sealed-bid auction

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Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning About a Highly Connected World

by David Easley and Jon Kleinberg  · 15 Nov 2010  · 1,535pp  · 337,071 words

pays the current price. These auctions are called Dutch auctions because flowers have long been sold in the Netherlands using this procedure. 3. First-price sealed-bid auctions. In this kind of auction, bidders submit simultaneous “sealed bids” to the seller. The terminology comes from the original format for such auctions, in which

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the seller, who would then open them all together. The highest bidder wins the object and pays the value of her bid. 4. Second-price sealed-bid auctions, also called Vickrey auctions. Bidders submit simultaneous sealed bids to the sellers; the highest bidder wins the object and pays the value of the second

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some simple, informal observations that relate behavior in interactive auctions (ascending-bid and descending-bid auctions, which play out in real time) with behavior in sealed-bid auctions. These observations can be made mathematically rigorous, but for the discussion here we will stick to an informal description. Descending-Bid and First-Price Auctions

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bidding one’s true value is a dominant strategy. Comparing Auction Formats. In the next two sections we will consider the two main formats for sealed-bid auctions in more detail. Before doing this, it’s worth making two points. First, the discussion in this section shows that when we analyze bidder behavior

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in sealed-bid auctions, we’re also learning about their interactive analogues — with the descending-bid auction as the analogue of the sealed-bid first-price auction, and the

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we mentioned toward the end of the previous section: with independent, private values, bidding your true value is a dominant strategy in a second price sealed-bid auction. That is, the best choice of bid is exactly what the object is worth to you. Formulating the Second-Price Auction as a Game. To

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for the object. Bidder i’s strategy is an amount bi to bid as a function of her true value vi. In a second-price sealed-bid auction, the payoff to bidder i with value vi and bid bi is defined as follows. If bi is not the winning bid, then the payoff

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bid. We will discuss how to determine the optimal bid for a first-price auction in Section 9.7. All-pay auctions. There are other sealed-bid auction formats that arise in different settings. One that initially seems counter-intuitive in its formulation is the all-pay auction: each bidder submits a bid

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a brief (1-3 sentence) explanation for your answer. 2. In this problem we will ask how the number of bidders in a second-price, sealed-bid auction affects how much the seller can expect to receive for his object. Assume that there are two bidders who have independent, private values vi which

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’s expected revenue. 3. In this problem we will ask how much a seller can expect to receive for his object in a second-price, sealed-bid auction. Assume that all bidders have independent, private values vi which are either 0 or 1. The probability of 0 and 1 are both 1/2

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why this should occur. You do not need to write a proof; an intuitive explanation is fine. 4. A seller will run a second-price, sealed-bid auction for an object. There are two bidders, a and b, who have independent, private values vi which are either 0 or 1. For both bidders

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value still a dominant strategy for bidder a? Explain briefly (b) What is the seller’s expected revenue? Explain briefly. 5. Consider a second-price, sealed-bid auction with one seller who has one unit of the object which he values at s and two buyers 1, 2 who have values of v1

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your answer. 6. In this question we will consider the effect of collusion between bidders in a second-price, sealed-bid auction. There is one seller who will sell one object using a second-price sealed-bid auction. The bidders have independent, private values drawn from a distribution on [0, 1]. If a bidder with value

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the other bidders in an auction. In this auction the seller has one unit of the good which will be sold using a second-price, sealed-bid auction. Assume that there are three bidders who have independent, private values for the good, v1, v2 v3, which are uniformly distributed on the interval [0

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win the auction.] 9. In this problem we will ask how much a seller can expect to receive for his object in a second-price, sealed-bid auction. Assume that there are two bidders who have independent, private values vi which are either 1 or 2. For each bidder, the probabilities of vi

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set a reserve price, R, that is more than 1 and less than 1.5. 10. In this problem we will examine a second-price, sealed-bid auction. Assume that there are two bidders who have independent, private values vi which are either 1 or 7. For each bidder, the probabilities of vi

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price determination in a controlled setting. In our discussion of auctions, we found that if a seller with a single object runs a second-price sealed-bid auction — or equivalently an ascending-bid auction — then buyers bid their true values for the seller’s object. In that discussion, the buyers were choosing prices

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single buyer interested in purchasing an object from one of several sellers. Here, our auction results imply that if the buyer runs a second-price sealed-bid auction (buying from the lowest bidder at the second-lowest price), or equivalently a descending-offer auction, then the sellers will offer to sell at their

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no remaining items of any value. Thus, buyer 1 pays buyer 2’s valuation, and so we have precisely the pricing rule for second-price sealed-bid auctions. 15.4 Analyzing the VCG Procedure: Truth-Telling as a Dominant Strategy We now show that the VCG procedure encourages truth-telling in a matching

