by Lorne Lantz and Daniel Cawrey · 8 Dec 2020 · 434pp · 77,974 words
You Can The Evolution of Crypto Laundering FinCEN Guidance and the Beginning of Regulation The FATF and the Travel Rule Skirting the Laws Avoiding Scrutiny: Regulatory Arbitrage Malta Singapore Hong Kong Bahamas Crypto-Based Stablecoins NuBits Digix Basis Tether Initial Coin Offerings Founder Intentions Token Economics Whitepaper Exchange Hacks Mt. Gox Bitfinex
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involved a fine of $500,000, registration of its token as a security, and the establishment of a claims process for harmed investors. Avoiding Scrutiny: Regulatory Arbitrage Regulatory arbitrage is a term for measures taken to avoid compliance scrutiny in heavily regulated jurisdictions like the US. This can be done in a number of
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the issuance of securities. It also indicated that US securities laws could apply to blockchains and cryptocurrencies in many instances. ICOs were an example of regulatory arbitrage in that ICO issuers were often ahead of the regulators. Despite this, as a result of The DAO investigation, out-of-court settlements in the
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Trading-Float Configuration 3basic, Arbitrage Trading basic mistakes in, Basic Mistakes exchange risk, Exchange Risk involving fiat currency, banking risk, Banking Risk regulatory, Avoiding Scrutiny: Regulatory Arbitrage-Crypto-Based Stablecoins timing and managing float, Timing and Managing Floatfloat configuration 1, Float Configuration 1 float configuration 2, Float Configuration 2 float configuration 3
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as a Service, Blockchain as a Service B B-Money, B-Money BaaS (Blockchain as a Service), Blockchain as a Service Back, Adam, Hashcash Bahamas, regulatory arbitrage, Bahamas banking risk, Banking Risk banking, blockchain implementations, Banking-JPMorganBanque de France, Banque de France China, China JPMorgan, JPMorgan permissioned ledger uses of blockchain, Banking
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), Storing Data in a Chain of Blocks hex value arguments to smart contract calls, Custody and counterparty risk Honest validator framework, Ethereum Scaling Hong Kong, regulatory arbitrage, Hong Kong hot or cold storage wallets, Counterparty Risk hot wallets, Wallet Type Variations HotStuff algorithm, Borrowing from Existing Blockchains Hyperledger, Hyperledger I IBMIoT interaction
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information on blockchain industry, Information Infura, Interacting with Code initial coin offerings (ICOs), Mastercoin and Smart Contracts, Tokenize Everything, Initial Coin Offerings-Whitepaperas example of regulatory arbitrage, Initial Coin Offerings DAOs and, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations Ethereum, Tokenize Everything founder intentions, Founder Intentions funds collected into multisignature wallets, Multisignature Contracts illegal activities in
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process lottery-based consensus, Alternative methods M MaidSafe, Understanding Omni LayerICO for, Use Cases: ICOs Maker project's DAI, DAIsavings rates for DAI, Savings Malta, regulatory arbitrage, Malta man in the middle attacks, Zero-Knowledge Proof margin/leveraged products, Derivatives market capitalization, low, cryptocurrencies with, Whales market depthconsiderations in cryptocurrency trading, Basic
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of Regulation-FinCEN Guidance and the Beginning of Regulation regulatory challenges in cryptocurrency market, Regulatory Challenges-Basic Mistakes regulatory issues with ICOs, Tokenize Everything regulatory arbitrage, Avoiding Scrutiny: Regulatory Arbitrage-Crypto-Based StablecoinsICOs as example of, Initial Coin Offerings relational databases, Databases and Ledgers replay attacks, Replay attacksprotecting against, on Ethereum and Ethereum Classic
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to operator, The Evolution of Crypto Laundering provision of bitcoin to users without KYC/AML, Skirting the Laws SIM swapping, SIM Swapping-SIM Swapping Singapore, regulatory arbitrage, Singapore single-shard takeover attacks, Other Altchain Solutions slashing algorithms, Proof-of-Stake slippage, Slippage smart contracts, Mastercoin and Smart ContractsDAML language for distributed applications
by Ludwig B. Chincarini · 29 Jul 2012 · 701pp · 199,010 words
of credit risks with well-diversified counterparty correlation has the same risk weight as one with heavily concentrated counterparties. Basel I let banks engage in regulatory arbitrage. Many instruments’ true measured risk was different than their assigned risk under the regulatory requirements, so banks might replace assets with lower true risk with
