationalizations illustrates better than anything the fundamental dislocation of state monopolism by a new liberalism, and hence, represents a critical moment in the crisis of the theory of state-monopoly capitalism, its reformist assumptions, and the Communist parties clinging to its tenets. The crystallization of a state-monopoly tendency in the Atlantic bourgeoisie during the interwar years arose from the survival needs of large-scale industry confronted with the havoc wrought by an anarchic liberal capitalism, whose operating principles were no longer adequate to the development of the productive forces. After the Armistice in 1918, state intervention had been dismantled along with the apparatuses of the war economies as such. The defeat of the working class and the confinement of its revolution to Soviet Russia allowed the bourgeoisie to opt for a rehabilitation of pre-war patterns of class and economic relations, and to retreat from the danger-zone of state control.

Rich White Men: What It Takes to Uproot the Old Boys' Club and Transform America
by Garrett Neiman
Published 19 Jun 2023

Groundswell Fund. https://groundswellfund.org/. Institute for Policy Studies. https://ips-dc.org/. Just Economy Institute. justeconomyinstitute.org/. JustFund. https://justfund.us/. Justice Funders. https://justicefunders.org/. Kataly Foundation. https://www.katalyfoundation.org/. Liberated Capital. https://decolonizingwealth.com/liberated-capital/. Liberation Ventures. https://www.liberationventures.org/. ManKind Project. https://mankindproject.org/. Mayors for a Guaranteed Income. https://www.mayorsforagi.org/. Media 2070. https://mediareparations.org/. Movement for Black Lives. https://m4bl.org. Movement Voter Project. https://movement.vote/.

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A growing number of organizations are offering support and community for donors who aspire to have a different type of relationship with intergenerational wealth. In earlier chapters, I mentioned my involvements with Liberation Ventures and Resource Generation. Other efforts that inspire me include Emergent Fund, Grantmakers for Girls of Color, Groundswell Fund, Justice Funders, Liberated Capital, NDN Collective, Patriotic Millionaires, Solidaire Network, Third Wave Fund, and many others. Within institutions, some organizations are launching “reverse mentoring” programs, which call for junior employees to mentor executive team members on various topics of strategic and cultural relevance.

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In 2019, Georgetown University announced it would raise $400,000 a year to benefit the descendants of the 272 enslaved people who were sold to raise money to help keep the college afloat nearly two centuries ago.33 In 2020, the Los Angeles Times denounced its own racist reporting in a sensationalized 1981 series that demonized Black men living in high-poverty communities, and apologized for harm the project caused.34 In 2022, Harvard University pledged $100 million to make amends for its historical reliance on slavery.35 Within philanthropy, several efforts—including Justice Funders, Kataly Foundation, Liberated Capital, Liberation Ventures, Omidyar Network, NDN Collective, New Media Ventures, Resource Generation, and Solidaire—have embedded aspects of a reparative frame into their grant making. Over time, I hope more institutions elevate repair as a core priority, as part of a wider commitment to equity. Elected leaders are also working to advance societal repair.

This Is Not Normal: The Collapse of Liberal Britain
by William Davies
Published 28 Sep 2020

Postmodernity, by contrast, involved a collapse of historical progress into a perpetual present, a constant rehashing and recombining of existing styles and ideas, which put an end to any hope (or fear) that the future might be radically different. The economic corollary of this was the entrenching of a neoliberal order in which liberal capitalism was treated as the final stage of human history: the only plausible plans were business plans, the only source of innovation was entrepreneurship. This vision still held on to some notion of progress, but it was now tightly bound to improvements in economic efficiency and consumer experiences.

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Amid the stress of the pandemic, there were glimpses of alternative futures – less beholden to tradition, work, consumption and long-distance travel. One survey showed that the vast majority of people did not want to return to ‘normal’ patterns of life, once the crisis had finally passed.2 The key pillars of liberal capitalism were questionable and questioned like never before, not just in terms of their past (which could now be publicly explored in relation to colonialism and slavery), but in terms of their future, which seemed less certain than they had for decades. The breaking of normality also represents liberation.

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The left has highlighted the fact that the bourgeois public sphere only admits property-owners as equals; and yet it has also exploited the freedoms of the public sphere to advance its arguments and interests, and is hostile to political efforts to constrain such liberties. Critical theorists in the Frankfurt School tradition have often sought to walk this dialectical path, of harnessing the methodologies and intellectual freedoms of bourgeois society to challenge, unmask and weaken the power of liberal capitalism. In the context of neoliberalism, and especially in the wake of September 11, the left has found itself defending the norms and institutions of liberalism, often with little acknowledgement from the liberal establishment itself. As neoliberal reforms have sought to elevate financial mechanisms and metrics above legal ones, the defence of rights and due process has frequently become an anti-capitalist one.

The Cult of Smart: How Our Broken Education System Perpetuates Social Injustice
by Fredrik Deboer
Published 3 Aug 2020

But if we are willing to think clearly and follow the facts where they lead, a better world is possible—most of all for those at the bottom of the performance spectrum. SEVEN Before the Veil of Ignorance To build a vision for a better future, it’s necessary to unpack a lot of our current philosophical baggage. Because beneath the placid surface of liberal capitalism lie inherent contradictions that threaten to break the entire thing apart. The liberal ideal of equality of opportunity has become a commonplace, an assumed part of contemporary intellectual and political life, albeit one always subject to basic questions about what exactly society owes to every citizen in terms of their ability to secure the good life.

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Nor does equality of human rules lead to genuine equality of opportunity in a world where different individuals have different kinds of potential. Once we recognize that, all manner of better systems become possible. Equality and Mobility Complicating the discussion of equality of opportunity, many people think of social mobility as the real metric of a healthy and free economy, within the constraints of liberal capitalism. What we want to see, according to many progressives, is a world where people are free to move up (or, less commonly noted, down) in society’s hierarchies, with the poor child rising out of poverty into success, a common American trope. As with equality of opportunity, I find the yen for mobility stems from deep confusion about what precisely we want our social systems to accomplish.

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Why should we celebrate the downward mobility into hardship and poverty for some that is necessary for upward mobility into middle-class security for others? As a leftist, I understand the appeal of tearing down those at the top, on an emotional and symbolic level. But if we’re simply replacing them with a new set of winners lording it over the rest of us, we’re running in place. According to the logic of liberal capitalism, downward mobility is an absolutely necessary aspect of broader equality of opportunity. Richard Reeves lays out the case with admirable frankness: Dear upper-middle class reader … If you really want a fairer and more socially mobile society, there is no avoiding an uncomfortable, attendant fact.

Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism
by Wolfgang Streeck
Published 1 Jan 2013

This is not contradicted by the fact that Adorno introduced ‘late capitalism’ into social theory as a ‘Frankfurt School’ concept, using it in the title he chose for the German Sociological Congress in 1968 and in his opening report ‘Late Capitalism or Industrial Society?’ (T. Adorno, ‘Late Capitalism or Industrial Society?’, in Volker Merja et al., Modern German Sociology, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987). Adorno distinguished ‘late capitalism’ from what he called ‘liberal capitalism’, which, following Pollock, he regarded as a historically prior form of capitalism now superseded by state intervention and organization. Late capitalism was thus essentially identical with what others had been calling ‘organized capitalism’. The possibility of a looming crisis of organized (late) capitalism, or of a return to its liberal past in the shape of a neoliberal future, does not appear anywhere in Adorno’s writings. 23 D.

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Canedo, The Rise of the Deregulation Movement in Modern America, 1957–1980, New York: Columbia University, 2008. 50 In different perspectives and from different normative positions, Weber, Schumpeter and Keynes all predicted a peaceful, or not so peaceful, end to free-market capitalism in the second half of the twentieth century. It is also worth recalling that, in The Great Transformation (1944), Karl Polanyi took it for granted that liberal capitalism was history and would not return. ‘Within the nations we are witnessing a development under which the economic system ceases to lay down the law to society and the primacy of society over that system is ensured’ (K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, Boston: Beacon Press, p. 251). 51 For a selection from the abundant literature on the subject, see H.

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See precarious labour labour productivity. See productivity labour surplus ‘late capitalism’, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4n22 law, 2.1, 3.1, 3.2n49, 3.3, 3.4; medieval, 2.2n27. See also courts ‘legitimation crisis’, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 passim, 1.4, 1.5n61, 1.6, 1.7 passim, 2.1, 4.1, 4.2 lenders as constituency. See Marktvolk ‘liberal capitalism’, 1.1, 1.2n50 loans, private. See private debt loans, public. See public debt loans, ‘subprime’ mortgage. See ‘subprime mortgages’ Lombardo, Raffaele London, England, 1.1, 2.1n56 Maastricht Treaty, 3.1, 3.2 Maier, Charles S. market internationalization. See globalization market justice, 2.1 passim, 3.1, 4.1 passim; EU, 3.2, 4.2 markets, capital.

A Line in the Tar Sands: Struggles for Environmental Justice
by Tony Weis and Joshua Kahn Russell
Published 14 Oct 2014

One side of the limitations of the dominant ENGO approach is the failure of mainstream environmentalism to challenge neo-liberal capitalism. Neo-liberalism is a type of capitalism with extensive government support, in the form of deregulation, privatization, and reducing government intervention, while expanding the role of markets in economic life. The logic of neo-liberalism holds that the free market will respond to the environmental and social needs of the public by creating new technologies or services. Both Rodriguez and McMichael contend that what they describe as the “NGO industrial complex” reinforces neo-liberal capitalism, as ENGOs fill a market role of assuaging public guilt for social or environmental destruction without challenging the root issue of capitalism.9 Simply put, many ENGOs profit from selling stories of environmental destruction and token reforms to the public.

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Its Achilles heel, however, lies in claims to be engaging in a rational conversation, despite lacking evidence, in order to defend the unsustainable proposition of endless growth. Reactionary Environmentalism in the Tar Sands Reactionary environmentalism is, in essence, an extreme right-wing philosophy tied to the political economic ideology of neo-liberal capitalism. It goes under various guises, such as “ecological modernization,” “market ecology,” and “green neo-liberalism,” with the fundamental premise being a “business-as-usual” approach to environmental problems that largely places the onus on technological innovation and corporate self-management.4 In this messianic vision of enlightened corporations operating benignly within ever-freer markets, the best thing for the environment—it is claimed—is to turn everything into a commodity, from the water we drink to the air we breathe, as this supposedly yields uncoerced behavioural reform and promotes investment in innovation and efficiency.

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The trope of “ethical oil” rests in large measure on Alberta’s place in an affluent, Western, democratic, capitalist nation, which ensures that transnational corporations (including many of the same players who have been implicated in crimes elsewhere) are welcome to purchase their extraction “rights” and can be entrusted to be responsible, law-abiding corporate citizens. Former premier Ralph Klein helped convert Alberta into a “capitalist paradise,”18 and this political and regulatory environment of neo-liberal capitalism is the crux of Levant’s claim that “the oil sands are cleaner than any other competing jurisdiction.”19 After all, the companies are just doing what they are allowed to do by law! Levant attempts to build his case further through a hodgepodge of relativist claims, and some patently absurd ones.

Who Are We—And Should It Matter in the 21st Century?
by Gary Younge
Published 27 Jun 2011

People used to say that the Fifth Republic became Americanized while remaining anti-American; today we are Americanizing ourselves while at the same time inventing an exaggerated cultural identity in order to distinguish ourselves from others.” But the real issue is not America (a place) but neo-liberal capitalism (a system). The nature of the globalized threat and the localized scapegoat is a tale of democracy eroded, sovereignty diminished, insecurity inflicted and alienation enhanced. The fact that all this should be so clearly illustrated so close to a supranational center such as Brussels is no coincidence.

…

The simultaneous arrival of “others” who are unknown with the disappearance of much that is known is not difficult either to exploit or manipulate. And in the absence of a substantive response of their own, mainstream parties generally condemn the messengers and coopt the message. Even as almost every European nation has liberated capital to roam freely around the globe, they have severely restricted immigration from outside the EU. Like arsenic in the water supply of their political cultures, the bigotry of these nationalist parties has infected most areas of domestic policy-making, from policing to the warped efforts at integration recounted earlier.

…

Minnow, Martha Mitchell, Mary Moore, Roy Morales, Evo Morgan, Robin Morris, Benny Muhammad, Fard Mulchinock, William Mulgan, Geoff Multiculturalism Multiracial Americans of Southern California Murdoch, Rupert Myant, Chris Myard, Jacques NAACP Nagourney, Adam Narmada Bachao Andolan National identity globalization and the nation state See also Racial identity Nationalism Native Americans Neo-liberalism neo-liberal capitalism neo-liberal globalization (see Globalization) Netanyahu, Benjamin Nixon, Richard Nobles, Jennifer Norris, Pippa Norris, Steven North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Ntshoko, Hombi Obama, Barack race, gender and– racial authenticity of Obama, Michelle O’Connell, Michael O’Connor, Mary O’Connor, Orla O’Connor, Sandra Day The Office (US version) O’Gara, Anthony O’Grady, Geraldine– O’Keeffe, Dennis Olmert, Ehud O’Loingsigh, Niall One Parent Exchange Network Orgreave O’Sullivan, Alice “Other” (the) O’Toole, Fintan Palestinians Paris Parks, Rosa Patriotism Payne, Charles Pelé (Edison Arantes do Nascimento) Penn, Mark Peterson, Julie Petri, Tom Pofalla, Ronald Political correctness Political identity democracy and the “enemy within” identity politics race, gender and the Left and the personal and the political the Right and Powell, Colin Powell, Enoch Project Race Quebec Race Relations Act (UK) Racial authenticity See also Authenticity; National identity Racial “diversity” Racial identity colored identity gender and genetics and mixed race Racism apartheid (see Apartheid) the judiciary and New Haven, Connecticut sexism and Voting Rights Act (US, 1965) See also Anti-racism; Discrimination; Holocaust Ransom, Janice Rather, Dan Reagan, Ronald Redding, Savana Reid, Harry Rell, Jodi Renan, Ernest Republican Party (US) Resnik, Judith Reuband, Karl-Heinz Rhodes, Ted Ricci, Frank Rice, Condoleezza, Richardson, Bill Robinson, Jackie Robinson, Mary Rock, Chris Rodney, Walter Roma Roman Catholic Church Romney, Mitt Rose, Flemming Rose of Tralee competition Royal Ulster Constabulary Ruane, Medb Rushdie, Salman Rustin, Bayard Rwanda Rwililiza, Innocent San Juan San people Sanjek, Roger Sapir, André Saracino, Daniel Sarkozy, Nicolas Savu, Maria Scalia, Antonin Schleifer, Rebecca Schmitter, Philippe Schulweis, Harold Scoica, Obama Sorin Ilie Seaga, Edward Secada, Jon Segregation apartheid (see Apartheid) Self-definition Semenya, Caster Sen, Amartya Senna, Danzy September, Reggie Serbians Sessions, Jeff Sexism Seymour, Amy Shatz, Adam Sheinin, Yosef Sherman, Rabbi Avraham Short, Clare Shuster, David Sifford, Charlie Smith, Iain Duncan Smith, Tommy Sobers, Gary Soccer.

Fully Automated Luxury Communism
by Aaron Bastani
Published 10 Jun 2019

In this flat, crowded and connected world everything would be subject to ever-accelerating change. Everything, that is, except the rules of the game. Indeed, many no longer even considered them to be rules but rather reality itself, with alternative political systems viewed as either futile or incomprehensible. Here, liberal capitalism went from a contingent project to a reality principle. Welcome to the world of capitalist realism – where the map is the territory and nothing really matters. Capitalist Realism Capitalist realism is best summed up with a single sentence: ‘It is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism.’* For Mark Fisher – the British theorist who coined the term – that catchphrase captures the very essence of our era, with capitalism not only viewed as the exclusively ‘viable political and economic system’ but also one where it is ‘impossible even to imagine a coherent alternative’.

…

Thus even standard-bearers for the establishment might concede that living standards are getting worse, or that society is going backwards by many measures, but at least, they will respond, we aren’t in 1990s Rwanda and aren’t medieval serfs. Such a position signifies the death of the very idea of the future, with enlightenment and progress – formerly ideological pillars of liberal capitalism – exchanged for a vision of the good society where decline is marginally slower than it might otherwise be. Others, who may agree about the scale and even urgent necessity of change, will contend that such a radical path should only be pursued by a narrow technocratic elite. Such an impulse is understandable if not excusable; or the suspicion that democracy unleashes ‘the mob’ is as old as the idea itself.

The Corona Crash: How the Pandemic Will Change Capitalism
by Grace Blakeley
Published 14 Oct 2020

Proponents of both perspectives rely upon the liberal notion that the political and the economic are somehow separate – that free markets exist as a self-regulating sphere, subject to greater or lesser levels of intervention from a central state.23 The rigid ideological separation between politics and economics – states and markets – helps to legitimise liberal capitalism. State activity is framed as ‘intervention’ in a self-contained, self-regulating market system. More often than not, such interventions – it is argued – throw the system off course. A state that provides a strong social safety net threatens to erode the desperate reserve army of labour that capital relies upon to generate profits and discipline workers, so those on the right argue that unions and minimum wage laws disrupt the operation of the free market.

The Fourth Revolution: The Global Race to Reinvent the State
by John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge
Published 14 May 2014

South Korea loosened up. Today the picture looks very different. So far the twenty-first century has been a rotten one for the Western model. First America’s war on terror, particularly its invasion of Iraq, did immense damage to democracy’s image, then the credit crunch savaged the idea that liberal capitalism was the only answer, and finally the euro crisis and the shutdown of Washington in 2013 confirmed Asian suspicions that Western government is dysfunctional. To a growing number of people Lee’s ideas provided precisely what Fukuyama had thought was ­impossible—“a viable systematic alternative.”18 Western intellectuals engaged in an agonized reconsideration of both democracy and capitalism.

…

Western countries almost invariably introduced the mass franchise only after they had already introduced sophisticated political regimes with powerful legal systems and entrenched constitutional rights—and they did so in cultures that cherished notions of individual rights. Even then they were plagued by serious problems. Half of Europe surrendered to authoritarianism in the 1920s and 1930s. From that perspective it is not surprising that democracy wilted so quickly in Russia and Egypt. The link between liberal democracy and liberal capitalism is also far from automatic, a problem economists have been much quicker to recognize than politicians. James Buchanan and other “public choice” theorists worried that democratic politicians would always pander to their electorates—and thus build up deficits and underinvest in ­infrastructure—a worry that has been proven spectacularly accurate.

Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea
by Mark Blyth
Published 24 Apr 2013

114 Giavazzi and Pagano conjectured that “in both cases, cuts in spending and tax increases were accompanied by a shift in the balance of political power, and by complementary monetary and exchange rate policies; after an initial devaluation, both countries pegged … to the German mark, inducing a sharp monetary deflation, and liberalized capital flows.”115 This did not, however, sound very expectations related. New policies and developments external to the budget brought about a major fall in interest rates that increased income (a wealth effect—less debt to pay back) more than the contraction in spending hurt the economy. To get over this problem, Giavazzi and Pagano teased out econometrically the part of the postcontraction boom that can’t be attributed to the wealth effect.

…

The classic exposition of this thesis remains Barrington Moore’s Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966) and Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Belknap Press, 1962). 6. Woo Cummings, ed., The Developmental State (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1999); but also Wolfgang Streek and Yamamura, The Origins of Non-Liberal Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002). 7. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness; and Leonard Seabrooke, The Social Sources of Financial Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006). 8. The world’s first welfare state was founded in Germany, in the nineteenth century, by Otto von Bismark. 9.

Age of Anger: A History of the Present
by Pankaj Mishra
Published 26 Jan 2017

Meanwhile, selfie-seeking young murderers everywhere confound the leaden stalkers of ‘extremist ideology’, retaliating to bombs from the air with choreographed slaughter on the ground. How did we get trapped in this danse macabre? Many readers of this book will remember the hopeful period that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. With the collapse of Soviet Communism, the universal triumph of liberal capitalism and democracy seemed assured. Free markets and human rights appeared to be the right formula for the billions trying to overcome degrading poverty and political oppression; the words ‘globalization’ and ‘internet’ inspired, in that age of innocence, more hope than anxiety as they entered common speech.

…

Nietzsche’s writings provided a kind of pivot into a new set of questions and range of possibilities, which had not been present a century earlier when Rousseau first offered his political cure – a coherent and united community of patriotic citizens – to the discontents of modernity. He seemed to be turning away from sterile reason to life-sustaining myth, from moral notions of good and evil, truth and falsehood, to aesthetic values of creativity, vitality and heroism. As a detractor of both liberal capitalism and its socialist alternative, Nietzsche seemed to be offering, with his will to power, an unprecedented scope for human beings to reshape the world: to create, in effect, one’s own objects of desire, values, ideology and myths. To his youthful followers across the world, he provided the intellectual framework for several quintessentially modern and pressing projects: the radical trans-valuation of inherited values, the revolt against authority and its shibboleths, the creation of new forms of superabundant life, and politics in the grand mode.

Hacking Capitalism
by Söderberg, Johan; Söderberg, Johan;

The DVD-Jon debacle is a showcase of the consequences when information can be accessed from any point in a network spanning the whole globe. The commodity form of information is threatened by pirate sharing from every place irrespectively of the distance in real space. Subsequently, law enforcement needs to be equally spread out. Omnipresence of markets is typically taken as a proof of the triumph of liberal capitalism and the ‘end of history’. Alternatively, it can be argued that the necessity of markets to be omnipresent is what constitutes the vulnerability of market economy at this point in time. The presence of a single void in the global fabric of law enforcement is sufficient to cause destabilisation to the intellectual property regime everywhere.

…

Before the notion surfaced about a high-tech gift economy on the Internet, it was commonly believed that the gift economy had been marginalised in modern society to the point of near extinction. Igor Kopytoff recounted a short list of goods that never enters into commodity circulation, not even in neo-liberal capitalism. Norms and law are mobilised to exempt these unique objects. Atomic bombs, crown jewelleries, body parts, child pornography, and endangered species, are rare examples where legal markets have been withdrawn. Even with an official decree not to trade in a certain kind of goods, however, the pull from generalised exchange is always-already present.

Ellul, Jacques-The Technological Society-Vintage Books (1964)
by Unknown
Published 7 Jun 2012

At the present moment, what system is most efficient? I insist on the phrase at the present moment. It means nothing to explain that liberal capitalism was extraordinarily effi­ cient a century ago. The statement is true and we do not wish to deny it. But what of the present moment? If we accept the idea that different human systems of action ought to correspond to different social, political, and economic circumstances, can we uphold the thesis that the past efficiency of liberal capitalism is a pledge of present efficiency? Let us remember that from the point of view of efficiency the Russian and German planned economies were successes.

…

All human functions are mobilized in the “productionconsumption” complex. This restoration of unity is, in a certain sense, a step forward, for it holds that production and consumption are perfectly adapted to each other and that two correlative and interdependent functions may no longer be separated, as in liberal capitalism. But what in one sense restores unity represents in an­ other a circumscribing of the whole human being. To be in tech­ nical equilibrium, man cannot live by any but the technical reality, and he cannot escape from the social aspect of things which tech­ nique designs for him. And the more his needs are accounted for, the more he is integrated into the technical matrix.

A Game as Old as Empire: The Secret World of Economic Hit Men and the Web of Global Corruption
by Steven Hiatt; John Perkins
Published 1 Jan 2006

Naomi Klein, “Not Neo-Con, Just Plain Greed,” Globe and Mail (Toronto), December 20, 2003. 5. 2006 World Data Sheet (Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 2006). 6. Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: How the Economic and Intellectual Histories of Capitalism Have Been Re-Written to Justify Neo-Liberal Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 7. See www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/printnews.php?ID=79568. 8. Lishala C. Situmbeko (Bank of Zambia), and Jack Jones Zulu (Jubilee-Zambia), “Zambia: Condemned to Debt.” Accessed at www.africafocus.org/docs04/zam0406.php. 9. Asad Ismi, “Plunder with a Human Face: The World Bank,” Z Magazine, February 1998, p. 10. 10.

…

London: TNI/Pluto Press, 1999. Blum, William. Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II—Updated Through 2003. Monroe, Maine: Common Courage, 2003. Chang, Ha-Joon. Kicking Away the Ladder: How the Economic and Intellectual Histories of Capitalism Have Been Re-Written to Justify Neo-Liberal Capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Chomsky, Noam. Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance. New York: Metropolitan, 2003. Noam Chomsky’s Web site is www.chomsky.info/. Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001.

Democracy and Prosperity: Reinventing Capitalism Through a Turbulent Century
by Torben Iversen and David Soskice
Published 5 Feb 2019

The system of representation underwrites the economic system. The institutional patterns of both advanced capitalism and of (usually) democratic politics have varied across the advanced nations but with stability over time. In particular, coordinated capitalism has been associated with negotiated political systems and liberal capitalism with competitive political systems. There have been relatively stable differences within these broad varieties, as between the centralized British and decentralized American political system, and associated differences in their institutions of capitalism. Other notable relatively stable differences are between Sweden, Germany, and Japan.