The Inner Lives of Markets: How People Shape Them—And They Shape Us

by Tim Sullivan  · 6 Jun 2016  · 252pp  · 73,131 words

States would notify his team of his intentions.1 Each interested MLB team had one chance to put in its best offer—a so-called sealed-bid auction. The highest bidder would win the right to negotiate a contract with the player. If the negotiations didn’t lead to an agreement within thirty

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century before Matsuzaka’s ill-fated sale to the Red Sox. Curiously, this different approach to auctions was almost exactly the same as the standard sealed-bid auction, with one small twist. Instead of paying the winning bid, the auction winner pays the price offered by the runner-up. But that one small

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been able to help him.) Vickrey’s classic auction study similarly began with a precise explanation of what was wrong with the standard first-price sealed-bid auction that was standard practice in procurement auctions for everything from highways to school supplies, the same mechanism that was used to sell Matsuzaka’s contract

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and laid the foundations for the field of auction design in the process. Vickrey described what he thought was a better way: the second-price sealed-bid auction, which is now known simply as a Vickrey auction. Then he proved mathematically that it just might be the best of all possible auctions that

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—a microcosm of economists’ larger role in society. Bidding What You’re Willing to Pay It seems such a small tweak to the way a sealed-bid auction is run: the high bidder pays the runner-up price rather than his own. Once the bids are in, it may or may not have

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you. The amount you ultimately have to pay drops along with your competitor’s bid, not your own. This is what makes a second-price sealed-bid auction so special: it has the amazing property that, under a wide range of circumstances, the only task confronting a prospective bidder is figuring out how

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understanding the ultimate outcome of Sword’s proposal to sell Tanaka’s contract via a second-price auction. A crucial disadvantage of a first-price sealed-bid auction—the kind used to get Matsuzaka to Boston—was that an overbidding manager would find himself pilloried in the local press and possibly unemployed. But

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for bid to consider. Every food bank would have the opportunity to review the listings and make its best offer on each one through a sealed-bid auction. The winning bidder would send a truck to collect the donation, and the shares from its winning bid would get split up among all two

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Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 102–103 feedback ratings, customer, 52, 74–75 Feeding America, 154 Findlay, Ronald, 85 first-price (live) auction, 84 first-price sealed-bid auction, 86–87, 99–100 Fisman, Ray Airbnb experience, 171–172 lesson on selling lemons, 59 study on eBay seller motivation for giving to charities, 73

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, 141–142, 143–149 Schultz, Theodore, 35 Schumpeter, Joseph, 24, 49–50 Scottish auctions, 82 Sears, 115–116 second-bid auction, 81–82 second-price sealed-bid auctions, 87–89 “Selection process starts with choices, ends with luck” (article), 146 self-destructive behaviors, signaling theory and, 67–68 selfish, markets making us, 177

The Armchair Economist: Economics and Everyday Life

by Steven E. Landsburg  · 1 May 2012

, where an auctioneer calls out a very high price and successively lowers it until he receives an offer to buy. There is the first-price sealed bid auction, where each buyer submits a bid in an envelope, all are opened simultaneously, and the high bidder gets the item for the amount of his

Algorithms to Live By: The Computer Science of Human Decisions

by Brian Christian and Tom Griffiths  · 4 Apr 2016  · 523pp  · 143,139 words

$25 or disappearing down the strategic rabbit hole. Both the Dutch auction and English auction introduce an extra level of complexity when compared to a sealed-bid auction, however. They involve not only the private information that each bidder has but also the public flow of bidding behavior. (In a Dutch auction, it

Reinventing the Bazaar: A Natural History of Markets

by John McMillan  · 1 Jan 2002  · 350pp  · 103,988 words

Dutch auction, used to sell flowers at Aalsmeer, in which the price starts high and falls until a bidder claims the item. Another is the sealed-bid auction, in which there is a single round of sealed bids; the high bidder wins and pays his or her bid. Commercial real estate is sometimes

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self-perpetuating. Myriad auction mechanisms can be found on the various online auction sites. Dutch auctions are used to sell containers on oceangoing cargo vessels. Sealed-bid auctions are used for selling vacation time-shares. A few sites allow package bidding. One wine auction site, for example, packages bottles into sets (usually different

A Little History of Economics

by Niall Kishtainy  · 15 Jan 2017  · 272pp  · 83,798 words

buy. Descending auctions are fast, and so are useful for selling flowers that need to be sold before they wilt. Houses are sometimes sold in ‘sealed-bid’ auctions in which each bidder submits a bid in a sealed envelope. The person with the highest bid pays the amount that they bid and gets