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, yet the difference in credit weights was just 150% versus 100% (a difference of 1.5 times). This was an inconsistency and an opportunity for regulatory arbitrage. Although Basel II considered how hard it is for outsiders to monitor banks’ true risks, the standard reporting items it required were not sufficient to
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as the markets innovate around specific guidelines. By reducing the risk weighting for mortgages and allowing banks a relatively high amount of leverage assisted by regulatory arbitrage, the Basel Committee encouraged banks to load up on mortgage-backed securities. That fueled the boom. When the mortgage market crashed and Lehman failed, the
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type of risks and transfer them. At the margin, they will be ahead of the competition. This might lead to a whole new set of regulatory arbitrage trades. Credit Rating Agencies Many people also believe that the failure of credit rating agencies (CRAs) to accurately rate the mortgage-backed securities and collateralized
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quotes that competitors have to process, thus causing processor delays and gaining an advantage over others. It's a much more elaborate form of spoofing. regulatory arbitrage The exploitation by traders of poorly specified government regulations so as to make arbitrage returns. For example, a bank could hold much riskier assets and
by John Kay · 2 Sep 2015 · 478pp · 126,416 words
Chasing the dream Adverse selection and moral hazard 3 Intermediation The role of the middleman Liquidity Diversification Leverage 4 Profits Smarter people Competition The Edge Regulatory arbitrage I’ll be gone, you’ll be gone How profitable is the finance sector? PART II: THE FUNCTIONS OF FINANCE 5 Capital allocation Physical assets
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demonstrated that regulatory anomalies could be used by banks to attract business. And by countries. Governments that promoted the interests of these banks could make regulatory arbitrage easier. The Bank of England, which in the 1960s saw advocacy of City of London interests as one of its principal functions, actively encouraged the
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take full advantage of ‘the Edge’. And there are profits to be earned from another ‘edge’: the advantage the financial institution enjoys over the regulator. Regulatory arbitrage Fantastic grow the evening gowns Agents of the Fisc pursue Absconding tax defaulters through The sewers of provincial towns. W.H. Auden, ‘The Fall of
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understandably it was not one on which Mr Potts chose to dwell. Much of the complexity of the modern financial services is the result of regulatory arbitrage. Such arbitrage is a process by which you avoid or minimise regulatory restriction by engaging in a transaction with more or less identical commercial effect
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failing insurer, which was thus able to meet its obligations in full. Significantly, Goldman had separately insured itself against the failure of AIG.13 But regulatory arbitrage was in place long before Brooke Masters, an executive at J.P. Morgan, invented credit default swaps. An early example of
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the circumvention of interest rate restrictions on current accounts under Regulation Q through the Eurodollar market. A different mechanism of regulatory arbitrage was created for retail customers – the money market fund. An investor in a US money market fund holds a share in a portfolio of debt,
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but which is rarely fully effective in achieving its intended purpose. Both the Eurodollar market and the market in credit default swaps had origins in regulatory arbitrage, but both acquired a life of their own. This is also a recurrent pattern. The ‘repo market’ is an example of a financial investment that
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began as a mechanism of regulatory arbitrage and has survived and prospered despite extensive attempts to remove its arbitrage benefit. A repo agreement is the means by which many large corporations make
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it all for? If you ask a corporate treasurer, you will be told that repos offer companies slightly better returns than simple deposits. But why? Regulatory arbitrage is one reason for trading in this way: repo transactions were treated differently in accounting reports and the calculation of regulatory capital (and, in the
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are opportunities for accounting arbitrage – two transactions have similar commercial effect but are treated in different ways in company accounts. Just as regulators respond to regulatory arbitrage by developing ever more complex rules, so tax authorities respond to fiscal arbitrage by adding pages to the tax code, and accounting standards bodies respond