…

See also specific country advanced capitalist sectors (ACS), 258, 259, 279n4 African Americans, 84, 109, 226, 283n4, 283n13 Alphabet, 262 Amazon, 155, 265 American International Group (AIG), 210 analytic skills, 186 antitrust law, 153, 285n5 Antitrust Paradox, The (Bork), 153 Apple, 265, 280n13 apprentices, 61, 64–65, 68, 71, 104, 110, 127, 179–80, 230 aristocracy, 53–54, 64, 67, 72, 74, 81, 83, 86–87, 90, 98 artificial intelligence (AI): black box problem and, 264; capitalism and, 260–72; colocation and, 261, 266–72; cospecificity and, 262–66; explainable (XAI), 264; Google and, 262, 265, 287n1; limits of, 263, 269; manual jobs and, 264–65; multinational companies (MNCs) and, 267–68, 271; politics of future and, 272–73; production networks and, 263; robots and, 260–62; skilled labor and, 261–62, 265–68, 271–72; technology and, 260–72 artisans, 61, 63–65, 70, 79, 94–95, 98 Asia, 26–27; knowledge economies and, 142, 144, 222, 229, 235, 241, 243; specialization and, 267 assembly lines, 104, 108 Australia: Acts of Parliament and, 88; democracy and, 38, 56–57, 61, 62, 88–89, 283n8, 283n9; Fordism and, 106; Gini coefficients and, 36; knowledge economies and, 147–48, 150, 153, 166, 221, 233, 236, 242 Austria: democracy and, 56, 59, 61, 62–63, 77, 99; Dollfuss and, 77; Fordism and, 106, 147–48, 150, 154; Gini coefficients and, 36; knowledge economies and, 230, 233, 245; military and, 279n2; populism and, 230, 233, 245; protocorporatist countries and, 59, 62–63, 77, 99; taxes and, 17 authoritarianism: Asian, 26; democracy and, 4, 37, 53, 74, 78, 88–100; Germany and, 4, 74, 99, 279n1; libertarian, 45; military and, 279n2; populism and, 234 Autor, David H., 193, 260 Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 208 bankruptcy, 114, 170, 210 Bartels, Larry M., 22, 24, 167–68 Basel II, 208 Beck, Nathaniel, 132 Beckett, Terence, 170 Belgium: democracy and, 56, 57, 61, 62–63; Fordism and, 106, 121; Gini coefficients and, 36; knowledge economies and, 147–48, 150, 154, 233, 245; populism and, 233, 245; protocorporatist countries and, 62–63; taxes and, 17 Benn, Tony, 169 Bentham, Jeremy, 81–82 Bernanke, Ben, 207 big-city agglomerations, 194–200 biotechnology, 141, 175, 184 Blackbourn, David, 75, 92 black box, 4, 264 Blair, Tony, 33, 171, 209 Blais, André, 93 Blanchard, Olivier, 132 Bohr, Niels, 260 Boix, Carles, 35, 37, 55–56, 58, 94, 100 Bork, Robert, 153 bourgeoisie, 60, 72, 83–84, 283n7 Braverman, Harry, 14, 186, 188 Bretton Woods, 151, 207 Brexit, 130, 245, 248, 250, 276 Bright, 85 British Motor Company, 170 Brüning, Heinrich, 77 Brustein, William, 93 Brynjolfsson, E., 260 Bryson, Alex, 105 Caminada, Koren, 133 Canada: British North American Act and, 87–88; democracy and, 38, 56–57, 61, 62, 87, 283n15; Earl of Durham report on, 87; Fordism and, 106; Gini coefficients and, 25, 36; knowledge economies and, 147–48, 150, 154, 166, 221, 233, 236, 242, 245; median income and, 25; populism and, 245; Tories and, 87 Cantwell, John, 193, 279n1 capitalism: artificial intelligence (AI) and, 260–72; colocation and, 159, 261, 266–72; competition and, 1, 6, 11–12, 16, 26, 30–31, 33, 40, 122, 128, 131, 139, 152, 163, 177, 182, 186, 218, 258, 261; decentralization and, 39, 49, 122, 152, 186, 275; decommodification and, 9; democratic politics’ strengthening of, 30–35; Denmark and, 39, 148, 203; economic geography and, 2–3, 7–8, 18, 20, 31, 48, 147, 159, 185, 192; education and, 7, 10, 12, 20, 26–28, 31, 37–38, 45, 54, 60, 102, 128, 131, 143, 159, 161, 165, 225, 228, 234, 237, 250–51, 257; financial crisis and, 177, 206–14; France and, 17, 148, 182; Germany and, 4, 10–11, 17, 49, 55, 77; growth and, 2–3, 8, 13, 16, 30–32, 38, 79, 97, 125, 156, 163, 218, 247, 261; industrialization and, 4, 37–38, 53, 58, 60, 101, 124, 203; inequality and, 1, 5, 9, 20, 22, 24–26, 40–41, 125, 139, 261, 268, 273–74, 282n22; inflation and, 253, 285n9; Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and, 261, 266, 276; innovation and, 2, 6–12, 19, 31–34, 47, 128, 131, 157, 206, 258, 281n18; institutional frameworks and, 31–34, 47–49, 128–29, 131, 146; Italy and, 4, 77, 148; Japan and, 4, 11, 49, 55, 148, 282n2; labor market and, 1, 6, 12, 31, 38, 46–47, 122, 125, 128, 152, 186, 229, 258; liberalism and, 1–2, 32, 49, 60, 97, 100–1, 137, 143, 213–14, 228; low-skilled labor and, 265–66; majoritarianism and, 22; managerial, 103; manufacturing and, 2, 14, 33, 142, 203; middle class and, 2–3, 20, 22, 41, 53, 97, 101, 162, 225, 227, 257–58, 273; mobility and, 8, 16, 30, 35, 50, 145, 280n11; nation-states and, 4–13, 30, 46–50, 77, 136, 139, 159, 161, 206, 249, 261, 267–68, 272, 279n4; political economy and, 2–9, 12, 17, 24, 34, 45–48, 97, 112, 129, 131, 137, 160, 167, 214, 227, 251, 275; as political force, 139; politics of future and, 272–77; puzzle of rise of, 35–38; puzzle of varieties of, 38–40; redistribution and, 1, 18–20, 31–32, 35, 37, 39–40, 47, 51, 55, 124, 128–31, 137, 261, 273; research and, 2, 10, 12, 37, 48, 139, 159, 165, 234; semiskilled labor and, 261; shocks and, 6, 10, 30, 54, 125, 136, 138, 140, 156, 159, 214; skill clusters and, 2, 7, 49, 145, 185, 192, 261; skilled labor and, 2–3, 6–8, 12–15, 19–20, 30–34, 37–38, 47–50, 53–54, 58, 60, 97, 101–2, 128, 137, 139, 144–47, 157–58, 172, 185–86, 192, 218, 250–51, 258, 261, 280n6; South Korea and, 4, 26, 148; specialization and, 2, 6, 8, 17, 40, 139, 145, 147, 161, 192, 258, 267, 270–71, 276–77; Sweden and, 19, 39, 49, 148; symbiotic forces and, 5–9, 14, 20, 32, 53–54, 102, 130–31, 159, 165, 206, 249–53, 258, 259, 270, 272; taxes and, 16–17, 24, 34–35, 40, 51, 73, 167, 206, 261, 280n12; unemployment and, 51, 117, 172, 282n22; United Kingdom and, 10, 13, 19, 32, 38, 148, 152, 172, 206, 209; United States and, 13, 16–17, 24–25, 38, 47, 148, 152, 186, 209, 275, 277; voters and, 11–14 (see also voters); weakened democratic state and, 1, 30, 93–94, 124–25, 128; welfare and, 8, 16–19, 31, 39–40, 46, 122, 125, 128, 131, 137, 167, 234, 261, 279n5, 282n22 Catholicism, 56, 61, 63, 68, 77, 83, 87, 92, 94–95 causal identification, 280n7 Cavaille, Charlotte, 220, 237 central banks, 121–22, 142, 151–52, 170, 172, 176, 207 centralization: democracy and, 53, 58, 63, 66–67, 69, 70, 73, 96, 99, 101, 276, 283n8; Fordism and, 103–10, 113, 116–21; knowledge economies and, 146, 151–52, 156, 173, 186, 202, 209, 231, 243, 252; populism and, 231, 243, 252; skilled labor and, 53, 58, 67, 69, 96, 99, 101, 110, 119–20, 173, 186; unions and, 49, 53, 58, 63, 67, 69–70, 73, 96, 99, 101, 105, 107–10, 113, 116, 119, 122–23, 152, 156, 172, 174, 283n8; United Kingdom and, 49 centrism, 100, 113, 128 Chandlerian corporations, 5, 7, 15, 17–18, 37, 103, 267 China, 26, 27, 142, 209, 211, 223, 279n3 Chirac, Jacques, 183 Christian democratic parties, 44, 63, 92–95, 114–14, 116, 124–32, 221, 229, 251 Clayton Act, 153 Cohen, Yinon, 119 Cold War, 78, 111 collateral debt obligations (CDOs), 209–10 collective bargaining, 67, 69, 73, 92, 103, 107, 137, 176, 179 Collier, Ruth Berins, 56, 57, 85, 282n3 colocation: artificial intelligence (AI) and, 261, 266–72; capitalism and, 159, 261, 266–72; economic geography and, 2–3, 7–8, 15–16, 159, 185–88, 261, 266–72; education and, 2, 7, 261, 272; knowledge economies and, 159, 185–88; knowledge-intensive businesses (KIBs) and, 187–88, 190; reputation and, 267; skill clusters and, 2–3, 7, 15–16, 185, 261, 272; technology and, 266–72 communism, 5, 49, 55, 79, 115, 182, 186, 218 comparative advantage, 31, 49, 51, 128, 131, 268 competition: barriers to, 18, 154, 285n5; capitalism and, 1, 6, 11–12, 16, 26, 30–31, 33, 40, 122, 128, 131, 139, 152, 163, 177, 182, 186, 218, 258, 261; decentralized, 18, 96, 122, 146–49, 152, 163, 186, 190, 217; democracy and, 89, 96, 254, 257–58, 261; education and, 12, 21, 26, 31, 52, 80, 89, 119, 128, 131, 156, 166, 177, 181, 194, 198, 222–23, 257, 285n9; Fordism and, 115, 119, 122, 128, 131; foreign, 14, 173, 177, 194, 223, 285n5; globalization and, 1, 28, 50, 156; growth and, 16, 31, 115, 162–63, 170, 177, 218, 261, 285n9; innovation and, 6, 10–12, 31–35, 47, 128, 131, 173, 182–83, 258, 285; intellectual property and, 31, 128, 131; knowledge economies and, 139, 146, 149, 152–56, 162–63, 166–69, 173, 177, 181–82, 186, 194, 198, 208, 218, 222–23, 226, 236, 285n5, 285n6, 285n9; labor market and, 1, 6, 12, 31, 70, 122, 128, 152–56, 177, 183, 186, 190, 223; for land, 89; low-wage countries and, 18, 28, 119, 181, 222; market rules and, 6, 12, 21, 40, 163, 173; multinational enterprises (MNEs) and, 154; outsourcing and, 118, 193–94, 222; politics and, 1, 11–12, 29–30, 96, 139, 169, 181, 223, 236, 257–58, 285n9; populism and, 218, 222–23, 226, 236; product market, 152–56; skilled labor and, 6, 12, 18, 21, 30–34, 66, 96, 119, 128, 146, 157, 181, 186, 194, 198, 218, 222–23, 258; socialism and, 11; trade and, 26, 31, 128, 131, 153–55, 218, 285n5, 285n9; unions and, 6, 33, 66, 68, 80, 96, 119, 152, 169–72, 177, 181, 186; welfare and, 31, 40, 52, 122, 128, 131, 223, 285n6; World Values Survey (WVS) and, 168, 235–36, 245; zero-sum games and, 222–23 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, 155–56 Confederation of British Industry (CBI), 169–70 conservatism: democracy and, 58, 72–85, 88–90, 98; education and, 38, 79, 83, 89, 98, 219; Fordism and, 115, 121, 124, 128, 134; institutional frameworks and, 32; knowledge economies and, 169–72, 218–19; landowner influence and, 38; populism and, 218–19; United Kingdom and, 32 Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs): Denmark and, 171–76; flexicurity and, 174; Fordism and, 102–4, 123, 125, 127; Germany and, 176–81; knowledge economies and, 152, 169, 171–81, 198, 232; populism and, 232; reforms and, 171–81 cospecificity: advanced capitalist democracies (ACD) and, 14–17; artificial intelligence (AI) and, 261–66; electoral systems and, 280n6; location, 14–17; skilled labor and, 7–15, 20, 37, 47–50, 69, 99, 101, 115, 123, 196, 259, 261; specialization and, 14–17; technology and, 7, 12, 14, 20, 37, 48, 50, 103, 159, 261–62; wages and, 49–50; welfare and, 49–50 Crafts, 32–33 credit default swaps (CDSs), 209–10 Crouch, Colin, 58–59, 62, 67 Czechoslovakia, 4, 36 DA, 66 Danish Social Democrats, 74, 77 debt, 15, 121, 172, 209 decentralization: analytic skills and, 186; authoritarianism and, 99; capitalism and, 39, 49, 122, 152, 186, 275; competition and, 18, 96, 122, 146–49, 152, 163, 186, 190, 217; democracy and, 96, 262, 275–76; Fordism and, 122–23; Germany and, 94, 283n11; Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and, 3, 163, 186, 190, 276; knowledge economies and, 3, 18, 138, 144, 146–52, 156, 163, 172–74, 180, 183–84, 186, 190, 193, 196, 212, 217, 225, 234, 275; populism and, 217, 225, 234; skilled labor and, 96, 123, 138, 144, 146, 148, 172, 183–86, 190, 193, 212, 225, 262, 276; United States and, 49 decommodification, 9 deficits, 113, 121, 172, 286n10, 286n12 deindustrialization, 18, 43, 103, 117–20, 124, 134–35, 180, 203, 224 democracy: aristocracy and, 53–54, 64, 67, 72, 74, 81, 83, 86–87, 90, 98; aspirational, 6, 12–13, 20–21, 32, 167, 214, 219, 272; Australia and, 38, 56–57, 61, 62, 88–89, 283n8, 283n9; Austria and, 56, 59, 61, 62–63, 77, 99; Belgium and, 56, 57, 61, 62–63; Canada and, 38, 56–57, 61, 62, 87, 283n15; centralization and, 53, 58, 63, 66–67, 69, 70, 73, 96, 99, 101, 276, 283n8; class conflict and, 54; coevolving systems and, 46–52; communism and, 5, 49, 55, 79, 115, 182, 186, 218; competition and, 89, 96, 254, 257–58, 261; by concession, 72–79; conservatism and, 58, 72–85, 88–90, 98; decentralization and, 96, 262, 275–76; decommodification and, 9; Denmark and, 56, 57, 61, 62–63, 66, 71, 74–76, 78; deregulation and, 96, 98; economic geography and, 92, 268, 274, 276–77; education and, 12, 14, 20, 24–27, 37–38, 41, 45, 53–55, 60, 70–72, 79–83, 88, 90, 94–101, 131, 138, 143, 158–61, 165, 181, 225, 228–29, 235, 247, 250–51, 257–62, 265–66, 270–77, 283n11, 283n13; egalitarian, 30, 81–82, 96, 120, 139, 163, 239; electoral systems and, 90–97, 100–1; elitism and, 53–61, 67, 70–71, 75–76, 79–90, 96–101; Fordism and, 274, 277; France and, 54, 56, 57, 59, 61, 62–63, 70, 81, 83, 87, 94–95, 283n9; fundamental law of, 158, 168; Germany and, 55–56, 57, 61, 62–68, 71–91, 94, 99, 382n11; globalization and, 258, 267, 272; growth and, 8, 68, 78–79, 92, 97, 261, 267, 276; human capital and, 53, 58, 101; immigrants and, 88–89, 275; income distribution and, 56; industrialization and, 4, 37, 53–62, 65–66, 79, 83, 88–92, 98, 101; Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and, 261, 266, 276; innovation and, 87, 258, 262, 267, 271; institutional frameworks and, 97; Ireland and, 62, 282n2; Italy and, 77, 91, 99, 276, 282n2; labor market and, 64, 66, 96–98, 260, 266, 268, 273; liberalism and, 56–62, 67–71, 79–90, 96–101, 282n3, 283n14; literature on, 55–60; low-skilled labor and, 97–98, 265–66; majoritarianism and, 60, 71, 91–93, 97–98, 100–1; manufacturing and, 80; middle class and, 3, 20, 22–23, 35, 44, 53–55, 60, 63, 71–74, 84–85, 90, 96–101, 115, 158, 163, 168, 257–58, 273–74; mobility and, 59, 258, 275–76; modernization and, 55, 57, 66, 70, 79–83, 87, 89, 98; multinational companies (MNCs) and, 267–68, 271; nation-states and, 4–5, 8, 13, 46, 136, 159, 161, 213, 215, 249, 261, 267–68, 272, 279; Netherlands and, 56, 57, 61, 62–63; Norway and, 56, 57, 61, 62, 282n3; party system and, 93, 101; political economy and, 59, 97; politics of future and, 272–77; populism and, 13, 45, 129, 136, 215, 217, 226, 228, 248–51, 275; production and, 54, 60, 64–66, 69, 72–73, 83, 93–94, 258, 262–63, 267–71; proportional representation (PR) systems and, 19, 34, 44–45, 60–61, 91, 93, 97, 100–1, 112–13, 125–28, 132, 134, 135, 212, 217, 229, 251; protocorporatist countries and, 59–79, 82–83, 89–92, 98–101, 228, 283n11; public goods and, 54, 60, 79–90, 98, 258, 275; puzzle of rise of, 35–38; redistribution and, 1, 8, 18–20, 32, 35, 37, 40, 55–56, 60, 69–71, 74–79, 90–91, 95–100, 115, 124, 158, 221, 259, 261–62, 273–74, 282n3, 284n2; research and, 55, 66–67, 72, 262, 264, 268, 287n1; semiskilled labor and, 61, 64–65, 68–69; shocks and, 54; skilled labor and, 3, 6, 8, 12, 20, 31, 37–38, 44, 53–54, 58–71, 79, 84–85, 90, 96–101, 115, 158, 185–86, 250, 258–62, 265–68, 271–72, 276–77; socialism and, 11, 56, 61–63, 68, 71, 75, 94, 97, 100, 137, 181–82, 215, 218; social networks and, 258, 261, 268, 270–71, 274–75; South Korea and, 78; specialization and, 67, 258, 267, 270–71, 276–77; state primacy of, 46–48; strengthening of capitalism by, 30–35; Sweden and, 56, 57, 61, 62, 67, 71–76, 78; Switzerland and, 56, 57, 61, 62–63, 282n3; symbiotic forces and, 5–9, 14, 20, 32, 53–54, 102, 130–31, 159, 165, 206, 249–53, 258, 259, 270, 272; taxes and, 73, 261, 267–68, 271; technology and, 70, 92, 259–63, 267–72, 277; trade and, 258, 267; unemployment and, 74–77, 92, 96; unions and, 53, 58–80, 90–92, 95–101, 274, 282n3, 283n8; United Kingdom and, 38, 54–65, 73, 80–90, 277, 283n9; United States and, 13, 24, 38, 55–57, 59, 62–64, 70, 83, 88, 96, 107, 147–48, 186, 215, 220, 275, 277; unskilled workers and, 62–63, 67–71, 96–97, 101; upper class and, 35; voters and, 75, 81, 90, 96–100, 111–13, 125, 129–30, 133, 260, 272–73; wages and, 266, 268, 273; weakened democratic state and, 1, 30, 93–94, 124–25, 128; welfare and, 94, 96, 261, 273; working class and, 53–79, 81, 83, 89–92, 96–101, 282n3, 283n9 Democrats, 226 Denmark: British disease and, 172; capitalism and, 39, 148, 203; Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) and, 171–76; democracy and, 56, 57, 61, 62–63, 66, 71, 74–76, 78; Fordism and, 106, 120, 129; Gini coefficients and, 25, 36; Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and, 175; knowledge economies and, 147–48, 150, 154, 166, 169, 171–76, 181, 203, 221, 233, 245; median income and, 25; populism and, 221, 233, 245; segregation and, 203; taxes and, 17 deregulation: competition and, 1, 6, 12, 31, 70, 122, 128, 152, 177, 183, 186, 190, 223; democracy and, 96, 98; Fordism and, 120, 122; globalization and, 1; knowledge economies and, 145, 173, 183; labor market and, 1, 96, 122, 183 Deutsch, Franziska, 37, 55 Deutsch, Julian, 37, 55 dictatorships, 273, 281n18 Disraeli, Benjamin, 81, 85, 96 Dollfuss, Engelbert, 77, 279n2 Douglas, Roger, 171 Downs, Anthony, 112 dualism, 282n25 Due, Jesper, 63, 66 Earth Is Flat, The (Friedman), 188 Ebert, Friedrich, 75–76 EC Internal Market, 173 economic geography: capitalism and, 2–3, 7–8, 18, 20, 31, 48, 147, 159, 185, 192; colocation and, 2–3, 7–8, 15–16, 159, 185–88, 261, 266–72; democracy and, 92, 268, 274, 276–77; education and, 2–3, 7, 52, 138, 140, 161, 195, 197, 200–6, 224, 274, 276; Fordism and, 109, 116; growth and, 3, 31, 116; knowledge economies and, 138, 140, 144–47, 159, 161, 185, 188, 191–92, 195–97, 200–6, 224; location cospecificity and, 14–17; mobility and, 2, 8, 18, 20, 39–40; multinational enterprises (MNEs) and, 2–3, 40, 192, 279n1; political economy and, 2–3, 8, 48–49, 140; populism and, 224; rebirth of cities and, 224–27; skilled labor and, 2–3, 7–8, 15, 20, 31, 48, 109, 116, 144–47, 185, 191–92, 195–96, 276–77; social networks and, 48–49, 185, 195, 274; specialization and, 8, 14–17, 39, 144, 146–47, 192, 276–77 Economist, The (journal), 180 education: ability grouping and, 230; Asia and, 26–27; big-city agglomerations and, 194–200; capitalism and, 7, 10, 12, 20, 26–28, 31, 37–38, 45, 54, 60, 102, 128, 131, 143, 159, 161, 165, 225, 228, 234, 237, 250–51, 257; church control over, 87; colocation and, 2, 7, 261, 272; competition and, 12, 21, 26, 31, 52, 80, 89, 119, 128, 131, 156, 166, 177, 181, 194, 198, 222–23, 257, 285n9; conservatism and, 38, 79, 83, 89, 98, 219; democracy and, 12, 14, 20, 24–27, 37–38, 41, 45, 53–55, 60, 70–72, 79–90, 94–101, 131, 138, 143, 158–61, 165, 181, 225, 228–29, 235, 247, 250–51, 257–62, 265–66, 270–77, 283n11, 283n13; economic geography and, 2–3, 7, 52, 138, 140, 161, 195, 197, 200–6, 224, 274, 276; elitism and, 30, 38, 53–54, 60, 70–71, 79, 83–84, 89–90, 98, 101, 141, 179, 184, 214, 235, 243, 248, 251; Ferry reforms and, 87; Fordism and, 104, 109–11, 118–19, 127–31, 143; Forster Elementary Education Act and, 86; France and, 70, 81, 83, 94, 104, 166, 177, 233; Germany and, 80, 82, 87, 89, 166, 179, 181, 232, 283n11; higher, 14, 31, 41–44, 55, 70, 89, 119, 128, 131, 139–43, 146, 156, 163–65, 174–80, 184–86, 192, 195–97, 214, 219, 225, 228–32, 238–41, 252, 255–56, 265, 272–77, 284n2, 284n4, 285n9, 286n11; immigrants and, 45, 89, 194, 217, 223, 226, 283n13; income and, 14, 24, 41–42, 55, 89–90, 139, 167–68, 181, 192, 217, 228, 231–32, 238, 240, 246, 252, 271–74, 284n4, 286n12; investment in, 10, 12, 20–21, 37, 52, 54, 98, 101–4, 109–11, 119, 146–48, 159, 163, 181, 186, 234, 252, 257, 266, 271, 283n13, 284n4, 285n9; Italy and, 166, 248; Japan and, 166, 232, 241, 284n4; knowledge economies and, 138–48, 156–68, 174–81, 184–86, 191–200, 204, 214, 217, 219, 222–25, 228–47, 250–52, 255–56, 284n2, 284n4, 285n9, 286n11, 286n12, 287n1; labor market and, 12, 28, 31, 41, 53–54, 60, 70, 72, 83, 89–90, 96, 98, 104, 128, 165, 174, 177, 191, 223, 225, 229, 260; liberalism and, 45, 60, 71, 79, 82–83, 89–90, 101, 104, 138, 143, 156, 175, 208, 212–14, 228–29, 232, 241, 243, 284n3, 286n11; middle class and, 3, 20, 24, 41–43, 53–55, 60, 71, 84, 90, 98, 101, 128, 158, 168, 203, 222–25, 235, 238–40, 243–44, 249, 251, 257–58, 273–74, 286n11, 287n1; politics of future and, 272–77; populism and, 217, 219, 222–25, 228–47, 250–52, 287n1; private spending and, 231–32; research and, 10, 12, 20–21, 28, 48, 55, 72, 146, 159, 165, 234, 262; school quality and, 231; Scotland and, 283n12; segregation and, 43, 119, 140, 161, 192, 195, 197, 200–6, 214, 231; skill clusters and, 2–3, 7, 139, 141, 145, 148, 185, 190–95, 198, 223, 261; skilled labor and, 7, 12, 20–21, 31, 37–38, 41, 54, 60, 70–71, 79, 84, 90, 101–4, 119, 127–30, 139, 142, 158, 174–76, 179–81, 184–85, 191–95, 198, 217, 222–25, 228–35, 238–40, 246, 250–52, 266; social networks and, 2, 51–52, 139, 145, 185, 191–99, 204–5, 217, 225, 234, 261, 270–71, 274–75; South Korea and, 26, 28, 166, 232, 241, 284n4; specialization and, 14, 191, 271; student tracking and, 230–31; training and, 7, 10, 14, 31, 44, 82, 89–90, 101, 104, 109, 111, 128, 131, 174, 176, 179, 181, 204, 223, 228–29, 232–33, 241–43, 252, 257, 275, 277, 280n10; United Kingdom and, 38, 130, 166, 177, 231–32, 277; United States and, 24, 38, 55, 70, 83, 109, 127, 130, 166, 177, 195, 223, 230–32, 241, 275; upper class and, 43; VET system and, 176, 179–80; vocational, 31, 44, 68, 82, 89, 92, 104, 109, 113, 127–28, 131, 174, 176, 179, 228–30, 233, 242–43, 251–52, 257; voters and, 12–13, 21, 38, 45, 90, 158, 164, 167–68, 219, 234, 247, 273; welfare and, 31, 42, 45, 52, 94, 96, 116, 128, 131, 146, 167, 223, 234, 261, 287n1; women and, 87, 116, 141, 151, 174, 184, 195, 238 Education Act, 89 egalitarianism, 30, 81–82, 96, 120, 139, 163, 239 electoral systems: choice of, 90–97; coevolving systems and, 46; cospecificity and, 280n6; democracy and, 90–97, 100–1; Fordism and, 103, 111, 124–25; knowledge economies and, 163–68, 212, 217–18, 228; populism and, 217–18, 228, 251; voters and, 22 (see also voters) Elgin, Lord, 88 elitism: aristocracy and, 53–54, 64, 67, 72, 74, 81, 83, 86–87, 90, 98; bourgeoisie and, 60, 72, 83–84, 283n7; democracy and, 53–61, 67, 70–71, 75–76, 79–90, 96–101; education and, 30, 38, 53–54, 60, 70–71, 79, 83–84, 89–90, 98, 101, 141, 179, 184, 214, 235, 243, 248, 251; Fordism and, 111; knowledge economies and, 9, 141, 158, 179, 184, 214, 216, 226, 235, 243–44, 248–51, 287n3; landowners and, 38, 57, 80–89, 95, 98, 158; modernization and, 38, 57, 79–80, 83, 89, 98; monarchies and, 72–73, 81, 87; populism and, 216, 226, 235, 243–44, 248–51, 287n3; projects of, 56–60, 90; working class and, 53–60, 67, 71, 79, 83, 90, 96, 98–101, 226 Elkins, Zachary, 161 Elkjaer, Mads Andreas, 167–68, 281n14 encapsulation, 227, 243, 249 enfranchisement, 84–90 Engerman, Stanley L., 80, 84, 89 Entrepreneurial Politics in Mid-Victorian England (Searle), 85 entrepreneurs, 42, 65, 85, 183, 217, 275 Esping-Andersen, Gösta, 1, 30, 93–94, 124–25, 128 ethnic issues, 52, 91, 160, 205, 275, 277, 280n8 European Central Bank, 122 European Monetary System (EMS), 122 European Union (EU), 51, 122, 145, 153, 170–71, 177, 245, 248, 250 exchange rates, 121–22, 148, 152, 209, 212 Facebook, 155 factory workers, 61, 65–66, 70 feeder towns, 108–9, 224 Ferry reforms, 87 financial crisis: collateral debt obligations (CDOs) and, 209–10; credit default swaps (CDSs) and, 209–10; export-oriented economies and, 211–12; Great Depression and, 45, 99, 214, 218, 247; Great Moderation and, 151, 207; Great Recession and, 206, 214, 247, 250, 276; high leveraged financial institutions (HLFIs) and, 207–13; Keynesianism and, 207; knowledge economies and, 177, 206–14; liberalism and, 207–13; value-added sectors and, 206–9 financialization, 149–51 Finland: Fordism and, 106; Gini coefficients and, 36; knowledge economies and, 147–48, 150, 154, 166, 221, 233, 236, 241, 242, 245; median income and, 25; taxes and, 17 Fioretos, Orfeo, 10–11 Five Star Movement, 248, 276 flexicurity, 174 Foot, Michael, 169 Ford, Martin, 260 Fordism: advanced sector and, 130–31; assembly lines and, 104, 108; Austria and, 106; Belgium and, 106, 121; big-city agglomerations and, 194; centralization and, 103–10, 113, 116–21; Chandlerian corporations and, 5, 7, 15, 17, 103, 267; compensation and, 123–29; competition and, 115, 119, 122, 128, 131; conservatism and, 115, 121, 124, 128, 134; Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) and, 102–4, 123, 125, 127; decentralization and, 122–23; democracy and, 274, 277; Denmark and, 106, 120, 129; deregulation and, 120, 122; economy of, 103–17; education and, 104, 109–11, 118–19, 127–31, 143; electoral systems and, 103, 111, 124–25; elitism and, 111; fall of, 117–30, 277; Finland and, 106; France and, 104–5, 106, 181–82; Germany and, 106, 107, 121, 129; growth and, 109–16, 125, 133, 135; industrialization and, 103, 108, 117–20, 124, 134–35; inequality and, 107, 116–20, 125, 213; inflation and, 120–21; Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and, 102; innovation and, 104, 128, 131; institutional frameworks and, 128–31; Ireland and, 106, 121; Italy and, 106, 120–21, 132; Japan and, 106, 109, 284n4; knowledge economies and, 140–43, 146–49, 152, 154, 160, 169, 181–82, 189, 192, 194, 200–1, 214–25, 237–40, 248–49, 277; labor market and, 103, 118, 122–28, 152; liberalism and, 103–5, 115, 125, 127; Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) and, 103, 112, 125, 127–29; low-skilled labor and, 119–20, 126; macroeconomic policies and, 120–23; majoritarianism and, 103, 112–13, 124–32; manufacturing and, 103, 108–9, 118; mass production and, 43, 104, 108; middle class and, 43, 112, 115, 117, 123, 125, 128, 142, 160, 201, 219, 222–25, 238, 248; mobility and, 16, 118, 124, 221; modernization and, 104, 109, 114; national champions and, 154; Netherlands and, 106, 121; Norway and, 106, 130; OECD countries and, 107, 117, 125, 133; party system and, 113, 123–24; populism and, 113, 130, 216, 218–25, 237–40, 248–49; production and, 43, 103–4, 108–11, 115–17, 123, 127; proportional representation (PR) systems and, 112–13, 124–28; public goods and, 113; redistribution and, 103, 111–12, 115, 123–25, 128–29; reputation and, 112–13; research and, 103, 108, 110; second-order effects and, 129–30; segmentation and, 123–24; segregation and, 109, 119; semiskilled labor and, 12, 102–5, 112, 115, 118–20, 123–24, 127, 129; shocks and, 125–27, 132–35; skilled labor and, 12, 14, 16, 102–5, 109–12, 115–30, 222–25, 277; social protection and, 123–29; specialization and, 108; Sweden and, 106, 107, 117, 120, 129; symbiotic forces and, 102, 130–31; taxes and, 110–13, 124; technology and, 5, 7, 14–15, 50, 102–6, 109, 117–19, 124, 127–28, 131, 140–43, 154, 192, 194, 222, 277; trade and, 114, 128, 131; unemployment and, 105, 107, 110, 117, 120–21, 124–27, 133, 135, 284n2; unions and, 105–16, 119–23, 127, 284n3; United Kingdom and, 105–8, 120, 123, 130; United States and, 105–9, 117–20, 123, 127, 130; unskilled workers and, 104–5, 118; wages and, 104–24, 127, 284n2; welfare and, 110–11, 115–28, 131; women and, 116–17; working class and, 109, 115, 129, 131 foreign direct investment (FDI): globalization and, 40, 198; Helpman-Melitz model and, 284n3; knowledge economies and, 139, 145, 147, 148, 154, 163, 193, 198–99, 200, 284n3, 285n5, 285n9; skilled labor and, 3, 139, 145, 147, 193, 198; trade and, 154, 163, 285n5, 285n9 Forster Elementary Education Act, 86 France: capitalism and, 17, 148, 182; Chirac and, 183; democracy and, 54, 56, 57, 59, 61, 62–63, 70, 81, 83, 87, 94–95, 283n9; education and, 70, 81, 83, 94, 104, 166, 177, 233; Fordism and, 104–5, 106, 181–82; Gini coefficient for, 36; guild system and, 59, 63; Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and, 182; knowledge economies and, 147–48, 150, 154, 166, 169, 177, 181–83, 202, 221, 233, 236, 239, 242, 245, 248; Le Chapelier laws and, 59; Legitimists and, 86; Macron and, 183; Mitterrand and, 182; mobility and, 59; Orleanists and, 86; Paris Commune and, 86; polarized unionism and, 62; populism and, 183, 221, 233, 236, 239, 242, 245, 248; postwar, 11; protocorporatist countries and, 59, 62; Third Republic and, 57, 81, 86–87 Freeman, Christopher, 5 free riders, 127 free trade, 17, 155 Frey, Carl Benedikt, 260 Friedman, Thomas, 145, 188 Galenson, Walter, 63–65, 73 game theory, 188–89, 222–23 gender, 116–17, 129, 192, 225, 238, 255–56, 280n8, 287n1 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 114 geographic segregation, 109, 140, 161, 185, 195, 197, 200–6 German Democratic Party (DDP), 77 German People’s Party (DVP), 77 Germany: authoritarianism and, 4, 74, 99, 279n1; banking sector of, 176–77; Bismarkian welfare state and, 176; capitalism and, 4, 10–11, 17, 49, 55, 77; Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) and, 176–81; decentralization and, 94, 283n11; democracy and, 55–56, 57, 61, 62–68, 71–91, 94, 99, 382n11; education and, 80, 82, 87, 89, 166, 179, 181, 231–32, 283n11; electoral system and, 91; Fordism and, 106, 107, 121, 129; Gini coefficents for, 25, 36; Grand Coalition governments of, 177; Harz reforms and, 178–79; Hitler and, 77, 99, 219; Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and, 176, 180; knowledge economies and, 142, 147–48, 150, 154, 166, 169, 176–81, 191, 207, 209, 219, 221, 230, 232, 233, 236, 242, 245; Kohl government and, 178; Kulturkampf and, 94–95; Landesbanken and, 176–77; median income and, 23, 25; Mittelstand and, 68, 92, 95, 179, 191; Nazism and, 75, 77, 99, 219, 279n2; October Revolution and, 75–76; populism and, 181, 219, 221, 230, 232, 233, 236, 242, 245; protocorporatist countries and, 62–63, 65, 68, 71, 74, 77, 99, 238n11; Schroeder government and, 178; Social Democratic Party (SDP) and, 68, 74, 76–77, 78; Socialist Republic of Bavaria and, 