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the house. Imagine you’re taking part in a sealed-bid auction for a house which to you is worth £300,000. How much would you bid? Probably not £300,000. You’d be strategic about it

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devised a type of auction in which bidders have every incentive to be truthful. In standard sealed-bid auctions the winning bidders pay an amount equal to their own bid, the highest bid. Instead of the ‘first-price’ sealed-bid auction, Vickrey proposed a ‘second-price’ auction in which the winning bidder is the highest bidder

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scared of risky situations – those in which they have a chance of winning a lot or winning nothing. Shading your bid in a first-price sealed-bid auction is risky. If you bid £250,000 for a house that you value at £300,000 then you might win and make a £50,000

Radical Uncertainty: Decision-Making for an Unknowable Future

by Mervyn King and John Kay  · 5 Mar 2020  · 807pp  · 154,435 words

through open bidding, in which prices rise until only one prospective purchaser is left. eBay uses a variant of this method. A second is a sealed bid auction, often used in competitive tendering for public contracts, in which contenders submit their proposals and on a specified day the envelopes are opened and the

Who Gets What — and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design

by Alvin E. Roth  · 1 Jun 2015  · 282pp  · 80,907 words

higher prices, until only one bidder remains, and that bidder pays the last, highest price called by the auctioneer. Sometimes items are sold instead in “sealed bid” auctions: each bidder submits a bid without hearing the other bids, the bids are all opened at the same time, and the highest bidder wins, sometimes

Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach

by Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig  · 14 Jul 2019  · 2,466pp  · 668,761 words

; in either case they have to have time to go through several rounds of bidding. An alternative mechanism, which requires much less communication, is the sealed-bid auction. Each bidder makes a single bid and communicates it to the auctioneer, without the other bidders seeing it. With this mechanism, there is no longer

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is offset by the fact that the auction is more competitive, reducing the bias toward an advantaged bidder. A small change in the mechanism for sealed-bid auctions leads to the sealed-bid second-price auction, also known as a Vickrey auction.5 In such auctions, the winner pays the price of the

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second-highest bid, bo, rather than paying his own bid. This simple modification completely eliminates the complex deliberations required for standard (or first-price) sealed-bid auctions, because the dominant strategy is now simply to bid vi; the mechanism is truth-revealing. Note that the utility of agent i in terms of

The Darwin Economy: Liberty, Competition, and the Common Good

by Robert H. Frank  · 3 Sep 2011

O’Hare, Lawrence Bacow, and Debra Sanderson, Facility Siting and Public Opposition, New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1983; and Howard Kunreuther and Paul Kleindorfer, “A Sealed-Bid Auction Mechanism for Siting Noxious Facilities,” American Economic Review 76(2), May 1986: 295–299. Chapter Eight: “It’s Your Money . . .” 1. Liam Murphy and Thomas

The Undercover Economist: Exposing Why the Rich Are Rich, the Poor Are Poor, and Why You Can Never Buy a Decent Used Car

by Tim Harford  · 15 Mar 2006  · 389pp  · 98,487 words

Understanding Sponsored Search: Core Elements of Keyword Advertising

by Jim Jansen  · 25 Jul 2011  · 298pp  · 43,745 words

King of Capital: The Remarkable Rise, Fall, and Rise Again of Steve Schwarzman and Blackstone

by David Carey  · 7 Feb 2012  · 421pp  · 128,094 words

Slouching Towards Bethlehem

by Joan Didion  · 1 Jan 1968  · 184pp  · 62,220 words

Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste: How Neoliberalism Survived the Financial Meltdown

by Philip Mirowski  · 24 Jun 2013  · 662pp  · 180,546 words

Mastering Ethereum: Building Smart Contracts and DApps

by Andreas M. Antonopoulos and Gavin Wood Ph. D.  · 23 Dec 2018  · 960pp  · 125,049 words

Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In

by Roger Fisher and Bruce Patton  · 15 Mar 1991  · 242pp  · 60,595 words

Irrationally Yours: On Missing Socks, Pickup Lines, and Other Existential Puzzles

by Dan Ariely and William Haefeli  · 18 May 2015  · 184pp  · 35,076 words

Model Thinker: What You Need to Know to Make Data Work for You

by Scott E. Page  · 27 Nov 2018  · 543pp  · 153,550 words

Raising Cubby: A Father and Son's Adventures With Asperger's, Trains, Tractors, and High Explosives

by John Elder Robison  · 12 Mar 2013  · 342pp  · 115,769 words