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up the Monte Carlo casino a hundred and fifty years ago, and jurisdictional arbitrage has since become a major revenue source for many small states. Regulatory arbitrage, fiscal arbitrage and accounting arbitrage all cost money. From the perspective of the non-financial economy, the resources devoted to arbitrage are a dispiriting waste
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a means of taking money out of the pockets of the public and transferring it to advisers, traders and the firms that employ them. With regulatory arbitrage, the loser is the potential beneficiary of the regulation. If the regulation is useless, as may often be the case, the costs of
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regulatory arbitrage simply represent a transfer from the operating profits of the business to the financial professionals who make the arbitrage possible. If the regulation would have
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$2 billion to settle claims made by Enron investors who alleged they had been duped by misleading accounts facilitated by transactions the banks had arranged. Regulatory arbitrage is an inevitable outcome of the detailed prescriptive regulation of financial services. The only means of avoiding it is to ensure that transactions with similar
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large multinational companies have corporate and financial structures of mind-blowing complexity. The mechanics of these arrangements, which are mainly directed at tax avoidance or regulatory arbitrage, are understood by only a handful of specialists. Much of the securities issuance undertaken by Goldman Sachs was not ‘helping companies to grow’ but represented
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, which can be fully financed from their underlying cash generation. The use of capital markets by large companies today is mainly driven by tax and regulatory arbitrage, and undertaken by corporate treasurers with other people’s money. Financing small and medium-size enterprises ‘Is not commercial credit based primarily upon money or
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the no-deposit loans to NINJAs (no income, no job, no assets) that were marketed in US cities. The mechanics of risk weighting also stimulated regulatory arbitrage. A package of mortgages might be transferred to another bank, in which case the mortgages might be categorised as bank loans for regulatory purposes. After
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could also reduce their required capital by establishing off-balance-sheet vehicles (SIVs) which operated outside the scope of regulation. Instruments created for purposes of regulatory arbitrage – beginning with repos and mortgage-backed securities and in time extending to credit default swaps, SIVs and other acronyms too numerous to list – were central
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of arbitrage developed during financialisation are not restricted to methods of reducing the burden of regulation. In Chapter 4 I described four principal types: the regulatory arbitrage prompted by the Basel rules (and earlier and later mechanisms of financial regulation); accounting arbitrage, designed to flatter corporate – or government – accounts; fiscal arbitrage, intended
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in other sectors. The Basel process has sought to control bank activities and exposures through a prescriptive rulebook, and has responded to each instance of regulatory arbitrage – and the comprehensive failures of regulation before and during the global financial crisis – by the proliferation of more complex rules. The best account of why
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the incorporation of such targets in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 which formed the basis of the Eurozone. The treaty encouraged governments to engage in regulatory arbitrage, meeting their financial objectives by adopting measures that were not technically classed as borrowing. A familiar cat-and-mouse game of accounting arbitrage between Eurostat
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underlying securities, the tax is likely to have more undesirable side-effects than benefits. Such an imperfect tax would probably be a new stimulus to regulatory arbitrage, and a further source of profit to traders, earned at the expense of the long-term investors who would actually bear the brunt of the
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–9 what went wrong 233–9 ‘Regulation Q’ (US) 13, 14, 20, 28, 120, 121 regulatory agencies 229, 230, 231, 235, 238, 274, 295, 305 regulatory arbitrage 119–24, 164, 223, 250 regulatory capture 237, 248, 262 Reich, Robert 265, 266 Reinhart, C.M. 251 relationship breakdown 74, 79 Rembrandts, genuine/fake
by Nicholas Dunbar · 11 Jul 2011 · 350pp · 103,270 words