75; Sparkassen and, 176–77; VET system and, 176, 179–80; Weimar Republic and, 75–77; working class pressure in, 74–79; World War I and, 4, 56; World War II and, 4, 55–56, 76 Ghent system, 78 Gilens, Martin, 22, 24, 167–68 Gini coefficients: Australia and, 36; Austria and, 36; Belgium and, 36; Denmark and, 25, 36; disposable income and, 22–23, 25; Finland and, 36; Ireland and, 36; Netherlands and, 25, 36; Norway and, 25, 36; redistribution and, 22–23, 25, 36, 117, 118, 141, 221; South Korea and, 36; Spain and, 36; Sweden and, 25, 36; taxes and, 22, 141; United Kingdom and, 25, 36 globalization: advanced capitalist democracies (ACD) and, 38–40; capitalism and, 2–3, 7–8, 18, 20, 31, 48, 147, 159, 185, 192; competition and, 1, 28, 50, 156; democracy and, 258, 267, 272; deregulation and, 1; foreign direct investment (FDI) and, 40, 198; inequality and, 1, 3, 22, 26; Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and, 3, 143, 156, 175, 198; knowledge economies and, 137, 142–44, 148–49, 151, 156, 198, 206, 234, 245; liberalism and, 1, 51, 142–43, 155, 162–63, 208, 213; liberalization and, 1; multinational enterprises (MNEs) and, 2–3, 15, 18, 25, 28, 40, 139, 154, 192, 279n1; populism and, 234, 245; privatization and, 1; production and, 5, 40, 51, 258; Rodrik on, 22; specialization and, 3, 8, 17, 40, 51, 198, 258; strategic complimentarities and, 17–18; strength of democratic state and, 1–2, 50–51; symbiosis and, 8; varieties of advanced capitalism and, 38–40; weakened democratic state and, 1 Glyn, Andrew, 282n22 Google, 175, 262, 265, 287n1 Gordon, Robert, 260–61 Governments, Growth, and Markets (Zysman), 181 Great Depression, 45, 99, 214, 218, 247 Great Gatsby Curve (GGC), 220–23, 227–28, 247, 259, 275–76 Great Inversion, 224 Great Moderation, 151, 207 Great Recession, 206, 214, 247, 250, 276 Grey, Lord, 86 growth: capitalism and, 2–3, 8, 13, 16, 30–32, 38, 79, 97, 125, 156, 163, 218, 247, 261; competition and, 16, 31, 115, 162–63, 170, 177, 218, 261, 285n9; democracy and, 8, 68, 78–79, 92, 97, 261, 267, 276; economic geography and, 3, 31, 116; Fordism and, 109–16, 125, 133, 135; GDP, 38, 133, 261; industrialization and, 68, 92, 111, 115, 177, 181, 194; knowledge economies and, 51, 142, 156, 162–64, 168, 170–71, 177, 179, 181, 192, 194, 218, 221, 226, 237, 247–48, 285n8, 285n9; mobility and, 13, 30, 247, 276; populism and, 218, 221, 226, 237, 247–48; recession and, 5, 206, 214, 247–50, 276; skilled labor and, 8, 13, 31, 68, 97, 110, 115–16, 218, 261; social networks and, 51, 92; technology and, 3, 5, 13, 38, 162, 194, 226, 261; voters and, 2, 13, 23, 32, 111, 113, 164, 168, 247 guild systems, 59, 63–64, 69–70, 90–91, 93, 96, 98 Hacker, Jacob, 282n22 Hall, Peter A., 129, 216, 251 Hallerberg, Mark, 121, 151 Häusermann, Silja, 234 Hayek, Friedrich A., 5–6, 9, 11, 279n4 Healthcare NeXT, 262 health issues, 32, 79, 82–84, 86, 110, 198, 204–5, 262, 275 Hechter, Michael, 93 hegemony, 8, 113, 137 Helpman-Melitz model, 284n3 Herrigel, Gary, 93–94 heterogeneity, 17–20, 54, 133 highly leveraged financial institutions (HLFIs), 207–13 Hitler, Adolf, 77, 99, 219 Hochschild, Arlie R., 223, 226 Hong Kong, 4, 26, 279n3 housing, 41, 79, 177, 197, 200, 201, 203, 206, 225–26, 231, 275 Hovenkamp, Herbert, 153 human capital, 3, 53, 58, 101, 206, 229, 281n18 IBM, 175, 186 immigrants: closing access to, 43; democracy and, 88–89, 275; education and, 45, 89, 194, 217, 223, 226, 283n13; knowledge economies and, 136, 160, 193–94, 206, 215–17, 223, 226–27, 234, 237, 249; outsourcing and, 118, 193–94, 222; populism and, 45, 216–17, 223, 226–27, 234, 237, 239, 249; squattocracy and, 88 income distribution, 21, 25, 56, 116, 181, 221, 252, 274 industrialization: capitalism and, 4, 37–38, 53, 58, 60, 101, 124, 203; deindustrialization and, 18, 43, 103, 117–20, 124, 134–35, 180, 203, 224; democracy and, 4, 37, 53–62, 65–66, 79, 83, 88–92, 98, 101; feeder towns and, 108–9, 224; Fordism and, 103, 108, 117–20, 124, 134–35; growth and, 68, 92, 111, 115, 177, 181; knowledge economies and, 180–81, 203, 224; Nazism and, 75, 77; populism and, 224; protocorporatist countries and, 60–62, 65, 79, 89–90, 98, 101; urban issues from, 83–84 Industrial Relations and European State Traditions (Crouch), 58 industrial revolution, 5, 12, 58, 293, 295 inequality: capitalism and, 1, 5, 9, 20, 22, 24–26, 40–41, 125, 139, 261, 268, 273–74, 282n22; fall in, 5, 35; Fordism and, 107, 116–20, 125, 213; globalization and, 1, 3, 22, 26; Italy and, 36; knowledge economies and, 41–45, 139–41, 192, 197, 219–23, 228; majoritarianism and, 22; middle class and, 3, 20, 22–23, 41–43, 140, 222–23, 228, 273, 281; populism and, 219–23, 228; poverty and, 3, 5, 18–19, 25, 43, 47, 109, 117, 142, 221, 237; redistribution and, 1, 3, 20, 40–46, 140, 220, 222, 273; rise in, 1, 3, 9, 23, 40–46, 282n25; Robin Hood Paradox and, 220; undeserving poor and, 43, 142, 160, 216, 222, 227; United Kingdom and, 36; upper class and, 41, 158, 261; welfare and, 3, 8, 18–21, 31, 39–40, 42, 43, 115, 123–25, 128, 131, 137, 223, 261, 273, 282n22 inflation: capitalism and, 253, 285n9; Fordism and, 120–21; knowledge economies and, 151–52, 153, 163, 168–73, 176, 178, 202, 207, 234 Information and Communication Technology (ICT): capitalism and, 261, 266, 276; decentralization and, 3, 163, 186, 190, 276; democracy and, 261, 266, 276; Denmark and, 175; Fordism and, 102, 118; France and, 182; Germany and, 176, 180; globalization and, 198; knowledge economies and, 136–44, 156, 163, 171, 175–76, 180–90, 193, 195, 198, 214, 238, 249; outsourcing and, 118, 193–94, 222; physical skills and, 193; populism and, 238, 249; revolution of, 3, 5, 102, 136–43, 156, 163, 171, 176, 182–88, 193, 195, 198, 214, 238, 249, 276; routine tasks and, 193; shocks and, 136, 138, 214; skilled labor and, 41, 102, 185–86, 190, 193, 195, 198, 218, 276; smart cities and, 194–95; societal transformation and, 138–43 Inglehart, Ronald, 235, 246, 287n1 innovation: assembly lines and, 104, 108; capitalism and, 2, 6–12, 19, 31–34, 47, 128, 131, 157, 206, 258, 281n18; competition and, 6, 10–12, 31–35, 47, 128, 131, 173, 182–83, 258, 285; democracy and, 87, 258, 262, 267, 271; Fordism and, 104, 128, 131; knowledge economies and, 141, 152, 157–58, 173–75, 180–83, 196, 198, 205–7; manufacturing and, 33; middle-income trap and, 27; multinational enterprises (MNEs) and, 2, 40, 279n1; patents and, 7, 12–15, 26, 27, 145, 201, 281n15, 285n6; political economy and, 2, 7–8, 34, 183; production and, 10, 40, 262, 271; productivity and, 19, 34; public goods and, 35, 258; research and, 2, 12, 40; skilled labor and, 2, 6–12, 19, 27, 31–34, 104, 128, 141, 174, 196, 198, 258, 262, 271, 281n18; specialization and, 8, 14, 198, 267, 271 institutional frameworks: capitalism and, 31–34, 47–49, 128–29, 131, 146; comparative advantage and, 31, 33, 49, 51, 131; democracy and, 97; Fordism and, 128–31; knowledge economies and, 138, 146, 150, 156; unions and, 32–33 intellectual property, 31, 128, 131, 145 Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 42 International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), 208 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 38, 149–50 Ireland: capitalism and, 4; democracy and, 62, 282n2; Fordism and, 106, 121; Gini coefficients and, 36; knowledge economies and, 147–48, 150, 154, 166, 170, 230, 233; laborist unionism and, 62; middle-income trap and, 26; patents and, 27; taxes and, 17 Israel, 4, 25, 26, 28, 36, 81, 85, 96, 166 ISSP data, 165, 168 Italy: capitalism and, 4, 77, 148; democracy and, 77, 91, 99, 276, 282n2; education and, 166, 248; Five Star Movement and, 248, 276; Fordism and, 106, 120–21, 132; Gini coefficents for, 25, 36; inequality and, 36; knowledge economies and, 147–48, 150, 154, 166, 221, 233, 236, 242, 245, 248; Lega and, 248, 276; median income and, 25; Mussolini and, 77; populism and, 221, 233, 236, 242, 245, 248; postwar, 4; taxes and, 17 Iversen, Torben, 124, 135, 168, 211, 229, 251, 281n14 Japan: Abe and, 218; authoritarianism and, 279n2; capitalism and, 4, 11, 49, 55, 148, 282n2; education and, 166, 232, 241, 284n4; Fordism and, 106, 109, 284n4; Gini coefficients and, 25, 36; Keiretsu and, 182; knowledge economies and, 147–48, 150, 154, 166, 182, 207, 209, 218, 221, 232, 233, 236, 239, 241, 242, 244, 284n4; LDP and, 218; median income and, 25; populism and, 218, 221, 232, 233, 236, 239, 241, 242, 244; postwar, 4; tertiary educational spending and, 231–32 Johnson, Simon, 282n22 journeymen, 61, 65 Kalyvas, Stathis N., 92, 95 Katz, Jonathan N., 133 Katznelson, Ira, 62–63, 70, 283n13 Kees Koedijk, Jeroen Kremers, 154–55 Keynesianism, 115, 121, 145, 201, 207, 286n12 Kitschelt, Herbert, 234 knowledge economies: analytic skills and, 186; Asia and, 142, 144, 222, 229, 235, 241, 243; Australia and, 147–48, 150, 153, 166, 221, 233, 236, 242; Austria and, 230, 233, 245; Belgium and, 147–48, 150, 154, 233, 245; big-city agglomerations and, 194–200; Canada and, 147–48, 150, 154, 166, 221, 233, 236, 242, 245; centralization and, 146, 151–52, 156, 173, 186, 202, 209, 231, 243, 252; changing skill sets and, 184–94; colocation and, 159, 185–88; competition and, 139, 146, 149, 152–56, 162–63, 166–69, 173, 177, 181–82, 186, 194, 198, 208, 218, 222–23, 226, 236, 285n5, 285n6, 285n9; conservatism and, 169–72, 218–19; cooperative labor and, 152–56; Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) and, 152, 169, 171–81, 198, 232; decentralization and, 3, 18, 138, 144, 146–52, 156, 163, 172–74, 180, 183–84, 186, 190, 193, 196, 212, 217, 225, 234, 275; Denmark and, 147–48, 150, 154, 166, 169, 171–76, 181, 203, 221, 233, 245; deregulation and, 145, 173, 183; economic geography and, 138, 140, 144–47, 159, 161, 185, 188, 191–92, 195–97, 200–6; education and, 138–48, 156–68, 174–81, 184–86, 191–200, 204, 214, 217, 219, 222–25, 228–47, 250–52, 255–56, 284n2, 284n4, 285n9, 286n11, 286n12, 287n1; electoral systems and, 163–68, 212, 217–18, 228; elitism and, 9, 141, 158, 179, 184, 214, 216, 226, 235, 243–44, 248–51, 287n3; embedded, 137–38, 143–56, 161–83, 185, 188, 191–92, 195, 205, 214, 225, 251; financial crisis and, 177, 206–14; financialization and, 149–51; Finland and, 147–48, 150, 154, 166, 221, 233, 236, 241, 242, 245; first-order effects and, 120, 129, 132–33, 216; Fordism and, 140, 142–43, 146–49, 152, 154, 160, 169, 181–82, 189, 192, 194, 200–1, 214, 216, 219–25, 237–38, 240, 248–49, 277; foreign direct investment (FDI) and, 139, 145, 147, 148, 154, 163, 193, 198–99, 200, 284n3, 285n5, 285n9; France and, 147–48, 150, 154, 166, 169, 177, 181–83, 202, 221, 233, 236, 239, 242, 245, 248; Germany and, 142, 147–48, 150, 154, 166, 169, 176–81, 191, 207, 209, 219, 221, 230, 232, 233, 236, 242, 245; globalization and, 137, 142–44, 148–49, 151, 156, 198, 206, 234, 245; Great Gatsby Curve (GGC) and, 220–23, 227–28, 247, 259, 275–76; growth and, 51, 142, 156, 162–64, 168, 170–71, 177, 179, 181, 192, 194, 218, 221, 226, 237, 247–48, 285n8, 285n9; human capital and, 206, 229; immigrants and, 136, 160, 193–94, 206, 215–17, 223, 226–27, 234, 237, 249; industrialization and, 180–81, 203, 224; inequality and, 41–45, 139–41, 192, 197, 219–23, 228; inflation and, 151–52, 153, 163, 168–73, 176, 178, 202, 207, 234; Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and, 3, 5, 136–43, 156, 163, 171, 175–76, 180–90, 193, 195, 198, 214, 238, 249; innovation and, 141, 152, 157–58, 173–75, 180–83, 196, 198, 205–7; institutional frameworks and, 138, 146, 150, 156; Ireland and, 147–48, 150, 154, 166, 170, 230, 233; Italy and, 147–48, 150, 154, 166, 221, 233, 236, 242, 245, 248; Japan and, 147–48, 150, 154, 166, 182, 207, 209, 218, 221, 232, 233, 236, 239, 241, 242, 244, 284n4; Korea and, 284n4; labor market and, 140, 152, 173–78, 183, 186, 190, 223, 229; liberalism and, 137–38, 141–56, 159, 161–83, 207–14, 228–29, 232, 241, 243, 250, 284n3, 286n11; Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) and, 152, 169, 181, 198, 230, 232; low-skilled labor and, 180, 194, 200, 212–13, 218, 223, 238, 249; macroeconomic management and, 151–52; majoritarianism and, 213, 217, 243–44, 251; manufacturing and, 142, 169, 182, 194, 197, 200–3, 224, 241; middle class and, 140, 142, 158, 163, 168, 201, 203, 218–28, 234–51; mobility and, 145, 207, 214, 217–23, 227–32, 239–42, 247, 249; modernization and, 174; multinational companies (MNCs) and, 7, 145, 147, 193, 200, 267–68, 271; multinational enterprises (MNEs) and, 2–3, 15, 40, 139, 154, 192; nation-states and, 139, 159, 161, 206, 213, 215; Netherlands and, 147–48, 150, 154, 166, 230, 232, 233, 236, 242, 245; Norway and, 147–48, 150, 154, 166, 221, 233, 236, 242, 245; OECD countries and, 153–54, 175, 196, 230–32, 233, 250; open financial markets and, 152; outsourcing and, 118, 193–94, 222; party system and, 21, 44, 51–52; physical skills and, 193; political construction of, 161–83; political decisions leading to, 156–61; political economy and, 51, 164–68, 181, 220, 226, 235; populism and, 136, 138, 140–42, 146, 161, 171, 175, 181–85, 195, 202, 205, 214–23, 226–28, 235–53, 254–56; privatization and, 154, 173; production and, 143, 152, 161, 180, 183, 224–25, 234–35, 247, 249; proportional representation (PR) systems and, 132–34, 135, 212, 217, 229, 251; public goods and, 52, 143–48, 152, 157, 167, 225; reconfigurability and, 185, 191, 214, 224; redistribution and, 48, 137, 140, 158, 168, 220, 222, 225, 234–37, 241; regulation index and, 285n5; relational skills and, 187; reputation and, 158, 163–64, 182–83, 188, 190–91; research and, 139, 146, 159, 164–65, 179, 187, 189, 196, 200, 204, 234, 285n9; routine tasks and, 193; second-order effects of, 129, 216; segregation and, 43, 107, 140, 161, 185, 192, 195, 197, 200–6, 214, 231; semiskilled labor and, 142, 172–73, 212, 238–40; shocks and, 136–40, 143, 156–59, 181, 185, 194, 214; skill clusters and, 139, 141, 144–48, 183, 185, 190–98, 200, 223; skilled labor and, 137–49, 157–58, 172–200, 211–13, 217–35, 238–41, 246, 249–52, 255–56; smart cities and, 194–95; socialism and, 137, 181–82, 215, 218; social networks and, 139, 145, 185, 188, 191–92, 195–97, 200, 204–6, 217, 225, 246; societal transformation from, 138–43; socioeconomic construction of, 183–99; South Korea and, 147–48, 150, 154, 156, 166, 232, 233, 236, 239, 241, 242; Spain and, 154, 166, 201, 221, 233, 236, 242, 248; specialization and, 139, 144–47, 161, 190–93, 198, 200, 281n21; Sweden and, 147–48, 150, 153–54, 166, 173, 221, 233, 236, 242, 245; Switzerland and, 147–48, 150, 154, 166, 221, 233, 236, 242, 245; tacit knowledge and, 2, 39, 145, 263; taxes and, 141, 157–58, 165, 167, 172, 206, 221–22, 225, 231, 281n21; technology and, 138–44, 147, 154–62, 175–76, 184–86, 192–94, 198–99, 214, 222, 226, 232, 234, 238, 246, 249, 284n1, 284n3, 285n6; trade and, 142, 145, 153–55, 163, 172–73, 180, 211–13, 218, 250; unemployment and, 170–72, 174, 178, 180, 207, 248–49, 255–56, 285n8; unions and, 152, 169–83, 212, 228, 251; United Kingdom and, 142, 147–48, 150, 152, 154, 161–63, 166, 169–77, 180–81, 194, 200–1, 204, 206, 209, 218, 232, 233, 236, 242, 245, 250; United States and, 141–42, 147–56, 162, 166, 169, 171, 177, 186, 194–95, 198, 202, 209, 215, 218–23, 230, 232, 236, 241, 244, 277; unskilled workers and, 193, 246, 255; voters and, 24, 138, 140, 158–59, 163–64, 167–68, 183, 213–19, 234–36, 245, 247; wages and, 151, 160, 172–76, 181, 196, 211–12, 219, 222–23, 227, 229; welfare and, 137, 146, 167, 176, 214, 223, 234, 249, 285n6, 285n8, 287n1; women and, 141, 151, 174, 176, 184, 195, 238; working class and, 201, 225, 231, 239, 251; World Values Survey (WVS) and, 168, 235–36, 245 knowledge-intensive businesses (KIBs), 187–90, 190 Kristal, Tali, 119 Krueger, Alan B., 220 Kulturkampf, 94–95 Kurzweil, Raymond, 264 Labor and Monopoly Capitalism: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century (Braverman), 186 labor market: active labor market programs (ALMPs) and, 126–27, 135, 284n1; analytic skills and, 186; apprentices and, 61, 64–65, 68, 71, 104, 110, 127, 179–80, 230; artificial intelligence (AI) and, 260–72; artisans and, 61, 63–65, 70, 79, 94–95, 98; assembly lines and, 104, 108; big-city agglomerations and, 194–200; capitalism and, 1, 6, 12, 31, 38, 46–47, 122, 125, 128, 152, 186, 229, 258; Catholicism and, 56, 61, 63, 68, 77, 83, 87, 92, 94–95; collective bargaining and, 67, 69, 73, 92, 103, 107, 137, 176, 179; comparative advantage and, 31, 49, 51, 128, 131, 268; competition and, 12 (see also competition); craft skills and, 32, 53, 61–71, 79, 82, 90–91, 96, 98, 101, 104, 172; democracy and, 64, 66, 96–98, 260, 266, 268, 273; deregulation and, 1, 96, 122, 183; dualism and, 282n25; education and, 12, 28, 31, 41, 53–54, 60, 70, 72, 83, 89–90, 96, 98, 104, 128, 165, 174, 177, 191, 223, 225, 229, 260; flexicurity and, 174; Fordism and, 103, 118, 122–28; globalization and, 162–63 (see also globalization); guild systems and, 59, 63–64, 69–70, 90–91, 93, 96, 98; immigrants and, 45, 88–89, 136, 160, 193–94, 206, 215–17, 223, 226–27, 234, 237, 249, 275, 283n13; journeymen and, 61, 65; knowledge economies and, 140, 152, 173–78, 183, 186–90, 223, 229; laziness and, 222, 237, 254; manual jobs and, 76, 78, 226, 238–40, 246, 255–56, 264–65; mobility and, 8, 13, 59 (see also mobility); monopolies and, 6, 24, 47, 54, 64, 68, 87, 99, 114, 155, 186; outsourcing and, 118, 193–94, 222; pensions and, 41, 92, 178–79; politics of future and, 272–77; populism and, 223, 229; relational skills and, 187; retirement and, 110, 151, 201; revisionist history and, 283n9; robots and, 18, 141, 143, 184, 193, 260–66, 273; rules for, 6, 10, 12, 28, 38; semiskilled labor and, 12 (see also semiskilled labor); September Compromise and, 66; skilled labor and, 2–3, 12 (see also skilled labor); strikes and, 73, 75, 108, 116; tacit knowledge and, 2, 39, 145, 263; trade and, 17, 155 (see also trade); training and, 7, 10, 14, 31, 44, 82, 89–90, 101, 104, 109, 111, 128, 131, 174, 176, 179, 181, 204, 223, 228–29, 232–33, 241–43, 252, 257, 275, 277, 280n10; undeserving poor and, 43, 142, 160, 216, 222, 227; unemployment and, 16, 282n22, 284n2, 285n8 (see also unemployment); unions and, 6 (see also unions); vocational learning and, 31, 44, 68, 82, 89, 92, 104, 109, 113, 127–28, 131, 174, 176, 179, 228–30, 233, 242–43, 251–52, 257; welfare and, 31, 46, 96, 118, 120, 122–23, 125, 128, 176, 223, 279n5; women and, 5, 174, 176 Labour Party, 68, 169, 171 Landesbanken, 176–77 landowners, 38, 57, 80–89, 95, 98, 158 Lange, David, 171 Lapavitsas, Costas, 150 Latin America, 29, 56, 257 laziness, 222, 237, 254 Lega, 248, 276 Lehmann Brothers, 210 Le Pen, Marine, 183 Lewis-Black, Michael S., 164, 167, 285n8 liberalism: capitalism and, 1–2, 32, 49, 60, 97, 100–1, 137, 143, 213–14, 228; democracy and, 56–62, 67–71, 79–90, 96–101, 282n3, 283n14; education and, 45, 60, 71, 79, 82–83, 89–90, 101, 104, 138, 143, 156, 175, 208, 212–14, 228–29, 232, 241, 243, 284n3, 286n11; embedded, 51, 97, 137–38, 143–56, 159–83, 214; financial crisis and, 207–13; Fordism and, 103–5, 115, 125, 127; globalization and, 1, 51, 142, 155, 162–63, 208, 213; knowledge economies and, 137–38, 141–56, 159, 161–83, 207–14, 228–29, 232, 241, 243, 250, 284n3, 286n11; majoritarianism and, 33, 49, 60, 71, 97, 100–3, 125, 213, 243; middle class and, 2, 60, 71–72, 90, 96–97, 100–1, 115, 286n11; neoliberalism and, 1–2, 286n11; populism and, 228–29, 232, 241, 243, 250; protoliberal countries and, 59–61, 68, 90, 97, 100–1, 228; public goods and, 79–90; regulated, 143, 149; trade, 51, 62, 142, 155, 163, 173, 213, 250, 284n3; United Kingdom and, 32 Liberal Market Economies (LMEs): Fordism and, 103, 112, 125, 127–29; knowledge economies and, 152, 169, 181, 198, 230, 232; populism and, 230, 232 libertarians, 45, 225, 234, 237, 240, 249 Lib-Lab political parties, 62–63 Lindblom, Charles, 5–6, 11, 19, 34, 280n9 Lindert, Peter H., 81, 220, 283n11 Lipset, Seymour Martin, 4, 37, 55, 71–72, 79, 113 Lizzeri, A., 79–80, 86 LO, 19, 66, 108 loans, 110, 148, 173, 209–11 Local Government Act, 86 Louca, Francisco, 5 low-skilled labor: capitalism and, 265–66; democracy and, 97–98, 265–66; Fordism and, 119–20, 126; knowledge economies and, 180, 194, 200, 212–13, 218, 223, 238, 249; populism and, 218, 223, 238, 249; robots and, 18; unions and, 19, 47, 50, 66, 70–71, 96, 98–99, 119, 127, 181 low-wage countries, 18–19, 28 Luddites, 226 Luebbert, Gregory, 62, 69, 282n3 Lutheran Church, 72 Maastricht Treaty, 122 McAfee, A., 260 machine-based technological change (MBTC), 262 Macron, Emmanuel, 183 majoritarianism: capitalism and, 22; cross-class parties and, 125; decommodification and, 9; democracy and, 60, 71, 91–93, 97–98, 100–1; Fordism and, 103, 112–13, 124–32; inequality and, 22; institutional patterns and, 33, 49, 132, 251; knowledge economies and, 213, 217, 243–44, 251; liberalism and, 33, 49, 60, 71, 97, 100–3, 125, 213, 243; populism and, 217, 243–44, 251; proportional representation (PR) systems and, 19, 44–45, 60, 93, 100–1, 124–26, 128, 132, 217, 251; taxes and, 24, 44, 113, 124; Westminster systems and, 19 Manning, Alan, 193 Manow, Philip, 44, 92–93, 95–96, 124 manual labor, 76, 78, 226, 238–40, 246, 255–56, 264–65 manufacturing: Asian, 5, 14, 241; capitalism and, 2, 14, 33, 142, 203; democracy and, 80; feeder towns and, 108–9, 224; Fordism and, 103, 108–9, 118; innovation and, 33; knowledge economies and, 142, 169, 182, 194, 197, 200–3, 224, 241; populism and, 200–3, 224, 241; research and, 15, 200; skilled labor and, 15, 33, 44–45, 109, 118, 194, 224 Marketcraft: How Governments Make Markets Work (Vogel), 11 Marks, Gary, 68 Martin, Cathie Joe, 63 Marxism, 11, 34, 46, 62, 279n4, 280n8, 280n9 materialism, 217, 234–35, 238 median income, 23, 25 Medicare, 24, 42 Melitz model, 211–12 Meltzer-Richard model, 3 Mezzogiorno, 93 microprocessors, 14, 140, 284n1 Microsoft, 155, 186, 262 middle class: capitalism and, 2–3, 20, 22, 41, 53, 97, 101, 162, 225, 227, 257–58, 273; democracy and, 3, 20, 22–23, 35, 44, 53–55, 60, 63, 71–74, 84–85, 90, 96–101, 115, 158, 163, 168, 257–58, 273–74; education and, 3, 20, 24, 41–43, 53–55, 60, 71, 84, 90, 98, 101, 128, 158, 168, 203, 222–25, 235, 238–40, 243–44, 249, 251, 257–58, 273–74, 286n11, 287n1; encapsulation and, 227, 243, 249; Fordism and, 43, 112, 115, 117, 123, 125, 128, 142, 160, 201, 219, 222–25, 238, 248; Gini coefficients and, 23; Great Gatsby Curve (GGC) and, 220, 221, 227–28, 247, 259, 275–76; growth and, 2–3, 97, 115, 163, 168, 226; hollowing out of, 160, 219, 222, 238; inequality and, 3, 20, 22–23, 41–43, 140, 222–23, 228, 273, 281; knowledge economies and, 24, 140, 142, 158, 163, 168, 201, 203, 218–28, 234–51; liberalism and, 2, 60, 71–72, 90, 96–97, 100–1, 115, 286n11; lower, 22, 35, 42, 63, 72, 90, 98, 124, 128, 142, 158, 201, 223, 235, 238, 244, 248, 251, 273; Medicare and, 42; middle-income trap puzzle and, 8, 26–30; neoliberalism and, 2; new, 3, 43, 218, 222, 224–27, 234, 238–41, 246, 247; old, 3, 43, 140, 142, 203, 219, 222–28, 234, 237–40, 243–44, 247, 249, 287n1; populism and, 218–28, 234–51; rebirth of cities and, 224–27; redistribution and, 3, 20, 35, 42, 60, 71, 90, 98, 100, 112, 115, 123–25, 140, 158, 168, 220, 222, 225, 234, 237, 241, 273–74; skilled labor and, 3, 20, 27, 30, 35, 41–44, 71, 85, 90, 96–101, 112, 115, 123, 125, 142, 158, 193, 222, 224, 235, 239–41, 249; Social Security and, 42; taxes and, 21, 42, 124, 158, 222, 225; technology and, 3, 21, 29–30, 41, 117, 139, 222, 226, 249; upper, 2, 41–44, 72, 125, 158, 168; voters and, 2–3, 20–22, 44, 90, 96–100, 125, 140, 158, 168, 273 military, 8, 28, 33, 73, 75, 86–87, 279n2, 281n18 Mittelstand, 68, 92, 95, 179, 191 Mitterrand, François, 182 mobility: capital, 8, 16, 30, 35, 50, 145, 280n11; democracy and, 59, 258, 275–76; economic geography and, 2, 8, 18, 20, 39–40; Fordism and, 16, 118, 124, 221; France and, 59; Great Gatsby Curve (GGC), 220–23, 227–28, 247, 259, 275–76; growth and, 13, 30, 247, 276; implicit social contract and, 221–22; income classes and, 220–22; intergenerational, 13, 21, 124, 219–22, 228, 230, 232, 241–42, 275–76; knowledge economies and, 145, 207, 214, 217–23, 227–32, 239–42, 247, 249; populism and, 217–32, 239–42, 247, 249; skilled labor and, 8, 13, 20–21, 39, 124, 217, 222, 228, 232, 239, 249; as strengthening state, 50–51; taxes and, 221 modernization, 19; democracy and, 55, 57, 66, 70, 79–83, 87, 89, 98; elitism and, 38, 57, 79–80, 83, 89, 98; Fordism and, 104, 109, 114; knowledge economies and, 174; protocorporatist countries and, 79, 83; Whigs and, 80 monarchies, 72–73, 81, 87 monopolies, 6, 24, 47, 54, 64, 68, 87, 99, 114, 155, 186 Morrison, Bruce, 80 mortgages, 151, 173, 209 Muldon, Rob “Piggy”, 171 multinational companies (MNCs): artificial intelligence (AI) and, 267–68, 271; democracy and, 267–68, 271; knowledge economies and, 7, 145, 147, 193, 200, 267–68, 271; technology and, 48 multinational enterprises (MNEs): changing roles of, 279n1; competition and, 154; economic geography and, 2–3, 40, 192, 279n1; globalization and, 2–3, 15, 18, 25, 28, 40, 139, 154, 192, 279n1; immobility of, 2; innovation and, 1, 40, 279n1; knowledge economies and, 2–3, 15, 40, 139, 154, 192; skill clusters and, 192–93; skilled labor and, 28; specialization and, 192–93 Municipal Corporations Act, 86 Mussolini, Benito, 77 Nannestad, Peter, 164 nanotechnology, 141, 184 nationalism, 216, 218, 227 National Reform League, 86 nation-states: advanced capitalist democracies (ACD) and, 9–11; capitalism and, 4–13, 30, 46–50, 77, 136, 139, 159, 161, 206, 249, 261, 267–68, 272, 279n4; democracy and, 4–5, 8, 13, 46, 136, 159, 161, 213, 215, 249, 261, 267–68, 272, 279; FDI globalization and, 40; knowledge economies and, 139, 159, 161, 206, 213, 215; skilled labor and, 8, 30, 48, 139, 261; strong role of, 9–11; symbiotic forces and, 5–9, 20, 32, 53–54, 130–31, 159, 206, 249–53, 259 Nazism, 75, 77, 99, 219, 279n2 neoliberalism, 1–2, 286n11 Netherlands: democracy and, 56, 57, 61, 62–63; Fordism and, 106, 121; Gini coefficients and, 25, 36; knowledge economies and, 147–48, 150, 154, 166, 230, 232, 233, 236, 242, 245; median income and, 25; populism and, 230, 232, 233, 236, 242, 245; protocorporatist countries and, 62–63; taxes and, 17; tertiary educational spending and, 231–32 New South Wales, 94–95 New Zealand: Acts of Parliament and, 88; democracy and, 38, 56–57, 61, 62, 87–89, 283n8; Douglas and, 171; Education Act and, 89; Fordism and, 106, 132; Gini coefficients and, 25, 36; knowledge economies and, 147–48, 150, 153, 166, 171, 221, 233, 236, 242; Lange and, 171; male suffrage and, 89; Muldoon and, 171; as outlier, 23; patents in, 27 Nolan, Mary, 65–66 Nord, Philip, 59 Norris, Pippa, 235, 246, 287n1 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 155 Norway: democracy and, 56, 57, 61, 62, 282n3; Fordism and, 106, 130; Gini coefficients and, 25, 36; knowledge economies and, 147–48, 150, 154, 166, 221, 233, 236, 242, 245; median income and, 25; populism and, 221, 233, 236, 242, 245; taxes and, 17 October Revolution, 75–76 OECD countries, 25, 38; education and, 14; Fordism and, 107, 117, 125, 133; knowledge economies and, 153–54, 175, 196, 230–32, 233, 250, 286n13; populism and, 230–32, 233, 250; taxes and, 17, 280n13 Oesch, Daniel, 234 oil crisis, 120, 171, 181 ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, 132 Osborne, Michael A., 260 outliers, 23, 232, 241 outsourcing, 118, 193–94, 222 overlapping generation (OLG) logic, 7 Paldam, Martin, 164 Panduro, Frank, 203 Paris Commune, 86 parliamentarianism, 58 partisanship, 32, 47, 91, 112, 129, 164, 171, 174 party system: democracy and, 93, 101; Fordism and, 113, 123–24; knowledge economies and, 21, 44, 51, 51–52; voters and, 21 (see also voters) patents, 7, 12–15, 26, 27, 145, 201, 281n15, 285n6 pegging, 121 pensions, 41, 92, 178–79 Persico, N., 80, 86 physical skills, 193 Pierson, Paul, 282n22 Piketty, Thomas, 1, 16, 20, 22, 30, 41–42, 117, 137, 139, 141, 163, 261, 273, 280n11, 282n22 PISA scores, 196 plantations, 38, 84 police, 96, 173–75 political economy: broad concepts of markets and, 46; capitalism and, 2–9, 12, 17, 24, 34, 45–48, 97, 112, 129, 131, 137, 160, 167, 214, 227, 251, 275; democracy and, 59, 97; economic geography and, 2–3, 8, 48–49, 140; innovation and, 2, 7–8, 34, 183; knowledge economies and, 51, 164–68, 181, 220, 226, 235; literature on, 2, 4, 6–8, 48, 114, 164, 167, 281n19; populism and, 45; spatial anchors and, 48–49 Politics Against Markets (Esping-Andersen), 30 populism: Austria and, 230, 233, 245; Belgium and, 233, 245; centralization and, 231, 243, 252; competition and, 218, 222–23, 226, 236; conservatism and, 218–19; Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) and, 232; cross-national variance and, 241–44; decentralization and, 217, 225, 234; democracy and, 13, 45, 129, 136, 215, 217, 226, 228, 248–51, 275; Denmark and, 221, 233, 245; economic geography and, 224; education and, 217, 219, 222–25, 228–47, 250–52, 287n1; electoral systems and, 217–18, 228, 251; elitism and, 216, 226, 235, 243–44, 248–51, 287n3; Fordism and, 113, 130, 216, 218–25, 237–40, 248–49; France and, 183, 221, 233, 236, 239, 242, 245, 248; Germany and, 181, 219, 221, 230, 232, 233, 236, 242, 245; globalization and, 234, 245; Great Gatsby Curve (GGC) and, 220–23, 227–28, 247, 259, 275–76; growth and, 218, 221, 226, 237, 247–48; immigrants and, 45, 216–17, 223, 226–27, 234, 237, 239, 249; importance of economic progress and, 247–48; industrialization and, 224; inequality and, 219–23, 228; Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and, 238, 249; Italy and, 221, 233, 236, 242, 245, 248; Japan and, 218, 221, 232, 233, 236, 239, 241, 242, 244; knowledge economies and, 136, 138, 140–42, 146, 161, 171, 175, 181–85, 195, 202, 205, 214–23, 226–28, 235–53, 254–56; labor market and, 223, 229; laziness and, 222, 237, 254; liberalism and, 228–29, 232, 241, 243, 250; Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) and, 230, 232; libertarians and, 45, 225, 234, 237, 240, 249; low-skilled labor and, 218, 223, 238, 249; majoritarianism and, 217, 243–44, 251; manufacturing and, 200–3, 224, 241; materialism and, 217, 234–35, 238; middle class and, 218–28, 234–51; mobility and, 217–23, 227–32, 239–42, 247, 249; nationalism and, 216, 218, 227; national variation and, 228–34; Netherlands and, 230, 232, 233, 236, 242, 245; new materialism and, 234–35; Norway and, 221, 233, 236, 242, 245; OECD countries and, 230–32, 233, 250; political alignment and, 219–27; political cleavage and, 146, 181, 183, 228, 236–39, 241; political economy and, 45; postmaterialism and, 234–35; proportional representation (PR) systems and, 217, 229, 251; public goods and, 225; rebirth of cities and, 224–27; redistribution and, 220, 222, 225, 234–37, 241; regression analysis and, 236, 239–40, 246, 254–55; Republicans and, 218, 244–45; research and, 234; Robin Hood Paradox and, 220; root cause of, 13; rural areas and, 218, 224, 238–41, 287n1; semiskilled labor and, 238–40; sexuality and, 216–18, 225, 237, 243, 249, 254; skilled labor and, 52, 217–35, 238–41, 246, 249–52, 255–56; social contract and, 221–27; socialism and, 218; social networks and, 217, 225, 246; South Korea and, 232, 233, 236, 239, 241, 242; Sweden and, 221, 233, 236, 242, 245; Switzerland and, 221, 233, 236, 242, 245; symbiotic forces and, 249–53; taxes and, 221–22, 225, 231; technology and, 222, 226, 232, 234, 238, 246, 249; trade and, 218, 250; Trump and, 215, 218–20, 237, 243–45, 248; undeserving poor and, 43, 142, 160, 216, 222, 227; unemployment and, 248–49, 255–56; unions and, 228, 251; United Kingdom and, 13, 218, 232, 233, 236, 242, 245, 250; United States and, 13, 130, 171, 195, 215, 218–23, 230, 232, 236, 241, 244, 275; unskilled workers and, 246, 255–56; upper class and, 222, 227, 237, 253; values and, 239–41; voters and, 217–19, 234–36, 244–47, 250, 256; wages and, 219, 222–23, 227, 229; welfare and, 45, 223, 234, 249, 287n1; women and, 238; working class and, 225, 231, 239, 251; World Values Survey (WVS) and, 235–36, 245 postmaterialism, 234–35 Poulantzas, Nicos, 6, 9, 11, 19, 39, 279n4 poverty, 3, 5, 18–19, 25, 43, 47, 109, 117, 142, 221, 237 Power, Anne, 200 privatization, 1, 18, 154, 173 production: artificial intelligence (AI) and, 263; assembly lines and, 104, 108; broad market notions and, 46; clusters and, 40, 49, 183, 270–71; democracy and, 54, 60, 64–66, 69, 72–73, 83, 93–94, 258, 262–63, 267–71; feeder towns and, 108–9, 224; Fordism and, 43, 103–4, 108–11, 115–17, 123, 127; globalization and, 5, 40, 51, 258; innovation and, 10, 40, 262, 271; knowledge economies and, 143, 152, 161, 180, 183, 224–25, 234–35, 247, 249; skilled labor and, 10, 18, 35, 43, 49–50, 60, 64–65, 69, 104–5, 115, 123, 127, 180, 183, 225, 249, 258, 262, 267, 271; specialization and, 51, 108, 161, 258, 267–71; Vernon’s life-cycle and, 18 productivity, 19, 34, 118–19, 247, 261, 272 proportional representation (PR) systems: Christian democratic parties and, 44; democracy and, 19, 34, 44–45, 60–61, 91, 93, 97, 100–1, 112–13, 125–28, 132, 134, 135, 212, 217, 229, 251; Fordism and, 112–13, 124–28; green parties and, 45; knowledge economies and, 132–34, 135, 212, 217, 229, 251; liberalism and, 97; majoritarianism and, 19, 101; multiparty, 34, 44; negotiation-based environment and, 93; populism and, 217, 229, 251; redistribution and, 91; Westminster system and, 19 protectionism, 28, 41, 169 Protestantism, 61, 68 protocorporatist countries: Austria, 59, 62–63, 77, 99; Belgium, 62–63; Catholicism and, 56, 61, 63, 68, 77, 83, 87, 92, 94–95; democracy and, 59–72, 74, 77, 79, 82–83, 89–92, 98–101, 228, 283n11; entrepreneurs and, 65; France and, 59, 62; Germany and, 62–63, 65, 68 71, 74, 77, 99, 238n11; industrialization and, 60–62, 65, 79, 89–90, 98, 101; Marx and, 62; modernization and, 79, 83; Netherlands, 62–63; skilled labor and, 60, 64–66, 79, 90, 98, 101; Ständestaat group and, 59–60, 65–66, 70, 90–91, 93; Switzerland, 62–63; working class and, 60–79 protoliberal countries, 59–61, 68, 90, 97, 100–1, 228 Prussia, 72, 93 public goods: democracy and, 54, 60, 79–90, 98, 258, 275; Fordism and, 113; innovation and, 35, 258; knowledge economies and, 52, 143–48, 152, 157, 167, 225; liberalism and, 79–90; populism and, 225; role of state and, 10 Public Health Acts, 86 race to the bottom, 51, 122 Rasmussen, Poul Nyrup, 173 recession, 5, 206, 214, 247–50, 276 reconfigurability, 185, 191, 214, 224 redistribution: capitalism and, 1, 18–20, 31–32, 35, 37, 39–40, 47, 51, 55, 124, 128–31, 137, 261, 273; democracy and, 1, 8, 18–20, 32, 35, 37, 40, 55–56, 60, 69–71, 74–79, 90–91, 95–100, 115, 124, 158, 221, 259–62, 273–74, 282n3, 284n2; Fordism and, 103, 111–12, 115, 123–25, 128–29; Gini coefficients and, 22–23, 25, 36, 117, 118, 141, 221; inequality and, 1, 3, 20, 40–46, 140, 220, 222, 273; knowledge economies and, 48, 137, 140, 158, 168, 220, 222, 225, 234–37, 241; middle class and, 3, 20, 35, 42, 60, 71, 90, 98, 100, 112, 115, 123–25, 140, 158, 168, 220, 222, 225, 234, 237, 241, 273–74; populism and, 220, 222, 225, 234–37, 241; proportional representation (PR) systems and, 91; skilled labor and, 8, 20, 31, 35, 37, 47, 71, 90, 98–100, 103, 115, 123, 125, 128, 158, 220, 222, 241, 259, 261; social insurance and, 8; taxes and, 35, 40, 51, 124, 158, 221–22, 225; voters and, 3, 19–21, 32, 43, 90, 98, 100, 125, 140, 158, 273; welfare and, 3, 8, 18–21, 31, 39–40, 43, 115, 123–24, 128, 131, 137, 261, 273 Reform Acts, 56, 80–81, 85–86 Reform Crisis 1865–7, The (Searle), 85 Reform League, 86 Reform Party, 88 regional theory, 11 regression, 99–100, 132–35, 236, 239–40, 246, 254–55 Rehn-Meidner model, 19 relational skills, 187 Republicans, 38, 57, 59, 87, 218, 244–45, 282n24 reputation: colocation and, 267; consultants and, 286n15; Fordism and, 112–13; knowledge economies and, 158, 163–64, 182–83, 188, 190–91; Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) and, 112; political, 4, 12, 29, 32, 34, 112–13, 158, 163–64, 182–83, 188, 190, 258, 259, 280n9; skill clusters and, 190–91; social networks and, 191; subconscious signals and, 190 research: capitalism and, 2, 10, 12, 37, 48, 139, 159, 165, 234; democracy and, 55, 66–67, 72, 262, 264, 268, 287n1; education and, 10, 12, 20–21, 28, 48, 55, 72, 146, 159, 165, 234, 262; Fordism and, 103, 108, 110; innovation and, 2, 12, 40; knowledge economies and, 139, 146, 159, 164–65, 179, 187, 189, 196, 200, 204, 234, 285n9; manufacturing and, 15, 200; populism and, 234; skilled labor and, 2, 12, 21, 28, 37, 39, 48, 66–67, 139, 179, 187, 196, 268 retirement, 110, 151, 201 Robin Hood Paradox, 220 Robinson, James, 9, 35, 37, 56, 58, 71–72, 74, 76, 85–86, 99, 282n3 robots, 18; artificial intelligence (AI) and, 260–62; great technology debate and, 260–66; knowledge economies and, 141, 143, 184, 193; politics of future and, 273 Rodrik, Dani, 16, 22, 128 Rokkan, Stein, 66, 94, 97, 100, 113 Rueda, D., 45, 282n25 Rueschemeyer, Dieter, 56, 72–73, 75, 77, 280n6, 283n7 Ruggie, John G., 51, 143 rust belt, 224 Scheve, Kenneth, 221 Schlüter, Poul, 172 Schumpter, Joseph A., 6, 9, 11, 279n4 Scotland, 283n12 Searle, G., 85 segregation: centripetal and centrifugal forces in, 200–6; cultural choices and, 205–6; educational, 43, 119, 140, 161, 192, 195, 197, 200–6, 214, 231; Fordism and, 109, 119; geographic, 109, 140, 161, 185, 195, 197, 200–6; health and, 204–5; knowledge economies and, 43, 140, 161, 185, 195, 197, 200–6, 214, 231; private services and, 203–4; social networks and, 205–6; transport systems and, 201–3 semiskilled labor: capitalism and, 261; democracy and, 61, 64–65, 68–69, 261; Fordism and, 12, 102–5, 112, 115, 118–20, 123–24, 127, 129; knowledge economies and, 142, 172–73, 212, 238–40; populism and, 238–40; segmentation of, 43–44; technology and, 41, 43, 65, 102–5, 118–19, 127, 238, 261; undeserving poor and, 43; unions and, 61, 64–65, 68–69, 105, 119–20, 123, 172–73 September Compromise, 66 service sectors, 16, 31, 44, 51, 119, 157, 194, 200, 204, 219, 285n5 settler colonies, 84–90 sexuality, 52, 216–18, 225, 237, 243, 249, 254, 269 Sherman Act, 153 shocks: capitalism and, 6, 10, 30, 54, 125, 136, 138, 140, 156, 159, 214; democracy and, 54; Fordism and, 125–27, 132–35; Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and, 136, 138, 214; knowledge economies and, 136–40, 143, 156–59, 181, 185, 194, 214; supply, 30; technology and, 6, 30, 136, 138, 140, 143, 159, 185, 194 Simmons, Beth, 161 Singapore, 4, 26–28, 221, 282n3 Single European Act, 145, 170–71 Single Market, 122 skill-biased technological change (SBTC), 41, 238, 262, 265–66 skill clusters: big-city agglomerations and, 194–200; capitalism and, 2, 7, 49, 145, 185, 192, 261; colocation and, 2–3, 7, 15–16, 185, 261; democracy and, 261; education and, 2–3, 7, 139, 141, 145, 148, 185, 190–95, 198, 223, 261; knowledge economies and, 139, 141, 144–48, 183, 185, 190–98, 200, 223; multinational enterprises (MNEs) and, 2, 192–93; reputation and, 190–91; social networks and, 28, 139, 191–92; specialization and, 190–91; sub-urbanization and, 141 skilled labor: analytic skills and, 186; artificial intelligence (AI) and, 261–62, 265–68, 271–72; capitalism and, 2–3, 6–8, 12–15, 19–20, 30–34, 37–38, 47–50, 53–54, 58, 60, 97, 101–2, 128, 137, 139, 144–47, 157–58, 172, 185–86, 192, 218, 250–51, 258, 261, 280n6; centralization and, 53, 58, 67, 69, 96, 99, 101, 110, 119–20, 173, 186, 279n1; colocation and, 2, 7, 261, 272; competition and, 6, 12, 18, 21, 30–34, 66, 96, 119, 128, 146, 157, 181, 186, 194, 198, 218, 222–23, 258; cospecificity and, 7–15, 20, 37, 47–50, 69, 99, 101, 115, 123, 196, 259, 261; craft skills and, 32, 53, 61–71, 79, 82, 90–91, 96, 98, 101, 104, 172; decentralization and, 96, 123, 138, 144, 146, 148, 172, 183–86, 190, 193, 212, 225, 262, 276; democracy and, 3, 6, 8, 12, 20, 31, 37–38, 44, 53–54, 58–71, 79, 84–85, 90, 96–101, 115, 158, 185–86, 250, 258–62, 265–68, 271–72, 276–77; economic geography and, 2–3, 7–8, 15, 20, 31, 48, 109, 116, 144–47, 185, 191–92, 195–96, 276–77; education and, 7, 12, 20–21, 31, 37–38, 41, 54, 60, 70–71, 79, 84, 90, 101–4, 119, 127–30, 139, 142, 158, 174–76, 179–81, 184–85, 191–95, 198, 217, 222–25, 228–35, 238–40, 246, 250–52, 266; Fordism and, 12, 14, 16, 102–5, 109–12, 115–30, 222–25, 277; foreign direct investment (FDI) and, 3, 139, 145, 147, 193, 198; growth and, 8, 13, 31, 68, 97, 110, 115–16, 218, 261; Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and, 41, 102, 185–86, 190, 193, 195, 198, 218, 276; innovation and, 2, 6–12, 19, 27, 31–34, 104, 128, 141, 174, 196, 198, 258, 262, 271, 281n18; knowledge economies and, 137–49, 157–58, 172–200, 211–13, 217–35, 238–41, 246, 249–52, 255–56; manufacturing and, 15, 33, 44–45, 109, 118, 194, 224; middle class and, 3, 20, 27, 30, 35, 41–44, 71, 85, 90, 96–101, 112, 115, 123, 125, 142, 158, 193, 222, 224, 235, 239–41, 249; mobility and, 8, 13, 20–21, 39, 124, 217, 222, 228, 232, 239, 249; nation-states and, 8, 30, 48, 139, 261; overlapping generation (OLG) logic and, 7; physical skills and, 193; politics of future and, 272–77; populism and, 52, 217–35, 238–41, 246, 249–52, 255–56; production and, 10, 18, 35, 43, 49–50, 60, 64–65, 69, 104–5, 115, 123, 127, 180, 183, 225, 249, 258, 262, 267, 271; protocorporatist countries and, 60, 64–66, 79, 90, 98, 101; rebirth of cities and, 224–27; redistribution and, 8, 20, 31, 35, 37, 47, 71, 90, 98–100, 103, 115, 123, 125, 128, 158, 220, 222, 241, 259, 261; relational skills and, 187; research and, 2, 12, 21, 28, 37, 39, 48, 66–67, 139, 179, 187, 196, 268; social insurance and, 8, 35, 50, 67, 123, 125, 127, 192; social networks and, 2, 28, 48, 139, 145, 185, 191–92, 195, 197, 225, 258, 261, 267–68, 271; specialization and, 14 (see also specialization); tacit knowledge and, 2, 39, 145, 263; technology and, 3, 7, 10–14, 20, 30–31, 37, 41, 43, 48, 50, 70, 96, 102–5, 118–19, 127–28, 138–40, 144, 147, 157, 175–76, 185–86, 192–94, 198–99, 222, 232, 238, 261, 268, 277; unions and, 6, 19, 33, 47, 50, 53, 58, 60–71, 96–101, 105, 110, 119–20, 123, 127, 172–73, 176, 181, 186, 251; upper class and, 43–44, 125; upskilling and, 102, 123, 129, 174–75, 178, 228, 232, 250–51; wages and, 6, 18, 33, 41, 50, 61, 64, 67, 104–5, 110, 115, 118–24, 127, 172–76, 181, 212, 222–23, 229, 266 Slomp, Hans, 62 smart cities, 194–95 social contract, 161, 221–27 social democratic parties: Denmark and, 76–77, 181; Germany and, 62–63, 68, 72–77, 181; Norway and, 282n3; Sweden and, 19, 72, 74, 76; unions and, 6, 19, 61–63, 67–68, 72, 74, 76, 114, 181, 282n3 Social Democratic Party (SPD) [Germany], 68, 74, 76–77, 78 Social Democratic Party (Sweden), 19 social insurance, 21; democracy and, 67; Fordism and, 111; skilled labor and, 8, 35, 50, 67, 123–25, 127, 192 socialism: competition and, 11; democracy and, 11, 56, 61–63, 68, 71, 75, 94, 97, 100, 137, 181–82, 215, 218; knowledge economies and, 137, 181–82, 215, 218; populism and, 218 social justice, 115, 237 social networks: cultural choices and, 205–6; democracy and, 258, 261, 268, 270–71, 274–75; economic geography and, 48–49, 185, 195, 274; education and, 2, 51–52, 139, 145, 185, 191–99, 204–5, 217, 225, 234, 261, 270–71, 274–75; growth and, 51, 92; knowledge economies and, 139, 145, 185, 188, 191–92, 195–97, 200, 204–6, 217, 225, 246; populism and, 217, 225, 246; reputation and, 191; segregation and, 205–6; skilled labor and, 2, 28, 48, 139, 145, 185, 191–92, 195, 197, 225, 258, 261, 267–68, 271 Social Security, 24, 42, 50, 118, 174, 184 socio-optimists, 260, 266, 275 socio-pessimists, 260, 266 Sokoloff, Kenneth L., 80, 84, 89 Soskice, David, 124, 135, 211 South Korea: capitalism and, 4, 26, 148; democracy and, 78; education and, 26, 28, 166, 231–32, 241, 284n4; Gini coefficients and, 36; knowledge economies and, 147–48, 150, 154, 156, 166, 232, 233, 236, 239, 241, 242, 284n4; middle-income trap and, 26; military and, 28; patents and, 27; populism and, 232, 233, 236, 239, 241, 242; skilled labor and, 28 Soviet Union, 139, 142, 156, 186, 241, 285n7 Spain: Gini coefficients and, 36; knowledge economies and, 154, 166, 201, 221, 233, 236, 242, 248; patents and, 27; taxes and, 17 Sparkassen, 176–77 specialization: advanced capitalist democracies (ACD) and, 14–17; Asia and, 267; capitalism and, 2, 6, 8, 17, 40, 139, 145, 147, 161, 192, 258, 267, 270–71, 276–77; cospecificity and, 14–17; cross-country comparison and, 39; democracy and, 67, 258, 267, 270–71, 276–77; economic geography and, 8, 14–17, 39, 144, 146–47, 192, 276–77; education and, 14, 191, 271; Fordism and, 108; globalization and, 3, 8, 17, 40, 51, 198, 258; heterogenous institutions and, 6; innovation and, 8, 14, 198, 267, 271; knowledge economies and, 2–3, 139, 144–47, 161, 190–93, 198, 200, 281n21; location cospecificity and, 14–17; multinational enterprises (MNEs) and, 192–93; patterns of, 192–93; production and, 51, 108, 161, 258, 267–71; skill clusters and, 190–91; as strengthening state, 50–51 Ständestaat group, 59–60, 65–66, 70, 90–91, 93 Standing, Guy, 142 Stasavage, David, 221 Stegmaier, Mary, 164, 167, 285n8 Steinmo, Sven, 16 Stephens, Evelyne Huber, 56, 229 Stephens, John, 56, 229, 280n6 Streeck, Wolfgang, 1, 16, 22, 30, 137, 163, 206, 281n17, 282n22 strikes, 73, 75, 108, 116 suffrage, 72–74, 76, 80, 87–89 Susskind, Daniel, 260 Susskind, Richard, 260 Swank, Duane, 16, 39, 101 Sweden: capitalism and, 19, 39, 49, 148; democracy and, 56, 57, 61, 62, 67, 71–76, 78; Fordism and, 106, 107, 117, 120, 129; Gini coefficients and, 25, 36; knowledge economies and, 147–48, 150, 153–54, 166, 173, 221, 233, 236, 242, 245; median income and, 25; populism and, 221, 233, 236, 242, 245; Social Democratic Party and, 19; taxes and, 17 Swenson, Peter, 108 Switzerland: democracy and, 56, 57, 61, 62–63, 282n3; Gini coefficient of, 36; knowledge economies and, 147–48, 150, 154, 166, 221, 233, 236, 242, 245; populism and, 221, 233, 236, 242, 245; protocorporatist countries and, 62–63; taxes and, 280n13; unions and, 106 symbiotic forces: democracy and, 5–9, 14, 20, 32, 53–54, 102, 130–31, 159, 165, 206, 249–53, 258, 259, 270, 272; Fordism and, 102, 130–31; knowledge economies and, 159, 165, 206, 249–53; populism and, 249–53 tacit knowledge, 2, 39, 145, 263 Taiwan, 4, 26–28, 78, 156 tariffs, 89, 114, 285n5 taxes: capitalism and, 16–17, 24, 34–35, 40, 51, 73, 167, 206, 261, 280n12; democracy and, 73, 261, 267–68, 271; Fordism and, 110–13, 124; Gini coefficients and, 22, 141; government concessions and, 18; Internal Revenue Service and, 42; knowledge economies and, 141, 157–58, 165, 167, 172, 206, 221–22, 225, 231, 281n21; majoritarianism and, 24, 44, 113, 124; middle class and, 21, 42, 124, 158, 222, 225; mobility and, 221; populism and, 221–22, 225, 231; redistribution and, 35, 40, 51, 124, 158, 221–22, 225; Republican reform and, 282n24; rich and, 22, 24, 261, 280n13; shelters and, 280n13; transfer systems and, 21–22, 112, 158; United Kingdom and, 17, 141, 206; United States and, 16–17, 24, 42, 141; upper class and, 42; value added, 34, 206; welfare and, 16–17, 21, 40, 42, 167 technology: artificial intelligence (AI) and, 260–72; assembly lines and, 104, 108; biotechnology and, 141, 175, 184; change and, 5, 13, 40–45, 50, 124, 138–41, 155, 162, 192, 199, 222, 232, 246, 249, 259, 262; codifiable, 7, 12, 14–15, 238; colocation and, 261, 266–72; cospecificity and, 7, 12, 14, 20, 37, 48, 50, 103, 159, 261–66; debates over future, 259–72; democracy and, 70, 92, 259–63, 267–72, 277; Fordism and, 5, 7, 14–15, 50, 102–6, 109, 117–19, 124, 127–28, 131, 140–43, 154, 192, 194, 222, 277; growth and, 3, 5, 13, 38, 162, 194, 226, 261; ICT and, 3 (see also Information and Communication Technology (ICT)); income distribution and, 21, 40; industrial revolution and, 5, 12, 58, 293, 295; investment in, 3, 20, 30, 37–38, 50, 109, 142, 147, 156, 175, 272; knowledge economies and, 138–44, 147, 154–62, 175–76, 184–86, 192–94, 198–99, 214, 222, 226, 232, 234, 238, 246, 249, 284n1, 284n3, 285n6; Luddites and, 226; manual jobs and, 264–65; microprocessors and, 14, 140, 284n1; middle class and, 3, 21, 29–30, 41, 117, 139, 222, 226, 249; multinational companies (MNCs) and, 48; nanotechnology, 141, 184; outsourcing and, 118, 193–94, 222; overlapping generation (OLG) logic and, 7; patents and, 7, 12–15, 26, 27, 145, 201, 281n15, 285n6; populism and, 222, 226, 232, 234, 238, 246, 249; robots and, 18, 141, 143, 184, 193, 260–66, 273; self-driving vehicles and, 265; semiskilled labor and, 41, 43, 65, 102–5, 118–19, 127, 238, 261; shocks and, 6, 30, 136, 138, 140, 143, 159, 185, 194; skilled labor and, 3, 7, 10–14, 20, 30–31, 37, 41, 43, 48, 50, 70, 96, 102–5, 118–19, 127–28, 138–40, 144, 147, 157, 175–76, 185–86, 192–94, 198–99, 222, 232, 238, 261, 268, 277; smart cities and, 194–95; trade and, 3, 7, 31, 50, 128, 131, 142, 284n3; transfer and, 18, 31, 38, 48, 128, 131; vocational training and, 31, 44, 68, 82, 89, 92, 104, 109, 113, 127–28, 131, 174, 176, 179, 228–30, 233, 242–43, 251–52, 257; voters and, 6, 13, 20, 159, 234, 260, 272 techno-optimists, 260, 269–70, 275, 277 techno-pessimists, 260–61 Teece, David J., 7, 12 Thatcher, Margaret, 33, 149, 163, 169–71, 182, 209 Thelen, Kathleen, 62–64, 219 Third Republic, 57, 81, 86–87 Tiebout, Charles M., 252 Tories, 87 trade: barriers to, 50, 114, 154, 285n5; competition and, 26, 31, 128, 131, 153–55, 218, 285n5, 285n9; democracy and, 258, 267; FDI and, 154, 163, 284n3, 285n5, 285n9; Fordism and, 114, 128, 131; free, 17, 155; knowledge economies and, 142, 145, 153–55, 163, 172–73, 180, 211–13, 218, 250; liberalism and, 51, 62, 142, 155, 163, 173, 213, 250, 284n3; NAFTA and, 155; open, 27, 154; populism and, 218, 250; protectionism and, 28, 41, 169; technology and, 3, 7, 31, 50, 128, 131, 142, 284n3 Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), 155–56 transport systems, 201–3 Trump, Donald, 130, 156, 211, 215, 218–20, 237, 243–45, 248, 276 Über, 265 undeserving poor, 43, 142, 160, 216, 222, 227 unemployment: automatic disbursements and, 133, 284n2; capitalism and, 51, 117, 172, 282n22; countercyclical policies and, 16; democracy and, 74–77, 92, 96; Fordism and, 105, 107, 110, 117, 120–21, 124–27, 133, 135, 284n2; knowledge economies and, 170–72, 174, 178, 180, 207, 248–49, 255–56, 285n8; social protection and, 51 unions: centralization and, 49, 53, 58, 63, 67, 69–70, 73, 96, 99, 101, 105, 107–10, 113, 116, 119, 122–23, 152, 156, 172, 174, 283n8; centralization/decentralization issues and, 49–50, 53, 58, 63, 67–70, 73, 96, 99, 101, 105–10, 113, 116, 119, 122–23, 152, 172, 174, 186, 283n8; competition and, 6, 33, 66, 68, 80, 96, 119, 152, 169–72, 177, 181, 186; craft, 61, 63, 67–71, 101, 172; democracy and, 53, 58–80, 90–92, 95–101, 274, 282n3, 283n8; exclusion of, 67, 70, 98; Fordism and, 105–16, 119–23, 127, 284n3; hostile takeovers and, 33; institutional frameworks and, 32–33; knowledge economies and, 152, 169–83, 212, 228, 251; laborist unionism and, 62; low-skilled labor and, 19, 47, 50, 66, 70–71, 96, 98–99, 119, 127, 181; polarized unionism and, 62; populism and, 228, 251; power and, 32, 66–67, 69, 73–76, 99, 105, 108, 112–13, 119, 169, 172, 186; predatory, 6; Rehn-Meidner model and, 19; segmented, 62, 105, 113; semiskilled labor and, 61, 64–65, 68–69, 105, 119–20, 123, 172–73; September Compromise and, 66; skilled labor and, 6, 19, 33, 47, 50, 53, 58, 60–71, 96–101, 105, 110, 119–20, 123, 127, 172–73, 176, 181, 186, 251; social democratic parties and, 6, 19, 61–63, 67–68, 72, 74, 76, 114, 181, 282n3; solidaristic, 62, 105, 172; strikes and, 73, 75, 108, 116; trade, 62–64, 170 United Kingdom: Blair and, 33, 171, 209; Brexit and, 130, 245, 248, 250, 276; British disease and, 172; British North American Act and, 87–88; Callaghan and, 169, 171; capitalism and, 10, 13, 19, 32, 38, 148, 152, 172, 206, 209; centralization and, 49; Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and, 169–70; Conservative Party and, 32, 81, 85, 88, 169, 218–19; democracy and, 38, 54–65, 73, 80–90, 277, 283n9; Disraeli and, 81, 85, 96; education and, 38, 130, 166, 177, 231–32, 277; enfranchisement and, 84–90; Fordism and, 105–8, 120, 123, 130; Forster Elementary Education Act and, 86; Gini coefficents for, 25, 36; Healey and, 169; health and, 204–5; Hyde Park Riots and, 85; inequality and, 36; knowledge economies and, 142, 147–48, 150, 152, 154, 161–63, 166, 169–77, 180–81, 194, 200–1, 204, 206, 209, 218, 232, 233, 236, 242, 245, 250; labor co-operation and, 152; laborist unionism and, 62; Labour Party and, 68, 169, 171; Liberals and, 32; Local Government Act and, 86; median income and, 25; modernization and, 19; Municipal Corporations Act and, 86; patents and, 27; populism and, 13, 218, 232, 233, 236, 242, 245, 250; postwar, 11; Prior and, 169–70; Public Health Acts and, 86; Reform Acts and, 56, 80–81, 85–86; Reform Party and, 88; segregation and, 200–3; settler colonies and, 84–90; taxes and, 17, 141, 206; Thatcher and, 33, 149, 163, 169–71, 182, 209; Tories and, 87; Victorian reformers and, 82; Whigs and, 80 United States: capitalism and, 13, 16–17, 24–25, 38, 47, 148, 152, 186, 209, 275, 277; Civil War and, 57; Clayton Act and, 153; Cold War and, 78, 111; decentralization and, 49; democracy and, 13, 24, 38, 55–57, 59, 62–64, 70, 83, 88, 96, 107, 147–48, 186, 215, 220, 275, 277; education and, 24, 38, 55, 70, 83, 109, 127, 130, 166, 177, 195, 223, 230–32, 241, 275; Fordism and, 105–9, 117–20, 123, 127, 130; inequality and, 24, 36, 42, 107, 117, 118, 123, 220, 282n22; knowledge economies and, 141–42, 147–56, 162, 166, 169, 171, 177, 186, 194–95, 198, 202, 209, 215, 218–23, 230, 232, 236, 241, 244, 277; labor market and, 56 (see also labor market); NAFTA and, 155; populism and, 13, 130, 171, 195, 215, 218–23, 230, 232, 236, 241, 244, 275; Sherman Act and, 153; taxes and, 16–17, 24, 42, 141; Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) and, 155–56 unskilled workers: democracy and, 62–63, 67–71, 96–97, 101; Fordism and, 104–5, 118; knowledge economies and, 193, 246, 255; populism and, 246, 255–56 upper class: capitalism and, 4, 6; democracy and, 35; education and, 43; as gaming the system, 222; global distribution and, 27–29; Great Gatsby Curve (GGC) and, 220, 221, 227–28, 247, 259, 275–76; inequality and, 41, 158, 261; political influence of, 24, 41–43, 253; populism and, 222, 227, 237, 253; skilled labor and, 43–44, 125; taxes and, 22, 42, 261, 280n13; voters and, 2 upskilling, 102, 123, 129, 174–75, 178, 228, 232, 250–51 urbanization, 37, 92; big-city agglomerations and, 194–200; effects of, 83–84; feeder towns and, 108–9, 224; knowledge economies and, 141, 194–95, 201–3, 224–27, 239, 241; rebirth of cities and, 224–27; segregation and, 200–6 (see also segregation); smart cities and, 194–95; transport systems and, 201–3 US Patent and Trademark Office, 26–27 value-added sectors, 206–9 Van Kersbergen, Kees, 44, 92, 95, 124 Verily Life Sciences, 262 Vernon, Raymond, 18 VET system, 176, 179–80 Vliet, Olaf van, 133 Vogel, Steven, 11 Von Hagen, Jürgen, 121, 151 Von Papen, Franz, 77 voters: advanced capitalism and, 2, 6, 11–14, 19–22, 30–32, 38, 46–47, 112, 158–59, 167, 215, 247, 273; aspirational, 6, 12–13, 20–21, 32, 167, 214, 219, 272; decisive, 2–3, 6, 11–14, 19–23, 32, 38, 43, 158–59; democracy and, 75, 81, 90, 96–100, 111–13, 125, 129–30, 133, 260, 272–73; economic, 164; education and, 12–13, 21, 38, 45, 90, 158, 164, 167–68, 219, 234, 247, 273; electoral politics and, 21–22, 46, 100, 111, 158, 183, 217, 272; growth and, 2, 13, 23, 32, 111, 113, 164, 168, 247; knowledge economies and, 24, 138, 140, 158–59, 163–64, 167–68, 183, 213–19, 234–36, 245, 247; median, 3, 21, 23, 44, 96–97, 100, 125, 168, 213; Meltzer-Richard model and, 3; middle class, 2–3, 20–22, 44, 90, 96–100, 125, 140, 158, 168, 273; mobilizing, 75; neoliberalism and, 2; politics of the future and, 272–73; populism and, 217–19, 234–36, 244–47, 250, 256; prospective, 164; PR systems and, 19, 34, 100, 217; redistribution and, 3, 19–21, 32, 43, 90, 98, 100, 125, 140, 158, 273; retrospective, 164; suffrage and, 72–74, 76, 80, 87–89; technology and, 6, 13, 20, 159, 234, 260, 272; upper class and, 2; welfare and, 3, 21–22, 43, 45–46, 111, 167, 214, 234, 273 wages: bargaining and, 49–50, 61, 105–10, 119–21, 127, 151, 172, 176; coordination and, 49–50, 106–7, 120, 123, 172, 229; cospecificity and, 49–50; democracy and, 266, 268, 273; Fordism and, 104–24, 127, 284n2; Great Gatsby Curve (GGC) and, 220, 221, 227–28, 247, 259, 275–76; knowledge economies and, 151, 160, 172–76, 181, 196, 211–12, 219, 222–23, 227, 229; monopoly, 6; populism and, 219, 222–23, 227, 229; restraint and, 18, 110, 113, 120–21, 151, 176, 211–12; skilled labor and, 6, 18, 33, 41, 50, 61, 64, 67, 104–5, 110, 115, 118–24, 127, 172–76, 181, 212, 222–23, 229, 266 Wajcman, Judy, 260 Wallerstein, Michael, 105 Washington Consensus, 38 Waymo, 265 Weimar Republic, 75–77 welfare: Bismarckian, 176; capitalism and, 8, 16–19, 31, 39–40, 46, 122, 125, 128, 131, 137, 167, 234, 261, 279n5, 282n22; cash transfers and, 21; competition and, 31, 40, 52, 122, 128, 131, 223, 285n6; cospecificity and, 49–50; democracy and, 94, 96, 261, 273; education and, 31, 42, 45, 52, 94, 96, 116, 128, 131, 146, 167, 223, 234, 261, 287n1; Fordism and, 110–11, 115–28, 131; free riders and, 127; Golden Age of, 127; inequality and, 3, 42, 125, 223, 282n22; Keynesianism and, 115; knowledge economies and, 137, 146, 167, 176, 214, 223, 234, 249, 285n6, 285n8, 287n1; labor market and, 31, 46, 96, 118, 120, 122–23, 125, 128, 176, 223, 279n5; populism and, 45, 223, 234, 249, 287n1; power resources theory and, 280n6; public services and, 21; redistribution and, 3, 8, 18–21, 31, 39–40, 43, 115, 123–24, 128, 131, 137, 261, 273; skilled labor and, 45; social insurance and, 21; taxes and, 16–17, 21, 40, 42, 167; trade protectionism and, 51; undeserving poor and, 43; voters and, 3, 21–22, 43, 45–46, 111, 167, 214, 234, 273; wage coordination and, 49–50 Westminster systems, 19 Whigs, 80 Winters, J.