able to feed into the model their “internal ratings” for loans on their balance sheets, with the idea that this would reduce the pressure for regulatory arbitrage. Banks that weren’t sophisticated enough to build these lending radar systems would be allowed to use old-fashioned credit ratings. The interminable meetings about
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they were buying. The larger European banks, such as Société Générale or UBS, were already buying triple-A-rated CDOs to cash in on this regulatory arbitrage and were asking dealers to sell them default swaps on their investments. The Goldman European sales force had a list of second-tier banking clients
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2008. Regulators initially hoped that they could seize banks and “shoot the hostage”—punish investors for lax governance. But the tricks of financial innovation and regulatory arbitrage meant that these investors held them hostage instead. That’s how they made themselves “too big to fail.” In the United States, the only regulator
by Jeremias Prassl · 7 May 2018 · 491pp · 77,650 words
consumer protection and tax enforcement to show how characterizing gig-economy ‘micro- entrepreneurs’ as workers and platforms as their employers closes down avenues for exploiting regulatory arbitrage, corrects negative externalities, and avoids asset misallocation. At a fundamental level, the gig economy’s problems—for workers, con- sumers, taxpayers, and markets—are all
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issue: by presenting themselves as mere intermediaries rather than powerful service providers, platforms can shift nearly all of their business risk and cost onto others. Regulatory arbitrage, externalities, and asset misallocation all skew the play- ing field in favour of platforms and impose cost on everyone else. Despite much doublespeak to the
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supply, relying on clever algorithms and sophisticated rating systems to grasp otherwise wasted busi- ness opportunities. Another school of thought is more critical, suggesting that regulatory arbitrage and negative externalities are at the core of most platforms’ valuations. Matching and Intermediation We have already seen how the dominant story behind the gig
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marketplaces, and classified sites such as Craigslist and Gumtree have, after all, been around for nearly two decades— and are valued at much lower prices. Regulatory Arbitrage Professor Julia Tomassetti is highly critical of the suggestion that platforms’ primary value creation is achieved through better matching and lower transaction cost: ‘What happens
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. Rather, [they] may create shareholder value by other means, like asset manipulation, specu- lative activity, and, most pertinent here, regulatory arbitrage.’34 What does that mean? Victor Fleischer’s seminal work defines regulatory arbitrage as ‘the manipulation of the structure of a deal to take advantage of a gap between the economic substance of
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offloaded onto individual workers: a bus company’s drivers ply their routes and receive wages regardless of whether passengers are on board or not.37 Regulatory arbitrage in the gig economy takes many forms: think about ride-sharing platforms’ insistence that taxi regulation does not apply to their business, for example. Portraying
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platform] to additional compensation expenses or taxes in certain jurisdictions, which could have a material adverse effect on its ability to operate its business’.38 Regulatory arbitrage also leads to negative externalities: the social cost of platforms’ activities are higher than their private cost. Think, for example, of a number of ride
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magnitude are unprecedented.41 As gig-economy platforms become mature market players, mounting losses raise a difficult question: will they ever be profitable? Or has regulatory arbitrage camouflaged a different model altogether, leading to a misalloca- tion of capital? Writing for the Financial Times, Izabella Kaminska was amongst the first to raise
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left with one final question: assuming that the rapid growth of gig-economy platforms has really been fuelled by little more than a combination of regulatory arbitrage and cheap venture capital, why are savvy investors competing to invest? What is behind their willing- ness to burn unprecedented amounts of cash? Network Effects
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to which we return in the final chapter. Faster matching, digital work intermediation, and assorted rating algorithms have the potential to create much economic benefit. Regulatory arbitrage, externalities, and lack- ing profitability despite considerable cash burn, on the other hand, should give us all pause for thought. The Promise—and the Perils