The Powerful and the Damned: Private Diaries in Turbulent Times
by Lionel Barber
Published 5 Nov 2020

At the very least, they challenge two assumptions which have held good since the fall of the Berlin Wall: the innate superiority of the western model of market capitalism and the inevitable progress of globalisation.’ 2009 Aftershocks By the turn of 2009, the global financial crisis had moved from survival to recovery. Central banks had ‘saved the system’ by injecting vast amounts of liquidity to support the banks. But questions remained about their solvency. A serious recession was under way, as well as a political reckoning for the model of liberal capitalism which had held sway since the Thatcher–Reagan years. The US, with an untested President Obama in office, would have a vital role to play in international economic diplomacy. The Group of 20, a new forum for the world’s most important powers, would work on a coordinated fiscal stimulus. Other groups examined re-regulation of the financial sector.

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W. 54, 63, 188, 314 Bush, George W. 31, 54, 55, 56, 63, 106, 110, 169, 188, 233, 435 Buttigieg, Pete 413 BuzzFeed 258, 395 Cadbury 263 Cambridge Analytica 394, 394n Cameron, David ix, xvi, 81–2, 97, 98, 125, 148, 151, 152, 158, 159, 161–2, 164, 174, 177, 180–81, 191–2, 193, 195, 196, 198, 203, 204, 205, 209, 222, 223, 226–7, 244, 259, 260, 263, 267, 283, 286, 288, 289, 290, 304–5, 308–10, 316, 319, 320, 321, 323, 326, 333, 344, 345, 374–5, 382–3, 388, 389, 414, 417, 427, 438 Cameron, Samantha 81–2, 161–2, 198, 304 capitalism: liberal capitalism model xi, xii, 117, 147n, 276, 312, 330, 334, 335, 339, 353, 355, 401, 419, 434, 436, 439; reform of 352, 353, 410, 439 Carnegy, Hugh 321 Carney, Mark 122, 323–4, 327, 341, 365–6, 371, 412 Catalan independence movement 219, 226 Cayne, Jimmy 24, 25, 85 Centre for European Reform 388–9 Chan, Andy 393 Charles, Prince x, xii, 264–6, 267, 268–70 Charlie Hebdo terrorist attack (2015) xv, 281 Cheney, Dick 54, 56, 233 Chidambaram, P. 38 China xi, 30, 31, 31n, 98–9, 117, 120, 123–4, 123n, 133, 140, 162–3, 169, 182–3, 206–7, 213–14, 228, 233, 241–2, 271, 303–6, 309, 344, 347–8, 351–2, 366, 374–5, 376, 390, 392–3, 395–8, 399, 410, 414, 434, 436, 439, 440 China Entrepreneur Club 233 Chubais, Anatoly 229 Churchill, Winston 24, 24n, 95, 128, 314, 310, 364, 422 Citigroup 68, 69, 85, 113, 114, 228, 404 City Lecture, Cambridge University 264 City of London xii, xiii, 25n, 106, 180, 224, 259, 297, 334, 365, 366, 429 Clark, Pilita 379 Clegg, Miriam 151, 195 Clegg, Nick 151–2, 158, 159, 162, 195–6, 275n, 286, 321, 394, 395, 414 Clinton, Bill 82, 150, 206, 208, 233 Clinton, Hillary 82, 96, 133, 233, 315–16, 331, 332 Clooney, George 204–5 Coalition government, UK 156–7, 158, 159–60, 193, 195–6, 209, 258–60, 275, 275n, 288, 289, 290, 354; austerity policies 209, 210, 259, 273, 289, 319, 438; Big Society concept 152–3 Cochrane, Alan 273 Cohen, Jared 332 Cohn, Gary 341–2 Cold War 96, 233, 314, 354, 395, 396, 398, 436, 438 collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) 45 Collins Stewart 14–15, 17–18, 19–20 Colloque (Anglo-French forum) 255–6 Colombia 140–42 Comcast 268 Communism, collapse of Soviet 88, 129, 137, 228, 344 Conservative Party 67, 71, 97, 106, 128, 139, 148, 151, 152–3, 156–8, 158n, 159, 174, 180n, 195–6, 217n, 223n, 227, 227n, 232, 244, 260, 273–5, 275n, 283–4, 287, 288, 289–90, 309, 310, 327, 333, 343, 345–6, 353–4, 358, 359–60, 365, 381, 388, 410, 410n, 411, 412, 414, 423 Corbyn, Jeremy 11n, 303, 340, 341, 345–6, 354, 363, 399, 402, 410, 427 Costolo, Dick 210–11 Coulson, Andy 191, 223, 223n Covid-19 xi, xvii, 123, 130, 383, 398, 433, 434–6, 438–9, 440–41 Cox, Jo 319 Crabtree, James 247 credit derivatives 37, 62, 66, 186 credit-rating agencies 62, 62n, 84 Crimea 91, 91n, 237n, 239, 275, 277 Crosby, Lynton xvi, 283–4, 287–8, 290, 345–6, 388 Crosby, James 18–19 Cummings, Dominic xv, 313–14, 420n, 423–4, 438 Dacre, Paul x, 76, 192, 195, 196–7, 220, 221, 227, 233, 239, 257, 331, 331n, 357, 363 Daily Mail x, 41, 67, 126, 151, 152, 192, 195, 220, 221, 239, 316, 327, 331, 334, 363 Daily Mirror 11, 32, 100 Daily Telegraph 32, 35, 51, 67, 126, 135–6, 135n, 192, 197, 273, 358, 358n, 359, 422 Dalian Wanda 213 Dalton, Stephen 148, 150 Danone 263 Darling, Alistair 69–70, 83n, 101, 101n, 136, 273 Darroch, Jeremy 267–8 Davidson, Heather 83 Davies, Howard 76–7, 76n, 190 Davis, David 362–4, 363n Davis, Ian 122, 197 DDB (advertising agency) 34 deflation 39, 391 Dell, Michael 120–21 Delors, Jacques 83, 341 Democratic Party, US 82, 98, 99, 187–8, 330, 332, 396; convention (2004) 82, 99; convention (2008) 98, 99; Democratic National Committee (DNC) 330 see also US Presidential Election Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 157, 157n, 399, 425 Deng, Wendi 191 Deng Xiaoping 124, 129, 183 ‘de-platforming’ 262 Deutsche Bank 295, 383, 404, 410 Diamond, Bob x, 167–8, 212 Dickie, Mure 185 Dickson, Martin 13, 18–19, 102, 106–7, 431 Dilenschneider, Robert 84–5, 332 Dimbleby, Jonathan 340 Dimon, Jamie xiv, 24, 24n, 93–4 Dinmore, Guy 162 Disney 213, 214, 268 Doerr, John 215–16 Döpfner, Mathias x, 283, 291–3, 295, 407 dotcom crash (2000–2001) 4, 16, 76, 84, 184, 228 Dow Jones 59–60, 65, 66, 135n, 282 Dowler, Milly 190 Draghi, Mario xiv, 178–9, 198–9, 200, 212–13, 223, 226, 320, 341, 367, 368, 402, 412–13, 415 DreamWorks 213 Dubai xiv, 102–3, 111, 112, 135, 168, 175 Duberstein, Ken 188 Dudley, Bob 163, 239 Dumfries House 264–5, 269 Duque, Iván 142 Economist, The 26, 205, 221, 238, 258, 282, 294, 354, 381, 389 Edano, Yukio 185–6 Edelstein, Jillian 208 Edinburgh, Prince Philip, Duke of 304 Edward VIII, King 198, 201 Egypt 54, 107, 177, 331 El-Erian, Mohamed: When Markets Collide 113 Elizabeth II, Queen 23, 271, 303–4, 305 England, Andrew 260–61 En Marche 353 Entwistle, George 217–18 Epstein, Jeffrey 7, 7n Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip 335 euro xiii, 61, 64, 84, 100, 172–3, 178, 179, 180, 198, 212, 223, 228, 413, 429 European Central Bank (ECB) xiv, 61, 69, 84, 100, 178–9, 179n, 188, 198–9, 203, 212, 223, 226, 367–8, 402, 412–13, 415–16, 436 European Commission 83, 84, 84n, 179, 274, 343, 344, 363, 402, 406 European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 274 European Economic Community (EEC) 227 European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 198–9 European People’s Party (EPP) 97 European Round Table of Industrialists 409 European Union 437; Brexit see Brexit; Covid-19 and 436, 437; Customs Union 328, 339, 354; euro see euro; fatal flaw in 99–101; ‘fiscal compact’ proposal 198; free movement of people 324; Lisbon treaty 64, 64n, 67, 381; Maastricht treaty 64n, 342, 389, 426, 433; Single Market 196, 315, 324, 328, 339, 341, 354, 366, 425; sovereign debt crisis 100–101, 148, 153–5, 172–3, 177, 179, 180, 188, 198–9, 212, 219, 224, 226, 238–9, 253, 341, 368, 413, 415–16 European University Institute, Fiesole 178 Evans, Harry 6–7, 10 Evening Standard 126, 136–7, 138–9, 345 Exxon Mobil 155 Facebook xi, 178, 200, 215, 216, 222, 247, 347, 394–5, 394n, 439 Fairhead, Rona 29, 66 ‘fake news’ 41, 346, 347 Fallon, John x, 251–2, 257, 281–3, 292, 294, 295, 296, 297, 302 Farage, Nigel 253, 259, 262, 266, 284, 349, 412 ‘fast’ and ‘slow’ news 240, 255 Federal Reserve, US 76, 85–7, 86n, 88, 94–5, 114, 199, 241, 415, 436 Federal Reserve Bank of New York 87–8 Felsted, Andrea 235 Ferguson, Jason 247 Ferguson, Alex 247–8, 251, 389 Fidler, Stephen 21 Fillon, François 205 financial crisis, global xi, xiii–xiv, 19, 22n, 25, 31n, 37n, 44, 62, 66, 69–72, 74–7, 81, 83–8, 92, 93–5, 96, 100–107, 108, 109, 110–13, 114–16, 117–23, 123n, 124, 125, 127–9, 130, 131, 133, 134, 138, 144, 154, 173, 174, 186–7, 228, 232, 245n, 364, 401, 434, 435, 436; Bear Stearns collapse 25, 85, 87–8, 93, 98, 104; Lehman Brothers collapse xiv, 5n, 37, 81, 101–2, 104, 105, 107, 121, 160, 199, 432 financial liberalisation, era of 129 Financial Services Authority 76n, 106, 138 Financial Times xi; ‘A List’ contributors 189–90; advertising revenues 4, 9, 26, 255, 288; advertising/marketing campaigns 4, 33, 34, 70; alpha-male problem 209; app 137–8, 214; ‘B2B’ business 118–20; Boldness in Business awards 262; Bracken House, headquarters move from One Southwark Bridge to 373, 391, 404, 411; Bracken Room 24, 25, 101, 398; ‘Brighton’ meeting 73–4; British Press Awards newspaper of the year (2008) 92; British Press Awards newspaper of the year (2018) 379; Business Book of the Year 112–13, 166, 243–4; Business of Luxury Summit, Monaco (2009) 156; circulation 4, 26, 312, 379, 401, 406–7, 431 see also subscriptions, digital; code of conduct 201; Collins Stewart libel case 14–15, 17–18, 19–20; Commodities Summit 286–7; core mission 9; cost cutting 16, 26, 147–8; ‘digital first’ journalism 224–5, 240, 255, 403, 440; digital transformation of xi, xv, 10, 17, 43, 74, 92, 117–18, 147, 201, 218, 224–5, 240, 241, 255, 257, 272, 285, 394, 395, 401, 403, 432, 440; editorial independence, principle of 60, 93, 251, 282, 288–9, 292, 294–5, 297, 299, 311, 394; editorial leader conference 209–10; FastFT 224; FT Alphaville financial blog 27; ft.com 6, 69–70, 114, 117–19, 167, 240, 321, 380; Future of Capitalism series 129, 133; Future of News conference 379–80; gender balance at top of, plans for 340; Gulf, edition for the 135; ‘Here Day’ 202, 202n; hiring of staff/power to shape through appointments 5, 6, 12–13, 16, 26–7, 43, 51, 158, 189–90, 255, 403; House and Home, Weekend FT supplement 174, 264, 270; How to Spend It 104; in-house lawyer 20n, 200–201, 258, 405; independent sources, stories supported by two 9, 20, 56, 201; ‘Inside Blair Inc’ feature 142; investigations team 291, 368–9, 381–2, 405; Latin America coverage 140–42; LB accepts Nikkei request to stay on as editor 300; LB appointed editor 3–10; LB daily routine as Editor 35–6, 175–6; LB hosts team leader summer event 296–7; LB leaves post as Editor of 430–32; LB news editor of 9, 15; LB rotates top team 147, 302; LB’s essays for 355, 381, 427, 429; LB’s New Year note to staff, LB’s 224–5; LB’s overseas trips see individual nation name; LB’s second term as editor of 197–8, 202–3; LB succession planning at 252, 312, 391, 395, 401, 404, 426, 428, 429–31; LB US managing editor of 3–5; LB ‘walking the floor’ of 431; letters to the FT editor 83; Leveson inquiry and see Leveson inquiry; Lex Column 99–100, 361; Lunch with the FT 72–3, 120, 175, 176, 188, 229–30, 325, 326, 343; Magazine, weekend 208–9, 219, 302, 381, 401, 429; managing editor, change of 26n, 117, 147, 203, 224, 403; mid-morning meeting of commentators and ‘leader writers’ 103–4; motto, revival of original 58; Nikkei and see Nikkei; 125th anniversary 224, 225, 228–30, 234, 235; 1 million paying readers by 2020 target 312, 379, 401, 406–7, 431; origins 24–5, 25n, 224; Pearson and see Pearson; Pearson sells to Nikkei xiv, xv, 281–3, 284–5, 288–9, 291–300, 301–3, 304, 305–6, 310–11, 312, 403, 407, 428; pensioners’ lunch 277; Person in the News 21, 21n; Person of the Year 166–7, 223, 314, 357–8; publishing system 15–16, 26; ‘rebrush’/redesigns 34, 58, 254–5, 272; self-regulation, system of 257–8, 258n; sponsors 166, 243, 262; subscription business 26, 92, 118, 119, 229, 285, 312, 322, 339, 346, 379, 401, 406–7, 431; ‘thought leader’ brand 172; union members 202–3, 202n; US managing editor 5, 5n, 130, 147, 389; US, move into 3–4; ‘We Live in Financial Times’ marketing slogan 34, 44; Weekend FT 127, 174, 194, 208–9, 219, 302, 381, 401, 429 Fischer, Hartwig 377, 377n 5G technology 184, 375 Five Star Movement 203, 380 Flanders, Stephanie 42–3 Fleurot, Olivier 8, 9, 15–16, 25–6, 29 Ford, Jonathan 158 Fowler, Susan 357–8 Fox, Liam 274 Foy, Henry 417, 419 France x, 62, 69, 91–2, 95, 172, 177, 185, 198, 205, 255–6, 263, 326–7, 339, 341, 343–4, 353, 355, 366, 380, 408, 412–13 Fraser, Simon 319–20 Freeland, Chrystia 12–13, 12n, 85, 130, 147, 147n Fridman, Mikhail 90, 275 Friedman, Alan 27–8, 27n Frost, David 45, 137, 245 Frost/Nixon (Morgan) 45 FT Group 29 Fukushima nuclear reactor disaster (2011) 181, 185 Fuld, Dick x, xiv, 46, 85–6, 105 Fu Ying x, 124, 125–6, 241, 242 Gaddafi, Muammar 142, 177, 180, 259 Gandhi, Indira 407 Gandhi, Mahatma 408 Gandhi, Rahul 245 Ganesh, Janan 205 Gapper, John 43, 70, 88, 104–5, 190, 209–10, 221, 432 Garrahan, Matthew 213, 357, 379, 384 G8 237, 237n General Election, UK: (1992) 157, 228, 261; (1997) 12, 101n, 157; (2001) 12, 157; (2005) 12, 157; (2010) 148, 150–53, 156–9, 158n, 174, 173; (2015) 11n, 274, 283–4, 286–8, 289–90, 345; (2017) 343, 345–6, 353–4, 363, 388; (2019) 402 General Electric (GE) 66, 162–3 General Motors (GM) 221, 376 George, Eddie 138 Georgian National Theatre Company 192–3 Germany ix, xiii, xv, 31, 67, 69, 90n, 95, 101, 149, 172, 173, 179, 180, 188, 198, 199, 203, 219, 228, 237–8, 238n, 242n, 274, 283, 291, 292, 309, 331, 339, 343, 358–9, 368, 401, 404, 405, 406, 407, 413, 415, 416, 419, 421, 427, 433–5, 437 Ghosn, Carlos 375, 375n Giampaolo, David 233 Gibbs, Robert 131, 359 Gibson, Janine 395 Giles, Chris 210 Glasenberg, Ivan 287, 428, 428n Glastonbury Festival 322 Glencore 286, 287, 428n globalisation 34, 116, 228, 312, 333, 335, 348, 434 Gnodde, Richard 429–30 Gold, Dore 109, 109n Goldman Sachs xiv–xv, 24n, 31, 31n, 37, 55, 84n, 86, 87, 112, 122, 166–7, 178, 179, 243, 341, 342, 429 González, Felipe 225 Goodwin, Fred 22–3, 22n, 72, 75 Google xi, 137, 160–61, 178, 214–15, 326, 332, 439; Google Camp conference, Sicily 422; Mountain View headquarters 73–4; Street View 160–61 Gorbachev, Mikhail 90, 136–7, 138, 250, 344 Gordon, Sarah 209, 287, 383 Gove, Michael 255, 315, 316–17, 318, 323, 362, 410 Gowers, Andrew 5, 5n, 7–8, 12, 13, 26, 46, 105, 160 Grade, Michael 65 Grant, Charles 388–9 Grauer, Peter 212–13 Grayling, Chris 274 Great Depression 94, 114, 130, 335 Greece 99–100, 148, 153, 154, 172–3, 177, 211, 212, 238, 253, 341, 413 Greenberg, Maurice ‘Hank’ 36 Green, Damien 362–3 Green, Philip x, 162, 167, 235, 371 Greenspan, Alan 76–7, 88, 94, 129 Greig, Geordie 265 Grimes, Chris 403 Grove, Andy 420 G20 92, 117, 123, 123n, 131, 143, 408, 419, 420 Guardian 27, 35, 76, 82–3, 151, 161, 165, 190, 191–2, 197, 236, 237, 255, 258, 290–91, 318, 395, 440 Guerrera, Francesco 102 Guha, Krishna 94 Guinness, Sabrina 300–301 Gu Kailai 206 Gunvor 286, 287 Guthrie, Jonathan 361 Haass, Richard xvi–xvii Hague, William 274–5, 275n Hall, Jerry 317 Hall, Tony 217 Hamas 54, 108, 108n Hammond, Philip 324, 342–3, 345, 362, 365, 373, 420, 420n Hancock, Matt 413 Hannigan, Robert 149, 149n Hanson, Nigel 20n, 200–201, 258, 405 Harding, James 28, 192, 389 Harding, Robin 181, 284, 391 Harry, Prince 422 Hastings, Max 126–7 Hastings, Reed 398–9 Hayward, Tony 160, 163 HBOS 18–19, 104, 122, 127, 128 Heinz 263 see also Kraft Heinz Heywood, Neil 206 Heywood, Jeremy 258–60, 342, 364–5, 414–15 Hill, Andrew 244 Hill, Dave 11 Hille, Kathrin 183 Hill, Fiona 342, 349, 349n Hill, Jonathan 342–3, 342n Hilton, Steve 345 Hiroshima, Japan 284 Hitchens, Christopher 56–8, 57n, 72–3, 205–6 Hizbollah 107, 249 HK National Party 393 Holbrooke, Richard 57, 132–3, 132n, 148n, 170 Hollande, François 255–6 Hong Kong xvi, 60, 217n, 304, 350–52, 390, 392–3, 414 Hornby, Andy 19 Hoskins, Carine Patry 201 House of Commons 152, 193, 259, 343, 363n, 399–400, 423; Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee 216n, 239–40; Treasury Select Committee 127 House of Lords 72, 158, 229, 275, 275n, 349, 363, 363n, 394, 438 House of Representatives, US 106 Howard, John 283 HSBC 22, 22n, 121, 122, 237 Huawei xii, 182–4, 375, 398, 399 Huffington, Ariana 99 Huffington Post 99, 258, 380n Hu Jintao 99 Hunt, Jeremy 274, 410, 411–12, 413, 425 Hussein of Jordan, King 102, 110 Hussein, Saddam 28, 57 Hutton, John 71 Hyon Hak-Bong 253–4 Ignatius, David 276 IMF (International Monetary Fund) 118, 123, 219, 246n, 402, 412 Immelt, Jeffrey 162–3 immigration xi, 67, 203, 283–4, 309, 313, 318, 319, 334, 335, 343, 354, 410, 420 Inagaki, Kana 181 Independent 32, 41, 192 Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO) 257, 257n India ix, 30, 37–40, 123n, 129, 168–70, 203, 228, 244–7, 309, 348, 383, 407–9 inequality xiii, 193, 273, 410 inflation 30, 52, 95, 138, 251, 415, 435 Instagram 200, 347, 395 interest rates 30–31, 61, 70, 86, 100, 138, 323, 415 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 149, 150 Iran 54, 245n, 248–9, 249n, 250, 251, 251n, 259, 307, 377, 425; US nuclear deal with 248–9, 250, 251, 259, 307 Iraq 28, 108, 111, 243n; US-led war in 11, 12, 54, 55, 56, 57, 108, 110, 111, 142, 206, 208–9, 228, 330, 377, 387 Ireland 148, 188–9, 212, 425 ISIS 378 Islam, radical xv, 107, 108n, 170, 171, 248, 249, 251, 281, 378, 397 Israel xiv, 102, 107–9, 109n, 141, 208–9, 250, 251, 292, 319, 378, 382 Italy 27–8, 27n, 99, 100, 162–3, 178–9, 196, 203–4, 212, 214, 238, 239–40, 367, 380, 400, 413 Ivanov, Sergei 329–31, 417 Jackson, Andrew 348 Jacobs, Emma Gilpin 201 Jacques, Jean-Sébastien 386–7 Jain, Anshu 295 Jaitley, Arun 244–5 Jang Song-thaek 253–4 Japan ix, xv, xvi, 17n, 69, 181, 185–6, 281, 283, 284–5, 296, 298–9, 300, 301–3, 304, 305–6, 308, 325, 334, 359, 367, 371–2, 374, 390–92, 402, 403–4, 408, 411, 420, 427–9 Javid, Sajid 410, 420n Jenkins, Antony 285–6 Jenkins, Patrick 166 Jio 40, 247 jishuku (‘self-restraint’) 185–6 Johnson, Boris xvi, 37–8, 38n, 40, 98–9, 138, 139n, 158, 159, 200, 242–3, 244, 310, 315, 323, 325, 344, 345, 358, 359, 362, 371, 373, 388, 402, 410, 410n, 412, 420, 420n, 421, 422, 423, 425–6, 435, 437 Johnson, Jo 37–8, 38n, 40, 244, 373 Johnson, Woody 364 Jones, Claire 416 Jonsson, Martin 240 Jordan 102, 107, 108, 110 JPMorgan Chase xv, 24n, 88, 93–4, 98, 142 Judge, Igor 194–5 Juncker, Jean-Claude 274–5, 343–4, 406 Kagame, Paul ix, xvi, 142, 340, 354–6, 380 Kaiser, Bob 332 Kalanick, Travis 357 Karzai, Hamid 149–50 Kasparov, Garry 89, 91 Katzenberg, Jeffrey 213–14 Kaufman, Henry 186–7 Kazmin, Amy 407 Kellaway, Lucy 159 Kelly, General John 366n, 367, 367n Kelner, Simon 32, 41 Ken Hu 183, 398, 399 Kengeter, Carsten 193 Kennedy, John F. 96n, 380–81, 381n Kenny, Enda 188–9 Kerr, Simon 112 Kerry, John 68, 222 Keswick, Henry 304, 304n Keynes, John Maynard 88, 129 Khalaf, Roula x, 29, 102–3, 110, 111–12, 135, 177, 209, 248, 250, 302, 306, 308, 321, 322, 339, 371, 379, 390, 392, 428–9, 430, 431, 432 Khan, Imran 170–71 Khan, Sonia 420, 420n Khashoggi, Jamal 308, 392 Kim Jong-un 253, 374, 397 King, Mervyn 30–31, 31n, 71–2, 76, 106, 128–9, 173, 212 King, Rodney 148 King, Stephen 237 Kinnock, Neil 157, 261 Kissinger, Henry 54, 207 Kita, Tsuneo 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 310–11, 312, 321, 391, 401, 402, 404, 411, 428–9, 430, 432 Klerk, F.W. de 229–30 Knight-Bagehot fellowship programme, Columbia Journalism School 46 Kock, Gerhard de 51 Kohl, Helmut 344, 426 Kosovo 89, 89m Kraft Heinz 263, 352, 353 Kushner, Jared 367 Kuwait 111, 142, 206, 208 Kynge, James 124, 303, 393 Kyriacou, Kristina 268, 270 labour market, growth in size of world’s 228 Labour Party 11, 11n, 12, 30, 41, 64, 68, 71–2, 101n, 127, 128, 151, 157–8, 158n, 159, 162, 163–4, 193, 207, 228, 239, 259, 273, 284, 287, 288, 290, 303, 319, 340, 341, 354, 377n, 402, 438 Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford 395 Lambert, Richard 115–16, 244, 252, 297, 411 Lam, Carrie xvi, 350–51, 393, 414 Lamont, James 168, 203, 224, 302, 403 Lansley, Andrew 180, 180n Lavrov, Sergei 237 Lawson, Nigel 229 Lazard 121, 121n Leahy, Terry x, 23–4 Lebedev, Alexander 137, 138–9 Lebedev, Evgeny 136–7, 138–9, 139n, 376–7 Lee Jae-yong (J.Y.

Liberalism at Large: The World According to the Economist
by Alex Zevin
Published 12 Nov 2019

Its correspondent was gung-ho about the dictatorship, which would endure for over four decades, killing or disappearing hundreds of thousands: ‘the government, the political parties, the labour unions, and the independent agencies dealing with such matters as social security and land reform had all been so thoroughly infiltrated by Communists that there was no alternative to starting all over again.’108 In contrast to Crowther, who was prepared to cut back social spending to pay for rearmament as the Cold War intensified, Ward saw butter for natives as the necessary complement to guns.109 Going considerably further than the Economist, in her last book as foreign editor Ward called on Britain and America each to dedicate 15 per cent of their national income to defence, with an annual 3 per cent added on for a colonial Marshall Plan – providing a boost to full employment at home and a form of social democracy abroad, as part of a worldwide Keynesian stimulus.110 At the end of 1950 Ward went abroad to test these theories, overseeing development projects with her Royal Navy officer husband, sending back reports to the Economist from India, Australia and the Gold Coast (where she grew close to Kwame Nkrumah).111 By then Ward was a star, crisscrossing the globe to extol liberal capitalism as a test of ‘faith and freedom’ – and now to far more powerful audiences, US Democrats like Adlai Stevenson, John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson.112 Donald Tyerman and the Cold War News Room Crowther may have moved the extreme centre to the right by 1950–51, but for the rest of the decade the newsroom he built was less narrow.

…

Milton Friedman, or that, even if they read Newsweek, they have ever heard of him.1 Brian Beedham, Robert Moss and Vietnam The moonlighting of a celebrity editor gave a great deal more freedom to his two deputies – Brian Beedham and Norman Macrae – each equally influential in their domains, both convinced liberal capitalism must fight communism to some final reckoning. How did the Economist represent the battlefields of the US Empire, which took that fight direct to the enemy, and what were the implications for democracy? From 1965 to 1989 the answers were given by the dour, domineering and articulate Brian ‘Bomber’ Beedham, whose author photos show him dressed like a retired US intelligence analyst in a natty sweater layered over a shirt and tie, wearing aviator glasses and a beard.

…

These people were not just enemies but lightweights, who well-meaning liberals mistakenly wished to engage in dialogue. In the end, his economic position dovetailed with Beedham’s politics: in a backward country like Brazil or Chile, or in a poor black neighbourhood in America or Britain, democracy could easily become the enemy of liberal capitalism. Richard Nixon, with scant respect for the former, received barely a slap on the wrist over Watergate. The Economist viewed the affair as a mildly amusing intrigue almost up to the day the president resigned.61 Macrae, at any rate, looking to escape from the corset of fixed exchange, praised Nixon for dismantling Bretton Woods between 1971 and 1973.62 Andrew Knight: Special Relationships, 1974–86 The Economist may have applauded the delinking of the dollar from gold and the effective end of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange in 1973.

Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order
by Noam Chomsky
Published 6 Sep 2011

Constraints on capital flow are barred: for example, the conditions imposed by Chile to discourage inflows of short-term capital, widely credited with having insulated Chile somewhat from the destructive impact of highly volatile financial markets subject to unpredictable herdlike irrationality. Or more far-reaching measures that might well reverse the deleterious consequences of liberalizing capital flows. Serious proposals to achieve these ends have been on the table for years, but have never reached the agenda of the “architects of power.” It may well be that the economy is harmed by financial liberalization, as the evidence suggests. But that is a matter of little moment in comparison with the advantages conferred by the liberalization of financial flows for a quarter century, initiated by the governments of the United States and UK, primarily.

The Marginal Revolutionaries: How Austrian Economists Fought the War of Ideas
by Janek Wasserman
Published 23 Sep 2019

The 1937 publication of Walter Lippmann’s Inquiry into the Principles of the Good Society provided an impetus for a more coordinated reaction against the threats that Mises, Hayek, and the Chicagoans had identified. The Good Society initiated a transnational conversation about the salvation of liberalism, capitalism, and democracy. The Austrians were at the center of these developments as theorists, organizers, and ideologues.41 Lippmann’s The Good Society inspired many European and American intellectuals in defense of liberty and the capitalist order. Interestingly the book owed a substantial debt to Austrian ideas.

…

The shift from gold-backed to floating currencies has been called “probably the most significant market reform of the last 25 years,” and Machlup spearheaded its inception. The Machlup Group, MPS, AEI, and other free-market institutions turned a fringe idea into a dominant one. Supporters for liberalized capital exchange and floating currencies were a tiny minority in the early 1950s (about 5 percent of economists), but by the late 1960s they were hegemonic (about 90 percent). According to Matthias Schmelzer, no two individuals were more instrumental than Machlup and Haberler. The monetary changes they wrought developed hand in hand with liberalized international trade, globalization, the rise of multinational corporations, and a growing confidence in the power and logic of market thinking.

Open: The Story of Human Progress
by Johan Norberg
Published 14 Sep 2020

There were some exaggerated hopes swirling around at the time the Berlin Wall came down, but since Fukuyama wrote his article in 1989 the share of countries that are electoral democracies has actually increased from 41 to 64 per cent.1 The fact that most governments in the world pledge allegiance to democracy, some form of rule of law and a relatively open economy seems almost banal today, but this represents an astonishing turn of events, not just compared to the ancient past but even to 1974, when the German chancellor Willy Brandt thought that ‘Western Europe has only 20 or 30 years more of democracy left in it; after that it will slide, engineless and rudderless, under the surrounding sea of dictatorship.’2 But just because we can’t go forwards and replace liberal capitalism with an even more responsive and open system, it doesn’t mean we can’t go backwards. Fukuyama recognized that we live in a ‘world still full of authoritarianisms, theocracies, intolerant nationalisms’ and thought we could very well ‘drag the world back into history with all its wars, injustices, and revolution’.3 Far from being a triumphalist, Fukuyama feared that freedom and wealth would not be enough, as people fought for something more important: recognition and respect.

…

When he discussed whether the status-seeking and power-hungry would in the long run be satisfied with the comfortable life at the end of history, he just happened to mention ‘a developer like Donald Trump’.4 I don’t agree with all of Fukuyama’s analysis, and I do think he overdosed on Hegel and Nietzsche. But he was perceptive in his historical positioning of liberal capitalism and of the cultural and psychological factors that make us uncomfortable with it, and which therefore threaten to undermine it. Meanwhile, history has not been as kind to Samuel Huntington’s predictions as popular perception would have it. We did not experience global chaos after the Cold War; instead it has been the most peaceful era yet.5 Despite the Syrian civil war, the rate of battle deaths in 2018 was a quarter of what it was during the 1980s.

Rethinking Islamism: The Ideology of the New Terror
by Meghnad Desai
Published 25 Apr 2008

฀Many฀of฀these฀states฀had฀a฀large฀Muslim฀population฀ which฀had฀thus฀far฀been฀subjected฀to฀religious฀repression.฀Now฀that฀   ฀  the฀old฀system฀could฀no฀longer฀provide฀bread฀or฀circuses,฀the฀time฀ was฀ripe฀for฀Islamists฀to฀move฀in. Globalisation฀accelerated฀the฀spread฀of฀liberal฀capitalism.฀Many฀ countries฀ that฀ had฀ sought฀ to฀ use฀ their฀ independence฀ to฀ fashion฀ a฀ national฀ development฀ strategy฀ found฀ that฀ they฀ were฀ exposed฀ to฀ the฀ vagaries฀ of฀ the฀ international฀ bond฀ markets.฀ They฀ had฀ lost฀ their฀economic฀sovereignty.฀Countries฀that฀had฀a฀more฀or฀less฀wellfunctioning฀ economy฀ found฀ that฀ with฀ the฀ increased฀ availability฀ of฀ private฀ capital฀ old฀ policies฀ did฀ not฀ work฀ any฀ longer.฀ Mexico฀ had฀followed฀the฀advice฀of฀the฀IMF฀and฀won฀praise฀for฀its฀policy.฀ When฀the฀peso฀collapsed฀in฀December฀,฀there฀was฀widespread฀ misery.

Last Best Hope: America in Crisis and Renewal
by George Packer
Published 14 Jun 2021

If the narrative helps to create a more humane criminal justice system and bring Black Americans into the conditions of full equality, it will live up to its promise. But the grand systemic analysis usually ends in small symbolic politics. In some ways Just America resembles Real America and has entered the same dubious conflict from the other side. The disillusionment with liberal capitalism that gave rise to identity politics has also produced a new authoritarianism among many young white men. Just and Real America share a skepticism, from opposing points of view, about the universal ideas of the founding documents and the promise of America as a multi-everything democracy. There’s another way to understand Just America, like the other three narratives, and that’s in terms of class.

Angrynomics
by Eric Lonergan and Mark Blyth
Published 15 Jun 2020

To see why, let’s go back to our opening parable. The Karl in our opening parable is not Karl Marx, as you may have thought. Rather it was Karl Polanyi, a historian and sociologist. Polanyi wrote a book in 1944 called The Great Transformation that captured the essence of the bug in the software that killed version 1.0 of liberal capitalism, the version that emerged in the nineteenth century, spanned the globe by the turn of that century, and crashed and burned in the aftermath of the First World War. To find that bug, Polanyi asked the following question. Markets, trading, and prices have existed for as long as humans have been around, so what is it that makes economic organization “capitalist”?

How to Change the World: Reflections on Marx and Marxism
by Eric Hobsbawm
Published 5 Sep 2011

The object of social institutions is to ‘faire concourir les principales institutions à l’accroissement du bien- être des prolétaires’, defined simply as ‘la classe la plus nombreuse’ ( Organisation Sociale, 1825). On the other hand, insofar as the ‘industrialists’ are entrepreneurs and technocratic 28 Marx, Engels and pre-Marxian Socialism planners, they oppose not only the idle and parasitic ruling classes, but also the anarchy of bourgeois-liberal capitalism, of which he provides an early critique. Implicit in him is the recognition that industrialisation is fundamentally incompatible with an unplanned society. The emergence of the ‘industrial class’ is the result of history. How much of Saint-Simon’s views were his own, how much influenced by his secretary (1814–17), the historian Augustin Thierry, need not concern us.

…

Nevertheless, the fall of the USSR and the Soviet model was traumatic not only for communists but for socialists everywhere, if only because, with all its patent defects, it had been the only attempt actually to construct a socialist society. It had also produced a superpower which for almost half a century acted as a global counterbalance to the capitalism of the old capitalist countries. In both these respects its failure, not to mention its patent inferiority in most respects to Western liberal capitalism, was manifest, even to those who did not share the post-1989 triumphalism of Washington ideologists. Capitalism had lost its memento mori. Socialists saw that the end of the Soviet Union 386 Marxism in Recession 1983–2000 foreclosed any hope that somehow a different and better socialism (‘with a human face’ as the Prague Spring put it) could emerge from the heritage of the October Revolution.

No Such Thing as Society
by Andy McSmith
Published 19 Nov 2010

People expected this contest between rival systems to continue indefinitely. Instead, they saw it coming to a quick, decisive and non-violent end. As communism rolled out of Eastern Europe in 1989, an American philosopher forecast that the end of history was approaching13 and that every other political system in the world would evolve into the western model of liberal capitalism. These developments were mirrored in domestic politics. Since 1945, the UK had edged towards becoming more ‘socialist’, with free medicine, free schools, state pensions and more than 40 per cent of the country’s industrial capacity owned by the state. Within the Labour Party, there was a vigorous movement led by Tony Benn to give the country another sharp push in the same direction.

…

‘Nowadays, there is a clear tendency to proclaim the death of all ideologies in the name of the victory of capitalism,’ the novelist Carlos Fuentes lamented, writing in the Guardian in the last week of 1990.16 However, to proclaim that history has ended, that all ideologies have been routed by the final victory of liberal capitalism is itself ideological. It was to be the prevailing ideology of the 1990s. British history did not end during the 1980s, but it did slow down, because the events of that turbulent decade had settled the way that Britons would be ruled and the way they thought about the world for at least the next quarter of a century.

Profiting Without Producing: How Finance Exploits Us All
by Costas Lapavitsas
Published 14 Aug 2013

An early and incisive critique of Hilferding reliance on German/Austrian phenomena was made by Kozo Uno (Keizai Seisakuron, Tokyo: Kobundo Shobo, 1936, part 3, ch. 2), who suggested that finance capital actually takes several forms, and British finance capital is heavily dependent on stock markets. Uno was fully aware of the importance of joint-stock capital for Hilferding’s analysis (part 3, ch.1). The specific character of joint-stock capital was vital to Uno defining the stage of ‘imperialism’ in contrast to the stages of ‘liberal’ capitalism and ‘mercantilism’. 42 Lenin’s view of imperialism was developed in a variety of writings during 1915–17; see Bibliography. 43 See, for instance, John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, Economic History Review 6:1, 1953; and David Fieldhouse, The West and the Third World, Oxford: Blackwell, 1999. 44 Joseph A.

…

In Marx’s writings, the spontaneously arising form of the capitalist credit system has close affinities with market-based finance.58 That is, the credit system comprises banks that lend essentially on a short-term basis by mobilizing idle money capital. Hilferding’s innovative argument about the transformation of capitalism due to the emergence of finance capital can thus be understood in terms of the market-based financial system of competitive liberal capitalism spontaneously becoming the bank-based system of mature (and declining) capitalism. For Hilferding, banks dominate the financial system in mature capitalism, even though the capital market also grows as it supports finance capital. The future of capitalism for Hilferding lay in Germany, a late developer that relied on her banks, not England, a declining power in which banks kept their distance from corporations.

Consumed: How Markets Corrupt Children, Infantilize Adults, and Swallow Citizens Whole
by Benjamin R. Barber
Published 1 Jan 2007

It defines the ideal capitalist protagonist as the prudent bookkeeper: the calculating investor who is capable of hard work and long-term rational planning as well as sustained saving. The several stages that then interpose themselves between Weber’s ideal moment of capitalist takeoff can be called “Liberal Capitalism,” accompanied by an ethic of radical individualism and defined by the protagonist as free chooser (the individual defined by autonomy and rights); then “Managerial Capitalism,” accompanying and accompanied by an ethic of organization and conservation defined by the ideal protagonist as manager.

…

As entrepreneurial competition was overtaken by cartels and monopoly, democratic antitrust legislation saved capitalism from itself. Egoism found itself up against a civic community willing to enforce the rights of the public. Ayn Rand in a face-off with John Dewey. Hoover versus FDR. John D. Rockefeller’s capitalism in check. Liberal capitalism was accompanied and to some degree succeeded by a phase of managerial capitalism, best exemplified by the 1950s and 1960s in the United States when management of capital became more important than ownership, and the deployment of resources more valuable than the creation of resources. Corporate managers grew conservative, seeing their task as maintaining wealth and perhaps expanding it on paper rather than in reality.

The Retreat of Western Liberalism
by Edward Luce
Published 20 Apr 2017

The West is good at screening out local detail when it is inconvenient, particularly in regard to Russia. In the 1980s, the Soviet Union’s collapse humiliated an entire generation of Western Sovietologists. None had been expecting it. In the 1990s, we convinced ourselves Russia was in transition from socialist autocracy to liberal capit­alism, even while Western consultants urged Moscow to adopt shock therapy, which would enable the rise of a new Russian oligarchy. On Western advice, Yeltsin privatised Russia’s most valuable state assets in a fire sale to a small coterie of businessmen in exchange for bankrolling his 1996 re-election.

The Globalization of Inequality
by François Bourguignon
Published 1 Aug 2012

See also emerging economies development aid, 148–53, 157 development gap, 34–35, 83 Di Bao program, 166 discrimination: ghettos and, 66– 67; immigrants and, 64, 66, 127; labor and, 64–66, 69, 132, 142, 180–81; non-­material inequalites and, 64–66, 69; racial, 65; women and, 64–65, 103 disinflation, 95, 102, 110 distribution, 10n1, 186; capital-­ labor split and, 55–58, 60; efficiency and, 142–45; evolution of inequality and, 41, 42t, 44t, 45, 46t, 48–59, 64, 71–72; fairer globalization and, 148, 153, 156–73, 175, 178; geographical disequilibria and, 83; Gini coefficient and, 18 (see also Gini coefficient); global, 18–19, 25, 29, 39, 41, 46t, 121, 124–38, 141– 45, 156; growth and, 49–50, 188; international, 17–18, 30, 148; median of, 31; OECD countries and, 10–11, 12n3; policy and, 26, 72, 135, 188; range of, 16; real earnings loss and, 78; redistribution and, 4, 7, 37 (see also redistribution); rise in inequality and, 74, 77–79, 82, 85, 90–92, 94–96, 99, 103–4, 106–7, 112, 114–15; Southern perspective on, 82–85; standard of living and, 16, 18 (see also standard of living); taxes and, 37, 92–94 (see also taxes); Theil coefficient and, 18–19, 37–38, 194 distribution (cont.) 52; transfers and, 4, 14, 48, 105, 110, 130, 135–36, 142, 148, 153, 158–67, 170, 175, 181, 183, 187; wage, 3, 78–79, 107 Divided We Stand report, 52 Doha negotiations, 154 drugs, 66, 133 Dubai, 127 Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), 156 education, 34, 187; college, 132; evolution of inequality and, 61, 65–68; fairer globalization and, 149, 152, 167–73, 180–81; globalization and, 132, 140, 143; labor and, 168, 180; Millennium Development Goals and, 149– 50; national inequality and, 167–73; poverty and, 24; preschool, 169–70; redistribution and, 149, 152, 167–73; rise in inequality and, 111; taxes and, 167–73; tuition and, 170 efficiency: data transfer technology and, 78; deregulation and, 94, 96, 105, 108; economic, 1, 4, 6, 111, 116, 119, 129–33, 135, 140–45, 158, 164, 167, 171, 181; emerging economies and, 78; equality and, 116, 129–31; fairness and, 8, 129– 31; globalization and, 1, 4, 6, 8, 36, 78, 94, 96, 105, 108, 111, 116, 118–19, 129–35, 140–45, 157–58, 164, 167, 170–71, 175, 180–81, 188; human capital and, 175; import substitution and, 34, 180; inefficiency and, 105, 129–30, 132–33, 135, 140, 170–71, 180, 188; labor Index and, 175; loss of, 142, 164; opportunity and, 142–45; Pareto, 130n5; privatization and, 94, 96, 105, 108; redistribution and, 142–45; rents and, 180; social tensions and, 188; spontaneous redistribution and, 133; taxes and, 170; technology and, 78; weak institutions and, 36; wealth of nations and, 1 elitism, 182; fairer globalization and, 151, 165; globalization and, 127n4, 136, 138; rise in inequality and, 4, 6–7 emerging economies: Africa and, 122–23 (see also Africa); competition and, 178, 187–88; conditional cash transfers and, 165– 66; credit cards and, 165; domestic markets and, 120, 125; efficient data transfer and, 78; evolution of inequality and, 57; fairer globalization and, 147, 154, 158, 165–66, 177–78, 182; global inequality and, 40, 77– 80, 82, 109, 113, 115, 188–89; globalization and, 117, 119–22, 125–27; institutions and, 109– 12; Kuznets curve and, 113; labor and, 77; natural resources and, 127; profits and, 117; rise in inequality and, 109–12; structural adjustment and, 109– 12; taxes and, 165; trends in, 57; Washington consensus and, 109–10, 153 entrepreneurs, 83, 92, 96, 131–32, 135, 143, 170–71, 188 equality: efficiency and, 116, 129– 31; policy for, 184–89; relative gap and, 18, 28, 30, 31–32, 36 Ethiopia, 21–22, 46t, 155 Index195 European Union (EU), 24, 156, 174, 177 Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative, 155 evolution of inequality: Africa and, 46t, 54–55; Brazil and, 46t, 55, 59, 70; capital and, 55–58, 60, 73; China and, 47, 53, 57–60; consumption and, 42t, 44t; convergence and, 65, 69; credit and, 61; crises and, 48, 50, 54, 57, 73–74; developed countries and, 47, 52–53, 56, 59–64, 66; developing countries and, 47, 53–55, 57, 63, 68; distribution and, 41, 42t, 44t, 45, 46t, 48–59, 64, 71– 72; education and, 61, 65–68; elitism and, 4, 6–7, 46t; emerging economies and, 57; exceptions and, 52–53; France and, 46t, 51f, 52–53, 55, 58, 59n8, 62–63, 66, 70–71; ghettos and, 66–67; Gini coefficient and, 39, 42t, 44t, 48, 50, 51f, 53, 58–59; Great Depression and, 48; growth and, 33, 49–50, 54; India and, 54, 57, 59–60; institutions and, 55, 69; investment and, 56; labor and, 55–58, 60; markets and, 48–50, 53–54, 64, 69; national income inequality and, 48–52; non-­monetary inequalities and, 49, 60–70; normalization and, 41, 43–44; opportunity and, 61–62, 68, 70–71; perceptions of inequality and, 69–73; policy and, 55, 72; primary income and, 48–50, 58; production and, 57; productivity and, 63; profit and, 56; reform and, 54, 72; rise in inequality in, 48–52, 73, 77–80, 91–95, 97–98, 102–8; risk and, 63, 66; standard of living and, 41, 43– 45, 46t, 53–55, 58, 60–62, 67, 69, 73; surveys and, 42t, 43–45, 56, 68n17, 69–71; taxes and, 12–14, 37, 48, 50, 56n5; Theil coefficient and, 42; United Kingdom and, 46t, 50, 51f, 59, 67, 68n17; United States and, 2, 4–6, 9, 11, 21, 33, 46t, 47–50, 51f, 58, 59n9, 66–70, 73; wealth and, 58–60 executives, 73, 88–89, 97, 174 expenditure per capita, 13, 15, 42t, 44t exports: deindustrialization and, 76, 82; fairer globalization and, 147, 154–55, 176, 178; globalization and, 124, 128; rise in inequality and, 76, 82–84 fairer globalization: Africa and, 147, 151, 154–56, 179, 183; African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) and, 155; Bolsa Familia and, 166; Brazil and, 150, 154, 166–68, 173; capital and, 158–62, 167, 171, 175, 182; China and, 150, 154, 165–66, 172, 178; competition and, 155, 169, 173, 176–79, 182; consumers and, 177–78; consumption and, 159, 177; convergence and, 146–47, 157; correcting national inequalities and, 158–80; credit and, 164–65, 172, 180; crises and, 163, 176; deregulation and, 173; developed countries and, 150, 154–57, 160, 162, 164, 168–72, 176, 178–79, 181; developing countries and, 154, 166; development aid and, 196 fairer globalization (cont.) 148–53, 157; Di Bao program and, 166; distribution and, 148, 153, 156–73, 175, 178; Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and, 156; education and, 149, 152, 167–73; 180–81; elitism and, 151, 165; emerging economies and, 147, 154, 158, 165–66, 177–78, 182; Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative and, 155; exports and, 147, 154–55, 176, 178; France and, 147, 159–61, 164, 169, 175, 177; Gini coefficient and, 156, 166; goods and services sector and, 180; growth and, 147–52, 155, 162, 167–68, 171, 177, 180, 183; health issues and, 152, 166; imports and, 154, 177–78, 180; India and, 150, 154, 165– 66, 172; inheritance and, 170– 73; institutions and, 151, 168, 174–75; international trade and, 176–77; investment and, 150, 155, 157, 160, 170, 174, 179; liberalization and, 156, 179; markets and, 147–48, 154–58, 168, 173–75, 178–81; Millennium Development Goals and, 149–50; national inequality and, 147, 158; opportunity and, 155, 167, 170, 172; policy and, 147–53, 157, 167–73, 175, 177, 179–83; poverty and, 147–52, 164, 166, 175; prices and, 147– 48, 176, 178, 182; primary income and, 158, 163n10, 167, 173; production and, 155–57, 167, 176, 178–79; productivity and, 155, 177–78; profit and, 173, 176; Progresa program and, Index 166; protectionism and, 7, 147, 154, 157, 176–79; redistribution and, 148, 153, 156–73, 175, 178; reform and, 151, 161, 163, 168–69; regulation and, 152, 173–76, 181–82; risk and, 148, 154, 156, 159, 164, 171, 174–75, 178; standard of living and, 146–48, 154, 156–58, 160, 165, 168–69; surveys and, 169; taxes and, 148, 158–73, 175, 181–83; technology and, 156, 173; TRIPS and, 156; United Kingdom and, 163, 169; United States and, 155, 159–61, 163– 64, 169, 174–75, 182; wealth and, 162, 164, 167, 170–73 Fitoussi, Jean-­Paul, 14 France: evolution of inequality and, 46t, 51f, 52–53, 55, 58, 59n8, 62–63, 66, 70–71; fairer globalization and, 147, 159–61, 164, 169, 175, 177; Gini coefficient of, 20; global inequality and, 2, 9, 11, 20–21; offshoring and, 81; rise in inequality and, 80, 88, 92–93, 95, 97, 99, 103; soccer and, 87; wage deductions and, 159 G7 countries, 56 G20 countries, 182 Garcia-­Panalosa, Cecilia, 107 Gates, Bill, 5–6, 70, 150 Germany, 2, 21, 46t, 50, 51f, 80, 88, 92 Ghana, 46t, 54 ghettos, 66–67 Giertz, Seth, 160–61 Gini coefficient: Brazil and, 22; Current Population Survey and, 21; evolution of inequality and, Index197 39, 42t, 44t, 48, 50, 51f, 53, 58– 59; fairer globalization and, 156, 166; France and, 20; historical perspective on, 27–28; meaning of, 18–19; purchasing power parity and, 28; rise in inequality and, 110; United States and, 21; wealth inequality and, 58–60 Glass-­Steagall Act, 174n15 global distribution, 18–19, 25, 29, 39, 41, 46t, 121, 156 global inequality: Africa and, 16, 21, 23, 30–31, 34, 36; between countries, 2–3, 5, 7, 9, 16–19, 23, 33, 36, 38–39, 42–45, 47, 53, 58, 68, 90–91, 107, 117–19, 123, 128, 153; Brazil and, 21– 23; crises and, 20, 38–41; cross-­ country heterogeneity and, 13; definition of, 3–4, 9–10, 25–26, 30–32, 39; developed countries and, 10–11, 21, 34–39; developing countries and, 10–11, 13, 21, 32, 34–39; effects of, 38–40; emerging economies and, 40, 77–80, 82, 109, 113, 115, 188– 89; at the end of the 2000s, 20– 25; evolution of inequality and, 41 (see also evolution of inequality); expenditure per capita and, 13, 15, 42t, 44t; France and, 2, 9, 11, 20–21; globalization and, 117–18, 121–23, 128; great gap and, 33–36; historic turning point for, 25–32; Human Development Report and, 25; institutions and, 36; measuring, 10– 20; Millennium Development Goals and, 149–50, 185; normalization and, 13, 15, 22–23, 26, 29; OECD Database on Household Income Distribution and Poverty and, 11–12; policy and, 185–89; Povcal database and, 10, 12, 42t, 43, 44t; prices and, 27–28, 74, 80, 84, 91–92, 94, 97, 110; profit and, 13; reduction of, 2, 185–86; relative gap and, 18, 28, 30–32, 36; rise of, 2–4, 7; risk and, 20; standard of living and, 10–26, 29, 31–33, 36, 39; surveys on, 10, 12–15, 20n10, 21–22, 29, 42t, 43–45; technology and, 3–4, 34–35; trend reversal in, 37–38; within countries, 2, 5–7, 9, 16, 30, 33, 35–45, 47, 113–14, 118, 124– 29, 184–85, 189 globalization: Africa and, 122–23, 126–27; Asian dragons and, 34, 82; Brazil and, 127, 133; capital and, 117, 125–26, 132, 137; China and, 120–22, 128; competition and, 117–18, 130, 186 (see also competition); as complex historical phenomenon, 1–2; consumption and, 137–39; convergence and, 120–22, 125; credit and, 131–32, 137–40; crises and, 119–22, 125, 135–39, 142; debate over, 1; deindustrialization in developed countries and, 75–82; democratic societies and, 135–36; deregulation and, 95–99; developed countries and, 117, 119, 121, 127n4, 128, 133, 143; developing countries and, 121, 127n4, 128, 132, 143; education and, 132, 140, 143; efficiency and, 1, 4, 6, 8, 36, 78, 94, 96, 105, 108, 111, 116, 118–19, 129–35, 140–45, 157–58, 164, 167, 170–71, 175, 180–81, 188; elitism and, 127n4, 136, 138; 198 globalization (cont.) emerging economies and, 117, 119–22, 125–27; exports and, 124, 128; fairer, 146–83 (see also fairer globalization); future of inequality between countries and, 119–22; global inequality and, 117–18, 121–23, 128; goods and services sector and, 127, 130; growth and, 118–29, 134–39; health issues and, 140– 41, 144; Heckscher-­Ohlin model and, 76; imports and, 119, 124; inequality within countries and, 124–29; inheritance and, 144–45; institutions and, 124; as instrument for modernization, 1; international trade and, 3, 75–76, 78–79, 83, 112, 114, 176–77; investment and, 119, 130, 134–35, 143; laissez-­faire approach and, 118, 129; markets and, 118, 120–21, 124–37, 140, 143–44; as moral threat, 1; national inequality and, 119; negative consequences of inequality and, 131–42; opportunity and, 133–34, 139, 142–44; as panacea, 1; policy and, 118–19, 124, 126, 128–31, 139, 143–44; poverty and, 117, 123, 126–27, 134, 144; prices and, 118, 122, 126, 136–38; primary income and, 135, 143–44; production and, 119, 124, 126, 129, 131, 133, 137; productivity and, 120, 125, 127, 144; profit and, 117; redistribution and, 121, 124–38, 141–45; reform and, 124, 126–27, 138; regulation and, 136; rise in inequality and, 117–18; risk and, 127–28, Index 137–39, 144; shocks and, 38, 55, 91–92, 175; Southern perspective on, 82–85; standard of living and, 120–23, 126, 138, 143; surveys and, 127n4, 141n15; taxes and, 74, 89n10, 91–94, 104, 114–15, 129–30, 135–36, 142–45; technology and, 86–91, 118–20, 125; trends and, 118; United States and, 135–39; wealth and, 74, 95, 98, 125, 127, 129, 131–32, 139, 143–45 Great Depression, 48 Greece, 46t, 135 gross domestic product (GDP) measurement: Current Population Survey and, 21; evolution of inequality and, 41–45, 56–57; fairer globalization and, 123, 127, 165–66, 176; global inequality and, 13–15, 20–21, 23, 26, 27f, 29–30, 39; normalization and, 29, 41, 43–45; rise in inequality and, 94; Sen-­Stiglitz-­ Fitoussi report and, 14 Gross National Income (GNI), 148–49 Growing Unequal report, 52 growth, 4; African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) and, 155; constraints and, 35; consumption and, 13–15, 42t, 44t, 80, 137–39, 159, 177; convergence and, 16; determinants of, 34; distribution and, 49–50, 188; emerging economies and, 125 (see also emerging economies); evolution of inequality and, 33, 49–50, 54; fairer globalization and, 147–52, 155, 162, 167–68, 171, 177, 180, 183; GDP mea- Index199 surement of, 30, 39 (see also gross domestic product (GDP) measurement); globalization and, 118–29, 134–39; great gap in, 33–36; import substitution and, 34, 180; inflation and, 50, 95, 102, 110; negative, 31; political reversals and, 36; poverty and, 28–29; production and, 3, 34–35, 57, 74, 76–81, 84–86, 119, 124, 126, 129, 131, 133, 137, 155–57, 167, 176, 178–79; rate of, 15, 29–35, 79, 125, 185; recession and, 6, 31, 99, 120; relative gap and, 18, 20, 30–32, 36; rise in inequality and, 75, 79, 82, 84, 109–12; trends in, 40, 121 health issues, 24, 187; fairer globalization and, 152, 166; globalization and, 140–41, 144; public healthcare and, 37, 111, 140 Heckscher-­Ohlin model, 76 Hong Kong, 34, 82, 174 housing, 12, 61, 137 human capital, 74, 167, 175 Human Development Report, 25 Ibrahimovich, Zlata, 87 IKEA, 172 immigrants, 64, 66, 127 imports: fairer globalization and, 154, 177–78, 180; globalization and, 119, 124; import substitution and, 34, 180; rise in inequality and, 80 income: average, 9, 18, 21, 29–30, 43, 72; bonuses and, 87, 174; convergence and, 16; currency conversion and, 11; definition of, 45; deindustrialization and, 75–82; developed/developing countries and, 5, 36; disposable, 20, 22, 24, 48, 50, 51f, 74, 91, 163; distribution of, 3 (see also distribution); executives and, 73, 88–89, 97, 174; family, 10; financial operators and, 87–88, 90–91; gap in, 3, 5–6, 27f, 33– 36, 42t, 44t, 149; GDP measurement and, 13–15, 20–21, 23, 26, 27f, 29–30, 39, 41–45, 56–57, 94, 123, 127, 165–66, 176; high, 50, 52, 56, 85–93, 97–99, 140, 143, 158–62, 164, 189; household, 10–12, 43, 45, 50, 58, 105, 107, 137, 163, 177; inequality in, 2, 4, 41, 48–50, 56–64, 68, 70, 72–73, 83, 98, 102–3, 107–8, 114, 125, 132– 34, 137, 140–41, 143–44, 163; inflation and, 50, 95, 102, 110; international scale for, 17–18, 23, 30; lawyers and, 89–90; mean, 17, 20n10, 27f, 42t, 44t; median, 6, 49, 71, 102–3, 106; minimum wage and, 52–53, 100, 102–8, 175, 177; national, 7, 16–19, 30, 43, 48–52, 60, 73, 84n6, 125, 149, 153, 172; OECD Database on Household Income Distribution and Poverty and, 11; opportunity and, 5; payroll and, 53, 93, 100, 104, 107, 175; pension systems and, 167; per capita, 20, 25, 29–30, 42t, 45, 48, 55–56, 120; portfolios and, 88; poverty and, 1, 11, 15n6, 19–20, 22–25, 28–29, 32, 44t, 109, 117, 123, 126–27, 134, 144, 147–52, 164, 166, 175; primary, 48–50, 58, 135, 143–44, 158, 163n10, 167, 173; 200 income (cont.) purchasing power and, 11, 13, 19–24, 27f, 28, 50, 80, 144, 158, 178; real earnings loss and, 78; relative gap and, 18, 28, 30, 31– 32, 36; superstars and, 85–87, 89–90; taxes and, 37, 89n10, 92–93, 145, 159, 161–65, 170 (see also taxes); technology and, 34, 180; virtual, 12; wage inequality and, 51–53, 79, 101–3, 106, 108; wage ladder effects and, 78–79; wealth inequality and, 58–60; women and, 64– 65, 103 India: evolution of inequality and, 54, 57, 59–60; fairer globalization and, 150, 154, 165– 66, 172; household consumption and, 15; international trade and, 75; Kuznets hypothesis and, 113; rise in inequality and, 2, 15–16, 19, 30, 34, 46t, 75, 83, 90, 112–13; taxes and, 165 Indonesia, 30, 46t, 54, 111, 127 industrialization: deindustrialization and, 1, 75–82, 102, 120, 188; labor and, 1, 26, 29, 33, 35, 54, 82, 84, 102, 113, 120, 127, 179, 188 Industrial Revolution, 26, 29, 33, 35 inequality: between countries, 2–3, 5, 7, 9, 16–19, 23, 33, 36, 38– 39, 42–45, 47, 53, 58, 68, 90– 91, 107, 117–19, 123, 128, 153; efficiency and, 1, 4, 6, 8, 36, 78, 94, 96, 105, 108, 111, 116, 118– 19, 129–35, 140–45, 157–58, 164, 167, 170–71, 175, 180–81, 188; Gini coefficient and, 18 (see Index also Gini coefficient); income, 2, 4, 41, 48–50, 56–64, 68, 70, 72–73, 83, 98, 102–3, 107–8, 114, 125, 132–34, 137, 140–41, 143–44, 163; international, 17; inverted U curve and, 54, 113; measurement of, 18; negative consequences of, 131–42; non-­ monetary, 49, 60–70; perceptions of, 69–73; social tensions and, 188; standard of living and, 18 (see also standard of living); Theil coefficient and, 18–19, 37–38, 42; wealth, 58–60; within countries, 2, 5–7, 9, 16, 30, 33, 37–45, 47, 113–14, 118, 124–29, 184–85, 189 infant mortality, 150 inflation, 50, 95, 102, 110 inheritance: fairer globalization and, 170–73; globalization and, 144–45; rise in inequality and, 93 institutions: deregulation and, 91– 112 (see also deregulation); disinflation and, 95, 102, 110; emerging economies and, 109– 12; evolution of inequality and, 55, 69; fairer globalization and, 151, 168, 174–75; global inequality and, 36; globalization and, 124; markets and, 91–92; privatization and, 94–109; reform and, 91–112; rise in inequality and, 91–112, 114; structural adjustment and, 109– 12; taxes and, 92–94; “too big to fail” concept and, 174–75; Washington consensus and, 109–10, 153 International Development Association, 149 Index201 international income scale, 17–18, 23, 30 International Labor Organization, 51 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 54, 57, 84, 90, 109–10 international trade: capital mobility and, 74; China and, 75; de­ industrialization and, 75–76, 78–79; effect of new players, 75–76; Heckscher-­Ohlin model and, 76; India and, 75; offshoring and, 81–82; rise in inequality and, 75–76, 78–79, 83, 112, 114; Soviet Union and, 75; theory of, 76; wage ladder effects and, 78–79 inverted U curve, 54, 113 investment: direct, 76, 79; evolution of inequality and, 56; fairer globalization and, 150, 155, 157, 160, 170, 174, 179; foreign, 83, 85, 112, 155, 157, 160, 179; globalization and, 119, 130, 134– 35, 143; production and, 119; public services and, 143; re-­ investment and, 56; rise in inequality and, 76, 79, 82–83, 85, 92, 97–98, 112; taxes and, 92 Ivory Coast, 54 Japan, 34, 46t, 51f, 103 job training, 34, 181, 187 Kenya, 46t, 54 kidnapping, 133 Kuznets, Simon, 113, 126 labor: agriculture and, 12, 82, 84, 122–23, 127–28, 132, 155; artists and, 86–87; bonuses and, 87, 174; capital and, 3–4, 55– 58, 60, 158, 161n7, 185; capital mobility and, 3; cheap, 77, 117; costs of, 81, 100, 104–5, 117, 176, 187; decline in share of national income and, 73; deindustrialization and, 75–82; demand for, 168; deregulation and, 99– 109; discrimination and, 64–66, 69, 132, 142, 180–81; distribution of income and, 175 (see also distribution); education and, 168, 180; efficiency and, 96–97, 175; emerging economies and, 77; entrepreneurs and, 83, 92, 96, 131–32, 135, 143, 170–71, 188; evolution of inequality and, 55–58, 60; excess, 81, 83; executives and, 73, 88–89, 97, 174; goods and services sector and, 13, 73, 80, 85, 91, 102, 127, 130, 180; growth and, 154, 179; immigrant, 64, 66, 127; increased mobility and, 90–91; industrialization and, 1, 26, 29, 33, 35, 54, 80, 82, 84, 102, 113, 120, 127, 179, 188; inflation and, 50, 95, 102, 110; International Labor Organization and, 51; job training and, 34, 181, 187; manufacturing and, 57, 80–82, 84, 123, 154–55, 157; median wage and, 49, 71, 102– 3, 106; minimum wage and, 52– 53, 100, 102–8, 175, 177; mobility of, 185; offshoring and, 81–82; payroll and, 53, 93, 100, 104, 107, 175; pension systems and, 167; portfolios and, 88; poverty and, 1, 11, 15n6, 19– 20, 22–25, 28–29, 32, 44t, 109, 117, 123, 126–27, 134, 144, 147–52, 164, 166, 175; 202 labor (cont.) privatization and, 99–109; productivity and, 63, 79, 81–82, 89, 100, 102, 104, 114, 120, 125, 127, 144, 155, 177–78; protectionism and, 7, 147, 154, 157, 176–79; real earnings loss and, 78; reserve, 84; security and, 133; skilled, 76–78, 82–83, 86, 90, 114, 117, 126, 176; standard of living and, 69 (see also standard of living); superstars and, 85, 87, 89–90; supply of, 130– 31, 164; taxes and, 159–60, 171; technology and, 85–91 (see also technology); unemployment and, 37, 39, 53, 62–63, 66, 69, 77, 94, 100–108, 164, 175–76; unions and, 100–106, 108, 156, 179; unskilled, 3, 76–77, 79, 83, 105, 117, 154; wage inequality and, 51–53, 79, 101–3, 106, 108; wage ladder effects and, 78–79; women and, 64–65, 103, 114; writers and, 86–87 Lady Gaga, 5–6 laissez-­faire approach, 118, 129 Latin America, 9, 34, 36, 54–55, 58, 109–11, 155, 165–66, 168, 180 lawyers, 89–90 liberalization: capital and, 96; customs, 156; deregulation and, 96–99, 108–9, 112 (see also deregulation); fairer globalization and, 156, 179; mobility of capital and, 115; policy effects of, 97–99; Reagan administration and, 91; recession and, 6, 31, 99, 120; rise in inequality and, 76, 91, 93, 96–99, 108–9, 112, 115; tax rates and, 93 Luxembourg, 16, 19 Index Madonna, 71 Malaysia, 127 manufacturing: deindustrialization and, 75–82, 84, 123; emerging economies and, 57, 84; fairer globalization and, 154–55, 157; France and, 81; offshoring and, 81–82; United Kingdom and, 80; United States and, 80 markets: competition and, 76–77, 79–82, 84, 86, 94–98, 102, 104, 115–18, 130, 155, 169, 173, 176–79, 182, 186–88; credit, 131; deindustrialization and, 1, 75–82, 102, 120, 188; deregulation and, 91–92, 99–109 (see also deregulation); development gap and, 34–35, 83; Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and, 156; effect of new players, 75–76; emerging economies and, 120 (see also emerging economies); entrepreneurs and, 83, 92, 96, 131–32, 135, 143, 170–71, 188; evolution of inequality and, 48–50, 53–54, 64, 69; exports and, 76, 82–84, 124, 128, 147, 154–55, 176, 178; fairer globalization and, 147–48, 154–58, 168, 173–75, 178–81; GDP measurement and, 13–15, 20–21, 23, 26, 27f, 29–30, 39, 41–45, 56–57, 94, 123, 127, 165–66, 176; globalization and, 35, 118, 120–21, 124–37, 140, 143–44; Heckscher-­Ohlin model and, 76; housing, 12, 61, 137; imports and, 1, 34, 80, 119, 124, 154, 177–78, 180; institutions and, 91–112; international trade and, 3, 75–76, 78–79, 83, 112, 114, 176–77; labor and, Index203 144 (see also labor); liberalization and, 112 (see also liberalization); monopolies and, 94, 111, 127, 136; offshoring and, 81– 82; protectionism and, 7, 147, 154, 157, 176–79; purchasing power and, 11, 13, 19–24, 27f, 28, 50, 80, 144, 158, 178; reform and, 54 (see also reform); regulation and, 74 (see also regulation); rise in inequality and, 74, 76– 79, 83, 86, 90–112, 114; shocks and, 38, 55, 91–92, 175; single market and, 76; South-­South exchange and, 35; TRIPS and, 156 median wage, 49, 71, 102–3, 106 Mexico, 46t, 57, 59, 109–10, 133, 166, 172 middle class, 51, 71, 93, 109, 133– 34, 136, 140 Milanovic, Branko, 4–5, 17n8, 29n16 Millennium Development Goals, 149–50, 185 minerals, 84, 127 minimum wage, 52–53, 100, 102– 8, 175, 177 monopolies, 94, 111, 127, 136 Morocco, 173 Morrisson, Christian, 28 movies, 87 Murtin, Fabrice, 28 national inequality, 2–4; correcting, 158–80; education and, 167–73; fairer globalization and, 147, 158; Gini coefficient and, 27 (see also Gini coefficient); globalization and, 119; market regulation and, 173–75; protectionism and, 147, 157, 176–79; redistribution and, 158–73, 175, 178; rise in, 6, 48– 52, 115, 204; taxes and, 158–73, 175, 181–83 natural resources, 84–85, 92, 122, 126–28, 127, 151 Netherlands, 46t, 50, 66, 70, 102 Nigeria, 9, 46t, 54, 127, 151 non-­monetary inequalities: access and, 61, 67–68; capability and, 61; differences in environment and, 66–68; discrimination and, 64–66, 69; employment precariousness and, 63–64; evolution of inequality and, 49, 60–70; intergenerational mobility and, 68; opportunities and, 49, 60– 70; social justice and, 60, 70; unemployment and, 62–63 normalization: evolution of inequality and, 41, 43–44; GDP measurement and, 29, 41, 43– 45; global inequality and, 13, 15, 22–23, 26, 29 Occupy Wall Street movement, 6, 135 OECD countries, 27t; evolution of inequality and, 42t, 43, 44t, 50– 52, 64, 65n13; fairer globalization and, 149, 159, 162, 164– 65; Gini coefficient and, 51; income distribution and, 51; relaxation of regulation and, 99; restrictive, 64; rise in inequality and, 50–51, 94, 99, 102, 106n18, 107; social programs and, 94; standard of living and, 11–12, 43, 50–52, 64, 94, 99, 102, 107, 120, 149, 159, 162, 164–65; U-­shaped curve on income and, 50 OECD Database on Household 204 Income Distribution and Poverty, 11–12 offshoring, 81–82 oil, 92, 127 opportunity, 5; African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) and, 155; as capability, 61; efficiency and, 142–45; evolution of inequality and, 61–62, 68, 70–71; fairer globalization and, 155, 167, 170, 172; globalization and, 133–34, 139, 142–44; redistribution and, 142–45; rise in inequality and, 102 Pakistan, 46t, 111 Pareto efficiency, 130n5 Pavarotti, Luciano, 86–87 payroll, 53, 93, 100, 104, 107, 175 Pearson Commission, 149 pension systems, 167 Perotti, Roberto, 134 Philippines, 46t, 111 Pickett, Kate, 140 Piketty, Thomas, 4, 48, 59n8, 60, 89n10, 125, 160n4 PISA survey, 169–70 policy, 4; adjustment, 109, 153; Cold War and, 149, 153; convergence and, 147–48; development aid and, 148–53; distributive, 26, 72, 135, 188; educational, 149, 152, 167–73; evolution of inequality and, 55, 72; fairer globalization and, 147–53, 157–58, 167–73, 175–83; Glass-­Steagall Act and, 174n15; global inequality and, 185–89; globalization and, 118–19, 124, 126, 128–31, 139, 143–44; globalizing equality and, 184–89; import substi- Index tution and, 34; Millennium Development Goals and, 149– 50, 185; poverty reduction and, 147–48; protectionist, 7, 99– 100, 107–8, 147, 154, 157, 176–79; reform and, 74 (see also reform); rise in inequality and, 34, 74–75, 85, 94, 97, 99– 100, 104, 106–11, 114–16; social, 7; standard of living and, 147–48 population growth, 28–29, 110, 183 portfolios, 88 Povcal database, 10, 12, 42t, 43, 44t poverty, 1, 44t, 109; Collier on, 23; convergence and, 147–48; criminal activity and, 133–34; definition of, 24; development aid and, 147–52; fairer globalization and, 147–52, 164, 166, 175; ghettos and, 66–67; global inequality and, 11, 15n6, 19–20, 22–25, 28–29, 32; globalization and, 117, 123, 126–27, 134, 144; growth and, 28–29; measurement of, 23–24; Millennium Development Goals and, 149– 50, 185; OECD Database on Household Income Distribution and Poverty and, 11–12; reduction policies for, 147–48; traps of, 144, 150, 164 prices: commodity, 84, 182; exports and, 178; factor, 74, 126; fairer globalization and, 147–48, 176, 178, 182; global inequality and, 27–28, 74, 80, 84, 91–92, 94, 97, 110; globalization and, 118, 122, 126, 136–38; imports and, 80; international compari- Index205 sons of, 11; lower, 94, 137; oil, 92; rise in inequality and, 74, 80, 84, 91–92, 94, 97, 110; rising, 110, 122, 178; shocks and, 38, 55, 91–92, 175; statistics on, 11, 27; subsidies and, 109–10, 175 primary income: evolution of inequality and, 48–50, 58; fairer globalization and, 158, 163n10, 167, 173; globalization and, 135, 143–44 privatization: deregulation and, 94–112; efficiency and, 94, 96, 105, 108; globalization of finance and, 95–99; institutions and, 94–109; labor market and, 99–109; reform and, 94–109; telecommunications and, 111 production: deindustrialization and, 75–82; evolution of inequality and, 57; fairer globalization and, 155–57, 167, 176, 178–79; globalization and, 119, 124, 126, 129, 131, 133, 137; growth and, 3, 34–35, 57, 74, 76–81, 84–86, 119, 124, 126, 129, 131, 133, 137, 155–57, 167, 176, 178–79; material investment and, 119; North vs.

Shadows of Empire: The Anglosphere in British Politics
by Michael Kenny and Nick Pearce
Published 5 Jun 2018

The liberal, free market institutional order appeared to contain no internal contradictions that could threaten it. The prospect of a serious challenge to the Anglo-American West was almost inconceivable. Fukuyama captured the Zeitgeist of this moment with great elan, anchoring the claims of liberal democratic politics and Anglo-liberal capitalism in a historicist account which foretold their continued dominance into the new century. Yet, precisely because of its universalist aspirations, Fukuyama's thinking eschewed any recourse to Anglosphere Whiggishness. The spread of democracy and the market could not be reduced, culturally or institutionally, to the genius of the English-speaking peoples.

Survival of the Richest: Escape Fantasies of the Tech Billionaires
by Douglas Rushkoff
Published 7 Sep 2022

Lifting language from books by new economics theorists such as Paul Mason, Kate Rayworth, and even myself, Schwab claims the concept of “stakeholder capitalism,” which will acknowledge the interests not only of shareholders but workers and locals impacted by a company’s operations. Some of what he’s asking for sounds great. We are to welcome the billion or more refugees displaced by climate change, listen to scientific experts, and eat less meat. All good stuff. The ways we are to arrive at this new normal are more suspect. First, we are to liberate capital from all regulatory encumbrances—stuff like taxation, protection for local industries, and, worst of all, nationalization. Instead of forcing corporations to address global problems or taxing their winnings to do it on a national level, we are supposed to encourage their voluntary “impact investing” and support their emerging spirit of “corporate global citizenship.”

Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste: How Neoliberalism Survived the Financial Meltdown
by Philip Mirowski
Published 24 Jun 2013

The neoliberal subject is not supposed to be “free” to meditate upon the nature and limits of her own freedom—that is the dreaded “relativism” which neoliberals uniformly denounce. 95 Behrent, “Liberalism Without Humanism.” This is discussed in the next chapter, in the section on governmentality. 96 See Kristol, “Socialism, Capitalism, Nihilism,” LAMP, Montreux meeting, 1972: “And what if the ‘self’ that is ‘realized’ under the conditions of liberal capitalism is a self that despises liberal capitalism, and uses its liberty to subvert and abolish a free society? To this question, Hayek—like Friedman—has no answer.” 97 There are exceptions to this generalization. For instance, the MPS member Gary Becker has proposed to solve illegal immigration by “selling” the rights to citizenship.

Slouching Towards Utopia: An Economic History of the Twentieth Century
by J. Bradford Delong
Published 6 Apr 2020

So let us look at the failures that fascism ascribed to the pseudo-classical semi-liberal order that establishment politicians were attempting to rebuild after World War I. And make no mistake: the failures were real. The first was a macroeconomic failure: semi-liberal capitalism had failed to guarantee high employment and rapid economic growth. The second was a distributional failure: either semi-liberal capitalism made the rich richer while everyone else stayed poor, or it failed to preserve an adequate income differential between the more-educated, more-respectable lower middle class and the unskilled industrial proletariat. It could not win.

The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830–1970
by John Darwin
Published 23 Sep 2009

Germany's foreign trade had expanded rapidly and its new merchant fleet, like its navy, was second only to Britain's. German investment had begun to penetrate regions like Latin America, long the preserve of British capital.26 Not surprisingly, in some naval, shipping and colonial circles, as well as among conservatives hostile to the liberal capitalism with which London was so closely identified, antagonism to Britain was commonplace. But, while German policy was committed to the Tirpitz plan, and a high seas fleet strong enough to enforce neutrality on Britain in the event of continental war, there was little enthusiasm in Berlin for a frontal assault on the British system.

…

Some regions – those where the old staples of textiles, shipbuilding and coal were still strongly entrenched – suffered acute unemployment and the deprivation that followed. South Wales, Lancashire, Northeast England and industrial Scotland were especially hard-hit. Here, political feeling displayed deep alienation from the Victorian ethos of liberal capitalism, including perhaps the Victorian conception of a free-trading empire. The sense of betrayal was sharpened by the irony that it was in these old staple regions that wages had been highest, labour unions strongest, and awareness of Britain's great place in the world most widely diffused. But the critical fact was that, despite all their visible hardship, the ‘old’ industrial regions were not representative of the British economy as a whole.

…

There, as in Europe, the champions of the post-war settlement seemed weak and divided, reluctant to challenge the revisionist powers, let alone to match their military power. For all the fragility of its industrial base (carefully noted in London), Japan's military spending between 1933 and 1938 exceeded that of Britain or America.3 The revolt against the geopolitical order was also a revolt against liberal capitalism and its two great centres in London and New York.4 By the mid-1930s, a new world economy had emerged, bringing a drastic reversal of the post-war ‘normality’ of the late 1920s. Commercial liberalism was replaced by economic nationalism. Almost every state had built a wall of controls to reduce its exposure to external pressures – trade competition, capital movements and currency fluctuations – and the domestic unrest that followed closely behind.

Does Capitalism Have a Future?
by Immanuel Wallerstein , Randall Collins , Michael Mann , Georgi Derluguian , Craig Calhoun , Stephen Hoye and Audible Studios
Published 15 Nov 2013

State capitalism has been an exception during the last 450 years, but one possible transformation of capitalism would be for it to grow more common. Arguably Soviet communism already involved something like state capitalism. Certainly fascism did. Where governments today use reactionary nationalism to shore up their legitimacy, state capitalism seems more likely. The key point is that future capitalism need not be an extension of the “liberal capitalism” dominant in the last two centuries of Western history. The widely remarked link between capitalism and liberal democracy may turn out to have been only one way of relating capitalism to politics, shaped by particular historical conditions and struggles. Of course domestic neoliberalism was closely related to the international promotion of “free trade.”

In Defense of Global Capitalism
by Johan Norberg
Published 1 Jan 2001

Politicians can create the appearance of rising wages by accelerating inflation, which is precisely what Swedish politicians did for a long time. Because each dollar is then worth less, however, those increases are entirely chimerical. Growth and productivity alone are capable of raising real wages in the long run. All political and economic systems need rules, and this includes even the most liberal capitalism, which presupposes rules about legitimate ownership, the writing of contracts, the resolution of disputes, and many other matters. Those rules are a necessary framework required for markets to operate smoothly. But there are also rules that prevent the market economy from working—detailed regulations specifying the uses people can make of their property and making it difficult to start up a certain kind of activity, owing to the need for licenses and permits or to restrictive rules on pricing and business transactions.

Raw Data Is an Oxymoron
by Lisa Gitelman
Published 25 Jan 2013

Adam Hochschild, Bury the Chains: Prophets and Rebels in the Fight to Free an Empire’s Slaves (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005), 197. 99 100 Ellen Gruber Garvey 7. See Augusta Rohrbach, “‘Truth Stronger and Stranger than Fiction’: Reexamining William Lloyd Garrison’s The Liberator,” Truth Stranger Than Fiction: Race, Realism, and the U.S. Literary Marketplace (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 2, for an examination of the relationship of The Liberator to “liberal capitalism and moral suasion.” 8. Dan McKanan, Identifying the Image of God: Radical Christians and Nonviolent Power in the Antebellum United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 135. 9. Although writers like Spender have criticized Theodore Weld for failing to share authorial credit for American Slavery with his wife and sister-in-law, and he did sign the circular requesting information, his name does not actually appear on the 1839 edition as the book’s author.

Global Governance and Financial Crises
by Meghnad Desai and Yahia Said
Published 12 Nov 2003

S. (1999) Malaysia’s Political Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profits, 2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Hamilton-Hart, N. (2000) ‘Indonesia: reforming the institutions of financial governance?’, Processed, Australian National University, Canberra. Helleiner, E. (1994) ‘Freeing money: why have states been more willing to liberalize capital controls than trade barriers?’, Policy Sciences, 27(4): 299–318. Hellmann, T., Murdock, K. and Stiglitz, J. (1997) ‘Financial restraint: toward a new paradigm’, in M. Aoki, H. Kim and M. Okuno-Fujiwara (eds), The Role of Government in East Asian Economic Development: Comparative Institutional Analysis, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 163–207.

The Long Good Buy: Analysing Cycles in Markets
by Peter Oppenheimer
Published 3 May 2020

Low inflation and interest rates led to a growing belief that, after a period of strong growth, the major economies could achieve a ‘soft landing’ – avoiding a recession and enjoying an extended economic expansion. The fall of communism and the ‘peace dividend’ that followed, together with the expansion of liberal capitalism, enabled risk premia to fall. This optimism and strong market rises continued throughout 1986 and, in the first 10 months of 1987, the Dow Jones appreciated by an astonishing 44%. Then, quite suddenly, on 18 October, everything changed. The Dow collapsed by 22.6% in a single day. That day became known as Black Monday, in reference to Black Monday, Tuesday and Thursday in 1929, almost exactly 58 years earlier, when the stock market had dropped by 13% (with much sharper falls to follow).

The Idea of Decline in Western History
by Arthur Herman
Published 8 Jan 1997

But Horkheimer and the others had already fled to Geneva, where they took refuge while waiting for visas to the United States. In the meantime they began to put forward a theory to explain why a supposedly civilized country like Germany had embraced an irrational, violent, and racist ideology with such devastating swiftness. In the end, they proclaimed that liberal capitalism “contained from its very beginning the tendency toward national socialism.”16 Meanwhile Horkheimer and the institute took refuge in the United States. Only a year earlier, in 1935, its administrative director, Friedrich Pollock, had denounced New Deal America as a hotbed of fascism.17 Now it became their place of refuge.

…

And since “violence is the common origin of all regimes” and “successful revolutions taken together have not spilled as much blood as empires … we should prefer revolutionary violence because it has a humanist future.” The violence and terror of Stalinism were really only a more blatant and “honest” form of the violence and terror that underlay liberal capitalism. “The purity of [liberal] principles not only tolerates but even requires violence,” Merleau-Ponty intoned. Hence, “a regime which acknowledges its violence might have in it more genuine humanity” than those of the bourgeois West, which try to disguise it by appeals to the rule of law.37 In praising Marxist “humanist” violence, Merleau-Ponty was saying something more than that the end justifies the means.