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as mere matchmakers, rather than powerful service providers and digital work intermediaries, platforms can shift much of their business risk and cost onto their stakeholders. Regulatory arbitrage, externalities, and asset misallocation: all skew the playing field in favour of platforms and impose cost on everyone else. Employment law has a unique potential
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pay the price of this rebalancing? The answer: first and foremost, the investors and shareholders behind platforms designed and valued on the basis of existing regulatory arbitrage. Restoring platforms’ responsibility will undoubtedly cause disruption in the short term: platform employers will have to face the full cost of their activities, from equipment
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scope of employment law will turn out to benefit everyone: workers, consumers, taxpayers—and even markets at large. Employ- ment classification cuts off rogue operators’ regulatory arbitrage opportun- ities, and will force platforms to enter into genuine competition on matching and product quality. This is the key to a level economic and
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advanced information technology’ (2016) 34(1) Hofstra Labor and Employ- ment Law Journal 1, 17. 33. Ibid., pt IV. 34. Ibid., 34. 35. Victor Fleischer, ‘Regulatory arbitrage’ (2010) 89(2) Texas Law Review 227, 230. Not all commentators agree with the terminology, even though the phenom- enon itself is generally accepted. Oei
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, characterize platforms’ decision to classify themselves as mere intermediaries and their ‘affirma- tive adoption of independent contractor classification’ as examples of ‘tax opportunism’, rather than regulatory arbitrage, whilst acknowledging that the overlap between those categories can be significant—‘In some cases, it may be questionable whether the transaction should be viewed as
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the core of the business model: Elizabeth Pollman and Jordan M. Barry, ‘Regulatory entrepreneurship’ (2017) 90(3) Southern California Law Review 383. 36. Victor Fleischer, ‘Regulatory arbitrage’ (2010) 89(2) Texas Law Review 227, 230. 37. Questions about the true cost of the gig-economy platform model do not stop there. Individual
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119, tax liability 126 121–2 (see also structural ‘free agents’ 28–9 imbalances) Freedland, Mark 174, 175 regulation see regulation Freedman, Judith 111, 178 regulatory arbitrage 20–2 freedom 8, 14, 27, 29, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, size of the phenomenon 16–17, 145–6 55, 65–8, 69, 85
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, 49 safe harbours 47, 49 enthusiasts 61 self-regulation 36–7, 47 Sharing Economy UK 33, 37 shaping 32–3, 45–9 sharing platforms 116 regulatory arbitrage 20 –2, 147 Shavell, Steven 184 regulatory experimentation 36 Shleifer, Andrei 111, 178 Reich, Robert 108, 176 Shontell, Alyson 161 Relay Rides 46 Silberman, Six
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intermediation 14, 15–16 driver income projections 51 financial losses 22 Driver-Partner Stories 25, 149 founding myth 34–5 driver-rating system 158, 160 regulatory arbitrage 20 employment litigation terms of service 44, 53, 122, 158, 181 France 99 wage rates 64 UK 45, 48, 98, 106, 115 working conditions 57
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-making tactics and market share 64 contributions 125–7 monopoly power 23 VAT 124–5, 129 positive externality claims 132–3 taxi apps 12, 20 regulatory arbitrage 20 * * * Index 199 regulatory battles 35, 36 Vaidhyanathan, Siva 40, 154 resistance to unionization 65, 178 value creation 18–19, 20 risk shift 86 van
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Demand Understanding the Gig Economy Digital Work Intermediation How Big Is the Gig Economy? Explosive Growth The Economics of the Gig Economy Matching and Intermediation Regulatory Arbitrage Cash Burn Network Effects and Monopoly Power The Promise—and the Perils—of On-Demand Work Looking on the Bright Side of Life The Dark
by Satyajit Das · 14 Oct 2011 · 741pp · 179,454 words
English playwright Susannah Centlivre observed that: “Tis my opinion every man cheats in his own way, and he is only honest who is not discovered.” Regulatory arbitrage—the process of exploiting gaps in bank regulations—evolved into a business model. Banks reduced the amount of expensive capital, transferring loans, investments, and trading
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author Giuseppe di Lampedusa: “everything must change so that everything can stay the same.” As before, the revised rules were susceptible to being manipulated, through regulatory arbitrage. Many of the rules had little to do with improving regulation, instead focusing on familiar regulatory turf wars or battles for power, staff and budgets