Branded Beauty
by Mark Tungate
Published 11 Feb 2012

According to Jacques Marseille in his history of L’Oréal, Eugène Schueller was familiar with a number of ‘Cagoulards’. Following the fall of France in 1940, he helped to finance Deloncle’s next group, Le Mouvement Social-Révolutionnaire (The Social Revolutionary Movement), whose aim was to ‘construct a new Europe with the cooperation of Germany and all other nations free, like her, of liberal capitalism, Judaism, Bolshevism and Freemasonry’. This time Schueller’s name appeared for all to see on the group’s posters and political tracts – alongside that of Jacques Corrèze, Deloncle’s secretary, who would later become chairman of L’Oréal’s American operations (‘Jacques Corrèze, L’Oréal official and Nazi collaborator, dies at 79’, New York Times, 28 June 1991).

Culture Shock! Costa Rica 30th Anniversary Edition
by Claire Wallerstein
Published 1 Mar 2011

Guanacaste is the only part of the country where colonial architecture can still be seen intact and traditional ox carts are in use. In fact, however, Guanacaste only became part of Costa Rica in 1824. Previously the southernmost province of Nicaragua, its inhabitants narrowly voted to leave that country because of the ongoing civil war between the liberal capital, León, and the powerful conservative trading town of Granada following independence from Spain in 1821. Nicaragua did not accept the loss of Guanacaste until 1858, when a border limit treaty was finally signed. The people of Guanacaste (known by the Meseta Central Ticos as cholos) clearly have a richer ethnic mix than most other areas of the country.

Losing Control: The Emerging Threats to Western Prosperity
by Stephen D. King
Published 14 Jun 2010

In a world of constant financial innovation, it became increasingly difficult to impose capital controls successfully. Moreover, capital controls allowed countries to pursue bad domestic policies for too long, ultimately to their own detriment. Nevertheless, the abolition of capital controls has hardly been plain sailing. Some economists foresaw the problems associated with newly liberalized capital markets. James Tobin (1918–2002), for example, suggested in 1972 a (now-eponymous) tax – to be paid on foreign-exchange transactions – to limit speculative cross-border capital flows. He feared that the failures of Bretton Woods would be replaced by anarchy in the capital markets. On occasion, he was proved right.

The Twittering Machine
by Richard Seymour
Published 20 Aug 2019

The fascist movements of the interwar period were rooted in imperialist ideologies, popular militarism, paramilitary organizations and a world system run by colonial empires and menaced by socialist revolution. These circumstances will not return. The colonies are dead, most armies are professional and there isn’t an abundance of popular organization of any kind, let alone paramilitary organization. Nonetheless, liberal capitalism shows itself to be vulnerable, crisis-ridden and open to challenge by the racist, nationalist far right. And what, in such circumstances, are the cultural valences of the social industry that produces so much of our social life now? Which tendencies would it select for, and which would it mute?

Less Is More: How Degrowth Will Save the World
by Jason Hickel
Published 12 Aug 2020

Proponents of the Green New Deal have it right: we need to pump public investment into building renewable energy infrastructure at a historically unprecedented rate, reminiscent of the industrial retooling that enabled the Allies to win the Second World War. But there’s something troubling about the way this idea has been picked up and repackaged by some media pundits. The claim is that transitioning to clean energy will liberate capitalism from any concerns about ecology. It will pave the way to ‘green growth’, they say, and we can keep expanding the economy for ever. It’s a compelling story. It seems so obvious and straightforward. And not surprisingly, it has seized the imaginations of orthodox economists and politicians. But this narrative suffers from a number of serious flaws.

The Capitalist Manifesto
by Johan Norberg
Published 14 Jun 2023

Free markets and individualist societies make us obsessed with being independent, but this also liberates us from what makes us human – communities, relationships, fellow human beings, faith and family. Self-realization becomes nothing but a beautiful word for the emptiness of modernity, the loneliness of the mall. This is the last line of defence against free markets, from the statist left, the national conservatives and collectivist intellectuals. Once upon a time the critics said liberal capitalism could never produce wealth, then they had to admit that it does albeit only to a small elite, then they admitted that everyone might get richer but poor countries will suffer, but eventually then they said OK, everyone might be better off, but why would that be such a good thing? Capitalism may make us materially rich but spiritually poor.

Winds of Change
by Peter Hennessy
Published 27 Aug 2019

I call ’em Stop-Go and Son’ [Steptoe and Son was in its comedic prime on BBC TV in 1964] … It was rousing election rhetoric and even Conservative Central Office’s secret agent could scarce forbear to cheer the Labour leader for providing such wonderful entertainment.21 Aitken returned to London thinking Wilson ‘would win the election easily’. Elections are always difficult to read. There is a dash of quantum physics about them – they are a mix of waves and particles. Sometimes (1945, 1966, 1979, 1997) the electorate votes for a serious squirt of social democracy or liberal capitalism, but usually it wants a sensible fusion of both and looks to Westminster and Whitehall to broker it. What were the waves and particles of the general election of 1964? In the grand sweep of post-1945 British politics and political economy, it has a particular significance as the first example of what Peter Riddell calls the ‘declinist general election’.22 Wilson set out his stall firmly and powerfully as the man to halt and then reverse the UK’s deep-set relative economic decline (Ted Heath did the same in 1970 and Margaret Thatcher in 1979).

…

More recent American economic historians have characterized the first two-and-a-half decades as ‘the Great Leap Forward’:11 the Princeton economist Robert Gordon argues that the great technical breakthroughs of the second industrial revolution of the late nineteenth century did not reach their maximum effect in terms of ‘total factor productivity’ until the years after 1945, boosted by wartime innovation and stimulated still further by the rise of a mass-consumption society whose ingredients were electricity, cars, telephones, running water and sewerage, improved infrastructure generally plus the spread of mass higher education.12 Gordon was writing about the United States (where, of course, overall consumption and living standards were much higher), but his analysis fits early postwar Britain apart from mass higher education, which the UK reached only in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This delayed bonus from late-nineteenth-century technological breakthroughs powerfully shaped the nature of the UK’s standard model of politics and the liberal capitalism/social democracy tussle at the heart of it. It enabled the UK version of Bobbitt’s ‘constitutional industrial state’ to make generous offers to its people compared with past political eras. The Second World War had also laid down a new psychological path along which subsequent socioeconomic progress could march.

Social Class in the 21st Century
by Mike Savage
Published 5 Nov 2015

Elite educational institutions succeed not because they are in the pocket of the former aristocratic elite (though, of course, old habits die hard and it is still possible to find traces of this), but because they are at the apex of highly competitive recruitment and training processes which lie at the heart of contemporary neo-liberal capitalism. Meritocracy goes hand-in-hand with the generation of the kind of intense inequalities we have identified in this book. It thus follows that calls for more ‘education’ as a means of encouraging social mobility and addressing class inequalities have considerable limitations in the face of the growing inequalities witnessed in recent decades.

Capitalism: Money, Morals and Markets
by John Plender
Published 27 Jul 2015

In his book After the Victorians, the novelist, biographer and journalist A. N. Wilson points out that when Mond was raised to the peerage with the title of Lord Melchett, he felt obliged to counter a denunciation of capitalism made by Philip Snowden in the House of Commons.223 In a classic defence of liberal capitalism, he talked of his father’s risk taking and altruism, of the dangers they had endured to build up a huge business and of the benefits to society that resulted. Father, son and various business partners had, he said, given work and prosperity to thousands, an enterprise which ‘could never have been commended under any Socialist system that I have ever known’.

War for Eternity: Inside Bannon's Far-Right Circle of Global Power Brokers
by Benjamin R. Teitelbaum
Published 14 May 2020

They agreed that the past was something to be overcome, that with the help of their reforms a greater future could come about—one that wouldn’t be experienced in the confines of a village or home, but on a global scale. He could have added to his argument, for in his writings he described all three as being materialist as well—liberalism (capitalism) and communism being obsessed with money, and fascism with bodies. To put that differently, all three were modernist, competing for the chance to modernize the world. Liberalism won, of course. It partnered with communism to defeat fascism in 1945, and then let communism die of old age in 1991.

American Marxism
by Mark R. Levin
Published 12 Jul 2021

Unlike sustainable development, which is a concept based on false consensus, degrowth does not aspire to be adopted as a common goal by the United Nations, the OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development] or the European Commission. The idea of ‘socially sustainable degrowth,’ or simply degrowth, was born as a proposal for radical change. The contemporary context of neo-liberal capitalism appears as a post-political condition, meaning a political formation that forecloses the political and prevents the politicization of particular demands. Within this context, degrowth is an attempt to re-politicize the debate on much needed socio-ecological transformation, affirming dissidence with the current world representations and search for alternative ones….

How to Be Idle
by Tom Hodgkinson
Published 1 Jan 2004

Yutang, Lin, The Importance of Living (London: Heinemann, 1 938) . Zeldin, Theodore, An Intimate History of Humanity (London: Vintage, 1 998) . Zeldin, Theodore, Conversation (London: Harvill, 1 999) . A list of useful websites: www.abebooks.co.uk Beautiful secondhand books at low prices. Brian Dean ' s brilliant critique of liberal capitalism. For an insight into the mind of poetlrocker/freedomseeker Peter Doherty. Useful reference site. The home of the Campaign for Real Ale. Spend less, work less. www.hermenaut.com Josh Glenn ' s digest of heady philosophy. www.idler.co.uk Website of the Idler magazine. www.luxuriamusic.com For lovers of lounge music.

Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization
by Branko Milanovic
Published 10 Apr 2016

Surely, those who argue for localism do not wish to propose a major drop in living standards or a Khmer Rouge solution to inequality. Forms of state capitalism, as in Russia and China, do exist, but this is capitalism nevertheless: the private profit motive and private companies are dominant. It is often stated that Islam is the only remaining ideological competitor to Western liberal capitalism. This is, I think, true in many respects as far as liberal society is concerned but not in the one that we address here, namely, the effects of inequality on capitalism. For Islam itself, not only as it exists in dominantly Muslim countries, but even in theory, is indeed a kind of capitalism, in its emphasis on private ownership of the means of production, the pursuit of gain, and the rejection of unfree labor.31 The only area of economics where Western and Islamic capitalisms part ways is in the treatment of interest (as differentiated from profit, which, unlike interest, is a variable rather than a fixed source of income that depends on the success of the enterprise).

China's Good War
by Rana Mitter

In the Cold War, both the American and Soviet systems generated their own moral discourses, often based on similar-sounding vocabulary (freedom, peace, democracy), but consisting of contrasting worldviews which then generated adherents and dissenters. The legacy of the Second World War was drawn into service to argue for the superiority of liberal capitalism or socialism, opposing discourses which could nonetheless draw on shared assumptions about the war as a transformative event. With the war more than seven decades in the past, and little sense that China provides an attractive model for generating “soft power” (in the strict sense, following Joseph Nye, of being able to influence without coercion), Beijing’s discourse about the war has had considerably less purchase than it would wish.42 A New Marshall Plan?

A History of the World in Seven Cheap Things: A Guide to Capitalism, Nature, and the Future of the Planet
by Raj Patel and Jason W. Moore
Published 16 Oct 2017

Understand how capitalism has made “cheap lives” a strategy of cheap nature, and you understand not only the forces required to keep money, work, care, food, and energy cheap but also how the most sophisticated and subtle modern institution, the nation-state, still draws on early modern roots and natural science to manage modern life. More important still, as states confront the limits of their ability both to manage the lives in their charge and to provide conducive environments for liberal capitalism, we’re reaching the end of an era of cheap lives. We make this argument not with relish for the successor to the liberal nation-state but out of concern for what may follow. We’re astute enough students of history to know that what comes next might be far worse. Like everything else in our tale of cheap things, the components of the modern nation-state and its cheap lives predate capitalism.

Roller-Coaster: Europe, 1950-2017
by Ian Kershaw
Published 29 Aug 2018

In the post-war decades all political parties agreed on the need to expand welfare provision. The extraordinary economic growth allowed the fulfilment of both aims – in the east under communist regimes that forcibly created societies more equal than ever before, if at a high political price, and greatly extended welfare provision from the state, and in Western Europe under liberal capitalism that also reduced social inequalities (though to a far smaller degree than in the east) and combined market forces with the varying forms of welfare state. Pre-war advances in social security had left many gaps. Scandinavia, Germany and Britain had made most progress with national insurance schemes, but these were still limited, while in most European countries large sections of the population had minimal insurance (or none at all) for accidents at work, unemployment and ill-health, and little or no provision for old-age pensions.

…

They applauded President Reagan’s hardline stance (abetted by his British acolyte, the ‘Iron Lady’ Margaret Thatcher) on communism, revelling in what they saw as the vindication of the ‘Star Wars’ programme and levels of military spending that had demonstrated Western economic superiority and exposed Soviet weakness. They did not conceal their sense of triumph at what they paraded as the victory of liberal capitalism over state socialism, of freedom over serfdom. Most people, though, refrained from outright triumphalism. Relief was more apparent – relief that the Cold War was finally over and, consequently, that the danger of nuclear conflict had been eliminated. This mingled with satisfaction at the collapse of a system built upon oppression and unfreedom and the sense that Western values had triumphed.

Brexit, No Exit: Why in the End Britain Won't Leave Europe
by Denis MacShane
Published 14 Jul 2017

By February 2017, the Swiss parliament had quietly turned the referendum vote into a system of internal management of people movement which allowed European workers into Switzerland and was acceptable to the European Commission in Brussels. Many were aghast at this rapid expansion of the EU from a grouping of states with roughly similar levels of development based broadly on the system of responsible, open-trade liberal capitalism with a social face that put down roots after 1950, despite widely varied political and government systems. Greece was perhaps the most egregious example, though southern Italy would run it a close second. The creation of the euro was meant to have a double effect. It would allow the Single Market to expand, as every economic actor would now stop worrying about currency wars or need to hedge against the uncertainty of what a franc, peseta, lira or drachma would be worth.

The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy
by Dani Rodrik
Published 23 Dec 2010

When Stanley Fischer made the case for capital mobility during the 1997 meetings of the IMF, he devoted a major part of his presentation to the adjustments required for countries to “prepare well” for capital mobility. As he put it, “economic policies and institutions, particularly the financial system, need to be adapted to operate in a world of liberalized capital markets.” Some of what needs to be done was well known, he said. Macroeconomic policies need to be “sound” the domestic financial system needs to be “strengthened” and the removal of capital controls should be phased in “appropriately.” But there were also issues about which there was less knowledge or consensus.

Capital Without Borders
by Brooke Harrington
Published 11 Sep 2016

It would be more accurate to say that many high-net-worth individuals desire to “escape what they regard as onerous, unreasonable or capricious restrictions imposed by governments.”13 These maneuvers range from the relatively benign, such as evading the “prohibition against interest payments in some Moslem countries,” to the more sinister, like “arms dealing and the evasion of international sanctions and embargoes.”14 What all those restrictions have in common is that they limit participation in global financial markets, which are the primary site of wealth generation in the contemporary political economy.15 Wealth managers “liberate” capital from these limitations on growth and mobility, freeing clients to accumulate wealth unfettered. Ironically enough, shifting wealth away from one set of sovereign constraints requires recourse to another set of states: ones that use their sovereignty in a different way, to compete for and shelter assets that have been “liberated” from other places.

Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society
by Eric Posner and E. Weyl
Published 14 May 2018

Scott, 174 Ford, 185–87, 193, 240, 243, 311n30 France, 10, 12, 13, 90, 127–30, 139, 141, 182, 210 free access, 43, 211 free data, 209, 220, 224, 231–35, 239 free-rider problem, 107–8 Free: The Future of a Radical Prize (Anderson), 212 free trade, 23, 131–33, 136, 266 French Revolution, 46, 86, 90, 277 Friedman, Milton, xiii, xix Galbraith, John Kenneth, 125–26, 240 Galeano, Eduardo, 140 General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 138 General Theory of Employment, Money and Interest, The (Keynes), 1 George, Henry, 4; capitalism and, 36–37; inequality and, xix–xx; labor and, 137; laissez-faire and, 45, 250, 253; Progress and Poverty and, 36–37, 43, 240; Progressive movement and, 174–75; property and, 36–37, 42–46, 49, 51, 59, 66; reform and, 23; socialism and, 37, 45, 137, 250, 253; Vickrey and, xx–xxii Germany, 10, 12, 13, 45, 77, 93–94, 131, 135, 139 Gibbons, Robert, 52 Giegel, Josh, 32–33 Gilded Age, 174, 262 globalization: backlash against, 265; capital flows and, 265; common ownership self-assessed tax (COST) and, 269–70; foreign products and, 130; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and, 138; growth and, 257–58; imbalance in, 264–65; immigrants and, 28, 127–30, 132, 141–53, 156–66, 256–57, 261, 266–69, 273, 308n19; inequality and, 8, 9, 134, 135, 165; internationalism and, 140, 160–67; international trade and, 14, 22, 132, 137–38, 140, 142, 265, 270; investment and, 140–41; labor and, 130, 137–40; liberalism and, 255; public goods and, 265; Quadratic Voting (QV) and, 266–69; reform and, 255; VIP program and, 265–66 Glorious Revolution, 86, 95 GM, 185–87, 193, 196, 243 Goeree, Jacob, 304n34 Google, xxi, 314n29; advertising and, 202, 211–13, 220, 234; algorithms and, 289; asset managers and, 171; Brin and, 211; data and, 28, 202, 207–13, 219–20, 224, 231–36, 241–42, 246; immigrants and, 149–51, 154, 163, 169; Page and, 211; re-CAPTCHA and, 235–36; search and, 117, 202, 213, 233, 235 Google Assistant, 219 Gray, Mary, 233–34 Great Depression, 3, 17, 46, 176 Great Recession, 181–82 Greece, 55, 83–84, 90, 131, 296n16 gridlock, 84, 88, 122–24, 261, 267 Groves, Theodore, 99–100, 102, 105 growth, economic: capitalism’s slowing of, 3; common ownership self-assessed tax (COST) and, 73, 256; entrenched privilege and, 4; entrepreneurial sectors and, 144; equal distribution of, 148; globalization and, 257–58; index funds and, 181; inequality and, 3, 5, 8–9, 11, 23–24, 123, 148, 256–57; investment and, 181; liberalism and, 3–11, 23–24, 29; monopsony and, 199, 241; productivity, 254–55; quadratic, 103–5, 123; savings and, 6; stagnation and, 257–58; technology and, 255; wage, 190, 201 guest workers, 140, 150–51, 308n32 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 158–65, 265–66 gun rights, 15, 76, 81, 90, 105–9, 116, 127 H1–B program, 149, 154, 162–63 Hacker, Jacob, 191 Haiti, 127–30, 153 Hajjar, 168–71 Handmaid’s Tale, The (Atwood), 18–19 happiness: Bentham on, 95–96, 98; Quadratic Voting (QV) and, 108–10, 306n52; utilitarian principle and, 95 Harberger, Arnold, 56–59 Hardin, Garrett, 44 Hayek, Friedrich, xix, 47–48, 278, 286 health issues, 100–101, 113, 151–52, 154, 266, 290–91 Her (film), 254 Hicks, John, 68 Hitler, Adolf, 3–94 Hobbes, Thomas, 85 holdout, 33, 62, 71–72, 88, 299n28 homeowners, 17, 26, 33, 42, 56–57, 65 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 186 House of Cards (TV series), 221 human capital, 130, 258–61, 264, 293 Hume, David, 132 Hylland, Aanund, 100 immigrants: auctioning visas and, 147–49; au pair program and, 154–55, 161; common ownership self-assessed tax (COST) and, 261, 269, 273; data as labor and, 256; DeFoe on, 132; democratizing visas and, 149–57; education and, 14, 143–44, 148; elitism and, 3, 146, 166; English language and, 151, 155, 165, 251; Europe and, 139–40; expansion of existing migration and, 142–46; family reunification programs and, 150, 152; free trade and, 131–33, 136; George on, 137; globalization and, 28, 127–30, 132, 141–53, 156–66, 256–57, 261, 266–69, 273, 308n19; guest workers and, 140, 150–51, 308n32; H1–B program and, 149, 154, 162–63; Haitian, 127–30, 153; human trafficking and, 158; illegal, 130, 139, 143, 152–53, 158, 160, 165–66, 268; Irish, 137; J-1 program and, 154, 161, 273; labor and, 28, 127–30, 132, 141–53, 156–66, 256–57, 261, 266–69, 273, 308n19; legal issues and, 130, 139, 143, 152–53, 158; living standards and, 148, 153, 257; logic of free migration and, 132–37; Marx on, 137; mercantilism and, 132; Mexico and, 139–40; Mill on, 137; New World and, 136; populism and, 14; Quadratic Voting (QV) and, 261, 266–69, 273; refugees and, 130, 140, 145; skill levels of, 143–47, 150, 159–65; Smith on, 132–33; sponsors and, 129, 149–65, 273; Stolper-Samuelson Theorem and, 142–43; Syrian, 116, 140, 145; taxes and, 143–45, 156; technology and, 256–57; transportation costs and, 141; unlimited immigration and, 142; Visas Between Individuals Program (VIP) and, 150, 153, 156–66, 261, 265–66, 269; wages and, 143, 154, 158, 161–62, 165, 308n19; World Bank studies and, 140; xenophobia and, 3, 166 Immorlica, Nicole, 306n52 impossibility theorem, 92 income distribution, 4–8, 12, 74, 133, 223 index funds, 172, 181–82, 185–91, 194–95, 302n63, 310n16 India, 15, 21, 134–35, 149, 173, 206 industrial revolution, 36, 255 inequality: Brazil and, xiv; common ownership self-assessed tax (COST) and, 256–59; crosscountry analysis of, 134–35; democracy and, 123; evolution of, 133–34; George and, xix–xx; global, 8, 9, 134, 135, 165; growth and, 3, 5, 8–9, 11, 23–24, 123, 148, 256–57; growth in, 4–8; immigrants and, 266 (see also immigrants); income distribution and, 4–8, 12, 74, 133; institutional investment and, 187; labor and, 133–35, 141, 148, 163–65, 223; legal issues and, 22; liberalism and, 2–11, 22–25; living standards and, 3, 11, 13, 133, 135, 148, 153, 254, 257; measurement of, 133; minorities and, 12, 14–15, 19, 23–27, 85–90, 93–97, 101, 106, 110, 181, 194, 273, 303n14, 304n36; ownership and, 42, 45, 75, 79, 253; Quadratic Voting (QV) and, 264; Radical Markets and, 174, 176, 199, 257; slavery and, xiv, 1, 19, 23, 37, 96, 136, 255, 260; Smith on, 22; stagnequality and, 276; US Civil Rights movement and, 24 inflation, 8–9, 11, 149 innovation: competition and, 202–3; neural networks and, 214–19; robots and, 222, 248, 251, 254, 287; supersonic trains and, 30–32; technology and, 34, 71, 172, 187, 189, 202, 258 Innovator’s Dilemma, The (Christensen), 202 Instagram, 117, 202, 207 intellectual property, 26, 38, 48, 72, 210, 212, 239 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 138, 141, 267 international trade, 14, 22, 132, 137–42, 265, 270 Internet, 27, 51, 71; data and, 210–12, 224, 232, 235, 238–39, 242, 246–48; dot-com bubble and, 211; free access and, 211; high prices of, 21; online services and, 211, 235; user fees and, 211 “In the Soviet Union, Optimization Problem Solves You” (Shalizi), 281 Israel, 71 Italy, 10, 12, 13, 21 It’s a Wonderful Life (film), 17 J-1 visa program, 154, 161, 273 Jackson, Andrew, 14 James II, King of England, 86 Japan, 10, 12, 13, 80–81, 105–8 Jefferson, Thomas, 86 Jevons, William Stanley, 41, 50, 66, 224 Jonze, Spike, 254 JP Morgan, 171, 183, 184, 191 judicial activism, 124 Jury Theorem, 90–92 Kapital, Das (Marx), 239 Kasparov, Gary, 213 Keynes, John Maynard, 1, 9, 11 Kingsley, Sara, 234 Klemperer, Paul, 52 Korea, 11, 13, 71, 251 Kuwait, 158 labor: artisan, 206, 222; auctioning visas and, 147–49; au pair program and, 154–55, 161; automation of, 222–23, 251, 254; border issues and, 28, 130, 133, 139–40, 142, 144, 161, 164–65, 242, 256, 264–66; capitalism and, 136–37, 143, 159, 165, 211, 224, 231, 239–40, 316n4; collective bargaining and, 240–41; competition and, 145, 158, 162–63, 220, 234, 236, 239, 243, 245, 256, 266; cooperatives and, 118, 126, 261, 267, 299n24; cost of, 129, 200; craftsmen and, 17, 35; data and, 209–13, 246–49; democracy and, 122, 147, 149–57; digital economy and, 208–9 (see also digital economy); education and, 140, 143–44, 148, 150, 158, 170–71, 232, 248, 258–60; efficiency and, 130, 148, 240–41, 246; Engels on, 239–40; as entertainment, 233–39, 248–49; entrepreneurs and, xiv, 35, 39, 129, 144–45, 159, 173, 177, 203, 209–12, 224, 226, 256; equality and, 147, 166, 239, 257; exploitation of, 154, 157–58, 239–40; farm, 17, 34–35, 37–38, 61, 72, 135, 142, 179, 283–85; feudalism and, 16, 34–35, 37, 41, 61, 68, 136, 230–33, 239; free trade and, 131–33, 136; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and, 138; George and, 137; globalization and, 130, 137–40, 264–65 (see also globalization); guest workers and, 140, 150–51, 308n32; H1–B program and, 149, 154, 162–63; human capital and, 130, 258–60, 264; human trafficking and, 158; illegal aliens and, 160, 165–66, 268; immigrants and, 28, 127–30, 132, 141–53, 156–66, 256–57, 261, 266–69, 273, 308n19; income distribution and, 4–8, 12, 74; inequality and, 133–35, 141, 148, 163–65, 223; J-1 program and, 154, 161, 273; job displacement and, 222, 316n4; manufacturing and, 77, 122, 162, 174, 185–86, 190, 279; markets and, 255–60, 265–66, 268–69, 273–74, 280, 285; mercantilism and, 131–32; 136, 243; monopsony and, 190, 199–201, 223, 234, 238–41, 255; optimality and, 231, 243; pensions and, 157, 181; prices and, 132, 156, 207, 212, 221, 235, 243–44; productivity and, 9–10, 16, 38, 57, 73, 123, 240–41, 247, 254–55, 258, 278; programmers and, 163, 208–9, 214, 217, 219, 224; Radical Markets and, 132, 147, 158, 199–201, 243, 246–49; Red Queen phenomenon and, 176–77; reform and, 129, 153, 240, 247, 255; resale price maintenance and, 201; retirement and, 171–72, 260, 274; rise of data work and, 209–13; robots and, 222, 248, 251, 254, 287; serfs and, 35, 48, 231–32, 236, 255; skilled, 130, 144–47, 154, 159, 161–63, 180, 279; slave, xiv, 1, 19, 23, 37, 96, 136, 255, 260; socialism and, 137, 299n24; Stolper-Samuelson Theorem and, 142–43; technology and, 210–13, 219, 222–23, 236–41, 244, 251, 253–59, 265, 293, 316n4; unemployment and, 9–11, 190, 200, 209, 223, 239, 255–56; unions and, 23, 94, 118, 200, 240–45, 316n4; unpaid, 210, 233–39, 248–49; unskilled, 163, 266; visas and, 158 (see also visas); wages and, 5 (see also wages); wealth and, 130–43, 146, 148, 159–66, 209, 226, 239, 246; women’s work and, 209, 313n4; Workers International and, 45 Labor Party, 45 laissez-faire, 45, 250, 253, 277 landlords, 37, 43, 70, 136, 201–2 landowners, 31–33, 38–39, 41, 68, 105, 173 Lange, Oskar, 47, 277, 280, 282, 286–88, 298n13 Lanier, Jaron, 208, 220–24, 233, 237, 313n2, 315n48 land value taxation, 31, 42–44, 56, 61 Latin America, 10, 57, 130, 138, 140 Law of the Sea Authority, 267 Ledyard, John, 100 Lenin, Vladimir, 46 Lerner, Abba, 280 liberalism: capitalism and, 3, 17, 22–27; central planning and, 19–20; competition and, 6, 17, 20–28; conflict and, 12–16; crisis in, 1–29; democracy and, 3–4, 25, 80, 86, 90; efficiency and, 17, 24, 28; elitism and, 3, 15–16, 25–28; equality and, 4, 8, 24, 29; globalization and, 255; governance and, 3, 16; growth and, 3–11, 23–24, 29; industry and, 19, 22, 24; inequality and, 2–11, 22–25; labor and, 5–12, 21–23, 26, 28, 141, 164; markets and, 16–29; monopolies and, 6, 16, 21–23, 28; neoliberalism and, 5, 9, 11, 24, 255; ownership and, 17–19, 26–27; prices and, 7, 8, 17–22, 25–27; profits and, 6–7, 17–18; property and, 17–18, 25–28; Quadratic Voting (QV) and, 268; reform and, 2–4, 23–25, 255; regulations and, 3, 9, 18, 24; stagnation and, 8–11; taxes and, 5, 9, 23–24; values of, 1, 18; wages and, 5, 7, 10, 19; wealth and, 4–17, 22–24, 255–56 Ligett, Katrina, 306n52 Likert, Rensis, 111 Likert surveys, 111–16, 120, 306n53 LinkedIn, 202 liquidity, 31, 69, 177–79, 194, 301n49 living standards, 3, 11, 13, 133, 135, 148, 153, 254, 257–58 lobbying, 98–99, 189–90, 198, 203, 262, 312n50 Locke, John, 86 Lyft, xxi, 117 McAfee, Preston, 50 machine learning (ML), 315n48; algorithms and, 208, 214, 219, 221, 281–82, 289–93; automated video editing and, 208; consumers and, 238; core idea of, 214; data evaluation by, 238; diamond-water paradox and, 224–25; diminishing returns and, 229–30; distribution of complexity and, 228; facial recognition and, 208, 216–19; factories for thinking machines and, 213–20; humanproduced data for, 208–9; marginal value and, 224–28, 247; neural networks and, 214–19; overfitting and, 217–18; payment systems for, 224–30; productivity and, 208–9; Radical Markets for, 247; siren servers and, 220–24, 230–41, 243; technofeudalism and, 230–33; technooptimists and, 254–55, 316n2; techno-pessimists and, 254–55, 316n2; Vapnik and, 217; worker displacement and, 222 McKelvey, Richard, 94 Macron, Emmanuel, 129 Madison, James, 87 Magie, Elizabeth, 43 majority rule, 27, 83–89, 92–97, 100–101, 121, 306n51 Malkiel, Burton G., 309n14 managers, 40, 129, 157, 171–72, 178–81, 193, 209, 266, 279, 284, 311n27 manufacturing, 77, 122, 162, 174, 185–86, 190, 279 Mao Tse-tung, 46 marginal cost, 101–3, 107, 109 marginal revolution, 41, 47, 224 marginal value, 103, 224–28, 247, 304n35 Market Fundamentalists, xix, xvi–xvii markets; as antiquated computers, 286–88; auctions and, xv–xix, 49–51, 70–71, 97, 99, 147–49, 156–57; border issues and, 22–23, 25, 28, 130, 133, 139–40, 142, 144, 161, 164–65, 242, 256, 264–66; capitalism and, 278, 288, 304n36; central planning and, 277–85, 288–93; Coase on, 40, 48–51, 299n26; for collective decisions, 97–105; colonialism and, 8, 131; common ownership self-assessed tax (COST) and, 270, 286; competition and, 25–28, 109 (see also competition); computers and, 277, 280–93; concentration of, 186, 204; consumers and, 19, 47, 117, 172, 175, 186, 190–91, 197–98, 220, 238, 242–43, 247–48, 256, 262, 270, 280, 287–91; control and, 178–81, 183–85, 193, 198, 235; democracy and, 97–105, 262, 276; discontents and, 16–19; diversification and, 171–72, 180–81, 185, 191–92, 194–96, 310n22, 310n24; dot-com bubble and, 211; efficiency and, 180, 277–85; equilibrium and, 293, 305n40; expansion of, 256; exports and, 46, 132; Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and, 176, 186; feudalism and, 16, 34–35, 37, 41, 61, 68, 136, 230–33, 239; free trade and, 23, 131–33, 136, 266; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and, 138; globalization and, 265 (see also globalization); Great Depression and, 3, 17, 46, 176; Great Recession and, 181–82; immigrants and, 132–37; imports and, 132; international trade and, 14, 22, 132, 138, 140, 142, 265, 270; Internet and, 211; labor and, 255–60, 265–69, 273–74, 280, 285; liberalism and, 16–29; liquidity and, 31, 69, 177–79, 194, 301n49; manufacturing and, 77, 122, 162, 174, 185–86, 190, 279; marginal value and, 103, 224–28, 247; mercantilism and, 131–32; mergers and, 176, 178, 186–90, 197, 200, 202–3; monopsony and, 190, 199–201, 223, 234, 238–41, 255; open, 21–22, 24; as parallel processors, 282–86; passivity and, 171–72, 192, 196–97, 272, 274; Philosophical Radicals and, 4, 16, 20, 22–23, 95; power and, 6–8, 21, 25–28, 186, 190, 200, 234, 241, 255–56, 261, 271, 316n3; prices and, 278–80, 284–85; property and, 282; public goods and, 271; Quadratic Voting (QV) and, 122–23, 256, 272, 286, 304n36; Red Queen phenomenon and, 176–77, 184; scope of trade and, 122–23; sea power and, 131; Smith on, 16–17, 21–22; socialism and, 277–78, 281; stock, 8, 78, 171, 179, 181, 193, 211, 275; Stolper-Samuelson Theorem and, 142–43; tariffs and, 138, 266; technology and, 203, 286–87, 292; trade barriers and, 14; tragedy of the commons and, 44; without property, 40–45 Marx, Karl, 2, 19, 39, 46, 78, 137, 239–40, 277, 297n25 Means, Gardiner, 177–78, 183, 193–94 Mechanical Turk, 230–31, 234 Menger, Karl, 41, 47, 224 mercantilism, 96, 131–32 mergers, 176, 178, 186–90, 197, 200, 202–3 Mexico, 15, 139–41, 143, 148 micropayments, 210, 212 Microsoft, 2, 202, 209, 211, 219, 231, 238–39, 315n46 Milgrom, Paul, 50, 71 Mill, James, 35, 96 Mill, John Stuart, 4, 20, 96, 137 minorities: democracy and, 85–90, 93–97, 101, 106, 110; inequality and, 12, 14–15, 19, 23–27, 85–90, 93–97, 101, 106, 110, 181, 194, 273, 303n14, 304n36; religious, 87–88; tyrannies and, 23, 25, 88, 96–100, 106, 108; voting and, 303n14 mixed constitution, 84–85 Modern Corporation and Private Property, The (Berle and Means), 177–78 Modiface, 318n10 Mohammad, 131 monarchies, 85–86, 91, 95, 160 monopolies: American Tobacco Company and, 174; antitrust policies and, 23, 48, 174–77, 180, 184–86, 191, 197–203, 242, 255, 262, 286; Aristotle on, 172; capitalism and, 22–23, 34–39, 44, 46–49, 132, 136, 173, 177, 179, 199, 258, 262; Clayton Act and, 176–77, 197, 311n25; common ownership self-assessed tax (COST) and, 256–61, 270, 300n43; competition and, 174; consumers and, 175, 186, 197–98; corporate control and, 168–204; deadweight loss and, 173; democracy and, 125; Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and, 176, 186; feudalism and, 16, 34–35, 37, 41, 61, 68, 136, 230–33, 239; Gilded Age and, 174, 262; labor and, 132, 136, 243; land monopolization and, 42–43; legal issues and, 173–77, 196–99, 262; liberalism and, 6, 16, 21–23, 28; mergers and, 176, 178, 186–90, 197, 200, 202–3; natural, 48; prices and, 58–59, 179, 258, 300n43; problem of, 6, 34, 38–42, 48–52, 57, 66, 71, 196, 199, 298n7, 298n9, 299n28; property and, 34–39; Quadratic Voting (QV) and, 272; Radical Markets and, 172–79, 185, 190, 196, 199–204, 272; Red Queen phenomenon and, 176–77; resale price maintenance and, 200–201; robber barons and, 175, 199–200; Section 7 and, 196–97, 311n25; Sherman Antitrust Act and, 174, 262; Smith on, 173; Standard Oil Company and, 174–75; United States v.