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Basel 2, 200 central banks, 279-281 self-regulating markets, 102 synthetic securitization, 176 regulators preparation for financial crises, 264-278 understanding of securitization, 282 regulatory arbitrage, 75 Reid, Harry, 299 relative value funds arb (arbitrage) market inefficiencies, 242 religious prohibitions on usuries, 32 remote risk of loss, 220 renminbi, 21 rentiers
by Nouriel Roubini and Stephen Mihm · 10 May 2010 · 491pp · 131,769 words
in the wake of previous crises. Along the way we’ll explain several intimidating and often misunderstood concepts in economics: moral hazard, leverage, bank run, regulatory arbitrage, current account deficit, securitization, deflation, credit derivative, credit crunch, and liquidity trap, to name a few. We hope our explanations will prove useful not only
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net underneath. There were ways to conduct banking free of regulations, but also free of the protections afforded ordinary banks. So began a game of “regulatory arbitrage,” the purposeful evasion of regulations in pursuit of higher profits. This quest gave rise to the shadow banks. The shadow banks didn’t have tellers
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regulators, who would be charged with making sure that it had the necessary reserves to ride out a storm. More problematic is the risk of regulatory arbitrage: if the clearinghouse handles only straightforward, standardized credit derivatives, financial engineers are likely to deliberately create exotic derivatives that the clearinghouse cannot accommodate, simply to
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the significant obstacles that stand in the way of this ambition. These obstacles include the intentional evasion of regulatory oversight, or what’s known as regulatory arbitrage; the too-many-cooks-in-the-kitchen problem, in which an overabundance of regulators and a lack of coordination frustrate effective supervision of the financial
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prevent crises. That’s all well and good, but bankers and traders have a funny way of dodging even the most carefully constructed regulations. Such regulatory arbitrage is one of the issues that policy makers must confront if reforms are going to have any effect. In the years before the crisis, ordinary
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. So they increasingly shifted banking activities to the shadow banks: institutions that looked and acted like banks but weren’t regulated like them. This was regulatory arbitrage: the purposeful movement of financial activity from more regulated to less regulated venues. In the wake of the crisis, the consensus holds that these nonbank
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reform specifically target “systemically significant financial firms.” A selective application of regulations would be a profound mistake: it would simply open the door to more regulatory arbitrage. Next time around, financial intermediation would move from the bigger, newly regulated institutions to their less significant brethren. However small, these less regulated institutions would
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to run and hide; regulation should not be applied only here and there. Otherwise there will be more arbitrage—and more crises. In all fairness, regulatory arbitrage was too easy a game to play in recent years, thanks to what was euphemistically called “self-regulation.” This was the idea that regulators could
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governing each and every kind of structured financial product. This would be a fool’s errand: such granular regulation will only generate another burst of regulatory arbitrage, as financial engineers figure out how to tweak products so as to evade the law. Superspecific regulations would also be pointless on another level: the
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between national and state governments rules that out—some significant consolidation and centralization is desirable and necessary. While it might not prevent the kind of regulatory arbitrage that helped create the recent crisis, it would certainly make it far more difficult. Unfortunately, financial firms have another way to circumvent regulations. In this
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?) shadow banks and of too-big-to-fail firms see also self-regulation; specific regulatory agencies Regulation D Regulation T Regulation Z (Truth in Lending) regulatory arbitrage regulatory capture Reinhart, Carmen renminbi, Chinese Republic (Plato) repurchase agreements (repos) Reserve Primary Fund reverse auction r evolving-door appointments Ricardo, David risk: aversion to
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) derivatives and employees of NRSRO category and securitization compensation and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and reform and standardization and self-regulation (soft-touch regulation) regulatory arbitrage and self-reliance Senate, U.S. senior tranche September 11 attacks shadow banking system bank runs on coining of term defined forerunners of liquidity of
by Katharina Pistor · 27 May 2019 · 316pp · 117,228 words
ability to partition assets and shield them behind a chain of corporate veils to access low-cost debt finance, and to engage in tax and regulatory arbitrage. Separating the use of corporate law for organizing a business from its capital-minting function is not always easy, and one function frequently morphs into
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corporation created anywhere, even if it maintains no operations and has no employees there, and its only purpose is to engage in tax arbitrage.58 REGULATORY ARBITRAGE Within hours after LBHI had filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, its major UK-based subsidiary, Lehman Brothers International Europe (LBIE), went into administration
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, it seems, that the same experts had spent all this time devising a scheme that had no intrinsic economic value but was devoted entirely to regulatory arbitrage. Like the chancery courts of the eighteenth century, which had sided with the landed elites, he had few qualms about parties using the law to
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time value of money. Charging money for time, which was of God’s making according to church doctrine, was prohibited as immoral.27 Not every regulatory arbitrage around usury rules, however, passed muster in the courts, both canon and secular, that policed them. Transactions that flipped bills between two parties without exchanging
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species on demand, deposit accounts passed legal muster and have since become the standard for raising funds from the broader public—another example of effective regulatory arbitrage.34 Competition in finance will always push some to find new ways of making money. State money is boring, as every banker would tell you
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countries that offer competitive tax rates. If a corporation exists only as a legal shell for the sole purpose of avoiding taxes or engaging in regulatory arbitrage, why recognize it as a legal person?38 Third, arbitration or the private settlement of disputes may be great ways to resolve disputes among parties
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, 85, 96, 101, 103–4, 106; New York Cotton Exchange and, 49; partnership of, 50; public offering of, 50; RASCAL and, 73–75, 250n60, 250n62; regulatory arbitrage and, 73–76; special-purpose vehicles (SPVs) and, 51; subsidiaries and, 50–53, 58–59, 61–64, 70–76, 135, 149, 250n59; United Kingdom and
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and, 253n41; US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and, 103, 195 Regulation and Administration of Safe Custody and Global Settlement (RASCAL), 73–75, 250n60, 250n62 regulatory arbitrage, 48, 73–76, 90–91, 226 religion, 90, 236n26 repurchase agreements (Repos), 74, 76, 145, 148, 211, 262n45 residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), 87, 94
by Simon Johnson and James Kwak · 29 Mar 2010 · 430pp · 109,064 words
, to solve. The solution must be economically simple, so it can be effectively enforced; the more complex the scheme, the more susceptible it is to regulatory arbitrage, such as reshuffling where assets are parked within a financial institution’s holding company structure. And the solution must change the balance of political power
by Harry Markopolos · 1 Mar 2010 · 431pp · 132,416 words
examinations. It seems to me that the existence of so many financial regulators leaves gaping holes for financial predators to engage in what I called regulatory arbitrage. They find those regulatory gaps where no agency is looking or there is some question about which agency has the oversight responsibility, and they exploit
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by that agency least likely to pose any problems. The objective should be to combine regulatory functions into as few agencies as possible to prevent regulatory arbitrage, centralize command and control, ensure unity of effort, eliminate expensive duplication of effort, and minimize the number of regulators to whom American corporations must respond
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the SEC, the Fed, a national insurance regulator, and the Treasury or Department of Justice should be sent together on audits whenever possible to prevent regulatory arbitrage. The SEC, the Fed, and the national insurance regulator would be responsible for the inspections, while the Treasury or Department of Justice would be responsible
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