Revolution Française: Emmanuel Macron and the Quest to Reinvent a Nation
by Sophie Pedder
Published 20 Jun 2018

During the summer of 2015, the mood in the minister’s office was one of frustration. Macron felt increasingly humiliated, and marginalized within government. He had lost his parliamentary battle with Manuel Valls, over the bill to deregulate Sunday trading. He was considered an agent of ultra-liberal capitalism by the left wing of the Socialist Party. But was he so out of touch with public opinion? In July the team organized a town-hall debate, open to the public and publicized on Macron’s Facebook page. ‘We had no idea whether we would have just 50 people, or more than that,’ recalls one of the coordinators.

The Cold War: A World History
by Odd Arne Westad
Published 4 Sep 2017

Even those who did not support the tsar felt that natural, direct, genuine forms of personal interaction were being lost, and might be replaced by inauthentic and foreign ways of living. All of this fueled anticapitalist resistance in Russia both on the Right and the Left in the years before World War I. The few who believed in the ideas of liberal capitalism were often lost in the melee. In this anticapitalist chorus in Russia, the Social Democratic Party stood out as one of the movements that linked the empire to broader trends in Europe. Founded in 1898, the party’s background was in Marxist thinking, which of course connected it to significant parts of the labor movement in Germany, France, and Italy.

…

Overall capitalism had a very bad run in the first half of the twentieth century. It was easy to inflame world opinion against it and in favor of ideals of social justice and defense of local communities, even when such values were presented by thugs and murderers. The Soviet Union was not the only collectivist challenger to liberal capitalism in the interwar years. In Italy, the Fascists, headed by Benito Mussolini, claimed that their combination of nationalism and socialism was the way forward. In Munich in 1923, just four years after the defeat of the Bavarian Soviet Republic, a young German extremist, Adolf Hitler, tried to grab power on behalf of his Nazi Party.

The End of Growth: Adapting to Our New Economic Reality
by Richard Heinberg
Published 1 Jun 2011

Those with privilege will no doubt struggle to maintain it, while the poor, driven to desperation by generally worsening economic conditions, may in increasing numbers of instances organize or even revolt in order to increase their share of a shrinking pie. In her 2008 book The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, Canadian anti-globalization author and activist Naomi Klein argued that modern neo-liberal capitalism thrives on disasters, in that politicians and corporate leaders take advantage of natural calamities and wars to ram though programs for privatization, free trade, and slashed social spending — programs that are inherently unpopular and would have little chance of adoption in ordinary times.51 Klein’s thesis seems confirmed in the present instance: the end of growth is presenting societies with an ongoing economic crisis, and we have already seen how, in the US, well-heeled investors and executives have benefited from government bailouts while millions of workers have lost jobs and homes.

Rewriting the Rules of the European Economy: An Agenda for Growth and Shared Prosperity
by Joseph E. Stiglitz
Published 28 Jan 2020

However, the aggressive free-market approach of Margaret Thatcher and the fall of the Berlin Wall resulted in a major change in this balance, based on an excessive confidence in markets. In the clash between two competing systems, Communism and capitalism, the latter seemed to have triumphed absolutely. Some, like Francis Fukuyama, went so far as to proclaim “the end of history,” prophesying that the entire world would eventually appreciate the wisdom of liberalism, capitalism, and democracy. This triumphalism paved the way for a shrinking role for the state. This confidence in the market has taken more than a few body blows since 1989. Above all, the 2008 financial crisis laid bare deep structural shortcomings. In the West, even in the decades before the financial crisis, few economic gains have accrued to the bottom half of households, or even the bottom 90 percent.

Inglorious Empire: What the British Did to India
by Shashi Tharoor
Published 1 Feb 2018

This, of course, is what Niall Ferguson does do. As we have seen, he sees in Empire cause for much that is good in the world, in particular the free movement of goods, capital and labour and the imposition of Western norms of law, order and governance. Without the spread of British rule around the planet, he argues, the success of liberal capitalism in so many economies today would not have been possible. Even if this were arguably a defensible proposition, however, it is not necessarily, as Ferguson would put it, a Good Thing. The continuity of today’s world with the world of the British empire, which he so celebrates, is most strikingly evident in the economic dependence of much of the postcolonial world on the former imperial states, a contemporary reality that hardly redounds to the credit of the colonizers.

Unfinished Business
by Tamim Bayoumi

International Monetary Fund (2009): “The State of Public Finances: Outlook and Medium-Term Policies After the 2008 Crisis”, International Monetary Fund Policy Paper, March 2009. International Monetary Fund (2011): “The United States: Spillover Report”, IMF Country Report No. 11/203, July 2011. International Monetary Fund (2012a): “Liberalizing Capital Flows and Managing Outflows”, International Monetary Fund Policy Paper, March 2012. International Monetary Fund (2012b): “The Liberalization and Management of Capital Flows: An Institutional View”, International Monetary Fund, November 2012. International Monetary Fund (2015): “Monetary Policy and Financial Stability”, International Monetary Fund, August 2015.

The Divide: A Brief Guide to Global Inequality and Its Solutions
by Jason Hickel
Published 3 May 2017

As the historian Mike Davis puts it: We are not dealing, in other words, with ‘lands of famine’ becalmed in stagnant backwaters of world history, but with the fate of tropical humanity at the precise moment (1870–1914) when its labour and products were being dynamically conscripted into a London-centred world economy.40 Millions died, not outside the ‘modern world system’, but in the very process of being forcibly incorporated into its economic and political structures. They died in the golden age of Liberal Capitalism. Of course, there was nothing ‘free’ about the free-market system that the British imposed. It was brought in by force, and the rules of trade were rigged by London. The peasants who switched to cash cropping did so under the duress of debt and taxes – including taxes on local irrigation systems and even on the construction of new wells.

Reset
by Ronald J. Deibert
Published 14 Aug 2020

Consider Amazon, what anticompetition jurist Lina Khan calls “the titan of twenty-first century commerce.”450 Amazon started out as a mere online retailer but is now also a marketing firm; a global transportation, delivery and logistics supplier; a payment vendor; a credit lender; an auction network service; a book publisher; a producer of television programs and films; a streaming media service; a hardware manufacturer; a neighbourhood security service provider; a facial recognition service provider; one of the world’s leading cloud hosting providers; and a grocery retailer (thanks to its acquisition of Whole Foods), among others. Amazon employed a predatory pricing policy to undercut competitors and then expand to the point of becoming essential infrastructure for a large number of other businesses. It did so while craftily evading antitrust measures, which themselves had been watered down over time, thanks to neo-liberal capitalism. As Khan says, “It is as if Bezos charted the company’s growth by first drawing a map of antitrust laws, and then devising routes to smoothly bypass them.” And this has paid off in spades: Jeff Bezos was named by Forbes magazine the “richest man in modern history” after his net worth increased to $150 billion in July 2018 — though it’s declined somewhat since that time, thanks to some risky investments and a costly divorce settlement in 2019.451 (It’s worth underlining here that Amazon, Facebook, and Google spent nearly half a billion dollars on lobbying efforts in Washington, D.C., over the past ten years, no doubt in response to the creeping prospect of greater government regulation and to ward off antitrust initiatives.)452 Let’s face it, there may be an element of vengeance at play in the “let’s break them up” rallying cry.

In Our Own Image: Savior or Destroyer? The History and Future of Artificial Intelligence
by George Zarkadakis
Published 7 Mar 2016

The tension between totalitarian utopias and free-market idealism resulted in the destruction of the ancient imperial order, caused the violent death of tens of millions during two world wars and accelerated the development of new technologies – of which computers were perhaps the most important one. We now live at a time when the aftermath of the Cold War seems like a fading echo of the past. The apparent victory of liberal capitalism over communism, symbolised by the destruction of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, is nowadays doubted and challenged. The Great Recession that was set off in 2007 has demonstrated that unregulated financial markets create financial bubbles that can bring down the entire world economy. Millions of livelihoods have been destroyed in southern Europe, where double-digit unemployment has wiped out hope for the next two generations at least.

Prosperity Without Growth: Foundations for the Economy of Tomorrow
by Tim Jackson
Published 8 Dec 2016

In fact, those inclined to question the consensus wisdom are swiftly denounced as cynical revolutionaries or modern-day Luddites. ‘We do not agree with the anti-capitalists who see the economic crisis as a chance to impose their utopia, whether of a socialist or ecofundamentalist kind’, roared one UK newspaper at the height of the crisis. ‘Most of us in this country enjoy long and fulfilling lives thanks to liberal capitalism: we have no desire to live in a yurt under a workers’ soviet.’36 With that confusingly attired bogey-man looming over the situation, rebuilding consumer confidence to boost high-street spending looked like a no-brainer. And internecine warfare was all saved for arguing over how this is to be achieved.

Green Tyranny: Exposing the Totalitarian Roots of the Climate Industrial Complex
by Rupert Darwall
Published 2 Oct 2017

Lawaczeck was on the left wing of the party and associated with Feder, Julius Streicher, Heinrich Himmler, and Joseph Goebbels. Technology and the Economy is both an anticapitalist tract and a blueprint for a renewable energy future. Lawaczeck extolled the corporatist state that had been destroyed by egoistic liberal capitalism and denounced foreign trade as only benefitting traders.20 The capitalist system was an experiment in liberal thinking that had led Germany to catastrophe. The experiment was now over and everyone could see the consequences.21 Like many Nazis, Lawaczeck was impressed by Stalin’s Five Year Plans.

Moneyland: Why Thieves and Crooks Now Rule the World and How to Take It Back
by Oliver Bullough
Published 5 Sep 2018

Much Western political thought envisages the liberal democracies of the ‘developed’ countries as the natural end point of a historical process, and refers to other societies as ‘developing’, as if they are trains on a track which will eventually deliver them to the terminal station where we now live. The political theorist Francis Fukuyama – who has given up on the idea that history has come to an end – argues in his 2011 book The Origins of Political Order that this is a damagingly wrong way of looking at the world. The liberal capitalism of Western Europe, the United States and the other Western countries is not only extremely unusual, but also just one of multiple kinds of government. Corruption, he writes, often emerges where a Western-style state and economic structure has been imposed through ignorance or arrogance on to a society with totally different traditions.

The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World
by Niall Ferguson
Published 13 Nov 2007

I. 246 alleged insight on currency devaluation 107 on imperialist rivalries and war 304 and money 17 less-developed countries 14. see also emerging markets leveraging 4. lex mercatoria 186 liability: limited see limited-liability companies unlimited 187 liberal imperialism 294 liberalization: capital market 310-12 economic 333 trade 305 Liberal party 202 liberals 89-90 Libor 265 Lifan company 333 life annuities 74 life expectancy 188 Lima 277 limited-liability companies 120 Lincoln, Abraham 93 Lincoln Savings and Loan 258n. liquidity 6. crises 55; see also financial crises ratios 62 and First World War 297 Liverpool 94 Liverpool, Lord (Prime Minister) 83 Lloyd George, David 202 Lloyd’s (London) 186-7 Lloyds Bank 56 Loaisa, Rodrigo de 23 Lo, Andrew 348 loans: conditional 185 forced 71-3 liquidity of 51 see also debt loan sharks 13 London & Westminster Bank 56 London: City of 53 as financial centre 299 insurance market 186-7 life expectancy in 190 Medici bank in 43 London Assurance Corporation 198 Londonderry, Thomas Pitt, Earl of 148 London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (Libor) 265.

It's Better Than It Looks: Reasons for Optimism in an Age of Fear
by Gregg Easterbrook
Published 20 Feb 2018

From the attack on Pearl Harbor until that summer, American shipyards christened seventeen fleet-class aircraft carriers, the most valuable vessels of World War II, while Japanese shipyards produced six. In the same period, the United States launched almost one hundred escort carriers; Japan launched twelve. As the analyst Daniel Yergin has noted, when in 1926 Japan ended suffrage to become a fascist state, the Japanese upper class “rejected liberalism, capitalism and democracy as engines of weakness and decadence.” Japan was burned to the ground by a weak, decadent system that could build aircraft carriers with far greater efficiency. Free societies hold an edge in fostering inventions and inventiveness, which closed societies discourage. In an irony, free societies also are better at organization than closed societies.

The Economics Anti-Textbook: A Critical Thinker's Guide to Microeconomics
by Rod Hill and Anthony Myatt
Published 15 Mar 2010

Froot, K. A. and E. M. Dabora (1999) ‘How are stock prices affected by the location of trade?’, Journal of Financial Economics, 53(2): 189–216. Frydman, C. and R. E. Saks (2008) ‘Executive compensation: a new view from 279 Bibliography Eatwell, J. and L. Taylor (1998) ‘The performance of liberalized capital markets’, Center for Economic Policy Analysis Working Paper Series III, Working Paper no. 8, New School for Social Research, New York, September. Edlin, A. S. and P. Karaca-Mandic (2006) ‘The accident externality from driving’, Journal of Political Economy, 114(5): 931–55. Einstein, A. (1926) ‘Remarks on new quantum mechanics’, quoted in A.

Transcending the Cold War: Summits, Statecraft, and the Dissolution of Bipolarity in Europe, 1970–1990
by Kristina Spohr and David Reynolds
Published 24 Aug 2016

Bipolarity was not, however, confined to Europe. America and Russia had global reach and also global pretensions: each was not just a ‘country’ but a ‘cause’.7 As well as being rivals for power and territory, they also embodied opposing ideologies—political pluralism versus a one-party state, liberal capitalism versus a command economy. This ideological confrontation was a core feature of East-West competition in Europe ever since 1945. But although Europe was the cockpit of the Cold War, over the next two decades superpower rivalry for place and position, for hearts and minds, spread across the so-called Third World.

Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus
by Rick Perlstein
Published 17 Mar 2009

It was an embodiment of the parable of the blind men poking the elephant, each one describing a different beast: here was Jacob Javits claiming that “when a composite of our Party is taken, the thinking is Eisenhower (modern) thinking”; there Chicago Republicans were convening a banquet called “Real Republicanism versus Modern Republicanism.” Each was correct. Abraham Lincoln’s party was formed in the 1850s to fight the spread of slavery, and also to fight for something: the ideal that would later be called liberal capitalism—every man making the best for himself through his own hard work, every farmhand aspiring to be a farmer, every factory hand aspiring to own a factory. On this much the Republican homesteaders of the West and the industrialists and artisans in the East could agree. America prospered under Republican rule through the Gilded Age.

…

A program to sell: John Kessel, The Goldwater Coalition: Republican Strategies in 1964 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), 125. 158 “When a composite”: John Andrew III, The Other Side of the Sixties: Young Americans for Freedom and the Rise of Conservative Politics (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1997), 40. For the Chicago banquet, see George B. Russell, J. Bracken Lee: The Taxpayer’s Champion (New York: Robert Spellers and Sons, 1961), 154. My interpretation of liberal capitalism and the founding of the Republican Party is from Malcolm Moos, The Republicans: A History of Their Party (New York: Random House, 1956), 30; and Milton Viorst, Fall from Grace: The Republican Party and the Puritan Ethic (New York: New American Library, 1968), 37. 158 My sense of the development of the sectional split is from Nicol C.

Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the Seventies
by Judith Stein
Published 30 Apr 2010

Baker believed that the liquidity problems of debtor countries had structural causes. The solution was to shift to export-led growth, reduce the role of the state, and open up the economy to foreign capital. This was not simply a Washington project. The Europeans and IMF bureaucrats were equally enthusiastic and began encouraging developing countries to liberalize capital as well as trade accounts.93 The premise was that low savings and weak financial markets hampered development. Access to funds from abroad would boost investment and growth. After the demise of the Soviet Union, leaders of the developed and developing nations were giddy with expectations that free markets, global connections, and new technology could transform the world.

Beyond the Random Walk: A Guide to Stock Market Anomalies and Low Risk Investing
by Vijay Singal
Published 15 Jun 2004

INCREASING AND VARYING CORRELATIONS Concern The key benefit from international investing arises because of low correlations between the domestic market and foreign markets. There are two criticisms of historical correlations. First, the correlations may be increasing due to greater global integration as evidenced by larger capital and trade flows. Moreover, as more and more emerging markets liberalize capital flows, the correlations will increase. If the correlations are increasing, the above analysis based on prior data overestimates the benefit from international investing. Reconsider the example in the preamble of “Evidence,” above. With a correlation of 0.60, the new portfolio’s risk fell from 18 percent to 16 percent.

Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World
by Niall Ferguson
Published 1 Jan 2002

Sir Richard Turnbull, the penultimate Governor of Aden, once told Labour politician Denis Healey that ‘when the British Empire finally sank beneath the waves of history, it would leave behind it only two monuments: one was the game of Association Football, the other was the expression “Fuck off”.’ In truth, the imperial legacy has shaped the modern world so profoundly that we almost take it for granted. Without the spread of British rule around the world, it is hard to believe that the structures of liberal capitalism would have been so successfully established in so many different economies around the world. Those empires that adopted alternative models – the Russian and the Chinese – imposed incalculable misery on their subject peoples. Without the influence of British imperial rule, it is hard to believe that the institutions of parliamentary democracy would have been adopted by the majority of states in the world, as they are today.

Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind
by Yuval Noah Harari
Published 1 Jan 2011

They were so successful that billions of people gradually adopted significant parts of that culture. Indians, Africans, Arabs, Chinese and Maoris learned French, English and Spanish. They began to believe in human rights and the principle of self-determination, and they adopted Western ideologies such as liberalism, capitalism, Communism, feminism and nationalism. The Imperial Cycle During the twentieth century, local groups that had adopted Western values claimed equality with their European conquerors in the name of these very values. Many anti-colonial struggles were waged under the banners of self-determination, socialism and human rights, all of which are Western legacies.

The Billionaire Raj: A Journey Through India's New Gilded Age
by James Crabtree
Published 2 Jul 2018

But there was clearly a sizable portion of the Indian economy in rent-thick sectors operating “a unique Indian business model,” as one academic study put it, “in which cultivating political connections in Delhi became the core competence and the most important survival imperative for businesses.”30 Sinha, who later went on to win election as a member of parliament for the BJP and serve as a junior minister under Narendra Modi, blamed many of India’s difficulties at that time on the ruling left-wing Congress party and its weakness for corruption. But at a deeper level, he also pointed to a three-way split at the heart of Indian business. First, there was state capitalism, meaning those many companies that were still run by the government in areas like steel and mining. Second was liberal capitalism, meaning those sectors that tended to be most connected to the global economy, and which were also the most competitive and least corrupt. Finally, and most troublingly, there was crony capitalism: the sectors dominated by the Bollygarchs, most of whom enjoyed deep connections with the state.

Kleptopia: How Dirty Money Is Conquering the World
by Tom Burgis
Published 7 Sep 2020

Seva could move anything across borders: art, crude, clothes, bootleg vodka and the belongings of emigrating Soviet Jews, gems, girls, gas, guns, heroin, nuclear material, hitmen and, naturally, himself. But he was best of all at smuggling money. He was swift to grasp the changes wrought by the triumph of liberal capitalism. Money could be seized by force and made to look like any other money. Cleansed of its past, it became what all the other money was: ‘a formal token of delayed reciprocal altruism’, as another brainy don, Richard Dawkins, had put it, a token denoting that you had done society a service and society owed you something in exchange.

Civilization: The West and the Rest
by Niall Ferguson
Published 28 Feb 2011

As a result, Western civilization became a kind of template for the way the rest of the world aspired to organize itself. Prior to 1945, of course, there was a variety of developmental models – or operating systems, to draw a metaphor from computing – that could be adopted by non-Western societies. But the most attractive were all of European origin: liberal capitalism, national socialism, Soviet communism. The Second World War killed the second in Europe, though it lived on under assumed names in many developing countries. The collapse of the Soviet empire between 1989 and 1991 killed the third. To be sure, there has been much talk in the wake of the global financial crisis about alternative Asian economic models.

Wall Street: How It Works And for Whom
by Doug Henwood
Published 30 Aug 1998

Given the ownership and management structure of U.S. industry, there's a conflict among stockholders, managers, and workers over how to manage these strains. Wall Street would like to withdraw capital from these industries — slim them down or eliminate them entirely — and pocket the money. In high market theory, Wall Street can be relied upon to redeploy this liberated capital beneficently, and the squeezed industries will either discover a fountain of youth under the discipline of debt or die. Since the last 200 pages of this book have argued that Wall Street isn't up to that task, the whole finance and governance structure is called into serious question. The great advantage of Jensenism is that, when combined with an uncritical acceptance of the efficient market religion, it amounts to a unified field theory of economic regulation: all-knowing financial markets will guide real investment decisions towards their optimum, and with the proper GOVERNANCE set of incentives, owner-managers will follow this guidance without reservation.

Superclass: The Global Power Elite and the World They Are Making
by David Rothkopf
Published 18 Mar 2008

The interesting thing is that some markets, like Korea, do not need the money from Wall Street because their people have saved enough on their own. They’ve linked their market to the global system, so that the people in the country with money can move their money to Wall Street and the people from Wall Street can move the money into and out of the country freely. Liberalizing capital markets—making it easier for those on Wall Street to move their money in and out of the country—gives more voting power to Wall Street.” Schwarzman saw the consequences: “We have become more central to each economy we are in. We realize we have to be responsible players…We would expect not to have people react adversely because what we are doing is trying to develop companies and make them better, and usually we can make that sale almost everywhere in the world.”

War and Gold: A Five-Hundred-Year History of Empires, Adventures, and Debt
by Kwasi Kwarteng
Published 12 May 2014

By 1918–19 it was generating £285 million for the Treasury. This was almost a third of the government’s revenue for that year.21 The ‘excess profits duty’ also showed the single-mindedness with which Britain applied itself to winning the war. The London of 1914 had been the home of Lombard Street, of liberal capitalism, of the upper-class world depicted by writers like P. G. Wodehouse and John Galsworthy. Yet, in a sudden reversal, Britain would tax its capitalists more rigorously than any of the other belligerents. Despite the considerable demands on British finance, the British government felt confident enough to give loans to foreign governments, to a greater extent than it borrowed from them.

How Asia Works
by Joe Studwell
Published 1 Jul 2013

The loudest and most evangelical message of these agencies was that deregulating the financial sector could put the development efforts of lagging countries back on track. States were encouraged to privatise existing banks and license new banks, to take a laissez-faire attitude to international flows of capital and to expand stock markets. The argument of the Washington Consensus was that liberated capital would then itself identify the right investments to spur economic progress. What actually happened, in 1997, was a financial catastrophe on a scale similar to that which afflicted Latin America after 1982. Financial sector liberalisation in south-east Asia led not to better allocation of capital, but to control of private banks by business entrepreneurs whose interests, because they were not required to manufacture and were not subject to export discipline, were not aligned with those of national development.

Them And Us: Politics, Greed And Inequality - Why We Need A Fair Society
by Will Hutton
Published 30 Sep 2010

When viewed in these terms, the mind-boggling scale and cost of the credit crunch – in total governments worldwide have so far spent $14 trillion on supporting their banking systems – is almost as big a crisis for market fundamentalism and financial capitalism as the collapse of the Soviet Union was for economic planning and communism. What happened between 1989 and 1992 did not just represent the triumph of liberal capitalism; it was claimed as the triumph of the market fundamentalist ideologues who believed that they had engineered it. If communism was the logical conclusion of left thinking, it had collapsed. Some twenty years later the same can be said of market fundamentalism, the logical conclusion of right thinking.

Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism
by Quinn Slobodian
Published 16 Mar 2018

A W o r l d of C o n stit u tio n s 217 By the end of the 1960s, neoliberals saw an EEC that “­violated GATT rules more and more openly as it advanced.”218 How did they react? Chapter 7 shows that they borrowed a page from the Eu­ro­pean playbook to find a solution by extending the economic constitution beyond Eu­rope itself. As challenges to the uniform rules of liberal capitalism mounted from the Global South in the 1970s, Eu­rope and its laws became a countermodel to the demands for a New International Economic Order. The universalist and constitutionalist position found a synthesis in the plans to reform the GATT of the 1970s and 1980s. The idea of the economic constitution was set to go global. 7 A World of Signals Order is not an object.

The Price Is Wrong: Why Capitalism Won't Save the Planet
by Brett Christophers
Published 12 Mar 2024

Or is it states not deigning to de-risk, and potentially seeing renewables development – for as long as it is something expected principally of private sector actors – wither on the vine? III An end to government support was not necessarily their recommended solution, but even before the global energy crisis of 2021–2 put some of the problems associated with liberalized, capital-centric Western electricity systems under the spotlight (Europe, after all, was a focal point of the crisis), many mainstream organizations and commentators were already arguing that such systems were no longer fit for purpose – if, indeed, they ever had been. Both the growing significance, in practice, of renewable sources of electricity generation, and the growing importance in policy of optimizing conditions for further renewables development, have long been pivotal to such concerns about inherited, liberalized systems.

Trust: The Social Virtue and the Creation of Prosperity
by Francis Fukuyama
Published 1 Jan 1995

The keiretsu’s brand names, for instance, can be used in new product markets to establish credibility. One very important function that the keiretsu played in the 1960s and 1970s was to block or otherwise control the degree of direct foreign investment in Japan. When the Japanese government agreed to liberalize capital markets in the late 1960s, many Japanese companies feared an influx of foreign, mostly U.S., competition as outside multinationals bought stakes in Japanese businesses. The importance of foreign direct investment to exports has typically been insufficiently appreciated; it is often very difficult for a multinational corporation to market in a foreign country unless it also manufactures its products there.24 As Mark Mason has shown, the level of intra-keiretsu cross-shareholding increased dramatically in anticipation of capital market liberalization, so as to make it more difficult for foreigners to acquire majority ownership of Japanese corporations.25 This tactic proved quite successful: few American multinationals were able to purchase more than minority interests in Japanese companies, even after they were legally permitted to do so.

Strange Rebels: 1979 and the Birth of the 21st Century
by Christian Caryl
Published 30 Oct 2012

At Oxford, Thatcher did not make a name for herself as a radical enthusiast of the values that would later be associated with her name. The Toryism of the time was very much under the sway of the period’s progressive mainstream. Just before the 1945 election, Oxford’s student conservatives published a paper declaring that “Liberal Capitalism is as dead as Aristocratic Feudalism,” and welcoming “a state without privilege where each shall enrich himself through the enrichment of all.”16 No one can recall Margaret Roberts taking up a stand that radically differed from this stance. She later claimed to have read Friedrich von Hayek’s Road to Serfdom during her last year at Oxford.

The Rise and Fall of Nations: Forces of Change in the Post-Crisis World
by Ruchir Sharma
Published 5 Jun 2016

The fact that crisis and revolt can force even reluctant elites to reform has been clear at least since the early critiques of Marx, who thought capitalist societies would collapse in a series of increasingly violent attempts to defend the upper classes. Instead, facing the economic depressions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, political leaders proved capable of reforming liberal capitalism, deflecting popular revolt with the creation of the welfare state, starting in Germany and Britain. The link between boom times and political complacency is equally well documented, for example, in the cases of modern Japan and Europe, which are often described as too comfortably rich to push tough reform.

Money and Government: The Past and Future of Economics
by Robert Skidelsky
Published 13 Nov 2018

It was to this kind of politics that Keynesian thinking offered an antidote, by providing a rationale for keeping banking under national control. Few paused to ponder the political consequences of releasing finance from national regulation in the 1980s and 1990s. Keynes’s theory could have become the basis of policy only under conditions of social balance. His was the economics of the middle way; the best deal that liberal capitalism could expect in a world veering towards the political extremes. He thought of his economics as the economics of the general interest, for it encompassed, while transcending, the sectional interests of both capital and labour. This is true: it was the least ideological of all economic doctrines, the least dependent on class interest.

The Social Life of Money
by Nigel Dodd
Published 14 May 2014

Our primary interest is in their implications for Marx’s theory of money and credit. The most significant contributions toward revising Marxist theory in light of the changes just mentioned came from Hilferding and Lenin. In Finance Capital (originally published in 1910, 2007 cited here), Hilferding sought to capture the transition from a competitive and pluralistic “liberal” capitalism toward a monopolistic form of capitalism in which finance had a crucial role. In particular, he focused on the merger, which he saw taking place in Germany, between banking capital and industrial capital. Hilferding suggested that the ultimate outcome of such a merger would be the formation of a general cartel through which capitalist production would be regulated, as by a “single body which could determine the volume of production in all the branches of industry” (Hilferding 2007: 304).

The Making of Global Capitalism
by Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin
Published 8 Oct 2012

The report still repeatedly stressed that the role of international agencies was to provide “a mechanism for countries to make external commitments, making it more difficult to back-track on reforms,” including on the international treaties through which states committed themselves to “self-restricting rules, which precisely specify the content of policy and lock it into mechanisms that are costly to reverse.”78 This was what the IMF especially had done, although by the mid 1990s it had also started to take up the governance theme and apply it broadly to the institutional “reform” of states, albeit in terms that hewed closely to the language of neoclassical economics, designed to “enhance market confidence in a context of increasingly liberalized capital accounts.”79 Notably, however, while the G7 countries wanted the IMF to be given a larger surveillance role in ensuring that emerging markets adopted legal and institutional changes to facilitate not only capital flows but also market discipline, little progress was made on the European states’ proposal to amend the IMF articles of agreement so as to prohibit all restrictions on capital mobility.

Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration and the Future of White Majorities
by Eric Kaufmann
Published 24 Oct 2018

The Bushes’ string of victories produced an optimistic mindset in which the Republican elite felt they could win Latino votes with a package emphasizing conservative social values and the work ethic. Ideologically, the fall of the Berlin Wall gave rise to an optimistic ‘End of History’ spirit among American neoconservatives and interventionist liberals, symbolized by Francis Fukuyama’s iconic book of 1992.40 With communism defeated, liberalism, capitalism and democracy, under American tutelage, could finally become universal. A global framework based on the Pax Americana and the shared values of the ‘Washington Consensus’ would revolutionize humanity. Here was a classic form of liberal-democratic missionary nationalism in keeping with the country’s ‘City on a Hill’ traditions.

The True and Only Heaven: Progress and Its Critics
by Christopher Lasch
Published 16 Sep 1991

The story of American politics, as seen by Hartz, Richard Hofstadter, and others—not necessarily a success story, in their eyes—was the unchallenged ascendancy of liberalism, the triumph of capitalism, and the failure of conservatism and socialism alike. Thus Andrew Jackson, once deified as the tribune of the people, emerged in Hofstadter's American Political Tradition as an exponent of "liberal capitalism" and Abraham Lincoln, the Great Emancipator, as the foremost ideologist of the "self-made myth." Whether the intention behind such interpretations was to deplore the absence of a social democratic tradition (as it seemed to be, initially at least, in the case of Hofstadter and Hartz) or to celebrate the absence of ideological division (as in the case of Daniel Boorstin), the assumption of a broad liberal "consensus"—stifling or comforting, as the case might be— dominated historical scholarship in the forties and fifties.

Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State
by Paul Tucker
Published 21 Apr 2018

The gradual and cumulative internationalization of policy making could unobtrusively hand the reality of power, if not its formal accoutrements, to a new transnational meritocratic elite. Rodrik’s trilemma of internationalism, described in chapter 12, was not news to international economists and policy makers. It had long been recognized that a country could not combine national control over domestic monetary policy, a fixed exchange rate, and liberalized capital flows. Each country had to choose two out of three. After World War II, most countries more or less surrendered domestic monetary autonomy, tying themselves to a de facto dollar standard. To police the rules of the game agreed at the famous Bretton Woods conference in New Hampshire’s White Mountains, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were created.

The Stack: On Software and Sovereignty
by Benjamin H. Bratton
Published 19 Feb 2016

New Left Review, no. 61 (January/February 2010): 45, http://newleftreview.org/II/61/mike-davis-who-will-build-the-ark: “Tackling the challenge of sustainable urban design for the whole planet, and not just for a few privileged countries or social groups, requires a vast stage for the imagination, such as the arts and sciences inhabited in the May Days of Vkhutemas and the Bauhaus. It presupposes a radical willingness to think beyond the horizon of neo-liberal capitalism toward a global revolution that reintegrates the labour of the informal working classes, as well as the rural poor, in the sustainable reconstruction of their built environments and livelihoods.” 15.  Martin Heidegger interview with Der Spiegel by Rudolf Augstein and Georg Wolff, September 23, 1966, published May 31, 1976. 16. 

Aftermath: Following the Bloodshed of America's Wars in the Muslim World
by Nir Rosen
Published 21 Apr 2011

Many Iraqis were driven from towns back to a rural and agricultural life, and the power of feudal landlords increased. A stated goal of the American occupation was to transform Iraq into a free-market economy. One of the first measures taken by the American occupation was to impose laws that liberalized capital accounts, currency trading, and investment regulations, and lifted price regulations and most state subsidies. An important principle guiding the occupation was not to invest in any state institution that could be privatized in the future, in anticipation of the liquidation of state assets.

EuroTragedy: A Drama in Nine Acts
by Ashoka Mody
Published 7 May 2018

In downplaying the role of the nation-​state, European leaders had unwittingly but inescapably embraced the principles of free movement of capital and labor. While European leaders were publicly contemptuous of the heartless Anglo-​Saxon model of unbridled competition, they had—​in their bid to build a supranational state—​created a system that featured all of the downsides of “ultra-​liberal” capitalism. For European citizens, more European integration had understandably become associated with “hyper-​globalization,” with all its ills. And despite Europe’s promise to honor its “social model” and provide greater social protection, its institutions and policies offered little hope for those who were being left behind by the competitive forces unleashed.

A History of Modern Britain
by Andrew Marr
Published 2 Jul 2009

But Joseph was different, a former cabinet minister with close and direct experience of government. With his Centre for Policy Studies, he was the rain-maker, the storm-bringer, the Old Testament prophet denouncing his tribe. Joseph argued that Britain by the mid-seventies had a fundamental choice to make between a socialist siege economy or a breakaway into proper liberal capitalism – in effect, Benn or Joseph. He could not have formed his ideas without the libertarian and monetarist thinkers of the fifties and sixties, men we met earlier. During the Tories’ years in opposition from 1964 to 1970 he had educated himself in free-market economics and was soon using as his speechwriter the violently spoken, irrepressible Alfred Sherman, an East End boy from a left-wing family who had fought as a machine-gunner in the Spanish Civil War before swinging right round later and becoming an insistent right-wing critic of the British way.

From Peoples into Nations
by John Connelly
Published 11 Nov 2019

Czechoslovak President Beneš forcefully articulated this new spirit. His country could no longer tolerate minorities, he said, because the system of minority treaties had failed. Germans and Magyars had proved incapable of acting as loyal Czechoslovak citizens. Thus, Europe was dividing not only between liberal capitalism and people’s democracy, but also between the new internationalism in the West and nation-statism in the East, frozen beneath the power of the Soviet hegemon, which began imposing its own order on the people’s democracies from late 1947.42 Yet the state that modeled itself from the start on the Soviet Union—“federal” Yugoslavia, which claimed to transcend ethnic nationalism—was also the state that first challenged Soviet hegemony in 1948—in the name of nationalism!

Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America
by Rick Perlstein
Published 1 Jan 2008

Now history had caught them in a bind: with the boom they had helped build, ordinary laborers were becoming ever less reliably downtrodden, vulnerable to appeal from the Republicans. The pollster Samuel Lubell was the first to recognize it: “The inner dynamics of the Roosevelt coalition have shifted from those of getting to those of keeping.” Their liberal champions developed a distaste for them. One of the ways it manifested itself was in matters of style. The liberal capitalism that had created this mass middle class created, in its wake, a mass culture of consumption. And the liberals whose New Deal created this mass middle class were more and more turning their attention to critiquing the degraded mass culture of cheap sensation and plastic gadgets and politicians who seemed to cater to this lowest common denominator—public-relations-driven politicians who catered to only the basest and most sentimental emotions in men.

The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power
by Daniel Yergin
Published 23 Dec 2008

When the League of Nations condemned Japan for its actions in Manchuria, it stalked out of the League and embarked on its own path—one that would eventually lead to ruin.[3] The New Order in Asia Over the next few years, as Tokyo elaborated its claims to a "mission" and "special responsibilities in East Asia," Japanese politics seethed with conspiracies, ideological movements, and secret societies that rejected liberalism, capitalism, and democracy as engines of weakness and decadence. It was thought that there was nothing more noble than to die in battle for the Emperor. Yet some elements in the Japanese military were also, by the mid-1930s, focusing on the more practical question of how to wage modern warfare. Promulgating a doctrine of total war, they sought to establish a "national defense state" in which the industrial and military resources of the country would all be built up and harnessed for that grim eventuality.